to be of value as an air base only, and Chinese manpower was
relegated to a minor position. Major land campaigns on the Asiatic
continent were to be avoided, and there was not enough time to equip and
train Chinese troops for use in the U.S. drive through the Pacific.
The establishment of the B-29 in the CBI had brought the Japanese
"Inner lone" under attack, but forces were already at work to shift the
bulk of the big bombers to bases in the Marianas, where logistics would
not be so difficult on the ground, the tide of Japanese expansion in
Burma began to recede.
Now the prime interest of the enemy would be shifted to the
airfields of eastern China, which, as Allied heavy bombers were brought
in, would present a serious threat to the Japanese homeland. The
Japanese reaction to this threat was a drive that opened in April and
reached major proportions in May with advances into east China. But even
if the Japanese were successful in capturing the airfields and
eliminating CBI air support for the Pacific drive, they would only gain
delay, not escape, for the CSI was no longer considered essential to the
Allies for victory over Japan.
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