24 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
25 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 41.
26 A full discussion of AWPD-42, essentially a reaffirmation of
AWPD-42 is contained in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, II, Europe-TORCH to POINTBLANK-August 1942 to December
1943 (Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press, 1949) hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF II), 27779,
288-90, 292-93, 301.
27 (1) CCS 155/1,19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War
in 1943. (2) See also Craven and Cate, AAF II, 301.
28 CCS 166/1/D, 21 Jan 43, title: The Bomber Offensive From the
29 Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan 43.
30 For a discussion of area versus precision
bombing, see Craven and Cate, AAF II, 212-13, 227-29, 296-302.
31 Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, Harper &
Brothers, 1949), pp. 261, 375, 393.
In January 1942 Faker had organized the VIII Bomber
Command in England, and in December 1942 he became Commanding General,
Eighth Air Force.
32 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 678-80.
33 (1) Min, 56th mtg JCS, 20 Jan 43. (2) Min, 65th mtg CCS, 21 Jan
34 The summary of JCS views was contained in JCS 167/2,
23 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943, circulated as CCS 135
on 26 Dec 42 for consideration of the CCS. The JCS paper followed largely
the line of thought developed in joint Strategic
Survey Committee (JSSC) studies. See: (1) JSSC 1, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for
1943; (2) JCS 167, 11 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943; and
(3) JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42, title: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943.
35 Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43.
36 CCS 135/2, 3 Jan 43, title: American-British
Strategy in 1943. The paper contains a memo by British Chiefs of Staff.
37 Min, ,6th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
38 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
39 Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43.
40 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
41 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca
42 Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
43 CCS 153, 17 Jan 43, title: Situation To Be
Created in the Eastern Theater
(Pacific and Burma) in 1943.
44 CCS 153/1, 17 Jan 43, title: Situation To Be Created
in Eastern Theater.
45 Min, 60th mtg CCS, 18 Jan .43.
46 For a summary of the discussion on Pacific strategy
at the conference, see John Miller, jr., "The Casablanca Conference and
Pacific Strategy, "Military Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (Winter 1949).
47 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.
48 CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, title: Strategic Concept for
49 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.
50 Min, 51st mtg JCS, 14 Jan 43.
51 (1) Min, 55th mtg CCS , 14 Jan 43.(2) Min, 56th mtg CCS, 14 Jan
52 Min, mtg JCS and President, 16 Jan 43.
53 Min, 59th mtg CCS, 17 Jan 43.
54 See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland,
Stilwell's Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington Government Printing
Office, 1953), Ch. VII, which contains a brief discussion of the issues
relating to the CBI theater before and during Casablanca.
55 Min, 60th mtg, CCS18 Jan 43.
56 Min, 2d Anfa mtg, 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf Book.
57 (1) Min, 2d Anfa mtg , 18 Jan 43, Official Casablanca Conf
Book. (2) Min, 54th mtg JCS, 18 Jan 43. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate,
58 For Casablanca decisions pertaining to the Far East,
see especially: (1) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, title: Conduct of the War in
1943; and (2) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, title: Final Rpt to the President
and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the CCS.
59 General MacArthur had served as Chief of Staff in 1930-35 and
then had become Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. In July 1941 he was appointed Commanding General, U.S.
Army Forces in the Far East. In April 1942 he was ordered from the
Philippines to Australia and became Supreme Commander, Southwest
Hinge of Fate, pp. 686-87
61 General Somervell had been Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-4, in 1941 and the following year
became Commanding General, Services of Supply, predecessor
of Army Service Forces.
62 Pers ltr, Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer to Gen
Handy, 22 Jan 43, Paper 5, Item la, Exec 3.
63 (1) Min, 67th mtg CCS, 22 Jan 43. (2) CCS 75/3. 22
Jan 43, title: System of Comd for Combined
64 The London Times, January 27, 1943.
65 In late 1942 a State Department subcommittee on
security problems, which included Army and Navy representatives, had come
to the conclusion that unconditional surrender should be imposed upon
Germany and Japan, though negotiations might be carried on with Italy.
Norman Davis, chairman of the subcommittee, informally imparted the early
conclusions of this group to the President, but the subcommittee never
made a formal recommendation. The
effect of the informal recommendation on the President's thinking and
announcement is a moot point. See Department of State, Postwar Foreign
Policy Preparation: 1939-1945, General Foreign
Policy Series 15, released February 1950 (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 127.
66 For a description of the background of the
President's announcement, see: Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, pp. 695-97, 972-74; and Churchill,
Hinge of Fate, pp. 68.t-88. Apparently the only body that discussed
the unconditional surrender policy formally at the time of Casablanca was
the British War Cabinet. For a provocative discussion, based largely upon
circumstantial evidence, of the background of the enunciation of the
concept, see Guenther Moltmann,
"Die Genesis der Unconditional-Surrender Forderung,"in Wehrwissenschlaftliche Rundschau, Vols. 3 and 4 (March and April
1956). The postwar debate over unconditional surrender may be
traced in a number of accounts. For arguments
against the concept see: (1) J. F. C. Fuller, "The Lost Peace: An Analysis
of the European Strategy of World War II," Army Ordnance, XXXI, No.
161 (March-April 1947), 413-16: (2) Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes
of the War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp.14ff.; (3) Wilmot,
Struggle for Europe, pp. 123, 166,
382, 477, 549-51, 713-14; (4) Russell Grenfell, Unconditional
(New York, Devin-Adair Company, 1953), pp, 204, 240-42.
For more favorably inclined accounts see: (1) Churchill, Hinge
of Fate, pp. 685, 688-90; (2) Wallace Carroll, Persuade or Perish (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,
pp. 306ff; (3) Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Wilmot's War or Churchill Was
Right," in The Reporter, Vol. 6, No. 9 (April 29, 1952), pp.
38-39; (4) John Ehrman, Grand
Strategy, VI, October 1944-August 1945 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
67 Actually the Joint Board had recommended as a
national objective the eventual restoration of the balance of power in
Europe and Asia in its report to the President on the Victory Program in
September 1941. See Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, p.
68 In May 1942-less than eight months before the Casablanca
Conference-President Roosevelt had intervened in Anglo-American treaty
negotiations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concessions to the
Soviet Union, even though Churchill had indicated his willingness to
accede to the Soviet desire. See Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell
Hull (New York, The Macmillan Company,1948), 2 vols., II, 1170-74.
See also Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York,
Harper & Brothers, 1950) Ch. V, "The Decision to Postpone Political
and Territorial Decisions until after the War."
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