Endnotes for Chapter XII

1 Quoted in Harris, Allied Military Administration, n. 89.

1a This is only a summary of AMGOT thinking at the outset, but the actual plans developed did not deviate in basic features from the ideas stated above. The belief that food supply in Sicily would be adequate was based on false figures put out by the Fascist government as to yields and imports in recent years. (See below, Section 2, Archibald S. Alexander's 13 November letter, paragraphs 1, 2, 3.) While the theater hoped that after a month normal supply channels could be reopened, the AMGOT planners, to provide against the contingencies indicated in the AFHQ message of 5 May, recommended that a 32,000-ton stockpile of wheat flour be accumulated by the U.S. Army. The plan of imports approved by the War Department included food and medical supplies to cover estimated minimum needs for a period of from 9o to 120 days. The chief component of the food was approximately 5,000 tons of flour, to provide the bread and pasta which are the principal elements of Italian diet. The Sicily supply program also included minimum requirements of coal and charcoal and petroleum products. No provision was made for clothing, for barter goods, or engineering equipment (which the Corps of Engineers was expected to provide. ASF, ID files, Hist of Civ Sup, 1, 65-66.) It will be remembered that by May the War Department itself was estimating civilian supply requirements as a check on the theaters.

2 The theater's supply program for the mainland as well as Sicily went forward 22 August, about six weeks after Sicily had been occupied but before there had been time fully to appraise the factors which would determine civilian supply. For the six months beginning October 1943, the planners estimated that only 15 percent of the population south of Rome and 10 percent north of Rome would require supplementary feeding during the first ninety days, and 1o percent in both areas during the second ninety days. The subsistence items provided for included flour, dehydrated soup, evaporated milk, dried vegetables, cheese, laundry and toilet soap, and household matches. Coal and petroleum requirements were also included. ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-101.

3 As matters developed, transportation could not be maintained adequately between producing and consuming areas; this was to be one of the major difficulties of civilian supply even when sufficient stocks were on hand. In the final report of the Transportation and Shipping Subcommission, AC, it is stated: "It is felt that it was not fully realized at the beginning the importance transportation played in the economic life of a country and the vital need for its speedy rehabilitation." ACC files, 10000/109/480

4 The producers in Italy were required to turn in a set proportion of their produce to government-controlled warehouses at fixed prices.

5 This proposal was not accepted but the remainder of the program received CCS approval.

6 It in interesting to note the higher ration for civilians working for the Allied forces. In the spring of 1944, after a large number of solutions on an individual basis, a uniform policy was adopted of providing supplementary rations not only for heavy workers laboring directly for the armed forces but also for those working indirectly. The report of the Economic Section ACC in September 1944 observed that keeping the population quiet resolved itself, in practice, into providing adequate rations for urban heavy workers. ACC files, 10000/154/ 328.

7 A critical report of a Royal Navy Flag Officer on ACC's handling of the economic situation, in particular food supply.

8 This was 34,000 tons less than the quantity asked for on 26 November. Because of a debate raised by SACMED's desire for authority to use the reserve anywhere in the Mediterranean Theater, CCAC/S did not approve the request until June 1944.

9 This is the report made by the group which the CCS, through its subcommittee for supply, sent to Italy. It was presented only as a preliminary draft pending AFHQ's comments. The theater took the position that many of its criticisms were invalid.

10 The responsibility for typhus control in Occupied Italy belonged to AMG, operating under the 15th Army Group, from the date of occupation until 2 January 1944. Under authority of AFHQ, responsibility was transferred to the U.S.A. Typhus Commission on 3 January 1944 where it remained until 19 February. On 20 February, the direction of typhus control activities passed to the Public Health Subcommission of the ACC, which had been officially recognized as the over-all supervisory agency for public health activities in Occupied Italy. The change in administrative responsibility caused only minor changes in the program. The Rockefeller Foundation Typhus Team, which organized the Delousing Service for the AMG in December, continued its functions under USATC and reassumed responsibility for all delousing when the Public Health Subcommission took over.

11 Brig G. S. Parkinson, Director of the Public Health Subcommission, wrote in his report on the typhus epidemic that it would "stand out as a mile-stone in the field of public health and disease control" because "here it was for the first time that a major epidemic of this vicious disease . . . was not merely curbed but actually brought under control by the vigorous application of delousing measures." ACC files, l0000/563/546.

12 ACC could, of course, provide not only a more centralized control but a medical policy better integrated with that of highest theater levels.

13 At the beginning of April a decision was made to evacuate compulsorily all civilians from the malarial Anzio beachhead area (with the exception of essential farmers and their families), largely in order to reduce the incidence of malaria among the troops. Nearly 20,000 civilians, after being treated with antilouse powder, were evacuated.

14 Refugees were first met in any sizable number in Cosenza Province. To the south, people did not generally flee far from their homes. However, the refugee situation became serious with the advance beyond Naples in the Volturno operation. The AMG Eighth Army report for November stated that the southward flow had in creased from 100 to 550 a day.

15 By this time Italian refugees and DP's were both handled by the same subcommission; the change was made on 24 September 1944.

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