1 Memo, McCrea for JCS, 1 May 42, sub: Aircraft and Trs for
Australia, Item 53, Exec 10. The Pacific War Council was created in Washington on 1 April 1942,
with membership consisting of the President, Mr. Hopkins, and political
representatives of the United Kingdom, China, Australia, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, and Canada. Representatives of India and the
Philippines were added later. The President had desired a special body
for control of Pacific matters at the time of the ARC.4DIA Conference,
but Churchill and Marshall had dissuaded him. (See (1) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 515--16: and (2) Cline, Washington Command
Post, p. 101.)
2 Draft memo [CofS for President], n.d.. sub: Increase in U. S.
Commitments to Australia, Item 53, Exec 10.
4 Memo. CofS for President, 4 Mad- 42, no sub, (OPD 381, 62: copies
in Item 53, Exec 10 incl copy corrected in pen by Marshall.
5 Memo, CofS for President, 6 May 42, sub: Pacific Theater versus
BOLERO, and three incls, with JCS 48 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases
6 Memo, FDR for Marshall, 6 May 42, filed with JCS 48 in ABC 381
Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 2.
7 The War Department took that position in the latter part of May, in
response to the renewal of demands by the Australian Government,
strongly representing the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Australia.
(For WD action, see: (1) memo, Handy for Marshall, 17 May 42, no
sub, and incls, and (2) Itr, CofS to Dill, 22 May 42, no sub, both in
Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec: 8.)
8 Memo, OPD for Secy JCS, 13 May 42, sub: U. S. Army Objectives in
Pacific, OPD 320.2 PTO, 3. This memorandum was a statement "of the
action the Army proposed to implement the President's Memorandum to
General Marshall of 6 May, 1942, relative to the deployment of forces in
the Pacific Theater as provided in JCS 48." (See memo cited n. 6. )
9 For the President's ARCADIA and March statements, see Chs. V and VII, above, respectively.
10 Memo, F. D. R. for SW, CofS, Arnold, SN, King, and Hopkins,
6 May 42, WDCSA 31 (SS), 1. The President used the argument that
Soviet forces were destroying more enemy troops and materiel than
all the other nations at war with Germany in his message of the same
day to MacArthur (see P. 214, above). The President had already
used it in his fireside chat of 28 April 19-42. (The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 Volume (New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 228.)
11 For preparation to ship the 37th Division to New Zealand, see:
(1) memo, OPD for SOS, AGF, and TAG, 12 Apr 42, sub: Mvmt of 37th Div to
SPOONER. and (2) memo, same for same, 14 Apr 42, same sub. Both in
OPD 370.5 New Zealand, 7; and (3) OPD Ltr of Instns to Maj Gen Robert
S. Beightler, Sr., 28 Apr 42, OPD :370.5 New Zealand, 8.
12 For the deployment of the 70th Pursuit Squadron to the Fijis, see: (1)
memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmts for Week
Ending Midnight Jan 3-4, 1942, WPD 4624-5: and (2) memo, Chief,
Theater Gp, for ACofS OPD, 16 Jun 42, sub: Recommendations Made by Gen Richardson,
Ref BIRCH. HOLLY, FANTAN, :end POPPY, OPD '333 (Gen Richardson's Trip), 15. ('Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., was
commander of the VII Corps.)
13 For reports on this point, see (1) memo for rcd [9 Apr 42],
OPD 381 Fiji, 5: (2) memo, G- 3 Hawaiian Dept for CofS, 1 Apr 42, sub:
Visit to Viti Levu, OPD .381 Fiji, 1 (this memo bore indorsement of
Gen Emmons), and (3) msg, Col John L. McKee [Ft. Shafter] to Gen
Eisenhower, 9 May 42, CM-IN 2357 (R).
14 Min, kith mtg JCS, 4 May 42.
15 For WD action, see: (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall [to CG
SFPE] for Beightler, 13 May 42, CM-OUT 2644 (R); (2) ltr, ACofS
OPD to Beightler, 16 May 42, sub: Jt A&N Plan for Relief of New
Zealand in Fiji Islands, OPD 381 Fiji, 9; (3) msg, Marshall 'to SFPE
for Beightler, 22 May 42, CM-OUT 5054 5/24/42; (R): and (4) memo for rcd, 8 Jul 42, OPD
370.5 Fiji Islands, 9.
16 See msg, Beightler to Marshall, 10 Jun 42, CM-1N 3312 6/11/42 (R), for the arrival of the
FANTAN force in the Fiji
17 Memo, Eisenhower for Arnold, 8 May 42, no sub, OPD 381, 62.
Eisenhower inclosed topics of the recent correspondence between the
President and Marshall. Arnold replied, indicating his agreement, and giving the numbers of
planes he expected to have sent by 1 July, together with additions to be
sent as soon as possible thereafter, provided it would not seriously
interfere with planned deployment in the Atlantic.( Memo, Arnold for
Eisenhower, 14 May 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO, 21).
18 Min, 14th mtg JCS, 11 May 42.
19 Ltr, COMINCH to CofS, 12 May 42, sub: Sit in S Pacific and SWPA as
of End of May 42, Tab Navy, Book 5, Exec 8. On 14 May Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, sent word of his complete agreement with the contention of
Admiral King, and made a lucid statement of the Navy's case on the
assignment of bombers to the South Pacific. (Msg, CINCPAC to COMINCH,
14 May 42, copy filed with JCS 48 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1-22-42),
20 (1) Memo, Marshall for Eisenhower, 12 May 42, no sub. (2) Memo, GCM for Eisenhower, 13 May 42, no sub. Both in Tab Navy, Book
5, Exec 8. For staff action on the projected plane movements, sec msg, Arnold
to Emmons, 13 May 42, CM-OUT 2645 (the entire movement was to be
completed by 25 May), and msg (originator AAF) , Marshall to Emmons,
14 May 42, CM-OUT 2725 (R).
The War Department also planned to send an antiaircraft regiment from
Hawaii to the Fijis about 20 May, the regiment in Hawaii to be replaced
by one from the Western Defence Command (WDC), sailing from San
Francisco about 23 May. The loss of these was, in turn, to be made up by
a cross country movement of units from the Eastern Defence Command (EDC).
Two barrage balloon battalions were also alerted to start at once for
the west coast. (See rnsg !originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 12 May
42, CM-OUT 2490 (5/13/42) (R) memo for rcd [12 May 421, OPD 320.2
Fiji, 2; and memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 13 May 42, no sub, Item 67a,
Exec 10.) For a summary of the steps the Army was taking, see memo, CofS for
King, 13 May 42, sub: Sit in S Pacific, Item 67a, Exec 10. For
acknowledgment, see memo, King for Marshall, 17 May 42, no sub, OPD 381
21 Msg, Emmons to Marshall, 16 May 42, CM-IN 4.577.
22 (1) Memo, Handy for Marshall, 17 May 42, no sub, Tab Navy, Book 5,
Exec 8. (2) Memo, CNO for CofS, 18 May 42, sub: Strengthening of
Hawaiian and Alaska Defs, Item 67a, Exec 10. Admiral King requested the Army to strengthen Hawaiian defenses, particularly by retaining there
forces destined for the South and Southwest Pacific. The .Navy apparently had concluded soon after 12 May that the Japanese
were likely to attack in the Central Pacific, and delay the offensive in
the Southwest Pacific. See Admiral Nimitz' estimate of the situation (in
msg cited n. 19).
23 (1) Draft memo, OPD for CofS, n.d., sub cited n. 22 (21, Item
67a, Exec 10. (2) Msg, Marshall to Emmons, 20 May 42, CM-OUT 4419 (R).
24 (1) Msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 21 May 42, CM-OUT 4284. Sec
draft of this message approved by Marshall and Arnold, Item 14, Exec 10.
(21) For DeWitt's requests, see msg, DeWitt to Eisenhower, 21 May 42,
25 (1) Msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 20 May 42, CM-OUT 4090. See also
draft of this msg, Item 14, Exec 10. (2) Navy msg, King to Nimitz, 21
May 42, copy filed Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8. This copy bears the penned
note by DDE [Eisenhower], "I concurred in this today for the
26 (1) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 17 May 42, sub: Probable Japanese Opus
Against Continental U. S. and Alaska, OPD 381 WDC, 42. (2t Draft msg,
Marshall to DeWitt, 29 May 42, Item 14, Exec 10. Such a possibility had also been mentioned by Admiral Nimitz in his 14
May estimate of enemy plans. (Msg cited n. 19.)
27 (1) Mtg, Gen Council in Off of DCofS, 27 May 42, OPD 3.34.8
Gen Council, 2. (2) Notes on War Council, 25 May and 1 Jun 42, SW Confs,
Vol II, WDCSA.
28 (1) Memo, OPD for CG AGF, 25 May 42, sub: Reserves for WDC.
(21 D ,F, OPD for TAG, 25 May 42, same sub. Both in OPD 320.2 WDC, 69.
(3) Memo, OPD for WDCMC, 26 May 42, same sub, OPD 320.2 WDC, 93.
29 Draft memo [JCS for CCS], sub: Sit in Pacific, incl with memo,
COMINCH and CNO for CofS, 24 May 42, game sub, Item 67a, Exec 10.
30 Memo, CofS for COMINCH, n.d., sub: Sit in Pacific, Ref Your Memo of
May 24, Item 67a. Exec 10.
31 Memo, F. D. R. for SW, CofS, Arnold, SN, King, and Hopkins, 6 May
42, WDCSA 381 (SS), 1 (cited n. 10).
32 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 19 May 42, 147, with CCS
61/1 in ABC 452.1 (1-22-42), 1. For a later, unsuccessful attempt to apply the principle to the USSR,
see below, Ch. XV.
33 (1) See Craven and Cate, AAF I. p. 567. (2) For action on this compromise, see below, pp. 245,
34 It was finally rejected on 13 June 1942. See Romanus and
Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China. Ch. V.
35 Msg (originator OPD, Marshall to Stilwell, 24 May 42, CM-OUT
5022. The messages from Chiang Kai-shek were relayed to Stilwell for his
36 (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 24 May 42, sub: Sit in China Theater, OPD
381 CTO, 41. (21 Stilwell was notified by msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 24
May 42, CM-OUT 5022 (R).
37 Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 25 May 92, CM-IN 7037.
38 (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 26 May 42, sub: Keeping China in the
War. (2) Memo, CofS for President, 28 May 42, same sub Both in OPD 381
CTO, 44. (3) Msg ;;originator OPD), Marshall to Stilwell, 28 May 42,
39 (1) For an account of the Russia aid program, including the
formulation of the Second Protocol, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics
of Global Warfare. (2) The protocols are published in U. S. Dept. of
State, Soviet Supply Protocols, cited p. 57n.
40 (1) Memo, Mun Asgmts Bd (MBW) [Gen Burns] for JCS, 12 May 42, sub: Summarized Rpt
on Status of Proposed Second Soviet Protocol, with JPS 28/D in ABC: 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1.
(2) Memo, MBW for JCS, 12 May 42, sub: Status of Proposed Second Soviet Protocol. This
memorandum, which analyzes the program more in detail, is an inclosure with the memorandum cited
immediately above. (3) Draft of Jt statement, appended to draft protocol, incl with above cited papers.
41 The total tonnage of military items to be offered under the
terms of the draft protocol was 1,110,000 short tons, valued at
$2,000,000,000. Over 90 percent of this tonnage was accounted for by
tanks and vehicles: trucks accounted for over half the tonnage. (See
Second (Washington) Protocol, Sched of U.S. Stores, incl with memo cited
42 (1) Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 207. (2) Cf. Churchill, Hinge of
Fate, Ch. 15, and Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, Chs. VI and VII.
43 The CMTC had found that there would be a shortage of cargo
tonnage from June 1942 through December 1943 which would always be
greater than 3,500,000 dead-weight tons, and would rise to a high of
4,400,000 in December 1942 and January 1943. These calculations were
based on estimates of construction, losses, and United States and
British requirements. The committee's findings, announced in CMT 5/3 of
4 Max 1942, were later summarized and discussed in JPS 28/1.
44 Memo, King for JCS, 1 May 42, no sub, incl with JPS 28/D, 7 May
42, title: Russian Mun Protocol. JPS 28/ D was a directive to JPS to
consider the memorandum, in anticipation of a JCS directive to that
effect. Admiral King summarized his views orally in the next JCS meeting.
(Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42. )
45 Min, 17th mtg JPS, 20 May 42. JPS agreed that "action on
this directive should be deferred pending the final outcome of the
revised Protocol, which is now before the President."
46 OPD brief, Notes on . . 17th mtg JPS, 20 May 42, with JPS 28/ D
in ABC: 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42 ), 1. The statement was attributed to
Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding.
47 Draft of Jt Statement, with draft of Second Protocol, with JPS
28/D in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1.
48 See agreement, n.d., title: Confidential Protocol of Conf of
Reps of U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Gt Brit . . . , copy filed in separate
folder annex, title: Russia (Moscow Confs), with WPD 4557.
49 Second Protocol, Sched of U.S. Stores, Group I (Armament and
Mil Equip), Item 1 (Airplanes), with JPS 28, D in ABC 400.3295 Russia
(19 Apr 42), 1.
50 Min, 15thmtg JCS, 18 May 42.
51 (1) Ibid. (2) Notes on War Council, 18May 42, SW Confs, Vol
II, WDCSA. In this meeting of the War Council, Marshall's recomended
qualification on commitments of planes was interpreted as follows:
". . . the Russian contract to be filled up to August, thereafter
the Russians to receive 50 pursuit planes, 50 light bombers and 12
52 The conversations lasted from 29 May through 1 June 1942.
The rest of this chapter is based mainly on an account of these
negotiations in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 556 78.
53 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 326 ff.
54 The Second Protocol was finally signed in Washington, 6 October
1942. It had meanwhile served as a basis for the Soviet lend-lease
program. (See State Dept rpt on War Aid Furnished by U. S. to USSR, p.
3, cited p. 205n, above.)