Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XX:

Political Principle Versus Military Pragmatism in the Issue of Venezia Giulia

The story of Venezia Giulia- for reasons inherent in the issue and the events- forms a separate element in the history of the occupation of the north. Separated in the main from the rest of northern Italy by the Adriatic Sea, and lying in the extreme northeast at the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of  1939, Venezia Giulia, which included the port of Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula, had once been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but had been ceded to Italy at the end of World War I. Its political past was thus like that of Bolzano and other northeastern frontier areas, but nevertheless the CCS, on 30 October 1944, gave it special mention in its directive to establish military government in all the potential areas of dispute within Italy's 1939 boundaries. The reason was that the Yugoslav forces under Marshal Tito were already operating in parts of Venezia Giulia and thus might here present AMG with a serious difficulty not foreseen elsewhere-prior occupation designed to lead to annexation.

Later, SACMED negotiated with Tito and realized that the directive to set up AMG in all Venezia Giulia could not be implemented without the use of force against an ally. The issue was so serious that it had to be re-examined by all concerned. In this re-examination SACMED took one point of view and political authorities-in particular those of the United States-took another. It was one of the rare cases in the history of the Italian operation where military and political authorities sharply disagreed over the best course to follow. The denouement was still rarer: The judgment of the military commanders finally prevailed over that of the political authorities. This was undoubtedly because their judgment favored a pragmatic compromise whereas the cost of enforcing a solution based on abstract political principle would have been too great.

The CCS directive of October 1944 stemmed primarily from a political decision. The two governments recognized from the beginning that Tito would not only claim Venezia Giulia but might attempt to annex it to Yugoslavia unilaterally. It was primarily in order to uphold the principle of peaceful settlement of all territorial disputes that the State Department wished Allied military government to be established and maintained until the fate of the area could be settled on a governmental level. The views of the Department were apparently accepted by both the President and the Prime Minister and their Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The reasons for the Allied wish to extend AMG over Venezia Giulia were, to


be sure, military as well as political. The Allied armies wished to utilize the port facilities of the area, especially Trieste and Pola, and to safeguard their lines of communication running northward into Austria. When Prime Minister Churchill visited Italy in August 1944 he met Marshal Tito and informed him of the Allied intention to set up AMG over the whole territory. The Marshal demurred but did not refuse because he was receiving large amounts of supplies as well as air and naval support from the Allies. Later it -was to become clear that the military factor weighed less than the political, and that the British were less concerned about either than were the Americans. Although the State Department's views had been accepted by the CCS and communicated to the theater commander, the British Chiefs of Staff early in 1945 asked SACMED whether AMG would be required in the whole of Venezia Giulia or "alternatively, whether his needs could be met by an agreement with the Yugoslavs for Allied military control of certain areas.1 A British historian explains that "In principle the British view coincided with that held by the American State Department .. . but experience in Greece led to severe doubts as to how far such control [of disputed areas] was practical. 2 The doubts of the British chiefs were doubtless amplified by the successes of the Yugoslav armed forces. By early 1945 the Army of National Liberation was in control of a large part of Venezia Giulia, and Tito had made it clear that he intended to occupy still more in order to strengthen Yugoslav claims. At a meeting with Field Marshal Alexander at Belgrade on a February Tito nevertheless agreed to the establishment of AMG within the zone of the Allied line of communications and offered to put his troops within that area under Allied command.

The State Department at the Yalta meeting in February 1945 again maintained that no action which would prejudice the peace settlement should be countenanced. A month later, in spite of further advances by the Yugoslav Army, the CCS instructed Field Marshal Alexander to establish AMG in all of Venezia Giulia. Early in May units of the British Eighth Army crossed the border and the province was subjected to a double occupation by Yugoslav and Allied forces. Tito made no secret of the fact that he intended not only to stay where he was but also to lay claim to the whole province at the peace conference. Field Marshal Alexander reported to the CCS that he could carry out their orders only through use of force. Since armed conflict with the Yugoslavs was obviously undesirable he proposed "a purely military agreement" for divided administration in the territory. Things had come to such a pass that the Field Marshal believed that establishment of AMG in the whole of Venezia was less important than his control of the line of communications to Austria.

Field Marshal Alexander's representative, General Morgan, who was sent to Belgrade, held three meetings, 7-9 May, during which Tito refused to relinquish any territory but suggested a joint military command. Alexander notified Tito that his proposal involved a political question that must be settled on the governmental level. After the Belgrade meetings President Truman apparently brought pressure to bear via Moscow. In any event Marshal Tito agreed on 9 June to a division of the territory for purposes of military occupation along the "Morgan line," described in the documents. Soon afterward Allied Military Government XIII Corps (later AMG Venezia Giulia) was established and placed under the operational control of Lt.


Gen. Sir John Harding, the XIII Corps commander.

The administrative division of Venezia Giulia did violence to its economic unity but the situation was substantially corrected by a supplementary agreement which set up agencies and machinery for economic co-operation. The basic trouble for AMG was in being called upon to establish local government in an area with two nationality components, neither of which wished, either for patriotic reasons or for fear of reprisal, to co-operate with the other. Moreover, AFHQ felt it necessary to direct the restoration of the Italian system of administration after the Yugoslavs had already set up their own governmental machinery, staffed with members of their own nationality. It was true that the military agreement called for "use .. . of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily." This provision was interpreted by the Yugoslavs as requiring the retention of their administrative machinery. From the point of view of the Allies retention meant not only offending the Italian Government but also acquiescing in an inequitable system designed to perpetuate Yugoslav power in the region. The Allies did not have a very sound legal case but they rationalized that it would not be possible to make the Yugoslav system work satisfactorily in conjunction with the quite different system set up for the remainder of Italy.

When it became evident that the Yugoslavs would not co-operate under any but their own system, AMG authorities conceived and secured approval for a system of local government which was neither Yugoslav nor, for that matter, quite Italian. Avowedly designed to bypass all existent Yugoslav agencies, it was based upon an artificial territorial unit called the "Area." This unit conformed more to the Italian province than to the Yugoslav region and to that extent the scheme complied with the directive to restore the Italian system. The Yugoslav agencies were ignored and the positions on the area level and that of its component communes were filled with Italians when Slovenes refused to accept appointment. Somehow both political and economic life were kept going until the peace treaty with Italy ended a difficult situation with a political expedient that was to prove even less manageable. Dividing up all the rest of Venezia Giulia between Yugoslavia and Italy, the powers created the Free Territory of Trieste as a framework within which Trieste served as a customs-free port for the ships of all nations. Its governor was to be selected by the U.N. Security Council and, within forty-five days after he assumed office, the Anglo-American and Yugoslav troops who were meanwhile occupying the territory in separate zones were to be released. No governor could be agreed upon within the stipulated time of ninety days. In consequence the occupation continued until October 1954, when, once more, an unnatural territorial division between Italy and Yugoslavia was effected in order to end the even more deplorable evil of international contentiousness.



[Memo, Capt Stone, USNR, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for G-5 AFHQ, 28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. In order that A.C.C. may issue the appropriate instructions to the A.M.G. officers concerned we shall be grateful for guidance on what provinces should be included within ACC/AMG administration on the boundaries of Italy. 1

2. In the case of those areas which abut on France, Switzerland and Austria we should be glad to know whether the provinces which ACC/ AMG must be prepared to administer should include all those territories up to the frontier of Italy as drawn in 1939.

3. Those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939 present what seems likely to be a more immediate and more difficult problem. There is already indication that Yugoslav forces under the control of General Tito are preparing to make a bid at the earliest possible moment to take over certain areas to the West of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939. In such circumstances various possibilities are open.
Allied authorities might insist that until a peace treaty has been drawn up, it is the duty of Allied military government to function in all those territories which were under Italian sovereignty at the time of the Italian declaration of war.
At the other extreme Allied authorities might be prepared to accept as a purely temporary and provisional arrangement Yugoslav military government over those Italian territories which Yugoslav forces had already occupied and were controlling at the time that contact was made between Allied forces and Marshal Tito's forces.
Various other courses could be followed, such as de facto acceptance of the Italian Eastern boundary as it existed before 1918 or negotiation with the Yugoslavian Government, or Marshal Tito as its military commander in this field, of some other arbitrary line accepted for reasons of practical convenience but without any commitment insofar as the future boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy are concerned.

4. It will be appreciated that unless some clear ruling is given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces are likely to occur. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Field Marshal Alexander for Marshal Tito, 13 Aug 44, 2  ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern Italy, Austria or Hungary it is the Supreme Allied Commander's intention to impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. . . . It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned.

2. This direct Allied Military Government is necessary in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe.

3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be supplied through the Port of Trieste, it will be necessary for them to have secure lines of communication protected by British troops on the route through Ljubljana-Maribor-Graz.

4. Supreme Allied Commander looks to the Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest liaison with them.


[Memo, Actg Secy of State Joseph C. Grew for Hopkins, 16 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

♦ ♦ ♦ Certain areas of Italy's northeastern frontier will probably be in dispute after hostilities. In order that the final disposition of these disputed areas would not be prejudiced by occupation of the Armed forces of claimant states, it is suggested that Allied Military Government be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory


within its 1939 frontiers. In the South Tyrol and the Istrian Peninsula (Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia), Allied Military Government should be maintained and these areas not restored to Italian administration (as is the present practice with respect to liberated areas in southern Italy). Allied Military Government would thus be maintained until the disputed areas are finally disposed of by peace treaty or other settlement. Any other course, such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Peninsula or Free Austrian forces occupy the South Tyrol prior to final disposition at the peace settlement, would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of these territories, cause deep resentment on the part of the Italian people and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy.

The British have already suggested a plan along these lines and would, it is believed, be willing to maintain Allied Military Government in frontier areas likely to be in dispute for the required period. . . . On our part, it would mean keeping a certain number of American Military Government officers and soldiers in Northeastern Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Leahy for H. Freeman Matthews, Dept of State, 19 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

The suggestion regarding extension of Allied Military Government to the South Tyrol and Istrian Peninsula contained in your memorandum dated September 16th to Mr. Hopkins has been discussed with Mr. Churchill and is approved by the President.


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 30 Oct 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

1. Administration of disputed areas formerly under Italian Rule. General policy is to restore Italian administration under supervision of Allied Commission in all Italian metropolitan territory up to Italy's nineteen thirty nine frontiers. There are, however, certain disputed territories formerly under Italian rule which should be treated as exceptions to this general policy. These are set out in the following paragraphs.

2. Venezia Giulia. The final disposal of this province, lying between 1914 and 1939 Italian frontiers, cannot take place until peace settlement and in meantime it is clearly undesirable that either of two main interested parties, Italy and Yugoslavia, should he left in control. Are equally opposed at this stage to any attempt to divide province between Italy and Yugoslavia by laying down some temporary and arbitrary line, which could only lead to friction and incidents and would moreover prejudice an impartial final settlement.

3. Apart from the necessity of maintaining law and order and of preventing either claimant jumping claims, this province in which Trieste and important railways are situated, will be of great importance during the immediate post hostilities period as providing a base and lines of communication both for Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe, in particular Austria, and for relief and rehabilitation operations generally.

4. Allied Military Government should therefore be established and maintained in this province.

5. As Yugoslav Partisan forces are already present in Istria it is probable that at time of German withdrawal Marshal Tito's military and civil authorities may succeed in establishing considerable measure of control in Istria and possibly in other parts of province. It will thereafter he necessary to reach some agreement with Marshal Tito about establishment of Allied Military Government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 23 Nov 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-2, Incl C]

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC'S intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government in this area until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned.

Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied Military Command and control of the port of Trieste and L of C required by Allied Forces occupying Austria or Hungary.
Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC'S intention.

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia follow the pattern established elsewhere in Italy but that it be made clear from the outset that control will not revert to the Italian Government as elsewhere in Italy, but will remain in Allied hands until otherwise instructed by the two governments.

Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are suggested, as follows:


A. Insofar as responsibile local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav Partisan or non-Partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.
B. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or troops. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to Austria, Allied garrison troops will probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.
C. The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslavs and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian National Legislation may be excluded from the area.
D. Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian Lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military Lire.
E. Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, with which the Allied Regional authorities could consult at their discretion might be formed.

3. Developments may be such that, unless Yugoslav agreement is secured in advance, we may find it politically and militarily difficult to impose Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia.

4. Accordingly, we invite your consideration as to the advisability of negotiations being undertaken at a governmental level with the Yugoslav authorities in this matter. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Summary by Political Sec, AC, of a Rpt by No. 1 Spec Force, ACMF, 3  Issued by CofS, AC, 31 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/3391

♦ ♦ ♦ 1.. . . . Communist controlled bands in North East Italy were soon to pursue the course [of preparing to seize power when the Germans are expelled ] by:
"(a) denying their operational responsibility to SACMED and placing themselves under Tito's Slovene IX Corps;
(b) ignoring the orders of the CLNAI;
(c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to Tito;
(d) threatening not to co-operate with AMG and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated."

2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal Tito be requested to prohibit Slovene attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in i5th Army Group territory."

4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the Natisone River and they are attempting to attain a realization of their aspirations by a show of popular support through propaganda, intimidation and forced mobilization.

5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist territorial link with the USSR through the Balkans, aid and abet the Slovenes in their activities. This reputedly is done with the agreement of the Slovene IX Corps and of the Russian Mission attached to the Corps. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of SAC's Political Conf, 1st Mtg, 20 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

5.. . . The Supreme Allied Commander explained that there had been much discussion regarding the form of government which should be set up in Venezia Giulia at the time when the port of Trieste would be required as a base from which to maintain Allied occupational forces in Austria. It was essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal Tito, since there were Jugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal Tito wished to incorporate the area in the New Jugoslavia. During the recent conferences he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal Tito that a military boundary should be established which would run


north and south over well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration east of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal Tito to remove any Jugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain west of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station east of the boundary would come under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

Mr. Kirk said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of Italy, including Zara and the Italian islands in the Adriatic. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between Italy and Jugoslavia. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of Venezia Giulia to Jugoslavia, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout Venezia Giulia. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

Rear Admiral Stone said that the Italian Government had been notified that all Venezia Giulia would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with proposals which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since the implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

The Supreme Allied Commander pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of SAC's Political Conf, 2d Mtg, 2 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

5.... The Supreme Allied Commander said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject [Allied military control of Venezia Giulia] by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of Austria, he (Field Marshal Alexander) would require the use of the port of Trieste and road and rail communications leading from it into Austria. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently garrison the area with his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of Venezia Giulia up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in these areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern Italy east of the Isonzo. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of Istria as control of the entire area was not essential for military communication. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Jugoslav communications through Ljubljana available to the Allies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 2 Mar 45, 4  ABC files, 387.4, Italy (2 Sep 43), sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-1]

7. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must take account are:
A. Provision for the control and security of the port of Trieste and L of C thence to Austria.
B. Avoidance of any action that would appear to prejudge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.
C. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Jugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

8. It is accepted policy that all Italy (including of course Venezia Giulia) should be subject to Allied military government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 7 A and B above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of Venezia Giulia, and Jugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in Tito's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue. In order, therefore, to meet the requirements in 7 C as well as those in 7 A and B above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the provisional Jugoslav Government-as soon as it is formed-to participate, as an Ally, in the Allied military government of Venezia Giulia. In that event, I recommend that the Joint provisional Jugoslav Government be asked to send representatives to consult with members of my staff in formulating plans for the military government of Venezia Giulia, and that it should be arranged that British or American forces occupy the L of C area and perhaps also Fiume and Pola; that the Jugoslav forces in other parts of Venezia Giulia come under the orders of the appropriate Allied commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 26 Apr 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 8051-A]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. Events are moving rapidly in this Theater and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of Allied occupation of Venezia Giulia. I must therefore now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary these will be as follows:

2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to seize those parts of Venezia Giulia which are of importance to my military operations. The area so occupied will include Trieste, and the communications leading to this port and from it into Austria. Pola will also be required.

3. Within the above area, Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking, provided as far as possible equally from U.S. and British resources. It will work through such suitable local personnel, whether Italian or Jugoslav, as may be found in the area, and will be part of the Military Government organization which controls other areas of Italy.

4. Before the task force enters Venezia Giulia I will inform Marshal Tito of my intentions and will explain to him that if any of his forces remain in this area they must necessarily come under my command. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive (FAN 536), CCS to AFHQ, 28 Apr 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 19647]

♦ ♦ ♦ Administration of areas formerly under Italian rule, final disposal of which is in dispute. Combined Chiefs of Staff has approved plan hereinafter set out. Successful working of plan depends on Soviet co-operation. U.S. and U.K. Governments are now considering best method of seeking such co-operation and subsequent Yugoslav agreement to the plan. In meantime you should implement this plan if military necessity so requires before Soviet and Yugoslav agreements have been obtained.

1. General policy to restore Italian metropolitan territory to Italian administration under the supervision of Allied commission will be subject to the exceptions set forth in this message.


2. You should establish and maintain Allied Military Government in:
The Compartment of Venezia Giulia, including Fiume and the Quarnerolo Islands, but excluding the Province of Zara, and
Tarvisio and surrounding areas, which before 1919 formed part of Austrian Province of Carinthia and have since been incorporated in Italian Province of Friuli.

The U.S./U.K. military government will function through local authorities of whatever nationality still remains. In all cases civil authorities will be responsible to your Allied Military Government.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are recommending to the U.S. and U.K. Governments that the forces required to back the plan and the civil affairs officers required to work it, should be provided jointly by the U.S. and U.K. Governments.

4. Soviet concurrence will be sought to join in requesting Yugoslav Government to withdraw all Yugoslav forces from the Compartment of Venezia Giulia, as described above.

5. In case any Yugoslav forces in the area to be placed under U.S./U.K. military government fail to co-operate with the plan set forth in this message, you will communicate with the Combined Chiefs of Staff before taking action.

6. You should try to ensure that the interim administration of Zara and certain Adriatic Islands, other than those referred to in paragraph 2 above, acquired by Italy after the last war and now claimed by the Yugoslavs, is conducted in the name of the Allies. However, in practice it may be necessary for you to permit Yugoslavs to perform the actual functions of administration.5  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to Gen Mark Clark, CG, 15th AGp, 30 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/497]

4. . . . the object of your operations in Venezia Giulia for the present will be as follows:
(a) Secure Trieste and L of C through Italy leading to it.
(b) Secure L of C from Trieste to Austria via Gorizia-Tarvisio.
(c) Secure Pola, anchorages between Trieste and Pola, and the L of C between those ports.

5. Concurrently with operations indicated in para. 4 above, you will continue operations against the enemy until you have completely cleared Venezia Giulia or linked up with regular Yugoslav Armed Forces. 6

6. In linking up with regular Jugoslavs, maximum care will be exercised to avoid armed clashes. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, Marshal Tito to Field Marshal Alexander as Quoted in Msg, Alexander to CCS, 2 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 641]

♦ ♦ ♦ I have received and carefully considered the 5 points contained in your telegram regarding the regulations and the areas of operations of the Allied Armies and the Jugoslav Army in Istria and the Slovene Littoral.

Since our last meeting and conversation the situation has changed so much in so far as units of my 4th Army, cooperating with Slovene Units, have, with great difficulty and heavy losses, broken through the German defensive line run ping from Fiume to Trieste where street fighting is going on now. In addition nearly the whole of Istria, with the exception of Pola Rovigno and several other towns where street fighting is going on, has been liberate by our troops. In connection with the above I wish to give you the following information. In order to liberate Jugoslavia and round up all enemy troops in Jugoslavia as quickly as possible I have made the following plan which is already being carried out:

1. To liberate Istria, Trieste and Monfalcone as far as the Isonzo River and to advance up the Isonzo towards the Austrian frontier.

3. In accordance with our previous agreement I am prepared that you should use the ports of Trieste and Pola as well as the railway line


Trieste-Tarvisio for supplying your troops in Austria.

4. I will therefore be grateful if you will give orders to your troops to get in contact with my troops on the above mentioned line where further details regarding your cooperation can be agreed on the spot. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, U.S. Ambassador Kirk to the Secy of State, 2 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent for me to say that the report that Tito's troops have occupied territory up to the Isonzo has made the most profound and painful impression on the Italian Government and on all the patriotic elements in Italy who have been reached by this news. . . . He said that all efforts were being made to preserve calm but that he feared that the effect, especially in the north, of the Yugoslav military occupation would be disastrous and could retard all efforts toward the unification of the country.

I see much merit in the Minister's observation and believe that the Italian Government should be immediately placed in a position to reassure the country that whatever de facto developments may occur on a purely military level such events should not be regarded as indicating a policy prejudicial to an eventual just settlement of territorial arrangements affecting Italy....


[ Literal Transl of Remarks of Yugoslav Member in Min of 35th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

♦ ♦ ♦ I give my personal vote against the proposed transfer of certain territory to Italian Administration.

When the Italian Government request that Jugoslav Areas such as the Slovenian Littoral, Trieste, Istra and Reka should be occupied by British and American troops thus denying Jugoslavia the quality of an Ally, Member of the United Nations, I cannot agree that any more territory of liberated Italy be transferred to the Italian Government, as to a Representative of a Country which has lost the War, prior to settling questions as are the boundary towards Jugoslavia, the payment or reparations and extradition of respective War criminals to Jugoslavia, and generally prior to signing the Peace Treaty.

The Chairman pointed out that the provinces mentioned by the Jugoslav Representative were not involved in the present proposed transfer of territory. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to Marshal Tito as Quoted in Msg from Alexander to CCS, 4 May 45. 7  AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1129]

6. I am setting up the necessary organization in Trieste, and elsewhere in the Communications Zone, to ensure that my line of communications is brought into operation rapidly and can function efficiently, so that the battle may be carried with all possible speed into Austria against the remnants of the enemy forces.

7. Provided that your troops in the area affected are clearly informed by you as to the position, no inconvenience from the joint presence of our troops in the same area will arise. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 4 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1129]

♦ ♦ ♦ I received at 1902B hours 3d May [the following message from Marshal Tito]

This moment I have received a signal from my Fourth Army saying tanks and Infantry Units of the Allied Forces which are under your command, without any previous notice have entered Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, the cities which have been liberated by the Jugoslav Army.

Since I do not know what was meant by this I wish you would give me your immediate explanation of the matter with expedience.

C. I have thereupon dispatched the following message to him at 1300B hours today:

1. I have received your message of 3rd May. I am astonished at your apparent failure to honor the agreement we made at Belgrade. [Sec.2, above.]
2. The agreement was that as the Port of Trieste and the rail and road communications from Trieste to Austria via Gorizia and Tarvisio are essential to maintain my advance into Austria,


I should have full control in these areas. You further offered, and I accepted, that any of your forces in these areas would be put under my command.

3. To enable you to clear the enemy from your country, I have provided you, and am still doing so, with great quantities of munitions of war, medical supplies and food. In addition, I have also given you the support of strong Air and Naval Forces. I have thus fully kept my promise to you and I still believe that you will keep yours to me.

4. So far, however, you have taken unilateral action by ordering your troops to occupy territory as far west as the Isonzo River.

5. I suggest that as this question demands an immediate solution you send your Chief of Staff to Bari, where you have a mission, to meet my Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Morgan. I feel sure that they could bring this conflict of views to a conclusion satisfactory to us both.

6. I have ordered my troops to maintain their present positions in the Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia Areas.


[Msg, AMG Eighth Army for G-5, 15th AGp, 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/594]

Subject is Trieste area and Gorizia. Both Yugoslav and Allied forces are in Trieste. Yugoslav administration had been set up by adherents Tito before arrival. Position is very delicate. AMG officers are in town but are not functioning. Position Monfalcone and District. Civil administration of Tito adherents in complete control and functioning well. . . . Large numbers Yugoslav partisans parading streets fully armed also Yugoslav Army. Well behaved demonstration in favor Tito taking place. Impossible yet assess strength of local Tito feeling or number partisans. In any case would be impossible disarm partisans unless carried out by strong military force which would be tantamount to setting off gunpowder. Position Gorizia understood to be Yugoslavs in complete control. Italian partisans are reported to have been disarmed by Yugoslavs and arrested. In view of all above and after consultation AMG 13 Corps have ordered a standstill on AMG until position examined by higher authorities coming from AFHQ tomorrow. Therefore no proclamations have been posted and no military government has been imposed anywhere in Venezia Giulia. Army commander has approved above decision in consultation with Corps commander. .. .


[NAF 948, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 5 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1638]

I. I have received the following cablegram from Marshal Tito:

1. I was surprised at your readiness to express your doubts as to the respect on my part of the agreement we made in Belgrade. I am even more surprised owing to the fact that I am not only bound solidly by the military responsibilities as C-in-C but also by the responsibilities as Prime Minister who must first of all take care of the interests of his country. I am even more surprised because in my message of May 2nd I underlined that I am keeping my word given in Belgrade, namely that you may use the ports of Trieste and Pola as well as the line of communications leading towards Austria for supplying your troops.

9. My troops have been ordered to hold the whole of the occupied territory and not to impede in any way your troops on their way toward Austria along the L of C foreseen by the agreement. The port of Trieste is also at your disposal.

2. I have replied as follows:

Thank you for your telegram of 5 May. I fully appreciate your difficulties. I suggest that it would lead to a quicker and more satisfactory solution if I sent my Chief of Staff to Belgrade to discuss the whole question with you. ♦ ♦ ♦

3. It is quite certain that I cannot carry out the policy laid down in FAN 536 (C.C.S. 739/2) [MC-IN 19647, 28 Apr, sec. 2 above] without use of force. I propose therefore to send my chief of staff to Belgrade to negotiate a purely military agreement on the following lines:
(1) Field Marshal Alexander requires the port of Trieste, and the railway and roads from there to Villach via Gorizia. The territory west of the line marked on the map will be under his control. All forces, whether Fifteenth Army Group or Jugoslav, or Partisan, will come under his orders at an agreed time.
(2) Field Marshal Alexander's Allied Military Government will administer this area. Full use will be made of any Jugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily.
(3) To facilitate the working of 1 and 2 above, Jugoslav regular forces should gradually be withdrawn from the area under Field Marshal Alexander's control and Partisans will hand in their arms and disband.
(4) This agreement is purely military and


in no way affects long-term policy regarding these territories.

4. The line referred to in the above agreement would be such as to include the port of Trieste, space required for depots, and the road and rail communications from Trieste via Gorizia to Villach. ♦ ♦ ♦


[FAN 547, CCS to Field Marshal Alexander, 7 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-3]

♦ ♦ ♦ We agree paragraph 2 of NAF 948 [above]. We also agree you should negotiate on lines of your paragraph 3, but you should make it abundantly clear that this agreement is purely military and ensure that Tito understands that it does not affect the ultimate disposal of any prewar Italian territory which will be a matter to be decided at the peace settlement.


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 20 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-4]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Marshal Tito said he was sorry he could not accept Field Marshal Alexander's proposals. His reason for this was that as his troops had liberated territory which is Slovene, he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an Allied Army on account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause.

He further mentioned that at the peace conference he would claim territory to the west of Isonzo.

In view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a predominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal Alexander full use of the port of Trieste and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

D. In view of the above, I have sent the following message to Marshal Tito:
General Morgan has made his report to me. Since Paragraph I of your counter-proposals raises a political issue, I must now refer the whole question to the British and American governments. Meanwhile I propose to use the port of Trieste to maintain my forces in the northeast Italy and Austria. I trust you will take steps to insure that no regrettable incidents occur.


[Min of Mtg of SACMED's Political Conf, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/236/258]

3.... The Supreme Allied Commander said that the Jugoslav proposals for dual command were not militarily acceptable to him. His military requirement, to have his L of C under his own control, was a normal one for any commander. On Marshal Tito's proposals the long L of C into Austria would be dependent for its safety on the goodwill of the Jugoslavs. This could not be satisfactory in the long run, and a clear demarkation line, all forces on the west of which would be under his (Field Marshal Alexander's) command, was therefore required. ♦ ♦ ♦

As an interim measure and pending receipt of further directions, he proposed, therefore, to use Trieste without any formal agreement with the Jugoslavs, acting as we had already been doing. Meanwhile, as a second priority we should also develop Venice, so as to have it available for use if required. He thought that the Jugoslavs would in fact be anxious to avoid open clash at present, and use of Trieste on this basis should work until the governments had made their decision. Meanwhile, his forces would remain deployed in the Trieste-Gorizia area as they were at present. . . .

Mr. Kirk observed the arguments now being put forward by Marshal Tito were precisely similar to those advanced by the Japanese prior to their invasion of Manchuria and by Mussolini before the invasion of Abyssinia. There was every indication, therefore, that the Jugoslavs proposed to carry out what would be the first act of postwar aggression. He considered that the issue at stake was larger than that merely affecting the territory concerned....

General McNarney did not believe that public opinion in the United States would support hostilities against the Jugoslavs. In fact such hostilities would mean siding with the Italians, our enemies, in regard to territory they seized after the last war, against the Jugoslavs who were our Allies. He thought that if a plebiscite was taken in the area there was little doubt that the result would be favourable to the Slovenes. He had therefore a certain sympathy with Marshal Tito who had been fighting a long, hard war and now demanded the right to occupy a certain amount of enemy territory which his forces had won, in the same way as the French had demanded to participate in the occupation of Austria and Ger-


many. The Jugoslavs could, therefore, say that it was merely a choice as to whether the territory should be occupied by one Ally or another. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Dunlop, RC, Venezie Rgn for Exec Cmsr, AC, 13 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/312]

8. Shortly after crossing the Isonzo one commenced to meet many Jugoslav troops and the town of Monfalcone was full of them. At the same time there were, superimposed upon the Jugoslav occupation, many Allied troops, and there was a constant stream of Allied military traffic up and down the road.

11. The Corps Commander-Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding-was trying to get the Jugoslavs to withdraw all their troops to the eastern side of the Isonzo. The Corps Commander explained that the Isonzo was more or less an empirical boundary. .. .

12. His instructions to me were that I should try and form strong AMG teams west of the Isonzo and introduce effective Military Government there. East of the Isonzo I was not to introduce Military Government nor put up proclamations. I should have men available to move forward into the country east of the Isonzo should a decision be reached which would enable us to do this....

15. The picture presented is certainly a queer one. Of all the possibilities for which we planned I think we did not contemplate that two armies with, at any rate different immediate aims, should be completely superimposed one on the other. Jugoslav and Allied troops are completely intermingled....

19. Co-operation from the J/S [Jugoslav] authorities varied in a very remarkable way and it was Brigadier Eve's opinion that this was in a great measure due to their fear to take any action without consulting their own high command. Hence a tendency to stall. . . . Major General [Robinson E.] Duff had first come to secure an agreement as to the conditions under which we would use the port. These local negotiations had broken down and matters were proceeding on a day to day basis.

20. Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Robertson had been in Trieste the previous day, 11th May, and the plan was to go ahead with the development of the port but on a scale much reduced from the first ideas. . . . The port installations were not badly damaged and the electric cranes were working.

23. Brigadier Eve thought that the J/S had done well in getting the city going. The city services were all working and the tramways were running.

24. When the J/S first came in they locked up nearly all the influential Italians. They did not take many of them-if any-out of the city and many of them were now being released. There had been very little shooting. There had been a considerable amount of requisitioning and a good deal of looting....

28. . . . In the city area round the port, Allied and J/S officers and Headquarters are completely intermingled. Heavily armed J/S patrols of from eight to ten stolid and tough looking soldiers move slowly about. There are-so far as I could see- no allied patrols, but the Allied armed sentries outside our H.Q. are very smartly turned out. A strong company of J/S troops were drilling inside the dock area with Allied lorries coming and going around them.

29. It must be said that the streets of Trieste give an impression very different from that of any other "liberated" city which I have seen lately. The banks are closed and very nearly all the shops. The people are going about quietly and there is no manifestation of enthusiasm of any sort. There are many proclamations up, and wall slogans in Slovene everywhere. There are many J/S national flags. I also saw flags in the Italian colours with a star in the place of the shield of Savoy. I had also noticed these in Monfalcone. There were also public manifestoes in the same colouring. I asked [Lt. Col.] Armstrong about these. His report was that these were issued by the Italian Communist party of Trieste. This party was now in a very disillusioned state. They had been prime cooperators with the J/S in securing control of the city from the Germans and they now found themselves completely left out in the cold. They had been described as the "Trojan horse" of Trieste. I read one of these manifestoes. It laid great stress on the fraternity between the Italian and J/S peoples and acclaimed an autonomous Trieste within the framework of a federated Jugoslavia. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Dunlop, RC, Venezie Rgn, Rpt for May 1945, p. 25, ACC files, 10000/105/248]

♦ ♦ ♦ The decision had been taken by 8th Army that AMG could not be set up in Trieste, and although Lt. Col. [Joseph D.] Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong and other officers entered the city


and took up residence near Miramare, they did not function as AMG. However, it was found possible to establish AMG control in certain Communes within the Provinces of Gorizia and Trieste West of the Isonzo River, and AMG officers were installed there notably in Grado, Gradisca and Cormons. In the 1st week of the month at a series of discussions with 8th Army, Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner, and with Brigadier Henn from G-5 AFHQ, plans were worked out for the eventual severance of the Venezia Giulia group from the main portion of Venezie Region.8  ♦ ♦ ♦


[NAF 965, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 13 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 4005]

1. Allied commission have urgently requested policy for feeding civil population of Venezia Giulia, if it is not to be under Allied Military Government.

2. Allied Commission state that Gorizia and Trieste Provinces are largely dependent on Po Valley for supplies; that food situation in Monfalcone and Trieste is serious and that Jugoslav raiding parties have been requisitioning very large quantities of food in Udine Province.

3. After careful consideration have concluded that relief cannot practicably be furnished by us under present conditions. Apart from Tito's assumption of full responsibility for Civil Government and his refusal to permit AMG to function, no physical facilities exist for introduction and distribution of civilian supplies. Handover to Partisan forces is only alternative. If this were done, supplies would unquestionably be diverted to Tito's Army which is itself without administration and maintenance and whose foraging has contributed largely to present serious situation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 17 May 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 5666]

5. Jugoslav behaviour both in Austria and Venezia Giulia is making a very unfavourable impression on Allied troops both US and British. Our men are obliged to look on without power to intervene whilst actions which offend their traditional sense of justice are committed. Further, our men feel that by taking no action they are condoning such behaviour. As a result feeling against Jugoslavs is now strong and is getting stronger daily.

6. It is now certain that any solution by which we shared an area with Jugoslav troops or Partisans or permitted Jugoslav administration to function would not work.


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-11]

In connection with the problem of occupying Venezia Giulia and portions of Austria, Marshal Tito's reply to our proposals is unsatisfactory, and he is being urged to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile Field Marshal Alexander is directed, with maximum practicable assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately to reinforce his troops in the disputed areas so that our preponderance of force in those areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. Special precautionary measures will be taken so that an overt act, if any, will be by Tito's forces and will not be based on some local display by a few turbulent individuals.



[NAF 983, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 23 May 45, 9 AFHQ files, MC-OUT 7874]

My views on the proposals of the Jugoslav Government regarding Venezia Giulia are:
1. I could not agree to Jugoslav officers partici-


pating in the Allied Military Government (AMG) of the area but I have no objection to a small mission being attached to headquarters, Eighth Army as observers.

2. I would agree to a Jugoslav regular detachment not exceeding 2000 all ranks occupying an area selected by me west of the Morgan Line. This detachment would be under my orders. To prevent any attempt to requisition local resources, it would be maintained by administrative services. Personnel would not be allowed access to the rest of the area.

3. I am prepared to allow my AMG to "Act through the civil authorities which are already set up in that area." My AMG must be empowered to use whatever civil authority they deem best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion. I would, of course, instruct them to use Jugoslav civil administrators wherever they were functioning satisfactorily.

4. An extra condition should now be made to the effect that the Jugoslavs will return all non-Jugoslav residents in the area whom they have arrested or deported and make restitution of property they have confiscated or removed.

5. The draft agreement which my chief of staff presented to Tito on 8 May [NAF 948, sec. 3, above] is still the basis of army [my] requirements subject to the considerations in 1, 2, 3, and 4 above.

6. I do not either wish or consider it desirable to take over Pola or the line of communication from Trieste to Pola. My requirements are confined to the use of the port of Pola and the anchorages on the west coast of Istria by the Allied Navies.


[Text of Belgrade Agreement on Venezia Giulia Between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister and the U.S. and British Ambassadors, 9 Jun 45, Dept of State Bull, 1945, P- 1050]

1. The portion of the territory of Venezia Giulia west of a line which includes Trieste, the railways and roads from there to Austria via Gorizia, Caporetto, and Tarvisio, Pola and the anchorages on the west cost of Istria will be under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. All naval, military, and air forces west of the line will be placed under his command from the moment at which this agreement comes into force. Yugoslav forces in the area must be limited to a detachment of regular troops not exceeding 2,000 of all ranks. These troops will be maintained by the Supreme Allied Commander's administrative services. They will occupy a district selected by the Supreme Allied Commander west of the dividing line and will not be allowed access to the rest of the area.

3. Using an Allied Military Government, the Supreme Allied Commander will govern the areas west of the line, Pola and such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he may deem necessary. A small Yugoslav mission may be attached to the Headquarters of the Eighth Army as observers. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily. The Allied Military Government will, however, be empowered to use whatever civil authorities they deem best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion.

4. Marshal Tito will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of Venezia Giulia west of the line by (date to be inserted) 1945. Arrangements for the retention of the Yugoslav detachment referred to in paragraph (2) will be worked out between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Yugoslav High Command.

5. Any irregular forces in this area will, according to the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander in each case, either hand in their arms to the Allied Military Authorities and disband, or withdraw from the area.

6. The Yugoslav Government will return residents of the area whom they have arrested or deported with the exception of persons who possessed Yugoslav nationality in 1939, and make restitution of property they have confiscated or removed.

7. This agreement in no way prejudices or affects the ultimate disposal of the parts of Venezia Giulia west of the line. Similarly the military occupation and administration by Yugoslavia of the parts of Venezia Giulia east of the line in no way prejudices or affects the ultimate disposal of that area.


[App. I of Agreement Between CofS, AFHQ, and the Jugoslav CofS, 20 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207]

1. Since the line of demarcation cuts across existing areas of civil administration and economic activity, it is agreed that mutual arrangements should be arrived at which will ensure a minimum interference with the normal life of Venezia Giulia as a whole. The specific arrangements will have to be the subject of study and negotia-


tion between experts of AMG and of the Jugoslav authorities. The more important subjects to be covered and the principles which it is proposed should govern these discussions are as follows:
(a) Communications-Telephone
and Telegraph communications will be uncontrolled between the two areas. Mail facilities will be continued.
(b) Transportation-Rail
communication will be continued. In order to regulate traffic and ensure equitable utilization of equipment, a joint operating committe will be established.
(c) Commerce and Industry-Normal
economic movement across the line of demarcation is to continue subject only to control sufficient to prevent unauthorized movement of supplies. In order to work out the detailed arrangements for the interchange of power and of industrial, mineral and agricultural resources of both areas, a joint economic committee will be established.

All questions arising under the arrangements now existing between the Jugoslav authorities and industries in AMG area, including question of the continuance of such arrangements and the terms thereof, will be brought before this committee for determination.

It will be the policy to continue all such arrangements as do not prejudice the interests of the territory for which AMG is responsible and to utilize all industrial facilities in the area to the fullest extent in order to meet the needs of Jugoslav and other claimants on these facilities.

No plant or industrial facility will be moved out of Venezia Giulia during the period of this agreement. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Brig Gen Sir John Harding, GOC, XIII Corps, to AFHQ, 23 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207]

1. The concern expressed in your signal is quite unfounded. I am vigorously applying the Supreme Allied Commander's policy to G-5 as well as other matters and am not admitting the Jugoslavs to any participation in AMG activities West of the Morgan line.

2. The setting up of machinery to deal with the many practical problems of administration, particularly on the economic side, is not inconsistent with this policy. It is, in fact, a necessity if economic life in Trieste and the other cities in our zone is not to be paralyzed.

3. We have proposed two agencies or committees to deal with economic matters (a) Railways.

If trains are to continue to operate from Trieste into the Jugoslav zone, there must be working arrangements as to schedules, allocations of rolling stock, particularly with a view to insuring the return of rolling stock to AMG area, provision of fuel, priorities of traffic and other like questions.

(b) Industry and Commerce. Generally speaking, we control the industries and power of the area while the Jugoslavs have coal which is very important to us. Some group of experts must be convened to work out agreements by which we will, say, permit the contracts which the Jugoslavs have already made in Trieste for ship building to continue to be performed in return for allocation of the Istrian coal production. For each of the above purposes, it is planned to convene small groups of experts of AMG and the Jugoslavs to discuss procedures and negotiate agreements. I have sufficient confidence in the experts which the Allied Commission will be asked to furnish to feel sure that these committees will not operate as Trojan horses for Jugoslav infiltration into AMG. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ACC Hq, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

8. . . . Allied Military Government was formally set up in Trieste on 12 June and in Gorizia on 14 June.

9. . . . Reaction to . . . settlement of the Venezia Giulia question was not favourable in Italy. The Council of Ministers ... referred to the agreement as an "unsatisfactory arrangement." The "Globe" pointed out that Italy had "lost" by the terms of the agreement "about half the national production of coal, almost all her bauxite and a good part of her mercury." A one day general strike took place in Trieste on 26 June but there were no complications and Marshal Tito's latest speech on the possibility of Yugoslavia and Italy living in friendly relations "in an atmosphere of progressive democracy" should serve to clear the air. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Report by Recent Visitor to Venezia Giulia, in ACC Hq, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

47- Outwardly Trieste does not strike one as being the hot spot or the powder keg of Europe, as it has been variously described. Except when there


is a general strike, a superficial air of normality abounds. The bulk of the population seems to be either in the sea, bathing alongside the Allied troops, or in the trams which take them to and from the beaches. Food does not appear to be very short and flour was being sold on the quaysides from little ships coming in from the coastal towns at 40 to 50 lire per kilo....

48. But that is only on the surface. Underneath there is a complex problem of nationalism and politics, of economic distress and, at any rate in Pola and Monfalcone, the pressing problem of war damage, all of which are producing for the AMG authorities under XIII Corps one of the most difficult tasks that has faced the Allies in Italy.

49. But one and all are tackling it quietly and efficiently and in the true spirit of AMG's position as trustees in a disputed territory. AMG is dealing with the territory as an administrative case with the one object of establishing good government without fear or favour. There is no doubt that stability is being established: it may probably be upset from time to time by forces beyond control but the effect of impartiality and firm administration is being felt; it can be seen. ♦ ♦ ♦



[XIII Corps Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 3, 11 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/299]

2. On the withdrawal of Jugoslav troops and administration from the coastal areas, the situation there will have been considerably modified by over a month of Jugoslav occupation.... Their policy has been threefold; first to conscript, to requisition and to control supplies and equipment of all sorts for their military and economic needs; secondly to establish local administrations sponsored by themselves and favourable to Jugoslav claims while at the same time eliminating or driving underground the pro-Italian factions; and thirdly to ensure that the requisite organization to keep alive pro-Slav sentiments survives the ostensible withdrawal of their influence.

4. The establishment of Jugoslav sponsored local authorities was one of the earliest measures adopted by the Jugoslavs. These authorities issue the various decrees by which the life of the people is controlled and thus give an ostensible display of popular self-government which the Jugoslavs presumably hope will survive their withdrawal. Those who serve on the various committees are not necessarily bad characters nor indeed pro-Slav; the elections, which are apparently prearranged rather than spontaneous, have resulted on several occasions in some respected member of the community such as a doctor being nominated contrary to his own wishes. The general impression given by these committees is that they comprise earnest and inexperienced persons, with some stiffening of the fire brand agitator type....

5. Corresponding to their efforts to establish administrations favourable to themselves, the Jugoslavs have suppressed or driven underground the Italian and autonomist C.L.N.'s which, however, continue propaganda activity. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, CSO, XIII Corps, for SCAO, XIII Corps, 15 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/159/1090]

The Consiglio di Liberazione has seized control of supplies, and for the past several weeks has been issuing orders to the duly constituted Italian supply agencies. For example, the Economic Committee of the Consiglio has been dictating ration policy to Sepral, and wished to continue this function. The Petroleum Committee has seized the stocks of AGIP,10  and it has been announced in the local paper that this committee would distribute POL locally. I have advised both of these committees that for the time being at least, their only capacity will be advisory. It appears to this office that both committees are dominated by Jugoslavs who are motivated by other than purely economic considerations. Indeed, it is more than probable that they are inspired by the political ambitions of Jugoslavia. ♦ ♦ ♦


[NAF 1023, AFHQ to CCS, 25 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207, MC-OUT 7853]

1. During Trieste conferences difference developed with Jugoslavs over interpretation Para 3, Belgrade agreement [Section 4, above] regarding continuance Civil Administration. Jugoslavs submitted memorandum containing proposals not acceptable to U.S. Memorandum and our comments attached to agreement forwarded to you. In view expressed attitude Jugoslavs, radio broadcasts of last few days and declaration local Slovene groups, desire confirmation our interpretation as basis for possible further discussion or action.

2. Para 3, Belgrade agreement provides that use will be made of any Jugoslav Civil Administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily.

3. Present status of Civil Administration in our area is generally as follows:
Italian administration is functioning in part but has in part been suspended by Jugoslav action during the period of their occupation. The Prefecture staff is still on the payroll but has been relieved of any executive responsibility. Organizations such as Genio Civile, Sepral and the Consorzio are still functioning executively with Jugoslavs appointed chiefs. In place of the Prefecture staff the Jugoslavs have set up committees of liberation with sub-committees having jurisdiction in various administrative fields which up to the present have been exercising executive powers. This pattern has been followed down through the district and communal level with the regional committee exercising executive control over the whole area. Obviously, this Jugoslav committee administration is not completely or finally organized but it was the machinery which was functioning on the date of our occupation. The Jugoslavs are taking the position that the Belgrade agreement commits us to adopt this committee structure as the "existing administration."

4. We have maintained that inasmuch as the basic law of this area is and must continue to be Italian the Italian administrative system must in its essentials be continued; that it was the intention of the agreement that our commitment to continue existing administration related to personnel rather than to the system of administration itself; and that the committee system as an executive instrument of local government cannot be recognized but that committees where useful will be employed in an advisory capacity as in other parts of Italy.

5. We are convinced that above position is the proper one and the only one we can take as practical matter. Some color may be given to Jugoslav claim by wording of Para 3. You will recall that the draft which we submitted read "administrators" in place of "administration." Had this wording appeared in final agreement the position would have been perfectly clear. 11  We of course have in mind the qualification that the administration must in view of SAC be working satisfactorily. However we do not believe we should rely on this as we might then have the wholly anomalous situation of a committee form of government in one commune and the Italian system functioning in the adjacent locality. This would obviously be unworkable in practice.

6. Request confirmation that our interpretation is correct and any further guidance you may wish to give us.


[Directive, AFHQ to Hq Eighth Army, 26 Jun 45, 12  ACC files, 10000/109/2071

3. Attitude Toward Claimant Nations: No steps will be taken which support or may appear to support or prepare for any ultimate disposition of the area to any claimant nation.

4. Control of Line of Demarcation: The artificial "Frontier" created by the line of demarcation [see Belgrade Agreement, Section 4, above] will not be a closed frontier. Only such controls as may from time to time be deemed necessary by you or as may be agreed with the Jugoslav authorities will be imposed.

5. Local Government: The local government through which you will administer the area will be based on the Italian administrative system which existed and was in effect on 8 September 1943. It is not necessary, however, that all offices and appointments be filled. You may also, if for


administrative reasons it appears expedient to do so, make adjustments and modifications in the foregoing administrative system, so long as its essential structure is not changed. You will administer the area as a separate region, under your command but subject to the technical control of the Allied Commission. No civilian government official will be permitted to refer to or obtain instruction from authorities outside the area.

6. Appointment of Officers:
a. The appointment of prefects and all officials will be vested in Allied Military Government. You will utilize whatever civil authorities you deem best in any particular place and administrative personnel will be changed at your discretion. Subject to the above, use will be made of any Jugoslav civil administration which you find on entry to be already set up and which in your view is working satisfactorily. In interpreting the term "civil administration" you should consider that the term relates to personnel employed rather than the system of administration itself.
b. If you decide that it is impracticable to administer through local authorities you will resort to direct administration, calling for advice from local committees to be selected by you.

7. Legal:
a. The laws of the territory as established and in effect on 8 September 1943 will remain in force. All Republican Fascist legislation as well as any Jugoslav legislation will be abrogated. Italian decrees promulgated since 8 September 1943 will not be implemented. When necessary Allied Military Government orders will be issued, covering the subject matter of any such decrees.
b. You will suspend the right of appeal to Rome from decisions of the Court of Appeals in Trieste.
c. In particular, any Peoples' Court now functioning in the area will not be permitted to continue. Active Fascists, Nazis, their supporters and collaborationists will be interned pending further instructions. Local boards may be employed to advise you in this connection. You will receive a further directive on this subject in the near future.

8. Police:
You will
maintain and strengthen whatever police force is found to be functioning satisfactorily on your arrival. Carabinieri will not be introduced but may be used where found. If existing police organizations are inadequate you may in your discretion establish new organizations for the purpose. Patriots may be temporarily employed as auxiliary police at your discretion but you will effect complete disarmament as soon as practicable. The Questura system will be reinstated after the puration of Fascist elements.

9. Finance:
a. Allied Military Lire and the metropolitan lire will be the only currencies accorded the status of legal tender. No other currencies will be recognized. You will use Allied Military Lire in preference to metropolitan lire wherever possible.
b. No exchange rate will be decreed other than that for the lire in relation to the dollar and pound sterling. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Hq AC to Col Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, 3 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/495]

1. In order to avoid the appearance of introducing into Venezia Giulia current legislation passed by the Italian Government, the policy of implementing Italian Governmental and Ministerial Decrees will not be adopted in this region.

Effective legislation will therefore consist of the Proclamations of the Supreme Allied Commander and Military Governor, supplemented by such Regional or Provincial Orders as may be required.

The General Orders issued by AMG, either before or after the date of this directive will not be put into operation in Venezia Giulia as General Orders, but where applicable should be reissued as Regional Orders.

2. The absence of the Italian legislation leaves certain gaps in the legislation required for the administration of the territory and will necessitate the issue of additional Regional Orders. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 18 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/495, CM-OUT 5051]

A special Civil Police Force of high quality is urgently required for that part of Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line. Based upon the assumption that we are holding Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line in trust for ultimate disposition at the peace table and that we should direct our action so as not to prejudice eventual delivery to either claimant, then it is believed that


this Police Force should be equipped, maintained, administered and commanded as a combined U.S.-UK commitment exercised through the military chain of command. Accordingly, approval is requested to equip and maintain a special Civil Police Force of approximately 3,500 as a combined commitment with the responsibility for providing necessary equipment and supplies to be agreed within the Theater on an equitable basis.


[Proposed Supplementary Directive, AFHQ to Hq XIII Corps and Hq AC, 29 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/159/ 1859]

3. The guiding principle is that laid down in paragraph 3 of the Directive:
No steps will be taken which support or may appear to support or prepare for any ultimate disposition of the area to any claimant nation.
The application of this principle involves certain modifications in the established interpretation of the words "technical control." These are considered below.

4. Political
It is implicit in the principle quoted in paragraph 3 above that political guidance for this area should be laid down by AFHQ; subject to the condition that, when Italian interests are involved in any decision which may have long-term repercussions, Allied Commission should be consulted in order to represent the Italian case.

Commander XIII Corps is responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander for the Military Government of the Region. SCAO Venezia Giulia will be his principal staff officer and adviser in all matters pertaining to the discharge of these responsibilities. For technical and routine matters the SCAO will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and will deal with him under the general direction of Commander, XIII Corps.

5. Public Safety
The recruitment, training and maintenance of the Venezia Giulia Police Force will be a joint Allied responsibility. Political considerations make it essential that it shall show no overt connection with Italian personnel or methods; Allied Commission will therefore have no responsibility in regard to this, except that AFHQ may call on Allied Commission for technical advice as to matters of policy, the operation of the Questura system, etc., and Allied Commission may be requested to supply certain Public Safety Officers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 25 Aug 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 7196]

1. Reference is to following papers, paraphrases of which have reached this Hq through political advisers:
A. Jugoslav government note of 18 July to U.S. Government protesting against Allied failure to observe Para 3 of Belgrade agreement and in particular at reinstatement of Italian laws and administrative system in effect on 8 September 1943, at elimination of civil administration set up by national committees, peoples' courts and national militia, and at restraints placed on departmental National Liberation Committee and its agencies;
B. Letters of 26 July from Marshal Tito and Dr. [ Ivan ] Subasic [ Subasicth ] to President Truman and Mr. Churchill, proposing that the population of Allied occupied Venezia Giulia should be permitted to elect an administration of its own choosing which would function in close collaboration with AMG.

2. SACMED's interpretation of Para 3 of Belgrade Agreement, was set out in NAF 1023 [CM-IN 7853, 25 June 1945, above].

Following is interpretation of Par 4 of NAF 1023:
A. Even prior to the withdrawal of Jugoslav troops, considerable experience was gained of the so-called Jugoslav administrative machinery as Allied troops were in occupation of part of the area side by side with Jugoslav troops. After establishment of AMG, the peoples' courts, the national militia, Slovene civil agencies and departmental liberation committees or councils were eliminated one by one as incapable of functioning in practice. It is emphasized that no other course was possible if the area was to be administered impartially. Use, however, has been made where possible of Slovene and other officials appointed by the Jugoslavs. Liberation committees and councils still exist but are regarded as advisory only and not a part of the government.
B. Venezia Giulia was part of Metropolitan Italy from 1918-1943. Adoption of basic Italian civil law, with provision for elimination of Fascist elements and other changes required by military necessity was, therefore, considered to be in accordance with international law and normal military government functions. Regard-


less of any other considerations, it was and is necessary to make use of Allied commission machinery and personnel for expert advice and to conduct the day-to-day functions of military government in the area. It is unworkable and impracticable to operate a system of government which is quite different from that which is being operated in the remainder of Italy.

4. Reinstatement of basic Italian civil law was number one, which is criticised in Jugoslav note of 18th July. Proclamation accordingly promulgated in AMG proclamation specifically provided for elimination of Fascist agencies and doctrines.

5. Jugoslav note of 26 July contains suggestion that area occupied by the Allied Forces should be regarded as having been "liberated" from both German and Italian authority and that national elections should be held to choose government which will "collaborate" with AMG. This might well result in a lack of control incompatible with Allied military responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 Aug 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-B, CCS 739/23]

1.... You should continue to press home with the Jugoslavs the position that Allied Military Government will take no action which will prejudice the position of either of the disputing parties and that during Allied period of trusteeship the laws applicable in the territory will be Italian laws purged of all Fascist measures and supplemented by Allied Military Government proclamations and orders.

2. You should as far as possible administer the area on following lines: Jugoslav system of national committees should in general be discontinued in whole area and Italian system reinstalled. In predominantly Jugoslav towns and villages, token Jugoslav administration might be retained and national committee used in advisory capacity.



[Min of SCAO's Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 10 Jul 45, Reel 3169, MGF files, Venezia Giulia, 10 Jul 45-24 Jun 46]

♦ ♦ ♦ Lt Col Armstrong, Area Commissioner for Trieste, reported that he had endeavored to bring various political groups together at a meeting on Monday, 9 July, for the purpose of reaching an agreement as to the formation of a joint committee for the purpose of submitting recommendations as to the reestablishment of local government but that his efforts has been unsuccessful due to the opposition of the Slovene Committee. He did expect, however, to get the Slovene Committee to participate. Further he was having difficulty in removing the Slovene Commissioner from offices he had established during the Jugoslav occupation, but pressure was being brought to bear to securing the premises concerned....

Lt Col [A. G.] Simson, Area Commissioner for Gorizia, reported that he had discovered the best procedure in handling Slovene and Italian Committees was to direct them to settle, through joint action, by themselves, all details pertaining to the problems arising as a result of the occupation; that the Committees had agreed to a form of local government within the outline of the plan which he had given them. That problems had arisen with regards to fire service. The Slovenes had matched an existing Italian Fire Service and both services were at present in operation subject to an order from him that casualties would not be replaced until the total number of firemen had been reduced to the original figure, which in effect would permit an amalgamation at a reasonable number. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

1. SCAO expressed the opinion that efforts of AMG were not receiving the willing cooperation and understanding of the people and that the time is approaching when our policy must be applied in a stronger manner.♦ ♦ ♦


[Col Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

2. Local Government
In Trieste discussions have been held with the object of setting up some form of representative local government on the Area Level. . . . In the Communes some reorganization progress has been successfully accomplished. The City of Tri-


este had, of course, a special problem in the City "Council" of liberation whose leading personalities are extreme Communists (predominantly Slovenes) and would appear (though of course they deny this) to be predominantly pro-Jugoslavia. This Committee claims to, but does not in fact, carry on the government of the City and is generally uncooperative in its dealings with the Allied Military Government. . . . Steps are being taken toward the removal of . . . Jugoslav officials who hold high positions in the Harbor offices at Trieste and Monfalcone at the moment. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of SCAO's Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

♦ ♦ ♦ Col Henry S. Robertson stated that he and the Area Commissioners now have a firmer grip of the situation and that the main problems will be:
a. Introduction of Local Govt System to be as tactful as possible.
b. Appointment of Officials as fairly as possible, in proportion to population,
c. Modifications and adjustments to convert from the Italian Govt based on Province to present area formations.
d. Discouraging use of the term "fascist" to Italians in a general way. 13

Local Italian Govt system had only two levels, and the Jugoslavs instituted four levels-Regional, District, Sub-district and Communal. We must intermix these four levels. It is obvious that the Regional level of government must be done away with due to Jugoslav influence on that level. All Chiefs of Divisions are asked not to deal with any bodies on a regional level. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at Hq, AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1.... Re the demonstrations held in the area from time to time-SCAO expressed the opinion that they were more welcome than strikes as long as they were orderly and without incident. AMG permission is still necessary for public gathering or demonstrations, but insofar as possible such permission should be granted in a liberal manner. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 1 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

♦ ♦ ♦ [Colonel Bowman, SCAO:] Two petitions are being circulated in the occupied territory-one enrolling members in the Communist Party; the other calling for the annexation of this area to Jugoslavia. The circulating of these petitions as such need not be stopped, but any attempts to obtain signatures by violence, threats of violence, or other forms of duress constitutes an offence, and persons guilty of such action should be apprehended wherever possible. ♦ ♦ ♦


[XII Corps Admin Instrs 12, 5 Aug 45, AFHQ K-310A, CAO files, 209/7/6, vol. I]

2. This Police Force is specially constituted to meet the particular conditions obtaining in the Allied occupation of Venezia Giulia. It is composed of both Allied military and local civilian recruited police and has been formed from the following:
(a) From certain United States and British Army formation Provost units
(b) Specially selected personnel from US and British non-Provost units
(c) Specially enlisted civil personnel.

3. The Force will, within the Allied occupied area of Venezia Giulia, exercise all these police functions formerly performed by:
(a) Formation Military Police
(b) The Civil Police Force in existence before the Allied occupation.

The Military Police component will be responsible for both Military and Civil Police functions. The Civil Police component will be concerned with Civil Police matters only. ♦ ♦ ♦


[GO II, Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, 11 Aug 45, 14  AMG Gazette No. I ]


Organ of Local Government

1. The occupied Territory, for purposes of local government, is divided into the Areas of Trieste and Gorizia and into the Commune of Pola, each of which shall be composed of the Communes and fractions thereof as presently constituted.

2. Each Area shall have an Area President and Area Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

3. Each Commune shall have a Communal President and Communal Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

4. Each Area and Commune shall have such administrative and executive departments and agencies as the Allied Military Government may deem necessary for the proper carrying out of the functions of local government.


Area President

1. The Area President shall be appointed and be removed by the Allied Military Government.

2. He shall be directly responsible to the Allied Military Government for the local government of the Area and shall submit all orders and decrees for its prior approval.

3. He shall be the executive and administrative head of the Area local government and shall be subject to the provisions of this General Order and all further orders which may hereafter be made by the Allied Military Government and shall possess, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Prefect of a Province and of such Provincial and Prefectual legislative, administrative and executive bodies as are conferred by the Occupied Territory in effect on 8 Sept 1943 and by any proclamation or other order of the Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territory which may change or supersede such laws.


Area Administrative Departments

1. Allied Military Government shall establish such departments, divisions or agencies in the Area President's Office as may be necessary for the proper local government of the Area. ♦ ♦ ♦


Area Council

1. An Area Council shall be composed of a Chairman plus the following number of members for each of the Areas specified:

Area of Trieste-17 Members
Area of Gorizia-14 Members

all of whom shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

2. Consideration shall be given to the selection of the Chairman and Members from the leading citizens of the Area of the highest moral and political probity who shall be as far as possible, representative of all racial, political and economic groups and classes in the Area according to their respective local strength. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. An Area Council shall act as an advisory and consultative body to the Area President in all matters concerning the local government of the Area referred to it by the Area President and by the latter to the Area Commissioner of A.M.G. within two days after the meeting to which it related.


Heads of the Communal Government

1. The Head of a Commune shall be styled Communal President.

2. He shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

3. He shall possess in his Commune, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Mayor of a Commune and of such Communal administrative, legislative and executive bodies as are conferred by the laws referred to in Section I, subsection (3) hereof, and shall be subject to such supervision and control by the Area President as may be provided by the said laws. The Communal President of the Commune of Pola shall, in addition to his other powers, possess all of the powers and duties of an Area President as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 2 of this General Order.


Other Committees

No committee, council or group other than those herin created and provided for, except those previously constituted by a Proclamation or Order of the Allied Military Government, shall possess any of the administrative, legislative, executive or other powers of government.


Control of Allied Military Government

1. Allied Military Government is the only government in those parts of Venezia Giulia occupied by the Allied Forces and is the only authority empowered to issue orders and decrees and


to make appointment to public or other office.

All of the local government bodies created by and referred to in this order shall at all times be under the direct control and supervision of the Allied Military Government.

2. The Chairman and Members of the Area and Communal Councils and District Committees shall be unpaid. Salaries of all other officials shall be determined by the Allied Military Government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

2. Local Government
The chief events of the month have centered around the publication of General Order No. I I. The Order was published on the ii August both in the local papers and by posters.

As had been anticipated, the order was received with satisfaction, if not enthusiasm, by the Italian element, and has been rejected by the pro Tito Slovenes and the pro-Tito Italian Communists.

The Slovenees reacted immediately with demonstrations, petitions, delegations, letters, and articles in the local Slovene and Communist papers.

The reaction, however, was not as violent as at first had been expected, and vocal reaction died down as quickly as it arose.

There is little doubt that the "average" Slovenes would be quite prepared to cooperate .. - but are afraid to do so because they have received instructions from the Regional National Liberation Committee not to submit candidates as officials or members of the different councils. ♦ ♦ ♦

... There is every reason to believe that this Committee receives its orders from Belgrade or some higher authority on the other side of the demarcation line.

It is interesting to note that in Gorizia Area the present Acting President, a Slovene, has told the Area Commissioner that he is sorry he cannot cooperate but that he is a party man and must obey party orders....

.... The President [of the Regional National Liberation Committee] was given a week in which to make up his mind as to whether his Committee would cooperate . . . or continue in their policy of non-cooperation which will mean, of course, that the Slovene party and the Italian Communist pro-Slovene party would not be represented in any of the different offices of local government.

The attitude of the Regional National Liberation Council can be summed up as follows:
"We will willingly cooperate if the Allied Military Government will govern in accordance with our views and through our institutions, but we will not cooperate otherwise, as any other form of government is considered to be Fascist and non-democratic." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at AMG Hq, XIII Corps, 1 Sep 45]

2. Local Government Committee (Col Robertson)
It is believed we have arrived at the stage where fruitless discussions must cease and action must be taken by Allied Military Government to appoint the necessary officials to implement Local Government General Order No. II. As a result of discussion with Mr. France Bevk, President of CLN, it was learned that he was sending instructions to opposition elements to oppose the Local Government General Order, but he stated he accepted full responsibility for this opposition, and claimed to receive no orders from "across the line." President is ready for appointment in Gorizia Area, but says he is under orders not to accept the position.

SCAO stated that he had replied to formal note of protest from CLN to our General Order No. II, and once more requested them to cooperate and make recommendations and nominations to Allied Military Government authorities. If this "passive resistance" continues until next Saturday, 8 September, we will go ahead without recommendations. Meanwhile, we must continue to exercise patience and make repeated offers to consider nominations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 8 Sep 45, Reel 3167, MGD files]

2. Local Government Committee (Col Robertson)
Conference yesterday with Mr. Bevk, President of the Consiglio di Liberazioni di Trieste ("Italo-Slovene") failed to produce any cooperation from that quarter. We are now going ahead with appointment of officials and formation of councils without recommendations from this advisory Committee. In those villages which are completely Slovene, CAO's will have to carry on for a time and await developments. An opening was still left to Mr. Bevk in that we said we might reshuffle our councils later on if his constituents changed their minds and decided to cooperate.


SCAO stated that we might have to resort to direct Military Government in some places, but this would be delayed, and avoided if possible; such an administration would be instituted only if we are unable to obtain local civilian officials. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 8 Sep 45]

3. Lt Col Armstrong, Area Commissioner for Trieste Area

In the Cesana area it will be quite impossible to implement Local Government General Order No. II in any way. The community is predominantly Slovene and if we try to introduce a Communal Council as such, all civil officials will quit and no one will be available to perform their duties. It is believed this situation will also prevail in four Slovene Communes in the Monfalcone district.

SCAO remarked that while we shall eventually have to comply with the letter as well as the spirit . . . of our directives, it is assumed that higher headquarters do not want us to force this issue too precipitately. General Order No. II, wherever it can, will be implemented now and we shall force the errant children into the mold later. Our first job is to keep the peace and feed the people. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Sep 45, p. 2, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

♦ ♦ ♦ The situation at the end of the month was as follows:
(a) All three Areas have Area Presidents and Councils functioning in accordance with General Order No. II.
(b) Eighteen out of the thirty-seven Communes have Commune Presidents and councils functioning in accordance with General Order No. I I.
(c) Nineteen Communes have refused to nominate any officials and are either operating under the local CAO or have retained their original Committees which are operating under the supervision of the local CAO.
(d) The nineteen Communes which come under the heading of (c) above, represent approximately only 15% of the population of occupied Venezia Giulia. In fact no Commune with a population over 10,000 comes under this heading. . . . It is interesting to note that amongst the nineteen Communes which are refusing to cooperate there are four Communes whose populations are over 90% Italian. In each case the people of these Communes are either extremely Communistic or completely overawed by the Communist elements. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt Gen Sir John Harding, CG, XIII Corps, for G-5, AFHQ, 14 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/159/800]

1. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, 13 Corps has represented that there should be an increase in the ration of the civil population in his area....

2. The S.C.A.O's reasons for proposing an increase . . . may be summarized as follows:
a. Strong influences are at work in an attempt to discredit the military government of Venezia Giula. A shortage of food would almost certainly be exploited in this connection and would be likely to lead to grave disorders.
b. The Chief Public Health Officer reports that the present ration is utterly insufficient to maintain health when it can no longer be supplemented by fruit and vegetables.
c. Venezia Giulia suffers under certain disadvantages inherent in its present autonomy in that it is economically weakened by the Morgan line and that only an unimportant quantity of food does, in practice, come in from the remainder of Italy. It is therefore likely to be less well fed than its neighbours in Jugo-Slavia and the remainder of Italy.

3. It is requested that the situation should be examined as a matter of urgency and that, if the ration is found, as stated by the Chief Public Health Officer, to be inadequate, an increased ration be authorised in view of the important political implications outlined above. 16


[Remarks, Armstrong, Area Cmsr for Trieste, in Min of Mtg at Hq, AMG, XIII Corps, 21 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/109/321]

♦ ♦ ♦ In those communes where communal councils have been appointed, Local Government is functioning satisfactorily. Where direct rule has been implemented the CAO's are doing excellent work, in spite of many difficulties. It may soon be possible to appoint a communal council at Aurisina where there is a predominantly Slovene population (approximately 80%).

The members of such councils will of course be pro-Yugoslav but, although they object to making contact with the "fascist" officials at Provincial Headquarters [Italians], they seem willing to cooperate with Allied Military Government. This situation can be overcome by getting CAO's to act as "go betweens" until there is a change of heart. As a matter of experience they will eventually start doing business in the normal way. 17



[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, 10 February 1947, Dept of State Publication 2743, European Series 21, Annex VI, pp. 60-61]

Article 2. Integrity and Independence

The integrity and independence of the Free Territory shall be assured by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. This responsibility implies that the Council shall:
(a) ensure the observance of the present Statute and in particular the protection of the basic human rights of the inhabitants.
(b) ensure the maintenance of public order and security in the Free Territory.

Article 3. Demilitarization and Neutrality

1. The Free Territory shall be demilitarized and declared neutral.

Article 9. Organs of Government

For the government of the Free Territory there shall be a Governor, a Council of Government, a popular Assembly elected by the people of the Free Territory and a Judiciary, whose respective powers shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute and of the Constitution of the Free Territory.

Article 11. Appointment of the Governor

The Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy. He shall not be a citizen of Yugoslavia or Italy or of the Free Territory. He shall be appointed for five years and may be reappointed. His salary and allowances shall be borne by the United Nations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, Italy, 10 Feb 47, Dept of State 2743, European Series 21, Annex VII, pp. 71-72]

The present provisions shall apply to the administration of the Free Territory of Trieste pending the coming into force of the Permanent Statute.

Article 1

The Governor shall assume office in the Free Territory at the earliest possible moment after the coming into force of the present Treaty. Pending assumption of office by the Governor, the Free Territory shall continue to be administered by the Allied military commands within their respective zones.

Article 5

(a) From the coming into force of the present Treaty, troops stationed in the Free Territory shall not -exceed 5,000 men for the United Kingdom, 5,000 men for the United States of America and 5,000 men for Yugoslavia.
(b) These troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor for a period of go days after his


assumption of office in the Free Territory. As from the end of that period, they will cease to be at the disposal of the Governor and will be withdrawn from the Territory within a further period of 45 days, unless the Governor advises the Security Council that, in the interests of the Territory, some or all of them should not, in his view, be withdrawn. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Bowman, SCAO, Venezia Giulia, Rpt for Feb 47, Reel 3167, MGD files]

At long last, on 10 February 1947, in Paris, the Treaty of Peace with Italy was signed, as a result of which the Free Territory of Trieste will, after ratification, come into existence.

As far as the world is concerned, the Trieste problem has been solved. Only those who understand the real implications of Annex VII of this Treaty, an avowedly political and ideological solution to a largely economic problem, are uneasy, shaking their heads, saying: "Well, there it is! It may work, but. . . . At any rate, we've got to try."

One could be much more optimistic about the future if both pro-Italians and pro-Jugoslav were determined to make the best of the business. Unfortunately neither group is in the least satisfied. Foreign Minister Stanoye Simic, who signed for Jugoslavia, later publicly proclaimed: "The signature of the Italian Peace Treaty does not mean that Jugoslavia gives up her claims to territories which are ethnically a part of our country. Jugoslavia will not cease to claim her rights to these territories." The Italian plenipotentiary, Sig. Lupi di Soragna, signed in silence, but later, about 26 February, following a two weeks debate on the new Government programme, the Italian Constituent Assembly resolved to serve notice on the United Nations Assembly that it would consider the Peace Treaty invalid without ratification by it (the Assembly)-a decision which was immediately followed by a vote of confidence in Sig. [Alcide] De Gasperi's new Government. ♦ ♦ ♦

The exodus from Pola continues. Anti-Tito Slovenes are still trekking westwards to a country which will probably be a little less unsympathetic to them than that which they are fleeing. These are the losers, who can do nothing but cut their losses and go. There are, of course, winners too. Already in Gorizia, pro-Slav-and even strictly impartial-Italians are being forced by intimidating letters from various exuberant Italian bodies to pack up and leave. In Monfalcone, the Italians are for the moment on top and busily repaying in kind past outrages by the pro Slavs. It is only reasonable, however disheartening, to suppose that this "paying-off" of old scores will continue for some time to come, and it can only be hoped that the common frontier between Jugoslavia and Italy will not be the storm-centre it shows at present every sign of becoming. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 17 Jul 47, AFHQ files, MC-IN 595]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. The agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning supply of civilian relief ended 3o June 1947. The United States has been informed by the United Kingdom that it can no longer contribute to the financing of these supplies but that it will still take part in the administration of the areas and in the distribution of the supplies which the United States furnishes.

2. After 30 June 1947 relief supplies will be provided by the United States and bought with funds which have been appropriated for relief assistance to the population of war-devastated countries in accordance with the authorization of Public Law 84-8oth Congress. 19 ♦ ♦ ♦


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