Endnotes for Chapter XIV
1 See above, pp. 292-93.
2 For estimates, see: (1) memo, OPD for WDCMC, 3 Aug 42, sub: TORCH OPD, Tab 78, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B: (2) msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42, COS (W) 236, WDCSA TORCH (SS) : (3) memo, G-2 for CofS, 4 Aug 42, sub: Comd of TORCH Opns, WDCSA TORCH (SS) (4) msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Aug 42, CM-IN 5608: (5) memo, OPD for SW, 10 Nov 42, sub: German Capabilities in Iberian Peninsula, and (6) JCS memo for info . 35, 28 Nov 42, sub: Axis Capabilities in Mediterranean Area, both in ABC 381 Mediterranean Area (11-28-42): and (7) Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa, pp. 68-88 MS.
3 Msg [Br] CsofS to Jt Stf Miss (Washington), 4 Aug 42 (COS (W) 236), WDCSA TORCH, 1.
4 (1) Min, 35th mtg CCS, 6 Aug 42. (2) The comments of Army planners are in memo, OPD for CofS, 6 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Tab 21, Item 1, Exec 5. This memorandum contains a systematic review of COS (W) 236.
5 Min, 28th mtg CPS, 7 Aug 42. The recommendations of the CPS were circulated as CCS 100, 8 Aug 42, title: Gen Order for Priority of Shipping Mvmts.
6 (1) CCS 100/1, 14 Aug 42, title cited n. 5. (2) Min, 36th mtg CCS, 13 Aug 42.
7 (1) CCS 87/4, 9 Aug 42, title: Shipping Implications of Proposed Air Force Deployment, rpt by CMTC, concurred in by CPS to the CCS. (2) See earlier papers in CCS 87 series, for background. (3) See min cited n. 6 (2) , for subsequent approval of the provision of the report.
8 For the diversion of the 33d Pursuit Group from the Middle East to TORCH, see pp. 319-20, below.
9 Min, 28th mtg JCS, 11 Aug 42. It was necessary to decide at once what to do with the Aquitania and the Mauretania, which were en route to the United States. If they were not utilized on the Middle East run, and were rerouted, ships suitable for the unescorted voyage might not readily be found. (CCS 87/3 and CCS 87/4.)
10 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42, CM-IN 4988. This message contains a report on an important conference with Churchill at Chequers, the official country residence of the British Prime Ministers.
11 The Prune Minister then took up the question with the President. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 14 Sep 42, Tab 50, Item 1, Exec 5.
12 Pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, Paper 59, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. This letter reports a conference with the Prime Minister.
13 (1) Msgs, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, Nos. 151 and 154, Paper 57, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (2) Pers ltr cited n. 12.
14 (1) Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 25 Sep 42, Item 42, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Deans for Marshall and King, 26 Sep 42, no sub, Item 63a, Exec 10. This memorandum transmitted information from Leahy, on the response of the President, Leahy, and Hopkins to the messages from the Prime Minister. Mention is made of a draft message prepared by the Chiefs of Staff and given to Admiral Leahy. This is probably identical with a text preceding the Prime Minister's messages and Leahy's memorandum. (Papers 56 and 58, ABC: 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.)
15 For a description of the so-called Trickle movement and the renewal of convoys on a reduced scale in mid-December 1942, see Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 365-70.
16 According to the Army strategic planners, an examination of the required Atlantic and Pacific railings of cargo vessels for the latter part of 1942 and early 1943 revealed that Pacific shipping requirements were greater, and that the Navy's demands alone in the Pacific were almost equal to all requirements in the Atlantic. (See The Weekly Strategic Sum of Policy Cam, OPD, 28 Nov 42, Tab Policy Com, 17th mtg, ABC 334.3 Policy Corn (1 Aug 42), 3.)
17 It appeared to the Army planners that the South Pacific undertaking complicated further an already muddled situation, since Allied shipping was handled by "four uncorrelated agencies" (the Army, the Navy, the War Shipping Administration, and the British Ministry of War Transport), and that the Navy had been "grabbing shipping" wherever it could be found. (See The Weekly Strategic Resume of Policy Com, OPD, 21 Nov 42, Tab Policy Com, 16th mtg, ABC 334.3 Policy Corn l l Aug 42), 3.)
18 (1) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 4 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1673. (2) Draft msg [President to Prime Minister], 4 Sep 42, Item 9, Exec 1.
19 Samuel Eliot Morison, Operations in North African Waters: October 1942-June 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1947), p. 31.
20 Morrison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 133, 222. The Wasp was sunk on 15 September 1942 and the Hornet on 27 October 1942.
21 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to OPD, 13 Aug 42, CM-IN 4811 (8/14/42). (2) Msg (originator OPD) Marshall to USFOR, London, 5 Oct 42, CM-OUT 1787.
22 See pp. 336 ff below, for the establishment of the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC).
23 OPD draft memo [CofS for President, 2 Oct 421. sub: Support of China, Item 54, Exec 10.
24 Ibid. The proposed reply for Chiang Kai-shek was sent to the President on 9 October 1942] The United States persuaded Chiang to modify the terms of his three demands. (See (1) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. VII: and (2) Ch. XVII, below.)
25 (1) Particularly useful War Department files on the story of strategic planning in connection with the Aleutians in the fall of 1942 are OPD 381 ADC and WDCSA Alaska (SS). (2) See also Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
26 In the month of November 1942 the total Allied losses of merchant vessels by submarine action in the Atlantic "for the first and only time surpassed 600; 000 tons." (See Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 324, and msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, No. 216, Tab 12/6, Item 4, Exec 5. ) Even then, the long debate on whether the Army or the Navy should control air operations against submarines had not been settled. For a partial explanation of the jurisdictional disputes, see: (1) Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 514-53; (2) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank-August 1942 to December 1943, II, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 377-411 (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF II) ; and (3) Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 237-47.
27 (1) Unused OPD draft ltr [President to Prime Minister], 25 Sep 42, Item 42, Exec 10. This letter was drafted by OPD and revised by Marshall. (2) See min, 40th mtg CCS, 18 Sep 42 for Marshall's views, in latter part of summer of 1942, on the revision of the shipping program.
28 Min, 42d mtg CCS, 2 Oct 42.
29 (1) Min, 48th mtg JCS, 29 Dec 42. (2 ) William Chaikin and Charles H. Coleman, Shipbuilding Policies of the War Production Board January 1942 to November 1945, Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study 26, pp. 14-18. (3) Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War, I, Program and Administration (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), 535-38, 602-09. (4) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XVI, p. 29, MS.
30 The Weekly Strategic Resume cited n. 17. For a full treatment of supply factors (including the long holdovers and uneconomical routing of ships and inefficient port operations) limiting the TORCH operation, see: (1) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, and (2) Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa.
31 See CinC's Dispatch, N Af Campaign, 1942-43, p. 5, copy in OPD Hist Unit File.
32 This number was carried over from the War Department planners' studies of June and July. See memo, OPD for CGs AGF and SOS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Preparation of Units for Overseas Serv, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 3a.
33 CCS 103/3, 26 Sep 42, title: Outline Plan, Opn TORCH. The plan itself bears the date 20 September 1942.
34 The immediate result of the decision taken on 30 July to withdraw ten small ships for partial conversion to use as combat loaders was to cut by about 20,000 the scheduled August troop shipments to the United Kingdom. (See msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 9255.)
35 For the effect on the date of TORCH, see above, Ch. XII.
36 For the background of Army-Navy consideration of this subject, see ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3-13-42) , 1.
37 (1) Memo, for red, Lt Col Edward B. Gallant, 18 Jul 42, sub: Conf, Amph Trig, Jul 18, 1942, ABC. 320.2 Amph Forces (3-13-42), 1. (2) For the engineer amphibian brigades, see typescript by Herbert . Rosenthal, entitled, The Engineer Amphibian Command, in Engr Hist Files, Baltimore.
38 Memo, King for Marshall, 5 Feb 43, sub: Army Engr Amph Boat Crews, with JCS 81/1 in ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3-13-42), 1.
39 The agreement of 18 July 1942 had been signed by General Handy and Admiral Cooke, with the concurrence of Marshall and King. The Navy's refusal to ratify it formally was based on its unwillingness to be committed on a permanent basis to a program which included provision for training Army engineer amphibian brigades. The 18 July arrangement was circulated on 10 August as JCS 81. (Memo, JPS for JCS, 10 Aug 42, sub: Distribution and Composition of U.S. Amph Forces, ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3-13-42), 1.) JCS 81 was superseded by JCS 81/1, approved by the JCS and circulated on 5 September 1942.
40 By early August the scale of U.S. assault forces was well enough established to make it relatively certain that the fourth and fifth brigades would not be needed for TORCH. Furthermore, suitable personnel were not, according to Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, available. After consulting with various officers in SOS, G-3, and OPD, Handy of OPD authorized their suspension. (See tel conv transcripts, Handy with McNair, and with Brig Gen Floyd L. Parks, 7 Aug 42, Book 6, Exec 8.) Neither the 2d nor the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade was used in North Africa. Together with the 4th Engineer Amphibian Brigade-which was later activated-they were sent to the Southwest Pacific and kept under Army command after the disbanding of the other brigades and the discontinuation of such training for Army troops in early 1943. (See memo of agreement, CofS and COMINCH and CNO, 8 Mar 43, with JCS 81/1 in ABC: 320.2 Amph Forces (3-13 42), 1.)
41 Tel conv, Handy with Parks, cited n. 40.
42 In Operations in North African Waters (pp. 23-31 ), Morison summarizes the difficulties encountered in joint planning and training for this amphibious operation. He points out that service traditions and organization at that time made the Army and Navy more receptive to a "temporary partnership" than to "organic unity" in the conduct of amphibious operations. (For an account of amphibious training for TORCH, see also Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa.)
43 Ultimately parts of both the 3d and the 9th Infantry Divisions participated in the initial landings.
44 This arrangement was in accord with the provision of the 18 July agreement for an amphibious corps of two or more divisions.
45 (1) OPD draft ltr, DCofS to COMINCH and CNO, 6 Aug 42, sub: Employment of Amph Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, atchd to memo, OPD for DCofS, 4 Aug 42, sub: Amph Forces, OPD 353 Amph Forces, 29. This was sent out to the Navy on 6 August 1942. (2) See also tel conv, Handy with Parks, cited n. 40.
46 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Aug 42, CM-IN 6236. (2) Memo, CofS for President, 20 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn, WDCSA TORCH, 1. At the same time the shortage of combat-loading vessels available in the United Kingdom for amphibious training reduced from two to one the number of requested U.S. combat teams that could be trained there at the time. Amphibious training in the United Kingdom, therefore, began with one regimental combat team of the 34th Division in stead of two from the 1st Division, as originally contemplated.
47 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4636.
48 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Aug 42, CM-IN 6998.
49 AFHQ, G -3 Sec, Outline Plan C (Provisional) Opn TORCH, 5 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25 42), 4-A.
50 (1) Ltr, Patton to OPD, 3 Aug 42, sub: Notes on Western Task Force-TORCH Opn, Book 6, Exec 8. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Aug 42, CM-IN 2766.
51 The 3d Armored Division was held in the United States until August 1943 and then sent to England.
52 Memo, CofS for OPD, 25 Oct 42, no sub, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 101.
53 Memo, OPD for CofS, 29 Oct 42, sub: Shifting of Divs Prior to Overseas Mvmt, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 101.
54 Memo, McNair, AGF, for ACofS OPD (through G-3, WD), 13 Nov 42, sub: Excessive Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 101. Army authorities did their best to cut down such transcontinental movements and the consequent taxing of transportation facilities in the zone of interior, but, in the late fall, one division was needed for the British Isles and one for the South Pacific. The 29th and 43d were selected as best available and were again shifted within the zone of interior.
55 (1) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Oct 42, CM-OUT 10217. (2) See also Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 178-79.
56 A good example of the difficulties and confusion faced by SOS in the zone of interior in readying its units for overseas service for TORCH, as a result of lack of sufficient time, was the dispatch of the 829th Signal Service Battalion. (See Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 435-42.)
57 Memo, Hq ETO for TAG and incl, 14 Dec 42, sub: Tr List, U.S. Trs Transferred to N Af from UK, Tab 58, Item 2, Exec 5.
58 Memo, OPD for CofS, 2 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Paper 45, ABC 381 (7-25-42 ), 4-B.
59 The extent to which TORCH was absorbing divisional equipment was indicated in an estimate in the late summer of 1942 of divisions that might be available for shipment to the South Pacific. The Army planners estimated that three divisions (2d, 29th, and 38th) besides those allocated to TORCH could be equipped by I October 1942-except for ammunition-by stripping most of the reserve and training divisions of their equipment. Preparations for TORCH had meanwhile made themselves felt in another way: all three divisions were understrength. (See memo, Logistics Gp, OPD for S&P Gp, OED, 13 Sep 42, sub: Availability of Units for a Sp Opn, with JCS 97/1 in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 1.)
60 Msg cited n. 55 (1).
61 For a full account of the complicated transactions over the utilization in TORCH of supplies accumulated in the United Kingdom and over the future level of supply far units remaining in the United Kingdom or sent to the United Kingdom, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare.
62 See, for an early example, memo, OPD for DCofS, 2 Aug 42, sub: Air Force Deployment, Item 7, Exec 1.
63 (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Theater Gp, OPD .[Streett] for Handy, 15 Aug 42, sub: Unit Designations for BOLERO and Air Force Deployment, Item 7, Exec 1. (3) Statements of McNarney, DCofS, in min, 28th mtg JCS, 11 Aug 42.
64 As Army planners were to point out, there were barely enough combat planes assigned to defense and training. See, for example, OPD draft memo [CofS for President], 26 Oct 42, sub: Sit in S Pacific, OPD 381 PTO, 107.
65 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to OED, 13 Aug 42, CM-IN 4811 (8/14/42), transmitting the plans for TORCH air force as drawn up in London by Patton, Spaatz, and Doolittle. (2) See also memo cited n. fi3 (2) . Various proposals of Army planners drafted in the summer of 1942 for air deployment for TORCH are in Item 7, Exec 1.
66 See Craven and Cate, AAF II, p. 51.
67 See n. 83, below.
68 See Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 24-25, 52.
69 Ibid., pp. 51-52, 59-60. This contains a brief description of the difficulties encountered in equipping, training, and readying far combat the medium and light bombers for TORCH. The original August plan provided for bomber groups-three medium and one light-to fly to England and there be indoctrinated, processed, and initiated into combat. Eventually, as a result of the experience with bad weather in the North Atlantic, the route was closed to twin-engine aircraft.
70 Memo, DCofS (for CofS) for COMINCH, 5 Sep 42, sub: Air Reinforcements for Guadalcanal Tulagi Area, Book 6, Exec 8.
71 (1) Ltr, Patton to CG AAF (through OPD), 26 Aug 42, sub: Air Support TORCH, Item 7, Exec 1. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0233. (3) Ltr, Patton to CG AAF (through OPD), 9 Sep 42, sub: Air Support TORCH, Incl B to JCS 97/1.
72 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42, CM-I 4988. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 12 Sep 42, CM-OUT 4316.
73 Ltr, Streett to JCS, 8 Sep 42, sub: Immediate Allocation of 33d Pursuit Gp, circulated as JCS 101.
74 See Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 25, 63.
75 Min, 32d mtg JCS, 8 Sep 42.
76 (1) Ltr, CG AAF to Evill, 9 Sep 42. (2) Ltr, Air Commodore S. C. Strafford (for Evill) to Arnold, 10 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, Arnold to Evill, 12 Sep 42. These ltrs are incls to CCS 112, 17 Sep 42, in ABC 381 (7-25-42) , 1.
77 Min, 40th mtg CCS, 18 Sep 42.
78 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42 (No. 2396), paraphrase atchd to CCS 112/1, 21 Sep 42, title: Immediate Allocation of 33d Pursuit Gp. (2) Msg, same to same, 13 Sep 42, CM-IN 5411. The War Department proceeded to comb U.S. air resources for replacements for the 33d Group for the Middle East. (See Craven and Cate, AAF II, p. 25, and min, 34th mtg CCS, 22 Sep 42.)
79 See above, Ch. XIII.
80 (1) OPD brief, Notes on . . . JPS 32d mtg, 2 Sep 42, with JPS 48 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), 3. (2) JPS 48, 28 Aug 42, title: Detailed Deployment of U.S. Air Forces in Pacific Theater. This contained views of Army and Navy planners on the JUSSC.
81 See Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 274-77.
82 JCS 97/1, 11 Sep 42, title: Relationship Between TORCH and Air Operations from the Middle East and the United Kingdom. This paper is a memo of CG AAF to JCS, with four inclosures. Arnold indicated that, at his suggestion, Eisenhower had been urged not to discontinue U.S. air operations from the United Kingdom on 8 September, but to maintain them until the last possible moment before TORCH, and thereby give no respite to the German Air Force.
83 JCS 97/2, 15 Sep 42, title: Detailed Deployment of U.S. Air Forces in the Pacific Theater (Need for Army Aircraft in Current Solomons Opn). For King's views in August, see above, Ch. XIII.
84 JCS 97/2, 15 Sep 42.
85 (1) Min cited n. 75. (2) Min, 33d mtg JCS, 15 Sep 42. (3) Min, 36th mtg JCS, 6 Oct 42.
86 For Marshall's earlier explanation to Eisenhower at the end of July, see above, Ch. XIII.
87 (1 ) Min 38th nag JCS, 20 act 42. (2) Min, 39th mtg JCS, 27 Oct 42. By 26 October, of the fifteen groups three had been comitted: one heavy bomber group to Hawaii: one half of another heavy bomber group to the South Pacific; and one and a half troop carrier groups divided among the Middle East, Alaska, and the South Pacific. Twelve groups were still uncommitted. (See JCS brief, 26 Oct 42, title: JCS 97/5 Deployment of U.S. Air forces in Pacific Theater, with JCS 97/5 in ABC 381 (9-25-41 ), 3.)
88 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2023.
89 "American-British Grand Strategy," 31 Dec 41, ABC-4/CS 1, in ARCADIA Proceedings . . . . See above, p. 99, n. 6, and p. 295.
90 Memo, Lt Col E. H. Qualls, OPD, for Gen Hull, 7 Sep 42, sub: BOLERO Com Mtg, File 3, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4. Colonel Qualls was a member of the committee for Bolero movements in OPD's European Theater Section, then headed by General Hull.
91 Memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Aug 42, sub: 5440 Shipts of Tr Units, Paper 39, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.
92 Memo cited n. 90.
93 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to USFOR, London, 8 Nov 42, CM-OUT 2704. In view of the tight shipping situation no precise date was set for the attainment of the 427,000 figure.
94 Ltr, Hartle to CofS, 12 Nov 42, OPD 381 ETO, 48.
95 OPD draft memo [CofS for President], 17 Oct 42, OPD 381 ETO, 35.
96 Min, mtg at White House, 1430, 10 Dec 42, Tab 42, Item 2, Exec 5. Present at this meeting with the President were Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, Deane, and Vice Adm. Richard S. Edwards.
97 (1) Summaries of Army planners' strategic views in the fall of 1942 appear in unused WD draft ltr, President to Prime Minister, 25 Sep 42, Item 42, Exec 10. This letter was drafted by OPD and revised by Marshall. (2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 8 Nov 42, sub: Amer-Br Strategy, with JCS 152 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), 3.
98 Pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, Paper 59, ABC 381 (7-25-42) , 4-B. Eisenhower, Clark, and Smith attended this staff conference.
99 Ibid.
100 1lsg, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, . 151, Item 63, Exec 10.
101 Msg, Smith to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CM-IN 11164. A copy of this message was sent to the President.
102 Msg, Prime Minister to President [25 Nov 42], No. 211, WDCSA 381, 1 (SS). This message was shown to Marshall and Handy in the War Department.
103 msg cited n. 101.
104 Churchill, in Hinge of Fate (pp. 648-59) gives an exposition of his views in late 1942 on a 1943 ROUNDUP.
105 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 657-58. Preliminary- drafts of the President's reply to the Prince 'Minister, drawn tip by Marshall and his staff' and bearing the date 25 November 1942, are contained in War Department files. For reply of President to Prime Minister's msg No. 211, see WD drafts of msg (25 Nov 42), Item 63a, Exec 10. Other copies are filed in WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).
106 Msg cited n. 101.

Page created 10 January 2002

Return to the Table of Contents