Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter XV:

Politics Will Not Wait

On the very day of the first restoration of territory to the Badoglio government the Allied Commander in Chief (now the British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) cabled the CCS about a development which was imperiling the policies underlying Allied support of that government. A political demarche by Naples political leaders was no longer manageable by Naples AMG but had enlisted such broad international sympathies that General Wilson now felt compelled to warn his superiors. The Naples leaders were demanding not only an immediate broadening of the Italian government-in defiance of the decision to defer this till the capture of Rome-but also the abdication of the King. There was no certainty that the mass of the Italian people would approve these steps, and General Wilson asked that the CCS stand firm in the policy of deferring all political issues that might interfere with the war effort. American political opinion, however, was tending toward the view that the war effort might be hurt even more by suppressing Italian liberal elements who considered the King discredited by past association with Fascism. Probably more than a few Americans both at home and in Italy were now beginning to regret the decision to entrust civil affairs to the military authorities rather than to civilians better qualified to understand the forces thrusting toward a break with the old order. Indeed, the representative of one American civilian agency in Italy reported to Washington that the Italian leader (Count Sforza) best able to lead a genuine democratic movement was being undermined merely because of Allied military power in Italy.

Actually, the military leaders were not taking sides politically but were merely implementing an inveterate policy, concurred in initially by civilian authorities, of postponing controversial political changes in Italy. This policy was the more natural for the Army in that it had thought that the military phase would be of short duration. As always in civil affairs matters the Army tried to limit its responsibility: it was mainly interested in the short-term objectives of maintaining stability behind the lines and securing maximum help from the Italian Government. The long term objectives of political as well as economic rehabilitation it hoped to turn over to civilian agencies. Because of the long delay in taking Rome, stubborn and prolonged German resistance even beyond Rome, and unforeseeable internal developments the Army's concept of limited responsibility proved to be unrealistic. By force of circumstances the Army was destined to become the agency through which both the short- and long-term policies were executed. But as the documents in this chapter show, the effort to hold politics in abeyance persisted from the beginning of the occupation until, in the spring of 1944, Italian political groups, American political sympathies, and a diplomatic maneuver by the Soviet Government combined to force a change.


General Eisenhower himself had initiated the policy of postponing drastic political changes, although, like his government, he leaned in sympathies toward the more progressive elements in Italian political life. But surveying the political scene as it had developed by September 1943 General Eisenhower saw only two alternatives: to accept the government of King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio as a legitimate and cobelligerent government or to ignore the rickety regime and establish military government over all of Italy. He strongly favored the first course of action as best suited to gaining the maximum contribution to the Allied military effort with the minimum expenditure of manpower. The President and Prime Minister approved this recommendation mainly on the ground that it was the best means of winning the loyalty of the Italian armed forces, especially the Navy. When the long terms of surrender were signed General Eisenhower made it clear to Badoglio that he was expected to develop the capacity to govern and to broaden his administration by including anti-Fascist elements such as were found principally among the liberal and left-wing Italian parties.

The opportunity to broaden the government was presented with the resurgence of the anti-Fascist political parties. Even before the fall of Mussolini various groups had met clandestinely in the principal Italian cities. After Badoglio left Rome, six parties-the Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, the Liberals, Action, and the Labor Democrats-formed a Committee of National Liberation, Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN), headed by Ivanoe Bonomi, and attempted to keep in touch with similar groups in the larger cities such as Florence, Milan, and Turin. A committee was formed in Naples and included the historian and philosopher, Benedetto Croce, and Count Carlo Sforza, who had returned from exile in America. Holding a wide variety of opinions on other matters, the Naples group of politicians were unanimous in their opposition to the King who had collaborated with Fascism. Trying earnestly to enlist the support of the anti-Fascists, Marshal Badoglio offered the vice premiership to Count Sforza and made overtures to others only to meet with a flat refusal. Unable to obtain the collaboration of the resurgent groups Badoglio offered to resign. At this point Bonomi, President of the CNL in Rome, promised support provided the King would give assurances that a representative government would be formed when Rome was liberated. Badoglio then withdrew his resignation and suggested the formation of a government of undersecretaries chosen from administrative and technical experts. With this compromise solution adopted on 17 November the formation of a full government was postponed until the capture of Rome at which time Badoglio promised to resign.

In accepting this arrangement the military authorities hoped to postpone the abdication of the King and related political issues that might interfere with the prosecution of the war. It should be emphasized that this in no way altered the pronouncement, made at the time of the Italian declaration of war against Germany, that the Italians had "the absolute and untrammeled right . . . to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have." Furthermore, at the Moscow Conference of October the Allies had proclaimed that the Italian people should enjoy the democratic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. The time, however, at which these rights would be extended was to be determined by the Commander-in-Chief as long as military operations continued.

By the beginning of the new year it was difficult to defer political change and im-


possible to continue prohibiting public political meetings. The military advance slowed down but the political agitation accelerated. The anti-Fascist groups continued their campaign against the King and in December requested permission to hold a national political convention in Naples. In spite of the Moscow declaration and other liberal pronouncements the military authorities, on the ground that the meeting might prejudice military interests, refused to permit it. The refusal to allow this assembly, together with the slow progress of epuration, caused widespread dissatisfaction with the Allied administration. Under pressure, MGS suggested that the political convention be held at Bari, outside AMG territory, and it also authorized a relaxation of the policy against public political meetings in AMG territory.

The Bari conference of 29-30 January 1944 drew up a program calling for the abdication of the King and the establishment of a government composed of all six anti-Fascist parties. An executive Giunta was formed to carry out these demands. The initial reaction of General Wilson, who had succeeded General Eisenhower as SACMED, was to postpone any change while the major offensive at Cassino and Anzio was in progress. He feared that opening up political questions might result in unrest and interfere with military operations. It was in the light of this advice from the field that Prime Minister Churchill made his speech in Parliament warning against breaking the handle while the coffeepot was hot. However, it had already become known to AFHQ that the U.S. State Department did not consider that the lid could be held down indefinitely upon a political situation that had already reached the boiling point. It was during this period of divergence in the political policies of the two countries that General Wilson sent the CCS his message of 9 February which warned against any action that might increase political unrest at a time when he was committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome.

In less than a week, General Wilson changed his mind. The winter drive had broken down and it was obvious Rome would not be reached before a fresh spring offensive. Infuriated by Churchill's coffeepot speech the Giunta threatened first a general strike and then warned all those in the service of the state to regard the King and his government as rebels. Under stern warnings from AFHQ these actions were withdrawn or modified. Nevertheless by the end of February it appeared that the existing political dissatisfaction portended greater evil to military operations than did any reaction to a change of government. Furthermore, General Wilson decided that the Allies were at the time in a better position to control or moderate the demands of the Giunta than when they would be in Rome. Matters had progressed to the point where, as General Wilson informed the CCS on 18 February, a choice had to be made between negotiating on the demands of the Giunta or slapping its members in jail.

Presented with this alternative President Roosevelt urged the Prime Minister to adopt General Wilson's recommendation; at all odds he said the Allies should avoid persisting in any course that entailed putting down an anti-Fascist group by force. But the Prime Minister had already committed himself publicly to the policy of deferring political change; moreover he appears to have lost confidence in Sforza when he failed to persuade the Italian leader that upon his return to Italy he should support the monarchy as the only remaining symbol of Italian unity, at least until the war was over. Mr. Churchill's reply to the President urged continued support of the Badoglio government at least until Rome was captured and the Allies could better afford the risk of taking on as


collaborators men who were known to be less co-operative than Badoglio. In the interest of Allied unity the President went along with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office.

But neither American nor British political authorities foresaw that continued Allied delay in accepting a liberalization of the Italian Government would play into the hands of the Russians, who had no intention of missing any opportunity to strengthen their political influence in Italy. By a sudden, unilateral exchange of representatives with the Badoglio government the Soviets bolstered the position of the Italian Communist party and thus threatened the more moderate parties in the Giunta with a loss in political weight. When it became clear that the long-term political prospects of the United States and Great Britain were as much at stake as the prospects of the parties most friendly to them, further delay seemed unwise. The American Political Representative and the British Minister made a joint visit to the King and urged him to abdicate in the interests of Italian unity, which was essential to the war effort. On 12 April Victor Emmanuel announced that after Allied liberation of Rome he would appoint his son Lieutenant General of the Realm. Upon this promise of the King the six anti-Fascist parties agreed to let their representatives participate in the Badoglio government. Settlement of the institutional question was deferred, by a commitment which the Allies secured from the new government, until the Italian people should be able to express its opinion freely. Only to this extent was it possible to make politics wait.



[Msg, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, Setting Forth Items of Agenda for Discussions With Marshal Badoglio at Malta, 24 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 583]

♦ ♦ ♦ (b) Present government to carry on; authority of King and Badoglio to be built up but with understanding this is not to prejudice untrammeled right of people of Italy to decide eventual form of government later.
(c) Final form of government to be decided after Germans are evicted from Italian territory.
(d) King and Badoglio to build broad based anti-Fascist coalition government which will work for Allies against Germans on basis of armistice. . . .


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 601]

♦ ♦ ♦ The King wished to know, which I insisted [sic], if Badoglio remain the Prime Minister for the duration of the War. 1  He said it was quite possible that he might find it difficult to form a representative anti-Fascist government if we stipulated that Badoglio must remain Prime Minister.

He added that strength of Fascist Party, although latent in some areas, was still great and was much underestimated by Badoglio.
The very large Red proportion of the population were equally a menace and although, at the moment, the Catholic Party was definitely pro Monarchy, definite reactions could rarely be foretold with accuracy. ♦ ♦ ♦

He said finally that he thought that it would be most dangerous to leave the choice of postwar government unreservedly in hands of Italian people.
I commented suitably on all of the King's points....


[Notes, Murphy, on Conf With Badoglio Aboard the H.M.S. Nelson in Valetta Harbor [Malta Conf], 27 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 611]

The Marshal [Badoglio] indicated that the other desiderata of the Allied Governments, such as the broadening of the basis of his government and similar matters, could only be effectively dealt with after the King and his Government returned to Rome. He accepted it, in principle, as desirable.

With regard to the expression: "It is understood that the right of the Italian people to choose their own system of government after the war," mentioned in the text of the armistice terms, Marshal Badoglio wishes to see this altered to: "It should be understood that free elections will be held after the war." In other words, he did not wish to pledge the King and the Government to throw open the question of the Monarchy by their own act. We must consider whether the form of words can be interpreted to mean merely that the Allies do not in any way by their actions now commit themselves to maintain the Monarchy. Marshal Badoglio ventured the opinion also that the Italian people are not adapted to a Republican form of government and feels that the retention of the Monarchy is essential to stability and unity of the country. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Notes, Murphy, on Conf with Badoglio Aboard the H.M.S. Nelson in Valetta Harbor [Malta Conf], 29 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 658-59]

General Eisenhower inquired whether it is Marshal Badoglio's purpose to seek anti-Fascists and invite them to participate in his government.
Marshal Badoglio replied that the choice of members of the government will be made by the King-he himself is only a soldier, he stated, knowing very little of politics.
General Eisenhower expressed his sympathy as a soldier but stated that the Italian Government must assume an anti-Fascist complexion if it is to fight with the Allies.
In the letter which he will give him General Eisenhower will so state, but Fascism is one of those things we are fighting which we regard with deadly enmity.
Marshal Badoglio indicated that he understood all of this.
General Eisenhower reiterated that the extent he would be permitted by his government to cooperate with the Italians will depend upon this point.
Marshal Badoglio said that the fight will be (1) against Fascism; (2) against Germany; in that order.

Marshal Badoglio read a letter from the King asking for the participation of Count Dino Grandi, stating in effect that Grandi made the initial attack against Mussolini and really is responsible for Mussolini's downfall. Grandi's presence in the government would ruin the status of the Republican Fascist Government.

General Eisenhower said he would refer this question to his governments. In his personal opinion, however, Grandi had been so closely associated for so long a period of time in the minds of our public opinion with Fascism that now for him to be included in the Italian Government would be subject to adverse misinterpretation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 711]

Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he has been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 2 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 992]

From General [Mason-] MacFarlane the following message has been received.

Badoglio told me today that he hoped to ask Sforza 2  to return to Italy as soon as a government was formed in Rome. Badoglio would insure that Sforza was well treated but it was


quite impossible to expect that the King would agree to his inclusion in the Government.


[Msg. Murphy to Mason-MacFarlane, 9 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/74]

Following message from Department of State is repeated to you as of interest. Count Sforza has not, in so far as Department of State is aware, stated in a broadcast that he approved the actions of the Badoglio Administration. The press has variously interpreted his remarks made at an Italian Rally on 26 September about the amount of support he is willing to accord present Italian Government. . . . He has expressed the opinion that Churchill is wrong in attempting to rally anti-Fascist forces to the King of Italy, however he has likewise taken the stand that the issue of constitutional reforms should not be brought up now and that all political wrangling should be shelved before the task of running the German invaders off of Italian soil....


[Min, Prime Minister's Interv With Count Sforza, II Oct 43, Forwarded by Br Resident Minister to CofS, AFHQ, 28 Oct 43, G-5 AFHQ, SGS 400-4, vol. XV, quoted in Komer, Civil Affairs and MG in the Mediterranean Theater]

The Monarchy in Italy certainly counted for something and commanded loyalty. In any case it was the only thing that represented any continuity in the Italian state and was the only remaining symbol of Italy. If that disappeared, I could not see what would be left. It was essential to concentrate and encourage all that might be left of Italy's strength and purpose in the struggle against the German oppressors. . . .

The future of Italy was not my business: that was a matter for the Italian people. But the Italian people would have no say in the matter unless the Germans were driven out of Italy. The King and Badoglio were at present giving us such help as they could do to that end. There was no effective help from any other Italian quarter that I could see; the only chance was to support them.


[Three Power Declaration Regarding Italy Signed at Moscow, 30 Oct 43, Dept of State Bull IX (6 Nov 43), 309-10]

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future, the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander in Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three Governments parties to this declaration will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.


[Ltr, Capt. R. Buckingham, Security Officer at Brindisi, Fifth Army, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, 31 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/61]

♦ ♦ ♦ I have formed the opinion that all is not well. There is a feeling of unrest, disappointment and surprise amongst the Italian people that a considerable number of Fascists, particularly "Squadriste" [sic] are still at liberty. Many of these continue to occupy their old positions and are engaged beneath the surface in certain subversive activities detrimental to the Allied cause.

Whilst complete domination by the regime has been lessened this is thought to be only latent and it is felt by the People that conditions may later become as before, rather on the lines of the French proverb "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose."

The Italian people thought and hoped that they were going to be freed from the Fascist regime and imagined, in their despondency, that the Allied invasion would create an immediate Utopia. They are unable to understand completely what they consider to be the inaction of the Allies. That some early arrests were made is applauded but these are not considered to have gone far enough. The Badoglio Government is thought to be weak, if not favourable to Fascism for some reason.



[Msg Gen Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

♦ ♦ ♦ Acquarone 3  explained that he had gone to Naples to try to effect the formation of a wholly non-Fascist cabinet of men of established ability. He had consulted various anti Fascist groups and he cited in particular Enrico de Nicola and Porzio who had been respectively President of the Chamber of Deputies and Under Secretary to Giolitti when Prime Minister. Their reaction to his invitation to join the government was a refusal on the ground that they could not take part in a government headed by Badoglio. Their objection to the Marshal was not personal. But, they considered it was a violation of the tradition of Parliamentary Government in Italy for a soldier to be Prime Minister.♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Taylor to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

... In the course of a conversation with Marshal Badoglio today, he discussed at length his difficulty in forming a satisfactory cabinet. He states that he has a long list of cabinet possibilities drawn from individuals of many political shades who will be available to him upon arrival in Rome. He feels that a stop gap cabinet formed prior to leaving for Rome would be useless as it would not have any of the machinery of the government available for performing its functions.... As it is hoped to be in Rome in a comparatively short time the Marshal, while requisitioning a present ministerial body, feels strongly that it is preferable to await arrival in  Rome before taking final action on cabinet selections.

He considers Acquarone's visit to Naples a failure, adding that the old liberals whom he contacted were "ghosts" of a former era.


[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 15 Oct 10000/100/26]

... The principal differences between the Badoglio and Acquarone interpretations of the cabinet situation lie in the importance attached to the Naples Group. To Acquarone they and their associates are the indispensable leaders of the anti Fascists who must be reconciled to assure a broad and liberal cabinet of established ability. Badoglio attaches no such importance to these people and feels sure that he can develop his cabinet from liberal personalities who he expects to find in Rome.

It should be observed that the mission is in no position to check the accuracy either of Acquarone's estimate of the importance of the Naples Group or of the latter's statements of the strength of their contacts in Rome. But it is clear that


Acquarone is speaking for the King and that in his view the Monarchy will be gravely endangered if speedy action is not taken to adjust matters with anti-Fascist groups.

In summary the choice which may be presented to the Allied governments is: will they hang with Badoglio for the time being even if he can produce only a second rate cabinet and this not until arrival in Rome or will they allow a recognized anti-Fascist to form a cabinet of his own choosing provided that it is wholly non Fascist and that Badoglio is not briskly discarded.

It is obvious that we are approaching a crossroad in our political relations with Italy....


[Memo, Gen Taylor on Conversation With Duke d'Acquarone, 24 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

♦ ♦ ♦ Acquarone then launched upon a vigorous attack on the Marshal whom he accused of disloyalty and of personal ambition to become regent. Although the Duke agreed that the text of the letter 4 showed no support of the regency movement, he felt that the inference was clear that Badoglio was encouraging it. He said that the relations between the King and the Marshal were approaching the breaking point and that the King could tolerate the Marshal no longer at the head of his Government.

Asked to outline the course of action which he, Acquarone, recommended he stated that he was first going to contact Sforza and see if he would come into the cabinet either as Prime Minister or as Minister for Foreign Affairs. If Sforza would not accept, he would next approach di [de] Nicola, whom he admitted was the only other available candidate for Prime Minister. At all events Badoglio must go at once while the completion of the cabinet would await the return to Rome, although the names would be agreed upon and be communicated to and concurred in by the Bonomi Group [Rome Committee of National Liberation, below].

In resume, the attitude of the Duke and, probably to a lesser extent, of the King is that the Marshal is undermining the King's position and is prepared to sacrifice the latter in order to remain in power. Meanwhile they say that it is really Badoglio who is the obstacle to a unified government as is proved by the statements emanating from Rome....


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

... Badoglio told me that he was extremely anxious for Sforza to join his cabinet. He considers that the inclusion of Sforza would strengthen his government very greatly. He himself and Sforza were and always had been on intimate terms. Badoglio added that he hoped to visit Naples on Thursday and thought he would be able to find up to three politicians there to join his cabinet. . . . Badoglio looked much older and more tired than when I last saw him and appears to be feeling the strain of his largely single-handed work.


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

... Present situation. The only political organization of any consequence now in being in liberated Southern Italy is the group around Croce and Sforza. It has the complete support of the bulk of the Allied press representatives, at any rate in the Naples area, in its hostility to the King. It is possible but unlikely that the orientation of the Rome group differs substantially from that of the Naples Group. In any case unless we get to Rome sooner than would appear probable it is really only the Naples Group that we have to consider at the moment. Badoglio has tried and failed on account of the King to gain their support. The King is now going to Naples to try himself. It is doubtful whether the King yet realizes that it is his own person that is forming the stumbling block to the formation of a representative government. Badoglio refuses to invite the King to abdicate but is perfectly willing to act as Regent for the King's grandson if others can induce the King to abdicate. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to Mason-MacFarlane, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

(1) Our immediate policy should be based upon a single principle. We will not recognize or cooperate with any Italian Government unless it is prepared to accept loyalty to the terms of the Armistice and all that these imply. . . .

(2) Italians will of course appreciate that the attitude of the British and American publics to


Italy both now and in the future will be influenced by the character of any Italian Government. The more broadly based it is and the more genuinely anti-Fascist is its performance, the better will be the effect upon the public opinion of the democratic world.

(3) Apart from making these facts known, you should be careful not to intervene. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 6 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

... Sforza has telegraphed me text of identical personal letters to Eden and [Adolph A.] Berle [Jr.] with request that text should be forwarded by telegram to London and Washington.... Following is text which reached me slightly garbled in minor respects....

King sent me today offer to become Prime Minister adding that personal independence towards him would be guaranteed by a solemn declaration that at end of war he would bow to any decision of nation. I answered:

1. That if all public men consulted by him agreed on my name it was because my past gave them the belief that I may have force to unite and govern nation.

2. That since I had always believed in advantage of representative Monarchy I had already succeeded in persuading even extremists to accept formula Grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent since all princes are corrupt or dishonoured; but that I have fully realized that this is maximum can be imposed on nation;

3. Therefore if I accepted present government, my name would lose any force and prestige.

5. That apart from any political considerations, I considered morally inacceptable King's offer to become Prime Minister with mental reservation about His Person and His future. Since I am in Italy I have done my best to fortify Badoglio in his effort to help Allies but neither I nor Badoglio can do anything without a complete moral purification of a situation where rightly or wrongly it appears all forces of reaction and responsible of disaster hail King as their symbol. ♦ ♦ ♦

It would help if Allies who have supreme responsibility recognize that there is a minimum that is indispensable to avoid too radical changes and to assure Italian efficiency and collaboration.



[Ltr, Bonomi, Head of Rome Comm. of National Liberation, to Badoglio as Summarized in Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 7 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

... He makes three conditions.

1. Reconstitution of entire Ministry so as not to imply blind acceptance of all preceding acts;
2. A completely political government with Badoglio as Military Head but not head of the Government;
3. It must be understood that an elected assembly in freed territory shall even determine the form of government. Therefore the members of the government shall undertake to abstain from any act which could compromise the free expression of the people in this respect.

He guarantees that thereby unity may be achieved.
He requests appointments be made only after Rome is freed.
He undertakes to prevent political speculations in Rome during the interval. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 7 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

... As we had anticipated the King has refused to accept the views of Sforza and the Naples Group as final. . . . He has therefore used the Bonomi letter to persuade Badoglio to postpone the whole issue until arrival in Rome. As Badoglio has accepted this thesis this means that attempts to form a broad based government will be abandoned until we reach Rome. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Transl of Badoglio Statement as Given in Msg, AMM to AFHQ, 12 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/28]

... In the Proclamation to the Italian people of last 13 October [see ch. IX, sec. 8] in which I announced that by order of H.M., the King, war was declared against Germany, I also laid down the proposals regarding the constitution of the government headed by me.


It was my intention to call upon the more outstanding representatives of all political parties, none excluded, so that the government could assume a completely democratic aspect.

Naturally, as I submitted to the Allied Mission, the formation of this government had to be brought about gradually, since many of those representatives were not in liberated zones and therefore not available for the time being.
I gave assurance, then, that I would contact statesmen in liberated zones in order to initiate a partial completion of the government.
In fact, I went to Naples where I conferred with Count Sforza, Benedetto Croce and others.

Count Sforza stated that he was ready to give all possible support to my government, but that he would not take any part in the same, since, in his belief, the King should abdicate, the Crown Prince should renounce succession and that the son of the Crown Prince should be made King, with a Regent appointed because of his minority. Benedetto Croce voiced the same belief.

I pointed out to them that the most important problem was that of freeing Italy from the Germans; that we should avoid any act, especially one of so radical a nature, which would cause disturbance in the liberated zone, which must be avoided in our interest and that of the Allies at all cost, and that in any case, we should await the complete liberation of Italy so that the Italian people as a whole, not merely a fraction thereof, could openly decide what form of government they preferred.

Since both Count Sforza and Benedetto Croce remained firm in their opinion and as other political leaders to whom I talked did not agree to take part in the government I returned here without having reached a final settlement.

In the meantime, the head of the Allied Mission informed me that various sections of the Mission were on the way, destined to start working with the different ministries in order to start the new administration rolling.

It was therefore indispensable to proceed with the forming of at least the executive part of the Ministries so that the work with the various sections of the Commission should not be delayed.

Now, a new matter appeared. The heads of each party made known to me that, once the capital was liberated, they favored the establishment of completely constitutional government composed of political personages, leaving to me only the military.

I then submitted a solution to the King: Form the Government, for the present, by placing technical experts in each Ministry, thereby starting the work with the Commission, and when Rome was liberated I would present my resignation as head of the government, and retire.

The new political government formed by the King would, in this manner, find for itself a group of experts and an amount of work already in process in each Ministry, and, regardless of the prevailing conditions in Rome at that time, would be able to continue without interruption its work with the Allied Commission.

The King having approved this plan, I will now complete the government with undersecretaries who will possess, by means of proper decrees, the authority intended to consider and deal with matters pertaining to each ministry, including authority to sign all documents within the competence of the respective ministries.

In this manner the necessary administrative work will not be held in abeyance, causes for disturbances in liberated zones will be avoided, and the desires manifested by the heads of all political parties will be fully met.


[Transl of Pamphlet of Action Party, The Italian Situation, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

♦ ♦ ♦ The first task of the Allies at this moment and with these aims is to permit a liberated Italy to form a strong administrative regime and a sound political representation which will inspire faith and hope in, and will give a vital impulse to, the Italian people of the whole Peninsula, so that on the one hand, the Allied operations will be rendered easier and more effective, and on the other, those of the Germans more difficult and disappointing.

There exists in Central Italy the shadow of a legal government which fled from Rome at the time of the Armistice to escape from the Germans who attacked the capital and seized control of two thirds of the Peninsula, bringing on the scene a new Fascist regime depending on them and under the apparent leadership of Mussolini. This refugee government has with it the King, who represents at least the figure of the head of the state, and it is directed by Marshal Badoglio, surrounded by military ministers and one civilian, Minister of Labor Piccardi. On 14 November the Marshal added a few undersecretaries which did not change nor better the technical and non representative character of the cabinet, so much so that he had to confess that he had not been able to obtain the concurrence of a single party from the Liberal to the Communist.♦ ♦ ♦

The people want:

(1) A respectable and respected regency at


the head of the State, if a President of a Republic is impossible at the present time;

(2) That a government of free, capable, and responsible men, representing the various currents of national opinion, be constituted as soon as possible and that it maintain honorable and fruitful contacts by assiduously and vigorously co-operating with the Allies in every field of activity in their common interest and for common ends.


[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

The Royal family lacks support but the population at large is not anti-monarchical or even anti King. The Army and Navy are fairly definitely and strongly behind the Monarchy and probably the King, at any rate for the present. The cadres, as all the bourgeoisie including the intellectuals and professional elements, are definitely anticommunist....
[Memo, McCaffrey, RCAO, Rgn II, for SCAO's, so Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/108]

5. For your personal information, high officials of the Allied Military Mission are thoroughly convinced that the Central Badoglio Government is definitely anti-Fascist, despite any incidents which have occurred at lower levels under circumstances giving rise to a contrary impression.



[AMGOT Proclamation ii, 5 AGO files, AMGOT Plan, 1 May 43]

Article IV

Section 1.... No newspaper, magazine, book, pamphlet or circular may be published or printed without a written permit from the Allied Military Government....

Article V
Meetings and Assemblies

Section 2. Permitted Meetings and Assemblies. Meetings and assemblies for the following purposes may be held without permits:

(a) Meetings for religious purposes, including baptisms, weddings and funerals;
(b) Such courts of law as are authorized to function by the Chief Legal Officer of the Allied Military Government upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.

Section-2. Other Meetings and Assemblies Prohibited. Except for the foregoing, no person shall promote or attend any public meeting, theatrical, moving picture or other representation or performance, any public assembly or other public gathering, whether indoors or out-of-doors, or any parade or demonstration for which a written permit has not been granted. Such permits will be either specific or continuing and will be issued by or on the authority of the Commissioner of Civil Police of the Allied Military Government through the Civil Police Officer for the locality upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.

Section 3. Power of Civil Affairs Officer or other Officer to Disperse Assemblies. Notwithstanding the issuance of any permit, any Civil Affairs Officer or Civil Police Officer, if he has reason to believe that public disorder will ensue or that the safety of the Allied Forces is threatened, may order any meeting, performance, assembly, or parade to be suspended or terminated and require all persons present to disperse. Any such order will be complied with immediately by all persons present. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Proclamation of Eisenhower to the People of Sicily, 5 Jul 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 3913]

B. 3. . . . No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced during the period of military government. [See also CCS directive for HUSKY, Chapter VII, Section 6.]


[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT, 11 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/688]

I saw Allessandro Tasca this afternoon principally in order to warn him that I did not want to see any further manifestations in public of the Sicilian Independence Movement. He told me that he had been associated with Sicilian Separatism, as I knew, all his life and that he and his brothers Polio and Lucio in company with about 90% of the population of Sicily, firmly believed in the absolute necessity of Sicilian Inde-


pendence from Italy. I told him that whatever he might believe in, the Military Government would not tolerate public manifestations, leaflets or posters in the street, and that he would best serve the interests of Sicily if he would assist the Military Government in reorganizing Administration and in providing the population with food. I said that I should be more inclined to believe in his movement if I could see evidence of assistance. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT. Rpt for Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43)(1)]

6. . . . The Tasca family associated with the Separatist Party for many years before Fascism is ... commendably co-operating on straight forward administrative subjects without obtruding the views they undoubtedly still hold. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Lt Col Peter R. Rodd, SCAO Enna Province, for AMGOT HQ, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

6. The doubts and hesitations which exercise the bureaucracy of the island have been very much increased by the Armistice and the events which followed it. Detached from it by conquest their affiliation to a definite, if inaccessible, national and administrative principle nevertheless survived until the Germans turned the whole of unoccupied Italy into a melting jelly. They have become, at least for the time being, not occupied Italian nationals, but the subjects of AMGOT. The strange and transient nightmare has become an apocalyptic reality. Their world has come to an end and this beast with many of the qualities of the Cheshire cat, which cannot be belled, haunts them with a fading grin.

12. There is . . . among the people generally a growing sense of disappointment that first the occupation and later the Armistice has not brought about the Golden Age, and a relief from restrictions in their personal liberty and the freedom of markets. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Benson, Officer, Comdg, AMG Eighth Army, to Hq AMG, 15th AGp, 25 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

Representations have been made to me from various quarters as regards allowing Italians to have a greater measure of political freedom than is given under the existing AMG Government. It is not suggested that meetings should be allowed, but that pamphlets discussing the merits or demerits of various shades of government should be permitted, after censorship, and provided they are not in any way detrimental to the Allied Cause and War effort.

It has been pointed out that stress had been laid in broadcasts on the fact that the people of Italy shall have the right to decide their own government after the war by free vote, and yet, after the armistice and her declaration of war, the people are forbidden to give any expression of political thought. This, it is considered, is reacting adversely Or. the relationship between the Italians and the Allies.

Whilst I would deprecate any relaxation in the operational zone in the present orders which forbid political meetings or meetings of any kind; it is a question for discussion as to how much they may be relaxed in the rear areas, and exactly what, for this purpose, could be considered the delineating line between the rear areas and the operational army zones.

If some measure of freedom were to be given in the rear, it would be probably impossible to prevent pamphlets being sent into the operational zone, but I could not consider this to be a matter of great importance. It would, however, enable the C.A.O.'s in the forward area to give an explanation of what to the Italian appears to be an illogical order, by explaining to them that as the areas pass out of the operational zone, they will have the right to give some expression to their political thoughts, and that the Allies were prepared to implement in fact what they have said in broadcast.

Could this matter be given consideration by higher authority and guidance be obtained?


[Hq AMG, Rpt for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

Region I (Sicily)

(28) During the month representatives of all the above groups [Christian Democrats, Action, Liberal Reconstruction, and Labor Front Parties] except the Separatists called on AMG officers in Palermo who again warned them that circulation of handbills and unauthorized publications and posting of manifestos could not be tolerated. They were called upon to co-operate, and agreed to do so, but requested that a greater measure of freedom be given for political activity. . . .

Region II

(131) The most aggressive "parties" are the Communists and the Socialists, and competition


between these two for positions of influence became rather sharp in Cosenza province. When the R.C.A.P.O. and other AMG officers discussed the situation with some of the Communist leaders they agreed that since we were fighting their battle and trying to help them, they would suspend political agitation and try to prevent the occurrence of disturbances of public order as long as we remained in control, but that they would do all they could to embarrass the Badoglio Government when it took charge. An indication of the state of political opinion is given by the fact that when the publication of newspapers was permitted in the province of Cosenza, eleven were started within a few weeks, each representing a different hue of political opinion.

(132) On 8 November, the R.C.A.P.O. and a Legal Officer, when visiting Rossano to deal with the cases of certain political prisoners, were informed by the Carabinieri Maresciallo that the Communists had arranged a public mass meeting to follow a procession through the town later that day. Because of the high feeling between the Communists and the Socialists, he feared trouble would result. In this fear, the Podesta concurred. The R.C.A.P.O. thereupon called the leaders of both groups together and obtained from them an agreement to suspend political agitation, and devote themselves to co-operating with AMG, which would welcome suggestions for the improvement of conditions, submitted through the Podesta....

(133) Subsequently, an order prohibiting all public meetings and demonstrations, other than for religious purposes, was sent to all S.C.A.O.'s.♦ ♦ ♦


[AMG, Sicily Rgn Memo 43, 10 Dec 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. 4J-2]

1. AMG policy regarding political activity or manifestations of a political nature is based on the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The directive does not permit political activity or manifestations.

2. This means that no political party, of whatever shade or inclination, can:

a. Hold public meetings of any kind.
b. Print, or cause to be printed, affix, or distribute posters.
c. Print, or cause to be printed, or distributed pamphlets or other written material of a political nature.

3. However, AMG has never stopped private meetings in the homes of individuals. AMG has sought to permit, within the limits of its controlling directive, freedom of thought and expression.♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq AMG, Rpt, Public Mtgs for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

14.... The gradual process of political reawakening continued to be retarded by the ban on overt political activity which continued in effect in both Regions I and II. In both Regions orders were issued prohibiting public meetings and open action by political parties. Close touch with all developments was maintained through public safety channels, and in Region I by liaison with military security organizations. It was the judgment of the public safety officials that because of the tension between certain political groups in some towns there might be serious disorders if public political meetings were permitted.

15. The parties, so-called, continued, however, privately to crystallize their programs by private discussions. The membership of these groups were drawn from the small middle and upper classes, particularly intellectuals and professors, and a handful of professional politicians who, together with a leftist nucleus, fought Fascism underground during the late regime. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, AFHQ to AMG, 15th AGp, 4 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

In view of the special situation prevailing in Naples, with particular reference to the press and political activity, paragraphs eight and ten of the AMGOT Political Directive are to be interpreted as follows:

1. Expressions of political opinion, including criticism of the Italian Government, shall be permitted in the press. Censorship of the press for military security will continue, and no news


paper will be permitted which does not submit to military censorship. Furthermore, general control of the press will continue in order to avoid waste of newsprint.

2. Normal, orderly political activity will be permitted except that public meetings and demonstrations will continue to be prohibited because of the general condition of the Naples area.


[Knight, ExecO, Rgn III, Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 3]

♦ ♦ ♦ It is certain in the opinion of the undersigned officer that the majority of Neapolitans and of the people of Region 3 are largely apolitical and give all their thoughts to the difficulties of daily existence rather than to the form of government and other purely political considerations. It is furthermore felt that a large section of Neapolitans have considered the Comitato as a group of ineffective theorists rather than practical administrators. For these reasons, and always guided by our paramount objective of not interfering with Italian self-determination, we gratefully accepted during October and November the Comitato's suggestions while refraining from actively encouraging more frequent relations.

However, after two months no competitive political organization came into being, notwithstanding our neutral attitude towards the Comitato intended to permit other manifestations of public sentiment and desires had they been latent in the population.

During the latter part of November and the first days of December increasing political activity on the part of the Comitato and especially in the recently liberated front line areas made a general and firm interview with the Comitato desirable. It was felt that such a policy would be more constructive and lead to greater permanent benefits than a limited policy of local repressive measures by our CAO's.

Colonel Hume, RCAO, Region 3, therefore summoned the Comitato to his office on 6 December. He advised it of AMG's general desire to be as liberal as possible but that for military reasons political activity in the front line area could not be permitted at all, and that because of Naples' military importance as a personnel and supply port political activity would have to be limited in the city. It must be reported that the Comitato's reaction was entirely co-operative. The results of this frank conversation were also satisfactory, political activity in the Corps areas being virtually eliminated and conducted along orderly lines in Naples.

It should be reported that a number of political posters did appear in the streets of Naples without the authorization of PWB. 6  These instances were dealt with by persuasion rather than by force because of our belief that force would not cure the evil and might on the contrary make "political martyrs" and invenom the otherwise relatively calm political situation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Wickersham, former Comdt, SMG, currently visiting Italy, to Hilldring, 21 Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ After the combat stage, the job begins to have a more political flavor. . . . In some ways that is a more difficult phase, because new problems come from political questions. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Knight, Rpt for Dec 43]

♦ ♦ ♦ The second incident to receive undeserved fame beyond the limits of Region 3 was the prohibition of the convention of National Liberation Committees scheduled for 2o December 1943 in Naples. 7  This convention had never been discussed with this Headquarters, either officially or unofficially, no permit had been requested and none had been denied. [See letter, Lush, below.]


[Ltr, Lush, DCCAO, 15th AGp, to Hq 15th AGp, 27 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

1. A certain amount of publicity has been given to the ban on the meeting of the Convention of Committees of National Liberation in Naples. You should, I think, know the facts.
2. On 14th December Headquarters A.C.C. (General Joyce informed me of a proposed


meeting of these committees and asked if I had granted permission. I instructed R.C.A.O., Region III (Naples) that the meeting was not to be held in Naples and so informed General Joyce.

3. My reason for this decision was that while tolerating a certain amount of political discussion and a few informal meetings in Naples, I considered a meeting of this size (over zoo delegates had been invited) was undesirable in a theater of operations, and I foresaw that permission to hold this convention would be regarded as a precedent for other similar, larger and more dangerous meetings.

4. The prohibition evoked a protest from the representatives of the Committee who asked that a formal telegram be dispatched to the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal [Joseph] Stalin. This has not been done. The protest was, however, handed to representatives of the Press and will probably be published in some British or American paper.

5. In the meantime, after consultation with Headquarters, A.C.C. and Colonel Spofford, I was able to let the committee know that the ban was restricted to 15 Army Group area and that the meeting could take place in King's Italy Region II-under certain conditions. I understand that Bari is the most favored rendezvous.


[Political Directive From CCS to AFHQ, 9 Jan 44, Following AFHQ Recommendation, ACC files, 10000/132/317]

1. Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than Fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorder.
2. These will include the right of peaceful assembly, attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine 10 be advisable.
3. Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting or disorder will not be tolerated.
4. To insure a similar liberal policy, the Allied Control Commission should also see that the Italian Government permits similar freedom of political activity in the portions of Italy which are restored to Italian jurisdiction.


[Gen Hume, SCAO, AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44 [hereafter cited as Hume Rpt, for Jan 441, ACC files, 10000/154/204]

2.... any signs of political activity in the forward areas are at once suppressed. The only noteworthy incident of the month was the visit of the Prince of Piedmont (Crown Prince) to the Italian troops at the front. The Prince appears to have achieved a certain degree of success in increasing the popularity of the Monarchy. ♦ ♦ ♦


[CAO, Monteodorisio, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, Sicily, 16 Jan 44, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

2.... The popularity of Fascism and National Socialism is rapidly nearing the zero point. Democracy and self government are being discussed by everyone but very few have the slightest conception of what it is all about. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Hq ACC, Monthly Rpt for Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

4. Throughout the whole of liberated Italy there is more political activity, generally of an orderly and quiet kind directed towards organization and definition of objectives.♦ ♦ ♦


 [ACC Permit to Hold a Public Mtg, ex. A of Hq ACC Directive of 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/147/27]

1. The meetings shall be conducted throughout in an orderly manner, and no person shall do or say anything:

(a) Which supports, or encourages any other person to support, any of the enemies of any of the United Nations, or any of the Fascist or Nazi parties.
(b) Which leads or may lead to public disorder.
(c) Which causes or may cause, or encourages or may encourage any other person to cause, any interruption of or interference with the military effort of Italy or any of the United Nations. ♦ ♦ ♦



[AMGOT GAI No. 2, 1 May 43, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, 1 May 43]

8. Neither local personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, shall have any part in determining your policies or course of action. It is essential to avoid any commitments to or negotiations with any local political elements, either in local or in general problems. Your job is to administer military government and to avoid completely any political discussion or commitment. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, for Col Hume, RCAO Rgn III, 11 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

♦ ♦ ♦ While A.M.G. has no control over the activities of P.W.B. or of other military or paramilitary formations I want to be sure, at any rate, that no A.M.G. officers under my control become involved in political matters. I wish you therefore to issue a warning to all your officers that while it is their duty to report as far as they are aware all facts on the political situation in the areas to which you have posted them, they are not in any circumstances whatsoever to take part themselves in political discussions with any Italians. This was originally laid down in the Standing Instructions drafted at Chrea, but I feel that a word of warning is necessary, since it has come to my ears that certain of your officers have been seeing such persons as Count Sforza, and have been indulging in political discussions....


[Memo, Hume for Rennell, 14 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

♦ ♦ ♦ On enquiry among officers at Headquarters, none confirm the truth of the rumor. I, for instance, have never met Count Sforza in my life, and all our officers to whom I have spoken made the same statement. The only exception to this is that Count Sforza called at our Naples City office for an automobile permit and discussed nothing else with the officers on duty. Similarly, none have conferred with other supposed political leaders. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is assumed that your letter does not refer to our efforts to get rid of Fascist office bearers. Obviously in this we have had to discuss such matters with people, in many walks of life. Unless you instruct me otherwise, we should like to continue to do so.


[Memo, Rennell for Hume, 19 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

Thank you so much for your letter of 14 November about political activities in Naples. I had heard of one A.M.G. officer indulging in such activities but of course he may have been a member of the ACC wandering minstrels. ♦ ♦ ♦


[MGS, AFHQ, Rpt, 17 Jan 44, ABC files, HORRIFIED, Govt, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 20) ]

3. . . . The Chief political group outside the Badoglio Government is the Neapolitan Committee of National Liberation. It is composed of representatives of six political parties and the Association of Disabled Veterans and the Federation of Veterans. The political parties are the Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, Democracy of Labor, Liberals and the Party of Action. The President of the Committee is Professor Arangio-Ruiz, Leader of the Liberal Party. The elder statesman of the Committee is Count Carlo Sforza. He holds no official position but his influence is great with the Committee as a whole. In spite of Allied declarations that Italy must work out her own political destiny along democratic lines without interference, Sforza has acquired the reputation of being the "Allies' man."

4. The Neopolitan Committee has constantly demanded the formation of a "political" government. . . . On frequent occasions, the Committee has also stated that final decisions regarding sovereign institutions, e.g. the Monarchy, should be deferred until the day when all Italians could express their will.

5. At the same time, there has been constant agitation among elements within the Committee for the abdication of the King. At a meeting in Naples which was held on 19 December to honor the Socialist leader Amendola, a motion was passed that all persons responsible for the dishonor and ruin of Italy, from the King to the last squadrista, should be removed effectively and immediately from public office. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Hq PBS to Base Sub-Areas, 29 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/114]

The present unsettled political situation in Allied Occupied Italy makes it necessary that Allied military personnel maintain a strictly neutral attitude towards Italian internal problems. Since even


the presence of military personnel at functions sponsored or organized by one of the many conflicting political groups may be used to indicate official approval of the principles of that group, extreme care must be exercised in accepting invitations even to those affairs which might appear purely social.

Military personnel will not attend Italian political meetings except on official business, and will refrain from entering into Italian political discussions with individuals.


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 30 Jan 44, ACC files 10000/136/114]

The Six-Party Congress at Bari has today unanimously accepted a compromise program which calls for (a) the prompt creation of a government to include representatives of all the six parties and endowed with the powers necessary at this critical period, (b) the creation of a constituent assembly as soon as hostilities cease, (c) the abdication of the King. The Congress then voted to establish an executive committee composed of representatives of all parties for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing aims. It was further agreed that the present situation does not allow the immediate solution of the institutional question, but the Congress considered that the King's abdication was an essential condition of the unification of Italian effort. This compromise was reached after the Christian Democrat and Liberal Parties refused to accept the program put forward by the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties... 8


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 5 Feb 44, MTO, HS files, CAO-701, CM-IN 2487]

1. The executive Junta of the six parties represented at the recent Bari Congress came to see me this morning. They confined themselves to communicating to me the immediate tasks which had been entrusted to them by the parties which they represented.

These were as follows:

1. To secure the abdication of the King;
2. To prepare the formation of a government with full powers including some of those exercised by the head of the state; such a government would continue in office until such time as proper elections should be possible after liberation of all Italy.

2. Several speakers stressed the fact that they represented a large majority of the population of Liberated Italy. That they represented those elements of the Italian people who had always been anti-Fascist. That it was self-evident that the King would never be able to form a broad based government and that his government was and inevitably must remain weak and without influence. That an unfortunate situation was now being created in Italy by what amounted to a complete political deadlock.

They emphasized the necessity for dealing with the situation with urgency as the speedy substitution for the King's government of government by the parties which they represented would enable Italy to pull its weight in the common fight against the Germans much more effectively than at present.

3. I made NO comment on their statement beyond saying that the Allied Governments were being kept closely informed of the political situation in Italy. I undertook to forward to the Allied Governments the programme of which they had just informed me, together with their representations regarding the urgency of dealing with the situation. I made it quite clear that the tranquility of the country and its administration must be preserved.♦ ♦ ♦


[Transl of Statement of Deputation From the Italian Govt, Attached to Memo from Mason-MacFarlane for AFHQ, 5 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

♦ ♦ ♦ 1. The censorship which is exercised jointly by the Government and by the Allies must ensure that the head of the State and of the armed forces should not be continuously and basely insulted, and that the Armed forces should not be constantly criticized and diminished in the eyes of the public opinion.
The exercise of criticism, which any free government cannot but desire, must be kept within legal forms, and must represent a useful collaboration.

2. Government supporters and the opposition should be freely allowed to publish newspapers both partisan and nonpartisan.

3. The intervention of the PWB should be avoided in matters that concern policy, publications, choice of radio or newspaper collaborators, among both government and opposition supporters; it should be limited to the strict control of all publications and expressions of public opinion, so as to keep them in harmony with the political and military conduct of the war. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, AFHQ to Hq ACC, 10 Feb 44, MTO, HS files, CAO-701, CM-OUT 2757]

Herewith reply to your memorandum of 5 February ...

On the first point you may say that it is the Allied policy that there be free expression of opinion in liberated Italy, subject to the requirements of Security and Public order.
On the second point you may say that such facilities as may be available for the publication of newspapers will be distributed impartially among all sections of opinion.
To the third request you may reply that the policy is that Allied Officers in Italy concerned with matters of censorship, information or propaganda will act on basis of strict impartiality and without bias towards any section of Italian public opinion.



[Msg, Gen Wilson, SAC, MTO, to CCS, 9 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6425]

2. . . . I should much regret any action being taken which could increase internal difficulties or political unrest at a moment when with good hope of success I am committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome.9  I should not wish to have to take any precautionary measures which might involve an alteration of military plans and it would therefore suit me best to leave the political set up in Italy as it is until the issue of the battle is decided. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 18 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 13297]

Political situation is developing faster than had been foreseen, and has outrun previous telegrams from Algiers [see Wilson's message, 9 February, above]. There are already indications that opposition tactics may threaten to dislocate administration. . . .

1. I am convinced that a clear decision cannot be delayed and cannot be made dependent on the progress of the battle for Rome. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. . . . Briefly put, the six opposition parties have agreed upon a program to permit the accession of the Crown Prince, provided the latter would agree to delegate his powers to Lieutenancy of a single individual or of a group until constituent Assembly can decide the constitutional question at the end of this war. They have requested Allied assistance in putting this program into effect, pointing out that if no action is taken they cannot continue to guarantee the actions of less responsible elements. At the same time, their executive committee had issued an appeal to all those in the service of the state to regard the King and Government as rebels, and not to take part in their rebellion against the Italian people. Circulation of and publicity for this appeal have been stopped as far as possible. The committees have been informed such action cannot be tolerated and they have been very severely warned. They have been operating from AMGOT Italy and any action against them for subversive activity against the Badoglio Government can only be taken by us. We cannot possibly allow this sort of thing to go on. The present attitude of the opposition threatens to interfere with our Military Operations more seriously than any like repercussions to an abdication and a change in the Government. If we take the obvious course in support of Badoglio's Administration, or allow Badoglio to do so in King's Italy, and arrest and take proceedings against the members of the opposition Executive committee we lay ourselves open to a storm of protest from almost every direction. But if we continue to support Badoglio we can hardly adopt any other course.

3. There are two main alternative courses. 1. To bring pressure on the King to abdicate in favor of Humbert whose succession in accordance with the constitution should, in our opinion insure the loyalty of the Italian Armed Forces, and 2, to inform the opposition that the Allied Governments will not tolerate any change in the political situation until Rome is reached and that any attempt to interfere with the Badoglio Government will be instantly repressed. In either case intervention on our part is now required.


4. In view of situation described in paragraph 2, we are inevitably faced with having to decide between these two courses at a very early date and we are in a better position to control the consequences now than we shall be immediately before or after capture of Rome.

5. From local angle, I recommend . .. that the Allied Government should agree at the earliest possible moment to inform the King that they insist upon his bowing to the will of his people and abdicating immediately in favor of the Crown Prince and that the Crown Prince should then be informed that he should summon the chosen representative of the opposition to form immediately a fresh government. It of course goes without saying that before any steps are initiated we would obtain an undertaking from the opposition, severally and collectively, to subscribe to all the engagements entered into with the Allies by Badoglio. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 21 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14896]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Six Parties agree that the present King should abdicate forthwith to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedmont, who, however, must agree to delegate the exercise of his Constitutional Powers to a single or collective Lieutenancy which would not include either a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier but would have powers enabling it to proceed at once to the immediate Constitution of an anti-Fascist Representative Government. This delegation of powers would remain in effect until war conditions would permit the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian People. In agreeing to the accession of Humbert, the Giunta [sometimes Junta] nevertheless points out that his adherence to Fascism and his responsibility for the attack on France cannot be forgotten.♦ ♦ ♦

The expressed Policy of the Allies is to guarantee to the Italian People the free choice of their own Government and Institutions and to maintain strict neutrality in all internal Italian political matters. But since this neutrality does in fact constitute support for the King who has stubbornly refused to give way, the Giunta considers that it becomes necessary if the Allies approve the Giunta's Program for the Allies themselves to make it clear to the King and Humbert that they must follow the proposed course of action. Only by taking such action can the Allies avoid blocking the will of the Italian People and maintain their expressed principles.

According to the Giunta, action is required immediately for two reasons, first, because the situation is steadily worsening and the moderate solution now advanced might not later prove possible either because of the state of public opinion or because of more serious events; second, the parties and patriots of Northern Italy, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, might decide to have recourse to more radical solutions of their own. Such action might in turn force the Giunta to review its present attitude....

I have informed the Giunta Council, agreeing to forward the above Program to the Allied Governments, I must insist that pending a reply, no action be taken to interfere with the Badoglio Government or to aggravate the present. situation and likewise that the Program should be considered confidential and should not be communicated to the press....


[Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, 22 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

♦ ♦ ♦ Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome, as I trust and believe we shall, we shall be free to discuss the whole Italian political situation and we shall do so with many advantages that we do not possess at the present time. It is from Rome that a more broadly based Italian Government can best be formed. Whether a Government thus formed will be so helpful to the Allies as the present dispensation I cannot tell, it might of course be a Government which would try to make its position good with the Italian people by resisting as much as it dared the demands made on them in the interests of the Allied armies. I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at a time when the battle is at its climax swaying to and fro. When you have to hold a hot coffeepot it is better not to break the handle off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and serviceable, or at any rate until there is a dishcloth handy. The representatives of the various Italian parties, who assembled a fortnight ago at Bari, are of course eager to become the Government of Italy. They will certainly have no elective authority and certainly no constitutional authority either until the present King abdicates or until he or his successor invites them to take office. It is by no means certain that they would have


any effective authority over the Italian armed forces now fighting with us. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Sforza and Croce to Churchill, Transmitted Through Mason-MacFarlane, 23 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Being of those who, after a painful internal struggle felt and worked as allies and friends of Great Britain in spite of fascist Italy fighting against you, we consider it our duty to inform you that your speech has caused deepest dismay among the millions of Italians who feel like us.

Sure that you realize the sincerity of our feelings not only for Great Britain but also for you to whom European freedom owes so much, we would not be loyal devoted friends of your country if hesitating to submit to you three points showing where we deeply disagree from sources of your information:

1. The alleged fear that a democratic government might "oppose requests from Allied armies" seems an unjustified attack on our loyalty to Allied cause, all the more so that our main opposition against present government is its inability to help you and validly co-operate with you.

2. Equally incomprehensible is statement about "representatives of parties anxious to get the power" since the second signer of this telegram was offered by king on 5 November to become Prime Minister and refused only because king's presence was obstacle to serious war effort-not to speak of the many offers of Badoglio to the parties to join at once the government.

3. To say that a democratic government could have "no valid authority on the armed forces" may only have been suggested to you by people who, being only in touch with the Badoglio government, ignore that we have great confidence in some Italian generals who have been always anti-Nazi and who have no responsibility in the shameful disintegration of September last....


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 29 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 20393]

1. The situation has developed owing to King having expressed willingness to accept a proposal put forward by the liberal political leader, de Nicola, which is also acceptable to Sforza and Croce. This proposal is that the King should appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant of the Realm, and himself withdraw into private life. An announcement to this effect would be made immediately but the proposal would only take effect when Rome is reached. The Crown Prince would then proceed to form a new government on a broad base.10

2. The present situation is that neither the political leaders nor the King will make any further move or continue negotiations until they have the views of the Allied Governments. Their position is that they have put forward their respective proposals for a solution of the political crisis and they await guidance.

3. Meanwhile Allied Control Commission has been instructed to avoid conversation involving commitments as to future policy.


[Msg (No. 490), Roosevelt to Churchill, 7 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

Our advice from Italy indicates that political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I feel we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will be using force against anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

..... I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply to his previous cables. As you know we prefer the program put forth by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a "lieutenant" of the realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active co-operation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian government.


If you will send instructions to your Chief of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.


[Paraphrase of Msg (610), Churchill to Roosevelt, 8 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

I am concerned about your number 490 [7 March, above]. This message is a departure from your agreement with me of i i February . . . which in your number 483 you kindly reaffirmed describing the matter as "finished business."

I made my statement to Parliament on the strength of the first assurances.

I do not find any reason to believe from my advice that any new facts of importance have arisen or that order cannot be maintained by the Allied forces in the regions which they occupy as the result of the Italian "up-conditional surrender." I think that it would be a very grievous mistake to yield to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of politicians who are seeking office. We should then be liable to establish in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but would attempt to make its position with the Italian people by standing up to the Allies. In fact we should have another, but more intractable, version of the deGaullist Committee. Meanwhile, we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of Badoglio and the King in the midst of a heart-shaking battle which is trying to aid us and work its passage.

The course you recommend, I readily admit, would have at least a transitory success and would be more popular. But it would be unfortunate, I'm sure, for the victorious conquerors to have their hands forced this way by sections of the defeated population. The obvious open division between you and me and between our governments would likewise be unfortunate. I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary, than at the present time, to have unity of action between our two governments considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead. I am quite willing to discuss with you now the proposals set forth by General Wilson . . . whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of the realm. . . . I repeat that I am most anxious to have a broad base government to assume power in Italy, but this can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or best of all when Rome is taken and ought not to be done under duress by the Allies....


[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

In reference to your 610 my dispatch #490 on the Italian Political Situation was sent with the purpose of trying to meet the difficulties presented in NAF 634 by General Wilson.

I would appreciate your sending me suggestions as to a way to remedy the serious situation which will be acceptable to your government.
That you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others is my strongest wish. Things like timing, on which we may differ, can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self determination we are in complete agreement.



[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, to Hull, 30 Nov 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 1 ]

♦ ♦ ♦ It has been said repeatedly by Vishinsky that Soviet Union is primarily concerned with military phase of Italian situation and that the Russians were [willing] to join the U.S. in doing everything possible to bring the war to a rapid end.


[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

♦ ♦ ♦ The only active political work which is going on in Italy is that of the Communist. Local communists cells are being set up in many towns and communities in occupied Italy. There is contact with the Communist elements on the


other side of the line. There is also, almost certainly contact with the Russian delegation in Algiers, who at any rate know a good deal about what is going on. Communist activity is almost exclusively local and proletarian. There is little or no intellectual or educated element in the movement, as yet. There are only two persons of any note whose names have come out as possible leaders. Mr. Vishinsky told me that he regarded this parochial communism as merely likely to be a nuisance at this stage since it had no real background or purpose. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 13 Mar 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 8566]

Italian Government proposes to issue communiqué along following lines for publication and broadcast March 14:

Following the wish officially expressed some time ago on the part of Italy, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Royal Government have agreed to establish direct relations between the two countries.

In compliance with this decision, the two countries will proceed without delay to the exchange of representatives enjoying the usual diplomatic status.

Foreign office explains that the first phrase was inserted at the request of the Russian representative and refers in fact to the general expression of Italian desire for closer relations with the Allied powers, a general request which was made to all members of the Advisory Council when they first arrived in Italy in December.


[Memo, Embassy of USSR to State Dept, 19 Mar 44, CCAC files, 000.1, Italy (11-2-42), sec. 1)

In connection with the decision reached by the Soviet Government following the request of the Italian Government on the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. [Sir Archibald Clark] Kerr, in a conversation with Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on March 13, 1944 stated, in passing, the following:

1) The British Government should like to stress that the action of the Soviet Government, if it will be followed by other Allied Governments, would inevitably undermine the whole foundation of the Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission. ♦ ♦ ♦

2) Besides, this would not be in full accord with the articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice with Italy.

1. The Soviet Government considers that the stated above assertions are baseless and erroneous in essence.

It is impossible to agree with the statement that the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy, as well as between other Allied nations and Italy, could in any way affect negatively the activities of the Advisory Council and the Control Commission.

As to the decision of the Soviet Government on the establishment of factual relations of the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, it is necessary to keep in mind that up to the present time the Soviet Government having no direct contact with the Italian Government was in an inequality position as compared to its Allies who had established from the very beginning a direct contact with the Government of Badoglio through their numerous institutions and numerous representatives on the territory of Liberated Italy. The establishment of a direct contact between the Soviet Government and the Government of Italy to a certain extent eliminates the above-mentioned inequality and provides a possibility of direct contact between them, which already exists [sic] for a long time in the relations between Italy and the governments of Great Britain and the United States. ♦ ♦ ♦

2. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on the question regarding the political situation which is at present in Italy. This is the more necessary since up to the present moment the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America together have not yet considered the political situation in Italy and have not yet discussed together the question what kind of government should be in Italy in the period of armistice and what measures should be taken for its democratization.

It is impossible not to acknowledge that at the present time the situation in Italy is developing not in the direction of improvement [such as would be desirable for the Allied countries] but on the contrary in the direction of deterioration. The affairs in Italy have come at present time to a dead end, and the economic and political collapse of Italy is growing. On the territory of liberated Italy there exists, on one hand, the Government of Badoglio supported by certain groups of the population and expressing readiness to take part


in the common struggle of democratic countries against the German-Fascist oppressors. Alongside with this on the territory of liberated Italy there exists a permanent executive Junta which is backed by anti-Fascist parties and groups and striving to unite the Italian people for the fight against Hitlerite Germany and Fascism and it is impossible not to see that on the side of the permanent executive Junta there is a considerably wide union of democratic elements expressing an inclination to active operations together with the Allied democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and the Fascist band of Mussolini. Thus, the Government of Badoglio as well as the permanent executive Junta are striving to take part on the side of the Allies in the struggle against the band of Hitler and Mussolini still controlling central and northern Italy, but in the course of all these months the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Junta not only were not united for common enemy but, on the contrary, were wasting strength fighting each other. Such a situation is, of course, only playing into the hands of the enemy of the Allies and is inevitably leading to the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of Italy. The experience of the recent months has shown to the full that the question regarding the uniting of democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Italy for the speeding up of the destruction of Hitlerite bands of the Fascist gang of Mussolini and, thus, the question of the establishment of such an Italian Government which would unite these forces and would facilitate the carrying out of the task of the Allies in such a government, if one judges from the statements of the British and American representatives, is being postponed until the capture of Rome and until the conclusion of military operations connected with this aim, and the existing split of forces in the anti Fascist democratic camp of Italy is increasing more and more. ♦ ♦ ♦

Proceeding from the desirability and necessity of the speediest liquidation of the split in the camp of the political groups and trends inclined to cooperate with the Allied democratic countries, the Soviet Government proposes to the governments of Great Britain and the United States to take steps toward the possible union of all democratic and anti-Fascist forces of liberated Italy on the basis of appropriate improvement of the Government of Badoglio. The Soviet Government is bringing for the consideration of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of the above-mentioned proposals regarding the general situation of the affairs in liberated Italy, bearing in mind that this will assist the efforts of the Allies in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini in Italy.


[Hq ACC, Rpt for Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/164]

12. Following conversations between the Soviet representative, M. [Alexander] Bogomolov, and Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Government issued a statement on 14 March that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Government to exchange diplomatic representatives. No prior consultation with the British and American Governments had taken place, and following Anglo-American inquiries at Moscow, it appeared that the intention of the Soviet Government was not to derogate from the authority either of the Allied Control Commission or of the Advisory Council for Italy. In fact, the Soviet appointment of the diplomatic representative carries only the rank of Counsellor or Minister and he will be under the orders of the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. There is no doubt that the Soviet move has had a marked influence throughout Liberated Italy. Some consider that it will strengthen the hand of the Badoglio Government and others believe that it will increase the influence of the Communist Party throughout Italy....

The leader of the Communist Party in Italy, Mario Togliatti, otherwise known as Ercoli, arrived in Italy on 26 March from Moscow after eighteen years of exile. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, AFHQ to Mason-MacFarlane, 21 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

You should point out to [Giuseppe] Prunas [Italian Foreign Minister] that the Italian Government is not in a position to enter into any engagement with any country without the consent of Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through the Control Commission....


[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 20 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Following message received from MacFarlane: message begins:

    1. Prunas yesterday warned the Political Section that Bogomolov had told him in strict confidence that the Soviet decision to exchange


diplomatic representatives was not to be regarded as an isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet proposals based on a policy of closer relations with Italy. According to Prunas, Bogomolov frankly admitted that the Soviets intended to exploit their privileged position in Italy where there was no Soviet army of occupation and where in the minds of the Italian people they were not directly associated with the restrictions imposed by military government....

3. Prunas said that the Soviet move had been very well received by the Italian people. . . . For this reason he emphasized that it would not be possible for any Italian Government to decline any further offer of Soviet friendship although the Government did not wish for such a one-sided development of Italy's international position. On the contrary they wished to base the rehabilitation of the country upon a closer association with the United States' and Great Britain. They felt, however, that they were being pushed in the opposite direction.

4. It was the earnest desire of the Italian Government that something should be done to neutralize the present trend. . . . He asked whether the time had not now come when the American and British Governments could consider a substitute agreement which would retain all the military requirements of the Armistice and leave over questions that could not be decided now but which would give Italy some of the legal and formal benefits that it might expect to derive from the fact of cobelligerency. 11


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 25 Mar 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 18318]

♦ ♦ ♦ [Mason-]MacFarlane has stated that he has received a communication from the Secretary of the junta pointing out that more than a month has elapsed [see Msg 5 Feb, sec. 6 above] since they submitted their memorandum and that it would be of assistance to him if some reply, even if of an interim nature, could be given at an early date.

In a message sent off by [Mason-] MacFarlane after the above it is stated that the Soviet initiative in establishing relations with Italian Government is having direct effect in South Italy upon the internal political situation.

It is further stated that the Communist Party prior to 16 March had not only publicly announced that the Russian decision had made no difference to their policy but had continued as prime movers in demanding that the three party petitions should go forward on Junta basis and had even offered to pay 1/3 or whole expenses involved. On 16 March however at junta meeting they completely changed their attitude and [Mason-] MacFarlane states he has been informed by the Secretary that proposal for the petition is in process of being shelved. Moreover at Bari on 19 March Tedeschi [an Italian Communist leader] refrained from attacking the King and Badoglio and argued that only necessity was that Italy should have a strong government, this being completely at variance with line of argument contained in his previous speeches and particularly to that delivered by him at Naples meeting. It has also been stated by members of Junta closely associated with Tedeschi that the Communist Party no longer insist on the abdication of the King as condition precedent to joining in a government and would accept King's plan or might even be willing to serve under Badoglio though the King made no concession. . . .

The changed attitude of the Communist Party brought about by the Soviet initiative and presumably under orders from Moscow would appear to have loosened the structure of the junta although it is still endeavouring to maintain some form of unity. The view is expressed that the fact that the Allied Government have made no reply to the Junta memorandum has clearly affected their ability to withstand Russian activity and that while the other parties and members of the government are fully aware of the potentialities of the Communist game they feel that if such a move is made they are not in a position to stand out. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 28 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Bogomolov asked to see me yesterday and talked for nearly an hour. . . . He was clearly anxious to be friendly. He gave the impression of a Penitent Cobra being matey.

2. He contended that we had attached much too great importance to the recent agreement to exchange representatives between the Russian and Italian Governments. He assured me that this did not involve reopening diplomatic relations with Italy. The sole object was to ensure closer liaison. He stated that if the Russians had wanted to do any abnormal business with the Italian Government they would not have been


so stupid as to exchange representatives. They had quite different and much more effective ways of doing that sort of thing.

3. He told me at considerable length of the memorandum which the Russian Government has just presented to HMG and U.S.A. He has already spoken to Macmillan. He explained the Russian Government's proposals for solving the political problem in Italy. I understand that the Russian Government attach little importance to whether the King remains or not and that they wish the Badoglio Government to broaden its structure by including representatives of the opposition parties in the government. Bogomolov spoke at great length on the necessity for producing a Government which would be capable of producing more effective help from Italy for the Allied operations. I am reasonably satisfied that the Russians intend to take a strong line with the Parties of the Left in Italy and that they intend to ensure that these Parties do nothing to upset the war effort by actions which might dislocate the administration.

4. Bogomolov frequently stressed the fact that in spite of the great differences between the British and Russian ideologies and political structures and in spite of inevitable occasional minor friction such as the recent case of the exchange of representatives with Italy it was essential that the three Allied Governments should collaborate fully and that such collaboration should continue for many years. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Reber, Vice President, Political Sec, ACC, to Dunn, Dir, OEA, State Dept, 31 Mar 44, CAD files, 387.4 (7-6-43) (1)]

♦ ♦ ♦ Recently our Note with respect to Italian dealings with the United Nations and our refusal after six months of co-belligerency to concede this status as regards prisoners of war have taken on a particular significance in the light of the Soviet move. 12  Unfortunately that move is being interpreted as a definite indication that Russia is entering Italian internal affairs as a positive factor. Should the changed attitude of the Communist Party under a Moscow directive result in a Left Wing collaboration with the present Italian Government, the other Parties will probably no longer hold out. Such a solution cannot fail to diminish Anglo-American influence in the ultimate political solution. We were handed the ball nearly two months ago and through our apparent failure to adopt a constructive policy have let it drop. The Russians have picked it up and are running down the field with it. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCAC to AFHQ, 14 Apr 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 23009]

. . . It has been suggested by the State Department that the new representative of the Soviet Union near the government of Italy be accorded a place on the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, similar to that of the American and British Vice-Presidents of that section. If given such a place, the Soviet representative would then have the same opportunity for direct relation with the Italian government as the United States and United Kingdom representatives on ACC, but this direct contact would be within the framework of the established Allied control machinery for Italy. 13  This proposal will be placed on the agenda of CCAC for discussion at an early meeting. Your comments and recommendations are requested, as it is desired to have your views before CCAC makes any recommendations to CCS....



[Msg. Mason-MacFarlane, to AFHQ, 7 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Resulting from the Sorrento Meeting yesterday the Giunta published a resolution recording the urgent necessity for the solution of the present political crisis without waiting for the liberation of Rome. . . . It is understood that this means that the Giunta accepted the De Nicola proposal subject to a single modification. They desire that the King should not only announce his intention of withdrawing and creating a Lieutenancy in favor of the Crown Prince but should put this into effect forthwith without waiting arrival in Rome. De Nicola is to be asked to communicate this decision to the King.♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 10 Apr 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6847]

... Following return of Ercoli [i.e. Togliatti] to Italy, Provincial Leaders of Communist Party met and passed resolution calling for the creation of a new strong government of temporary character supported by popular parties and capable of organizing proper war effort in the whole country. In statement made by Ercoli at time of publishing of this resolution, it appeared that whilst Communist Party thought formation of broad based government would be facilitated by abdication or removal of King, they would not insist on it as condition and would serve under Badoglio [Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 28 March above]. On this Badoglio proposed to go ahead with broadening basis of his government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Murphy, U.S. Representative, Advisory Council for Italy, to Secy of State, 14 Apr 44 (covering period 7-13 Apr), CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 5]

I got back from Naples last night, with Macmillan. When I reached there on 7 April, I immediately had a conference with the Soviet and British representatives and with Count Sforza, and I also had a frank private talk with General [Mason-] MacFarlane, Noel Charles [British Minister] and Macmillan and gave them your views. They expressed their concern about the way the Soviets are undertaking to intervene independently in Italian affairs and to build up the position of the Italian Communists. Although they still belittle Sforza, they fully agree with his opinion that the Soviets are trying to "diplomatically Sovietize" Italy as the focus for a wider European program. Macmillan agrees that the time has come for us and the British to make a demarche pointing out that British and the United States are carrying the burden of both the military campaign and the economic supply of Italy, and have acted as fast as possible toward democratizing Italy. The British are even more concerned than we are about the Soviet attempt, which every day becomes more obvious, to achieve political profits at the expense of Britain and the United States.

On 10 April Charles and I called on the King at Ravello. I frankly told the King he ought to retire at once, and the American public thinks that his failure to retire is blocking a consolidation of the Italian Liberals and may adversely affect the war. The King then undertook a defense of his record and his help to the Allies. I answered that we fully appreciated what he has done, as this has helped to offset the unfavorable twenty-two year record he had made during the Mussolini regime, which had resulted in Italy's acts against the Allies and the death of many American and other Allied soldiers, as well as unlimited harm to the people of Italy; that we are glad he has within the past eight months been able to make a contribution to redeem himself, but that the time for his withdrawal has arrived.

The King became excited and said he had never had a chance before July of last year to break with the Fascists but for all these years he had been waiting for his chance, and he then protested about the civilian deaths in Rome from Allied bombings. Macmillan and I reminded him of the 240,000 casualties in Mediterranean operations that might never have existed if Italy had not entered the war.

♦ ♦ ♦  On 11 April we . . . talked frankly and at length with Badoglio, who came to see us. He obviously had been groomed, and asked what we were trying to accomplish, i.e., the King's disappearance or the forming of a representative Government. We said both, and that they were tied together. He said he thought that under Italian Communist leadership the other three organized and popular parties in south Italy were


now ready to join his government, even although the King stayed on with the concession that he would reconsider his position after the Allies reach Rome. Badoglio said that the Action and Labor Parties are too unimportant for it to make much difference if they are in the Government or out of it, as they represent only small and unorganized minorities.

Macmillan and I both are suspicious that the Communists have given Badoglio secretly their assurances of support and much encouragement.

Later that day Prunas came to see us several times on behalf of the King and made it clear he would not go further than the formula that was finally published. Macmillan then told me that lacking more specific instructions from London, he was unwilling to go any further about forcing the issue of immediate retirement by the King, and I thereupon agreed upon the formula with Macmillan. We also told the Italians we considered this action one by the Italians on their own, as the king had suggested a program like this on 21 February which had met with no objections from the other Allies, including the Soviets.

When we got back to Naples after being assured that the announcement by the King would be made at noon on 12 April, we received the American and British press and had a chance to see how certain Italians, including Sforza, reacted. The reactions generally were favorable, and Sforza later stated that he approved and was satisfied with the King's action.


[Statement of Victor Emmanuel, 12 Apr 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-29-43), sec. 2, MGS Rpt 15]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Italian people know that I have always been with them at their side in difficult times and in happy times. They know that eight months ago I put an end to the Fascist regime and brought Italy, notwithstanding every danger and risk, to the side of the United Nations in the struggle for the liberation from Nazism. ♦ ♦ ♦

Putting into effect what I have suggested to the Allied authorities and my government, I have decided to withdraw from public affairs by appointing my son, the Prince of Piedmont, "Lieutenant General of the Realm." This appointment will become effective by the formal transfer of power on the day on which Allied troops enter Rome.

This decision, which I firmly believe furthers national unity, is final and irrevocable.♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Gen Wilson to Mason-MacFarlane, 13 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

I have been considering the manner in which Allied interests should be safeguarded in the event of the formation of a new Italian Government.

The most important consideration is that the new Government, whatever its composition, should accept all the obligations towards the Allies entered into by the old "Top Secret" Government, including both sets of armistice terms and all the subsequent undertakings. Please therefore make it clear to Marshal Badoglio at once that we will not agree to deal with any new Government which does not formally declare itself willing to assume all the obligations toward the Allies entering into by its predecessor.

You should also inform Marshal Badoglio that whatever arrangements may be entered into between the new Government and the King must be regarded as binding until such time as the Italian people can freely express their views. It will not be in the interests of the War effort that the institutional question should be raised again until that time and you should make this clear to the Marshal. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 16 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

After yesterday's meeting junta issued communiqué showing unanimous decision had been taken to accept King's plan and to enter a new government to be composed mainly of representatives of the six parties provided that such a government reiterate the pledge that the Italian people shall determine the future form of the State by means of a constituent assembly on the termination of hostilities....

We learn that the six parties are all ready to serve under Badoglio on the understanding that he forms a new government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 21 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Final composition of the cabinet represents a compromise reached after two days of intense discussion between Badoglio and all opposition leaders. . . . Croce and Togliatti are given much credit for the solution. The price paid for the Ac-


tion Party's decision was the appointment of the additional ministers without porfolio and the limitation of party membership to the parties represented at the Bari Congress. Sforza also used his influence to induce the Party of Action to come into line, Badoglio hopes that the Democratic composition of his new cabinet will be favorably received by the Allied governments.

All service ministers remain unchanged....

Among the new personalities whose names appear in the government are Aldisio the leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Sicily, appointed Prefect of Caltanisetta by AMG; [Alberto] Tarchiani, pre-Fascist editor of the Corriere Della Sera, whose presence in the government should strengthen its position among the anti-Fascist resistance groups in the north. [Attilio] Di Napoli and [Fausto] Gullo are lesser lights in the Socialist and Communist Parties. [Quinto] Quintieri is a local banker of standing who was appointed to the Finance Ministry for his technical qualifications.


[Mason-MacFarlane, Remarks in Min of 11th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 6 May 44, ACC files, 10000/132/477]

2. . . . Owing to the fact that Marshal Badoglio's former Cabinet was too weak to take a resolute stand on this subject, the purge program had proceeded somewhat slowly in the past. The new Cabinet is stronger, and it is hoped that it will be able to eliminate Fascists more effectively than the former one. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Mason-MacFarlane, Remarks in Min of l2th Mtg of Allied Advisory Council for Italy, 19 May 44, ACC files, 10000/132/477]

2. General [Mason-] MacFarlane remarked .. . that the new Government was in fact reacting more satisfactorily than the former Government to suggestions made by the Allied Control Commission and that progress is being made constantly. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Transl of Ltr, Count Sforza to Richard Bauer, Leader of Action Party, 3 Jun 44, (notation on document: "Handwriting illegible"), ACC files, 10000/136/116]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Coalition Cabinet to which I lent my name on 21 April was forced upon us by the Communist initiative accepted by the Parties.♦ ♦ ♦

... I cannot hide from you that I am more and more worried by a strange rising and ascending collusion between Communists and Generals. Beware, I have no communist phobia; there must be some. If I were Chief of the Government, I would be so certain of the efficacy of my direct contact with the Masses to whom I would offer obvious sincerity slow and difficult progress but not immediate miracles which I know would be believed; and the Communists defeated. But with "power" in the hands of the bourgeois without fresh moral forces and of military men only thinking of their material interests, the Communists are a strong force. A common cynicism unites them all. Is it wise that there be no reserves in the Country? ♦ ♦ ♦




[Transl of Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 Apr 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 1-B (CCS Memo for Info No. 218]

The Government over which I preside emphasizes that the agreement which has been arrived at with the King must be taken as remaining in force while and up to the limit of the time during which, the Italian people shall not be able to express its opinion freely, this being also in complete agreement with the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Zone. 14


[Trans] of the Declaration of the Council of Ministers, 1 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

♦ ♦ ♦ The program of the present Government is basically that of its origin and composition. Formed by representatives of the anti-Fascist parties, it is not the Government of those parties in competition among themselves but one of union for the good and honor of the Fatherland, to the end off bringing our full strength to the proper settlement of the vital and urgent problems of the hour.

Many proposals which are well-known and of the utmost importance must be put aside now be-


cause they are not timely. First among these is the institutional form of the State, which cannot be decided until the country is fully liberated and the war ended. Then the Italian people shall be called together in free public meetings and, acting under universal suffrage, shall elect a constituent and legislative assembly. ♦ ♦ ♦

It should not be forgotten that two world wars have upset conditions of economic and moral life and changed social relations which call for profound reforms. According to their principles and tendencies, the various parties are prepared to contribute, but it should also be remembered that these reforms of governmental, political, administrative and economic organization cannot be carried out in the midst of a war and while Italy is cut into two parts, the greater part of which is still occupied by the enemy.

The war, then, for the liberation of the Italian lands now invaded and in which to the foreign enemy has [sic] been joined the remnants of the nefarious regime which for twenty-two years oppressed and led us to ruin-this war is our first and supreme objective. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane to Gen Wilson, 8 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

2. From the point of view of avoiding any possible hiatus in the administration and of the probable awkward repercussions of a change of government at the moment of our reaching Rome, the retention of Badoglio and his Government in office provides an excellent solution. We ought to ensure that this Government gets every support from us and it is even more necessary to ensure that during the critical phase while we are assimilating Rome nothing is done to foment political controversies.

3. The present solution to the political problem is undoubtedly in our best immediate interest. Yet in spite of the fact that it has been made possible very largely through the recent change in the attitude of the Communist Party, there are not wanting elements in this country who are still strongly opposed to the retention of Badoglio as Prime Minister and continue also to be critical of the fact that the King has not actually abdicated.

4. In the absence of political censorship it is very possible that we may again find attempts to undermine the authority of the Monarchy and Badoglio. I know just how difficult any form of political censorship is. I do, however, hope that it may be possible to issue a strong directive to all concerned forbidding attacks on Badoglio and his Government and on the Monarchy until we are at any rate firmly established in Rome. It is the policy of the Allied Government to support in the meantime at any rate the Monarchy and a broad Government. It is clearly illogical to permit attacks on the administration with which we are co-operating during a period of crisis and of potential political difficulty. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AMG Fifth Army, Sitrep for 5-9 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/154/205]

I.... With regard to politics there have been several minor incidents with the Committee of National Liberation: Allied propaganda has given them the impression that once liberated the Italians will have complete political freedom. It is clearly impossible to put this into effect while the city is still within range of the sound of gunfire.15 While the situation is well in hand, it would be a great help if the Italian Government could put out instructions explaining that local parties must submit to the restrictions of Allied Military Government in initial stages of occupation. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hq, AC for All Concerned, 18 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/105/710]

1. It has been reported to this Headquarters that an election by popular vote of a Giunta communale was organized in military Government territory by an A.M.G. officer.

2. While the election was extremely well organized and run by the officer concerned, and there were very special circumstances in that case, it must be remembered that pending the reorganization of the electoral lists and the liberation of further territory, it is contrary to the law of the country to hold such elections.

3. Accordingly in military Government territory Provincial Commissioners should not permit elections for Giunte Communali or other local and provincial bodies, nor encourage in any way the holding of such elections in Italian Government territory. ♦ ♦ ♦


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