Endnotes for Chapter II
1 General Marshall's appointment as Chief of Staff dated from 1 September 1939. Hr had previously been Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, from 6 July to 15 October 1938; Deputy Chief of Staff from 16 October 1938 to 30 June 1939; and Acting Chief of Staff from 1 July to 31 August 1939.
2 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 40, sub: Nail Strategic Decisions, WPD 4175-7. The WPD action officer was Maj. Matthew B. Ridgway.
3 (1) Memo, CofS for WPD, 23 May 40, no sub, WPD 4175-10. (2) Aide Memoirs, May Ridgway, 23 May 40, WPD 4175-10.
4 ( 1 )As restated in Incl .4, to ltr, JPC: [Col Clark and Capt Cooke] to JB, 9 Apr 40, sub: Jt :A&N Bsc War Plans- Rainbow, JB ;325, sers 642 and 642-1 (2) Cf. statement of the year before in directive quoted in RAINBOW 1, JB a25, ser 642-1, cited above, p. 8.
5 JB 325, ser 642-4. Harry H. Woodring, Secretary of War, and Lewes Compton, Acting Secretary of the Navy, sent the plan to the President with their approval on 13 June. On 12 July the President asked the new Secretaries of War and Navy, Henry L. Stimson and Prank Knox, to read the plan and talk with him about it. On 26 July they resubmitted the plan, with the same letter of transmittal, and on 14 August the President approved it. For the full treatment of Rainbow 4, see Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
6 Rpt, Sr A&N members JPC [Col Clark and Capt Charles J. Moore, USN] to CofS and CNO, 26 Jun 40, sub: Views on Questions Propounded by President on War Sit, WPD 4250-3.
7 Ibid.
8 The U. S. Fleet had born scheduled to return to the west coast of the United States on 9 May 1940, but Admiral Stark had ordered that it remain at Hawaii for two weeks longer, and then indefinitely. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising .Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942 (Boston, Little, Brown 8c Company, 19481, p. 43. For correspondence between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Stark during this period, see Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Hearings) Part 14, pp. 923 1000. The letter of 27 May 1940, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson, is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 14, p. 943. Admiral Stark's exact words were: "You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."
9 (1) WPD study, n.d., sub: Decisions as to Nail Action, WPD 420-3. It is worth noting that WPD suggested, as a partial substitute for keeping the fleet in Hawaii, the dangerous expedient-already under discussion---of restricting exports to Japan. This June study was evidently a draft of an aide-memoire that Brig. Gen. George V. Strong was ready to submit to the Chief of Staff as a basis for talks with the President. (2) See memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Natl Def Policy, WPD 420--3, quoted below, p. 20. It follows and expands the views submitted by WPD to Gen Marshall in memo cited n. 2.
10 Pers ltr, Embick to Strong, 8 Jun 40, WPD 417;1-11. The syndicated article by Walter Lippman referred to, was entitled "Towards Peace with Peace." It appeared in The Washington Post. June 6, 1940.
11 A great deal of material concerning these very complicated transactions, and Army views thereon, is gathered in an Office of the Chief of Staff file entitled Foreign Sale or Exchange of Munitions. This file of papers was compiled for the period April -October 1940 by the Secretary of the General Staff, Lt. Col. Orlando Ward..
12 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 11 Jun 40, sub: Sale of 75-mm. Guns, OCS File, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mum. WPD's concurrence is stated therein. The five hundred 75-mm. guns represented a second increment, arrangements having already been made to transfer 395 75-mm. guns. The notification to prepare to transfer the second increment came through the Secretary of War about noon on 11 June 1940. (See unsigned memo, 11 Jun 40, filed with above memo.)
13 Memo, W. B. S. [Maj Smith] for CofS, 11 Jun 40, no sub, OCS file, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mum. Perhaps the most serious of the prospective shortages of finished munitions, apart from planes, that these transfers would render still more acute was a shortage of ammunition. Shortages of ammunition were not only an absolute limitation on wartime operations themselves but a very serious limitation on peacetime training, since the free use of ammunition was an important condition of alertness in overseas garrisons and a realistic, accelerated program for training recruits. (For a fuller treatment of this transaction, see Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II ( Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950) pp. 310-12.)
14 Notes on conf in OCS, 17 Jun 40, OCS Misc Confs, Binder 3. The remarks should be read in the light of the estimate made by the JPC in submitting Rainbow 4 (JB 325, ser 642-4). The immediate need, upon the surrender of the British or French Fleet, would be to begin mobilizing, so as to be ready to send expeditionary forces a few months later. Meanwhile it would be necessary to take naval action.
15 Notes cited n. 14. These are printed as part of Exhibit 87, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp. 1929 30.
16 Sec, for example: (1) ltr, Army member, JPC [Lt Col Raymond S. Pratt] to JB, 12 Jul 28, sub: Five Yr Programs of AAF and Bauer, JB 349, see 392 (see pats 8 and 12) ; (2) ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept [Maj Gen William Lassiter] to Comdt Fourteenth 1Vav Dist, 26 Mar 31, JB 303, ser 494; (3) memo, Col Sherman Miles for ACofS WPD, 27 Dec 35, sub: Basis of Calculation on Peace and War Garrisons, Hawaiian Dept . . . , JB 325, see 580; (4) 1tr, JPC. [Col Krueger and Capt Royal E. Ingersoll, USN] to JB, 13 May 36, sub: U. S. Forces, Hawaiian Islands, JB 325, see 580; and (5) rpt, JPC, 21 Apr 39, JB 325, see 634 (see Sec II, par 8: this rpt was approved by JB on 6 May 39).
17 Notes cited n. 14.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. General Marshall had occasion to act on this view the following day in connection with a British request for a few ; from six to twelve) B-1 Ts. The great objection to releasing the B-17 was the need to build up the reserve of B--17's (currently' being delivered at the rate of two a month) for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the Panama Canal. Marshall declared it to be "the unanimous opinion of the War Department officers concerned, that it would be seriously prejudicial to our own defensive situation to release any of these ships." ( 1 ) Memo, CofS for SW, 18 Jun 40, sub: Trams to Br of 11 Flying Fortress Type Planes (B--17), OCS File, Foreign Sale of Exch of Mum. (2) Memo, Maj Smith for Henry L.. Morgenthau, 25 Jun 40, no sub, OCS File, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun. On 20 June General Watson told :Major Smith that the matter would be dropped as a result of the War Department objections. (3) Cf. Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 306.
20 Notes cited n. 14.
21 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, sub: Def Precautions, WPD 4322. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, same sub, WPD 4326. (3) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp. 1907 f f: Part 27, p. 126. (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 108, 468-69. (5) Cone, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, Ch. II.
22 Memo WPD for CofS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Natl Def Policy, WPD 4250-3 (dictated and signed by Geri Strong).
23 (1) Navy study, 22 Jun 40, sub: Basis for Immediate Decisions Concerning Nail Def, WPD 4250-3. This bars the identifying mark in the upper left-hand corner: OP-12B-McC. On 27 June a copy of the original Navy study, as corrected by the President, was circulated by the: Joint Planning Committee. A copy of this is also included in WPD 4250-3. (2) Informal memo, G. C. M. [Marshall] for Strong, 24 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3) Kittredge Monograph, Vol I, Sec II, Part D, Ch 8, pp. 168-73. (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 110-13. (5) Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, Ch. II, pp. 20-23 MS.
24 The message is quoted in full in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Their Finest Hour (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 23-25.
25 The President stated he would consider carefully sending a naval squadron to Irish ports and explained that it would require an act of Congress to transfer destroyers to Great Britain. Sec (1) Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 25; (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (rev. ed. New York, Harper & Brothers 1950), p. 174; (3) Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948; ; and (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 107.
26 For the Export Control Act of 2 July 1940, subsequent regulations issued under it, and Japanese reaction thereto, sec (1) Hull, Memoirs, pp. 901-02; and (2) U. S. Dept of State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943) (hereafter cited as U. S. Foreign Policy 1931;11-1941), p. 97.
27 (1) PL 671, 76th Cong. This act, approved on 28 June 1940, was introduced in Congress as HR 9822 on 22 June 1940, an act "To expedite naval shipbuilding, and for other purposes." (2) For a full account of the destroyer-base agreement and its legal basis, see Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, Ch. II.
28 The Selective Service Act of 1940 was signed by the President on 16 September 1940. This act, with the joint Resolution of 27 August 1940 which authorized the President to call out the National Guard and Organized Reserves, provided the legislative authority for an army of 1,400,000 men. For a discussion of the work which led to the passage of the Selective Service Act, see (1) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 345-48: and (2) Watson, Prewar Plans arid Preparations, pp. 189-97.
29 For the Ghormley-Emmons-Strong visit to London, see: (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 113--15 (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 19,3.9-May 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1947), pp. 40-41 : and (3) WPD 4402, which contains copies of British minutes of the meetings held on 20, 29, and 31 August (officially known as meetings of the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee).
30 Min mtg Br-Amer Standardization of Arms Corn, 31 Aug 40, WPD 4402-1.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Notes on conf in OCS, 23 Sep 40, OCS Misc Confs, Binder 3. Officers attending this meeting with the Chief of Staff, besides General Emmons and Colonel Spaatz, were Maj. Gens. Henry A. Arnold, George H. Brett, Barton K. Yount, and General Strong. As an immediate result of this meeting, Brig. Gen. James E. Chancy of the Air Defense Command was sent to England, as Generals Emmons and Strong recommended, to get a firsthand impression of British air defenses. (See pees ltr, Col Ward, SGS, to Gen Chancy, 20 Sep 40, and handwritten note of Gen Marshall thereon, OCS (21-11-12.) General Chancy was later assigned as Special Army Observer, London. For the dispatch of Air Corps officers as observers with the British Army in Egypt, see: (1) ltr, Sumner Welles to Gen Marshall, 7 Oct 40, AG 210.684 (10-7-40) : and (2) ltr, Marshall to Under Secy State, 14 Oct 40, AG 210.684 (10-7-40 ) .
34 Memo, Emmons and Strong for CofS, 25 Sep 40, sub: Obsns in England, WPD 4638.
35 WPD study, 25 Sep 40, sub: The Problem of Pdn of Mun, WPD 4321-9.
36 No copy of the 4 Nov study was retained in WD files. A version of the memo exists in WD files as Navy draft memo [Admiral Stark for SN], 12 Nov 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15. For identification of this memo, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 118.
37 For discussions of the Plan Dog memorandum, see: (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. IV; (2)  Kittredge Monograph, App A to notes for Sec III, Part D, Ch. 13; (3) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 42-44; (4) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 271-72; and (5) Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
38 Navy draft memo cited n. 36.
39 (1) Memo, Col Jonathan W. Anderson, Actg ACofS WPD, for CofS, 12 Nov 40, sub: Natl Policy of U. S. Colonel Anderson wrote a long commentary on the Navy memorandum for General Marshall. (2) Memo, W PD for CofS, 13 Nov 4-0, same sub. Both in WPD 4175-15. The Army staff does not appear to have been unanimously in favor of adopting Admiral Stark's proposal.
40 See notes in WPD 4175-15, in particular, memo, CofS for SW, 13 Nov 40, no sub.
41 Memo, Col Ward, SGS, for ACofS WPD, 13 Nov 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15.
42 Off memo, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, 26 Nov 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15. For initiation of the study, see: (1) ltr, CofS to JB, 18 Nov 40, sub: Natl Def Policy for U. S., WPD 4175-15; (2) Itr, JPC [Col Joseph T. McNarney and Capt Turner, USN] to JB, 21 Dec 40, same sub, JB 325, ser 670.
43 See memo, Stark for Marshall, 22 Nov 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15. It is obvious from what followed that the President at least gave Admiral Stark his tacit consent to pursue the subject further.
44 Secretary Hull's views are quoted as summarized in memo, Gen Gerow for CofS, 3 Jan 41, sub: Conf with Secy State, WPD 4175-15. The only action that resulted was that after Stimson and Hull discussed the Joint Committee paper, the three Secretaries agreed to meet weekly (on Tuesdays) to talk over questions of national defense. (See penned note by General Marshall on the memorandum.) For the history of this paper, sec also: (1) WPD draft Itr, JPC to JB, 12 Dec 40, sub cited n. 42 (1), incl Navy draft proposal of substitute for p. 1 of Army draft study, W PD 4175-15 ; (2) memo, Gen Gerow for CofS, 20 Dec 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15; (31 ltr, JPC [signed Col McNarney and Capt Turner] to JB, 21 Dec 40, sub cited n. 42 (1), JB 325, ser 670; and (4) min, mtg JB, 14 May 41.
45 See discussion of events leading to the staff conversations with the British, known as ABC-1, in Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 120.
46 (1) Memo, McNarney for Gerow, 2 Dec 40, sub: Stf Convs, WPD 4402. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 26 Dec 40, sub: Army Reps for Stf Confs with Gt Brit, WPD 4402.
47 This account of the conference is based on Marshall's summary, memo, CofS for WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf Thursday, Jan 16, 1941, WPD 4175-18.
48 Ltr, JPC [signed Col McNarney Rear Adm R. K. Turner to JB, 21 Jan 41, sub: Jt Instants for A&N Reps for Holding Stf Cones with the Br, Incl an Agenda for the Convs, JB 325, see 674. 7 his study was prepared pursuant to a joint Board directive as proposed by Captain Turner at the joint Board meeting of 11 December 1940. (See min, mtg JB, 11 Dec 40.)
49 App II to Incl (A) to ltr cited n. 48.
50 In the version finally circulated the last passage was modified to read "in the Atlantic or naively in the Mediterranean region.- This qualification was inserted by the President. (See memo, Private and Confidential, F. D. R. [President Roosevelt] for SN, 26 Jt 41, 1B 325, ser 674.1
51 App II to Incl (4) to ltr cited n. 48.
52 (1) Min, mtg JB, 22 Jan 41. (2) ; Memo cited n. 50. (3) Menno for red, Lt Col William P. Scobey, 28 Jan 41, sub cited n. 48, JB 325, see 674. The President's emendations affected references to contingencies-American entry into the war, the wartime relations between the United States and Great Britain, and American operations against Germany. (For discussion of some of the President's emendations, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 373.)
53 (1) See App II to Incl (A) to Itr cited n. 48. (2) For a discussion of Stimson's views In the wintry of 1940 41 and the spring of 1942, see Stimson and Bandy. On Active Service, pp. 368-70.

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