Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.
Civil Affairs Agreements and Disagreements
Civil Affairs Agreements and Disagreements
From the point of view of civil affairs planning, France and the Axis-occupied countries to the north-Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway-shared basic similarities which called for treating them largely as a unit. Their peoples, in general, were pro-Allied, and all except Denmark and France had governments in exile which enjoyed Allied recognition. The government of Denmark had resigned in 1943 when the occupying Germans proclaimed martial law; the Danish legations in Washington and London continued their previous collaboration with the Allies. Even France was not too different; the French National Committee was recognized in 1942 as the authority which would be dealt with in those areas outside continental France where its forces were in control. In June 1943 the Committee developed in liberated North Africa into the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) which originally was under both Generals de Gaulle and Giraud and later under the chairmanship of De Gaulle alone. Thus civil affairs planners, except for inability to consider the FCNL as more than a provisional authority, adopted one and the same major aim for all the German-occupied countries of western Europe-to secure the maximum co-operation from the populations and governments in prosecuting the war. This aim was to be achieved mainly through reestablishing the government or elected authority as soon as military circumstances permitted, and meanwhile through using both its liaison officers and loyal local officials as much as possible in the conduct of civil affairs.
Civil affairs in the western European countries were dissimilar to the operations in the Mediterranean which had been initiated earlier. In none of them would the situation upon invasion be handled as in French North Africa, where, because collaboration with an existing central government proved possible, the Allied armies did not have to assume formal responsibility for civil affairs at all. In none of them would the situation be as in Sicily and mainland Italy, which the Allies entered as enemy territory, and which, until Italy surrendered and became a cobelligerent, they occupied on the basis of the law of belligerent occupation. But the greatest difference between the prospective western European occupations and those of the Mediterranean Theater was in the degree of importance assigned to the two. However engrossing the occupations of French North Africa and Italy may have become, they were of lesser importance militarily than the operations which began with the cross-Channel invasion. In view of the basic strategy of the European War, tenaciously advocated by the Americans and later by
the British as well, the invasion of France and other countries of western Europe would have central and not peripheral importance. Aid and resources which became available in western Europe would help in the attack on Nazi Germany; and once the German border had been crossed, all of adjacent western Europe would be of logistical importance as the hinterland of the combat area. Western Europe was of prime political significance also in that the liberated countries had both the material and human resources which would be most valuable to the Allies in their task of postwar security and reconstruction that lay ahead.
For all these reasons civil affairs planning for western Europe was pursued longer even if not more carefully than for any other area. After the planning (which had gone on longest in Great Britain) reached a certain stage its fruits were embodied in civil affairs agreements with all the governments of the area except France and Denmark. These agreements, which contained the basic policy guidance for all planning and civil affairs operations, originated in considerations of policy rather than legality. Under the rules of land warfare it was possible for the troops of a nation to occupy and establish military control over friendly territories if such territories were occupied by, or threatened by, an enemy. Thus by invoking military necessity, Allied Armies would have been able to invade the various occupied countries without any formal arrangement with the governments-in-exile. For a number of reasons, however, the Allies chose instead to base the occupation of friendly territories on the consent of their duly recognized governments.
The initiative in the formulation of written agreements came from the far-sighted British. In June 1942, while still on the defensive, they had set up the Administration of Territories (Europe) [AT(E) ], 1 a cabinet committee, to plan for the civil administration of territories to be liberated. In February 1943 the AT(E) began work on a civil affairs agreement with Norway which was to serve as a model for other agreements. In drawing up these agreements the British felt that it would be wise to make a distinction between enemy countries, which they would enter as conquerors, and enemy-occupied countries, which they would enter as liberators. Since the governments-in-exile of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Norway were recognized as de jure governments, planners concluded that clear and distinct understandings with these governments would evoke greater cooperation from the inhabitants, facilitate operations against Germany proper, and pave the way for harmonious relations after the war. Furthermore, some of the governments-in-exile controlled colonial and other resources which, if made available to the Allies, would be of great assistance. For reasons psychological, material, and moral, therefore, it was considered wise policy to enter into written agreements.
When the Norwegian agreement [see Chapter V, Section 2], arrived in the United States the Americans found themselves without precedents to guide them in the consideration of such a document. Nevertheless they agreed that it would be wise to have a full understanding with the countries to be liberated. In the North African campaign General Eisenhower had encountered initial difficulties in dealing with the French, and the agreement he was obliged to make with them was hastily drawn up and of purely military character. With only minor reservations, the new idea of preliminary agreements met with almost immediate acceptance.
Differences arose not over the basic idea but over the question of procedure whether the agreements should be given their final form by the British in London or by the Americans in Washington. There was much to be said for the British position : the various governments-in-exile were located in London in close proximity to the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander; the British had more experience in handling civil affairs matters; they had a more precise concept of long-term political objectives; and they had taken the lead in advocating and negotiating the civil affairs agreements. The Americans, on the other hand, were to furnish the lion's share of men and arms. Various civilian agencies of the U.S. Government were concerned and they could make their influence properly felt only in Washington. So far as the immediate issue was concerned, Washington won out; the civil affairs agreements were drafted in final form by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and were approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee before being sent to the Theater Commander. The agreements provided at one and the same time for all the authority required by the Allied commander in prosecuting the war and for as speedy a restoration as possible of maximum authority to the national government. Thus they divided the occupation into two phases, in accordance with the anticipated development of operations. In the first phase, in which combat would be intense and widespread, the Allied Commander in Chief would exercise this authority chiefly through liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in a military mission to be established by the government in question; such officers would also be the principal intermediaries between the commander in chief and loyal local authorities who would be retained to the fullest extent possible. The second phase, to be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief, would be the one in which the military situation had so far eased as to permit the national government to return, and in this phase the Allied Commander would invite the government to resume exercise of its authority subject only to special arrangements, prompted by military necessity, for areas of vital importance such as ports, lines of communication, and airfields. Other provisions of the agreements concerned the aid which would be rendered by the government to the Allied Commander and by the commander to the government, together with a definition of the respective rights of each.
The agreements offered a firm basis for final planning for the countries which had entered into them. On the other hand, in respect to France, the largest of the western European countries and the prospective scene of the invasion, the situation was unclear at the outset and unfortunately was to remain so for some time. In general it can be said that most British leaders and British popular opinion tended to favor De Gaulle as representing the spirit of resistance and the will of the French people. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, on the other hand, questioned that the French leader really represented the French people. The President was willing for General Eisenhower to have informal discussions with the FCNL but did not want him to consider that this precluded discussions with other French resistance groups.
In the divided counsels over the French Committee, General Eisenhower found himself in a difficult position. He occupied the dual role of Commanding General, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, responsible to the War Department, and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His main-in fact, only-concern in the problem of the civil administration of France was to
receive maximum help from the French with minimum interference from the civilian population. His military needs, however, could not in all respects be easily reconciled with the political decisions reached on a higher level, and it was impossible for him to plan for civil affairs administration in France with any certainty under the limitations that the President's policy imposed upon him.
In a message of 19 January 1944 to the CCS and the CCAC he pointed out the need for an immediate crystallization of plans relating to civil affairs in France, stated that this required conferences with properly accredited French authorities, and requested that General de Gaulle be asked to designate an individual or group of individuals with whom he could enter into immediate negotiations in London. Soon afterward the Assistant Secretary of War informed him that he could feel free to enter into discussions with representatives of the FCNL, as with any other French resistance group, should such discussions seem necessary for progress in civil affairs planning. This communication, however, did not seem to indicate any change in the President's basic thinking, nor did it meet clearly the issue which General Eisenhower had raised. On 15 March, through a letter to the Secretary of War which was to be redirected to General Eisenhower, the President reaffirmed that though the Supreme Allied Commander could consult with the FCNL informally he was not to assume an exclusive relationship with this committee, or do anything to imply its political recognition. This policy not only left De Gaulle dissatisfied, it left an uncertainty overhanging all civil affairs planning for France-an uncertainty which in fact was to last till after D-day.
1. A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH DELEGATES CA TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AS FAR AS COMPATIBLE WITH MILITARY NEEDS
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE MAY BE
CONSULTED ON CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
[Msg, CM-OUT 1381, from CAD to CG ETOUSA, 1 Oct 43, CAD, files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. I ]
Military representatives of the exiled governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the French Military Administration may be consulted in planning for civil affairs in their respective liberated countries at such times and to such extent as you may determine....
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN LIBERATED NORWAY
[U.S.-Norwegian Draft Agreement, JCS 398/3, 29 Jan 44, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. I ]
The discussions which have taken place between the representatives of Norway and the United States of America concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdiction in Norwegian territory liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under an Allied Commander in Chief, have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions.
The agreed arrangements set out below are intended to be essentially temporary and practical and are designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Commander in Chief and to further our common purpose, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Norway and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.
1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must, to the full extent necessitated by the military situation, exercise supreme responsibility and authority.
2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the military situation permits, the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the
Allied forces, such as ports, lines of communication and airfields, and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied forces of such other facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.
3. a. During the first phase the Commander in Chief will make
the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance which will be tendered to
him through Norwegian liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs
and included in the personnel of a Norwegian military mission to be appointed by
the Norwegian Government. He will also make the fullest possible use of loyal
Norwegian local authorities.
b. The Norwegian liaison officers referred to in subparagraph a above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the Allied military authorities and the Norwegian local authorities.
4. During the first phase the Norwegian Government will assist the Commander in Chief by reorganizing or reestablishing the Norwegian administrative and judicial services through whose collaboration the Commander in Chief can discharge his supreme responsibility. For this purpose the Norwegian Government will act through its representatives on the spot, who, for practical reasons, will be included in the Norwegian military mission referred to in subparagraph 3a above.
5. The appointment of the Norwegian administrative and judicial services will be effected by the competent Norwegian authorities in accordance with Norwegian law. If during the first phase (see paragraph i above) conditions should necessitate appointments in the Norwegian administrative or judicial services, the competent representative of the Norwegian Government will, upon the request of the Commander in Chief and after consultation with him, then appoint the requisite officials.
6. Members of the Norwegian armed forces serving in Norwegian units with the Allied Expeditionary Force in Norwegian territory shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Norwegian courts. Other Norwegians, who, at the time of entering Norway as members of the Allied Expeditionary Force, are serving in conditions which render them subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, will not be regarded as members of the Norwegian armed forces for this purpose.
7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Norwegian Government will make the necessary arrangements for insuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Norwegian courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offenses against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces, without prejudice however to the power of the Commander in Chief, if military necessity requires, to bring to trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense of this nature.
8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 15, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied forces respectively and over all persons of non-Norwegian nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to Allied naval, military, or air force law. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen as are not subject to Allied service law will require special consideration and should form the subject of a separate agreement.
9. Persons thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the Norwegian police for offenses against Norwegian law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied service authority. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in paragraph 8, shall be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement.
10. The Allied Commander in Chief and the Norwegian authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or Norwegian jurisdiction.
11. There shall be established by the respective Allies claims commissions to examine and dispose of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Norwegian civilians against the Allied forces exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.
12. Members of the Allied forces and organizations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or to the Allied Governments, shall be exempt from all Norwegian taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Allied and Norwegian Governments. The Allied authorities will take the necessary steps to insure that such property is not sold to the public in Norway except in agreement with the Norwegian Government.
13. The Commander in Chief shall have power to requisition billets and supplies and make use
of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of the forces under his command. Requisitions will be effected where possible through Norwegian authorities and in accordance with Norwegian law. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of Norwegian liaison officers attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief.
14. The immunity from Norwegian jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 12 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in Norway on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Expeditionary Force as may from time to time be notified by the Commander in Chief to the competent Norwegian authority.
15- Should circumstances in future be such as to require provision be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Norwegian members of the Allied forces present in Norway, the Allied Governments concerned and the Norwegian Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.
16. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Norwegian territory by an Allied Expeditionary Force (in particular questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first or military phase) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall form the subject of further negotiation as circumstances may require.
2. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS ARE CONSUMMATED
BRITISH SUGGEST THAT NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
[Memo by Representatives-of the Br CsofS, CCS-445, 22 Dec 43, CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. I]
1. The progress of events in Europe and the possibility of an early collapse of Germany make it important that discussions should be opened with. out further delay between COSSAC and the military authorities of Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium on the machinery to be set up in those countries in connection with the administration of civil affairs.1 ♦ ♦ ♦
4. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that instructions should be issued to COSSAC by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the discussion of civil affairs problems with the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian military authorities to be initiated forthwith within the scope of the principles laid down in the draft agreements with those governments.♦ ♦ ♦
TEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DRAFT AGREEMENTS
[Ltr, Sir Henry F. MacGeagh, JAG, to Bovenschen, 16 Dec. 43, Incl to Memo of Birley to Hilldring, 27 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43)(1)]
I undertook at this [A.T.(E)] Committee meeting of the 2d inst, to let you have a note on the differences that exist in the texts of the draft agreements that my Legal Subcommittee have negotiated with the Norwegian, the Belgian, and the Dutch representatives, which you could pass to General Devers when you send him the Belgian and Dutch provisional drafts. ♦ ♦ ♦
In the result it will be seen that we were able to arrive at agreements with the Belgian and the Dutch which, both in substance and in form, are similar to that negotiated with the Norwegians. It was inevitable, if there was to be any reality in our negotiations with the representatives of three nations differing in their juridical outlook, that there should be minor differences in the texts, but in my opinion, such differences as exist do not in any way modify the requirements of ourselves and the U.S.A. as covered by the Norwegian agreement.♦ ♦ ♦
It is clear from the Norwegian agreement that the basis for the exercise of supreme responsibility and authority by the Commander-in-Chief is recognized to be military necessity. Rather more emphasis is placed on this in the Belgian agreement . . . and in the Dutch agreement . . . by the insertion of "de facto" and also by the recital in the preamble to the Dutch agreement that "these arrangements in no way affect the sovereignty of the Netherlands Government." ♦ ♦ ♦
Paragraph 3(a) of the Dutch agreement introduces new matter relating to the decree concerning a special state of siege, and finds what is to some extent its counterpart in paragraph 4 of the Belgian agreement, relating to such special legislation as may be required. Neither paragraph affects the overriding power, responsibility and authority of the Commander-in-Chief which is based on military necessity, and not on Belgian
or Dutch law. It is obviously more advantageous that the Commander-in-Chief's requirements should, as far as possible, be met through Belgian and Dutch authorities exercising powers granted, under existing special laws or such additional legislation as may be required, rather than that he should have to resort to his own overriding powers.♦ ♦ ♦
MILITARY NECESSITY AS BASIS OF SAC's AUTHORITY
[Memo, Hilldring for JCS, 28 Dec 43, CCS-445, CAD files, 321 (12-21-43)(1), sec. 3]
♦ ♦ ♦ 2. The proposed [Netherlands] agreement is similar in framework and follows the general pattern as approved by the CCS for civil administration in Norway except in one major vital respect. It is clear from the Norwegian agreement that the authority and responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief is supreme and flows by operation of international law based on military necessity. In the proposed agreement for The Netherlands the authority of the Allied Commander seems to stem out of an existing Netherlands special law establishing a state of siege. In the initial and military phase this arrangement may hamper the field force commander.
3. There are minor objections that deal with matters of form and drafting rather than substance.
4. The proposed agreement is in the hands of General Devers who will transmit it to the War Department, together with his comments and recommendations.
It is recommended that the joint Chiefs of Staff, withhold approval . . . until the comments of General Devers are known and a further report is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Civil Affairs Division.
AMERICANS MODIFY AGREEMENT WITH THE NETHERLANDS
[Memo, Hilldring to CofS, 7 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43) (I)]
1. A draft agreement between the British and the Netherlands Governments was informally negotiated in London. The draft as submitted was similar to arrangements with the Norwegian Government as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 274 Series).
2. A copy of the Netherlands draft agreement was handed to General Devers with a view of obtaining comments or formal approval to the agreement of the War Department and other U.S. departments concerned.
3. At a meeting on 6 January 1944, in the office of the Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, attended by representatives of The Netherlands Government, Mr. James C. Dunn of the State Department, and General J. H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs Division, there was considered the draft agreement. The representatives of the United States proposed modifications which were incorporated into the agreement. The agreement as modified was transmitted to The Netherlands Government. The Agreement incorporating United States modifications . . . is acceptable to The Netherlands Government. 2 The State Department concurs.
4. The changes proposed by the United States are considered necessary to fully protect the Supreme Allied Commander in the accomplishment of the military purposes of the operation.
5. The State Department recommends that the agreement with The Netherlands Government be consummated on a military level. Mr. van Vredenburch, Counselor of The Netherlands Embassy, informs the State Department that the agreement would be signed on the Dutch side by The Netherlands Minister for War. ♦ ♦ ♦
[Msg, WD to CG, ETOUSA, CM-OUT I1877, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43) (I) ]
... Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that you consummate this agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of The Netherlands government in London. . . . It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the U.S. and British agreements with The Netherlands government may be arrived at simultaneously, if possible....
THE AMERICAN AGREEMENT WITH BELGIUM TO BE CONSUMMATED AT A MILITARY LEVEL
[Dir, CAD, Report on Administration of Civil Affairs in Belgium, JCS-697, 9 Feb 44, CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. I]
7. In connection with the U.S.-Norwegian arrangements for civil administration, the Secretary of State has stated his preference for the agreement to be consummated on a military level. The State Department stated that they desire that the same procedure be followed in the consummation of the U.S.-Belgian Agreement.
8. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:
a. To recommend approval of Appendix "A" [draft agreement] by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
b. That if Appendix "A" is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consummate the agreement on a military level with the Belgian Government.
[Msg, WD to CG, ETOUSA, CM-OUT 9898, 23 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Belgium (11-14-42)(1)]
... Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that you consummate this Agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of the Belgian government in London. 3 The content of this agreement will be identical with the text in JCS 697 already furnished you, approved by the JCS February 12, 1944 and as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 445 on February 18, 1944. It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the U.S. and British Agreements with the Belgian Government may be arrived at simultaneously, if possible....
CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT IN LUXEMBOURG ALSO TO BE CONSUMMATED AT A
[Msg, CCS for Eisenhower, 21 Feb 44, CCAC files, 014, Luxembourg (2-2-44), sec. 1 ]
... You are authorized to deal directly with the Luxembourg Government and their military representatives in London. For the purposes of planning for Civil Affairs, the proposed agreement for Civil Administration in Belgium should he used as a basis for planning for Civil Affairs in Luxembourg. In due course, formal agreements similar to those negotiated with the Belgian Government will be entered into with the Luxembourg Government but these should not delay your approach to the Luxembourg Government as mentioned above.
[Msg, Hilldring to Eisenhower, 23 Jun 44, CAD files, 014, Luxembourg (4-1-44) (1)]
... JCS direct that you consummate this agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of the Luxembourg Government in London. The context of this agreement will be identical with the text of enclosure "A," in CCS 493/ 2 [Civil Affairs Agreement and Directive for Luxembourg] already furnished you. . . . It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the United States and British agreements with the Luxembourg Government may be arrived at simultaneously if possible. The original of the United States-Luxembourg Agreement as consummated will be forwarded to the JCS with the report of your negotiations. 5
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, AND NORWAY
[Dept of State Press Release, 16 May 44, CAD files, 014, Belgium (11-14-42) (1)]
♦ ♦ ♦ These agreements are intended to be essentially temporary and practical in character. They are designed to facilitate the task of the Supreme Allied Commander and to further the common purpose of the governments concerned, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Allied territory and final victory of the Allies over Germany.
The Agreements recognize that the Supreme Allied Commander must enjoy de facto during the first or military phase of the liberation .. . such measure of supreme responsibility and authority over civil administration as may be required by the military situation. It is laid down that as soon as the military situation permits .. . [the various governments] shall resume their full constitutional responsibility for civil administration on the understanding that such special facilities as the Allied forces may continue to require . . . will be made available for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.
The Soviet Government has been consulted regarding these arrangements and has expressed its agreement.
3. BRITISH AND AMERICANS FIND THEMSELVES AT LOGGERHEADS OVER THE DE GAULLE COMMITTEE 6
THE BRITISH PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT WITH FCNL IN THE FORM OF A
DIRECTIVE TO THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF
[Ltr, Bovenschen, Chairman of AT(E) to Devers, CG, ETOUSA, 4 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (I))
As you may have heard from the officers of your Headquarters who are members of the AT(E) Committee, we considered at our meeting on Thursday, a paper . . . dealing with the policy to be followed as regards civil administration in Metropolitan France on its liberation by Allied Forces.
As you will see, the policy has been planned for purposes of convenience, in the form of a draft directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but the basic principles on which the directive has been drawn up are set out in paragraph 3 of my covering note. As is stated at the head of the directive, the draft only covers the political (including administrative and legal) section and would clearly require supplementing on other aspects of civil administration such as fiscal, economic, etc.
It was agreed by the AT(E) Committee that I should ask you to be good enough to send the attached papers to the War Department for their approval, with the request that any detailed comments they might have to make on the principle or text of the directive, should be forwarded to you for discussion with us in London on the lines we followed in the case of the Norwegian agreement. ♦ ♦ ♦
[Ltr, Devers, CG, ETOUSA to Chief, CAD, 13 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1)]
1zddddddddd. The Chairman of the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee [Bovenschen] has forwarded to me a draft directive dealing with the policy. to be followed for civil administration in Metropolitan France on its liberation by Allied Forces, and has asked that it be forwarded to the War Department for its approval....
2. The paper is cast in the form of a directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but it is also intended to serve as a basis for an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States on the one hand, and the French Committee tee of National Liberation on the other. It is apparent that the document in its present form raises a number of questions of policy which will be of interest to the War Department, and possibly to the State Department as well.
It is believed that the spirit of the document in its entirety may not be consistent with the President's communication regarding the recognition of the French Committee, in which he stated that "The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen." The proposed directive, by committing the military commander in advance to undertake dissolving certain specified political groups, might have unfortunate consequences in practice. ♦ ♦ ♦
BUT AMERICANS PREFER A DIRECTIVE WHICH AVOIDS SEEMING AGREEMENT WITH FCNL
[Memo, Marcus for Chief, CAD, 17 Sep 43, CAD files, 014,(3-8-43) (1)]
2. The paper [the proposed British draft] is cast in the form of a directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but it is intended to serve as a basis for an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States upon the one hand, and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other.
3. The American draft directive on this subject is based on the assumption that there will be no written agreement with the French Committee. It is my opinion that there should be no such agreement. Representatives of the Committee would be invited to participate in our planning, but it would not be considered within our policy to recognize the Committee to the extent of entering into a written agreement with it relative to the status of Allied troops in France.
4. The proposed British Directive is basically very similar in character to the American draft, but the American draft is brief and definite whereas the British draft includes provisions which it is unnecessary to mention in a directive. The latter partakes too much the form of an agreement. In particular, the British draft does not sufficiently establish that our troops will possess the powers and authority of an occupying force. If this point is definitely established as in the American draft, many of the provisions contained in the British draft become superfluous. ♦ ♦ ♦
AMERICANS BRING THEIR DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON FRANCE BEFORE CCAC
[Min of 12th Mtg, CCAC, 30 Sep 43, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), Sec. 1]
♦ ♦ ♦
a. Took note that the British Embassy will consult with the State Department regarding certain basic political questions involved in the proposed Directive.
b. Took note that British officials in London are now attempting to solve the problem of what group should have jurisdiction to consider the proposed Directive.
c. Agreed that the British members would refer the proposed Directive (except for Section 2 of Enclosure "B") to London for their information, with the statement that it represents the preliminary views of the U.S. members.
A COMPROMISE PROVIDES FOR AN FCNL MILITARY MISSION
[JCS Memo for Info No. 146; Tripartite Conf of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, 19-30 Oct 43, an. No. 5. The following document, which was presented to the Conference as the agreed US-UK view, was known as the Dunn-Wright Agreement, CCAC files, 014., Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]
Civil Affairs for France
The primary purpose of the Allied landing in France will be the defeat of Germany. Subject only to this, it will be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority may be able to assume the civil administration. The ultimate aim of the Allies is the free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live. Meanwhile and until this stage is reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security shall be restored to the French people. As far as the over-riding interests of military operations allow, there shall be freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press, and of correspondence. The French flag shall be used on French public buildings.
With these considerations in mind, the following principles may be laid down as governing the civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities.
1. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity requires, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war against Germany may continue unhampered.
2. The Civil Administration under the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French Officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in France.
3. The two Governments will inform the French Committee of National Liberation that the Supreme Allied Commander will invite the French military authorities to appoint a military mission on civil affairs to his headquarters. The Supreme Allied Commander shall in the planning of civil affairs consult the French military authorities appointed to assist in this work and give consideration to the policies recommended by them. When operations start the French Military Liaison Mission shall be associated in the direction of civil affairs.
4. Military control of civil affairs will be of as short duration as is practicable. The time of termination of military control will be decided by C.C.S. on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.
5. If circumstances permit, the transfer of civil responsibility to French hands may be progressive.
6. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander shall do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.
BRITISH TRY A NEW TACK: DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH
FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
[Ltr, Secy of State Hull to the President, 24 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2 ]
You will recall that just prior to my departure for Moscow you approved a paper entitled "Civil Affairs for France" which outlined the basic principles under which the Supreme Allied Commander would operate with regard to civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities. This paper had likewise received the approval of our War Department and subsequently was approved by the British Government. It was submitted to the Moscow Conference and by agreement with the British and Russian Delegations was referred to the European Commission. In view of the urgency of the matter and possible delay in setting up the Commission we suggested informally to the British that the Foreign Office might wish to
take immediate steps to clear it in London through the American and Soviet Embassies.
The British Foreign Office has, however, now come back with suggestions for an entirely different approach communicated in a memorandum left with the Department by the British Embassy.
The British memorandum sets out that the British Government feels "that in view of recent changes at Algiers and in particular of the fact that the French resistance movements, whose roles will be of such importance when Allied landings take place, are now strongly represented on the Committee, the collaboration of the French Committee and of the French military authorities may be impossible to obtain unless the matter is cleared on the Governments level with the French Committee before the Allied military authorities get in touch with the French military authorities in the matter. And French co-operation in the planning, and later in the actual work of civil administration, is essential to its success."
The memorandum also states that the British Government anticipates that since the Russian Delegates raised the matter at Moscow the Russians will again revert to the question of "the status and role of the French Committee" as soon as discussion is resumed with them. Consequently, the British feel, the memorandum continues, that "since this question raises an important aspect of a combined Anglo-American operation, it would be desirable that Anglo-American agreement should be reached before discussions are opened with the Soviet Government" and that for these reasons the British Government sees "no practical alternative to an early discussion of the whole problem with the French Committee, and feels that this ought to be done very soon if events are not to overtake action."
A similar approach has been made by [Charles B. P.] Peake of the Foreign Office to [William] Phillips in London and COSSAC requests an early reply. Phillips telegraphs in part as follows:
"(3) The proposed basic scheme envisages a French director of civil affairs. Manifestly his authority and responsibility would not extend to appropriate parts of the zone of operations until military conditions therein permit. However, under Rankin `c' conditions, which envisage a Nazi collapse and the cessation of organized resistance by the German forces, on or before D day, there would arise an almost immediate need for the establishment of a provisional French administration for virtually all France. It would appear that the only available organization capable of handling such a situation in the large areas outside the corridors through which our forces will pass, is the French National Committee which now has the support of the resistance groups. The Foregoing refers only to Rankin 'c.'
"(4) In the case of OVERLORD, this situation would probably not arise until very extensive areas of France have been liberated. Until this situation arises, the French director's responsibility would be necessarily limited to provide civil administration in areas to the rear of the fighting zone and then only as the military situation permits a progressive transfer of civil responsibility to him.
"(5) Therefore, the immediate and pressing problem now before us is . . . Rankin 'c."'
As you will observe, giving the changes in the French Committee as their reasons, the British have now advanced a basic contention that we should agree to negotiations with the French Committee relative to the basic civil affairs formula on a governmental level rather than the previous arrangement of dealing with French military authorities on a combined operational level.
I should appreciate receiving your instructions as to the nature of the reply you wish made to this British suggestion as well as to the proposal that the French Committee be permitted to assume control of "virtually all France" under Rankin 'c' conditions.
PRESIDENT REFUSES TO GO ALONG WITH BRITISH IN ANY FINAL
DECISIONS ON FRENCH CIVIL AFFAIRS OR DE GAULLE
[Msg, President, at SEXTANT Conf (Cairo), to Secy of State, 26 Nov 43 (Quoted in Ltr, Hilldring to SW, 28 Nov 43), CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 2]
♦ ♦ ♦ I am convinced that no final decisions or plans concerning Civil Affairs for France should be made at this time. Entire North African situation is complicated but the Lebanon affair illustrates the general attitude of the Committee and especially de Gaulle. The latter now claims the right to speak for all France and talks openly of plans to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in.
The thought that the occupation when it occurs should be wholly military is one to which I am increasingly inclined.
Although I may discuss it informally with the Russians, I see no need for further discussion at this time.
Four days ago I saw Vishinsky and I don't believe the Russians will press for any immediate action. I am showing this to the Prime Minister and until we can see the picture more clearly I hope we can hold up the entire matter.
PLANNING FOR FRANCE TO GO AHEAD DESPITE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, to CG, ETOUSA, 6 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 2]
1. On Friday, 26 November 1943, a message was received by the Secretary of State from the President at SEXTANT [above]. . . . We were concerned over this message as under a strict interpretation all Civil Affairs planning for France would have to be suspended until receipt of a further directive from the President. It was thought that such suspension at the present time might result in failure to have a comprehensive French civil affairs plan available for D day.
2. In view of these considerations and following discussions
with the State Department the following conclusions were reached regarding the
a. That the directive should be made available to Generals Devers and Barker and to Mr. Phillips [State Department representative at COSSAC].
b. That it would be desirable to authorize our representative in London to discuss this directive with the British.
c. That because of the time factor, printing AM francs should go forward without delay.
d. That as final decisions on early phases of relief and rehabilitation in France rest with U.S. and U.K. Armies, discussions in Washington with Mr. [Jean] Monnet on this subject may be continued under the directive.
3. These conclusions were transmitted to Mr. McCloy at SEXTANT by cable dated 3o November. . . . The same cable pointed out that General Barker is most anxious for some political guidance on tentative French planning and that it would be most helpful if we could advise him that he may proceed with such planning on a combined basis using the Dunn-Wright tentative formula for France as his basis....
4. The reply . . . to the cable mentioned in the preceding paragraph states in substance that the President only intended by his message of 26 November to prevent the making of commitments regarding French administration until the conclusion of the discussions at SEXTANT and his return to Washington. The President indicated further that there is no objection to proceeding along the line indicated by the conclusions stated in paragraph 2 above. However, Mr. McCloy stated that he personally was not familiar with the document referred to in our cable as the Dunn-Wright Agreement.
5. We have attempted by cable ... to further identify our reference to the Dunn-Wright tentative formula. Advice was also requested if any restrictions upon the authority for French civil affairs planning were to be imposed in the light of the identification of the Dunn-Wright formula. No response to this request has been received to date.
6. From the foregoing interchange of cables with SEXTANT, we
draw the following conclusions
a. That planning for civil affairs in France may be continued with the Dunn-Wright tentative formula as a basis.
b. That there will be no further discussions with the French regarding civil affairs pending further authorization from the President.
c. That we may proceed with the printing of Allied military francs for use in France....
d. That you may discuss with the British the President's directive of 26 November as amplified by the succeeding exchange of cables....
7. You will be advised immediately if further instructions are received by us not to use the Dunn-Wright formula as the basis for French civil affairs planning.
8. Also in connection with French civil affairs matters you will be interested to know that a U.K.-U.S. commission to deal with the French political situation was considered at SEXTANT. The commission would sit in London, be responsible to the SAC, and have approximately the same representation as the CCAC. The advantage of such a commission would be the assurance of Anglo-American sanction to all civil affairs policies for France without regard to the allocation of primary responsibility for the detailed administration of such policies. Apparently no final decision was made as to the advisability of organizing this commission.
BUT COSSAC STRESSES NEED FOR A FRENCH INTERMEDIARY
[Ltr, Phillips to James Dunn, Dept of State, 19 Dec 43, SHAEF files, 11.02, COSSAC-CAD Opns & Policies]
It occurs to us that since the entire French problem is up for consideration in Washington, it might be helpful to you to have before you some of the thoughts which have occurred to General Barker and to certain other American officers connected with Civil Affairs in COSSAC. ♦ ♦ ♦
From the military point of view, it is not considered necessary to make any arrangement whereby a French intermediary deals with civil affairs in the zone of operation and communications, because the military commanders them-
selves must be held responsible for the conduct of civil affairs activities within such zones....
However, in the "hiatus area," the commanders will have no military means for dealing with civil affairs problems. Manifestly, it is a matter of serious concern to them that the method adopted for dealing with such areas should be satisfactorily established in order to avoid situations which might lead to general disorder. It is evident that disorder in areas adjacent to military operations might seriously embarrass the conduct of those operations. Moreover, unless there is a "going concern," so to speak, set up in "hiatus areas," the Allied Commander's responsibility for civil affairs activities in the zone of communications may necessarily continue beyond the time when he would desire to be relieved of this by the French. ♦ ♦ ♦
4. U.S. NONRECOGNITION OF DE GAULLE HAMPERS CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING FOR FRANCE
CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING IN CCAC IS STYMIED
[Ltr, Gen Marshall to Field Marshal Dill, BJSM, 31 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), Sec. 2]
... I hope that a satisfactory formula for civil affairs in France can be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in the near future.
After discussing this question with Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring, I am inclined to their view that the first question to be settled is the formula for civil affairs which we are to follow in France. They have also informed me about the very critical situation which has developed with respect to all civil affairs matters related to COSSAC operations through the inability of the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to discuss, for the past two months, any question concerning COSSAC's contemplated operations.
I will, for my part, do what I can to clear up this business.
GENERAL SMITH SUGGESTS DEALING WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE AS
THE BEST VEHICLE AVAILABLE
[Msg, Gen Walter B. Smith to Hilldring, 7 Jan 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43)(1), CM-IN 4373]
2. Another phase that disturbs me is the apparent intention not to deal in any way with the French Committee on continental matters but rather to hope for the appointment of a French Army Officer who will in effect handle French civil affairs pending a proper election. I am far from being pro-Committee or pro-de Gaulle, as you know, but I believe we will have to use some vehicle and I don't see a better one at the moment. ♦ ♦ ♦
GENERAL EISENHOWER WANTS TO DISCUSS CIVIL AFFAIRS WITH THE
FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
[Msg, Eisenhower, SAC, to CCS and CCAC, 19 Jan 44, CCAC files, 0N, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1, CM-IN 12460]
It is essential that immediate crystallization of plans relating to Civil Affairs in metropolitan France be accomplished. This requires conferences with properly accredited French authorities. I assume that such authorities would be representatives of the Committee of National Liberation.
I therefore request that General de Gaulle be asked to designate an individual or a group of individuals with whom I can enter into immediate negotiations in London. The need for prompt action cannot be over-emphasized since we will desire to turn over to French control at the earliest possible date those areas that are not essential to military operations. In areas essential to military operations military control will of course apply.
[Ltr, Gen Walter B. Smith to Lt Gen Sir Hastings L. Ismay, 23 Jan 44, SHAEF, SGS files, 092, Fr, vol. 1]
I. Confirming our conversation yesterday evening, this telegram [above] was dictated by General Eisenhower and represents his own thoughts in the matter. His belief is that if we are to avoid political and civil confusion and excessive commitments in personnel and supply after entry on the continent, we must be able to deal with some form of government of Metropolitan France. The French National Committee, whatever its faults may be, represents the beginning of civil government in France, and has received the allegiance of practically all of the French resistance
groups and its present seat, Algiers, is actually by law a part of Metropolitan France. Consequently, the Committee seems to be the logical vehicle. General Eisenhower discussed this matter on an informal basis with the President, the War Department and the State Department while in Washington recently, and found them in general agreement with his own ideas. ♦ ♦ ♦
[Msg, from McCloy, to Eisenhower, 25 Jan 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. I, CM-OUT 9856]
In a recent conversation with the President, apropos of your telegram relating to the need for getting ahead with civil administration planning for France, question of what we were doing on Combined Staff level for coordination and supply of resistance groups in France came up. He made it clear that if there was any hestitation in your mind or anyone else's as to propriety of dealing with Committee resistance representatives, it could be disregarded. There was no reason from the point of view of national policy why your staff could not go ahead with definite plans.
I understand that planning and considerable operating have already been carried out in England but largely through British sources and on less than the Combined Staff level which might now be advisable since concrete combined operations are in view.
There has been considerable criticism in the press emanating from Algiers to the effect that French have not been consulted in connection with the formulation of resistance plans. There have, of course, also been criticisms of lack of supplies.
This is simply to let you know informally that the President assumed that you would feel entirely free to take whatever steps you felt desirable to make this resistance as helpful to you as possible, including dealing with any suitable representatives of the committee in this regard. I believe that on this basis you could so far as the President is concerned discuss at once all matters of resistance with them saving out for the time being and so long as you deem desirable all information as to time and place of landing.
As to matters of civil administration, we are now I think making real progress and will shortly communicate to you through the Combined Chiefs of Staff the basis on which you will be authorized to deal with the Committee as the authority to administer Civil Affairs in the nonmilitary zone, such zones to be prescribed by you.
FORMULA FOR FRANCE HAS UNDERGONE ALTERATION AND TENTATIVE
PLANNING AT SHAEF SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED
[Msg, Hilldring to SHAEF, 3 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2, CM-OUT 2083]
The formula for France that Mr. McCloy has been working on and a draft -of which Holmes took with him to London has emerged considerably altered. It is therefore recommended that any tentative planning that has been started in SHAEF regarding the French formula be discontinued. Also in view of changes which have occurred in our thinking regarding the handling of the French situation, Mr. McCloy and the undersigned believe it would be advisable for Julius Holmes to come over here for a few days and talk with the State and War Department officials. If you think it inadvisable for Holmes to leave London at this time, will you authorize me to carry on these discussions with Barker?
THE THEATER URGENTLY NEEDS A POLICY ON FRANCE
[Msg, Gen Walter 13. Smith to Hilldring, 6 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (I), sec. 2, CM-IN 4125]
Would be very unfortunate if Holmes had to leave here at this time when he is just getting his hand into the Civil Affairs Organization and unless you think it absolutely vital I would rather he did not go . . . Believe Barker is sufficiently in touch with opinion here to discuss matter of French formula with you. There is also the possibility that I myself may have to make a quick trip to Washington within the next week but I sincerely trust that the French formula will have been solved by that time. I assure you that lack of definite instructions are causing us a great deal of trouble, particularly in view of the fact that Giraud is threatening a visit and others of equal importance may come.
A "FINAL" U.S. POLICY IS FORMULATED
[Msg, Hilldring to Gen Walter B. Smith, 7 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2, CM-OUT 3451]
We understand your reluctance to let Holmes leave London at this time. We will therefore discuss the French formula with Barker. We are well aware of the necessity of producing a directive on French Administration. Yesterday we arrived at the final United States policy and are engaged at present in clearing this policy with
the British. We hope to have a combined directive within a few days.
21 ARMY GROUP ASSUMES THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION WILL BE
[NEPTUNE 21 AGp CA Plan, 15 Mar 44, SHAEF G-5 Hist files, 300, 21 AGp (Br), CA Sec]
♦ ♦ ♦
3. The general political situation in France presents a problem of very considerable complexity.
There exists at present no properly constituted government, and it is a matter of high policy as to how far the National Committee of Liberation can be regarded as a substitute.
For the purpose of this Plan it will be assumed that this National Committee will in fact be recognized as the Allied National Authority for France, and that it will command the allegiance of the local government authorities who will act in its name. ♦ ♦ ♦
5. BOTH U.S. AND U.K. TRY STILL OTHER LINES IN EFFORT TO GET TOGETHER ON FCNL
PRESIDENT HANDS DOWN A POLICY
[Ltr, President to SW, 15 Mar 44 (sent by Gen Hilldring as No. 324), CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]
After much thought and many revisions, and with the approval of yourself and the Secretary of State, I request that the following order be sent to General Eisenhower. I think it covers the practical objective of giving the final command in the forthcoming occupation to General Eisenhower and, at the same time, leaving him free to consult any and all French organizations as circumstances may be determined by him:
This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory:
1. The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are
A. The prompt and complete defeat of Germany
B. The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors
C. The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.
2. The following powers and instructions are given you for
your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:
1. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander, you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when, and how the Civil Administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.
2. When and where you determine that there shall be set up a Civil Administration in any part of France, so far as possible there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has willfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the Allies.
3. In order to secure the setting up of any such Civilian Administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with, the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.
4. Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said com-
mittee or groups as the Government of France even on a provisional basis.
5. In making your decision as to entering into such relations
with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons
for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following
restrictions upon its purpose:
a. It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.
b. It favors the reestablishment of all historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule or personal government.
c. It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.
6. In any area of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of Civil Affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.
7. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of Civil Affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French and American Commands, and review all plans.
8. You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.
9. You will. have no talks or relations with the Vichy Regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.
10. Instructions on economic,, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO ENTER INTO WORKING AGREEMENTS WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 15, CM-IN-1526o, 21 Apr 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. I]
♦ ♦ ♦ As it is urgently necessary that many matters affecting the civil administration of France be settled in advance, authority is requested to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services, including civilian labor, treatment of banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc. These working agreements would in no case go beyond the limitation set forth in the formula approved by the President and transmitted in Telegram 324, 5 March [above] as interpreted by the Secretary of State in his public address of 9 April. 8
WORKING ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE TENTATIVE PENDING U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENTS
[Proposed Reply to SCAEF 15, 21 Apr 44, Incl B to CCS-565, 4 May 44, 9 CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. I]
Subject is your SCAF 15. Until there is combined agreement on the civil affairs formula for France, all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the French Committee must be tentative.
It must be made clear to the French National Committee that your arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from the other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France.
On this basis you are granted authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working arrangements on the matters mentioned in your SCAF 15. In this connection, we desire clarification on what is intended by the term "transfer of property"....
SCAEF THINKS IT BEST TO INVITE DE GAULLE TO LONDON
[Msg, SCAEF for CCS, SCAF 24, 11 May 44, G-5 SHAEF, Hist Rcds, Negotiations With the French, an. 10]
The limitations under which we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous. We began our military discussions with the French representatives here in the belief that although we had no formal directive, we understood the policies of our own governments well enough to be able to reach a working basis with any French body or organization that can effectively assist us in the fight against Germany.10 For the present there is no such body represented here except the French, Committee of National Liberation. We have been in collaboration with its military and naval representatives, attempting to arrive at a solution of such pressing problems as the formation of security battalions to guard lines of communication, matters affecting supplementary franc currency, military security and civilian arrangements, billeting, the furnishing of local resources in goods and services especially to provide for large labor requirements, distribution of civil supplies, and most important of all, the initial approach to the French population. We also count on the influence of the French Committee to explain to the French people and reconcile them to the necessity of our bombing program.
The suspension of diplomatic privileges, including the use of foreign codes, which we ourselves urged for security reasons, has had one unfortunate effect in that it has produced a condition under which none of the above questions can be dealt with. The French Committee has directed its Senior Military Officer, [Lt.] General [Pierre] Koenig, not to communicate with Algiers except by French code, and not to proceed further in his discussions with us. I am aware that General Koenig feels very keenly the fact that he is denied even the most general knowledge of forthcoming operations although French naval air and airborne units are to be employed, and much is expected from French resistance, both active and passive. The sum total of these delays and resentments is, in my opinion, likely to result in acute embarrassment to the Allied Forces, and it will be too late, after the event, to correct them all.
There seem to be only two possible solutions, both of which involve divulging certain general information to a very few French officers in London only and on the highest level. The first, and probably the most effective, would be for General de Gaulle himself to come to London, on the invitation of one or both governments. I would then be able to deal with him direct on the most immediate and pressing problem of the initial approach to the French people and their organized resistance groups. The other alternative is to arrange for General Koenig to communicate with General de Gaulle and the French Committee, in French Cipher, if necessary, so as to remove the present block to our plans and preparations. I repeat that either of these alternatives implies the necessity of taking at least one or two senior French officers into our confidence to some extent, and relying upon them not to communicate any military information to Algiers until authorized by me to do so. From a military point of view coordination with the French is of overriding importance. It is requested that this matter be treated as of the utmost urgency, and that it be considered, as far as possible, on its military aspect.
IT IS ALL RIGHT TO BRING DE GAULLE TO LONDON BUT HE MUST STAY
THERE UNTIL AFTER D-DAY
[Msg, President to Eisenhower, 13 May 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 092, French Relations, vol. I, SMC-IN 1099]
I have today sent the following . . . message to Prime Minister Churchill: . . . I have no objections whatsoever to your inviting de Gaulle and others of the French Committe to discuss your [garbled] group being serviced [See SCAF 24 above] on military matters; however, you must consider, in the interests of security, keeping de Gaulle in the United Kingdom until the OVERLORD landing has been made. 11
It is my understanding that General Eisenhower now has full authority to discuss with the Committee all matters on a military level. I do not desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level, and I am unable at this time to recognize any Government of France until the French people have an opportunity for a free choice of Government. ♦ ♦ ♦
PRESIDENT EXPLAINS TO EISENHOWER WHY NONRECOGNITION OF FCNL MUST BE MADE CLEAR
[Msg, President to Eisenhower, 13 May 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 092, French Relations, vol. I, SMC-IN 1099]
♦ ♦ ♦ I hope my previous directive was wholly clear to you. I know you will understand that any matters relating to the future Government of France are a political and not a military matter. The American position has always been firm on this point.
We must be certain that the words "Free Determination," which date back to the Atlantic Charter, shall be preserved in substance and in spirit. Therefore, no existing group outside of France can be given the kind of domination over the French people in France which would dominate the free expression of a choice.
The French Committee denies that it has any such intention,
but so many instances have occurred in the last two years that I am unable to
accept their declaration wholeheartedly.
That is why you as Supreme Commander must assume this additional task.
We must always remember that the French population is quite naturally shell-shocked just as any other people would be after such sufferings at the hands of German occupation. It will take some time for them quietly and normally to think through the matters pertaining to their political future. We, as the liberators of France, have no right to color their views or give any group the sole right to impose one side of a case on them.
I know that you will understand my desire that self-determination for them shall be our true aim.
THE BRITISH WISH TO SIDE-STEP THE ISSUE OF RECOGNITION WHILE DE GAULLE IS IN
[Memo by Representatives of the Br CsofS, CCS 565-1,12 27 May 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]
I. We suggest, in view of the recent exchange of messages on the highest level with regard to the discussions which will take place on the arrival of General de Gaulle in the United Kingdom, that no further action is required on the proposals contained in CCS 565. ♦ ♦ ♦
[Min of 166th Mtg, JCS, 6 Jun 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr. (9-21-43), sec. 1]
♦ ♦ ♦ [Fleet] Admiral [Ernest J.] King expressed the opinion that the matter was linked with the immediate situation in Europe. The proposed reply to General Eisenhower has been approved by the President but the British have stated that no action is required because of General de Gaulle's presence in the United Kingdom. ♦ ♦ ♦
General McNarney remarked that General Eisenhower is already acting in accordance with the instructions set out in the reply proposed in Enclosure "B" to CCS 565. The approval of the reply would confirm his actions and this, apparently, the British do not wish to do.♦ ♦ ♦
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to inform the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that the United States Chiefs of Staff cannot confirm their views that no further action is required on the proposals contained in CCS 565. 13 ♦ ♦ ♦
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