Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, diamonds () are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

Chapter III:

The War Department Prepares for a Broader Role

Before operations in French North Africa the only War Department agency to engage in intensive preparation for a role in civil affairs was the Provost Marshal General's Office-more particularly the small Military Government Division established in that office in July 1942. This division, although vested with a charter authorizing it to engage in broad planning, was in fact scarcely in a position to extend its activities and influence beyond the sphere of training. The division, if not the Provost Marshal General's Office itself, was on too low a level to speak for the War Department as a whole and, aside from the backing given General Gullion by the Secretary of War in the issue over the Army's control of training, it did not command much active support. The attitude of other agencies of the War Department appears, indeed, to have been less one of opposition to or support of military control of civil affairs than lack of awareness of the issue. The multitude of major problems which pressed upon the Army during the first year of the war left little time for concern over the onset of civil affairs responsibilities in French North Africa. Because this area was friendly territory, and arrangements for civil affairs administration could be placed in the hands of the French, it seemed possible to allow civilian agencies to take over the handling of the economic problems which would normally have been the responsibility of military authorities in Washington.

The close relationships between supply problems and military operations disclosed by the French North Africa experience, together with the failure of civilian agencies to handle such problems with complete satisfaction, jolted a number of War Department authorities out of their complacency. Although the decision was made for practical reasons to leave the arrangements in French North Africa unchanged, the matter was quite different as regards occupation of enemy territory. This became a pressing question when it was decided in January 1943 to launch an invasion of Sicily. In the early months of 1943 assertions in the War Department as to the importance of placing civil affairs under military control became more frequent and emphatic, particularly among supply authorities.

But it would be impossible to assume such control, or to defend it against the conflicting aspirations of civilian agencies, without correcting the confused and inadequate organization for civil affairs which then characterized the War and Navy Departments. This placing of the military house in order entailed particularly the establishment of a high-level agency in the War Department to assume for that department, if not for both of the armed services, the central. co-ordination


of military civil affairs activities and a unified liaison in this sphere with civilian agencies. Other questions involved were the settlement of the responsibility for planning military policies for future civil affairs operations, the establishment of a military program and organization for civilian supply, and the further enlargement of a training program. The problem of preparing control machinery for combined operations was also involved, and the disposition of the British to favor the delegation of future operations to a combined civilian agency proved a potent stimulus to the, crystallization of a War Department decision to assume the leading role in initial civil affairs operations. The creation of combined organization for civil affairs came later than the establishment of an improved civil affairs organization and involved different types of problems; it is therefore treated separately (see Chapter V). The effective organization of the American military establishment for civil affairs involved many administrative issues, including such difficult ones as the compromise of conflicting departmental claims. Still more important, it involved the question of how long the military authorities should assume civil affairs duties in a situation where tactical efforts demanded so imperatively the greatest concentration of military resources. Far from indicating a military plot to wrest complete control of civil affairs from the nonmilitary agencies of the government, the record of the War Department's early organizational activities in this sphere suggests rather an attempt to limit the military role in time as much as possible.

Because of this attempt the organizational structure first designed later proved inadequate.


[Undated Memo, signed "Easton" for Brig Gen Miller G. White, ACofS, G-1, on 16 Dec 42 conf, G-1 files, Personnel SMG, Misc Info]

2. Agenda
a. . . . Apparently there is a loose understanding that the Army will provide personnel for military government of occupied countries (i.e., Civil Affairs sections). At any rate, if the Army does not have well laid plans, the State Department will take over everything, just as it apparently did in North Africa. ♦ ♦ ♦

[WD Statement of Policy, 1 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen 0942-43)]

1. Experience with North Africa has indicated that in any military operation which results in occupation of substantial areas of inhabited territory, provision must be made as part of the military plan of attack for' the welfare of the civil population over which jurisdiction is thus obtained.

2. The Military Plan must make adequate preparation for the following:
a. Feeding the civilian population.
b. Health of the civilian population.
c. Housing for the civilian population.
d. Maintenance of order and security.
e. Acquisition of raw materials available.
f. Restoration of civil control over the area in question.

3. Restoration of civil control over the area in question may be effected in several ways. It may be by restoring sovereignty to the native population; it may be by delegating sovereignty to civil agencies of the occupying forces. For the present it is assumed that there will be a considerable period of time following the invasion and preceding the time when sovereignty should be delegated to civil instrumentalities of the governments of the occupying forces.


4. For an initial period following the invasion, the matter must however be handled as part of the military operation. The military stores assembled for the operation should consequently include food, medical supplies and housing facilities, based on previous estimates of the condition to be faced. The Military Commander has a special staff section-Civil Affairs-for distribution of supplies, maintenance of order, establishment of municipal and public utility services, and supervision of civil government personnel.

5. Upon the event of an armistice terminating hostilities, or in the event that sufficient territory is acquired to make possible the resumption of normal life in substantial areas behind the fighting lines, it will then be possible to relinquish to civilian agencies the following duties in the order named:

a. Feeding civilian population.
b. Health of civilian population.
c. Housing of civilian population.
d. Resumption of trade relations (i.e., to obtain raw materials, etc.).

6. At such time civilian personnel for the purpose should be admitted to the area as required for the tasks to be taken up by the civilian representatives. Initially, they should be attached to the Staff of the Commanding General.

7. The period of time between the invasion and the assumption by civilian agencies of the occupying forces of initial responsibility of feeding the civilian population may not, under fortunate circumstances, be more than a few days. An example of this is found in certain areas of North Africa. Under less fortunate circumstances the shift in responsibility may be much longer delayed.1

[Telecon between Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, ACofS for Materiel, SOS, and Gullion, 5 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43) ]

Clay: We are interested in Civilian Supply, particularly relationships with Governor Lehman's organization. Our International Aid [Division] is interested from point of supplying shipping, items to be selected and stockpile prior to moving into area, and establishment of what we should NOT do. We feel question of civilian supply in the Theater of Operations should be handled as military operation....

Gullion: I have had several conferences with Governor Lehman and others and we have another conference on Monday. It would be unfortunate if we got wires crossed. Occupation is bound to be military. The President thinks it should be civilian and we have to see if we cannot break him out of the idea. Governor Lehman is preparing to duplicate what we are doing. They are working on economics, public health and schools. We are to go in first and they would take it up later. I do not want to take on any responsibility of supply if it means transportation or acquisition of supplies but civilian supply section of the Military Staff would advise him where supplies would go.

Clay: There is a dividing line as to where it is G-4 and where civilian. ♦ ♦ ♦

[Memo, Somervell, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD files, 014, Civil Govt, sec. I ]

We have had the opportunity to learn a real lesson from North Africa which lesson to me is that you cannot separate the handling of civil affairs from military operations in areas in which military operations are under way, and that an attempt to do so in a hostile country would be disastrous. Each Theater Commander contemplating active operations should have a Civil Affairs Division under an experienced officer selected for his administrative qualities to act for the Theater Commander in all civil affairs. This division would plan in advance the administrative procedure to be established in an occupied country, the supplies which must be brought into the country at an early date, and the staff which must be assembled to handle these affairs after occupation....



[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for USW Patterson, 16 Jan 43, OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG]

Colonel Greenbaum asked me to look briefly into the question of the War Department organization concerning military government as illustrated by the experience with North Africa.

Your responsibility in regard to the matter would seem to be twofold, first, as regards the military school at Charlottesville, and second, as regards to procurement of civilian supplies for North Africa. As far as I have been able to ascertain neither one of these matters had been fully co-ordinated with the whole of the civilian affairs action concerning North Africa. The matter is of importance not only as concerns North Africa but also more generally, because the pattern being set there may well be followed in other areas. In fact, that view has been expressed by other agencies.

In consequence, it seems to me that this matter should be fully explored, particularly with Mr. McCloy, to see if the situation cannot be clarified.


[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for Patterson, 26 Jan 43, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

As shown below, at the present time the powers concerning Military Government are scattered within the War Department, and delimitations of authority are not clear. This situation, it would seem, needs correction.2  The present memorandum is merely exploratory, to raise the question whether there should not be a full examination of the matter.

Whatever be the form of government in foreign territory occupied by American troops, there are bound to be a great number of questions affecting Civil Affairs which will have to be referred to the War Department for advice or decision. Their number and importance may vary, depending upon whether you have a purely military government or some variation thereof. They arise both in the planning and the operations phase. ♦ ♦ ♦

The agencies of the War Department most concerned with these matters are: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; Operations Division of the General Staff; Headquarters, SOS; G-1 of the General Staff the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office; and the International Division of SOS.

The actual functions of these several agencies seem to have evolved in practice out of the North African experience and to have departed from the organization as contemplated in the Manual of Military Government.

G-1 of the General Staff, according to the Basic Field Manual for Military Government, is "responsible for the preparation of plans for and the determination of policies with respect to military government." The exact limit of these powers does not seem clear. .. .

When set beside the above powers, those conferred upon the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office are even less clear. They are derived from a letter from the General Staff dated August 14, 1942, by which The Provost Marshal General, in regard to military government, is to be given the power to "engage in broad planning activities, with detailed estimates to be undertaken by the School of Military Government." The relationship between "broad planning activities" and the "preparation of plans" charged to G-1 of the General Staff is not defined.

In actual operation, however, neither G-1 of the General Staff nor the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office have been actively engaged either in the planning or in the day to day questions arising in the only present instance of occupation by our troops, namely, the operation in North Africa.

The matters of large policy have been acted upon directly by the Under Secretary of War, and Assistant Secretary of War, and the joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. The run-of-the-mine questions have come to the War Department through a committee of which the State Department furnishes the chairman and the War Department part of the secretariat. . . . Those questions which are not acted upon directly by the War Department representation on this committee are cleared by the International Division with such parts of the War Department as seem to have an interest. They have not gone to G-1,


which, as stated above, is charged with the making of plans and the formulation of policies for military government. They have gone, however, for comment to the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office, to Operations of the General Staff, the Fiscal Division of SOS, and other agencies of the War Department.

G-1, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has not performed any of the functions assigned to it by the Manual for Military Government, except that it has given directives to the Provost Marshal General's Office concerning the procurement of personnel. The training of the personnel has been directed by the Provost Marshal General under directives from G-3 of the General Staff and Training, SOS. ♦ ♦ ♦

It is ... suggested that consideration should be given to the charging of some single unit in the War Department with all of the powers and duties concerning military government, with provision for such routines for concurrences as should be required.

Otherwise, it is not seen how the War Department can accomplish its task. This is particularly so because other agencies may be inclined, unless corrective steps are taken, to assume authority properly belonging to the War Department. In fact, if steps are not taken to forestall it, the pattern as to North Africa may be taken as the model one, and thus impede the proper establishment of full military government in areas where it may be imperatively required.


[Memo, Capt J. O. Hall, PMGO, for Miller, Dir, MGD, PMGO, 2 Feb 43, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

The problems presented for discussion were (1) that of protecting the interests of the War Department in North Africa civil affairs organizational setup in Washington, and (2) coordination and operation generally, within the War Department, of civil affairs matters referred by commanders in the field .3

The Combined Chiefs of Staff informally proposed releasing to the State Department the function of handling communications regarding civil affairs in North Africa (and elsewhere as the problems arise) for action and information of interested agencies. The proposal was made because of the great volume of work involved. After considerable discussion it appeared to be the sense of the meeting that the War Department could not adequately have its interests protected by the proposed change, and that the CCS should continue to perform the job. Colonel Haskell and Captain Palmer were to inform the CCS informally of these views.

On the second problem the opinion seemed to be that a staff would have to be set up in the War Department to act as a central clearing house on civil affairs. G-1, G-4, and GS-OPD were mentioned as possible organizations in which a civil affairs section might be created.

There was cognizance of possible greater War Department interest in civil affairs in future theaters, and in a theater in which the War Department was directly interested rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff.


[Memo, Gullion for Secy, GS, 16 Feb 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 14]

2. At the conference on February 15, 1943 [Officials of WD and OFRRO ] . . . memorandum was submitted by Mr. Sayre and Mr. [Kenneth I Dayton, indicating the necessity for careful advance planning and co-ordination of activity between the Army and the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. Mr. Dayton said that Governor Lehman had personally delivered the original of the memorandum to the Secretary of War....
3. Governor Lehman's organization has been impressed by the fact that no agency of the War Department has been erected to deal authoritatively will all phases of civil affairs activities and, in such capacity, to make valid commitments for the War Department in working out co-operative arrangements with civilian agencies.
4. ... On this point the ... memorandum states:

"Where the Army group fits into Army organization is a matter for its determination, but the problems suggested above indicate the importance of the task from the Army's own point of view


so that it seems apparent that this Civil Affairs Section should be headed by somebody of high rank and authority. It seems to us that it should be attached directly to the General Staff, but should make proper use of the group who are training for military government and of the Services of Supply."

5. At the moment, operating Civil Affairs functions within the War Department are spread among a number of agencies....
6. General Spalding and I make the following recommendation:

That some agency of appropriate level be constituted, the function of which shall be to coordinate and direct all civil affairs activities for the War Department. This should be done immediately.4

[Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, CofS, ASF, for the CG, SOS, 14 Feb 43, ASF, Somervell files, Dec 42-Feb 43]

c. Organization to handle civil matters in occupied countries. General Handy informs me that the Secretary of War has been discussing this matter with the Chief of Staff, and that the Secretary of War had proposed setting up an organization to report to him to handle these matters.

On February 9, General Clay and I discussed this matter with General Handy, and later with General Marshall. Clay's and my opinion was that any organization established must be closely co-related with the theater commanders and operations in the theaters, and should, therefore, be under the Chief of Staff rather than directly under the Secretary of War. It should be a staff agency rather than an operating agency. For operation, it should utilize the existing machinery of the SOS and other agencies of the government.5

General Marshall had discussed the matter again with the Secretary of War, and while he agreed that these matters should be very closely correlated with the theater commanders and operations of the theater, he believed that it would develop into such a large matter that a separate organization should be set up to handle it. The Secretary of War appeared to be of the opinion that it should report to him.


[Ltr, AG to Haskell, OPD, 1 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43) (1), sec. 1 ]

1. By direction of the Secretary of War, a Civil Affairs Division of the War Department is hereby established. You are designated Acting Director of this Division.6
2. The primary function of the Civil Affairs Division is to inform and advise the Secretary of War in regard to all matters within the purview of the War Department, other than those of a strictly military nature, in areas occupied as a result of military operations. The Civil Affairs Division will perform such additional advisory and administrative functions in connection with civil matters as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.
3. Close co-ordination will be maintained between the Civil Affairs Division and the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and other military agencies of the War Department. To this end, all communications from the Civil Affairs Division to a commander in the field will be cleared through and transmitted by the Operations Division. The Civil Affairs Division will maintain liaison with civilian agencies exercising functions in any theater in which the Civil Affairs Division may be engaged.
4. The initial organization of the Civil Affairs Division will include a Chief of Division, an Executive, a secretary and such additional officers as the Secretary of War may direct. One working member of the Civil Affairs Division will be detailed thereto by the Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and one working member will be detailed thereto by the Commanding General, Services of Supply.
5. The Civil Affairs Division will maintain an office of record on civil affairs matters and action


taken by it in the performance of its assigned mission.


[Discussion between Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, and Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 5 Mar 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

Colonel Haskell described the War Department's policy in dealing with theater commanders, explaining that the War Department assigned the mission and provided the necessary means in the way of troops and equipment. The job was then up to the theater commander. If he proved to be unsatisfactory, the cure was to relieve him, not to tell him in detail what to do. If the mission was diminished or increased, the means provided or made available would vary commensurately.


[Msg, WD to Theater Comdrs, 6 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43) (1), sec. 1]

The following radio is being dispatched to the Commander of the North African Theater and to all theater commanders likely to participate in capture and occupation of enemy territory or enemy controlled territory: In response to a need in the War Department for a centralized organization for co-ordinating matters pertaining to civil affairs which arise in the North African theater and which will also be present in any territory captured from the enemy there is being established in the War Department reporting directly to the Secretary of War a Division of Civil Affairs. This Division will provide a central point for funneling such matters to the various operating agencies of the War Department for action and will provide a means for following up and co-ordinating action taken. It will also provide a means for liaison and co-operative action with other agencies of the Government and insure that such action is co-ordinated with the military effort. To this Division will be routed communications on strictly civil affairs matters as differentiated from those where the interest is solely military and arrangements will be. made for it to receive copies of pertinent communications received or dispatched through State Department or other channels. All communications on purely civil affairs matters sent by the War Department to theater commanders will be processed by the Division of Civil Affairs through the Operations Division War Department General Staff to insure co-ordination with military operations. It is considered essential that you establish at the appropriate time an agency on your staff headed by a suitably qualified individual and staffed with specialists competent to advise and handle matters pertaining to functions listed below. The War Department stands ready to assist in procuring necessary specialists on request...



[Incl A, Memo, CCS Secy's (CCS-190), 22 Mar 43,7  CAD files, 092 (3-.27-43), sec. 1 ]

Comprehensive and detailed plans for the handling of civil affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated should be given immediate and continued attention by the appropriate agencies of Government so that military operations will be supported by the population of areas occupied rather than be hindered thereby. Such planning can be made without undue risk to the security of information regarding military strategic plans. ♦ ♦ ♦

By handling this planning in a very general way at the outset, it is hoped to maintain the security of the information. Instead of asking specifically for plans for any one area that will be invaded it is proposed that the civilian agencies charged with this responsibility be asked to develop plans on a number of areas, any one or two or three of which might be a real scene of military operations within, say, the next year.

It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff request the Committee of Combined Boards to have outline plans prepared covering the following areas: Norway, Northern France, and the Low Countries, Southern France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, and Indo-China; the plans to be in the hands of CCS by May 10. . . .


[Memo, U.S. JCS (JCS 250), 31 Mar 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

II Discussion

1. The Committee of Combined Boards was created November 27, 1942, as a procedural convenience in dealing with civil affairs in North Africa (see CCS 126). In connection with matters referred to the various agencies by the North African Economic Board, which is attached to General Eisenhower's staff, the Committee exists with the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It does not exist as a delegated authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It has no charter. It has no staff. The secretariat is furnished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, this agency as such is not in a position to make or to direct the studies which are in effect proposed in CCS 190.
2. To extend the field of COB to the problems of civil administration in areas still enemy-held but expected to be occupied in the future would involve enlargement of the field of COB in two main respects: (1) geographically to areas other than North Africa; and (2) functionally to future military, operations rather than, as now, to civil affairs problems consequent upon past military operations. While COB is a co-ordinating agency of great usefulness, and while there would be no objection to geographical extension of its field to other territory after military occupation, there are objections to the proposal to use COB for advance planning for future operations.
3. In any consideration of future military operations the question of security is seriously and necessarily involved. The Committee of Combined Boards is not now so organized as to assure proper safeguards in this respect. While these agencies should participate in comprehensive, over-all planning as far as their own functions are concerned for the handling of civil affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated, this planning should not include any specific operations by these agencies until stabilized conditions have been attained in the areas involved.

III. Recommendations

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that CCS 1go be dropped from the agenda.
2. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign to the War and/or the Navy Department responsibility for the preparation of plans for civil affairs as an integral part of planning for any specific operation, and that such planning be conducted by the Army and/or the Navy directly with the civilian agencies concerned.
3. That the joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that representatives of the War and/or the Navy Departments consult appropriate British agencies with respect to plans and policies to be followed in handling civil affairs in specific combined operations.


[Ltr, JCS to SW and SN (JCS 250/2), 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

As long as military occupation exists, civil affairs are a responsibility of the commander concerned. In meeting local problems within his theater the commander is assisted by the Civil Affairs Division of his staff. However, there is much planning to be done in advance of the operation and considerable operating to be done in the United States regarding civil affairs in occupied territories. This must be accomplished or at least coordinated by some agency in Washington.

While many of the matters pertaining to civil affairs can be handled by civilian agencies, the requirements of secrecy and security prevent giving civilian agencies the information in advance of the operation which would be necessary for them to have in order to make advanced plans. It is therefore necessary to charge some military agency with this duty.

The War Department has recently established a Civil Affairs Division which is closely related to the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. This appears to be the logical agency to plan and co-ordinate the handling of Civil Affairs in nearly all of the occupied territories. Inasmuch, however, as the military occupation is by joint forces and certain aspects of civil administration are of interest to the Navy, the Navy should be represented on the War Department's Civil Affairs Division and be fully consulted.

This Civil Affairs Division in the War Department can well be given jurisdiction in certain theaters in which the commander is a naval officer but in which the actual occupying troops are Army.

There will be cases, of course, of occupation by naval or Marine personnel of areas of small extent in which civil affairs matters would be of minor importance. In such cases the civil affairs can be handled by existing agencies in the Navy Department.


In instances where the invasion of enemy territory is a combined operation with one or more allies, the Civil Affairs Division will, of course, have to be co-ordinated closely with the appropriate authorities of the allies concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to have civil affairs handled by civil authorities just as soon as the military situation permits subject, of course, to the control of the theater commander. As far as the United States is concerned, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, State Department, and the Committee of the Combined Boards are now set up to take over civil matters at the earliest time, which in the opinion of the joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff, as may be appropriate, it can be accomplished without interfering with the military purpose of the occupation.

In view of the foregoing the joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the War Department be designated as the agency to plan the handling of civil affairs in territory about to be occupied and to co-ordinate the activities of civilian agencies in the United States in administering civil affairs in hostile or liberated territory during the period of military occupation. They request the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to this recommendation [approved 17 April 1943 (JCS 250/2) ].


[Memo, Dayton, 2d Deputy Dir, OFRRO, to Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 1 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-543), sec. 1]

On April 28th, Mr. Sayre and I had a conference with General Hilldring who has been newly appointed the head of the Civil Affairs Division of the Army.

General Hilldring stated that he was charged with staff responsibilities for all affairs concerning military government....
....General Hilldring's jurisdiction is considerably broader than that suggested to us by the copy of the original letter establishing the Civil Affairs Division, which seems to make it primarily a liaison and information channel with civilian agencies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, to Dayton, 6 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43), sec. 1 ]

 ♦ ♦ ♦ I apparently didn't make the position of CAD clear to you. It is the business of this division to handle the general staff functions (planning, policy making, the issuance of basic directives, co-ordination and supervision) of all army responsibilities with respect to military government. However, this is not an operating agency. . . . It will be the responsibility of this office to co-ordinate his [General Clay's ASF] program with those of all other operating agencies in the War Department ... so far as they pertain to military government.... General Clay's responsibility to procure and make available the physical needs of military government is not changed in any way by the establishment of this division.8  ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 10 May 43, AG files, 014.1 (5-17-43), (1)]

1. General Somervell has submitted, with his concurrence, a memorandum from the Fiscal Division, ASF, which recommends:

    a. That the Fiscal Division, ASF, be charged with the direct responsibility for all War Department planning of overseas fiscal policy.
    b. That General Eisenhower be advised that the initiative for all fiscal planning in reoccupied areas is a War Department responsibility rather than a Treasury or State Department responsibility.

2. In view of the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division on March 1, 1943, with a direct responsibility for all War Department matters in reoccupied areas, other than those of a strictly military nature, it is believed inadvisable to delegate a large part of this responsibility to the Fiscal Division, ASF, as recommended in paragraph 1a. above. Overseas fiscal policy includes not only the financing of Army operations but also the very broad civil problems of foreign exchange, internal finance, budgets, taxes, currency, financial controls, etc., all of which make up an inte-


gral part of the administration of civil affairs in reoccupied areas.9


[Min, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 (4-14-43) (1)]

General Hilldring explained that the over-all function of the Civil Affairs Division is to obtain complete synchronization throughout the Army on military government problems. Such synchronization occurs only where a deliberate effort is made for its achievement. It was with that purpose in mind that the Civil Affairs Division was established in the War Department, thus setting up a single office devoted entirely to military government. It is the function of the Division to conduct the planning, policy making, supervision and co-ordination of all matters concerning military government. A further function is to regulate, in the Army, all operating agencies concerned with military government. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Min, Mtg in Hilldring's office, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 (4-14-43), (1)]

General Hilldring took advantage of the occasion to explain the most excellent co-operation existing between the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Office for Occupied Areas in the Navy Department. He explained that this co-operation has existed since his arrival in Washington, that it is wholehearted, and has welded the Army and Navy into a united understanding of the problems which are being faced. In no instance has a problem arisen between the two Services which has not been solved between General Hilldring and Captain Pence, thus obviating the necessity for reference to higher authority.

Captain [Harry L.] Pence, representing the Navy at the Meeting, stated that co-operation between himself and General Hilldring had been an easy task in view of the sound and practical ideas which had been presented. He further commented on the very excellent and close relationship existing in the War Department between the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division and the Secretary of War, through Mr. McCloy. ♦ ♦ ♦

The subject then turned to the selection of civil affairs personnel for theater commanders. General Hilldring stated that he was making a deliberate effort to have Navy personnel selected for some of the positions in the civil affairs sections of the staffs of theater commanders. He stated that it was particularly desirable in ports, and had added advantage as evidence of a united Army-Navy front. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hilldring for Exec to the ASW, 9 Feb 44, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43), sec. 1]

2. CAD and OAS [Occupied Areas Section] have responsibility for the administration of civil affairs in areas assigned to the Army and Navy, respectively. The Navy sphere of responsibility includes certain islands in the Pacific. The Army sphere of responsibility includes other enemy occupied areas. In the preparation of directives, manuals, and communications for the administration of civil affairs in all such areas, CAD and OAS collaborate in much the same manner as partners in a joint enterprise.
3. Preliminary to combined U.S.-U.K. discussions at Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) meetings (or at meetings of the U.S. side of CCAC), CAD co-ordinates with OAS in formulating the views of the U.S. armed forces....
4. In addition, CAD maintains close liaison with OAS in day-to-day operations. Through an OAS liaison officer, the CAD secretariat furnishes OAS with complete information on civil affairs problems currently under consideration. The Executive Officer, CAD, also furnishes copies of cables, letters, and other communications (incoming and outgoing) simultaneously with the distribution of such papers to CAD branches.


[Memo, Hilldring for Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, DCofS, 23 Aug 44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1), sec. 6]

1. . . . a. With or without a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, the real work of planning for civil affairs and the real operation of civil affairs will have to continue to be done in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department or the Military Government Section of the Central Division of the Navy Department.

    b. If Admiral [Frederick J.] Horne's memo-


randum [ 19 August 19441 implies, as it appears to, that the Army operates civil affairs in any area as a purely Army matter, the memorandum is in error. In those areas which the Joint Chiefs have assigned as a primary responsibility to the Army, civil affairs are co-ordinated in every detail with the Navy Department through the Military Government Section. Vice versa, in areas assigned as areas of primary responsibility of the Navy, the Navy carefully co-ordinates its civil affairs plans and operations with the War Department through the Civil Affairs Division. In effect, what Admiral Horne proposes is that instead of coordination between these two agencies of the Army and Navy, a Joint Committee be formed to effect this co-ordination. The point I want to make is that this will not bring about any better co-ordination than already exists. It will simply substitute a committee for the co-ordination now being accomplished....
3. Admiral Horne presents one argument, however, for a Joint Civil Affairs Committee for which I have no answer, and which, in my opinion, constitutes sufficient reason for the formation of such a committee. He says, "Since all other phases of joint operations are dealt with in the Joint Chiefs of Staff channel by joint committees, no reason can be seen why military government should be an exception." My only reason for objecting to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee is that it will increase administratively the difficulties of operation because it is difficult to work for a committee. However, if the Navy insists on having a Joint Committee, I can think of no valid grounds on which the Army can object, if the Navy chooses to disregard the obvious fact that the Committee is unnecessary.
4. However, the formula proposed by the Navy for a purely military Joint Civil Affairs Committee should not under any circumstances be concurred in by the Army, for the following reasons:
    a. There is no merit whatever to the statement made in paragraph 6, which would authorize "representative of the State Department to be appointed as associate member of the JCAC who would be available for discussions on the political aspects of joint military government operations, but would be excluded from discussions of purely military problems." Civil Affairs is 7070 on the civilian side. We never have a problem in civil affairs which is purely military.
    b. I am sure that the State Department, Mr. Stimson, Mr. McCloy, and, from what I have recently heard, Mr. [James V.] Forrestal himself, would violently oppose a civil affairs committee that did not accord full membership to the civilian authorities. Within recent weeks Mr. Stimson and Mr. Forrestal have complained to the Secretary of State because of the political questions which Mr. Hull is submitting to the joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the War Department I have kept this condition under control by repeatedly pointing out to Mr. Stimson and Mr. McCloy that these projects, through present procedures, either come to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee where Mr. McCloy and Mr. [James C.] Dunn are present, or are presented by General Hull or by me to Mr. McCloy....10



[Memo, Clay, ACofS for Materiel, SOS, for ACofS, OPD, 11 Feb 43, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1 ]

2. The meeting [with Governor Lehman, 10 February] as a whole demonstrated that the several civilian agencies concerned are approaching the problem for the "idealistic" viewpoint of improving conditions throughout the world rather than from a realistic viewpoint. Governor Lehman was realistic in his approach. He propounded as his thesis that we could not maintain our own war economy and help occupied countries except for these relief measures essential to prevent starvation and extreme suffering from exposure. He was particularly upset over the extent of civilian supply shipments to North Africa which he believed in excess of absolute needs. He was further concerned by the apparent lack of single economic direction in North Africa with Lend-Lease, BEW, and other agencies possibly working at cross-purposes. He believed it essential that a top committee be formed in Washington composed of representatives of the various agencies to establish definite


policies for the future and to direct advance planning. He did not believe that existing combined committees were at a high enough level to be effective, referring particularly to the Committee of Combined Boards headed by Mr. Finletter of the State Department. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. It was suggested that a committee be formed with representatives of the several agencies present under the chairmanship of Governor Lehman to formulate and recommend policies presumably to the President. It was apparent that those agencies having a more "idealistic" approach were not in full sympathy with this committee, and they countered with the suggestion that the committee should be at a sufficiently high level to justify the Vice President being its chairman.
5. Throughout the discussion it was apparent that very little thought was being given by any of the representatives present to the responsibilities of the Army in an occupied area, particularly in the initial phases of operations, and the possible necessity for military government in such areas was not introduced or discussed. It did not appear an appropriate time for this thought to be introduced by the War Department representative, particularly as the main theme of discussion was in the field of supply....
6. The meeting will undoubtedly stimulate the several agencies concerned to obtain high approval for their positions in the picture, with a strong probability that the State Department, prior to the next meeting, may formulate and obtain approval for the policy which it believes desirable. Therefore, it would appear essential for the War Department to formulate a definite War Department policy as to its own relationship to civil affairs in occupied countries at the earliest possible date so that its views may be presented before a policy which may be contrary thereto has been established.


[Memo, Somervell CG, ASF, for COB, 25 Mar 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43) ]

1. Reference is made to CCS 190 [sec. 3 above, which recommends that the Combined Chiefs of Staff request the Committee of Combined Boards to have outlined plans prepared covering certain areas which may become occupied areas as a result of military operations. This paper is an invitation to other government agencies for the handling of Civil Affairs in areas proposed to be occupied through military operations. While these agencies should participate in comprehensive over-all planning in as far as their own functions are concerned for the handling of Civil Affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated, this planning should not include any proposed operations by these agencies until stabilized conditions have been attained in the areas involved.
2. The planning for the handling of Civil Affairs during the initial phases of occupation should be a direct responsibility of the War Department, operating through the Theater Commander, and planning for this purpose should be undertaken with the utmost secrecy and full security measures. Moreover, the functions of the other Government agencies are largely concerned with supply, and difficulties of transportation necessitate that all supply measures be under direct military control until conditions have stabilized....


[Msg, WD to CG, NATOUSA, 5 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 2451]

. . . President's directive makes Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation an organization to facilitate progress of war and relieve suffering and provides OFRRO operations in any specific areas abroad will be subject approval of United States military so long as military occupation exists. Prior to Governor Lehman's departure, War Department agreed with him to assume full procurement, operating and administrative responsibility all phases civilian relief, reconstruction, sanitation, agricultural development, etc., as function of theater commander during initial period of operations for sufficient time to permit orderly turnover with adequate advance notice. For purposes of permitting Governor Lehman to plan this period has been estimated minimum go days but will of course vary considerably with each operation.11


[Summary of WD Cable of Gen Application to Theater Comdrs, 12 Apr 43, CM-OUT 4944, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

The Theater Commander is responsible for the provision of any essential civilian supplies in the occupied area from the military stocks which have been made available to him for a minimum period of time after occupation has been effected. For planning purposes this period should be assumed to be approximately go days, but it will of course vary with circumstances of each operation. The objective should be to discharge this responsibility from Army stocks or other supplies available to the Theater Commander until on adequate notice the civilian agencies are prepared to assist the Theater Commander in the discharge of this responsibility. All civilian agencies, including the agency responsible for relief and rehabilitation, have been advised accordingly.

The War Department will assume that your requisitions include provision for such essential civilian supplies as you propose to allocate shipping and no special provision will be made for such supplies except on receipt of special requisitions from the Theater Commander. Any special requisitions for subsistence, medical supplies, or other special items deemed necessary to meet essential civilian needs should be submitted to the War Department at the earliest possible date to permit advance procurement without sudden demands on the market which would indicate operations to be contemplated.

It is further assumed that the Theater Commander will include in his requisitions for engineering materials those items deemed essential for the rehabilitation of utilities in the occupied area if any appear necessary to meet military requirements and that such work will be undertaken by the Theater Commander in supervision of troops at his disposal.

The utilization of military supplies or such special supplies as may be obtained to meet essential civilian needs through commercial channels or as barter goods in payment for labor should be incorporated to the fullest possible extent.


[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

3. Captain Palmer opened the discussion with a summary of the civilian supply problem in occupied areas and the Army's relationship to it. He pointed out that:
    (a) This problem had not until recently been of concern to the War Department; North Africa both opened and enormously expanded it;
    (b) The British had all along been more aware of it because of their closeness to and political interest in the continent of Europe. British planning on the subject reaches back over a period of more than one and a half years. They are proposing to make civilian welfare in occupied countries a matter of Army concern for a period of six months and to sustain civilians for this period from Army supplies-thereby making purchases to meet this supply program a matter of military priority. Indeed, there is evidence that the British are prepared now to purchase such stores;
    (c) Some concept of the scope of the civilian supply program may be gleaned from the fact that some U.S. estimates contemplate need of at least six million tons of material during the first year of occupation of Europe. British figures run, it is believed, much higher, their estimates being based in part upon discussions with the governments in exile and may for that reason be on too generous a scale. It is in any event probable that the volume in which supplies must be furnished, even when cut to a minimum, can exert a serious effect on both the timing and undertaking of military operations;
    (d) The Army's problem of meeting civilian requirements must be geared (in the light of purely military necessity) to accomplish the following:
Prevent unrest and disease 12
Restore war production
Live off the country
Obtain assistance from the population. ♦ ♦ ♦
(e) The job over and beyond this was one for civilian agencies. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 May 43]

7. Captain Palmer pointed out that it was now accepted Army policy that responsibility for the initial period of occupation would be solely that of the military. For planning purposes it is now assumed that this period will last for a minimum of go days, for which time the Army must be


prepared to meet civilian needs from the ASP and not necessarily from Lend-Lease or OFRRO stockpiles.

    (a) Further that it was not a matter of duplicating the work of the above agencies, but rather of knowing what they were doing and preparing to do in order that the Army could be intelligently prepared to draw from and/or supplement such stockpiles.
    (b) That the British preparations for a six-month period in contrast to ours for a go-day period contained the possibility of conflict in the determination of items of military priority.

8. Captain [Donald H.] McLean added that the Army's problem was one essentially of procuring a "hedge" against items difficult to acquire and not available in occupied territories; that this involved a full knowledge of local peculiarities and eating habits. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for DCofS, 39 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

I. Discussion

    1. The War Department has placed the responsibility for civilian relief and rehabilitation, and for the requisitioning and distribution of essential civilian supplies, upon the Commander-in Chief, AFHQ, North Africa. No requisitions or statements of requirements have as yet been submitted by AFHQ.
    2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 10 cabled AFHQ to submit promptly to CCS for the War Department its estimates, even if tentative, of total civilian needs by item, quantity, priority, desired destination and markings from D Day to D Day plus go.
    3. In order that the War Department may be in a position to screen these estimates, when they arrive, and to anticipate subsequent requisitions by procurement, if necessary, it is desirable that independent estimates, based on information available in Washington, should be established.

II. Action Recommended

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That the Commanding General, ASF, prepare an estimate of total civilian requirements for HUSKY; the estimate to provide for food, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies, shelter, barter goods, engineering equipment and such other items as may be required to meet essential civilian needs; the estimate, by item, priority and destination from D Day to D Day plus 90.

2. That in the preparation of these estimates consideration be given to the importance of providing a minimum food ration which, combined with supplies locally available, will facilitate the maintenance of order, preservation of public health and utilization of local labor.13


[Memo, Maj Gen Edmund B. Gregory, QMG, for Dir, Opns, ASF, 24 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

a. It is anticipated that there will be a great demand for food for the civilian population of occupied countries. It is believed that the food supply now available in the United States, or to be produced, will be insufficient to supply all requirements unless national policies and allocations are revised to reduce current consumption.

b. At the present time, the only items of food in which surpluses are believed to exist are:
Wheat and wheat flour
Durum wheat and alimentary pastes
Cereal products made from wheat
Soybean products, principally flour

This list represents the only unrationed foods in the United States, and, indicates the basis of those items which we can readily spare after providing for the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian population of this country.

e. Should the Army be required to provide supplies for relief or for barter purposes, all luxury items should be excluded. In the case of North Africa, certain items supplied for barter purposes were in the nature of luxury items which were difficult to obtain and were subject to a high percentage of pilferage.

f. Quartermaster stocks of food are not sufficient to undertake the supply of civilians in occupied territories. If such supplies are taken from our stocks, it will be impossible in many instances to replenish them even at the expense of our civilian population.


[Notes on Mtg of Sup Officers, 4 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun-Jul 43) ]

... Major [Thomas R.] Taylor questioned the limitations placed on types of supply to be in


eluded by the Army in meeting civilian needs, pointing out the frequent requests for agricultural implements, fire-fighting equipment, and tools, etc. that came in from theaters. Major Palmer said that the purpose of such limitations was to place the burden of proof on those who wish to expand the already great Army supply problem....


[Memo, Brig Gen Boykin C. Wright, Dir, ID, for Dir of Materiel, ASF, 7 Jun 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS 63]

1. To cover the problem of civil supply for the first go days of an occupation it is proposed to include a section in the Army Supply Program, based upon Staff plans and Service recommendations.14  To this end it is proposed to consult with the several Services as to the character and amount of supplies to be provided....

3. With respect to the U.S. civil agencies, it is proposed to take the position that:
    a. The War Department will program and procure the supplies needed for military use during the first 90 days, whether U.S. or U.K.;
    b. During the period of military government the War Department may requisition against the Lend-Lease Administration or any others who may have stockpiles, thus, in effect, acting on behalf of the foreign territory in question to cover needs after the first 90 days;
    c. The War Department, while unwilling to endorse relief programs, will be glad to have them submitted for such comment as the War Department shall deem appropriate....


[Memo, Wright, Dir, ID, for QMG and SG, 2 Jul 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-63]

1. As a matter of policy it has been determined that the War Department shall be responsible for the supply of essential minimum needs of civilian populations in occupied areas during the initial phases of a military operation and the period of Military Government. Such supplies will be provided on requisition of the theater commander.

2. The War Department will itself provide from military stores the minimum essential supplies necessary for an initial period, until other agencies concerned with civilian relief become a source of supply. For planning purposes, it has been determined that this initial period shall be a minimum of at least 90 days and that all Axis-occupied areas together with Italy and her Mediterranean possessions will be involved. The extent of provision for civilian supply from military stores must be limited to requirements necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations. The basic objectives to be attained are:
    a. to prevent civil unrest which would endanger lines of communication and channels of supply;
    b. to prevent disease which would endanger troops.

3. To make provision for supply of civilian populations in occupied areas, requirements for this purpose will be included in the Army Supply Program and appropriate budget and financial arrangements will be made.

4. In determining the kind of materials to be provided consideration should be given, on the one hand, to the advisability of having such material be similar or identical to the customary commercial supplies of the area in question to facilitate distribution and, on the other hand, to the advisability of having such material conform to Army standards to make it interchangeable with Army supplies. Consideration must be also given to the problem of mass feeding and supplies appropriate therefor.


[Memo, Clay for Dir, ID, ASF, 22 Jul. 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun-Jul 43) ]

1. The following procedure for the establishment and procurement by the War Department of certain requirements for civilian populations in areas occupied by U.S., or combined U.S. and other forces is hereby adopted:

a. Requirements for civilian supply in the several areas will be determined by International Aid Division, Army Service Forces, upon the basis of operational plans received from Planning Division, Army Service Forces. In the case of combined operations, International Aid Division will also determine the proportion of combined Allied responsibility for furnishing civilian supplies in such areas which will be furnished from U.S. resources. In the determination of such requirements and the determination of such proportionate responsibility, International Aid Division will obtain recommendations from the


appropriate Technical Services and such additional information and assistance as may be appropriate. Also concurrences will be obtained by International Aid Division from Civil Affairs Division, OCS; Operations Division, WDGS; Director of Operations, ASF; and Requirement and Production Division, ASF.
b. The requirements so determined will be included in the Army Supply Program as U.S. military requirements in a new Section to be known as Section VI. The International Aid Division will transmit the proposed Section VI to the Director of the Requirements Division for publication by Requirements Division.
c. Supplies for the civilian population of occupied areas which are procured by the War Department will be delivered against requisition of the U.S. Theater Commander of the area in question.


[Memo, Maj Edward M. Conklin, Jr., ASF, on Remarks of Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Mtg of 4 Sep 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-125]

2. General Clay outlined the policy of the War Department in respect to providing relief and supplies for occupied and liberated territories as follows:
    a. The War Department will procure and stockpile the following items as military requirements for relief of civil population in occupied territories:
Basic ration
Medical and Sanitary Supplies

(This is in consonance with CCS 324/1 which was approved by the CCS at their 115 meeting, 23 August 1943.)15

3. General Clay stated further that any supplies beyond those which come within the categories indicated in paragraph 2 a above would not as a rule be procured as military items. However, in the event supplies beyond the scope of the categories indicated above were requested and such request bore the endorsement of approval of the U.S. Theater Commander, the War Department will submit such requests to the appropriate civil agency . . . and the War Department will obtain there from the necessary supplies. Such supplies, however, will not be programmed nor procured by the War Department unless not otherwise obtainable. General Clay stated further that if supplies beyond the scope indicated in the categories of paragraph 2 a above, were submitted for fulfillment but did not bear the endorsement of the Theater Commander, the War Department will submit such requests to the appropriate civil agencies for procurement. At the same time the ASF, through Production Division, will make a study as to the effect the procurement of such supplies would have on articles to be procured for the Army from the standpoint of materials, facilities and manpower and advise the WPB of the effect that filling such civilian requirements would have on the articles of supply programmed by and to be procured for the Armed Forces.



[Memo, Col Thomas North, Chief, Current Sec, OPD, for the Theater Gp, OPD, 10 Aug 42, OPD files, 352 (3-24-42), sec. 1 ]

1. Your comments and recommendations are requested on the enclosed paper from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. This matter pertains to the establishment of a general policy to guide the assignment of officers, trained in the administration of civil affairs by graduation from the School of Military Government, to appropriate units in the theaters and the continental United States.

3.a. It is the opinion of this section that:
    (1) The immediate need for large special staffs for administering military governments overseas is not indicated.
    (2) The requirements for each theater for a civil affairs staff section will vary to such an extent that a general policy concerning the detailing of officers to theaters and task forces for this purpose will prove impractical.
    (3) Premature assignment of officers to such a detail might result in insufficient employment of trained manpower.

    b. Pending the receipt of recommendations from the various theater commanders at the time


military governments in occupied territories are contemplated, it is believed that graduates of the School of Military Government can be given other assignments appropriate to their military qualifications. 16

[Memo, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, for the Dir of Personnel, ASF, 31 May 43, PMGO files, 200, MG]

1. The primary concern of this office in civil affairs lies in the supply field. In this field the personnel required in any specific area will be comparatively small. It is our view that key personnel in this field can be trained most advantageously through actual staff work in the Headquarters, Army Service Forces. We believe that a small group of officers should be maintained to provide the nucleus of supply personnel for each occupied area, and that still further training can be obtained through actual experience in these occupied areas to form units for other occupied areas.

2. In general we are somewhat of the same opinion with respect to the over-all training of officers for duty in the occupied countries. It would be a mistake to train a large number of officers for this purpose if these officers were to be returned to civil life pending their assignment to active duty or if they were to be kept in active service without a specific assignment of duties. It would appear almost impossible to train enough men in units in the United States to provide for the administration of the occupied countries and much dependence must be placed on officers and men to be made available from the occupying forces. It would seem, therefore, that the training objectives in this country should be devoted to developing the very high-grade administrators to occupy key positions. We are not likely to occupy very large areas concurrently, hence each area in which we establish a military government will become a training ground in itself where able and experienced administrators can be developed for use in other areas. Such a system taken into conjunction with the training which we now have under way would appear to be logical and would require a minimum of personnel in training.


[Memo, Gullion for the ACofS, G-3, ii Jan 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Trig, Tab 18 ]

1. The procurement authority of November 23, 1942 . . . as amended by authority of November 27, 1942 . . . authorizes the Provost Marshal General to recommend for commissions 20 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors and 2450 captains and lieutenants (a total of 2500) in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps, at a rate of not to exceed 300 per month.17

3. As above indicated, not in excess of 375 of the 2500 authorized officers will attend the Charlottesville School. As to the remaining officers, it is intended to earmark each for probable eventual duty in some general overseas area and then to call each temporarily to active duty for some brief instruction in military government and the background of the general area for which he will have been earmarked. Such instruction would in each instance be for a period not to exceed six weeks. Not only is such instruction indicated by the procurement authority, but without it these officers would enter upon important active service overseas without any special training whatsoever.

4. As already pointed out, it will not be possible to provide training at the Charlottesville School for more than 375 of these officers during the year 1943. It will be feasible, however, to arrange with a group of colleges and universities to furnish such training by farming out these officers in small groups from time to time for instruction in military government and backgrounds of the general areas involved. Recommendations:

(a) That the principle of "farming out" these reserve officers to a group of colleges and universities for periods not to exceed six weeks be approved and
(b) That the Provost Marshal General be authorized to engage in the necessary preliminary discussions to accomplish this objective, all final arrangements and agreements to be consummated by the duly authorized agencies of the War Department.


[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for the ACofS, G-1, 6 Feb 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Trig, Tab 19 ]

.. Two curricula must be provided, viz. for (a) Fort Custer and (b) civilian colleges .18  Inasmuch as the training program is a novel venture, sufficient flexibility should be retained at this time to make possible such minor adjustments as experience may prove to be desirable.

The Charlottesville School has developed a general pattern of instruction that, it is believed, should be followed as nearly as possible in the new training program. This should be done not only because the Charlottesville method is believed to be sound, but because the adaptation of its essentials to the present program will create a desirable uniformity in all instruction given to military government personnel.

The Charlottesville instruction is divided generally into two parts-(I) that relating to the general principles of military government which are applicable and important regardless of the particular area of occupation and (II) the study of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation. Under (I) are included such topics as Army organization and staff functions, the international law and American regulations relating to military government, the experiences and practices of the United States and other nations in the actual operation of military governments and the general principles of public administration. Included under (II) are matters concerning the institutions, customs and practices of particular areas and the language thereof [see above, Chapter I, Section 2.].

It is proposed to allocate to the Fort Custer training those portions of the instruction embraced in (I) above and to the civilian colleges and universities those portions embraced in (II).

A brief explanation for the desirability of such an allocation should be made. In the first place, it will be very difficult to establish in six separate colleges a satisfactory course of instruction embracing the general principles making up Part I of the Charlottesville curriculum inasmuch as persons trained in certain of the topics are not usually found on college faculties. On the other hand, there is already in operation at Fort Custer a Department of Military Government, which is furnishing the instruction in its two schools for occupational police (officers and enlisted) upon the same topics which should be included in the present curriculum. It will be an easy matter to augment the existing faculty at Fort Custer and to furnish the instruction in that way. Furthermore, this procedure should result in a betterment of the existing Military Government faculty at Fort Custer. Finally, since only one hour per day, or a total of 48 hours for each course, will be devoted to this instruction, it will not materially reduce the time allotted to basic military training. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Actg Dir, CAD, 2 Apr 43, PMGO files, 337, Confs (MG and CAD Staff Officers]

2. General. The objective of the total program is to recruit and train, during the period ending December 31, 1944, between 5500 and 6000 officers for military government duties in occupied areas....

The training program, insofar as instrumentalities are concerned, may be divided into three parts, namely (1) The School of Military Government, (2) The Fort Custer-college setup and (3) The Occupational Police Schools. The trainees at the School of Military Government are prepared for the planning and top general administrative levels in military governments. The Fort Custer-college program is for officers of the Specialists pool who will constitute the technical and advisory personnel in military government organizations, below the organizational level of the SMG graduates. Both groups must be viewed as staff officers whose activities are to be supplemented to a very large extent by drafts upon tactical and special service troops and also by the utilization of civilian population to the greatest extent possible. The occupational police personnel is designed to furnish officers and enlisted cadres for a considerable force of occupational police and, at the same time, to produce a surplus of occupational police officers for duty as junior administrative officers in military government.19

With these general observations in view, the three activities indicated above may be separately considered.

3. The School of Military Government. The School of Military Government was opened at Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 9, 1942, for the purpose of giving a series of 16 weeks' courses to selected groups of highly qualified student


officers. The first course was attended by 50 officers, the second course by 115 officers and the third (present) course by 133 officers. It is contemplated that succeeding courses (the fourth course begins on or about May 15, 1943) will contain approximately 150 officers, which is the authorized strength of the School.

The student-officers are divided into two categories, (a) officers already commissioned in the military service and (b) officers commissioned directly from civil life for the purpose of attending the School. Officers in group (a) have heretofore been secured from nominations submitted by the several Service Commands and Armies and by the staff branches; for the fourth and subsequent courses these sources of supply have been enlarged to include all Army Group Forces and the Army Air Forces, as well as officers from the various staff branches. Group (b) in the present course consists of 44 officers; all subsequent courses will contain from 50 to 75 each, depending upon the number required to bring the course to full authorized strength. This group will be drawn from reserve officers commissioned in the specialists pool presently to be discussed.

The student groups at the Charlottesville School are selected to represent, in the aggregate, all the general and special skills requisite to a complete Civil Affairs organization, namely, public works and utilities, public safety, fiscal, economics, public health and sanitation, public welfare, education, public relations, communications, legal and government administration. The training being directed at producing officers on a top planning and general administrative level, the curriculum of the School is designed to produce this result.

4. Specialists Pool. The Provost Marshal General has been authorized to select and recommend for commissions a pool of 150 Lieutenant Colonels, 600 Majors and 1750 Captains and Lieutenants, a total of 2500, from civil life in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps. Each officer must possess one or more of the functional skills indicated in the next preceding paragraph. From this pool, certain officers will be selected to attend the School of Military Government, as already pointed out. The remaining officers in the pool will be given, in comparatively small groups, beginning on or about June 1, 1943, a period of training at Fort Custer, Michigan, to be followed by training in seven to ten civilian colleges and universities....

6. The Provost Marshal General's procurement authority provides that all persons commissioned in the Specialists pool will revert to an inactive status upon the completion of the training period, whether at the SMG or in the Fort Custer-college program. This provision is entirely satisfactory to certain persons eligible for appointment; in the majority of cases, however, it is quite unsatisfactory and seriously impedes the recruitment of the most desirable personnel. The procurement authority should, it is believed, be amended to provide for a return to an inactive status only for those persons desiring such procedure, and to provide for the continuance on active duty of those officers who desire retention in the service. Since the training program will extend over a period of more than 18 months and the monthly increments will be comparatively small, it is believed that they can be absorbed into useful and relevant military duties without any serious difficulty. This will be particularly true if occupations on any considerable scale can be expected within the next twelve months. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for the Dir, CAD, 17 Apr 44, PMGO files, 008, Policy] 20


a. . . . The use of colleges makes available the most modern, up-to-date plant and equipment and the most competent civilian instructional personnel in the United States. The excellent results that can be accomplished by employing such facilities have been fully demonstrated in the prior training programs; a different course should not be pursued unless a clear advantage is apparent.

The principal difficulty in any army post setup will be in creating a proper faculty. In the Civil Affairs Training Schools previously in operation, staff, faculty and occasional lecturers ranged from 30 to 50 at each School; a minimum staff and faculty at an army school, with a maximum load of 1500 student officers, would have to be well over 100 plus a considerable number of outside lecturers.

It is not believed that an adequate number of qualified faculty members can be found in the Army; if available, their assignment to such duty is exceedingly doubtful. It is understood that the whole Far Eastern Program was once jeopardized


because it was thought in certain quarters that a small increase in the faculty of the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, might be involved; any request for a large military overhead at a Far Eastern School would probably be suicidal.

Consequently, the faculty would have to be recruited principally from civilian sources. There is little hope of attracting to any army post the numbers and quality of experts who are readily available on university campuses or their vicinity. As a result, any faculty recruited for an army school would be inadequate in numbers or mediocre in ability.

Furthermore, an army post is ill-fitted for the peculiar type of instruction required in Civil Affairs training. Instruction is very largely academic, with a minimum of the military training for which the ordinary army post is primarily designed. One pivotal item-an extensive library-is always entirely lacking. Lecture halls, class, conference and study rooms, if constructed originally for such purposes, are usually bleak, badly lit and ill-heated and ventilated; if (as is more usual) they are converted from mess halls or barracks, they soon become depressing and a definite morale-destroying factor. The Provost Marshall General's School at Fort Custer is one of the better equipped army post schools; anyone who has observed the reaction of a student officer coming, after a four weeks' stay at Fort Custer, to the campus of a modern university will readily understand the comparison.

Without protracting the comparisons further, it is perfectly obvious that the efficiency and quality of Civil Affairs instruction at an army post would be far below that easily possible in any high grade university. ♦ ♦ ♦


[Ltr, Thomson, Univ of Colorado, to Hyneman, Dir of Trig, MGD, 10 Jul 43, PMGO files, 330.14, Criticisms]

I do not feel that you have gone about the contracting with the six universities for training Civil Affairs Specialists in a satisfactory manner. You do not know who is going to teach what. The content of the courses that are to be given has not been gone over in any detailed fashion. You have left up to the universities both personnel and content. You have taken their word for it that they could find some one to do the job. That means hurried improvisation and competition between these schools for outside help, and you will find, in the event, that they have not been able to get the "experts" they have so glibly promised.

If you rely on the resident faculties of these institutions it seems to me you are being more trusting and un-businesslike than you have any right to be. The men are simply not to be found on these faculties in adequate quality or quantity. I know the men in these fields. That is my business. But with adequate foresight and a little imagination, a constructive and satisfactory program could have been worked out. A job like this cannot be done by correspondence from Washington.


[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 13 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 9087]

Most important problem Military Government subsequent operations is quality of personnel. All here emphasize need for experienced general administrators, organizer and operator type, for direct contact local officials and people. Higher standards and more detailed individual attention in selection of even lower echelons essential....


[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for CofS, CG, ASF, and the Chief, CAD, 24 Aug 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 2]

6. Presidential resistance found some counterpart within the War Department itself where there appeared to be some feeling that any extensive military government training program should be discouraged because of (a) the uncertainties of time and place of future occupation and (b) the undesirability of creating any considerable pool of officers for whom no fairly immediate civil affairs duties were apparent.

7. In the face of remarks made by the President, and the criticisms by civilian agencies and the War Department itself this office proceeded with a twofold design-a. to recruit and train the greatest number of officers possible under the circumstances in order that at least a sufficient supply will be on hand as soon as the inevitable emergency demand for it should arrive and b. at the same time, to erect a recruiting and training mechanism capable of immediate and unlimited expansion when the need for civil affairs officer personnel has become more apparent to those concerned.

9. In the light of the foregoing, I felt that we have accomplished our self-imposed mission with a considerable degree of success and under somewhat severe handicaps. Requisitions (completely filled, pending and for which we have been


alerted to 30 September 43) from CAD for civil affairs personnel for overseas duty total approximately 600. Against these demands, there are approximately 1200 officers trained or in training. By 30 September, this total will have increased to 1800. At the same time, we have erected a series of co-ordinated training programs that are, as above pointed out, capable of immediate and unlimited expansion, circumscribed only by the ability of qualified officers for student groups.

Nevertheless, in view of increasing demands, the lack of success in obtaining the approval for occupational police organizations, and the actual threat of deactivation of existing military police organizations, I am quite disturbed over the future.

II. In summary, I am of the opinion that the importance of trained personnel in handling the difficult military government problem is not generally recognized.


[Memo, Hilidring, Chief, CAD, for the PMG, 27 Aug 43, PMO files, 200, MG]

1. Secretary of War directs:

    a. That inasmuch as not to exceed 40 graduates of SMG and the Custer-CATS 21   program will be available for civil affairs assignment after the current NATOUSA requisition is filled:
        (1) Plans be made immediately to bring 2500 additional officers into civil affairs training programs by the end of the calendar year 1943.


[Memo, Gullion for Chief, CAD, 31 Dec 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 22]

1. By directive of 10 December 1943 the Provost Marshal General was ordered to prepare and submit to the Civil Affairs Division a detailed training program for Civil Affairs officers for duty in the Asiatic theater. The directive prescribes these bases for the program: (a) that 1500 officers (25 percent Navy, the remainder Army) be trained; (b) that approximately 10 percent of the total become available for occupational duties in October 1945 and the total number by March 1946; (c) that the training program follow the pattern of the Fort Custer-college (CATS [Civil Affairs Training School]) courses employed in training for the North African and European theaters and (d) that not less than six months of training be spent in area and Japanese language studies, (e) to be preceded by an indoctrination course in military government.

The following plan has been formulated within the foregoing prescription and in the light of the general situations and overriding objectives discussed below.

2. General. It is hoped that the lessons of American experience in the past two years will not be forgotten in the present venture. Two years ago and until recently it was urged that the control of occupied areas was a civilian, not a military, responsibility; that American forces might never be in occupation of any considerable areas; that, in any event, preparation for such possible tasks might be deferred until their emergence had become more apparent. These identical views may be aired again; if so, they must be beaten down as they have been in the past.

For it is infinitely more important in a program for the Far East than for the Mediterranean-European theaters that recruitment and training for occupation be initiated well in advance of the event. Familiarity in America with European languages and backgrounds, while not widespread, is nonetheless considerable; acquaintance with Far Eastern languages, institutions and points of view is practically nonexistent.

Furthermore, the difficulties of imparting useful language and other relevant knowledge of the Far East are many times those of similar preparation for European areas. Whereas a useful basic conversational knowledge of Italian and German can be imparted to a student officer in three months, a corresponding proficiency in Japanese cannot be achieved in six to eight months. Six months of intensive work in conversational Japanese is a bare minimum of useful instruction-a fact fully recognized in the directive itself.

Finally, it is feared that a certain amount of inevitable war-weariness may, in the end, adversely affect the Far Eastern program. With the conclusion of European hostilities, it is easy enough to visualize a diminishing interest in Far Eastern occupations, a fact that may seriously increase the difficulties of recruiting desirable student officers and of maintaining a necessary degree of zeal in their studies.

These situations combine to point out the first of two overriding objectives in the following plan, i.e., to begin training at the earliest possible moment consistent with the provisions of the directive. The second major objective relates to


the disposition of the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia. These two matters will now be discussed.


a. That the plan be generally approved.
b. That the training of the first group of student officers for the Far East begin at the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, on 1 July 1944; that a directive, calling upon all Forces to furnish nominations for this and five succeeding courses, be published not later than 1 April 1944
c. That the School of Military Government be authorized to conduct two courses in military government of six (6) to seven (7) weeks each during the period 1 March 1944 to 15 June 1944; that each of these two student groups consist of not to exceed one hundred (100) officers of field grade to be secured by allotments to the several Forces; that a directive establishing quotas for these two courses be published not later that 1 February 1944
d. That contracts with not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) universities, to be selected by the Provost Marshal General, be authorized for the purpose of furnishing instruction for periods of not less than six (6) months nor more than eight (8) months in Japanese language, backgrounds and related subjects, to groups of Army and Navy officers not to exceed two hundred and fifty (250) in each group.
e. That the Provost Marshal General be authorized to employ not to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) persons speaking the Japanese language for periods not to exceed three (3) months for any one person, during which time they will be instructed in modern methods of language instruction.
f. That a contract with the University of Chicago be authorized for the purpose of securing the services of said University in instructing not to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) Japanese language informants and not to exceed five (5) supervisors in modern methods of language instruction.22



[Ltr, William Bell Dinsmoor, President Archaeological Institute of America, Columbia Univ, to SW, 15 Mar 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43 (1)]

As the writer of one of the preliminary memoranda on the matter of a proposal for the protection of cultural monuments in the war zones and as one who has had this problem under consideration for the past several months, I wish most strongly to endorse the enclosed memorandum which Mr. Francis H. Taylor of the Metropolitan Museum, with whom I am collaborating, has drawn up on this subject.23

I am representing a group which at present constitutes an informal committee, of which I am chairman, and includes the heads of the departments of art and archaeology at Princeton and Harvard, who are most emphatically in favor of urging that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment. The matter was also brought before the American Council of Learned Societies, which approved of such action and asked me to assume the chairmanship of such a committee. I had previously, as President of the Archeological Institute of America, discussed the matter with the Board of Trustees and the Executive Committee of the body; and recently, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the American Academy in Rome, of which I am Secretary, I brought up the same matter. On all of these occasions, always with men who thoroughly know Europe and its cultural heritage, I was impressed by their earnest feeling


that something must be done to protect and salvage it....
In view of the fact that the proposal is now being presented to you for your consideration and, I venture to hope, approval, I wish . . . to offer my own services in any capacity in which they may be useful . . . particularly in connection with the organization and execution of the project....

[Memo, Taylor, Dir, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 15 Mar 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

(I) The United States Government has been party to a series of conventions for the protection of monuments, missions, works of art, and cultural property generally in time of war, as follows: a. Convention (II) with respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899.

b. Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907.
c. Convention (II) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907.
d. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact), opened for signature at Washington, April 15, 1935

(2) The War Department has implemented the diplomatic conventions in the Rules of Land Warfare, published in the Basic Field Manual (FM 27-10) prepared under the direction of the Judge Advocate General's Office, October 1, 1940, under the articles dealing with instructions for officials in occupied territory for the care of public . . . and . . . private property. . . .

(3) In view of the above, there is a body of precedent clearly established according to the rules of international law and of military procedure for dealing with these matters, but the great scale of destruction in the present war has exceeded anything imagined or provided for by previous declarations, and it is therefore imperative that certain additional measures be undertaken by the War Department which will not be in conflict with any military strategy or objective, but which will give added consideration to salvaging whatever may be possible of the civilization now being wrecked upon the continent of Europe.

Information which has been received through our channels indicates that through looting, forced sale and other forms of sequestration, the Nazis have stolen more than a billion and a half dollars worth of movable works of art.

Many of the great monuments of Europe have been pillaged or destroyed....
More recently, the air offensive upon the countries occupied by the enemy has created a new problem in regard to the bombing of cultural monuments by forces of the United Nations. In Nuremberg, Berlin, and Munich some of the greatest museums of the world have, we understand, been totally destroyed. While we realize that part of the tragedy of the war lies in the necessary bombing of cultural centers if they lie within the orbit of military objectives, we nevertheless feel that there should be attached to the general staffs in each area qualified officers who not only are competent to indicate what monuments should preferably be avoided, but also to direct operations of salvage and protection of partially damaged monuments and the care of movable objects in damaged buildings at the very moment that such devastated areas are occupied by our troops.

(4) There are today more than fifty museum directors, curators, archaeologists and historians of distinction and competence who hold commissions in the armed forces. The great majority are doing routine desk jobs as intelligence officers....
It is suggested that a special detail be formed where, by executive order, these officers could be brought together. Similarly by application to the Secretary of the Navy, such Naval and Marine Corps officers could be transferred to this detail. After a brief period of a few weeks' discussion of policy and procedure, they could be assigned to staff headquarters in various theaters of operation . . . to work in conjunction with personnel now being trained for military government....

The function of these officers would be to advise Commanding Officers in regard to the principal monuments under their care, so that the actual operation of salvage and protection might be carried out under the direction of junior officers assigned to the troops.


[Memo, Comdt, SMG, to Actg Dir, CAD, Through PMG, 1 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

I. The attached papers 24  and our own studies indicate that special measures will be required in


occupied territory for the protection and preservation of historical monuments and art treasures, and also to prevent black markets in historical paintings, objects of art, and similar articles stolen by the enemy.

3. . . . special measures should be taken for the protection of the cultural heritage of Europe and other appropriate areas. Clearly the matter is of great importance, and it is believed that the Army will gain in good will if adequate steps are taken.

4. For this reason, the protection and preservation of historical monuments and art treasures in occupied territory should be specifically included in the functions of the civil affairs section. Experienced personnel should be trained in order to assist the commanding general and the officer in charge of civil affairs in adequate advance planning and to act as advisers on technical aspects.

5. The objectives would include museums, libraries, archives, monuments, collections, universities, colleges, churches, convents and similar installations.

7. The following recommendations are submitted:
a. That four of five carefully selected experts having maximum knowledge and experience in the field of fine arts and archaeology be commissioned for the purpose of taking the course at the School of Military Government....
b. That the civil affairs section of each theater commander include one or two such experts....
c. That an appropriate number of experts be included in the pool of technicians and specialists now being formed by the Provost Marshal General to be available when needed for operating functions in the field....
d. That FM 27-5 be amended or supplemented by appropriate reference to the subject....


[Ltr, Dir, National Gallery of Art, to the President, 20 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43 (1)]

I refer to a letter addressed to you by the Honorable Harlan F. Stone, the Chief Justice of the United States, dated December 8, 1942, concerning the creation of an organization to function under the auspices of the Government for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis powers or by individuals acting under their authority....

In your reply to the Chief justice, dated December 28, 1942, you advised him of your interest ... and stated that his letter had been referred to the appropriate agencies of the Government....

I now have to inform you that this matter has been given careful consideration by the Department of State and that the governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics have been approached with the suggestion that a similar organization might be set up in each of these countries.

In the meanwhile, under the auspices of the War Department, a special section has been formed in the School of Military Government . . . with the idea of training certain officers in the Specialist Branch . . . so that they could be attached to the staffs of our armies which . . . will occupy European countries and thus be able to advise the commanding officers as to the location of and the care to be given to the various artistic and historic objects in these occupied territories....

It would seem therefore that it would now be appropriate to appoint a commission to be known as the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, such Commission to advise and to work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territories when it is possible to relinquish military control. ♦ ♦ ♦

The Commission should be authorized to secure, on a volunteer basis, the services of a committee of experts composed of museum directors and other qualified persons to advise on the above project and to furnish information required for carrying it out. ♦ ♦ ♦

I have consulted with Secretary Stimson concerning this matter and he is in accord with these suggestions.25


[Memo, Hilldring to SW, 27 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

I. Colonels Haskell and C. H. S. Townsend of this Division conferred April 19th with Colonel H. [Harry] A. McBride, Mr. David Finley, Director and Messrs. Walker, Shepard, and James, all of the National Gallery of Art, for the pur-


pose of considering measures to be taken for the protection of cultural monuments and works of art in enemy-held territory now or hereafter subject to military operations.

2. It was agreed that this Division would be furnished a comprehensive list of officers now on other duty but especially qualified by training and experience for duties in connection with the protection of works of art and historic monuments, and a further list of men so qualified but not now in the military service. It was tentatively agreed that certain officers should be assigned for both staff and field duty in this connection. The suggestion that some instruction on this subject be given at the school of Military Government was accepted by the War Department.

3. With regard to the committee mentioned in Mr. Dinsmoor's letter of April 7th, 26  it has been agreed that a committee be formed with such a membership as to make it national in scope, and further that the proposed membership of the committee should be submitted to the President for his approval.


[Ltr, SW to Dinsmoor, 24 May 43, CAD files, 000.4 (325-43) (1)]

With your letter you inclose, in draft form, a statement and questionnaire which, I observe from your letter, are "now being considered by the American Council of Learned Societies' Committee on Preservation of European Cultural Material for printing and distribution among those particularly concerned with the salvage and preservation of such material."

As you know, I am deeply interested in the preservation of the cultural heritage of Europe and desire to promote all practicable steps looking toward the accomplishment of this purpose.

The School of Military Government . . . is giving special attention to this problem and for that reason I am sending the proposed statement and questionnaire to the Commandant, Brig. Gen. Wickersham, for his information. As the statement might be interpreted to contain certain implications of a tactical nature, it would be inappropriate for me to comment upon it.


[Ltr, First Secy, Br Embassy, to Secy of State, 25 Jun 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

... the Embassy has been approached by certain interested British officials on the subject of the protection of works of art and ancient monuments in any projected invasion of the European Continent....

The real objective is twofold:
(a) To see that precautions are taken to prevent unnecessary damage to works of art after the actual fighting is over.
(b) To see that measures are taken at the first possible moment to save partly destroyed buildings from further damage....

This matter has already been brought to the attention of Lt. Col. David Bruce, Chief of the Office of Strategic Services in London....
Inasmuch as the British authorities are already taking measures looking to the protection of artistic works and ancient monuments during operations on the Continent, it is believed that the Department may wish to study this matter and take appropriate action with the American Military authorities in Washington.


[Memo, Hilldring for ASW, 21 Jul 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. There follows . . . action taken by the Civil Affairs Division to make available to General Eisenhower trained personnel ... concerning historic monuments in Italy:

a. The Directive for HUSKY made reference to the preservation of historic monuments.
b. Captain Mason Hammond, AC [Allied Commission], a specialist in planning for protection of historic monuments, was sent to General Eisenhower's headquarters under orders dated 26 May 1943. In addition, it is understood that an officer of qualifications similar to those of Captain Hammond was furnished by the British.27


[State Dept Press Release No. 348, 20 Aug 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

The President has approved the establishment of an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, 28  with the Honorable Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as Chairman. Mr. David E. Finley, Director of the National Gallery and a member of the Commission of Fine Arts, has been appointed Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Huntington Cairns, Secretary-Treasurer of the Gallery, will serve as Secretary-Treasurer of the Commission. The other members of the Commission are: The Honorable Herbert Lehman, Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; the Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress; Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the Archaeological Institute of America; Dr. Francis Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan Museum in New York, and President of the Association of Art Museum Directors, and Dr. Paul J. Sachs, Associate Director of the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts of Harvard University. The members will serve for three years.

The headquarters of the Commission will be in the National Gallery of Art. The Commission will cooperate with the appropriate branches of the Army and of the Department of State, including the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as well as with appropriate civilian agencies. The Commission will also advise and work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territory when it is possible to relinquish military control.

The Commission may be called upon to furnish museum officials and art historians to the General Staff of the Army, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by the armies of the United Nations. One of the principal functions of the Commission will be to act as a channel of communications between the Army and the various universities, museums and other scholarly institutions, organizations and individuals from whom information and services are desired....
The Commission will function under the auspices of the United States Government and in conjunction with similar groups in other countries for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic and historic records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and restoring to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis Powers or individuals acting under their authority or consent.


[WD Press Release, 25 Aug 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-2543) (1)]

Every effort consistent with military expediency is being made to preserve such art objects as come within the scope of Allied military operations....
Military personnel whose backgrounds include a knowledge of art are being assigned to the Allied Military Governments to counsel and guide commanding officers of various units on the value of the art objects.

Maps showing the locations of widely known art objects, including statues, museums and other structures containing both public and private collections, are being furnished combat commanders, including those officers directing aerial attacks. Commanders are doing everything practicable to keep these objects out of direct range.

In addition to preserving these art objects intact whenever possible, the duties of the AMG museums and monuments officers include advising on minor repair projects, and preservation of such fragments as are found after an occupation so that it may be possible for the objects to be completely restored after the war.


[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Oct 43, CM-IN 18164 (MAT-70), CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1]

Already this headquarters is receiving requests for procurement of Italian documents and other material of war. Note Hilldring's letter of 8 September inclosing request of Librarian of Congress. Systematic collection of archives and documents . . . requires organized and directed effort by competent archivist. Suggest if two governments desire such collection to be carried out that they make initial designation of one archivist with small staff each from United States and United Kingdom. They would be attached to


Subcommission in Education, Fine Arts and Archives of the Allied Control Commission. Not necessary that they be in uniform....

[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 5 Nov 43, CM-OUT 2457 [TAM-74], CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1]

... We agree with your statement of problem . . . and suggestion made in your MAT 70.... Action to accomplish above being initiated immediately. ...29


[Memo, Lt Col Charles P. Burnett, Jr., Chief, Govt Branch, CAD, to Chief, CAD, 26 Oct 43, CAD files, 000,.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. Determination of Policy. The War Department has adopted the policy of protecting artistic treasures to the fullest extent consistent with military operations .30   This policy is emphasized in the forthcoming Revised Civil Affairs Manual (FM 27-5), which states: "It is the policy of the United States, except where military necessity makes it impossible, to preserve all historical and cultural monuments and works of art, religious shrines and objects of art." In carrying out this policy, the War Department, through the Civil Affairs Division, works in close collaboration with the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe....

2. Formulation of Plans. Directives for military operations issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff have provided that, so far as consistent with military necessity, all efforts should be made to preserve local archives, historic and classical monuments and objects of art. . . . In the same connection, General Marshall cabled to the Commanding Generals of U.S. Army Forces throughout the world that by direction of the President all possible steps should be taken to preserve archives....
In the theater of operations, AMG General Administrative Instructions [GAI] No. 8 [Ch. XIV, sec. 7] contained detailed instructions to Civil Affairs officers concerning the steps necessary to implement these directives. AMG Planning Instructions No. 12 also emphasized the policy of protection for ancient monuments and prohibited the purchase of export of souvenirs of artistic value.

Notices have also been posted at historic ruins to safeguard them from damage by troops.

3. Procurement of Personnel. Provision was made in tables of organization of AMG for museums and monuments officers. Those officers are now serving overseas in the Education and Fine Arts Division of AMG. Their function is to make plans for precautions to prevent unnecessary damage to artistic treasures and to furnish advice and assistance regarding partially damaged monuments, museums, and other artistic treasures. ♦ ♦ ♦

4. Distribution of Maps.... there has been prepared under the general supervision of the American Commission and the Committee of the American Council a series of maps of European cities and towns. These maps contain a brief history and description of the chief museums and monuments in each locality and other information concerning artistic and historic monuments therein.

The maps are furnished to the War Department for use by museums and monuments officers in performing their functions and by the U.S. Army Air Forces in planning their own aerial operations. ♦ ♦ ♦ 

5. Coordination with Operations. General Eisenhower had been requested by OPD to comment on (a) the practicability of declaring specific cities and towns throughout Italy to be open by agreement and consequently safe storage for movable works of art ... and (b) the possibility of using radio broadcasts and pamphlets to advise Italians to remove such works from cities and towns which may be subjected to future military operations. . . . [See below, Chapter XIV, Section 7-1

General Marshall also submitted for General Eisenhower's consideration the policy of avoiding destruction of immovable works of art insofar as possible without handicapping military operations and General Eisenhower replied this policy was already in effect. ♦ ♦ ♦


[FM 27-5, 22 Dec 43, sec. 1]

Archives and Records. Archives and records, both current and historical, of all branches of the government of the occupied territory are of immediate and continuing use to military government. It is therefore essential to seize and protect such archives and records. ♦ ♦ ♦

Shrines and Art. It is the policy of the United States, except where military necessity makes it impossible, to preserve all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art. ♦ ♦ ♦


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