Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XVII:

A New Deal for Italy

On 26 September 1944 the President and the Prime Minister announced a new policy toward Italy-it was gradually to receive a greater measure of control in order to speed the day when it could again assume its "proper place in the great family of free nations." The policy was decided upon with the best of intentions, and eventually it was implemented with worthwhile results; earlier efforts, however, had in certain respects miscarried. The basic cause was disagreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Italy as to the extent of change in Allied policy which was desirable and practicable. The more immediate cause was that the President had proceeded in a series of unilateral announcements-undoubtedly willful but not, as will be seen, irresponsible-to broaden the new policy toward Italy into what the journalists could well call the New Deal for Italy. Whereas his joint announcement with Churchill indicated nothing more definite in the way of aid than support of an eventual UNRRA program, President Roosevelt supplemented the Allied political dispensation with an Allied economic dispensation, in particular an increased bread ration. When, owing to CCS apprehensions of a shipping shortage, months passed without appearance of any of the promised supplies, Italians felt very much let down and the British, who had had nothing to do with raising their hopes, but had to share the blame, felt somewhat put out.

If the President's New Deal started out wrong, so too, for that matter, did the new Anglo-American policy, for it was long delayed by the difficulty of deciding upon the precise details of implementation. But on the principle of relaxation of controls, there was no disagreement as this had by now become a matter of Allied as well as Italian interest as a result of several major developments. The first year of Allied hegemony over Italy was marked by close control because of military considerations, for all liberated Italy was in or near the battle zone. But with the freeing of Rome and central Italy the main strategic objectives of the Mediterranean campaign had been achieved and about half the country could be restored to the Italian Government. Since the liberation of the remainder might be a slow process it seemed especially logical to turn over more responsibility to that government. Further, the Italians themselves were beginning to bridle under Allied tutelage and were demanding more freedom of action. To have withheld this would have prejudiced the Allied postwar aim of close relations with a free Italy. Finally, Italy's contribution to the war effort and her return to liberal political principles led both British and American opinion to favor an improvement in her status and treatment. The British were perhaps slower to relent because they had been direct victims of Mussolini's perfidy, but Mr. Churchill, after visiting Italy in the summer of 1944, issued a statement to


the effect that he was disposed to forgive if not to forget.

A month later the Prime Minister and the President conferred together in the United States and issued the Hyde Park declaration on 26 September. An increasing measure of responsibility was to be extended to the Italian administration and, as an earnest of good intentions, the name of the Allied Control Commission was changed to Allied Commission. But SACMED could do nothing without a formal directive, and agreement on one was difficult to obtain because the United States saw more merit than did Great Britain in a preliminary peace treaty with Italy. In the meantime, some Allied authorities, despite Italian pressure for greater freedom, wished to maintain the status quo, even on issues unaffected by military necessity. They were so engrossed with questions of efficiency that they could not see the forest for the trees; administrative paternalism had become so ingrained that they tended to look upon their wards as helpless souls who would succumb to every peril if freed from restraint. Fortunately, in November the two governments decided to have the problem surveyed by a man who believed that the time for at least needless paternalism was over-Harold Macmillan, British Resident Minister, who to fulfil the new policy was now also made Acting President of the Allied Commission.

At the moment, however, the most difficult Allied problem was how to handle the Italian hue and cry for implementation in consequence of the President's unilateral announcements of October 1944 casting the United States in the role of Lord Bountiful. The first of these promised the Italians steps to increase the bread ration in areas deficient in food supplies, together with 1,700 trucks and electricity generating equipment; the second announced that the dollar equivalent of all lira issued as pay to American troops would be credited to the Italian Government to purchase civilian rehabilitation supplies. On 20 October the President wrote the Secretary of War that he wished to see established a 3oo-gram bread ration, thus far in effect only in southern Italy, for all liberated territory. Italian newspapers jubilantly reported the stories of American generosity in headlines. SACMED, having received no official communication, could only ask the CCS whether the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) intelligence reports that had reached him actually represented what he was expected to accomplish, and if so, with what resources. Because the British members of the CCS Supply Subcommittee considered that extra shipping could not be provided, the CCS could not translate the President's desires into military orders. Far from improving, the shortages of bread and other foods, particularly in the area north of the Garigliano, became more serious and both General Wilson and Field Marshal Alexander, who succeeded General Wilson as SACMED on 26 November, repeatedly warned the CCS of rapidly deteriorating civilian morale.

The Prime Minister, as soon as he read about the President's letter to Stimson, cabled Roosevelt that he hoped he did not mind his saying he thought he had "jumped a good many fences." There is no doubt he had, and it is interesting to speculate whether he had acted impulsively or in the knowledge that Churchill as well as himself would thereby be committed to increased aid for Italy. For if anything was clear it was that once the Italians read of Roosevelt's proposed ration increase, their clamor for getting it could scarcely have been resisted indefinitely by the Allies. If these suppositions impute to the President a certain deviousness, it must be borne in mind not only that his motives were hu-


manitarian but also that the supply program for Italy was primarily an American responsibility.

Something still remains to be said on the question of whether the President acted imprudently in announcing increased supply assistance before confirming that there was sufficient shipping to support it. In the first place, he at no time stipulated when the promises would be fulfilled. In the second place, even if the Italians were disappointed by the delay this does not mean that they would not have felt desperate if they had been given nothing to look forward to. It later transpired that SACMED did in fact have available the shipping to support the ration increase, but even before this discovery British authorities felt it advisable Lo modify any immediate condemnation of the President's actions.

That things were heading the way the President wanted them to first became clear when Mr. Macmillan completed and distributed his long Note on Allied Policy Toward Italy. This note is reproduced herein almost in entirety because it is the most influential and probably the most memorable piece of writing in at least the latter phase of the occupation. Mr. Macmillan was certainly more interested in lessening than in increasing Allied burdens, but he also had a deep sense of responsibility to the Italians, and neither in good logic nor in good conscience did he feel able to recommend untying them from Allied apron strings without also giving them the means to walk alone. In general Mr. Macmillan felt that controls should be waived wherever not essential to military needs. This meant that the emphasis should be shifted from control to advice, and even in matters of advice a distinction should be made between' the essential and peripheral interests of the Allies. Advice might be given on matters relating to justice, education, and fine arts, but the AC should raise no objection if the Italians ignored it. In the more pertinent spheres of finance, labor legislation, and wage negotiations the Allies should urge more strongly their views but even here the final decision should be left to the Italians. In the concluding portions of his note Mr. Macmillan strongly advocated both liberalizing the military supply program and adding a program of rehabilitation supplies.

When Mr. Macmillan's views, as translated into a draft directive, came before the CCAC the Americans accepted most of his recommendations but felt in general that he had not gone far enough in relaxing control. In fact the American members proposed a preliminary peace treaty on the understanding that ' territorial and financial matters be reserved for later discussion. The British, however, were opposed since the signing of a peace treaty would bring up the questions of the disposal of the Italian colonies and fleet. By way of compromise the British accepted certain amendments proposed by the Americans and the CCS sent SACMED a new directive on 30  January 1945.

The Italians did not get everything they wanted but they were gratified that the new policy had at long last been put into effect. Adding to their satisfaction was the fact that this policy, as finally developed, included all the supply ameliorations that President Roosevelt had espoused on his own. The military concept of disease and unrest was liberalized -to include also "those supplies, such as fertilizer, raw material, machinery and equipment, the import of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies" needed to prevent disease and unrest, as well as supplies necessary for restoring power systems and transport and communication facilities needed in the military effort. This was a signal development in interpretation of the military sup-


ply responsibility, but in addition the CCS authorized requests for industrial rehabilitation supplies, to be transmitted by AC to CCAC and thence to the civilian Combined Liberated Areas Committee (CLAC). Finally, the President had his way on the extension of the 3co-gram bread ration to all liberated Italy, through a typically Rooseveltian stroke of good luck. After all the dither over the conclusion that it would be impossible to provide additional shipping, the U.S. Quartermaster General discovered that SACMED's experts had overestimated the shipping needs by 500,000 tons and that the additional wheat could be sent within the current shipping allocation. The CCS authorized the ration increase on 18 January.

In accordance with the new directive, controls were quickly relaxed, with the general effect that the staff of AC Headquarters was henceforth occupied primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels. Italian opinion, as reflected in press comment, interpreted the New Policy as an expression of Allied confidence and of recognition that the best way to help Italy was to let Italy help itself.



[Memo, Council of Ministers Transmitted by Badoglio to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 13 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/609]

2. Appointments and movements of Prefects.

In some provinces as, for instance, in Sicily, in Cosenza, in Matera and in Reggio Calabria, the occupying Allied authorities have proceeded to remove the Prefects in charge, substituting for them local elements or functionaries of low rank with little experience or administrative ability.

In view of the importance of the position and of their functions it would be desirable for the Allied authorities to request the opinion of the Ministry of the Interior before adopting, in the territories under Allied control, provisions calling for the appointment, recall and transfer of Prefects. The opportunity could be taken to proceed in agreement with the Allied authorities, to review the appointments already made.

3. Appointments, promotions and dismissals of personnel.

In the territories controlled by them, the Allied authorities have similarly disposed of appointments and public positions, promotions in the administrative posts and dismissals without any attention to the Italian administrative set-up.

The Italian authorities are, therefore, now at a loss as regards the regularization of these appointments which also alter the classification and lists of the personnel and cause damage to the interests of many categories of employees.

It seems desirable in this connection that:
The Allied authorities should always request the personnel needed in the territories controlled by them from the appropriate Ministries which might have an over strength of personnel.
In case of necessity only temporary or special personnel, and always with initial rank, should always be employed.
The Allied authorities should refrain from granting promotions to State and Public Administration personnel, limiting themselves to the grant, in very particular cases, of promotions to a grade immediately above that previously held by the employee.
The Allied authorities should request, at least, the opinion of the Ministries concerned before adopting any provision concerning personnel.


[Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 16 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

♦ ♦ ♦ My surprise, dear General, finds justification in the circumstance that the agreement entered into between you and myself [March 1944, See Chapter XI, Section 51 in regards to appointments referred only to public posts and to high officials, with the obvious consideration that control reserved to the Allies is largely guaranteed with intervention in the selection of persons in whom rests the effective direction and therefore the full responsibility for offices and services. On


the other hand, in the listing made by Colonel Spicer there are indicated from the first Secretaries to the Vice Prefects inclusive-officials who, even though having directing functions, must nevertheless be considered merely as executors of directives issued by the Prefect in the Province and by the Minister or by the General Director within the Central Administration. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ Ltr, Mason -MacFarlane to Badoglio, 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

♦ ♦ ♦ I do not feel that it is asking too much to include in the category of high officials all officers down to and including the rank of Vice Prefect, and if you will arrange for the Allied Control Commission to be consulted before any appointments are made to those positions I feel that all misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties will be avoided. I am agreeable that the remaining categories may in the future be left to the Italian Government.


[Ltr, Prime Minister Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 22 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/117]

3. The Italian people feel themselves at the moment to be in quarantine, shut in as if hermetically isolated. They should be allowed back again into that free circulation of ideas and of international events which is one of the fundamental conditions for the resumption and the progressive development of free democratic institutions. Up until now any initiative in this sense has been precluded to us. For instance:
a. the request for Italian adhesion to the Atlantic Charter was never answered;
b. the request for Italian participation in the International Labour Office was put off to an undeterminate date;
c. the request for participation in the Monetary Conference was not welcomed.

4. The costs of occupation; the enormous, untold mess of notes issued by the Allies; the high rate of exchange fixed between the pound sterling, the dollar and the lira etc; these cut deeply into the exhausted resources of Italy. There is talk of U.N.R.R.A., of the Relief Committee for Italy, etc. These are excellent beginnings, but they are for the future. The Italian people in the meantime are being bled. It is necessary that the [initiatives in the above-cited cases] should become active and operative, that they should lighten the economic burdens which the armistice has placed on a country already poor and exhausted and which prevent any possibility of recovery. Italy asks to be placed in a position where she will have to rely as little as possible on the resources of the Allies, especially in this crucial moment of the war. Her economic rehabilitation is consequently in her own and the common interest. Italian experts and technicians should be authorized to discuss the most urgent and serious problems in London and in Washington directly with the competent authorities. These are technical and not political problems. The inclusion of Italy in the Lend-Lease Law would undoubtedly constitute a step forward in the right direction.

5. The Allied Control Commission should be relieved progressively of at least three quarters of its duties and directed towards a system at once less oppressive and less patently indicative of interference and intervention in all sectors of Italian life. There are already organizations in Italy ready to take on its heritage-for example, the High Commissions, which could in their turn be changed into something like the Ambassadors' Conferences which have in the past given proof of their capability and efficiency. The present situation should in any case be liquidated. It is not possible for a country to carry on for long without serious risk under the administration of two Governments. It is equally impossible for a highly civilized people such as the Italian to be indefinitely subjected to a state of tutelage and minority. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Statement by Gen Alexander, GOC, for AAI, 11 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/192]

When Allied troops invaded Italy in September 1943, I issued a directive regarding their behaviour towards the Italians. In brief, I said that their attitude should be correct but not familiar, as befitted the soldiers of a victorious Army entering a conquered country.

The time has come when I consider it desirable to modify this directive.

During the past eight months we have had valuable and sincere co-operation from the Italian armed forces and population in occupied Italy.


The people have had a hard time and have borne their lot well. Their combat troops have acquitted themselves well in the line, others have done good work in our bases and ports. Their Navy and Air Force have given important assistance. ♦ ♦ ♦

In brief, while the Italian Government, troops and people co-operate with us in the defeat of Germany, I consider it to be proper and expedient that we should show them good-will without familiarity and consideration without weakness. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Dunn, Dir, OEA, Dept of State, for Hilldring, 6 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 Italy (1-25-43)(1), sec 6]

♦ ♦ ♦ After the formation of the first broad based Government in Italy in April last, Marshal Badoglio sent a personal letter to the President asking for allied status for Italy as a means of supporting her new representative Government. He addressed similar urgent appeals for support to the British and Soviets. A solution to the Italian political crisis last April was welcomed by the Allies as bringing the anti-Fascist parties into active co-operation with the Government and creating a more stable political condition within the country, thereby contributing to the military campaign.

While the British and American Governments were of the opinion that Italy was not ready for full allied status, it was agreed desirable to make some concrete gesture to the newly-formed, liberal and friendly Italian Government which would express Allied sympathy for it and have the effect of strengthening and supporting it in the eyes of the Italian people.

The most recent Government, even more representative of the major political parties in Italy, was formed after the liberation of Rome. It is anti-Fascist, pro-United Nations and democratic. It is representative of the kind of elements we would like to see emerge in the future political life of Italy. For military as well as political reasons, it would appear desirable to support and strengthen it in such manner as may be feasible.

In order to end the technical state of war which will exist until some kind of peace treaty is signed between the United States and Italy, we are favorably inclined toward the British proposal of a preliminary peace treaty to replace the present armistice regime. The armistice regime and a continuing technical state of war between Italy and the other United Nations are inconsistent with her recognized status of a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Our willingness to return to a basis of peace with Italy would be well received not only by the Italian people but by the peoples of the enemy satellite countries as well.

In general, it may be said that we are entering the post-war period in our political relations with Italy. The wide-spread sympathy of the Italian people for the Allies and the Allied cause, the early surrender of Italy, and Allied military successes in Italy have all combined to redeem the Italian nation and separate her from her former Axis partners long before the period of armistice and negotiation with the rest of our enemies is possible. Events have therefore made it desirable, if not imperative, to deal with the Italian situation separately and prior to our consideration of other Axis relationships. 1


[Msg, Churchill to the Italian People on Leaving Italy, Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

... I was most deeply touched by the extraordinary kindness with which I was welcomed in all the villages and small towns through which I have driven in traversing the entire front. There is no doubt that in the Zone of the Armies the relations of the Italians with the British, American and other Allies are of the most friendly and co-operative character. The same is true of all the rest of the liberated territory. Of course, owing to the hard conditions of war, the disorganization caused by the demolitions of the enemy, the shortage of transport, much hardship may arise in particular places. I have given directions to the British representatives in the various international bodies concerned to do their utmost, in harmony with their colleagues, to meet these difficulties. When a Nation has allowed itself to fall under a tyrannical regime, it cannot be absolved from the penalties due to the crimes of that regime, and naturally we cannot forget the circumstances of Mussolini's attack on France and Great Britain when we were at our weakest. ... But in the main . . . I believe that the British Nation will be happy to see the day when


Italy, once again free and progressive, takes a place among the peace-loving nations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AMG Proclamation 1 (Rev), 7 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/142/263 to the People of Italy]

In the course of their war against the Axis powers the Allied Forces under my command are freeing the territory of Italy from German domination.

Much of this territory has already been restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and it is the intention that all territory freed from German domination shall be restored as soon as possible. .. .

This restoration and the complete expulsion of the German Forces from the whole of Italy will be achieved more quickly if you display the same courage, determination and discipline in co-operation with the Allied Forces that you displayed in resistance to the German Forces when they were in occupation.

In order to hasten the date of this restoration and of final victory steps must be taken to ensure the reconstitution and continuance of the administration of the country which the German Forces have attempted to disrupt and to provide for the safety and welfare of yourselves and of the Allied Forces and to preserve the law and order which are essential to military operations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Rpt, O'Dwyer, to Roosevelt, Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43)]

I. The plight of the Italian people is serious as a result of Nazi and Fascist rule and battle destruction on its soil.... From available information, including official Allied government medical opinion, the general health condition of the people seems to be bad. . . . Low resistance of the people seems to be the result of continuous low consumption under Fascist occupation.... Increased food supply is prescribed by the Allied Control Commission Health Subcommission.... In view of the responsibility of the Allied governments, the present policy should be amended to include adequate shipping allocations immediately.

II. Italian Unemployment. Universal unemployment is foreseen for the coming winter, mainly due to the thoroughness of demolition of power plants by enemy forces. Next in importance to increasing food supplies will be a partial restoration of power. . . . Without these two basic aids the Italian people and government will be in a desperate plight....

III. Inland Transportation. The present condition of transportation is haphazard and grossly inadequate. Any plan to maintain a food supply and to put Italian people in a position where they can help themselves must include adequate transportation....

IV. Relationship of the Allied Control Commission and Italian Cobelligerent Status to the Supply and Economic Situation in Italy. It is desirable to take every step necessary to develop the initiative of the Italian people.

The Italian mind is friendly toward the Allies but confused. The difficulties arise from an inability to understand the distinction between the status of defeated enemy as against the status of a co-belligerent. Despite the fact that there are Italian divisions fighting side by side with allies, and despite the fact that there is unrestricted use of Italian resources to serve allied military needs, there are still Italians held as prisoners of war.

It is generally believed that the government responsibility in liberated Italy might well be placed without any major restrictions in the hands of the Italian government, that a formal state of war between the allies and Italy should be discontinued, and that Allied Control Commission in liberated Italy should be abolished and its functions placed in hands of civilian experts.


[Memo, Roosevelt for Stimson, 8 Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 9]

As a result of years of Fascist and Nazi rule and the destruction resulting from the battles on its soil, I understand that the supply situation in Italy is critical.
This situation should be corrected as effectively and as quickly as possible.
The War Department should, therefore, take immediate action to make available the additional essential civilian supplies and shipping necessary to remedy this condition.


[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 15 Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 9]

♦ ♦ ♦ To date the distribution of relief supplies in Italy


Combined Chiefs of Staff. By directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Theater Commander is charged with the responsibility of making available the minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary and other essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, to preserve public order, and to maintain lines of communication. In short, the Theater Commander has been directed to call forward and make available to the Italian people sufficient supplies to prevent disease and unrest. Responsibility for the determination of the amount of such supplies required at any time has been placed upon the Theater Commander as he is in position to determine the extent of actual need.

. .. Subject only to the limitation of supply availability, the War Department has provided all such supplies requested by the Theater Commander the furnishing of which has been determined to be a United States responsibility. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Jt Statement to the Press by Roosevelt and Churchill, 26 Sep 44]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies. ♦ ♦ ♦

An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To make this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed "The Allied Commission."

The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA Conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.
We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council? 2

At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy-an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.


We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain-the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations.


[Paraphrase of Msg, Kirk, U.S. Political Adviser, to Dept of State, 30 Sep 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7 ]

Bonomi, when I called on him at his request this evening, expressed cordial appreciation of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement concerning Italy. He described it as not only proving the President's understanding of the problems Italy faces but also as promising in the future treatment of this country concrete manifestations of such understanding. ♦ ♦ ♦

... Referring briefly to the financial and economic situation, Bonomi expressed strong anxiety over the situation during the coming winter as concerns adequate shelter and food for the people.

Returning to the question of the President's statement, Premier Bonomi expressed hope that I would furnish him additional information as to how the statement would be implemented. More than to any other country, he added, Italy looked to the United States for guidance. It was . . . [inferred] from his conversation that, while acknowledging the responsibility of the Government and people of Italy for their own salvation, there is essential need for outside help, especially from U.S., and that the effect of the Anglo-American statement will be destructive, not constructive, if there is not at least partial realization of the hopes it raises in the near future.


[Statement by Roosevelt, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

♦ ♦ ♦ In accordance with the policies with respect to Italy which were outlined jointly by Prime Minister Churchill and me, in a statement issued to the press on 26 September, measures are now being taken to provide Italy with supplies necessary to prevent civilian hunger, sickness, and fear during the forthcoming winter. Steps are also being taken to restore the damaged transportation and electrical generating facilities of Italy to the extent necessary to enable the Italian people to throw their full resources into the fight against Germany and Japan.

A delegation of supply officers has been called from Italy to Washington to review the needs and requirements of the Italian civilian population.

In addition to the substantial quantities of food and clothing which are now being shipped and have for some time been shipped into Italy, 150,000 tons of wheat and flour are now scheduled for shipment.

Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas of Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency. ♦ ♦ ♦

The distribution of food and essential supplies within the country has been seriously impeded by the damage done to the transportation system and by the wholesale commandeering of trucks by the enemy.

To meet this emergency, it is planned to send 1,700 additional trucks to Italy.

In addition, preparations are under way to supply substantial quantities of generating equipment, including temporary power facilities, to furnish electricity to essential industries and public utilities in central Italy which have been brought to a standstill by the almost complete destruction by the Germans of the power plants. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Statement by Roosevelt, 10 Oct 44, Dept of State Bull (15 Oct 44), P. 403]

I have today approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War, and of the Foreign Economic Administrator, that the United States Government currently make available to the Italian Government the dollars equivalent to the Italian lire issued up to now and hereafter as pay to United States troops in Italy.

The dollar proceeds of remittances made by individuals in this country to friends and relatives in Italy are also being made available to the Italian Government as are the dollar proceeds of any products exported by Italy to this country.

It has been our intention to make available to the friendly western European countries dollars equivalent to the local currency issued as pay to American troops in their territory. This policy differs from that to be applied in the case of Italy since in the latter case it is subject to special restrictions reserved to the United States in connection with the final peace settlement.


The dollars made available to Italy will be used by the Italian Government to pay for essential civilian supplies purchased in this country for use in liberated Italy. The United States Army has supplied substantial amounts of certain essential civilian goods such as food, clothing, and medical supplies as a necessary part of military operations in Italy. The funds which I am now making available will enable the Italian Government under control of appropriate Allied authorities to obtain in this country other essential civilian supplies and to continue to obtain essential civilian supplies and to continue to obtain essential supplies after the United States Army program ceases. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 31 Oct 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (I), sec. II]

I have had before me the shipping difficulties in getting supplies for the civilian population of Italy and I note that we have been building up some reserves for use when northern Italy collapses. In the meantime, it seems to me that the situation is so acute, from the point of view particularly of food, in southern Italy, that some risks must be taken regarding supplies at the time of the collapse in northern Italy. That collapse may well not come until Germany herself collapses, in which case the shipping situation will be much less acute.

Under any circumstances, I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people.

I wish, too, that every effort would be made to get additional relief supplies which the Allied Control Commission has indicated are necessary. It seems to me, however, that food is the most important and should take preference over other additional relief supplies which may be sent.


[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 Nov 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. II]

I hope that you won't mind my saying that you have jumped a good many fences in your directive of I November [sic] to your Secretary of War [above] about the Italian ration of grain, which I have just read. I hope your people will consider that it will be difficult to give more to our ex-enemies in Italy than to our Greek and Yugoslavian Allies.

Commitments of this sort are bound to tie up a great deal of shipping, and because of this you will understand why I am rather anxious. We can not provide the additional required tonnage, and I trust that your War Department will adopt measures to carry the increased supplies.♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, Hq AMG, Fifth Army, to Hq ACC, 7 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/143/19]

On 6 October demonstration of some hundreds of Florentines mostly women took place before Prefettura to protest against insufficiency of food, in particular bread. Gathering was apparently spontaneous and was eventually dispersed peacefully. Florence has been receiving 200 grams of bread daily and full ration scale of miscellaneous items except olive oil was issued for October. In order to help alleviate undoubted hardship that exists trucks are being diverted from building up grain reserve to bringing in more fruit and vegetables. It is recommended that issue of pasta ration minimum of 500 grams weekly be considered without delay. Draw your attention to lack of harmony between facts described and announcement in Stars and Stripes of same date that substantial increases in food for Italy are promised by President Roosevelt [above]. This will undoubtedly, as usual be made subject of German radio propaganda. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Econ Sec, AC, to G-5, AFHQ, 6 Nov 44, MTO HS files, G-5, AFHQ, 43-1781 Food]

President's letter to War Department [3I October, above] has been released by PWB and all Italian papers carried it. This places us in an impossible position unless you immediately sanc-


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 19 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. Recent public announcements, which have been given wide circulation in Italy by the press, are interpreted by me to mean that the policy is to provide a 300 gram bread ration immediately; this ration to be nation wide on liberation of the north.

2. Confirmation is requested that my understanding in paragraph 1 is correct and that you wish me to implement this policy.

3. This policy cannot be implemented without increased imports since the import program authorized for the months of November and December is below the monthly scale of imports indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter of 24th September. From a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

4. If I am to establish a 300 gram bread ration, there are 2 alternatives:
a. Step up monthly shipments to the level required to produce total imports of 1,500,000 tons during the harvest year. This would mean a monthly program based on all Italy estimated at 165,000 tons from January through June 1945, or beginning December if possible.
b. Use existing stocks, together with imports under the existing program. The effect of this plan would be to exhaust the amassed grain by 1st March assuming inland transport not a limiting factor. I can only undertake this procedure under an absolute guarantee that stocks so used will be replaced in full to permit continuance of the 300 gram ration until the next harvest season. Without such guarantee I can see nothing but trouble ahead.

5. I recommend the first alternative. However even if approved, I would be unable to announce such a plan prior to the approval of a shipping program to meet it.

6. Your instructions are requested. In the meantime and in any event ACC will step up its efforts to realize maximum local production, particularly in products which might be substituted for wheat, and will continue to tighten up the administration of cereals wherever possible. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Food Ration Scales in Italy, by Commodore Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 21 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/109/732]

1. The 300 gram bread ration is in the opinion of this Commission the irreducible minimum and any scale below that figure, except for short periods in operational areas, is contrary to Allied military and political interests and announced aims.

2. In stating our reasons for this opinion it must be remembered that Italy is fundamentally a bread-eating country and that flour, in one form or another must always be the basic ration together with sugar, and that other commodities are ancilliary thereto. These reasons are four (a) medical, (b) control of Black Market, (c) maintenance of law and order and (d) grain collection campaign.

3. Medical. If the ration is not maintained at a minimum of a 300 gram bread ration the health of the nation will in our opinion be permanently impaired. The present scale of 300 grams of bread and 4.15 grams of sugar which is the ration in the south of Italy produces only a calorific content of 763 calories. This is supplemented in urban districts of over 50,000 inhabitants by meat and vegetables producing an additional calorific value of 143 calories, making a total of 906 calories. The Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936 advised that the daily average calorific intake for a man or woman living in a temperate climate and not engaged in manual labour should be 2,400 calories per day, and if engaged on moderate muscular work an additional 600 calories per day should be allowed....

4. Control of Black Market. A large section of the populace in fact make up its rations by purchases on the Black Market. . . . All that can be done is to limit its extent and from experience an increase in the ration to 300 grams throughout Italy will have this effect. ♦ ♦ ♦

5. Maintenance of Law and Order. It is the opinion of this Commission that the maintenance of law and order cannot be assured unless a minimum ration of 300 grams is maintained throughout liberated Italy. With an uncontrolled Black Market and a wholly inadequate bread ration, dissatisfaction, riots and industrial unrest generally are to be expected in many of the more important centres this winter. Such a situation must seriously affect the Allied war effort in


Italy. . . . [A copy of a signal dated 19 October to General Alexander from General Mark Clark on the food situation in the Fifth Army area is attached. ]

6. Nor can the political effect be overlooked. Rightly or wrongly the government is blamed at present for the failure to produce food and if it cannot be established on a uniform basis at a level of (about) 300 grams it is to be feared that the consequential social unrest may well affect the stability of the Government. In present circumstances this would be undesirable not only for the country as a whole but in particular for the Allied war effort in Italy. In considering this aspect it should not be overlooked that it would be impossible through lack of personnel to re-establish Military Government and the situation in the country might indeed become precarious.

7. Grain Collection Campaign. The questioning of rationing plays an extremely important part in the programme of amassing. With say a 250 grams bread ration a tendency to refuse to amass in order to hoard grain and later sell it in the Black Market at fantastic prices is such that it becomes an important factor in the amount amassed. It is thought that, if the ration can be established throughout at 300 grams, the incentive to refuse to amass, though not extinguished will be substantially reduced. This in turn will reduce import requirements and save shipping. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Comments on SACMED's Justification, Incl B to Interim Rpt, CCAC 105/2, 23 Oct 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ]

5. The U.S. shipping authorities advise that the maximum shipping now foreseeable for the movement of wheat to Italy will provide 1,010,000 tons during the harvest year, and that the maximum rate at which such shipping can be provided beginning 1 January 1945 will be approximately 107,000 tons per month. They emphasize that even this rate may not be met in the light of overall shipping shortages. Obviously if SACMED's estimate [1,500,000 tons] of the imports necessary to maintain the 300 gram bread ration is correct, and if the U.S. shipping authorities appraisal of the shipping potential is accurate, the desired ration cannot be maintained unless a greater contribution to the maintenance of the ration can be obtained from indigenous sources than SACMED now anticipates.


[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 7 Nov 44, OPD files, 014.1, sec. 5 ]

Immediately upon receipt of your instructions of 31 October 1944 [section 3 above] concerning civilian supplies for Italy, the War Department has recommended to the British War Office that instructions be issued in the name of the Combined Chiefs of Stall to General Wilson approving an increase in the bread ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy occupied by Allied Forces. Your instructions have been referred to London where it is understood British concurrence is under urgent review by the Cabinet.

A review is being made of the additional supplies requested by the Allied Control Commission. Final action on this matter also awaits concurrence by the British authorities. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 30 Nov 44, OPD Msg files, NAF-821 ]

1. The situation in Central Italy, particularly in Rome, Florence, and Pisa, is deteriorating due primarily to the food situation. My intelligence reports indicate the possibilities of disturbance in the cities during coming weeks, and I have found it necessary to take certain precautionary measures.

2. Also, the Chief Commissioner AC has advised me that with the winter months upon us, he cannot much longer hold the population in line under the existing 200 gram ration and shortage of other foods.

3. Concurrently the Italian Government has advised AC of its decision to raise the price of bread from its present subsidized figure of five lire per kilo to eight lire per kilo. This is a measure which AC approves as tending to cast down the substantial and uneconomic government deficit arising from the bread subsidy, but it feels that the price increase unaccompanied by a ration increase is more than likely to have unfortunate consequences. AC has therefore asked the Italian Govt to defer its announcement until 1 December.


5. I feel it is imperative that I be in a position to make an announcement on or prior to 1 December. I request instructions accordingly.


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 8 Dec 44, OPD Msg files, FAN-465]

Urgency of problems in Italy including bread is thoroughly understood here. Shipping situation is so acute that all theaters are currently accepting deficits in requirements of operational character as well as those for essential civilian supplies. This situation is under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. Meanwhile you should take no steps to establish or maintain any bread ration in Italy except such as you can support within shipping allocated to you under priorities which you are willing to establish in the light of your overall military responsibilities in the theater.


[Msg, Hq AAI, to AFHQ, 12 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 10107]

Following message received from Fifth Army  ♦ ♦ ♦ Chronic undernourishment is giving rise to unrest. There have been recent demonstrations demanding a minimum of 300 grams daily per person. That amount is now being distributed in the South of Italy a fact well known to the public in the Fifth Army Area. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for SAC, AFHQ, 12 Dec. 44, MTO, HS files, AC Ltr Requisition 4807/ 79/CofS, par. 10]

10. I cannot conceal from you the serious situation which must be [inferred] from the recommendation which I am forced to make. The political reactions against the newly formed Government and against the Allies in Southern Italy where the ration must be cut, and in Central Italy where the ration will not attain to that impliedly promised by the Allied Governments, must be grave. The Italian Government and people undoubtedly regard the fulfillment of the 300 gram ration backed by the message of the President and Prime Minister as a pledge which will not be broken. We must expect disease arising from malnutrition, and acceleration in inflation and the activities of the black market, a decrease in morale leading to an increase in crime and prostitution, disorders and the food riots which the Prime Minister, during his visit here, directed must be avoided. I would, however, rather face these admittedly serious difficulties with the knowledge that such a plan for feeding the population could be guaranteed and that the present disparity between North and South would disappear. The present uncertainty makes it virtually impossible to carry out a proper distribution of food and is most deleterious to the morale of the people.


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 21 Dec. 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 7699]

8. . . . If you find it impossible when you make your monthly allocations of shipping to meet the request put forward herein for additional wheat without some contribution from or deferment of operational maintenance we will undertake to make the necessary contribution at the expense of military requirements if operationally possible to do so. We can only do this period by period after receiving from you the form allocation for military imports during the period involved.

9. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many Theaters of war. It is my duty however to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot administer those parts of Italy under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians unless I am regularly provided with the means to do so. The alternative is an Italy embittered by unfulfilled promises, by hunger and distress. This I believe would be a grave handicap to our immediate war effort and a lamentable example to other nations of the justice of Allied dealing.



[Memo, Maj Gen Glen M. Edgerton, Dir, ID, for CG, ASF, 4 Oct 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-357]

♦ ♦ ♦ Concern over the Italian situation is justified in view of the absence of a long term policy on behalf of our government as to the provision to be made to solve Italy's basic problems and in view of the absence of any funds by means of which such policies could be implemented. Italy is faced with a serious problem of inflation. Sudden stoppage of war industries is leading to wide-spread unemployment. A failure of its internal administration is accompanied by inequitable and faulty distribution of its own rather plentiful supplies of food. Unless some long term policy of reconstruction is applied to Italy, there may be a very serious situation. The theater commander has pointed out this problem in a cable of 13 September, wherein he states that the measures required by military necessity leaves untouched the problem of creating a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, NAF-810, Gen Wilson to CCS, 1 Nov 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT III ]

♦ ♦ ♦ In view of the public statements of the President and the Prime Minister, I am proposing to take the following steps.

1. I am arranging for all current requisitions for basic civilian supplies to be reviewed on two assumptions:
First, that they will be provided and financed as heretofore;
Second, that they would be framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula.

2. In addition and in conformity with the joint statement of 26th September and the President's statement of 10th October, I have instructed the Allied Commission to draw up a programme of industrial first-aid. This will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

3. I am assuming that the necessary finance for (1) will be provided so long as Italy is a Theater of or Base for Military Operations and for a period of 6 months thereafter.

4. For planning purposes for (2) I am assuming an expenditure commensurate with the sources of new finance outside military responsibility mentioned in the President's statement, to be spent over a period of 12 months.

I hope this will meet with your approval as I am convinced that this is the right course to pursue.


[Msg, FAN-450 CCS to Gen Wilson, 13 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

♦ ♦ ♦ Pending issuance of instructions to you by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, you will take no steps to change the basis on which your Headquarters approves for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirements for essential civilian supplies as being within military responsibility.


[Msg, NAF-814, Gen Wilson to CCS, 17 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/732]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. The shipping allocated from producer countries to MTO has hitherto been determined on the basis of operational requirements including civilian needs, screened as within the disease and unrest formula.

2. This basis of allocation will no longer satisfactorily meet civilian needs. There are already several major projects under consideration or actually programmed that together involve heavy shipping requirements. For example:
(A) You have before you my request for authorization of 300-gram ration and for the import of supplies to meet it. This ration is in line with the statements of the President and Prime Minister of the new policy towards Italy, particularly in respect of the food ration.
(B) Substantial dollar credits have been promised to support an immediate industrial rehabilitation program in occupied Italy.
(C) Decision has been taken at highest levels to commence an UNRRA program of supplementary relief in Italy.

All of these projects are over and above the measure of civilian relief which has been granted under the directives applicable thus far


and all will involve increased tonnage for the Theater. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, 9 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 8205, FAN-466]

♦ ♦ ♦ Questions raised by you involve political and economic problems which must now be considered in the light of acute overall shipping shortage. Pending receipt of Combined Chiefs of Staff instructions, you should insure that NO commitment is made either to the Italian government or to UNRRA on projects programmed or contemplated along lines of NAF 814 [above], particularly avoiding commitments either as to shipping tonnages or as to definite dates or periods as of which the Italians or UNRRA may bid for shipping independent of the military authorities. 3



[Transl of Memo by the Italian Under Secy of State for Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/285]

♦ ♦ ♦ I. The words of the statement [of the President and the Prime Minister on 26 September 1944 in Section 3, above] imply therefore a limitation and change in the nature of the duties carried out until now by the Allied Control Commission. The omission of the word control, if it has, as it must have, special significance should not only coincide with the suppression of a certain number of functions exercised until now by the Commission but also with a different outlook and conception of those which the said Commission will continue to carry out; a limitation of duties therefore on the one hand, and a different spirit and outlook on the other.

2. This different spirit, in the opinion of the Italian Government, ought to be expressed not in terms of tuition and authoritative control, but in terms of co-operation on the basis of solutions discussed and agreed upon between the parties. The best and perhaps the only way of realizing such a collaboration is that of consenting to the appointment of an Italian member both on the Central Commission and on various subcommissions.

6. Summing up, the Italian Government suggest:
a. That the Commission should continue to exercise only those functions which have close and immediate connection with the war effort and those in which Allied assistance is carried out in a substantial direct and concrete form and that all other attributions be transferred to the Italian Government.
b. That the exercise of those functions which will continue to appertain to the Commission should reflect a spirit not of imposition but of collaboration realized by means of an Italian participation to the central and local activities of the Commission.
c. A prompt suppression of Subcommissions and Offices depending from the Allied Commission.
d. An exam [ ination ] carried out on equal basis of all the questions concerning the transformation of the Commission with a view to reaching a solution agreed upon between the two sides.
e. The submission to the examination of the Allied Authorities of all the evidence concerning the interferences and interventions which now hinder in the different Administrations the normal activities of the Italian Administration.


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 4 Oct 44, OPD Msg files, NAF 796]

1. Joint statement on Italy by the President and the Prime Minister issued to the press on 26 September, which has been given wide publicity in Italy, has naturally occasioned many inquiries from Allied as well as Italian sources. In the absence of directives from you as to the time and


manner of implementation of the policies laid down, I am instructing the Chief Commissioner that specific action is to be withheld.

2. In order to enable me satisfactorily to answer these inquiries and to cut short the present period of speculation, I request that I may be given directives as soon as practicable. I hope these may cover the matters directly raised by the announcement, most important of which is taken here to be the naming of direct Italian representatives to the two governments, as well as matters necessarily raised by implication, as for example, any modification in the relations between other United Nations and Italy.

3. . . . I wish that there may be avoided any situation such as recently arose through an important direct communication, the fact and contents of which were generally known in Italian circles but were unknown to the senior officers of Allied Control Commission or Allied Forces Headquarters until reported by the Office of Strategic Services on NY Intelligence basis.

4. If there is implied in the statement a forthcoming reorientation of the functions of Allied Control Commission, I request that the Allied Control Commission and this Headquarters may be given an opportunity to comment....


[Memo, G-5 AFHQ for Hq ACC, 24 Oct 44, ACC files. 10000/136/256]

1. It is notified that by direction of CCS the Allied Control Commission will henceforth be addressed as the Allied Commission.

2. It is requested that this should be notified in these terms to the Italian Government by letter simply stating the fact without elaboration, explanation or implication. In order that the matter may not appear to be of outstanding importance it should be notified by a routine communication, not signed by yourself, to an official of the Italian Government such as the Secretary to the Council of Ministers. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Upjohn, CA Sec, for Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 18 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

2. Shortly after the first handover of territory to the Italian Government which took place on 11 February 1944, there was an exchange of letters between the then Chief Commissioner, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane and the then Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio. . . . In effect by these letters it was agreed that all senior Government appointments would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission.

4. The arrangements so made have worked quite smoothly in practice. It is fair to say that in the vast majority of cases no difficulty has arisen and appointments have been approved almost as a matter of course, but the right of approval has proved useful in practice, and occasionally approval for good reason has been withheld and the Italian Government has been required to submit another appointee for the office.

5. Recently, and in view of the change of name of the Commission, the Italian Government has requested that the practice be revised and they have submitted a very short list of offices which they suggest should be submitted to the Commission for approval....

6. It appears to be a matter of overall policy as to whether or not the Commission should agree to the revised list. It is the opinion of the Civil Affairs Section that the list is too short, and that at any rate the names of directors of personnel in each Ministry should be submitted to the Commission for approval. The main reason for this is that appointments in Allied Military Government territory are always made by the Allied Commission, but in practice the Italian Government is normally consulted over such appointments, and it seems desirable that the Director of personnel should be the person approved by the Commission. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Actg Dir, Labor Subcom, AC, for Econ Sec, AC, 22 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/146/18]

1 . . . (a) No functions of A.C. should be discontinued in Italian Government territory. Representation is needed in every region for liaison on labor policy and in the interests of Army and Navy installations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min of SACMED's Political Conf, 10 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/118]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Supreme Allied Commander inquired what was the position regarding the submission of the names of the New Italian Government for approval by the Allied authorities, with particular reference to the precedent set at the time of the last change of government.

. . . Mr. Kirk observed that the United States


Government now took the position that the composition of the Italian Government was entirely a matter for the Italians themselves, although any new government must subscribe to the same commitments towards the Allies as had been undertaken by the previous government, and the Supreme Allied Commander might, if necessary for military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries. ♦ ♦ ♦

Mr. [ P. ] Broad said that H.M. Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval.



[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCAC, 23 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 6037-A]

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, as already announced, recently reviewed the situation in Italy and agreed upon a general policy for meeting the numerous economic and other difficulties of that country.

To facilitate the task they have decided that the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, MP, British Resident Minister at Allied Force Headquarters Mediterranean, should, in addition to his present position, become the responsible head of the Allied Commission. In order to effect this change, General Wilson will delegate his functions as President of the Commission to Mr. Macmillan. 4


[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/171]

1. As the joint statement of the President and Prime Minister on policy toward Italy announced, U.K. and U.S. have decided to enter into direct relations with the Italian Government. They have informed the Italian Government of this decision through the U.K. High Commissioner and the U.S. Representative respectively. Sir Noel Charles will be the U.K. representative to the Italian Government with the personal rank of ambassador. Mr. Kirk will be accredited formally as U.S. ambassador to the Italian Government. It is considered that the nature of the relations of other United Nations with the Italian Government should be worked out between the respective governments and the Italian Government. For your information it is understood that formal diplomatic relations with Italy are being reestablished by the other American republics and the U.S.S.R.

2. However, the U.S. and U.K. Governments intend, in general, that their two representatives should for the present handle only political questions which are of specific interest to their respective governments, while Allied Commission should continue to handle economic and administrative matters together with questions arising out of the terms of armistice.


[Macmillan, Actg President, AC, Note, Allied Policy Toward Italy, Circulated in AFHQ, AC, and in British Govt Depts, undated, probably Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

♦ ♦ ♦ We must now, I think, take the line that the recent formal change of name from Allied Control Commission to Allied Commission has a real meaning. It should be our purpose only to exercise control where our military needs require. Whenever possible the function of the Commission should be that of a mission of experts offering advice. If our advice is not accepted, we must shrug our shoulders and allow affairs to take their course. Only in this way can we bring a sense of reality and responsibility to the Italian authorities.

We should now inform the Italian Government that while we propose to hold absolutely to all our rights under the Armistice, and do not intend to discuss any settlement of purely post-war problems (for instance, territorial and colonial arrangements), yet, subject to the overriding military needs for the conduct of the campaign, we shall hold these rights largely in


reserve. We shall make the transfer of authority to the Italian Government as great a reality as possible. In consultation with them we shall provide, if they require it, expert advice on such questions as justice, education, fine arts, and the like. If they prefer to do without these experts in their territory, we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians to do for themselves, that is, regulation of their internal political and economic life, we shall play the role of advisers, except to the extent that the military authorities require to control specific functions or to take over particular properties.

There are, however, two stern warnings which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied imports depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help-within the physical possibilities of their present situation-in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reimpose military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisos, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be far reaching and sincere. ♦ ♦ ♦

It will be seen from the foregoing that the task of those who have to plan for the needs of the Italian people is no easy one. It reminds one of those ingenious puzzles that torture young or old who fall beneath their spell, where it is necessary to entice four mercury balls in a small cardboard box to fall into their respective or appropriate holes. Two may easily be done at once, three often, but the whole four present a formidable test of patience and determination. In this case the four balls are availability of supply, finance, shipping and port acceptability. It has seldom been possible to obtain clearance on all these at once. Yet without some near miracle of concurrent agreement, reasonable planning for the future becomes impossible. Of course it may be urged that there is no reason to worry ourselves unduly about the unhappy position in which the Italians find themselves. Their disasters are their own fault. But this policy, harsh though it might be, would at least have been practicable had it not been for the recent declarations formally made on behalf of the two Allied Governments. To turn now from the path of generosity there marked out is unthinkable. In addition, this more lenient mood seems to me greatly in the interests of the work in general. Whatever may be the post-war policy towards Germany, we have accepted Italy into a position different from that of a beaten enemy; we have invented and, to some extent, benefited by the doctrine of co-belligerency; and, from the larger aspect, prosperity like peace is indivisible.... It will need all the patience, courage and devotion that British and American administrators can give if we are to preserve Italy and her 45 millions of people from collapse into despair, anarchy and revolution. To fail to make the effort because of our grievances against Italy, however justified, may be to have won the war and lost the peace.


[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

1. 1 propose that the Political Section of the Commission be abolished.

This Section, which is managed by an American and British Vice-President of equal rank, belongs to the early post-Armistice period. . . .

Since that time policy has developed. The Italians have received in Rome an American and a British Ambassador. They are sending their Ambassadors in return to Washington and London. . . .

Moreover, the Italians are now themselves in direct relations with United Nations and neutral Powers. Interchange of Ambassadors and Ministers is going on at an ever increasing pace, the Latin republics of South America being particularly prominent in this diplomatic pilgrimage to Rome.

In theory all formal communications between the representatives of other Powers and the Italian Government should pass through the Commission, there being no objection to informal and unofficial contacts. This has not applied to Russia; and the United States and British representatives have now notified the Commission of the resumption of direct relations between their Government and the Italian Government. It would seem, therefore, that to maintain in theory a rule which was never in practice enforced or even capable of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. I propose that we should


confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council has proposed that the Italian representative in Moscow be given his own cypher. It seems difficult to refuse this request. The question of the provision of independent cyphers for the Italian representatives in London and Washington has been raised by the Italians. It has been referred by the Commission to Allied Headquarters and by them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I propose that this request should be granted.
1 propose that this privilege should be extended to their representatives in other countries.
♦ ♦ ♦

If these concessions are made, there is no need for the Political Section as such to continue. The function of giving political advice to the Commission can be undertaken by the British and American Embassies. In order to effect this, I have worked out a plan . . . with the British and American Ambassadors in Rome and it has their approval. I propose that it should be put into effect forthwith.

II. 1 propose that we surrender the control over Italian legislation in Italian territory.

In point of fact, nothing in the Armistice terms gives the Commission any right to be consulted on all decrees of the Italian Government. In practice a large proportion of decrees proposed are sent for study and advice by the appropriate Subcommission. Sometimes, as in the case of a recent decree raising wage rates, the Council of Ministers approved the decree without prior and detailed approval from the Commission. (I am bound to observe that in this instance my sympathies were with the Italian Government, who as sometimes happens with Governments, could not withstand powerful political pressure fortified only by the theoretical arguments of civil servants and statisticians.) The formal claim to approve decrees is difficult to enforce-as has been proved-since the only remedy would involve the removal of the Minister or the fall of the Ministry. It is wise, in the new conditions, to rely on moral persuasion and even, when required, pressure; and to develop a normal habit of consultation on matters particularly economic, when our joint interests are involved or when action taken in Italian Italy must, in fact, be followed in Allied Italy. The formal renunciation of this right to approve decrees would certainly be welcomed by the Italians.

III. Similarly, 1 propose that the control of Italian appointments in Italian Italy be modified or surrendered.

Again, it is doubtful whether we have a right to this control under the Armistice terms. But shortly after the first transfer of territory (11 February 1944) there was an exchange of letters between General Mason MacFarlane and Marshal Badoglio. In effect, by these letters it was agreed that all appointments to the Government and all senior appointments by the Government would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. .. .

The Italian Government has recently requested that the position be revised. They have submitted a very short list of offices to which this right should apply. It includes Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Government, the heads of the fighting services and so forth....

So far as the approval of [certain] officials.... 5  is concerned, I take it that the chief object was to secure "defascistization" rather than to guarantee efficiency. Indeed, after a country has been for a generation under a Fascist regime, these two purposes may well be contradictory rather than complimentary. While the right of approval has certainly helped to achieve the first purpose, I think it no longer necessary. Public opinion does not need stimulating on this issue. On the contrary, epuration in Italy (as in other countries) may be pushed dangerously far. 6

In practice, Italian nominations are approved almost as a matter of course. ♦ ♦ ♦

I therefore urge that we waive the right of approval altogether-with one exception.

A short list should be agreed of Service chiefs to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. In their case it would perhaps be wiser to ask that the approval should be obtained of the Supreme Allied Commander or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

If this recommendation is approved, certain consequential changes will have to be made in the legal documents of transfer of successive provinces from Military Government to Italian


Government, since it has been the practice to include in these a clause preventing the removal of any Italian appointed by Military Government authority to posts within the territories concerned.

This is a mere formality.

IV. I propose that local officers of the Allied Commission should be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy.

One of the features of the control which is most apparent to, and therefore to some extent, resented by the Italians is the presence of local Allied officers in all the regions handed back to Italian control. Since, in many cases, they are the same officers who were functioning during the period of military government, the change from "direct" to "indirect rule" is correspondingly obscured.

The Commission itself, under the two main Sections of General Administration and Economic Affairs, is organized into some twenty Sub-commissions, corresponding to the various Italian Ministries. In the regions are Regional officers, with specialists from one or other of those Subcommissions to assist them. Although a very drastic reduction has taken place recently in the total so employed, this only strengthens the argument for their total elimination. They are now insufficient to govern, but sufficient to interfere. And their presence tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the Italians themselves.

For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. We had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. And the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the congenial plan of throwing upon us-in the public opinion of the world-a responsibility which belongs to themselves.

It is true that there must be local contacts between the Allied Military and Naval authorities in Italian governed Italy, especially in places where there are still Allied installations. But this function could well be performed by Liaison Officers attached to the various Military Area and District Commanders. Where matters were incapable of local adjustment or when technical advice was required (for instance, on transportation and public utilities) special "trouble shooters" could be summoned from the Commission at Rome or, at the request of the Italians, specialist officers made available to them for special duties. ♦ ♦ ♦

Undoubtedly, the more the contacts and, where necessary, pressure-between the Allies and the Italian Government can be confined to the centre and at a high level, the better relations will be. Italian Ministers resent the appearance rather than the reality of control. And the withdrawal of officers from the field would enormously enhance the prestige of the Government.

V. Certain central, as well as local, functions of the Allied Commission in Italian Government Italy should be abandoned altogether.

There are a number of functions of subcommissions organized to carry them out which can well be surrendered. This does not, I regret, mean that any of these subcommissions can be liquidated. They must remain for the work in Allied Italy and to prepare the work in Kesselring's Italy. Such are, in the administrative field, Monuments and Fine Arts, Education, Local Government. In the economic field, arrangements are already being made to hand over to the Italians (subject only to inspection) the distribution of food and other supplies in Italian territory.


[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

♦ ♦ ♦VI. Changes in the Commission itself have been suggested as likely to emphasize the sincerity of the new policy embodied in recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister. "Demilitarization" has been put forward on this as well as other grounds. . . . In view of the importance of the military government aspect of the Commission's work, there is a very definite limit to what can be achieved by this method. But, in general, both by the issue of a new and clear directive, and by a statement publicly and with great precision of Allied Policy towards Italy, the whole conception of the Commission's new purposes and functions in Italian territory can be made effective. We are to be advisers, not controllers; elder brothers to our weak and errant juniors. ♦ ♦ ♦


I. I cannot believe that those who propose rapid or wholesale demilitarisation have understood that three-quarters of the effort of the Commission is necessarily concentrated on those parts of Italy occupied or about to be occupied by Allied armies-that is, what I have called, Allied Italy and Kesselring's Italy.


In Allied Military Government territory it is really quite impracticable for the organization to function except with officers in uniform. This will apply until the final stages of the operation. When the enemy has been driven from all Italian territory and when the first shock has been taken by the A.M.G. organization in the rear of our advancing armies, all Italy (except perhaps certain disputed provinces, such as Venezia Giulia), will in due course be returned to Italian control. The Commission can then be almost wholly demilitarized because its sole function will then be to give expert advice to the Italians and to protect our long-term interests under the Armistice. ♦ ♦ ♦

"Demilitarization" is only possible in the Headquarters of the Commission, not in the field. In Headquarters this is already being done to a considerable extent. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

.... civilian imports into both sections of liberated Italy have up to now been regarded as a legitimate war expenditure and carried on the military budget. Their scale has been regulated by the so-called "disease and unrest" formula; that is to say, the Supreme Allied Commander has been required to certify that his requisitions in this field are necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of either one or the other in a manner likely to incommode military operations.

It is believed that the War Department has recently reached the conclusion that even on this scale there was no justification for carrying such expenditure in respect of "Southern Italy" on their budget. This is quite illogical. As already stated, Italy must be treated as a whole. Products must be moved from surplus to deficiency areas without regard to the exact geographical line dividing Allied Controlled Italy from Italian controlled Italy. Moreover, the lines of communication still to some extent traverse the latter territory. It is for this reason that the Commune of Naples is still kept under military government although geographically in a transferred area. In any case, whether these supplies are carried upon a military budget or not, they must be introduced into the country at the expense of the American and British taxpayer. Since they must be requisitioned as a military priority, called forward by military authorities and shipped by the military, it would seem more satisfactory that they should continue to be dealt with on the military account. It is absolutely essential from a practical point of view if we are to be [assured of] delivery.

It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilians needs in Italy. Moreover, since some continuity of planning is necessary for efficiency, they should be so provided as long as Italy is a theater of or base for military operations and for a period of say six months thereafter. In addition, the scale of these should be regulated by a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula, and this for two reasons. First, because another year of shortage has greatly increased the need of the people; second, because it is equitable that having regard to the fact that many Italians are actively engaged in military, air and naval operations in support of our arms, a standard of life for the civilian population, many of them dependents of the fighting men, should be regulated at a somewhat higher level than that suitable to a conquered but non-co-operative nation. ♦ ♦ ♦

The normal requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the agreed percentage according to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.


[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

In addition to supplies on this [Military] account, the declarations by the heads of the two Governments have led us to believe that further deliveries would be made available to meet the needs not only of the present but of the immediate future. These were to be provided, so far as the United States were concerned, by various sources of finance outside military responsibility, such as value of the American troop pay in Italy, remittances from American citizens to Italy, and various other items. It was not clear what the total would be. Various calculations have been made ranging from 150 to 250 million dollars. In any event, I trust that his Majesty's


Government will contribute a percentage of whatever the sum may prove to be in the usual proportion.

Nevertheless, in spite [of] every effort by General Wilson to get some indication from Washington of how the declarations made in September and October are to be translated into reality, so far no reply of any kind has been received except of a negative and dilatory character. On the assumption, however, that this is merely due to the long technical procedure of the C.C.S. and C.C.A.C., General Wilson has given instructions for planning to proceed. . . . A programme of industrial first-aid is being drawn up to range somewhere within the figures believed likely to be available. . . . This is being drawn up for the immediate needs of Southern and Central Italy and making some allowance for the future requirements of Northern Italy. A preliminary detailed programme has already been sent to the C.C.A.C. . . . All that remains is to secure official approval. Meanwhile some doubt, which I can hardly believe to be well based, has crept into the more sceptical minds on the Commission. It is suggested that the new sources (Troop Pay, remittances, etc.) are to be in substitution not in addition to, the present expenditure for normal civilian needs; in other words, that these sources of income must be used not to introduce any form of rehabilitation of transport and power, but to provide the meanest necessities of life-food and clothing, which are at present carried on the military budget. Should this prove to be the case, the standard of life of the Italian people would fall to a figure which would be hardly possible to calculate. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Summary of Macmillan's Off the Record Remarks to American and British Correspondents in Rome, Dec 44, MTO, HS files, CAD, 091.1, Italy]

♦ ♦ ♦ BRACKER: Asked what exactly is planned.

Mr. Macmillan replied that we are seeking a middle way. We are seeking and proposing a directive.

NORGAARD: Said he had been shocked by the corruption of the present Italian Government for which the Allies are being blamed. Does the Commission think it wise to turn over to a corrupt Government?

Mr. Macmillan replied that we place the responsibility where it belongs, that is, on the Italians. He would not commit himself to say that self government is necessarily good government. (Laughter)

NORGAARD. But we are not convincing the Italian people.

Mr. Macmillan replied that as we are not remaining here permanently we should build up the responsibility of the Italian Government.

NORGAARD. Said he thought the same things were happening in Italy as in France. In the latter country we came as "heroes" and left as tramps.

Mr. Macmillan replied that these were the misfortunes which come to all who carried burdens. One must do what is right. We must give the Italian people what is their own responsibility. What goes wrong is their own affair. Everybody who carried responsibility would be blamed. He had even heard the British Colonial Empire criticized. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCAC, 23 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 6037-A]

♦ ♦ ♦ Because of the publicity which the Italian Government has given [to granting a cost-of-living indemnity disapproved by the Allied Commission] and the resulting expectation of Italians that the increases would be put into effect, it was felt that in the circumstances it was impossible to veto the Italian decree. This was decided despite the inflationary results likely to follow and the great difficulties which the Allied forces will meet in establishing new wage scales for labour employed by the military.

The entirely unsatisfactory attitude of the Government can be traced to the weak position in which ACC finds itself in consequence of the public statements made by the Prime Minister and President without instructions being received here for guidance of those on the spot in respect to interpretation and implementation. Such directives are still being awaited.


[Min, 46th Mtg of CCAC, 15 Dec 44, ABC files, 334, CCAC, Min (8-9-43) ]

♦ ♦ ♦ Mr. Makins [British member] said that the paper [CCAC-155] represented the


views of Mr. Macmillan, which he understood were endorsed by SACMED. The basic intention was that subject to the overriding requirements of the campaign in Italy and to our rights under the Armistice, the Italian Government should be given a greater measure of responsibility and control, that is to give effect to the statement issued by the President and Prime Minister.

Mr. McCloy said that the United States members were in general agreement with Mr. Macmillan's proposals and considered that, if anything, they should go further in the direction suggested than has been proposed in the paper. ♦ ♦ ♦

Mr. McCloy pointed out that paragraph 5 raises the question of the present ambiguity in the status of Italy vis-à-vis the Allies. He said that this situation might be clarified by the conclusion of an interim convention terminating the state of war....

General Spofford said that the anomalous position of Italy, vis-à-vis the Allies, might well be clarified by the signing of an interim peace treaty as a step forward and possibly as a step backward.

Lord Halifax said that the signing of a peace treaty would bring up considerations such as the disposal of the Italian colonies and fleet. While much could be done in the direction of giving the Italian Government the outward appearance of complete independence, as he understood it the British Government attached importance to our retaining the right of reentry if our confidence in the Italian Government turned out to be misplaced. Mr. Macmillan's proposal envisaged the suspension but not the abrogation of our rights. ♦ ♦ ♦

Mr. McCloy questioned, on psychological grounds, the necessity for requiring ministers on appointment to state specifically that they accepted the conditions of the Armistice.

Mr. Makins said that the British Government attached considerable importance to this point. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Statement of U.S. Members at 50th Mtg of CCAC, 22 Jan 45, ABC files, CCAC Min (8-9-43)]

The United States Members are voting affirmatively on the Italian directive, but I am instructed on their behalf to make a statement of the views of our Government.

We are strongly of the view that increased freedom of political and economic action on the part of the Italian Government is desirable. We are not unmindful of the fact that Italy was recently an enemy, but we view such steps as being in keeping with and, to a large extent, dictated by the military considerations which obtain in the area. We therefore welcome Mr. Macmillan's proposal as a step in the right direction but the directive as now written falls so far short of what we believe could reasonably be done at this time that we feel it amounts only to a relatively feeble gesture of no permanent or significant value. We support it only on the basis that it does provide certain minimum improvements in Allied relationships with the Italian Government.

The U.S. Members have strongly urged further actions which we believe should be adopted at the present time, and concerning these we make the following comments:

Our Government desires that in concert with the British Government, we should begin the negotiation of a Preliminary Treaty of Peace with the Italian Government and with the concurrence of the Soviet Government to substitute such a treaty for the present surrender terms. The treaty would, of course, reserve territorial and financial settlement for later discussion, and would be accompanied by appropriate military and civil affairs agreements reserving to the Allies necessary rights in Italian territory. It would, however, recognize the Government's efforts to cooperate with us in the war and as such would have the great psychological advantage of altering the status of Italy and removing her from the mere character of a surrendered enemy. This we believe to be desirable considering the objectives we seek to obtain, namely, a better and particularly a more self reliant spirit on the part of the people behind the lines.

Quite apart from any commitments the two countries have made or are considered to have made toward Italy, we strongly believe that failure to take such steps as those we recommend are quite as apt to induce unrest and costly disturbances behind the lines as are inadequate rations.

Moreover, it is generally conceded that the surrender terms contain many outmoded provisions. Some of these have never been enforced, and others have fallen into discard. The surrender instrument is not a realistic document, and does not accurately describe the present relationship between the Allies and the Italian Government. The Italian people as a whole have demonstrated their willingness to help us get along with the war, to strive toward a more democratic government. Their troops are now fighting alongside


ours. Accordingly, it has seemed to the U.S. members that any major restatement of Allied policy toward Italy must deal with the increasingly anomalous position which the continuing state of war with Italy involves.

For these reasons, the provision of the present directive which would request any new Italian Government rather pointedly to confirm their future adherence to the terms of surrender seems unnecessary and undesirable to the U.S. members, who agree to the inclusion of this provision only because the British members have made its inclusion a condition of their approval of the document as a whole.

The U.S. members, desiring to give the Italian Government a greater degree of responsibility in financial matters, have proposed a financial section to the directive. This would have instructed the Theater Commander to take steps which would include (1) the suspension of control on Italian financial transactions abroad, (2) the establishment of a lira account by the Italian Government to be utilized by the Allied Forces in payment for supplies, services and facilities where recourse to Italian procurement agencies is impracticable, (3) transfer of the issuance of lira from the Allied financial agency to the Italian Government or its agencies, and (4) arrangements with the Italian Government for the supply of an adequate volume of lira currency and credits to meet the needs of the Allied forces and to supplement the requisition procedures of the Italian authorities in purchasing supplies and services for the Allied forces in Italy.

The counter suggestion offered by the U.K. Members is not, in our opinion, adequate to the situation. The negotiation of financial arrangements are intricate and apt to be lengthy, but a specific statement of our willingness to open negotiations leading to desirable objectives should, we think, be made. Here again we agree to its inclusion only because it appears to be the maximum extent to which the U.K. members feel they can go in this direction at the present time.


[Msg, FAN-487, CCS to AFHQ, 30 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September 1944, the U.S. and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

In the light of this agreed U.S.-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

Political Section

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the U.S. and UK Ambassadors in Rome. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.
(b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.
(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.
(d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.
(e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.
(f) The U.S. and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be ad-


vised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between Italy and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between Italy and the United Nations.
(g) The U.S. and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the Moscow declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.
(h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in Italy other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be determined by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

Administrative Section

3. The internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganization of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:
(a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.
(b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government. Control should not be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
(c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianized to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).
(d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

Economic Section

4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are not met, the Allied authorities will not hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.

5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined U.S.-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:
(a) Those quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.
(b) Those supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. As the time when combined military responsibility will terminate will not be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will not be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may not be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.
(c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph
5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and Italy must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will not be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the


Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the United States 7 and British Governments. The United States and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

7. The questions raised by you in Sub paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of NAF 778 are answered as follows:
(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in Italy, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.
(b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorized to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except for those industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other Theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.
(c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into Italy is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have no responsibility for the importation of supplies into Italy.
(d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these reports and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.

8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into Italy must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

Financial Section

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.


[Paraphrase of Msg, CCAC to AFHQ, 9 Feb 45, 8  OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 34894]

♦ ♦ ♦ The classification of Italian exports will be as follows: (a) Goods exported on the grounds of supply. (b) Goods exported on commercial grounds. Included in category (a) will be products on the reserve commodities list necessitating allocation on the part of combined boards, plus other products which U.K., U.S. and Canada agree upon in advance to be essential to the war effort of the country making the purchases and which, for reason of shipping should be procured from Italy. All other products are included in category (b).

Merchandise comprised in category (a) will be sold in such markets and in such quantities as the appropriate combined Allied Agency may determine. The fixing of prices will be effected by negotiations between the purchaser and the Italians. Should the Allies fail to agree the merchandise will be exported and there will be paid to the Italians as a minimum the ceiling price in the country making the purchases, minus expenses. If such price should not be satisfactory, and if it is less than production cost, a request may be made by the Italians for a combined determination of the price by A.C., or, through appeal, by CCAC or CLAC.


The Italians may offer for sale products in category (b) in whatever market they may choose and prices will be determined by their negotiations with the prospective purchasers. A.C. would recommend to the Italian Government, however, that a policy be adopted by the latter whereby such products would not be offered for sale at a price less than the purchase price in Italy in Lire plus cost of transportation and other costs except as special circumstances derived from the conditions of war may justify.

There should be turned over as rapidly as possible to the Italians the responsibility for obtaining products for export or making such other arrangements as are required for the stimulation of export trade. Also there should be turned over to the Italians as rapidly as possible the responsibility for fixing prices of export goods. The activities of A.C. would be confined to the exercise of such supervision with regard to exports as is essential to ensure the carrying out of policies established by the CCS.

The Government of Italy should be informed that prompt restoration of private trade is the objective of our policy and that the problems involved should be examined by A.C. with the Italian Government and that A.C. should make such recommendations then for modifications in procedures now existing as will be most conducive to the accomplishment of this end. In the absence of other arrangements and pending the re-establishment of trade on a private basis, USCC and UKCC would offer to the Italian Government their services in conducting on an agency basis the sale abroad of Italian goods. They would operate, in case the offer should be accepted, under the limitations above referred to and in harmony with arrangements worked out between the corporations and the Italian Government.



[Memo, Brig Gen George A. Lincoln, Chief, Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD, for Asst Sec, WDGS, 16 Jan 45, ABC files, 430, sec.1, CCS 602/5]

♦ ♦ ♦ In view of critical shipping situation the British will not agree to directing General Wilson to increase ration to 300 grams unless at same time necessary additional shipping can be assured. SACMED cannot be promised additional shipping until completion of current examination of world shipping. Therefore message proposed in this paper merely authorizes SACMED to increase ration up to maximum of 300 grams per day to extent possible under currently approved shipping program. Such action may or may not comply with President's desire to increase ration to 300 grams but is best compromise possible in view of shipping situation.


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 18 Jan 45, FAN-478]

I. Critical food situation in presently occupied Italy and urgency of establishing a basis for supply planning for Northern Italy is fully appreciated here. However, in view of the extensive shipping commitments involved it will be impossible to give you a reply on your recommendation as to the basic ration to be established in areas now occupied by the Germans until completion of the current over-all examination of the world shipping situation now being conducted in Washington.

2. Meanwhile you are authorized to establish with that part of Italy which has now been liberated from German control the maximum basic ration you decide is practicable in light of the currently approved shipping programme up to a maximum of 300 grams of bread (or equivalent) per person per day. 9

3. As to German-occupied Italy, it is recognized that because of limited shipping you may be unable to stockpile reserves of wheat/flour in advance of liberation and that unless additional shipping can be provided you may be unable to establish and maintain in areas now occupied by the Germans a ration on the same scale as that which you are authorized to establish in areas now liberated. However, . . . your recommendation with respect to the desirability of a ration


up to 300 grams in areas now occupied by the Germans, once they have been liberated, will be given urgent consideration in the current over-all examination of the world shipping situation....


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander, SACMED, to CCS, 26 Jan 45, OPD files, MC-OUT 9132]

1. I appreciate the authority contained in your FAN 478 to issue 300 grams of bread per person per day in all presently liberated Italy and am anxious to use that authority as early as possible.

2. My present stock position and my advices of shipments for January and February make it impracticable to order the increased issue at an early date. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Disposition Form, Hilldring for SW Stimson, 8 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

3. On 6 November 1944 U.S. members of CCAC Supply Subcommittee pursuant to direction of the President presented to the Supply Subcommittee a proposed cable directing SACMED to establish the 300 gram bread ration in that portion of Italy now under Allied control.... the Prime Minister by cable advised the President of his non-concurrence in the proposed directive to the theater.

4. The question of whether the theater commander should be directed to establish 300 gram bread ration in Italy was under discussion between British and American Governments from November 1944 to January 1945.


[Ltr, SW Stimson to Congressman Vito Marcantonio, 27 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

♦ ♦ ♦ The inability to increase the bread ration in Italy does not result from a shortage of food because up to date the world supply of wheat has been adequate to meet the requirements which the theater commander has estimated as necessary to accomplish 300 grams a day bread ration. The problem has, at all times, since the receipt of the President's letter been one of assuring sufficient shipment to transport the wheat to Italy....


[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 16 Feb 45, NAF-865]

1. Consequent upon shipments of wheat in sight for February arrival and scheduled for succeeding months I have authorized extension of a 300 gram bread ration for all liberated Italy effective 1 March 1945

2. Reference joint announcement proposed in your FAN 478 and W-22519 of 18 January view held here is that it is not desirable to give undue prominence to this increased ration because firstly unforeseen circumstances might later make it necessary to reduce the ration; secondly it will not be possible to give this ration in Northern Italy when liberated for some considerable period on account of transportation difficulties; thirdly the intention to increase the ration was made known sometime ago and an announcement that we are now fulfilling this intention might appear belated. For these reasons suggest matter should be not treated as if it were some new step but merely as the natural outcome of previous announcements....



[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 19 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

(c) Para 2(C) [of the CCS directive on the New Policy, p. 515, above]....

(i) . . . Certain Italian decrees may affect Allied Military Government Territory and since it is considered desirable to coordinate policy in territory which will be ultimately transferred, I shall cause informal consultations to be continued between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government, particularly in relation to economic decrees.
(ii) I shall also interpret this clause, to vest in SACMED the right, when necessary, to exercise control in any decree affecting military needs and the requirements of the campaign.

(d). Para 2(D) . . . All Service Sub-Commissions desire to retain the right of vetoing military appointments. The technical posts of Direc-


tors of Telecommunications and Railroads will be considered military appointments as hitherto.10


[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 19 Feb 45]

(ii) ... There will be great temptation on the part of military formations and services, Italian local authorities and Allied Commission officers to regret the departure of Allied Commission officers and to retain a "small" number which will gradually grow and will lead us to fall between the two stools of (a) control, which necessitates many officers, and (b) decontrol, which should need none. It is essential that military formations and services should be instructed not to ask for the retention of Allied Commission officers but to take their share in some of the difficulties which will have to be faced by Allies and Italians alike as a result of the CCS directive. The Allied Commission will be compelled to give up responsibilities and duties which have been of value to the Allied military formations: Allied officers who have been the proper media between Allied military authorities and the Italian local Governments will disappear. I would ask that a direction be issued to military formations and services on this and other matters arising out of the directive. ♦ ♦ ♦


for Communication to the Italian Govt by Acts President AC, 24 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain jointly declared on September 26, 1944 that, subject to effective maintenance of law and order as well as the regular administration of justice, an increasing measure of control should be handed over to the Italian Government. In order to implement this declaration, the Allied Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the Armistice and surrender instrument in the matter of day to day administration and only to exercise such control when Allied military interests require.

3. The Political Section of the Allied Commission is being abolished as of 1 March 1945 The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will thus have no direct counterpart in the Commission. It will deal with the Chief Commissioner on matters of major policy, and on matters of minor policy and routine business it will address itself to whatever section 11  (Economic or Civil Affairs) of the Commission [as] may be appropriate to the subject involved. Matters involving the travel of diplomatic and other public officials will hereafter be dealt with on behalf of the Commission by the Office of the Executive Commissioner.

4. The Italian Government will continue, as at present, to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal. It is necessary, however, that the Allied Commission be kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other Governments. It is agreed in principle that facilities for the use of secret bags will be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their diplomatic representatives abroad. Undeposited cypher facilities cannot be allowed.

Insofar as these negotiations have to do with economic and financial matters, this requirement will be met by keeping the Economic Section and its Finance Sub-Commission informed of the progress of such negotiations....
An arrangement can also be made whereby the Italian Government furnish a periodic summary of negotiations completed or pending with other Governments.

7. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission for decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

It is, however, desirable to work out with the Italian Government a procedure for ensuring that the Allied Commission is informed of proposed decrees some time before their enactment, in order to enable the Chief Commissioner to consult with the Italian Government as to their application to territory under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government (AMG), and to lay plans for their effective implementation in such territory when appropriate.

9. The Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be withdrawn as soon as possible. Representatives of the Allied


Commission will, however, be sent into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government when it considers such action necessary and certain specialist officers with economic functions will remain in such territory for a limited period.

In implementation of this policy, it is intended to abolish by April 1, 1945, the Regional Offices of the Allied Commission for Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern and Lazio-Umbria Regions. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Rome Despatch to Stars and Stripes, 27 Feb 45, Microfilm, Stars and Stripes]

The announcement by Harold Macmillan, acting President of the Allied Commission, that greater autonomy has been restored to the Italian Government was hailed with satisfaction by the press here today.

... Though some journals had reservations, the general tone was approval.
Riconstruzione, organ of the Labor Democratic Party, said, ". . . we must recognize that the autonomy of which the Italian Government can today avail itself is the maximum to be allowed under war circumstances."

Il Globo, financial paper, called the latest decision a substantial step forward. It declared that "the best way to help Italy is to let Italy help herself. A corpse is always an embarrassing object." ♦ ♦ ♦
Il Lavoro, organ of the General Confederation of Labor suggested that gratified press comment had gone beyond reality. It said Italians must avoid illusions, without belittling the importance of what had been done.
Il Populo, Christian Democrat newspaper, said the change was "a gesture of confidence toward our government and our people alike." ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq AC, Directive, 24 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

1. The first duty of Allied Commission liaison officers will be to keep themselves, at all times, informed of the situation in the areas with which they are concerned....

3. Liaison officers will keep close touch with the senior military formation, American and British, in their areas. They will endeavour at all times to assist military formations in their relations with Italian Government departments and agencies. They must, however, remember that they are liaison officers and not executive officers and will not be able to carry out many of the functions of Provincial Commissioners.

Points which may require special attention are:
a. Law cases affecting Allied personnel or property.
b. Epidemics endangering Allied personnel.
c. Requisitioning and derequisitioning.
d. Relations between Allied and Italian police forces. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to AC Secs, 27 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/90]

1. Vice Presidents will impress upon the Directors of their Sub-Commissions, and Directors of independent Sub-Commissions upon their officers, the necessity of implementing the policy of the CCS directive defining the new relations of the Allied Commission with the Italian Government, especially with respect to the following paragraph:

"The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels."

2. Experience during the last six months has shown that whereas officers in the field have been careful to avoid executive action or speech with officials with the Provincial governments, there has been a tendency at HQ of officers in the Sub-Commissions to forget that the dropping of the "C" from A.C.C. was intended to convert the relations between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government to those of adviser (and provider of supplies on the one hand and of a sovereign government on the other. I have heard reports of discussions and conferences which lead me to think that more forceful measures than advice have been used to persuade-if indeed not to compel-the Italian Government to accept the views of the Allied Commission and come into line....

In future . . . Vice Presidents and Directors of Sub-Commissions will ensure that such formal advice as it may be necessary to convey to the Italian Government is given by Vice Presidents or their Deputies or by Directors of Sub-Commissions, to Ministers or Under-Secretaries.


[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 29 Mar 45, OPD Msg files, NAF-903]

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN


487 [CCS Directive, 30 January, Section 8, p. 517, above], PWB now:

(A) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign. 12
(B) Relinquished control of Italian radio network which is now operated by Italian radio agency.
(D) Handed over as appropriate informational activities in connection with books, plays, copyrights, news features and photographic services to Allied Commission, OWI, MOI [Ministry of Information (British) ] and British and United States embassies.

Similar action will be taken in respect of areas further north as soon as convenient after their liberation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Brig Gen Edward B. McKinley, Deputy Vice President, Econ Sec, AC, to Hilldring, 4 Apr 45, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 3]

♦ ♦ ♦ The fact that all FEA employees are concentrated in Economic Section has caused the organization to have a FEA "underground" which communicates directly with Crowley [Administrator FEA] and feels a loyalty only to him. He sends them over and calls them back regardless of whether they can be spared, much to the consternation of Admiral Stone. Also they act upon instructions in personnel matters which are communicated directly and do not come through the proper channels.

This is still decidedly a military show and will be for a long time to come-until we go into the North and all AMG is finally being moved from the North. As long as it remains a military show the channels and loyalties must remain military. Don't think that all plans aren't being made to replace the military with civilians as rapidly as possible, but this must be done from the bottom up, not from the top down. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Hilldring to McKinley, 18 Apr 45]

♦ ♦ ♦ The agreement whereby civilian agency furnish civilian experts for duty overseas

provides that these civilians are to be integrated at the control level of the council under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the theater commander. Therefore, there is no excuse for "back door" correspondence by any civilian on official matters about which the theater commander should be informed. If in spite of the agreement, civilian personnel in Allied commission continues to circumvent . . . I will take this matter up with appropriate civilian authorities. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, AC Hq to U.S. Army Officers Assigned to AC, 4 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/74]

1. There is in the process of development a procedure which will enable U.S. Army officers who have evidenced their desire to do so, and who are found to be qualified, to be relieved from active duty from the Army of the United States and immediately re-employed in this headquarters for a position with the appropriate U.S. Government civilian agency. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for CCS, 11 May 45, MTO, HS files, AC-387.4/079, G-EG-O, AFHQ Papers]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Political Section of the Allied Commission was abolished I March [See par. 3, Aide-mémoire, above] and the Allied Commission has since received political guidance from the U.S. and UK ambassadors in Rome. For day to day advice and in order that specific Embassy officials may be readily available to the Commission, particularly in the absence of the ambassadors, the U.S. and UK ambassadors have nominated representatives from their staffs to act as Political Advisors to the Chief Commissioner. These are stationed at Headquarters Allied Commission and comprise one Second Secretary and one Third Secretary on the American side, and one official with the rank of Minister and a Second Secretary on the British side. ♦ ♦ ♦

b. (I) . . The Italian Government has given oral assurance to the Chief Commissioner to keep the Commission advised of any negotiations in which it may engage with other governments. The Chief Commissioner, however, reports he is not wholly satisfied that the Commission is, in fact, being fully informed of such


negotiations and is taking steps with the Prime Minister to correct the situation.

(4) . . . Permission has been given for the Italian Government to communicate with their representatives by means of uncensored sealed bag facilities. It has not, however, been considered possible to permit them undeposited cipher facilities.... 13

e. .. . As reported . . . general withdrawal of Allied Commission officers from Italian Government territory took place i April. In the Allied military interest it was considered necessary to retain certain liaison and specialist officers in such territory. ♦ ♦ ♦

f. (2) The Italian Minister of Public Instruction has expressed himself as most anxious to promote interchange of knowledge and learning between Italy and the United Nations, and has set up the following committees to formulate plans to place before the Allied Commission:
(A) Two committees to consider the interchange of professors and students, the facilities available in Italy and those facilities they would like to receive from the United Nations.
(b) One committee to consider the exchange of books and periodicals. This committee is to concentrate in the first place on those of a scholarly nature published during the war years. This committee will also prepare lists of former subscribers to periodicals and lists of Italian bodies which formerly subscribed to United Nations publications.
(3) The Italian Government is also considering making proposals for interchange of scientific journals and of medical representatives.
(4) Contact has already been established with the International British and American Scout Organizations.
(5) This headquarters has had meetings with a view to putting forward proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for relaxing travel control to permit (inter alia) the above categories of persons to move into and out of Italy and these will be submitted separately. ♦ ♦ ♦

g. . . . Provision for the compilation of electoral lists was made by the Italian Government by Decree-Law of 28 September 1944 and a Ministerial Decree of 18 October 1944. The preparation of the lists is proceeding and it is hoped to complete them by mid-May. The Italian Government is preparing a decree to regulate the conduct of local elections and intend to review the pre-Fascist Law in that connection. Advice is being tendered to the Italian Government by the Commission on aspects of the draft decree with a view to ensuring freedom and secrecy of voting.

h. . . . Proposals submitted by the Italian Government and the Allied Commission for changing the status of prisoners of war serving with the Allies in Italy were considered here. They were unacceptable but counter proposals submitted by this headquarters proved acceptable to the Italian Government and have been submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval in NAF 951.14  ♦ ♦ ♦

k. . . . (2) . . . On 2 April 1945 the total of Allied civilians employed by the Commission was 91 (60 U.S. and 31 British). . . . The total number of officers of military status then employed by the Commission on AC AMG work was 1409.
(3) . . . The plans prepared by the Allied Commission for further civilian infiltration envisaged that by the time the liberation of northern Italy is reached, it will have been possible to employ a total of 115 Allied civilians and to reduce the number of officers of military status to 1300. Allied Commission states that in their view, still further civilianization will depend on the rate at which it is possible to hand territory back to the Italian Government. The matter is under further study by Allied Commission headquarters with a view to more precise plans being formulated.

1. (1) . . . The segregation of officers dealing with AMG functions from those dealing only with Allied Commission functions will be carried out as far as practicable. It is pointed out, however, that there are difficulties in carrying out such segregation, particularly with respect to duplication of personnel which may well be necessary if headquarters are separated. In an endeavor to achieve the object desired, Headquarters Allied Commission have given particular consideration to locating the Local Government, Labor, Monument Fine Arts & Education Sub-Commissions at places other than Rome on the ground that those sub-commissions are most closely concerned with problems arising out of AMG territory....


(2) ... On the general question, however, Allied Commission will establish as operations permit, an advance headquarters in Military Government territory where all matters affecting military government will be dealt with except those requiring close consultation with the Italian Government or with the Commission itself. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Program of Essential Italian Imports 1945, Prepared by the Italian Govt in Collaboration With AC, Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/364]

2. In general, what the Allies have been doing so far is to spoonfeed Italy with finished products. Partly, of course, this policy resulted from the fact that the original military program for Italian supplies contemplated military responsibility for only six months; . . . Moreover, of course, the destruction of Italian industry by the Germans, and the crippling effect of power and transportation shortages, have made the reactivation of plant and equipment most difficult during the past months.

3. . . . the time has now come for the Italian economy to begin pulling its own weight in the boat. It is possible for Italy to do this now for the first time-because the Italian Government is now developing administrative machinery which can plan and carry through a production program, and because essential first steps have been taken by the military forces and the Italians to organize the economy for production.

4. The limiting factors on production are now three:
b. Electric Power
c. Imported production materials and equipment.

The presentation of the Program of Essential Italian Imports, 1945, reflects the attack on these three limiting factors. In the following paragraphs the standard and levels of economic life implied in this Program are summarized and briefly discussed.

5. Transportation ...
a. In general, the purpose of the import program for transportation is to place the Italian economy in a position where it can transport a minimum ration of food and have left over the minimum amount of transportation necessary to implement a program of agricultural, mineral and industrial production in Liberated Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

6. Electric Power ...
b. The above program leaves entirely out of account the major reconstruction of many large generating plants which are now so badly destroyed that whole new installations will have to be built from the ground up. The purpose of the present Program is merely to provide the replacement, maintenance and repair supplies to transmit and efficiently utilize the limited quantities of power likely to become available. ♦ ♦ ♦

7. Agriculture ...
a. The clear purpose of the agricultural section of this Program is to maximize production of food both in Liberated Italy and in northern Italy after liberation....

14. Italy and the Italians are ready to go to work. The will, the skill and the manpower are there but the tools have been destroyed and the materials are lacking. To the extent they can be supplied and shipped, the Italians will be enabled to dig themselves out of the hole in which Fascism has left their country; and, to the extent of their success, they will cease to be a continuing charge on the economies of the United Nations. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Arthur Paul, Exec Dir, Bur of Areas, OLLA, to McC1oy, 15 Mar 45, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Italy]

♦ ♦ ♦ In view of the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister which was issued on September 26, 1944 and the desire of this government to further the contribution of Italy to the war and to minimize interferences with the war, it seems clear that the supplies to


be provided to Italy should include more than those commonly provided under the so-called disease and unrest formula applied by the Army. Experience has shown that this formula is not the one best adapted to serve our military and national interests in respect to Italy. I understand, however, that the War Department feels that it would be inadvisable on its part to include in its appropriation request essential civilian supplies of a type falling outside this formula.

It is proposed, therefore, that for the fiscal year 1946 the War Department and the FEA shall agree on an essential supply program for Italy which will carry out the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister, and which will include both the types of supplies previously supplied by the Army and other types contemplated by the joint statement. The FEA will include the funds necessary for this program in its lend-lease appropriation estimate and will inform the Congress that these funds are to be used for the purchase of goods to be transferred to the War Department, or in other words, for the financing of requirements certified by the War Department to the FEA. While the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister go beyond the customary War Department formula for essential civilian supplies, it is definitely linked to the war effort in that its principal objective is most effectively to place the resources of Italy in the war. This broader aim is one which the War Department will support in the Congressional hearing as one of military value. 15  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, for Actg President, AC, 29 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/109/734]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. Until the final cessation of hostilities with both Germany and Japan inadequate shipping can be expected to be a limiting factor. Currently it is a critical factor. All plans and programs, therefore, must be prepared with a view to minimizing shipping requirements during the continuation of military responsibility.

2. There must be maximum development and use of local resources of food and supplies of the nature now being imported. This is necessary not only because of the saving thus effected in shipping, but also because the resources available to the United Nations are being taxed severely to provide relief for the rapidly expanding liberated areas in all theaters of war. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Bonomi to the Chief Cmsr, AC, 30 May 45, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Italy]

2. When the first [rehabilitation] program was prepared it was impossible to foresee how long the war in Italy would last and what destruction and looting the Germans would do to the economic resources of Northern Italy, during the last phases of the war. Therefore only the productive capacity and industrial plants of the regions that had so far been liberated were considered.

3. Most luckily the liberation of the North happened so rapidly that the industrial plants and the transportation system suffered only very light damage. However, they are practically idle owing to the lack of coal and certain raw materials.

5. One of the aspects of the new situation that must be most seriously considered is the problem of employment of the specialized labor located in the densely populated and highly industrialized regions of the North. . . . Every person that observes the conditions of the working classes in the North agrees on the absolute urgency to put them back to work at once, because it is feared that if this does not happen there will be a most serious agitation.

6. For this reason it is necessary, following the liberation of Northern Italy, to coordinate and integrate the "Program of Essential Italian Imports-1945" by increasing the quantities of raw materials in respect to finished products. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, McCloy to William L. Clayton, Chairman, Liberated Areas Comm., 2 Jun 45, ASF, ID files, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-361]

♦ ♦ ♦ Because requirements ... have just been received in the War Department, up to this time no supplies have been furnished to Italy above those necessary to avoid disease and unrest. Since the broadened policy can no longer find support on military basis, no supplies will be furnished by the War Department to implement such policy. 16


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