Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds (♦) are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.
Washington or London?
In no war of American history were preparations for civil affairs as energetic as in World War II and yet in none was as long a time required for their completion. That more than two years elapsed before all the major national and combined control agencies had been established and their basic functions defined is partly explained by the fact that the civil affairs mission was of unprecedented scope. But the cause of the delay lay also in the novelty of the approach taken in important phases of the organizational problem. Firm decisions on this problem could not be made until issues more controversial than any of previous wars had been settled to the satisfaction of all whose jurisdiction was involved. Even preparations on the purely national level were enormously complicated, as has been seen, by the initial intention of departing from the tradition of exclusive Army control; only after primary responsibility had been entrusted to civilian agencies in French North Africa and, after long debate, the effort adjudged unsatisfactory could the Army begin to shape its organization to a task of known responsibilities.
This delay on the national level in turn tended to postpone the attempt to come to close quarters with the even more complicated problem of organizing civil affairs control on the combined level. Aside from the ad hoc and rather loose agencies required for the limited problems of civil affairs co-operation in French North Africa, combined machinery could not be established until the United States as well as Great Britain had created an agency to centralize its control of civil affairs both nationally and in international relations. The problem of combined organization also involved an inherent difficulty for, with the decision to dispense with the separate zones that had usually characterized international military government of the past, it became necessary to provide for reconciliation of national policies by creating tightly knit control organs on the highest level. The greatest difficulty of all came into view when it was discovered, as soon as discussions began, that Great Britain and the United States were approaching the problem of combined control from premises as divergent as those which had separated American military and civilian agencies on the question of national control. Thus a second great debate was necessary-one which if only because of international comity was conducted with more restraint than the first but with scarcely less strength of feeling. Once again the issue was the U.S. Army's share in control but in this case the Army was the sole representative of the nation.
With both governments desirous of instituting full collaboration as early as possible, it is evident that only a matter of such major moment as control could have protracted debate on the basic issues from March 1943 till the early part of 1944. Many minor differences in civil affairs
procedure existed and, in addition, a major divergence in administrative philosophy. These issues could probably have been compromised rather quickly if the organizational question alone had been involved. But the nature of combined control machinery would have an important bearing upon the major problem of Allied military government and in fact of all international collaboration-the problem of how to reconcile common with national interests. On the one hand, it was hoped that conflicting views of this problem would be reduced to a minimum if, instead of being left to take place haphazardly in every phase of operations, they were considered as early as possible by a high-level policy body whose familiarity with the basic facts of the civil affairs task as a whole would give the best promise of compromise. On the other hand, it was feared that if the combined body placed either partner in a position of advantage it would be able under the guise of compromise to shape civil affairs policy unduly in its own interest.
The hopes were greater than the fears because the two countries had common political values, including a common regard for equitable dealing on differences that required reconciliation. The caution evinced was prompted in large measure by the duty of every governmental agent to consult his apprehensions more than his hopes in representing his country's interest, but it rested also upon concrete experience in the initial phase of Anglo-American civil affairs relations. Thus all had not been harmonious in the family when the United States, which wanted to leave the French people free to determine eventually their own political destiny, at first favored excluding the de Gaullists from control in French North Africa despite earlier British support of General de Gaulle. Later, when planning for Sicily began, British authorities had argued that the paramountcy of their country's strategic interests in the Mediterranean entitled it to the senior role in military government rather than merely the equal partnership recommended by General Eisenhower. Continuing differences in point of view could be expected from the general background of the two partners on the one hand a country which, because its involvements in foreign power politics were occasional rather than constant, could afford to identify its primary interests with broad principles of international order; on the other hand a nation which, forced to consider short-range as well as long-range interests, tended to alternate unpredictably between pious international declarations and the position that until a better world was actually at hand some of the precautions of traditional power politics could not be safely dispensed with.
It may at first appear that each government could have expected adequate protection for its interests in the principle of concurrent decisions, which had been taken for granted in Anglo-American collaboration from the beginning. But this principle, while ensuring that each government would have freedom of action in any issue wherein agreement could not be reached, came really to very little because during military government in the theaters every major operational issue would have demanded eventually some sort of agreement whether for better or for worse. Thus the only meaningful protection of national interests would lie in ensuring that negotiations took place on terms of complete equality, and, since equality was theoretically already assured by the principle of concurrent decision, what was still needed may be designated as practical equality. This more tenuous kind of equality has probably been sought in every attempt at international organization but the record of the Anglo-American negotiations is of unique value to the student of
international relations in its clear indication of both the nature and the motivating force of the concept. Practical equality has to do with the relative degree of power or influence acquired by each partner in an enterprise through all the terms or circumstances under which it is conducted. It is not something which is specified in the charter of an international enterprise but an objective in the light of which the entire charter is drawn.
To illustrate the intricate calculus of practical equality as worked out by Americans, the site of the proposed combined committee was of major importance because government agents stationed in a foreign country are under the disadvantage of being away from their own principals and of being exposed, even if only unconsciously, to the subtle but powerful influences arising from the presence of high-level authorities of the other country as also of its entire body of technical experts. This consideration applied to the assumption that only a single combined committee would be created; if control were divided between a committee in Washington and a committee in London it would be important to note the distribution of functions lest the major areas of responsibility were assigned to the latter. But perhaps more important than anything-and pertinent even if civil affairs policy were entrusted to a single committee located in Washington-was the avoidance of any stipulation which would tend to obligate the committee to give special weight to the objectives of previous British planning, which especially in the British civilian economic agencies had gone much farther than that of their American counterparts.
The truth is that American civil affairs authorities did not start out with any hyper-nervous approach to Anglo-American relations but became cautious only after receiving British proposals which from the American point of view were almost wholly on the wrong tack. The British opened the discussion with a proposal to begin the transfer of the combined control of civil affairs to British and American civilian agencies at an early stage. This not only seemed to entail divided control in the theater before the theater commander could consider it safe but appeared also to give the British the advantage of being represented by civil affairs agencies which had achieved a far more elaborate organization than the American civilian agencies had as yet developed. As the discussions progressed further, London met American views on the duration of military responsibility and proposed a scheme of control which was, indeed, on an equal basis insofar as it envisaged one combined agency in Washington and another in London. But the committee in London, which was to be formed by adding American representatives to the Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) (AT(E) ), was to have jurisdiction over the European Theater, which, aside from Italy, comprised the most important areas of Europe. American misgivings became still greater when the British pressed the thesis that combined supply planning for northwest Europe should be based upon planning which had already been accomplished for that area by their own agencies. It was not difficult to presume the informed character of British planning but Americans could not overlook the fact that the premises of this planning were largely different from their own, especially in including in the military supply program categories of supplies which in the United States were the responsibility of civilian agencies.
Among American civilian as well as military authorities there was general agreement that these proposals would have the effect of entrenching British leadership and policy in civil affairs relations with the countries of northwest Europe, and there
were more than a few Americans who believed that the British had presented them with this aim in view. If the British had such an ambition it would not have been an unnatural one in view of their strong political interests in the adjacent European areas. But the fact remained that the United States had never consented to play the game under the rule of spheres of special influence, and such a rule seemed the less equitable because the huge civilian supply program would have to be sustained chiefly by American resources. It is true that the British position had in its favor administrative expediency- the advantage of so dividing civil affairs functions as to utilize as much as possible the greater proximity of London to the European governments in exile and the longer and fuller experience of British planners in respect to the problems of northwest Europe. But it seemed feasible to make adequate use of these British advantages only at the expense of carrying division of functions to the extreme of bifurcating the control of civil affairs policy making. American military leaders saw in the British proposal a revival of the same evil of divided control that they had finally succeeded in terminating in their relations with civilian agencies. They considered that the existence of two major civil affairs committees separated by the ocean would mean the artificial division of a problem that was essentially unitary, would result in duplication and waste of effort, and would entail the risk of impasse when the two committees pursued different policies on common problems. While in theory unified control would not completely satisfy the principle of equality-for one control organ could not be in two capitals-yet, realistically considered, the proper site of the senior civil affairs committee seemed to be dictated by the location of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Thus American authorities proposed a civil affairs committee situated in Washington, subordinated to the CCS and primarily military in its composition, and possessing general jurisdiction though assisted (as was added in a later recommendation) by a subcommittee for civilian supply. Both committees would be free either to accept or to reject the conclusions of previous British planning but the special facilities in London for detailed planning for the European Theater would be recognized by the addition of American representatives to the AT(E) Committee.
British formal acceptance of the American proposals for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee came only after months of negotiations so tortuous and finespun that a single article of the draft CCAC charter, such as that giving special rights with respect to liberated Pacific islands to whichever government enjoyed previous possession, might go through revision after revision until each party was satisfied that every punctilio of phrasing took proper care of its just interests. The selections from the documentary record of the negotiations reflect the inexhaustible patience and semantic ingenuity required of negotiators if a close international partnership is to get started. One learns also that however careful the preparations, the formal beginning of the partnership gives no assurance that it will continue if its charter compromises disagreements with such vague wording as to be subject to different interpretations. One can imagine the discouragement of American authorities when they learned, after an interval so short that the birth pains of CCAC were still fresh in memory, that they and the British had completely different ideas about what the newly created CCAC was.
The Americans believed that the CCAC was the senior combined civil affairs agency but the British, as they made clear in objecting to the American proposal to place the draft civil affairs agreement with
Norway before the CCAC, believed that it was merely the partner of a combined agency in London which had jurisdiction over civil affairs in the European Theater. Thus the issue of unified versus divided control had not been settled at all, and Americans in their struggle for maximum freedom of action had merely worked themselves into a trap unless they should now make their own interpretation of the agreement prevail. The American negotiators had not foreseen that, despite the absence of any express limitation upon the jurisdiction of CCAC, the acknowledgment of a role for the London committee would be interpreted as an implicit limitation upon the seniority of the former rather than as the assignment of a minor function to the latter. The British representatives in Washington had not foreshadowed such an interpretation, and probably the cause of the misunderstanding-a -confirmation of American fears on the separation of principals and agents-was that London took or came to take a different view of the CCAC charter from that of its representatives. Americans could argue that London's interpretation was farfetched but could not prove that it was wrong. With each side convinced that its own legal argument was correct and the other's the rationalization of a desire for seniority, it was impossible to avoid the spectacle of a partnership set up for the control of others turning into one in which there was passive resistance of each partner to the other. For several months neither the Washington committee nor the London committee could function because, pending settlement of the jurisdictional issue, the British withheld their co-operation in the former and the Americans their collaboration in the latter. At this stage, even though the impasse did not become publicly known, there were doubtless those on both sides who questioned the wisdom of having attempted so intimate a partnership.
How the Americans and British found their way out of this seeming impasse illustrates the necessity of persistent hope and effort in seeking international compromise. This is, to be sure, itself a business not without danger, and it has been a common assumption among Americans-though not among Europeans who have dealt with representatives of the United States-that American negotiators tend, out of either excessive kindness of heart or sheer naiveté, to give up much more than they obtain. The present case is of peculiar interest in that the principal responsibility in negotiation was carried by American military authorities who, because this was their first intensive experience in the international politics of civil affairs, might have been expected to err somewhat on the side of concession. Yet, however cordial their personal relations with their British colleagues, their intransigence in the issue ended only when it became possible to effect a settlement in which no major American objective was abandoned. But the art of successful compromise demands that one attempt to avoid the appearance of a victory for either side, and matters were so arranged that no substantial British interest or point of prestige was sacrificed. The United States, victorious in its claim as to the jurisdiction of CCAC, assented to the creation of a face-saving but scarcely very important subcommittee of CCAC in London (CCAC/L), and agreed to appoint military representatives to assist the European Advisory Commission, for which the British desired the broadest possible jurisdiction over surrender and posthostilities problems. In return the British recognized the seniority and general jurisdiction of CCAC in civil affairs during the period of military responsibility. This was, indeed, the American goal from
the beginning, but it is doubtful that the British would have acquiesced in it had they not finally come to feel that far from being incompatible with British interest the location of the major civil affairs agency in Washington could possibly even serve it. Nothing would be a greater obstacle to Great Britain in securing sympathetic American consideration of British requirements than any residual American isolationism, a characteristic of which had been the distrust of decisions arrived at in foreign capitals even though American representatives had participated in making them. There is evidence in any case of eventual British awareness of the greater understanding which could be expected of the American component of CCS if the problems and views of the combined civil affairs committee could be personally explained to them by its members. General Hilldring has stated that the crisis with the British ended when it became possible to point out face-to-face to their high-level representatives the practical advantages which location of the senior civil affairs committee in Washington would offer in relations with the CCS.1 This decided the question whether Washington or London should be the principal scene of the combined control machinery for civil affairs. Still open was the question whether Washington or London would achieve greater weight in the scales of civil affairs policy if, unfortunately, operations should prove to involve too many conflicts of national interests.
1. WASHINGTON AND LONDON COMPROMISE TO CREATE A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSE FORMATION OF A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE UNDER LEADERSHIP OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES
[Memo, Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 190/1), 11 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
1. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff welcome the basic principles underlying the proposals contained in CCS I9o 1 and regard this initiative as particularly opportune, since a considerable amount of work has lately been done in London on the problem of the provision of essential supplies for the local population in territories which may be liberated or conquered as a result of military operations. It is clearly very desirable that this work, should be pursued and developed on a fully combined basis.
3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will doubtless agree with the principle of an initial military period during which the responsibility for the conduct of all civilian affairs in the area concerned (including supplies, finances, etc.) must rest solely with the military authorities and that that this initial military period should be followed by a period during which an increasing degree of responsibility will be transferred-to appropriate civilian agencies.
4. It is appreciated that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) when created, may be called upon to carry out some of the functions with which this memorandum is concerned. As, however, a considerable time must necessarily elapse before that organization is fully operative, as the exact role and status of UNRRA have still to be worked out, and as some of the functions in question may in any case fall outside the scope of UNRRA, it is considered that immediate steps should be taken to harmonize the work already in progress in London with any similar
planning that may be in progress or in preparation in Washington.
5. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff therefore propose in regard to the problem of providing essential supplies for liberated or conquered territories:
(a) That the principle of an initial military period (as defined in paragraph 3 above) should be formally recognized and that full liaison should be established between the War Office Directorate of Civil Affairs in London and the Civil Affairs Section of the War Department in Washington by the appointment of special representatives of the latter to sit on the London Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee.2
(b) The co-ordination of planning of civilian supplies for the period subsequent to the period of initial military responsibility (see paragraph 3 above) should be conducted on a combined basis in Washington by the appointment of a Committee of representatives of the interested U.S. and U.K. agencies which would work in parallel with the appropriate Committee in London-at present the Shipping and Supply Subcommittee,3 on which the U.S. Government are represented. This Washington Committee should, it is suggested, be composed not only of representatives of the Combined Food Board, Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Raw Materials Board and Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the appropriate U.S. and U.K. civil agencies, but also of representatives of the War and Navy Departments. Its secretariat should include representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff secretariat.4 ♦ ♦ ♦
If the foregoing principles are accepted, it is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should address a letter to the Secretary of State in the sense of the attached draft, asking him in consultation with the British Embassy to arrange for the organization of the Committee referred to in paragraph 5(b) above.
U.S. JOINT CHIEFS PROPOSE A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE UNDER LEADERSHIP
OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES
[JCS 250/4, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 19 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
2. C. . . . Both British and the United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the principle of an initial military period during which the responsibility for the conduct of all civilian affairs in occupied areas (including supplies, finances, etc.) must rest solely with the military authorities. Both United States and British Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that upon the termination of the period of military occupation responsibility of all phases of local government will be returned either to a liberated local government or some form of territorial government, and at such time the matter ceases to be of concern to the military. This leaves only the period between the initial military operation and the termination of the military occupation and government where the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . and those of the British are somewhat at variance.
d. During this transitory period the plan proposed under CCS 190/1 would establish a Combined Committee of Boards, governmental agencies, and War and Navy Departments in Washington and in London under leadership of the Department of State and Foreign Office as the controlling and administrative body for the civilian affairs of occupied enemy and liberated areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not favor this procedure because it would result in a dual chain of command and require the Theater Commander in his role of military governor to report to two Chiefs. It would result in the participation in the administration of occupied areas of civilian agencies or representatives of civilian agencies having two loyalties: the first and greatest to the particular governmental department or agency by whom they are employed and, second, to the military governor or Theater Commander by virtue of his local position. It would be apt to lead to the establishment of a civilian Economic Board or shadow government in the local area in parallel to and duplicating the functions of the divisions of the established military government.5 ♦ ♦ ♦
a. That the planning, co-ordination and administration of civil affairs in occupied enemy or liberated areas be conducted in a combined operation in accordance with the general policies stated
in the letter included herewith as Appendix "A" [JCS 250, in Chapter III, Section 3]
b. That this general policy of the joint Chiefs of Staff be implemented for combined operations by the immediate designation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the co-chairmanship of United States and British military representatives consisting of representatives of the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff with authority to consult with such United States and British governmental departments, agencies and combined boards as may be necessary (CCS 190/2).
c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the medium of its Combined Civil Affairs Committee have primary responsibility for the planning and administration of civil affairs in areas occupied as a result of combined operations, including the co-ordination of the activities of the United States and United Kingdom civilian agencies, and the issuance of all directives to the Commanders in Chief in the field.
d. That a letter be addressed to the President and the Prime Minister requesting their concurrence in the recommendations set forth above.
BRITISH CONSENT TO JCS PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT CERTAIN BRITISH INTERESTS
[Paraphrase of Msg (84391), War Office to British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) in Washington, 28 May 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
2. We are ... in agreement that the War Department should in consultation with you proceed with a redraft of their paper for the CCS [CCS 190/1 above] on the basis that we accept a Washington Combined Civil Affairs Committee. There are a number of points which we require you to cover when negotiating the redraft of this paper with the War Department and in discussions later at the CCS. You are instructed to obtain express agreement in two of these points as a condition of our accepting the American proposal. These two points are elaborated in paragraphs 4 and 5 below. You have authority to agree the exact form of words with which to secure the satisfactory safeguarding of these provisos. ♦ ♦ ♦
4. Our first proviso covers the question of British territories under enemy occupation, such as Burma, Malaya, Channel Islands and other Far Eastern and Pacific territories, including those such as New Guinea the government of which is an Australian responsibility. The interests of New Zealand might possibly be affected also. Future developments may result in the CCS controlling combined operations in countries which are at present included in areas where the responsibility is purely British under the control of the British Chiefs of Staff. The corollary of the proposal which the Americans have made would be that the Washington Committee would handle all civil affairs questions which might arise out of the combined operations referred to above, but obviously in enemy occupied British territories His Majesty's Governments in the U.K. and Dominions have special interest and responsibilities just as the U.S. Government has in U.S. enemy occupied territories like the Philippines. Accordingly, we require you to obtain express acceptance from the Americans of the principle that final decisions on all civil affairs matters must lie with His Majesty's Government in the U.K. or in the Dominions in the case of enemy occupied British territories, with similar provision for the U.S. Government and U.S. enemy occupied territories.
5. Our second proviso is that we want the existing A.T.(E) London Committee to be expanded into a fully combined committee with strong U.S. representation which must be fully authorized to speak for the U.S. 6 Government." The Committee could, if desired, have a combined secretariat. U.S. representation on this committee would include State Department, Service Departments, and any other representatives the Americans may desire. It is difficult to emphasize too much the important nature of this proviso. At the present the U.S. representatives are hardly better than observers. Thus, even on minor points on which disagreement is most unlikely, it is impossible for us to feel that the War Department are in agreement or even advised of our decisions. For your information, we have been advised by the U.S. representatives that, in spite of the fact that we have at their request given them copies of A.T.(E) papers for transmission to the War Department, none has yet been sent. We must rectify this situation; otherwise the Washington Committee will be burdened with a mass of detail which you and the War Department deprecate, and the final result would be the worst form of remote control. 7
In addition we have in London the Allied Governments in whose countries future operations will take place based on the U.K. and it is essential that detailed consultation should be carried on with them on questions of liaison officers, jurisdiction, knowledge of local conditions and of administration, etc. It is also fair to say that there is in London a mass of information and a body of experience which are elsewhere unobtainable. If the A.T.(E) Committee becomes fully combined it will make possible a thorough and efficient use of these factors. 8 ♦ ♦ ♦
CAD RECOMMENDS QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH CONDITIONS FOR A CCS COMMITTEE
[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 1 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. I ]
1. The War Department and the British Joint Staff Mission are considering a proposal for the establishment of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the planning, co-ordination and administration of Civil Affairs in occupied areas.
2. The British Joint Staff Mission advise that the War Department proposal will be accepted provided (a) that a representative of the United States Government be designated to act as a member of the London A.T.(E) Committee with authority to speak for the United States and (b) that the United States or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, will control any decisions on Civil Affairs which are made with respect to any enemy occupied territories of the respective governments, such as Burma and the Philippines....
3. a. Although it does not appear to be desirable to have the War Department recognize and be a part of any agreements which are made by the War Office Committee, it does seem desirable to designate an officer to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) Committee with authority:
(1) To negotiate for the United States with respect to Civil Affairs matters
in the European Theater.
(2) To transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other American theaters of operations.
b. The State Department concurs.
4. There does not appear to be any objection to the condition that final decisions on civil affairs matters in occupied territories of either the United States or Great Britain be the primary responsibility of the Government with the primary interest. The State Department concurs.
II. Action Recommended
The Secretary of War directs:
a. That the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, designate an officer from his staff to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) London Committee, with authority to negotiate with respect to the planning of civil affairs in areas in the European Theater which are presently subject to enemy occupation, and to transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other American theaters of operation.
b. That the proposal of the British Government as to the control of decisions on civil affairs in enemy occupied territories of the United Kingdom and United States be accepted.
CAD PLAN FOR A COMBINED COMMITTEE LARGELY SOLVES DIFFICULT PROBLEM
[Min, 97th Mtg CCS, 4 Jun 43, ABC files, 334, CCS Min (1-23-43), sec. 4]
Sir John Dill [Br Representative, CCS] said that it seemed that the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had gone a long way in solving a difficult problem. He thought it possible to approve in principle the recommendations of the paper, subject to a few minor drafting alterations, one of which dealt with the important subject of U.S. representation on the A.T.(E) Committee in London.
General Hilldring explained that the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had achieved complete understanding with the U.S. Civil Agencies concerned. 9 The British Government had for some time been operating a most successful system of military government. The War Department had now set up a comparable organization. The proposals set out in the paper aimed at bridging the gap between the U.S. and British organizations, by setting up a Combined Civil Affairs Committee responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This would, in fact, legitimize an existing arrangement since the HUSKY
directive had been negotiated by an unofficial combined committee composed of members of the War and Navy Departments, State Department, Treasury, the British Embassy and the British Army Staff. The Civil Affairs Division had established a mechanism of linking in to their organization the interested U.S. Civil Agencies, such as the State Department, Treasury, Board of Economic Warfare, O.S.S. and Governor Lehman's organization. It was now hoped to use the British and U.S. organizations. ♦ ♦ ♦
PRESIDENT WANTS THE NEW COMMITTEE SET UP PROMPTLY
[Draft of Note from Roosevelt to Leahy, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
I have considered the arrangement whereby the Combined Civil Affairs Committee is to act as the planning and co-ordinating group for Military Government under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and have approved it. I understand it meets with the approval of the State Department and has been drawn up with the intention of meeting the expressed views of the British to whom it has not been officially submitted. I feel it should be instituted as promptly as possible.10
BUT A MOOT PARAGRAPH IS DESTINED TO KEEP THE COMMITTEE FROM FUNCTIONING
[Par. 6 of the Proposed Charter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCS 190/4), 12 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
Where an enemy-occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom, or one of the Dominions is recovered as a result of an operation by forces of either the United States, United Kingdom or one of the Dominions, acting alone or on a combined basis, final decision with regard to civil affairs policies to be followed in the area after the capture will be determined by the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory.11
THE AMERICANS REWRITE PARAGRAPH 6 TO PROTECT THEIR MILITARY COMMANDER'S
FREEDOM OF ACTION
[Min, 98th Mtg CCS, 18 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]
General Hilldring explained that there was a difference in substance between the U.S. and British proposals with regard to the wording of paragraph 6. Briefly, the point at issue was whether the military commander, if British and occupying U.S. territory, or vice versa, must accept the views on civil affairs of the government originally owning the territory immediately it was liberated; or whether he should plan his civil affairs in the light of the situation at the time of the occupation. In his own view the primary interest of the commander concerned must be to rid the area of the enemy and to achieve this most easily he should have no over-all restrictions with regard to civil affairs imposed on him....
THE CCS TENTATIVELY APPROVES CHARTER OF A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
[Charter of the CCAC (CCS 190/6/D) 3 Jul 43, Approved by CCS 25 Jun 43 with proviso that par. 6 was subject to revision, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]
1. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee (C.C.A.C.) is hereby established in Washington as an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee will consist of: One representative each of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, two representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission, and two additional civilian members, one of whom shall be designated by the United States and the other by the United Kingdom.
3. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall with respect to enemy or enemy-held areas occupied or to be occupied as a result of combined (U.S.-U.K.) operations:
a. Recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff general policies which should be adopted for civil affairs, including supply and related matters;
b. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the broad civil
affairs planning and the direction in Washington of civil affairs problems presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by theater commanders; and
c. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the co-ordination of the British and American military and naval establishments with the appropriate civilian departments and agencies of the respective governments which are concerned with civil affairs matters.
4. a. Complete plans for a military operation must anticipate the problems which will be presented by local populations. Planning and administration of civil affairs are an integral part of military operations and cannot be separated.
b. The administration of civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate civilian departments and agencies just as soon as the military situation permits. This may be accomplished gradually, even though the area is still the subject of military control. The decision as to when and to what extent civilian departments and agencies will assist the military in the administration of civil affairs will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation of the military commander in the area. Generally, responsibility for the handling of civil affairs should be relinquished by the military as quickly as this can be accomplished without interference with the military purposes of the occupation.12
5. At the present time there is established in London an Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee which is engaged in advance planning for civil affairs in areas which are occupied by the enemy. The Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S.A., has been authorized to designate an officer from his staff to serve on the London Committee with authority (a) to negotiate for the United States with regard to the planning of civil affairs in the European Theater, U.S.A., (b) to transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other theaters of operation and (c) to transmit to the Committee the views of the War Department, co-ordinated, where necessary, with those of other United States Departments and agencies. [See sec. 5 for revision of 29 Jan 1944]
Reoccupation of U.S. or U.K. Territory
6. a. Combined Operations
Where an enemy occupied territory of the United States the United Kingdom or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or otherwise, the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory may prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies desired for the handling of civil affairs. So much of this outline will be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as they determine, upon the recommendation of the force commander concerned, will not interfere with the military purposes of the operation.
b. Other Operations
For use in other than combined operations in enemy occupied territories of the U.S., the U.K. or one of the Dominions, the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory may prepare and submit through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies desired for the handling of civil affairs. This outline will be accepted by the Chiefs of Staff (U.S. or U.K.), unless it will interfere with the military purposes of the operation, in which case reference will be made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a decision.13
THE DEBATE IS STILL NOT ENDED: THE BRITISH AMEND PARAGRAPH 6
[Par. 6, CCS 190/7, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]
"When an enemy occupied territory of the U. States, U. Kingdom, or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or otherwise the directive to be given to the Force Commander concerned will include policies to be followed in handling of Civil Affairs as formulated by the Government which exercised authority over the territory before ene-
my occupation. If the Chiefs of Staff or Force Commander consider that such civil affairs policies will impede or are impeding military purposes of the operation the matter will be referred to aforesaid Government with recommendations."
3rd July 1943
Above is reply from London (Colonial Office) in commenting on P6 as approved by CCS 99th Mtg.
TWH [Col. Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., sec., CAD ]
AMERICANS AMEND BRITISH AMENDMENT
[Min, 117th Mtg CCS, 3 Sep 43, CAD files, 092 (3-2243) sec. 2]
General Marshall suggested that the word "military" should be inserted before the word "directive" in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee contained in CCS 190/7. He explained that this word was in order to ensure that directives to the theater commanders should be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels....
PARAGRAPH ON REOCCUPATION OF U.S. AND BRITISH TERRITORIES AS FINALLY ACCEPTED
[Rev par. 6, Charter of CCAC (190/8/D), 1 Oct 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]
6. When an enemy occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as the result of an operation combined or otherwise, the military directive to be given the Force Commander concerned will include the policies to be followed in the handling of civil affairs as formulated by the government which exercised authority over the territory before enemy occupation. If paramount military requirements as determined by Force Commander necessitate a departure from those policies he will take action and report through the Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.14
2. LONDON SUPPORTS A RIVAL OF THE WASHINGTON CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
BRITISH CLAIM THAT A LONDON AND NOT THE WASHINGTON COMMITTEE SHOULD PLAN FOR
[Memo by Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 274/1), 10 Jul 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1) ]
We are concerned over the question of procedure in this matter. The situation regarding this paper is that it was prepared in London at AT(E) Committee, has been considered by the British Chiefs of Staff and approved by them, and now has been brought over here by a representative of [Lt.] General [Jacob L.] Devers [CG ETOUSA ] for necessary approval by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. 15
In accordance with the charter in CCS 190/6/D, paragraph 5 [sec. 1, this chapter], it is the London "ATE" Committee which engages in advance planning for civil affairs in the European Theater, in close touch with U.S. representatives. We feel, therefore, that this paper, after consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, should be referred to the London Committee and not to the CCAC, Washington, and that the American representatives in London should be fully briefed to negotiate.16
U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF MAINTAIN CCAC HAS GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER ETO
[CCS 274/2, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 13 Jul 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]
1. In C.C.S. 274/1, the British Chiefs of Staff raise two questions:
a. General procedure to be followed regarding Civil Affairs matters handled
by the AT(E) Committee in London and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in
b. Immediate procedure to be followed in handling C.C.S. 274, the projected Norwegian-British agreements.
2. With reference to paragraph 1a above:
Paragraph 5 of the Charter (C.C.S. 190/6/D) contemplates that, in the main, advance planning with respect to the European Theater of operations (U.S.) will probably be carried on by the AT(E) Committee in London. However, there is nothing in that paragraph, nor in paragraph 3 (establishing the Civil Affairs Committee), which restricts the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff nor of its Combined Civil Affairs Committee with respect to civil affairs matters in the European Theater of operations to the extent that the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to influence the course of that planning. 3. With respect to Ib above:
a. The Norwegian agreement is a most important international document. It was prepared between Great Britain and the Norwegian Government-in-Exile without participation by the United States and without prior commitment by the United States. This document has been submitted by the British War Office to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the agreements reached by the British are acceptable to the United States in the event that U.S. troops participate in the liberation of Norway.
b. The joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff have examined the agreement and found it acceptable with several minor exceptions. However, before reaching final agreement, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to assure themselves that the exceptions they have made are acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.
c. In view of the fact that the document and the deliberations concerning it are now centered in Washington, and since the Civil Affairs Charter obviously permits such action, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire that their attitude, with respect to the British-Norwegian agreement, be referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and recommendation. ♦ ♦ ♦
CAD BELIEVES U.S. SHOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWING FROM THE LONDON COMMITTEE
[Memo, Hilldring for Barker, DCofS, COSSAC, 13 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, AT(E) Comm. (1) London (2-27-43)]
2. I believe there is no longer any real function to be performed by the AT(E) Committee with regard to the military phases of civil affairs. Consideration should be given for the withdrawal of Colonel Ryan's membership in it, if General Devers and you consider such a move to be politically expedient.17
U.K. AND U.S. DISAGREE ON WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER NORWEGIAN AGREEMENT
[Memo, Wing Comdr T. E. H. Birley, Br Member CCAC Secretariat for Col Thomas Hammond, U.S. Member, 24 Sep 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43) (1) ]
... I think the correct procedure would be for the agreed London paper to be forwarded from the CCAC Secretariat to the CCS with the statement that it has been agreed by the AT(E) Committee in London, and has been cleared by the British and US authorities concerned. It should not be brought up at the CCAC meeting but I think that as a matter of procedure the document should be forwarded to CCS through CCAC....
[Memo, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, for U.S. Secy, CCS, 5 Oct 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1) ]
2. As a result of completing the discussions in London the present paper (CCS 274/4) is now being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval.
3. As the paper will be considered at today's meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to suggest that they recommend that the document be referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for comment. This will be consistent with the intended procedure to be followed in the case of not only the Norwegian Agreement but all subsequent similar agreements which will be concluded with governments-in-exile.
4. One important reason for referring the matter to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee is that the State Department can thus comment officially on the contents for the first time, which is most essential as the US Government will undoubtedly desire to conclude a similar separate agreement with the Norwegian Government. The State Department was not officially represented during the London discussions.
[Memo, Hilldring for COB, 4 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-3-43), sec. 1 ]
2. At a recent meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, the U.S. members presented for consideration a draft of a directive for the administration of civil affairs in France during the period of military necessity. . . . [Discussions on a directive and decision reached will be found below, in Chapter XXII, Sections 3-5.]
3. The British view appears to be that the War Office AT(E) Committee in London, which derives no authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should have jurisdiction to determine policy and to make broad plans for the administration of civil affairs in combined operations, particularly as to operations based on the United Kingdom. The AT(E) Committee has no independent jurisdiction to formulate policies on the administration of civil affairs on parallel with, or to the exclusion of, the Combined Chiefs of Staff or their Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
4. The U.S. members of the Committee are clear that since civil affairs are an inseparable part of military operations, broad plans and policies must be established for all combined operations by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting on the recommendation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. This procedure has been followed, with the concurrence of the British, for operations based on Algiers [ MTO ]. It is consistent with the charter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and the purpose for which it was established.
5. If a decision should be made on a political level to transfer jurisdiction over these problems to a British Committee which has been operating in close collaboration with the exiled governments, the War Department and the agencies of this government which have an interest in the political and economic phases of civil affairs may be placed in the position of having to accept policy decisions on military and post military issues which have already been reached by the British through this Committee.
CCAC UNABLE TO RESOLVE DISAGREEMENT
[Memo, CAD, CCAC 33, 15 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1 ]
I. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, at their I22d meeting held on 8 October .1943, agreed that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be directed to make recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the procedure to be followed with respect to future papers of this nature (Norwegian Agreement)... .
6. a. Basic papers relating to civil affairs in combined operations based on the United Kingdom dealing with law, order and security be submitted to the CCS for final action through either the British or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CCS may, at their discretion, refer any such directive to their established agency for recommendation prior to final action.
b. With respect to planning or operations under the broad directives mentioned in paragraph 6a above it shall be normal procedure to refer these questions to the War Department for action of the U.S. interested departments and agencies.
c. This arrangement is applicable only to combined operations based on the U.K.
[Min, 14th Mtg CCAC, 16 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43) , sec. 1 ]
2. Procedure for Civil Affairs in operations based on the United Kingdom (CCAC 33) Mr. McCloy stated . . . that CCAC 33 contains a suggested procedure to be followed with respect to papers similar to the Norwegian Agreement.
After considerable discussion,
a. Took note that the British members would convey the views of the U.S. members to London, where discussions on the subject matter of the paper were already in progress.
b. Agreed to postpone action on the paper until such time as the British members had received a reply.
THE DISAGREEMENT HAVING A STULTIFYING EFFECT ON BOTH CCAC AND COSSAC
[Ltr, Barker, DCOSSAC, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 23 Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)]
... things require a great deal of clarification with regard to our relationship with the British agencies. . . . The difficulties arise through our relationship with the War Office and its related establishments, including the AT(E) which, unhappily, is not as defunct as we had thought it was.
... As you know, there has always been a considerable degree of resentment in the War Office because we declined to participate in AT(E)'s activities. I was informed yesterday that there is a disinclination on the British part to participate in Civil Affairs matters through the agency of the CCAC.
The last named disinclination stems, apparently, from two causes:
a. The aforementioned resentment about our nonparticipation in AT(E);
b. A desire, and this is very marked, to have all Civil Affairs matters pertaining to COSSAC transferred from the Washington CCAC to a similar body here in London.
All this tends to have a stultifying effect on Civil Affairs in COSSAC. For example, Major General Sir Roger Lumley, head of the British side of Civil Affairs in COSSAC, has been instructed by the War Office that he is not to be party to any transactions as between COSSAC and the CCAC. ♦ ♦ ♦
3. AMERICANS FEAR BRITISH DOMINATION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY FOR EUROPEAN THEATER
BRITISH PREFER To DIVIDE SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY ACCORDING TO AREA OF PRIMARY
[Ltr, Sir Robert J. Sinclair, Ministry of Production, to Sir Frederick C. Bovenschen, USW (Br), 5 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-86]
... the responsibility as regards territory should be divided as between U.K. and U.S., preferably according to agreed areas of strategic responsibility or, if not on that basis, on such other basis as might be determined 18 ♦ ♦ ♦
NEED FOR BRITISH-AMERICAN CO-ORDINATION OF SUPPLY Is RECOGNIZED IN PLANNING
[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 10 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM OUT 4110]
... In view of previous cables on this subject ... it is evident that a definitive procedure to handle all categories civilian supply for AMGOT must be established on a combined basis and clearly understood to avoid duplication of bidding here and in U.K. In view of urgency HUSKY Operation and without prejudice to future arrangements between U.S. and U.K. Governments and decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS took note at 8oth meeting that War Department would expedite planning and necessary co-ordination with British with regard to supply of civilian population and administration civil affairs necessary immediately upon occupation enemy territory HUSKYLAND.
Therefore Allied Forces Headquarters should submit promptly to CCS for War Department its estimate even if tentative of total AMGOT civilian needs by item quantity, priority desired, destination, and markings in 15 day cycles from
D Day to D plus 90 including medical and sanitary supplies and barter goods required to supplement local supplies and production. Upon receipt and consideration your requirements by War Department source of supply as between U.S. and U.K. will be discussed with appropriate U.S. and U.K. authorities and requirements which U.K. is unable to supply which we assume to be the majority will be filled by War Department. In connection with requirements, studies being made by War Department which should enable us to make suggestions which may be helpful. ♦ ♦ ♦
BRITISH PROPOSE DRAWING SOME FOOD SUPPLIES FROM U.S. IN PREPARING FOR SUPPLY
REQUIREMENTS OF NORTHWEST EUROPE
[Msg, Br Ministry of Food to Br Food Mission to the United States, 8 May 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS83]
... Minister has approved following proposals:
a. To import immediately for arrival before end June so far as possible 130,000 tons of flour from North America over and above present programme of flour shipments.
b. To place orders immediately in North America for 180,000 tons of flour with intention of having it ready for immediate shipment when offensive begins.
c. To ship from North America immediately offensive begins wheat at the rate of 20,000 tons per month or 120,000 tons in all being balance of War Office requirements for the 6 months.19
BRITISH SUPPLY PROPOSAL AROUSES SUSPICIONS
[Memo, Arthur B. Van Buskirk, OLLA, for Stettinius, Dir, OLLA, 26 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]
(4) In our opinion, the United States should not agree to the British proposal. In the first place, if there is to be any stockpiling in the United States of American supplies for reoccupied areas these should be under the control of the United States Government in the same way that we control munitions or other war supplies....
The British should not be allowed to become intermediaries between the United States and the reoccupied territories. The supply arrangements for United States products should be direct with the territory concerned and the United States should be free to make its own arrangements, if it desires, with the country concerned as is done in North Africa....
UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BRITISH DETERMINATION OF U.S. RELIEF RESPONSIBILITIES
[Min, Conf in Office of Wright, Dir, ID, 27 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]
Dunn of State Department says that State does not propose to recognize any relief requirements unless they have been approved by the Army. The worry of State is that London might otherwise become the final arena of requirements, even though the Combined Chiefs are in Washington. To date, Leith-Ross Committee 20. and AT(E) Committee have, consequently, not been recognized by State, just as they have not been recognized by War.
General Wright. It seems clear that determination of U.S. relief requirements should be made, for the military period of supply, the responsibility of the U.S. Army, and that the place for determining over-all military requirements should be in Washington, under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. .. .
GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT BE ALLOWED To STOCKPILE CIVILIAN SUPPLIES DRAWN FROM
[Ltr, Wright to Birley, BJSM, 15 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]
With respect to your specific inquiry as to flour, we believe that the stockpiling of supplies against requirements for civil population of occupied areas is a proper responsibility of this government in all cases where the supplies are to be drawn from U.S. resources.
The above has been discussed with and approved by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, Governor Lehman, and the Food Administration for War, who concur in this letter.
BRITISH ASK AMERICAN UNDERWRITING OF THEIR SUPPLY PLANS FOR EUROPE
[Memo, ID on Staff Mtg, 5 Jul 43, to Discuss Proposals of Lt Col Mocatta, Br Sup Representative,21 ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]
Mocatta's position was summarized as follows: a. U.S. and U.K. would agree on total requirements for areas.
b. U.K. would furnish supplies regardless of source as it chooses and would come to U.S. for balance to supplement such supplies. All relief for Continent would presumably be based on U.K.
c. This leaves initiative wholly in U.K. hands. Further complications are:
(1) Starts U.S. Army furnishing U.K. military with food, etc., which at present it does not do.
(2) Involves allocation machinery with existing combined boards which in turn confuses military responsibility with nonmilitary agencies.22
(3) Commits us to AT(E) estimates (calories, etc.). . . .
U.S. TO REJECT ENTANGLEMENT IN BRITISH SUPPLY PROCEDURE
[Memo, Wright for Dir of Materiel, ASF, 13 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jan-Jul 43] 23
4. The U.K. has advised the War Department that its basic interest is assurance that:
(a) Supply requirements shall be reviewed by the appropriate combined boards, and
(b) That the U.S. will furnish the supplies not available from U.K. sources.
5. As you know, the U.S. has not participated in the A.T.E. proceedings except as observers.
Actual operational planning is now being undertaken at COSSAC headquarters in London in which the U.S. will fully participate. Consequently, the War Department should not agree except on the recommendations of E.T.O. as to the details of supplies to be furnished beyond food, medical supplies and fuel, but should agree only to the basic principle that minimum essential supplies shall be furnished.
6. As to supply procedure, the method proposed by the U.K. contemplates that after requirements are agreed in the Theater, the U.K. will designate which items they can supply from U.K. sources, and will ask our support for U.K. acquisitions in this country of the unfilled balance.
7. It seems more appropriate to have the U.S. Theater Commander present to the War Department requirements to be drawn from U.S. sources along with his recommendations. The War Department would then procure all U.S. supplies necessary for the combined operation, and forward them to the U.S. Theater Commander to be made available by him for joint use as he deems necessary. This procedure should meet the basic problems of the U.K. outlined in paragraph 4 above, and yet avoid the possible repercussions of having the U.S. turn its supplies over to the U.K. for relief purposes except as the final need is determined. In considering this aspect of the problem it should be realized that supplies for civilian populations, if furnished as suggested by the U.K., would in due course come under Lend-Lease.
8. On the basis of the foregoing it is recommended that:
(a) The U.K. be advised that requirements for relief of civilians will be accepted only on basis of recommendation of U.S. Theater Commander.
(b) Supplies to be furnished from the U.S. will be furnished through our Theater Commander on his requisition.
(c) Such supplies will, as appropriate, be available for joint use, in the discretion of the U.S. Theater Commander.
4. CREATION OF A COMBINED SUPPLY COMMITTEE AND RECONCILIATION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUPPLY POLICIES
THE ISSUE BEFORE US
[Notes by Maj Palmer, Civ Sup Branch, on Discussions of WD Supply Authorities at Mtg of 31 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]
3. U.S. must decide to conduct relief as a sole or joint operation, as the case is to be. Present indications are that U.S. favors combined action and U.K. is dragging feet on it....
THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION FAVORS AMERICAN SENIORITY IN COMBINED PLANNING
[Memo, Wright for Chief, CAD, Jun 43, ASF, ID, files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. I]
As to matters of supply it seems clear to me that the War Department should be designated as the executive agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Theater Commander during the period of military occupation. Within the War Department the supply responsibility would then be ultimately discharged by the Army Service Forces with the concurrence of your office. ♦ ♦ ♦
... Mechanically the plan would work out as follows
a. As to Planning
The Army Service Forces, with your concurrence and after consultation with the B.A.S. [British Army Staff], will recommend the basic provisions to be made for each potential area of occupation, subject, in the event of disagreement, to review by the Combined Committee. Similarly, after consultation with the British Army Staff, a recommendation will be made as to the sources of supply for such requirements. As a result of the foregoing there will be established appropriate procurement objectives for the Army Supply Program to provide the necessary Army stores to fulfill civil requirements to be drawn from United States resources. In the case of a particular operation the Army Service Forces will, again in consultation with the British Army Staff, recommend the supply requirements, the sources and the method of operation for final adoption by the Combined Board. ♦ ♦ ♦
SUPPORT IN CAD FOR COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP
[Memo, Lt Col J. H. Hynes, Chief, Civ Relief Branch, CAD, for Chief, CAD, 24 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, CCAC (6-12-43) (1)]
I.... It is obvious that joint Anglo-American planning, procurement and stockpiling is essential if duplication and inefficiency are to be avoided. ♦ ♦ ♦
2. . . . the British viewpoint in the matter appears to be in substantial agreement with conclusions previously reached by the Civilian Relief Branch....
4. In order to facilitate the co-ordination of British-American estimates of requirements the [British] memorandum proposes that agreement be reached on the standardization of time periods and uniformity of terminology.
7. In regard to the above proposals, the following observations are made:
a. The principle of combined planning in combined operations in the strategic sphere was fully accepted with the establishment of CCS. It is no less important that the same principle of co-equal partnership be accepted and implemented in the sphere of civil affairs....
b. The six months military period has the advantage of insuring against under-procurement of supply requirements. In the event of over-procurement, supplies thereby released would be available for future operations, or could be turned over to the civilian agencies in the succeeding civilian phase.
c. If the principle of co-partnership in combined civil affairs is accepted, the War Department and the War Office should, as a natural corollary, prepare and submit joint requirements and procurements schedules to the appropriate combined boards.
d. The proposal that responsibility for supply planning and procurement should be delegated by the proposed Combined Civil Affairs Committee to a Supply Subcommittee would provide the necessary machinery to deal with these important questions. It would not appear necessary however to include in the Subcommittee all the elements represented on the main CCAC. It is suggested that membership in the case of planning and procurement for the military period should be confined to representatives of the U.K. and U.S. Armed Forces....
ANGLO-AMERICAN SUPPLY SUBCOMMITTEE-A COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP-CREATED
[CCAC 9/1/D, 9 Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-95]
I. The Supply Subcommittee is hereby established as an agency of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
2. The Supply Subcommittee will consist of: a. One U.S. Army Officer b. One U.S. Navy Officer c. One British Military or Naval member d. One British civilian member e. One U.S. and one British Secretary. 24
3. The Supply Subcommittee shall:
a. Study and make recommendations on supply matters referred to it by the combined Civil Affairs Committee.
b. Review for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and advise them in regard to action to be taken on recommendations of other agencies referred to it by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
4. The Supply Subcommittee shall:
a. Establish its own method of procedure.
b. Form such working groups as are necessary to assist it in the performance of its duties.
c. Consult formally or informally with such U.S. and British authorities in Washington as necessary to be sure that supply matters under its cognizance are adequately co-ordinated.
d. The U.S. members of the Subcommittee will be responsible for maintaining close liaison with the interested U.S. civilian supply agencies on all matters which are of concern to them.
AMERICANS ASK BRITISH TO SEPARATE MILITARY FROM CIVILIAN AGENCY
[Msg, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Quebec Conf, to Brig Gen Walter A. Wood, Dir of Requirements, ASF, 18 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, BOSCO-IN 113]
... Our policy is at variance with proposed British policy in which A.T.E. apparently combined the military requirements with the type of requirements computed by Governor Lehman's office. We have asked the British to separate essential military from their requirements so that we may reach an agreement. We feel strongly that the War Department using military priorities for procurement must limit its procurement to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary
supplies and fuel essential to military operations at variance from a more generous relief standard or from rehabilitation measures.
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A COMBINED SUPPLY PROGRAM AGREED UPON BY CCS
[CCS 324/1, Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories, 2z Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-98] 25
5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas that must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following principles:
a. The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the provision of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and petroleum products), and other agreed articles considered essential to military operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the same whether supplied by United States or United Kingdom.
b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount.
c. A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States.
d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country procuring the supplies.
e. In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of civil populations in reoccupied countries, maximum use will be made of supplies, stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries. Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within any particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for such commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to fill the requirements of other reoccupied countries.
f. The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is anticipated may be reoccupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
g. It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the occupation of Italy, the United
Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal to Italy each month if the Italian stock position and the need require it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further negotiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, the United States will make available the equivalent of two ships each month for the purpose of supplying the Italian civilian population with the essential dry cargo imports other than coal if the need requires it. Should it be agreed that essential civilian requirements exceed the capacity set forth above additional shipping will be provided as may be agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the provision that Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated.
CONTENT OF THE BASIC RATION IS STILL UNSETTLED
[Min, Remarks of Col G. A. Rickards, Br member at Mtg of CCAC Sup Subcomm., 28 Sep 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-108]
2. Italian Requirements
A. C.C.A.C. (S) 1/3
b. Colonel Rickards [British member] .. . stated . . . that the following appeared to constitute the present status of agreement and disagreement between the US and UK: (I) Both U.S. and U.K. were agreed on the six-month period of military responsibility and the desirability of achieving a 2,000 calorie level of food relief.
(2) U.K. differed with U.S. on the composition of items required as a military necessity to achieve 2,000 calories, the U.K. feeling strongly that fats, meats, and sugar should be added, with a corresponding reduction in cheese, pulses, and soup, and that coffee was not to be regarded as a luxury item.
(3) U.K. regarded provisions to be made for relief rather as a supplement to locally available supplies so as to raise the level of consumption in any given area to one of 2,000 calories, than as a standard ration.
c. General Wright, referring to paragraph, CCS 324/1 [above] indicated that he felt that the Committee was obligated under that directive to agree on a basic ration, which, however, did not preclude consideration of further items to be added to or substituted for the ration proposed by the U.S.
d. Colonel Rickards urged that the U.S. study with care the Sinclair-Young estimates, 26 which, he assured the Committee, had been prepared with extreme pains as to accuracy and which should be accepted as setting forth the scale on which the U.K. felt all liberated areas should be fed during the first six months. He added that it was the U.K. view that any lesser scale would fail in meeting the mutually agreed end of preventing disease and unrest.
e. Colonel [William A.] Rounds stated that there were two primary considerations behind items proposed by the U.S. for the basic ration: (1) That where items were in short supply, such as fat, the decision as to whether the needs of European or U.S. civilians were to be met must be made politically and in the open and not be concealed by the processes of military priority procurement; 27
(2) That provision for civilian feeding by the military must be on the basis of additional provision of normal military stores. 28
UNSETTLED TOO, THE QUESTION OF ROLE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES IN DETERMINING
SOURCES OF SUPPLY
[Min, 15th Mtg CCAC, 25 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-15-43), sec. 1]
Mr. McCloy summarized the respective positions of the U.S. and U.K. members of the Supply Subcommittee and stated that the sole question is whether the Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall authorize the Subcommittee to apply formally to the Combined Boards for their recommendations concerning appropriate sources of supply responsibility, or whether, instead, the
Subcommittee shall merely consult informally with members of the Combined Boards.
General Macready [British representative] stated that he and Lt. Gen. Somervell had participated in the drafting of CCS 324/1 [above] and that, while it was intended that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee make recommendations concerning monthly requirements of civilian supplies, it was definitely not intended that the Committee determine the division of responsibility between the U.S. and the U.K. without prior consultation with appropriate civilian boards and agencies which are familiar with the entire world supply picture. He stated further that since food supplies for the British Army are procured not by the Army itself but by the British Ministry of Food, British military officials must necessarily refer problems of food procurement to civilian agencies.
General Wright stated, with reference to General Macready's last statement, that it was his understanding that British civilians had been placed on the Supply Committee for the very purpose of meeting the point raised by General Macready. General Wright further stated that he construed CCS 324/1 as placing two responsibilities on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee; first the determination of requirements, and second, the division of supply responsibility between the U.S. and the U.K. He stated that therefore it does not appear appropriate to make a formal submission of this question to the Combined Boards; that such formal submission is not necessary to obtain the benefit of the experience and knowledge of the appropriate supply authorities of the two governments; and that formal submission of such questions to the various Combined Boards will seriously affect their prompt disposition.
Mr. [A. Dennis] Marris [British representative] stated that the British position envisaged the obtaining of formal recommendations from the Combined Board and not decisions which would be binding upon the Combined Civil Affairs Committee or its Supply Subcommittee.
Mr. McCloy suggested that for the time being the Supply Subcommittee be authorized to refer the pending question formally to the Combined Boards, with the understanding that when General Somervell returns to the U.S. he will be consulted and further consideration will be given to the entire question....
Agreed that in order to avoid further delay and without prejudice to a decision on a policy to be adopted upon the return of General Somervell, the CCAC Supply Subcommittee be instructed that formal submission of Italian civilian requirements should be made to the appropriate Combined Boards in order to obtain their recommendations as to sources of supply for such requirements. 29
DISAGREEMENT OVER ROLE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES IS COMPROMISED
[Ltr, Maj Palmer, to the Deputy Dir of the Food Distribution Administration, 11 Dec 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 4]
The Combined Civil Affairs Committee on 23 November 1943 agreed to instruct the Supply Subcommittee as follows:
"The Supply Subcommittee shall make recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as to the requirements of civilian supplies to be provided by the military during the period of military control and also as to the respective U.S. and U.K. responsibility therefor. In formulating recommendations as to supply responsibility, the U.S. and U.K. members may refer any requirement in question to their respective supply authorities for suggestions as to the appropriate sources of the necessary supplies. The supply authorities for either government may in their discretion refer any such question to the
relevant Combined Board in order to obtain its views and advice as to source of supply." 30
DIVERGENT POLICIES REGARDING HIATUS AREAS MUST ALSO BE RECONCILED
[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office with Bovenschen, Br Permanent USW, 17 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]
Sir Frederick stated that he was interested in discussing the effect of the Presidential Directive with regard to the responsibility of the War Department in Civil Affairs matters in liberated areas. He stated that before the British Government could agree to accept a similar responsibility, it would be necessary to ascertain the implications of the letter as to supply and manpower....
Sir Frederick inquired as to the extent to which the U.S. Army contemplated supervision over the distribution of relief supplies. He stated that the British were anxious about the possible large commitments in manpower and transport if the Army was to be responsible for the distribution of relief within hiatus areas,31 or in the event of a general collapse of the enemy....
General Hilldring stated as the U.S. position that requirements were being developed in the War Department for all enemy and enemy-occupied countries.... He stated that it was not possible to plan requirements for operational areas alone since in the development of military plans, operational areas were constantly changing....
Sir Frederick stated that the War Office had hitherto assumed that procurement and distribution of relief supplies would be undertaken by the military only in operational areas and not in hiatus areas. He stated that in view of the U.S. position, it would be necessary for him to take the matter up with the War Office. 32
5. A COMPROMISE ON LOCALE OF PLANNING-WASHINGTON AND LONDON
BRITISH WILL CO-OPERATE IN CCAC BUT EXPECT CONCESSIONS IN RETURN
[Msg, ASW to the SW, 27 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16774]
Had talk yesterday with [Br Foreign Secy Anthony] Eden. Quite evident he feels European Advisory Commission [EAC] 33 in London important achievement and does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow. He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but good staff to London immediately to assist [John G.] Winant whom the President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission. However Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advisory Commission of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by Commission to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee 34 in London and if we are prepared to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take full part in all dis-
cussions relating to U.K. based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British representation. . . .35
[Remarks, Bendetsen, in Telecon with Hilldring, 4 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, WDTC-120]
... I have a very brief report to make to you in regard to certain action that I thought you should know about, if you have not already been informed. It is in regard to the action taken by the British War Ministry with respect to the CCAC. They have agreed that the CCAC shall have jurisdiction over all combined civil authorities matters with regard to Northwest Europe. I believe they have in mind proposing that there be established here in London a Branch of the CCAC, a London Echelon, which will have jurisdiction over political matters and the remainder of the questions regarding supply, etc., to come before the main CCAC in Washington. ♦ ♦ ♦
JCS APPROVES CO-OPERATION WITH EAC PROVIDED IT DOES NOT TRESPASS UPON
[Ltr, JCS to Secy of State, 5 Jan 44, OPD files, 334.8, sec. 1 ]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered the question of military and naval advisors for the European Advisory Commission and have directed that adequate military and naval personnel be provided in London and Washington for liaison with the Commission.
Based on military considerations, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following should be incorporated in the instructions to Mr. Winant and should provide the accepted procedure for handling matters of direct or indirect military concern which may arise in connection with the work of the Commission:
a. That the European Advisory Commission, from the U.S. point of view, is an important body, whose functioning and development should be guided and maintained in accordance with the U.S. concept as to the scope of its activities and the manner of its operation.
b. That the Commission should keep strictly within the letter and spirit of its directive and in so doing be particular to avoid problems relating to the conduct of military operations, and concerning civil affairs of liberated or enemy territories incident to such operations prior to the end of hostilities. ♦ ♦ ♦
BUT OPD DISAGREES WITH CAD's PROPOSAL To ACCEPT A SUBCOMMITTEE OF CCAC IN
[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for Dir, CAD, 20 Jan 44, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]
3. It is understood that this proposal [that a subcommittee of CCAC sit in London] is a compromise designed to avoid the vitiation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington. It is, in our opinion, very doubtful whether your proposal will not have the opposite effect. The Subcommittee in London is empowered to act on matters "which do not require reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff" and "do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Apparently the London Subcommittee can under the proposed Charter decide what does require reference. As far as is known, no other agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has a sub-agency with powers to act in London. It appears that your proposal may well eventually place the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in a position of a figurehead only with all real power in London.36
REASONS FOR CREATING THE LONDON COMMITTEE
[Min, 143d Mtg CCS, 28 Jan 44, G-3 files, ABC, 334, CCS Min (1-23-42), sec. 6]
Admiral Leahy said that while not fully briefed on this matter he was naturally averse to any proposal which involved the establishment of yet another committee in the CCS organization. Personally he was unable to see the necessity for the new committee as proposed.
General Macready explained that the agreement as put forward by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee had been reached as a result
of a special mission from London. There were, he thought, good reasons why a subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee should be set up in London to deal with the many day to day minor matters on which the Supreme Commander would require advice. It was essential to have a body closer to the scene of action, particularly since it was in London that the exile governments were situated, who would have to be consulted on many of the points which arose. The Supreme Commander himself could not deal within his own staff with all these problems. It was hoped that the new Committee would assist in arriving at rapid decisions on matters other than of major policy.
General Hilldring explained that the subject had been under discussion for some three months. There had been in London an Administration of Territories Europe Committee (A.T.E.) which was a high level British committee with one U.S. War Department representative. The present proposal was that this committee should be abolished and that its place should be taken by a subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee sitting in London and dealing with day to day civil affairs problems in Northwest Europe. In his opinion this arrangement would smooth out many difficulties and assist in the easy working of the machine. There had been a difference of opinion between the two governments as to where decisions on Northwest European civil affairs should be made. As a result of these differences of opinion, during the past three months no guidance had been given to the Supreme Commander on these vital problems. The setting up of the new committee under the terms set out in the Combined Civil Affairs proposal would, he felt sure, enable the Supreme Commander rapidly to be given the much needed directives to enable him to carry out his planning for civil affairs in Europe.37
CCAC SUBCOMMITTEE IS ESTABLISHED IN LONDON
[Rev par. 5 (CCAC/Liaison) of CCAC Charter (CCS 190/10/D), 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]
A London Subcommittee of CCAC is hereby established (CCAC/L) as agency of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.
(i) To give guidance and make recommendations within the framework of the directives issued to the Supreme Allied Commanders Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect to the application of such directives to day-today problems or to detailed civil affairs planning which do not require reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
(ii) At the request of the Allied Supreme Commanders to resolve such civil affairs questions arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters as do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on which the Allied Supreme Commanders desire advice.
Note: Until adequate machinery is established in London, the matters relating to the Mediterranean Theater under (i) and (ii) above will continue to be resolved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as at present.
(iii) To make recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on civil affairs matters arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters which require decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
(iv) With reference to paragraph 6 of this Charter to receive from His Majesty's Governments the civil affairs policy of His Majesty's Governments in regard to territory of the United Kingdom or the Dominions (if HMG in the Dominions desire to use this channel) which is to be recovered from the enemy and to communicate such policy to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for them to take note of and to transmit to the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be appropriate.
(v) Except as provided in subparagraph (iv) above, the CCAC/L will not consider civil affairs matters arising in the Pacific.
CCAC/L will consist of a war office chairman and a representative from the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Treasury on the British side, and one representative of the U.S. Army, one of the U.S. Navy, two civilian members appointed by the U.S. Individual persons and representatives of the department or agencies, both British and American, may be invited to attend as required.
c. Exchange of Information
The London Subcommittee will keep CCAC currently advised of the suggestions and recommendations made to SAC and will forward to them minutes of all meetings. There will be full exchange of information, and papers between CCAC and CCAC/L. ♦ ♦ ♦
LONDON SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE KEPT IN ITS PLACE
[Msg, Hilldring to Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, CofS, SHAEF, 7 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3032]
All of us here agree with you completely that SCAEF, unencumbered and uninhibited must have complete and absolute authority and responsibility with respect to the operation of Civil Affairs. . . . In recognition of this, both Mr. McCloy and I made it clear to Bovenschen when he was here that the usefulness and success-as a matter of fact, the very existence of the Subcommittee-would be dependent upon its ability to be of service to the Supreme Commander and to perform this advisory service without interference with the Civil Affairs operations of SCAEF or without annoyance to the people involved in those operations. I am confident that he understands his position, although it may be that some bluntness on your part will as you say, be necessary to keep this point in focus, and if bluntness is necessary it should by all means, as you suggest, be applied. . . . This, however, in my opinion does not alter the desirability of making the people who render advice to SCAEF as members of the Subcommittee those individuals on your staff who are struggling each day with the problems that will be discussed in the Subcommittee....
THE WASHINGTON-LONDON ISSUE CONTINUES INTO POSTHOSTILITIES PLANNING
[Ltr, Hilldring to Brig Gen Julius C. Holmes, DACofS, G-5 SHAEF, 28 Jul 44, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]
The British position appears to be that coordination on supply matters should be in London.38 The State Department, the War Department and FEA are opposed to this, primarily because all of the combined supply machinery is centered in Washington and only confusion and duplication can result by transferring responsibility as to this phase of the supply business to any combined group in London at this time. It is impossible to predict when the deadlock will be broken, but our position is very clear and we propose to stand firm. ♦ ♦ ♦
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Last updated 18 February 2004