Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter X:

Control Agencies Are Easier To Create Than To Co-ordinate

By the end of 1943 the Allies had not only completed an elaborate organizational apparatus for civil affairs but 'had also concluded that it was working neither smoothly nor efficiently. In part the trouble was due to the disproportionate burden resting upon the MG component until the capture of Rome should make possible the transfer of territory and responsibility to the Italian Government. But, basically, the trouble was with the control machinery itself. In brief, it consisted of rather numerous specialized agencies for the co-ordination of civil affairs, but owing to remoteness of the over-all Algiers authority and overlapping jurisdictions, there was insufficient co-ordination of the control agencies themselves. Thus in late January, after months of increasing operational confusion, the entire apparatus had to be overhauled.

The documents herein include not only the orders detailing organizational structures and functions but also the interagency correspondence setting forth the reasons for both establishing and completely altering the organizational apparatus. In the latter correspondence one senses between the lines real intensity of feeling. This reaction was inevitable because those designing the organizations clearly felt that they were architects of success or failure in enterprises of great moment. By and large the arguments of the documents centered

on one main issue-the relative merits of centralization and decentralization. Both were argued for as best effecting coordination but whereas proponents of the former were usually focusing upon coordination of civil affairs as a whole, proponents of the latter were generally focusing upon co-ordination in a limited area or function which seemed to have distinctive organizational needs. As things turned out, the Allied control organization was first a centralized one, then changed to a decentralized one, and finally reverted to a centralized one, but of a type inclusive of decentralization as a subordinate element.

AMGOT was planned and operated for about three months as a unitary organization highly centralized by reason of concentration of authority at the top and transmission of such authority to lower levels through a tightly knit chain of command. The validity of the first step toward decentralization was scarcely disputable. In September, when the advance of Eighth Army was encompassing provinces isolated by poor transport conditions, AMGOT gave the SCAO's unusual freedom of decision in issuing orders on local matters. Decentralization might have gone no farther had it not been for another unexpected situation-the inability of the Italian Government to administer more than four provinces. In late September General


Rennell, CCAO 15th Army Group, wrote that one headquarters could not satisfactorily direct mobile military government and administer rapidly expanding rear areas. Not only were the two tasks together too big a job; they were also too different, especially in supply problems. On 21 October AMGOT was divided into AMG 15th Army Group, which administered areas in the wake of battle, and Headquarters AMG which, located in Palermo and reporting to MGS, administered static areas.

But even before the division was formalized the CCS-still not aware of the plan and concerned lest matters become confused after ACC had been activatedcabled that AMG should be prepared for merger with ACC. It seemed "of the utmost importance that the Control Commission ... and AMG follow uniform policies and that their functions be completely co-ordinated under one supreme authority." Pending the merger the personnel of the two should be as nearly the same as possible. General Eisenhower, compelled now to take a stand on the organizational issue, argued in effect in behalf of decentralization. He conceded that, once its task of military government was ended by transfer of Sicily to the government, static AMG could be merged with ACC; he urged, however that mobile AMG be left independent. Argument and counter argument followed, but in the end CCS yielded to General Eisenhower's contention that AMG 15th Army Group should be separate in order to have the latitude required for adapting civil affairs to military needs.

This denouement envisaged only two operational organizations for civil affairs but actually it resulted in three because, though rear AMG and ACC were pledged to each other,'union never came about since the former had to occupy itself with military government longer than had been expected. A deliberate trend toward functional pluralism in organizational structure was evidenced when the control commission, designed by MGS, was activated with twenty-six subcommissions grouped into four sections. The ensuing creation of the Advisory Council for Italy was not, indeed, motivated by organizational pluralism but only by the desire to satisfy the Soviet claim to representation, as well as that of other countries having a political interest in Italy, without yielding them a share in executive power. But the event did mark a striking deviation from the original intention of the American component to have only a unitary and military organization, without political admixture. Moreover, the effect was to produce four sources from which political advice about Italy could validly be issued-the ACC Political Section, the British Resident Minister, the U.S. Political Representative, and a Council in which these two could be outvoted, though this was not necessarily harmful as the Allied Commander in Chief could accept whatever advice he thought best.

It still remains to speak of decentralization in the more limited sense of a trend toward geographically or functionally distinct centers of authority in the same organization. AFHQ came to have an Advanced Adminstrative Echelon (FLAMBO) in Naples, a Peninsular Base Section (PBS) given primarily logistical but also civil affairs functions, and a Central Economic Committee (CEC) which was created when the food shortage called for co-ordination of civilian supply distribution. ACC, not to be outdone, had a headquarters for military government in Palermo, a nucleus at the seat of the Italian Government, and a rear headquarters in

Naples; another branch was planned for Rome. The number of control organs now just about equaled the number of civilian agencies set up in or for North Africa; it was as though some determinism led to organizational multiplication in civil af-


fairs whether handled by civilians or by the Army. While the process of proliferation came in for a certain amount of ironic comment, such proliferation is a valid ground for irony only if it entails redundancy or confusion.

The first notable indication of misgiving about decentralization came from Lord Rennell, who had introduced it. As soon as the SCAO's administering provinces acted with too great a lack of uniformity in matters which, like price and wage controls, required regional or even national uniformity he had to curtail their freedom of action. As the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) 15th Army Group he issued a directive explicitly specifying the matters on which the SCAO's could issue local orders on their own; later, when the regions were set up, he achieved the same effect by specifying the subjects on which the Regional Civil Affairs Officers (RCAO's) could not issue orders without reference to headquarters. These remedies were easy because en famille, but General Rennell could only complain morosely when ACC groups, whom he on one occasion called "wandering minstrels," roamed uninvited into one or another of his jurisdictions to set up committees for improving matters which he considered they knew little or nothing about. So, too, members of his public health organization in Naples were offended when AFHQ decided to improve the handling of the typhus epidemic by giving jurisdiction over that one phase of public health to FLAMBO. Because almost all the control agencies had representatives in Naples, the confusion there at times seemed not far short of chaos: "AMG could order the gas turned on and PBS order it turned off; one could deal with one epidemic, the other with another; one could authorize a meeting, the other prohibit it." A source of the confusion here, as indeed also in occupied Italy in general, was that the precise boundary lines between the various jurisdictions had not been made sufficiently clear. Basically, however, as it seemed to a visitor from CAD, the difficulties arose from the extreme decentralization. It simply was not practicable to deal with the various phases of the occupation as to time, territory, and function with separate organizations." Another spectator from CAD recommended that "in all future occupations the principle be established that for any given country there be a single, governing headquarters." Others would have added that it should not be located, as was MGS, on a different continent.

At a certain point in the operational confusion not only officers on lower levels, as the CAD officer noted, but the highest operational authority in military government, General Rennell, came to the same opinion. On 5 December, evidencing a marked capacity for self-criticism, General Rennell confessed that his division of AMG had "probably been a mistake," although it had seemed logical at a time when, on the assumption of an early occupation of Rome, the expectation was that rear MG territory could soon be transferred to the government. As matters had worked out, Headquarters AMG had not co-ordinated sufficiently with the mobile headquarters accompanying the armies. If at the beginning of December General Rennell found the confusion regrettable, by January he found it intolerable. On 8 January he wrote to General Alexander that the situation could not go on. The unsatisfactory state of affairs had been brought about by the division of authority among three separate administrations-General Rennell corrected himself to mention a fourth as he thought of FLAMBO. He informed General Alexander that "unless practical coordination is effected at once we are in danger of slipping into a position so confused that it will be impossible to ensure good administration in the fu-


ture." General Rennell concluded with a recommendation which was his swan song, as he was soon to return to England. This was that General Alexander centralize authority over all civil affairs in Italy at his own headquarters.

General Alexander on 15 January 1944, having already received AFHQ's approval of the proposal to bring civil affairs throughout Italy under his headquarters, submitted a plan to AFHQ by which the greater co-ordination thereby intended would be realized. It was, in brief, to make one and the same authority, directly subordinate to him, responsible for supervising both the Control Commission and military government, and at the same time to place the Control Commission in charge of co-ordinating civil affairs throughout liberated Italy. This would "ensure continuity of policy and procedure as our troops advance and . . . centralize policy regarding food supply and kindred subjects." On 24 January AFHQ in a General Order brought into effect General Alexander's plan. General Alexander, while continuing as Military Governor, was also made the Representative in Italy of the President of ACC (i.e. of the Allied CinC), with the right to act in his behalf in all civil affairs matters except certain subjects requiring high-level political guidance or involving issues not confined to Italy. The order designated General Mason-MacFarlane (formerly head of the Allied Military Mission) as Deputy President and Chief Commissioner of ACC, and also as Chief Civil Affairs Officer of occupied territory under military government. Further, it disbanded Headquarters AMG and placed Fifth and Eighth Armies AMG under the technical control of Headquarters ACC; military government in rear territory passed also to the control of ACC.

Through other orders, ACC absorbed the civil affairs functions of FLAMBO and also of the Central Economic Committee. General Mason-MacFarlane, because his headquarters would be with ACC, appointed Brigadier M. S. Lush (formerly Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) Fifteenth Army Group) as his deputy to represent him at General Alexander's headquarters for the purpose of detailed day-to-day conference, as distinguished from long-term matters which General Mason-MacFarlane would discuss with General Alexander periodically. The new Deputy President proceeded quickly to streamline ACC for discharging its broader responsibilities. The most important organizational change was the establishment of a Regional and Military Government Section to co-ordinate policy and procedure in operations. In writing to the Military Governor a little proudly that "things are very different to what they were," General Mason-MacFarlane contrasted remote control by MGS with on-the-spot co-ordination of ACC and AMG brought together "as one show." This was the victory, in a word, of centralization.

It was not the kind of centralization, however, which the Allies had started out with. Establishment of armistice control had brought into civil affairs a diversity and complexity; the only kind of centralization that could thereafter succeed was in the exercise of co-ordinative authority, not in the conduct of operations. Operations were of two-in fact, really three-different types: ACC/AMG operations in Army areas, where civil affairs personnel formed part of the staff of the Army Commander but followed as far as possible ACC's policies; ACC operations in military government rear territory, divided into regions, where regional teams, both administrative and technical, advised Italian local officials in full conformity with Headquarters ACC policy; and ACC assistance to higher Italian officials in Italian Government territory. Obviously these diverse and widespread activities entailed numerous centers


of authority, even within any one of these spheres of operation, and in fact, the ACC, in a report of August 1944 to the Advisory Council, stressed the scope given the principle of decentralization as illustrated by the division of field operations among regional and provincial teams. Thus the reorganization represented not the adoption of one pervading principle but rather the determination of the right spheres and relationships for an operational decentralization subordinated to policy-making centralization. Armies and departments of defense had made this determination on the basis of long experience and much experimentation. In civil affairs, with little or no precedent to go on, the Allies in Italy could learn the best solution only through trial and error.

The organizational problem is never over, and, as the concluding documents show, the overhaul of January 1944 had in one area-that of Anglo-American relations-worsened rather than improved the situation. In seeing a British officer placed at the head of ACC, under a British Military Governor and a British Allied Commander in Chief (General Eisenhower had now departed for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) many Americans, who had always been disturbed by British leadership of both the Political and the Economic Sections, felt more than ever that civil affairs in Italy was a British show. General Eisenhower himself had considered that the question of nationality should not enter into appointments, but the question involved more than national rivalry-it also involved a fear that British politico-economic policies would predominate over American policies. So keen was the resentment of Americans, at least on lower levels, that the Assistant Secretary of War reported the matter to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, as perhaps calling for attention. After discussions with high British officials General Devers reported back reassuringly that there was a desire to effect a more satisfying distribution of positions. The difficulty was, however, that at this point Americans in ACC would probably not have been satisfied by merely minor readjustments. In their eyes the chief standard of fair allocation was equality of power on the highest levels, and the least that could have been done, whatever the present Deputy President's personal merits, was to assign the top position in ACC to an American as an offset to a British Military Governor. When General Mason-MacFarlane resigned in June, AFHQ did, in fact, appoint an American, Captain Ellery W. Stone, USNR, in his place.



[Msg, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, to MGS, AFHQ, 24 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

.... I do not believe that one pair senior officers can from now on deal with (a) control of mobile AMGOT with two armies and army group headquarters, and (b) static administration in rapidly expanding area.

I have not found satisfactory up to present combination of these functions even with limited responsibilities....
Therefore suggest division of responsibilities to limit mobile AMGOT to combat areas and segregate static areas to another organization dependent on AFHQ.
This is especially true of supply problems beyond day to day needs required initial phase of occupation. After this phase longer term


supply cannot be expected to depend on call forward of goods through army commanders engaged in supplying fighting troops. Call forward on scale required after immediate phase must depend on Headquarters removed from immediate combat problems, namely AFHQ.
My conclusion is that I personally cannot combine both functions.


[AFHQ Admin Memo to All SCAO's and Heads of Divs, 21 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

I Division of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory Into Two Organizations
Effective 24 October 1943, the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory established by Administrative Memorandum No. 35, AMG headquarters Palermo, is divided into two organizations: Allied Military Government 15 Army Group, and Headquarters Allied Military Government. The former will administer Allied Military Government in territory in rear of combat zones of the 15th Army Group. The latter will operate in such other Italian territory as is placed under Allied Military Government. The transfer of territory from one organization to the other will be by order of this headquarters.

II Military Governor
General Sir Harold Alexander, as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15 Army Group, will remain Military Governor of all Italian territory under Allied Military Government.

III Assignment of Chief of Allied Military Government 15 Army Group and of Chief of Headquarters Allied Military Government
Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Lord Rennell of Rodd to be Chief of Allied Military Government 15 Army Group, and of Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry to be Chief of Headquarters Allied Military Government. 1


[Hq AMG, Rpt for Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(5) ... The Headquarters at Palermo under the D.C.C.A.O. continued to be charged with the administration of Military Government in Sicily (Region I) and the provinces of Cosenza, Reggio, Catanzaro, Matera and Potenza in Italy (Region II). The administration of Military Government in Region III (Compartment of Campania), the Province of Foggia and the forward areas back of the 5th and 8th Armies was handed over to AMG, 15th Army Group with headquarters at Bari. The C.C.A.O. and a portion of the headquarters staff then at Palermo proceeded to Bari to discharge this responsibility.

(6) On October 26, Region I was formally created under AMG Headquarters at Palermo [see ch. XI, sec. I]. Lt. Col. Charles Poletti was appointed R.C.A.O. [Regional Civil Affairs Officer.] At the same time Lt. Col. George McCaffrey, previously S.C.A.O. Agrigento Province, Sicily, took the assignment of R.C.A.O. Region II, relieving Lt. Col. Harvey Gerry who proceeded to AMG, 15th Army Group at Bari. The Provinces comprising Region II had been organized on a regional basis since the time of their original occupation.



[FAN 248, CCS to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 6210]

1. It is of the utmost importance that the Control Commission for Italy ... and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure and that their functions be completely co-ordinated under one supreme authority. It is contemplated that AMG's responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into the Control Commission, but while the two organizations are functioning their personnel should be as nearly the same as practicable. In conformity with this, you Will announce yourself as President of the Control Commission....


2. Allied Military Government. The directive for AMG for HUSKY will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and the Italian Government with areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction. It is anticipated that those areas will be reduced to a minimum and that the responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into the Control Commission as soon as practicable. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 15 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8761, dispatched before receipt of CM-OUT 6210,above]

In view of Italian declaration of war and uncertainty of date on which Italian Government may be able to function from Rome the following arrangements are being made.

1. Allied Commission being activated and will establish a skeleton headquarters in close contact with Italian Government at Brindisi. This skeleton headquarters will consist of heads of subcommissions of Allied Commission absorbing the Allied Military Mission. First task will be to examine with the Italian Government methods and machinery whereby Italian Territory, at present under Allied Military Government, can pass gradually to Italian Administration supervised by Allied Commission....

2. Forward elements of Allied Commission have been dispatched to Palermo to join AMG headquarters. Intention is that experienced officers of AMG headquarters together with forward elements of Allied Commission will shortly join Allied Commission Headquarters at Brindisi. By that time it is intended that sufficient progress shall have been made to enable steps to be taken looking toward handing over Sicily. . . . Balance of Allied Commission, composed of remainder assigned personnel and certain AMG officers, will join headquarters at Brindisi in due course. This process must necessarily be slow owing to limitations of accommodation and communications, etc.

3. Concurrently with above AMG Headquarters will be split into (A) AMG 15th Army Group responsible to Commander 15th Army Group for military government in rear of combat zone. (B) Headquarters AMG responsible to AFHQ for military government in rear of combat zone. (C) Headquarters Region I which will become an Allied Commission region on the transfer of Sicily.

4. Thus, when Sicily is transferred to Italian Administration Headquarters AMG will cease to function in area and be responsible solely for Region 2 or such other territory as is not the responsibility either of 15th Army Group or of Allied Commission. As soon as necessity for such responsibility disappears, Headquarters AMG will be merged into Allied Commission. 2


[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, i6 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9967]

2. . . . Commander-in-Chief 15th Army Group must have command over Military Government in Combat Zone, with local freedom of action to insure that civil affairs are so conducted as to meet military requirements on the spot. Necessary directives to all concerned and co-ordination will continue under this Headquarters.

3. Accordingly submit most strongly:
(A) That it is only the Static AMG whose responsibilities will be merged into Control Commission;
(B) That Deputy President of Commission should not be required to assume title of Military Governor of Occupied Territory;
(C) That Vice President of Economic and Administration Section should not be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of AMG.

As regards (A), we agree that functions of Static AMG in rear and Commission must be co-ordinated under Allied Commander-in-Chief, and that the former should be merged into the latter without disruption of Administration or dispersal of personnel.

As to (B), to announce a new Military Governor at this time would lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Considering the short time during which AMG is expected to continue in rear areas, the adverse effect on Italian morale of announcing a new Military Governor, and the


desirability of maintaining clear distinction between Military Government and new situation where Italian Government will administer under Commission's control, it had already been arranged for Alexander to remain nominal Military Government. Alexander has agreed to this.

As to (C), for like reasons objectionable and confusing to designate Commission Vice President by a Military Government title.

4. Request that Directive in FAN 248 [CCS Msg 14 October, above] be amended so that only Rear AMG will be merged into Commission, and that the Officers of Commission mentioned in paragraph 3 above be not designated for any Posts in Allied Military Government....


[Msg, McCloy to Eisenhower, 17 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 7604]

We visualize the combat zone will necessarily include substantial economic areas on peninsula such as Naples and Rome. Therefore we feel there is the greatest necessity for identity of personnel, policy and administration. As practical matter what you refer to as Mobile AMG will be the real Government of Italy as it will for sometime include outside of Sicily the greatest population centers of the country. Due to small geographical areas involved we think some identity of personnel is not only practicable but desirable and common direction of the two administrations can best be effected by this means. Identity of personnel in key jobs such as Chief Civil Affairs Officer and Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section is particularly important because the major economic problems are going to arise in the Rome Naples areas. If you have some reluctance to alter Alexander's title or to raise Joyce's title to Military Governor I feel there is no inclination to press....


[Msg, Eisenhower to McCloy, 18 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11001]

2. When we describe Mobile AMG 15th Army Group we mean Military Government extending back only to rear boundaries Army areas....

4.... Moreover, the actual center of Allied Military Government activity is at Palermo. It is at Headquarters there that the personnel for most of the Commission's subcommissions must be organized. This is all in hand, and being done under unified direction. When circumstances permit, the entire organization will function from seat of the Italian Government, which will be at Rome as soon as that city becomes available. It seems evident that senior personnel, who will be unifying activities at Brindisi and Palermo, can not at the same time be supervising the day to day developments of military government along the front of 15 Army Group. Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section, who must give attention to organization of the many technical subcommissions which will be controlling entire Economic and Administrative system of Italy so far as securely recovered, can not at same time act as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in combat zone. The control of Civil Affairs immediately in rear of the fighting must be under command of tactical commander, in this case Alexander. It would violate principles of command were he to receive orders from any other sources than C-in-C.3 3 ♦ ♦ ♦

5. This explanation should make it clear that mobile AMG 15 Army Group will not be the real government of Italy and will not retain Naples or Rome areas after the front has been pushed beyond them.



[Paraphrase of Msg, American Embassy at Moscow to the Secy of State, 26 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-1743) (I), sec. I]

The Embassy received this morning a secret communication which was signed by Molotov under date of 25 September.

♦ ♦ ♦ The establishment of an Allied Commission . . . is not considered necessary by the Soviet Government. It is common knowledge that after the ratification of the detailed Armistice Terms the three governments established the Military Political Commission,4  and conse-


quently, the Control Commission which Article 37 of the detailed terms contemplated falls to the ground. Soviet Government has concluded, therefore, that Military Political Commission should include in its work the co-ordination and direction of all activities of the military agencies organized on enemy territory and of any Allied civil authority concerning Armistice questions and of control over compliance with Armistice terms. Therefore, one of the functions of the Military Political Commission should be to issue from time to time directives and instructions on political, military and administrative matters to the Badoglio government, while the Allied Commander in Chief retains complete direction of military operational questions. Therefore, no reason is seen by the Soviet Government for an Allied Commission with these functions to be established under the direction of General Eisenhower.


[CCAC Paper, Military Political Commission in Mediterranean Area, 1 Oct 43, CAD files, 334, CCAC (9-17-43) (I)]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Soviet Government proposes that military operational questions only should he left under the direction of the Allied Commander in Chief; while the Mediterranean Commission would issue instructions and directives on other military and political and administrative questions for the Badoglio government. This division of control, whereby there would be two independent sources of authority in the same theater of operation, would be quite impractical and would place the Commander in Chief in an impossible position. Even if confined to political and economic and administrative questions it would be impractical inasmuch as such questions in an active theater are all predominantly affected by military considerations. Moreover, one of these sources of authority as proposed by Soviet Government would not even be under the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.


[Msg, Eden to the Dept of State, 1 Oct 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security]

In the view of the Prime Minister and myself nothing must derogate from the authority of the Commander in Chief. Questions affecting interrelation of political and military affairs can only be settled by the Governments concerned. The advice of Politico-Military Commission or of its individual members will be most valuable to them.

In rejecting the Soviet Government's proposal it will be desirable
(a) to indicate role proposed for Politico-Military Commission in regard to Italy, and
(b) to offer the Soviet Government a satisfactory position on the Control Commission for Italy or whatever authority is set up to ensure the carrying out of the terms.

As regards (a) I suggest that Politico-Military Commission should keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and political problems arising therefrom. For this purpose it should have access to the Control Commission and Allied Commander in Chief. In the light of this information and of their joint examination thereof, its members should tender advice on Italian affairs to their Government either collectively or individually....

As regards (b), our aim might be to associate a Soviet member on a basis of equality with British and United States members. Precise method by which this should be done depends on structure of the Control Commission. I should welcome the views of the United States Government on this point. 5


[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 10939]

1. These are my views on the relationship between the Politico-Military Commission, Allied C-in-C and Allied Control Commission.

2. Whilst there is no objection to the Politico Military Commission obtaining information from this headquarters on matters which concern them, Allied C-in-C must continue to receive instruction, whether political or military, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from them alone.

3. As regards the Allied Control Commission, experience in North Africa goes to show that so long as active military operations are being carried on, final authority regarding the Political relations between the occupying armies and the local Administration should remain with the Allied Commander-in-Chief.


4. When operations have ceased, the Commander-in-Chief's interest is reduced to the safety of any bases and the security of any lines of communication on which he may be relying, and normal diplomatic machinery can safely be allowed to function.

5. In applying this analogy to Italy, there would be three periods.

6. During the first period (from the present moment until the Badoglio Government is in a position to exercise effective authority) it is enough that skeleton arrangements be made for a Control Commission.

7. Period Two will be reached when the Badoglio Government is in a position to exercise effective authority. During this stage, operations in Italy will be continuing, and the maintenance of the Commander-in-Chief's authority remains the governing factor. At this point, the Control Commission will become fully operative, and as soon as this happens the Russians and French, and also the Greeks and Yugoslavs, will have to be associated with it. The following arrangement is recommended. Commander in Chief will be President of the Control Commission. His Deputy will be day-to-day managing head. An advisory council to the Commander in Chief (in his capacity as President of the Control Commission) to be formed of High Commissioners representing the U.S.A., UK, USSR, French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. They would meet and act as a body and make their own arrangements as to which High Commissioner should be chairman (either the most senior or in rotation).

8. The dual function of the Advisory Council should be to advise the President of the Control Commission on general policy and to take care of any special interests of the States represented on it or their Nationals.

9. Period Three would not arrive until either the campaign in Italy was at an end or, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the Allied Governments could bring the direct military control of the Italian Government to an end.


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, Directive for Control Commission, 23 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/136/256] 6

♦ ♦ ♦  A. Functions

1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under your orders and general directives.

2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.

3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.

B. Organization. The Control Commission will be divided into four sections: (1) Military, (2) Political, (3) Economic and Administrative, and (4) Communications. Each section will be in charge of a vice president, and will be divided into subcommissions as indicated below:

C. The Military Section, six subcommissions: (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, and (6) Material Disposal.

D. The Political Section, three subcommissions: (1) Foreign and Internal Political Affairs, (2) Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, and (3) Information, Press, Censorship.

E. The Economic and Administrative Section, two subsections: (a) Economic and (b) Administrative, each under a director.

(a) The Economic Subsection, eight subcommissions: (1) Finance, (2) Foreign Trade, (3) Industry and Commerce, (4) Public Works and Utilities, (5) Fuel, (6) Food, (7) Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries, and (8) Labor.

(b) The Administrative Subsection, six subcommissions: (1) Interior, (2) Legal, (3) Public Safety, (4) Education, Fine Arts and Archives, (5) Public Health, and (6) Property Control.

F. The Communications Section, three subcommissions: (1) Shipping and Ports, (2) Inland and Civil Air Transportation, and (3) Postal and Tele-Communications.

G. Each Government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes.

H. The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander in Chief, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This is not intended to prevent direct communication on routine matters between the commission and London and Washington. All such direct communication would, of course, be authorized by the respective heads of sections and subcommissions, and a copy of every such communication made a part of the records of the commission.


4. Personnel

a. Allocation of posts between U.S. and U.K. The commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in number to 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.
b. The allocation of the principal posts between U.S. and U.K. is as follows: (Agreement not yet reached) [see below, sec. 7, Msg CCS to AFHQ, 7 Nov 43].

The Deputy Vice President of each section will be of opposite nationality to that of the Vice President.

The nationalities of heads of the sub commissions will be left to your decision and, insofar as possible, these posts will be distributed equally between the U.S. and U.K. The assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality. 5. Generally speaking, the personnel of the Military, Economic and Administrative, and Communications Sections should have military status and the personnel of the Political Section should have civilian status. Military personnel may at the outset be used in the Political Section, but should be replaced with civilian personnel as soon as practicable. Arrangements may be made where necessary to employ civilian experts within the control commission.

6. It is contemplated that provision will be made for representatives of the dominions and the other interested United Nations to have access to the control commission. Further instructions will he sent to you on this point.


[AFHQ Admin Memo 74, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/ 136/256]

I-Establishment of the Allied Control Commission
Announcement is made of the establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, effective 1o November 1943.

II-Functions [Identical with par. A, preceding document.] ♦ ♦ ♦

III-President of the Allied Control Commission

1. The Allied Commander in Chief will be ex-officio President of the Allied Control Commission.
2. A senior officer will be appointed to serve as his Deputy on the Commission.

IV-Organization of the Allied Control Commission

1. The Allied Control Commission will maintain a National Headquarters and will have such Regional, Provincial or other outlying offices as may be found convenient.
2. The Allied Control Commission will be organized into Sections, each administered by a Vice President. A Section will comprise a number of related Subcommissions, each charged with a special function.

V-Relations With Allied Military Government

1. The relations between the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government operating in the field will be co-ordinated by this headquarters.
2. Whenever it is decided that an area under Allied Military Government shall thereafter be administered by the Italian Government subject to the directions of the Allied Control Commission, the latter will extend its activities to include that area.
3. The decision when an area is to be transferred from one government to another will rest with the Allied Commander in Chief.
4. Personnel both for the Allied Control Commission and for Allied Military Government will be provided and allocated by this headquarters.

VI-Relation to Allied Force Headquarters

1. The Allied Control Commission will operate under Allied Force Headquarters.
2. All communications between the Allied Control Commission and the governments of the United Nations will be transmitted through this headquarters.

VII-Assignment of Acting Deputy President
Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Kenyon A. Joyce as Acting Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission.7


[Agreement Signed by the U.S., U.K., and USSR at the Moscow Conf, 8 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/136/226]

An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith composed in the first instance of representatives of the U.K., U.S., Soviet Union, and French Committee of National Liberation. Rep-


resentatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war [see note 9, below].

2. Each representative will be assisted when necessary by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief.

3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational problems. Members of the Council will be supplied by their respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on Political and Military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several representations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have the power to take final decisions. They will not of course concern themselves with military functions of the Allied Commander in Chief.

4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will enforce the terms of surrender.

5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander in Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander in Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations over matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

6. The Allied Commander in Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the U.K. and U.S. Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander in Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of Italy's administration to an end, the Commander in Chief will relinquish the Presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission.


[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy  8 to Secy of State, 30 Nov 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43) (1), sec. I]

... Today at AFHQ the initial formal session was convened. 9 It was decided that Massigli should be the presiding officer at this first session, as we had come together on French soil. In the future the position of Chairman will rotate among all the members, which means that a substitute must be available for each member.... The Council's Secretariat will include an individual from each national group to be selected by the members concerned. It has been decided that English will be the language of the sessions.

Mr. Vychinsky [Andrei Y. Vishinsky] expressed the keen desire to go to Italy at once....

The Russian members, on reaching Algiers, had the impression that Article 37 of the long term Armistice Agreement with the Italian Government meant that the Soviet members were appointed automatically to the Control Commission. Chief of Staff has told the. Russians that CCS must approve all appointments and that Article 37 merely provides in general that Control Commission shall have representation from the U.N. . . . From our early talks with Vychinsky [sic] it became clear also that he thought the functions of the Allied Control Commission were to be decided by the Advisory Council. This concept has been corrected in accordance with specifications of the Moscow Conference. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, Badoglio to Eisenhower, 4 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/5]

... You are aware with what interest Italian public opinion follows this question. It is therefore superfluous for me to repeat once more what a strong and natural disappointment would come from the knowledge that a committee, expressly formed for the purpose of studying Italian affairs, located in Italy and in the very city where the Royal Government has its seat, should


start its work with absolute exclusion on our part. And it is for this reason, dear General, that I would be deeply grateful if you would use all your authority and weight in obtaining authorization to have an Italian member also sit in at the meetings, under whatever circumstances you may see fit. I personally believe that the title of observer would be sufficient for the time being....


[Msg, AFHQ to ACC, 7 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/5]

... Control Commission is representative of the United Nations, to execute Armistice, insure that conduct of Italian Government conforms to Allied requirements, and be organ for conducting relations with Italian Government. Advisory Council, with present representation confined to British, American, Soviet and French representatives, is charged to watch machinery of Control and advise President of Commission on General Policy connected therewith. It would not be in accord with nature and purpose of this body to grant Italian Government either representation or right to send an observer.


[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 7 Dec 43, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, CCAC-48]

... Advisory Council met at Brindisi on 3 December 1943; at meeting, Vyshinski (sic) held that U.K. and U.S. Governments understood at Moscow that Soviet Government had right to appoint representatives to ACC, under Article 37, and recall appointments already made, the two Governments being so informed.

Similar view regarding French representation on ACC held by French Committee per Massigli.

It was decided by Advisory Council to inform Allied C in C of above and to refer question to Governments respectively. Importance is evidently attached to status on Commission by Russians. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Jan 44, ABC files, 387.4, CCAC48/2]

The appointment of a Soviet Member to the Allied Control Commission for Italy is approved. The question of the appointment of a French member is still under consideration by U.S. and British Governments. 10


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 12 Feb 44, ABC files, 387.4, CCAC48/3]

The appointment of a French Member to the Allied Control Commission for Italy ..is approved.


[Memo, Murphy to CofS, AFHQ, 17 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/226]

♦ ♦ ♦ In the State Department's views, the Advisory Council for Italy has no direct relationship with the Italian Government, but must use the machinery of the Control Commission for any questions which it wishes to take up with the Italian Government.

The State Department agrees that it will be impossible and undesirable to prevent individual members of the Advisory Council from having personal relations with the members of the Italian Government. It interprets the terms of reference and the directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the effect that individual members of the Advisory Council acting in their official capacities may address the Italian Government. The State Department does not agree with the British view that its member of the Advisory Council should be the channel through which the British Government will communicate with the Italian Government on matters which do not concern the other Governments represented on the Council.

The State Department advises that while it is recognized that Messrs. Macmillan and Murphy are the principal British and American representatives in Italy, it would appear appropriate for them and the other members of the Advisory Council to make any individual official communications which they may have to the Italian Gov-


ernment through the Political Section of the Control Commission. It is stated that the advantages during active military operations in Italy of permitting the Italian Government to establish and maintain communications with only one United Nations body are obvious.



[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

The present administration of occupied Italy displays all the unsatisfactory characteristics of a transitional organization with certain permanent features which in my view make it likely to continue to be unsatisfactory.

At the end of September AMG was divided into two areas, A.M.G. Forward, namely, the 5th and 8th Army areas, and A.M.G. Rear consisting of the rest of the occupied parts of Italy namely the "Compartimenti" (groups of provinces) of Sicily, Calabria and Lucania 11  The G.O.C.-in-C., 15th Army remained Military Governor of the whole area occupied, forward and rear. The reason for the division of occupied territory into two administrative areas was that the C.C.A.O. had to be with G.O.-in-C. 15th Army Group which was moving to the mainland, but the administrative headquarters of A.M.G. at Palermo could not be moved to a temporary home such as H.Q. 15th Army Group were likely to occupy pending the fall of Rome. The division was probably a mistake but seemed the only solution at the time.

The C.C.A.O., to whom the Military Governor had delegated all powers except the signature of proclamations and the confirmation of death sentences remained titular C.C.A.O. of the whole. In practice the C.C.A.O. personally administered the forward areas from Bari where the headquarters of the 15th Army Group were placed; the D.C.C.A.O., Brigadier General McSherry, administered the rear areas from Palermo, referring direct to M.G.S., A.F.H.Q., on all administrative matters. He was supposed to keep the Military Governor in touch with major developments in the rear areas, but failed signally to do so. In addition to these two administrative areas of Allied Military Government, the four southern provinces of Appulia [Apulia] ... as well as Sardinia remained under the Italian Government at Brindisi....

As a temporary measure this arrangement could have worked satisfactorily had, as was envisaged at the beginning of October, the Italian Government been transferred to Rome and the Allied Commission of Control been set up at its side with little delay since upon this happening the whole of A.M.G. rear would also have been handed over to the Italian Government under the control of the A.C.C. In view of the early expected transfer, the A.C.C. was brought into existence on 11th November, when the Allied Military Mission ceased to exist and the staff was merged into the A.C.C. Nevertheless up to the time of writing no additional territory has been handed over to the Italian Government; and in consequence the division of the administration of Southern Italy into three parts described has proved most unsatisfactory. The quality of A.M.G. in Sicily and Southern Italy has deteriorated and considerable political difficulties have arisen from the diversity of regime in Apulia, Lucania, and the forward areas, such as Naples and Foggia 12


[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

♦ ♦ ♦ the Administration of AMG Forward and Rear has been rendered much more difficult and less efficient by the constant visits of parties


of A.C.C. officers who rarely remain long enough in one place to learn anything of value, but who seek to justify existence by criticising matters which they do not understand or trying to institute committees to perform functions which are not their concern. This especially true at Naples. ♦ ♦ ♦


[AFHQ Admin Memo 92, i9 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/62]

1. To insure the necessary co-ordination and control of civilian supply and economic matters in occupied or controlled territory of the Italian mainland, there will be established in Naples a Central Economic Committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer or his Deputy, responsible direct to this headquarters. In addition to the chairman, there will be one senior representative of AMG 15th Army Group and one senior representative to be designated jointly by the Allied Control Commission and AMG Headquarters. The representative of ACC/AMG will be the executive vice chairman. The vice chairman and the representative of AMG 15th Army Group will devote their full time to the work of the committee. [Chapter XII deals with civilian supply and the food crisis.]

2. Such other personnel as may be required will be made available by the Allied Control Commission, AMG Headquarters and AMG 15th Army Group upon the request of the committee. Necessary vehicles and other equipment will also be provided by these three headquarters as requested by the committee. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Rpt, Chanler, former CLO, AMGOT Hq, to the Dir, CAD, 21 Dec 43, CAD files, 091.1 AMG (5-27-43) sec. 2.]

57. A . . . complicated problem which confronted AMG as soon as operations in the field commenced was the extent to which such a central headquarters should itself centralize or decentralize its functions of government. It was the original intention to give the greatest possible amount of power and independence to provincial Senior Civil Affairs Officers, with only a minimum degree of centralized control from headquarters. This policy was adopted in anticipation of the difficulties of communication which would exist, at least during the early phases. The facts amply sustained the expectation. There were many provinces which were almost entirely out of communication with headquarters during the first five or six weeks, and after the 8th Army had swept through the Calabrian Peninsula, an even worse situation arose....

58. Accordingly, the theory of decentralization proved to have been soundly conceived. On the other hand, it had many disadvantages in practice despite the difficulties of communication. The business of government is an extremely difficult and specialized one, and it is expecting too much of any organization to count on having enough competent Civil Affairs Officers to give each independent power to govern a province containing in many cases as many as 400,000 to 500,000 people. Some proved unequal to the task and required continual guidance from above. Others who had plenty of ability and initiative proved too independent over the decentralized system, with the result that increasing divergence in both policy and practice began to appear in different provinces of the island.

59. To give a few examples by way of illustration: The Senior Civil Affairs Officer of one province which was itself not a great wheat producer, but which was surrounded by wheat producing provinces, decided on his own responsibility that the best way to solve his food problem was to increase the price of wheat in his province. Owing to bad communications, he did this without reference to headquarters, and this was not discovered until complaints were received from the neighboring agricultural provinces that their wheat was being drained out to the province where the price had been raised....

61. This problem received very serious discussion and consideration at AMG Headquarters, which found itself divided between "State's Righters" and "Federalists." Finally, a directive was prepared, entitled "Powers of Local Legislation," which was agreed to by all, drastically limiting the rights of provincial Senior Civil Affairs Officers to issue local orders. A list of about 14 subjects was prepared as to which they had the right to issue local orders without reference to headquarters. Most of these were of a police nature. Everything else had to be referred to headquarters except that in case of real emergency and inability to communicate, they were authorized to issue any necessary order


and to immediately inform headquarters of the action taken.

62. The same issue arose again in a different phase by the end of October, when the regional organizations were set up. After considerable discussion at headquarters a directive was in the course of preparation by the end of November, approaching the subject from the opposite standpoint: instead of providing what subjects the regional Civil Affairs Officers were permitted to deal with on their own responsibility, this directive covered the subjects which they were not permitted to go into without authoritative reference to main headquarters.13  This change of course was necessary because a regional Civil Affairs Officer, having a much larger area to govern, must have greater independent power.

64. Unquestionably, decentralization is not the most efficient form to adopt for a military government, provided communications between provinces and headquarters are reasonably well established. The political advantages of decentralization (such as the prevention of dictatorship by an overpowerful central government) are of course non-existent in military government, which in the first place, is only temporary, and in the second place, is essentially vested with dictatorial powers in any event. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Directive, Rennell to SCAO's Fifth and Eighth Armies and RCAO's Rgns III and IV, 1 Jan 44, ACC files, 10260/142/2673]

I have, during the last few weeks, tried to coordinate the efforts of the three administrative authorities governing that part of Italy not under German occupation, viz, Italian Government, AMG Rear, and AMG, 15 Army Group, in so far as 'decisions which affect the whole territory are concerned. AFHQ has now issued an instruction that no decisions which affect salaries and wages of civil servants, prices of basic commodities, wage rates, etc., are to be made without previous consultation with the three authorities concerned.

2. I wish the same principle to be applied within AMG, 15th Army Group. Unilateral decisions on matters which will affect other Regions, or commands, will not be made without reference to these Headquarters who will consult the other R.C.A.O.'s and S.C.A.O.'s and make the decision. As an example I should expect an R.C.A.O. to refer to these Headquarters before issuing orders on the following:
(a) Matters likely to affect occupied territory as a whole, as opposed to the specific region (e.g. price, wage and ration scales).
(b) Matters involving some relationship with other Regions (e.g. inter-regional shipments, inter-regional supply movement, movement of refugees).
(c) Matters which raise legal, political or ecclesiastical questions of a character which may require handling by this Headquarters or higher headquarters (e.g. policy as to internees and foreign nationals, matters affecting ecclesiastical personnel, repeal or suspension of Fascist Laws.)
(d) Matters involving a substantial change in Italian law or administrative procedure, other than of local application (e.g. modification of social insurance systems, agricultural tax structure, labour laws).
(e) Matters involving policy affecting institutions organised or operating on a National basis (e.g. banks, insurance companies).

There will be other matters not on this list which I leave to the discretion of the R.C.A.O.'s and S.C.A.O.'s.

3. This smacks of centralisation; but the need for co-ordination in administering even forward combat areas is so great that I believe that you will find this degree of centralisation a help rather than a hindrance. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Draft Memo, Rennell for CG, 15th AGp, 8 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

1. I must draw your attention to the unsatisfactory state of affairs from the administrative point of view in that part of Italy not under German occupation caused by the division of authority among three separate administrations....

2. These three administrations were established without any apparent provision for local co-ordination and the administration of . million people in this area is quite impossible unless coordination is effected. Moreover, since the setting up of these administrative organizations, various functions which should properly be carried out by the Italian Government or A.M.G., have been delegated direct by A.F.H.Q. to Advance Adm. Ech., A.F.H.Q.14  and thus a fourth administra-


tive authority has appeared to deal with supplies and food distribution, transportation, and latterly, the typhus epidemic in Naples city.

3. The result of this has led to confusion in the administrative field. Unilateral legislation has been promulgated by the separate administrative authorities. In Region I the wages of civil servants were raised without reference to any other part of the territory. The Italian Government has recently issued decrees relating to the basic price of oil and wheat. Advance A.F.H.Q. issued an over-all price for petrol. Other instances of unilateral procedure need not be quoted.

4. Administration under these conditions is virtually impossible even from the point of view of military government. It is not my province to plead for the Italian Government but from their point of view, remembering that we have assured them of our support and must indeed give them our support as an administrative machine, the position must be quite impossible.

5. It is, in my opinion, essential that co-ordination should be achieved between the (civil) administrative authorities and that that co-ordination should be centralized at your Headquarters as Military Governor in the present circumstances and as G.O.C.-in-C. of Allied troops in Italy in the future.

6. In an endeavour to carry out what I believe is the policy of the Allied Governments I am trying to administer the forward territories, subject always to Allied military interests, in such a way that they can be easily turned over to the Italian Government in the future. This concerns the appointment of Italian officials acceptable to the present Italian Government and the framing of legislation which is in keeping with Italian administrative policy for the future, for I conceive it our duty that some kind of continuity shall prevail.

7. But unless practical co-ordination is effected at once we are in danger of slipping into a position so confused that it will be impossible to ensure good administration in the future.



[Msg, Alexander to AFHQ, 15 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/ 136/594]

.... In view of urgent necessity of simplifying the organization for the direction and control of civil affairs in Italy I propose to make following arrangements on assuming responsibility for all occupied Italian territory. First. Mason MacFarlane as head of the Allied Commission of Control to assume responsibility for all Italian territory including that which under existing procedure would be under separate AMG control. This will ensure continuity of policy and procedure as our troops advance and will centralise policy regarding food supply and kindred subjects which is essential if best use is to be made of available resources. Second. Mason MacFarlane to be my adviser on all civil and political matters and to be represented at my headquarters by Brigadier [M. S.] Lush acting as his deputy. MGS staff now with Flambo [AFHQ advance administrative echelon] to be embodied in Lush's staff. Under this system I would deal with long term policy by means of periodical meetings and discussions with Mason MacFarlane and with day to day affairs through Lush who would be guided by general directives issued by Mason MacFarlane. This would I understand facilitate considerable reductions in AMG staffs, would ensure unified and properly integrated policy and would enable me to exercise general control and obtain considered advice through one channel only which is essential from my point of view....


[AFHQ, GO 5, 24 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

♦ ♦ ♦ I General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force to Exercise Certain Functions of President of Allied Control Commission

General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., while serving as General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force,15  will be the Representative in Italy of the President of the Allied Control Commission and act for and on his behalf carry


out the functions of the President of the Allied Control Commission in Italy in respect to such matters as shall be delegated to him from time to time by the President of the Allied Control Commission. General Alexander will continue to be the Military Governor of such occupied territory in Italy (including Sicily) as remains under Allied Military Government.

II Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, To Be Chief Commissioner and Chief Civil Affairs Officer

Lieutenant General Sir Frank N. Mason MacFarlane, K.C.B., D.S.C., M.C., while serving as Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission will be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission; he will also be Chief Civil Affairs Officer of occupied territory under Allied Military Government. His Headquarters will be Headquarters, Allied Control Commission and, in addition, it will be the Civil Affairs Branch of Headquarters Allied Central Mediterranean Force.

III Disbandment of Headquarters Allied Military Government: 25th Army Group: Responsibilities of Allied Control Commission

I. Headquarters, Allied Military Government, 15th Army Group (now Allied Central Mediterranean Force) is disbanded. Headquarters, Allied Military Government, Fifth and Eighth Armies, will operate under the operational command of Commanders Fifth and Eighth Armies and under the technical control of Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.

2. All Italian territory not under Allied Military Government will be administered by the Italian Government, under the direction of the Allied Control Commission.

3. A Regional Organization on the present lines will be maintained until further orders. The responsibility for all territory now under Headquarters Allied Military Government passes to Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.


[Memo, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, for the CG, ACMF, 28 Jan 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy (sec. I-B), CCAC, Memo for Info No. 22]

2. Certain powers and duties under the Armistice and under the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff are fastened upon the Allied Commander in Chief. As an incident to his command he is made the President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The purpose . . . is not to divest the Allied Commander in Chief of the office of President of the ACC, which has been vested in that appointment by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but merely to authorize and direct the C.G. CinC ACMF to perform on his behalf, in Italy, certain of the functions which belong to the President of the ACC. By the creation of a command over the Allied Central Mediterranean Force, and by the measures provided in GO No. 5 of AFHQ, a unified control over Allied Military Government and Allied Control Commission has been made possible. It is the desire of this Headquarters that so far as is practicable all problems of Civil Affairs arising in Italy shall be solved on the ground and under the control of the G.O. CinC ACMF, and accordingly the Allied CinC empowers the G.O. CinC ACMF to act for him in such matters.

3. Certain subjects will require reference to this Headquarters. This will be the case with matters which call for high political guidance, or raise issues not confined to Italy. Civilian Supply is another category where reference to this Headquarters will often be requisite, in view of the responsibility of the theater commander to decide, if needs be conflicting. There will, moreover, be questions other than the foregoing which because of their importance, intrinsically or as precedents, should be submitted to the commander on whom the final responsibility rests.♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Gen Wilson, CinC, AF, 16 20 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

♦ ♦ ♦ You probably know that there is pretty strong feeling over here as regards the way in which M.G.S. has endeavoured to run things over here by remote control rather than by leaving things to the people on the spot to do. Furthermore, there is evidence that questions occasionally get blocked and held up in M.G.S.

With A.C.C. and A.M.G. now running as one show under one Headquarters things are very


different to what they were and it may be that M.G.S. has not yet accustomed itself to the new set-up. 17 ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Clabaugh, CAD, for the Dir, CAD, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-28-43) (2)]

3. No estimate of the situation in Italy could be made at the time of our visit without taking cognizance of the difficulties in the organization of civil affairs. The problems inherent in the situation were multiplied and intensified by the creation of two military governments in Italy separated by what came to be known as the "Mason-Dixon Line"-the northern border of Salerno, Potenza and Bari Provinces.

4. The military government of Naples was under the command of the 15th Army Group located at Bari; the military government of Sicily was under AMG-ACC located at Naples; to communicate with each other they had to go through Algiers. ACC was established at Brindisi (the staff living 60 miles away at Santa Cesarea), with a forward headquarters planned at Salerno and a rear headquarters at Naples. A separate group was planned for Rome. There was a forward echelon at AFHQ, but with only two or three civil affairs officers attached to it. Both AMG and the Peninsular Base Section [PBS] 18   were exercising jurisdiction over Naples. For instance, AMG could order the gas turned on and PBS order it turned off; one could be dealing with one epidemic, the other with another; one could authorize a meeting, the other prohibit it. At one and the same time there were headquarters at Palermo, Naples, Salerno, Bari and Brindisi dealing with problems of more than local or provincial import. Questions of fiscal policy, social insurance, price control, power, distribution, transportation and many others are national in their scope and do not respect artificial lines. The experience demonstrates that in the administration of occupied territory, it is not practicable to deal with the various phases of the occupation as to time, territory and function with separate organizations. The line of demarcation is seldom clear. There is overlapping in all. What is indicated, in the opinion of the officers interviewed, is one continuing integrated organization sufficiently flexible to meet the Various phases as to time, territory and function, but avoiding the conflicts that are inevitable under separate organizations even with the best of intentions. This applies to the division as between AMG 15th Army Group and Regions I and II, which were under AMG/ ACC. It applies also to the relations between AMG and the Base Sections. As to AMG and ACC, their eventual merger was facilitated by their organization along parallel lines. They were in effect a single organization. The experience here affords a pattern for the transition from military government to allied missions in the case of the other countries yet to be liberated.

5. The transition and integration finally came in the case of Italy with the appointment of Lt. Gen. Mason MacFarlane as Deputy President of the ACC and Chief Civil Affairs Officer with jurisdiction over all Italian territory under Allied Control. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Memo, Hq, ACC for All Concerned, 23 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

5. The Allied Commander in Chief will be ex-officio President of the Commission. The General Office Commanding in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Forces, will be acting President. The acting senior officer of the Commission will be Chief Commissioner who will serve as Deputy President of the Commission.

6. The Commission will be divided into five Sections: Economic, Administrative, Military, Political, and Communications. Sections will be in charge of Vice Presidents or Directors and, in


each case, will comprise one or more Subcommissions. . . .

7. Each Section or Subcommission will maintain a headquarters staff. Some will also have representatives in the field. The existing regional organizations will be continued initially to correspond to such regional authority as may be set up by the Italian Government, or otherwise as administrative convenience may dictate.

8. A.C.C. personnel in the field will be known as Control Commissioners with designation of their particular specialist category where appropriate. For example, Control Commission (Legal), Control Commission (Public Health). The Chief Control Officer in the Region will be known as the Regional Control Commissioner (RCC).

9. Particulars as to the nature of the duties of A.C.C. field officers will be specified by the Subcommissions to which they are assigned. However, the following guides are applicable to all:
(a) The primary function of A.C.C. officers in the field will be to give assistance and guidance to and to supervise the local Italian officials and to convey such instructions to them as may be authorized either in specific instances or generally under this and further directives.
(b) Each A.C.C. officer will also carefully observe the operation of the Italian Government in the area or administrative field of his responsibility in order to determine whether the terms of the surrender are being vigorously and effectively enforced. The results of such observations will be the subject of periodic or special reports to higher headquarters.
(c) A.C.C. field personnel will have no power to command or direct Italian officials in connection with the performance of their duties. In this respect their powers and duties are to be contrasted with those of officers of AMG.
(d) Particularly during the transition stage and until the authority of the Italian Government is fully established and the administrative machine is functioning smoothly, the Italian officials will probably require considerable advice, information and assistance from A.C.C. officers. It is entirely proper in this way to support the authority of the Italian officials. Care should be taken, however, not to interfere directly or to give the appearance of interfering directly in or with the local administration except in real emergency.
(e) A.C.C. personnel must also take great care to avoid becoming involved in political disputes or conflicts. A.C.C. officers will deal only with the officials selected by the Italian Government. The competency of these officials and the quality of their administration will be the responsibility of the Italian Government. However, when officials behave in a manner likely to prejudice the position of the Allied Forces by violation of the terms of surrender or otherwise, A.C.C. personnel will take any action that may be authorized and promptly submit a report with recommendations to higher headquarters.
(f) Close co-ordination will be necessary between A.C.C. and tactical and administrative forces in the area. Certain committees have already been established (i.e. Local Resources Boards). Information as to these committees and other inter-service agencies will be communicated to field personnel where necessary. It is essential in order that confusion be avoided that the channels of communication with the Italian authorities remain as few and as simple as possible.
10. The disposition of A.C.C. personnel and their operations will be communicated by Regional Commissioners or by A.C.C. Headquarters. The following general rules will, however, apply:

(a) Generally there will be no A.C.C. field officers in the communes or in a position comparable to that of the C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. under AMG. General administration will, therefore, be subject to A.C.C. control at the provincial level. Such local inspection as may be required will be worked out from A.C.C. regional or provincial Headquarters.
(b) In the transition stage and until the Italian administration is functioning satisfactorily A.C.C. personnel will, subject to subparagraph (a) above, be disposed on a basis approaching that of AMG. An effort will be made to reduce numbers as quickly as conditions permit.

Regional Organization

II. It is understood that the Italian Government intends to appoint Italian Regional Commissioners in certain areas to function until the Italian Government can effectively communicate with and maintain control of the provinces. In other areas to be turned over, the Italian Government may communicate directly with the provincial officials. In either case, A.C. will initially appoint a Regional Control Commissioner. In regions in which there is an Italian Regional Commissioner the R.C.C. will, under directives of A.C.C. headquarters, establish control at the regional level and work with his Italian counterpart. In regions where there is no Italian commissioner the R.C.C. will serve as channel for communication with A.C.C. personnel in the field and as a regional representative of A.C.C. Headquarters. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane, Deputy President, ACC, to Hq, ACMF, 26 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/62]

1. With the inevitably scattered lay-out of the organizations with which A.C.C. has to deal it is essential that the Deputy President should have a Vice President as his personal deputy both to act in his absence and to be located near one of the main co-operating organizations where the situation necessitates this.

2. I am abolishing the post of Chief of Staff. This Officer and his office had far too much to do.
I am substituting a Secretary-General with adequate staff to deal with co-ordination at Main Headquarters and much of the work hitherto done by the Chief of Staff will devolve upon the Regional Control and Military Government Section now being formed.

3. It has become quite clear in practice that a combined Administrative and Economic Section was too big, too unwieldy and altogether too large to be effectively worked as one entity.
I have, therefore, divided it into an Administrative Section and an Economic Section each under a Vice President.
I have added the Subcommissions for Internal Transportation and Shipping to the Economic Section and have established the previous Communications Section which did not warrant a combination under a Vice President.

4. I have set up a new Regional Control and Military Government Section. This will be the executive section for dealing with Allied Military Government and control "in the field." It will also be responsible for security and internal administration. It will deal with a great deal of work hitherto done by the previous Chief of Staff.
The section will be of great importance and fully warrants its head being a Vice President.

5. The Political Section is advisory only and it will function adequately under joint British and American directors. This is what it has been doing for the past four months.
Its advice on the subject of questions connected with Displaced Persons will be most valuable and always sought, but there are many disadvantages in placing the Displaced Persons Subcommission under the Political Section.

6. As regards the Independent Subcommissions, all these work very much on their own. They do not fit into any of the main sections and they are best left to work independently under the direction of the Deputy President working through the Secretary General.
I am fusing the P.W. Subcommission and Displaced Persons Subcommission as under the  Jan 44, ACC existing organization there has been a great waste of available resources. This Subcommission will have a P.W. Subsection and a Displaced Persons Subsection but the personnel at the disposal of the Chief of the Subcommission will be available for either Subsection and can be switched from one to the other in accordance with the pressure of prisoners or refugees at the moment.

7. I have kept the balance of British and American appointments just about equal on the higher level. Admittedly both Vice President and principal assistant in the Economic Section are American but the majority of the heads of subcommissions in this Section are British.♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hq, ACC, for All Concerned, 31 files, 10000/136/322]

6. It is the wish of the Chief Commissioner that the Regional organization should continue both in the areas under Military Government and those under advisory control. The S.C.A.O.'s, 5th and 8th Armies, the R.C.A.O.'s of Regions III, IV and V, and the Regional Control Commissioners of Sardinia and Regions I and II will maintain their organizations (on a reduced scale in the two latter cases) and all specialist officers in the Regions as well as the C.A.O.'s and C.A.P.O.'s and C.C.'s [Chief Commissioners] will be under their command.

7. In order to centralize control of the Regional organizations (including 5th and 8th Armies AMG) and to ensure compliance by the Italian Government with the advice rendered to them and the execution of the Chief Commissioner's orders, as advised by the Economic and Administrative Sections, a third Section has been set up to be called the Regional Control and Military Government Section headed by an Executive Commissioner having the status of a Vice President under whose immediate command will come the R.C.A.O.'s and R.C.C.'s and their staffs both administrative and specialist in all matters, and the S.C.A.O.'s, 5th and 8th Armies and the military personnel of Headquarters, ACC, for administration and discipline.

8. On all matters of policy the Chief Commissioner's orders and directives (as advised by the Subcommissions) will be passed to the R.C.A.O.'s and R.C.C.'s by this Section. Heads of Subcommissions will correspond with their representatives in the Regions (but not with representatives of other Subcommissions) on routine technical matters only. R.C.A.O.'s and


R.C.C.'s will address themselves on all matters to the V.P. of the R.C. [Regional Control] and M.G. Section, which will also carry out (in the Establishment Branch), the MS, A&Q, G-1 and G-4 duties for all personnel of the ACC. All postings and assignments to Regions and to Headquarters will be made by the Section and no transfers of personnel from Region to Region will be carried out except by this Section.

9. This Section will also be responsible for Displaced Persons, Security and for proper liaison between ACC and Regions and all Allied military (all services) formations.

10. It is important to maintain the channel of communication to Regions and Army AMG's through this Section in order that co-ordination of policy, continuity in administration and close liaison with military formations and units may be ensured, so far as is possible, both in the areas administered by Allied Military Government and in the territory in which the Allied officers act in an advisory capacity-only.

11. It is therefore, the Chief Commissioner's wish that Subcommissions should err on the side of passing too much though this Section, especially during the early stage, rather than of dealing direct with their representatives in the field.


[ACC Hq, Rpt for Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, ACC (1-2744), sec. 1 ]

2. Action by the executive staff was limited by the fact that the Committee was not able to obtain an adequate number of officers. The additional officers required were not made available by ACC/AMG either because there were no officers with the proper qualifications on its staff or because ACC/AMG considered the qualified officers could not be spared. However, the executive staff did initiate central records of supplies on hand, allocate supplies arriving at the ports, initiate a study of the possibility of increasing the basic ration, commence a survey of the warehousing problem and of the bulk wheat handling problem, initiate a study of existing civilian motor transport, and handle, in conjunction with MGS Advance, the bidding for tonnage and diversions of ships and various matters referred to it by the Local Resources (Italian) Board.19

3. On 20 January . . . General [Mason-] Mac-Farlane stated that it was the wish of ACC to take over the functions of the Committee . . . as soon as the necessary reorganization of ACC could be completed so as to enable it to perform the functions of the Committee. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 22 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, CMOUT 8564]

Food Subcommission should be responsible for whole field of Food Policy, including rationing, import and export, agricultural production and comprehensive policy of fixing prices to merchants, processors, distributors, retailers, and consumers.


[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

(35) During the month the Food Subcommission was organized at Headquarters A.C.C. and assumed the responsibility for the importation, warehousing and distribution of food. Requisitions continue to be made through the Industry and Commerce Subcommission. A substantial portion of the staff of the Food Subcommission came from the Central Economic Committee and the balance from the Industry and Commerce Subcommission.


[ACC to the Advisory Council for Italy, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Government, 25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/268]

12. The functions of ACC differ in different parts of Italy. Three phases may be distinguished; two in Military Government territory, which is that territory which has not been restored to the administration of the Italian Government and is still under Allied Military Government and one in territory restored to the Italian Government. The two phases in Military Government territory are:
(a) Army Areas where the representatives are directly under the control and form part of the staff of the Army Commander;
(b) Areas behind the Armies which are formed into Regions under the command of Regional Commissioners who are responsible to the Chief Commissioner through R.C. and M.G. Section. ♦ ♦ ♦

13. In Army areas policies formulated by the Chief Commissioner are in theory paramount but it is not possible or desirable to place all into


effect at once. 20  Only those of first importance to operations are brought into force, as may be expedient according to the course of operations and the requirements of the Army.

26. In the Army areas, that is to say, where operations are progressing, a team of Allied Officers on the same lines as the Regional teams under a Senior Civil Affairs Officer is attached to the Headquarters of each Army. These Allied Military Government teams set up the initial phases of Military Government in a liberated territory as the Armies move forward. It is they who post the Proclamations of the Commander in Chief and appoint the provisional Italian local government immediately after occupation. Their primary duty is to establish law and order among the civilian population, to maintain the people with sufficient food and to render first aid to public utilities affecting the health and economics of the territories. Their secondary duty is to establish normality particularly on the agricultural and economic side as soon as the shock of battle has passed over the territory. The staffs of these Army AMG's are distributed among the Corps and Divisions of the combat troops. When a town is taken a Civil Affairs Officer with technical staff is posted therein. As the Armies go forward the staffs of Regions already formed under which the newly liberated areas will fall, follow up the Army AMG's and reinforce the staffs on the Army AMG's. Eventually, as the Army line moves forward the area is handed over to the static Regional Commissioner who maintains in places [sic] officers he had already sent up as reinforcements for the Army and begins regional control under Allied Military Government.

27. It will be seen that the Army AMG's are constantly moved forward, taking over new areas, while the Regional organization comes later and is on a static and more permanent basis.

28. In the forward areas the Provinces and Regions are governed under AMG. The administration, however, is carried out always through the Italian machinery of local government and the fullest employment is made of Italian officials purged of their Fascist element. One of the primary duties of both AMG Armies and Regional Commissioners is constantly to remove Fascist personnel, Fascist institutions and Fascist doctrines. ♦ ♦ ♦


[ACC to the Advisory Council for Italy, 25 Aug 44, Rpt, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Govt]

14. As conditions become more settled, the extent to which these [ACC] policies are carried out extends until in the Regions under Military Government they are all in operation. In these areas the responsibility is full and can be implemented by direct order and extends to the actual administration of the territory.

16. As an example of our increasing close relationship with the Italian Government we have evolved a system whereby the decrees passed by the Italian Government are almost invariably made operative by use in Military Government territory. That this is possible is a tribute to the co-operation between ACC and the Italian Government in the planning of decrees. In this connection it should be mentioned that the policy of ACC is that except in certain cases where military necessity dictates policy (e.g. restriction of movement) the Italian Government are the planners and draftsmen of decrees and ACC are advisers on the general policy to such decrees.

23. Policy is framed in the Administrative, Economic and Political Sections under their Vice Presidents in consultation with each other and the Chief Commissioner. This policy affects and is affected by external matters and the interior, political and economic situation in the country. The execution of policy is carried out by teams of Allied Officers both administrative and technical, in the field. In order to decentralize the work of the ACC in the field, the territory has been divided up into Regions under the command of Regional Commissioners. At present there are six Regions, viz., Region I (Sicily), Region VI (Sardinia), Southern Region (Calabria, Apulia, Lucania, Campania), Region IV (Lazio, Umbria and Rome), Region V (Abruzzi, the Marches), Region VIII (Tuscany).

24. In order further to decentralize, these Regional teams are divided into Provincial teams, each under an Allied Provincial Commissioner. The Regional Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner have under their command Provincial Officers who deal with local government, police officers, legal officers, supply officers and many other technical officers who are in fact representatives of the Subcommissions of the Administrative and Economic Sections in the field. The Regional Commissioner is the commander in the Region and has the over-all responsibility


for the work of his Regional team. The Provincial Commissioner is responsible for his Provincial team to the Regional Commissioner.

25. The work of Regional Commissioners and their staffs in the field is controlled by the Regional Control and Military Government Section at ACC Headquarters under a Vice President known as the Executive Commissioner.

29. A Regional Commissioner and his staff, like the SCAO of an Army AMG, is faced continually with every kind of problem, both administrative, economic, religious and social. Regional teams have to be prepared to meet and deal with every kind of situation that may arise from the extraordinary circumstances of occupation after battle. Quite apart from the subjects dealt with by the technical representatives of the Administrative and Economic Sections, the serious problems of refugees, displaced persons and patriots arise. ♦ ♦ ♦



[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 7 Nov 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 2879]

Directive for Allied Control Commission for Italy as furnished you in FAN 248 [Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 23 Oct, sec. 2, above] lacks agreement on the question of allocation by nationality of the principal posts on the Commission.

Agreement on this question has now been reached as follows:
Deputy President of the Commission-U.S. 21
Vice President in charge of the Military Section-U.S.
Vice President in charge of the Political Section-U.K.
Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section-U.K.
Economic Director-U.K. Administrative Director-U.K.
Vice President in charge of the Communications Section-U. S.22


[Msg, McNarney, DCofS, to Eisenhower, 14 NOV 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5738]

Cable deals with your proposal to the CCS to appoint a British officer, Admiral McGrigor [Rear Admiral R. R. McGrigor], as Acting Vice President of the Military Section of the Allied Control Commission. Before the War Department presents its views on this recommendation to the CCS, I would like you to consider the conditions which surrounded the allocation of principal posts on the Allied Control Commission to the U.K. and U.S. It was considered highly desirable by the State Department, as well as the War and Navy Departments here, that the Allied Control Commission should represent an equitable distribution of U.S. and U.K. strength so long as the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean is American. It is the feeling here that the assignment of the vice presidency of both the Political and Economic Sections to the British already constitutes a commission which is over balanced in favor of the British and we are therefore very reluctant to also assign the military vice presidency to a British officer, unless there is a most compelling reason on your part for doing so....


[Msg, Eisenhower to McNarney, 15 Nov 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9197]

It is difficult for me to appreciate the considerations involved in the allocation of principal posts on the Allied Control Commission, particularly on the Military side, as I do not pay much attention to the nationality of the military officers serving in Allied Forces and make their assignments as required by efficiency and economy of personnel. My recommendation of Admiral McGrigor as acting Vice President of the Military Section was prompted by the fact that as Flag Officer Liaison Italy he is now doing and will do the actual work of co-ordinating the operations of the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine, and I am certain it would be more simple, direct and


efficient to put him on the Commission in the capacity of acting Vice President. The Italian Naval strength is the only military factor of importance to us at this time. . . . With the President, Acting Deputy President, and Chief of Staff all American General officers, I see nothing inconsistent or unbalanced in the designation of McGrigor as head of the Military Section. 23


[Memo, Wickersham for the SW, 8 Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ One of the outstanding achievements of AMG is the complete co-operation of British and American officers with each other. Teamwork was in full operation as a well understood partnership. Many officers told me that they forgot half the time whether some other member of the team was British or American. The most thorough good feeling existed by each service towards the other. 24  ♦ ♦ ♦

[Maj John Boettiger, Chief, Public Info Branch, CAD, formerly ExecO, Hq AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt to Dir, CAD, 2 Mar 44, CAD files, 319.i, AMG (8-27-43), sec. 3]

♦ ♦ ♦ The Eighth Army AMGOT British commanding officer, Group Captain Benson, was all that anyone could desire. He was intelligent, efficient, friendly, a great leader. He had a keen appreciation of ability, and many times asked to have more American officers assigned to his staff. His immediate headquarters was half staffed by Americans, although the policy was to have the Eighth Army AMGOT two thirds British.

It seemed to me that the plan was working out admirably. However, among individual officers differences developed. They started with such piddling matters as a British officer asking an American colleague not to repeat his offense of going into the kitchen of our small mess to drink a cup of tea and chatting with a British enlisted man who had prepared the tea. "It just isn't done in our army." Americans had difficulty understanding the relationship of British officers and their batmen-at least, they did until they got accustomed to having their own boots shined, beds made and tea brought to them in bed at 6 a.m. !

I think these things could have been overcome, but there were other than social differences. The whole British army system is so different from ours. The nomenclature is different, the forms unlike. Personally, I think we wasted a tremendous lot of time in learning the other's methods. I saw no disposition on the part of either army to profit from contact with the other's system.

In AMG-Fifth Army there were most serious differences between American and British officers. Painful efforts were made on both sides to keep these from flaring up. It might have been a relief to let them flare, but it was thought best to keep striving with a bad situation. It was most embarrassing for an American officer to complain to higher headquarters of a British opposite number, and it surely was equally difficult on the British side.


[Msg, Hilldring to Devers, DCinC, ACMF, 14 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5662]

Bovenschen, Sir Frederick, now in Washington has asked the War Department for its views regarding the reallocation of top position in the Allied Control Commission as a result of the assignment of General Wilson as President and General [Mason-] MacFarlane as Deputy President of the Commission. Except as to the Vice President of the Military Section, it is the feeling of the War Department that no change is advisable or necessary and there is some doubt here as to the wisdom of the replacement of Admiral McGrigor. Your views and those of Smith with regard to Bovenschen's question are requested as a matter of urgency. 25


[Ltr, Henry F. Grady, Vice President, Econ Sec, ACC, to Gen Mason-MacFarlane, 14 Apr 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. I]

There has been forwarded to me copies of your correspondence with [Lt.] Colonel [Henry] Parkman [Jr.]. Colonel Parkman's letter to you of the 18th of March was written at my request and I am sorry that it annoyed you to the extent it apparently did. All my dealings with you have been most happy and I feel you have done and are doing a splendid job. Any question of your own fairness has never entered my mind. There are questions, however, that transcend the very pleasant relations which I hope you and I will always continue to enjoy.

It is distasteful to me to discuss whether a Britisher or an American is in this position or that. I have been interested primarily in seeing the job done provided British and American postwar objectives are the same. But I want to be perfectly frank with you and say that I am not sure they are fundamentally the same. As Assistant Secretary of State in charge of economic matters, I worked ardently for effective British-American collaboration. British officials who had occasion to deal with me can testify as to that. With the approach of the war's end, however, many of those in this country who went all out for aid to Britain when Germany might seriously threaten Britain's destruction are deeply disturbed-disturbed because collaboration for the peace shows signs of breaking down.

The ACC and corresponding organizations that will be set up in other liberated areas will be engaged in ad hoc peace making and these agencies are British dominated or give every promise of being so. This is certainly true in Italy and the evening up of numbers by making American heads of the Monuments and Education SubCommissions does not change the fact of control. The control is certainly British. I found that this was also to be true for the Balkans and the Near East, and when I got to London I discovered that again the organization. was topped by a British Major General. This despite the fact that supply comes almost entirely from the United States. You know that since last August our contribution in the Italian theatre has been almost 90%. In addition, the Italian Army is being fed entirely with American food though the channel of distribution is British. It is hardly conceivable that if the ratios were reversed the control would be American.

To have the control of ad hoc peace making in British hands in all the principal theatres means that America's position is that of a minor partner in reconstructing the post-war world. If the British conception of the post-war world is a secure and expanded British Empire rather than a world system in which preferences, sterling blocks and spheres of influence are eliminated, then British and American objectives are at .variance.

The public statements of British leaders, including the Prime Minister, give basis to the fear of many of Britain's friends and admirers that British and American objectives for the postwar are fundamentally different. This matter concerns both of us. Continued British and American collaboration is essential to the future of the world and to the best interest of the British people. The greatest tragedy would be for the breach that is starting to widen. The danger is that America may recoil and in disillusionment again retire from world affairs as it did after the last war. You and I want to do whatever we can to prevent this, I am sure. One way to prevent it is for American and British officials to discuss common problems with perfect frankness, as I have done in this letter.

[Ltr, McCloy to Devers, DSAC, Mediterranean Theater, 7 Jun 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-s7-43), sec. I]

♦ ♦ ♦ We have been made conscious recently that there was a succession of officers coming back from Italy who comment rather critically about the British emphasis which is being placed upon the Allied Control Commission's administration in Italy. I would not bother you about it were it not for the general unanimity of view which those recently returning from Italy seem to express. I have difficulty in outlining specific instances and it would not be consistent with the point which I want to make if I made anything of the particular things I may speak of. The fault seems to be that a certain atmosphere does exist, whether justified or not. ♦ ♦ ♦

I want particularly to emphasize the fact that it is the persistence of this thought among our lower officers, chiefly though not exclusively in the Civil Affairs work, of which I am talking, and that I am far from making any protest or com


plaint. I can perhaps best describe the matter by saying that after the British took over the headship of the Allied Control Commission the American element in the administration was rather submerged, particularly in some of the lower echelons, to such an extent that our people had the feeling that the British were not as solicitous as we had been of the combined aspect of civil administration in Italy. ♦ ♦ ♦

Dill called me up yesterday and said that in response to an informal letter he had sent to Wilson, Wilson had replied that he had not understood how such a feeling could arise, inasmuch as he thought he had been very careful about this phase of Anglo-American co-operation, and pointed out that the governors of both Naples and Rome were Americans....

It may be that the difficulty arises wholly from oversensitiveness on the part of the Americans. The only important thing is that we have felt that we had sufficient evidence of an attitude of mind amongst the American officers to justify calling it to the attention of the theater.♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Devers to McCloy, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 2]

♦ ♦ ♦ I wish to assure you that real steps are being taken to put us on a much fairer basis than has been so in the past. . . . MacFarlane has always been a square shooter, has done a magnificent job, and we all have great confidence in him. On our side of the fence we are improving personnel, and have promoted our personnel according to their abilities and our allotments from the War Department. . . . Spofford [ACofS, G-5, AFHQ] assures me that everything is improving. Gen. Wilson has been most helpful and aggressive. He is very anxious that we keep an even balance in this theater and does everything to improve the conditions which he found when he came to the theater, namely that on the top level everything was fine, but on the lower levels with the younger officers, particularly on the American side, there was considerable complaint. ♦ ♦ ♦


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