1. SHAEF Planning Staff draft Post NEPTUNE Courses of Action After Capture of the Lodgment Area, II, 30 May 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
2. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Washington, 1946), p. 62.
3. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 199.
4. Ibid., p. 214.
5. FWD 13765, Eisenhower to Comdrs, 4 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
6. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pages 216-17, provides the tactical story for this period between 4 and 13 September.
7. Most international of all Allied armies in the European theater, the First Canadian Army had two corps, one primarily Canadian, the other, during this phase of the war, primarily British. The army also included a Polish armored division, a Czechoslovakian armored brigade group, and at one time or another Dutch, Belgian, French, Norwegian, and American troops.
8. Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 210-17; Charles P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, vol. III of the official "History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War" (Ottawa: E.Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1960), 323-425.
9. Ibid., pp. 220-21.
10. FWD 13889, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 5 Sep 44, Pogue files.
11. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 306-07.
12. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, p. 67.
13. FWD 14758, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
14. FWD 14764, Eisenhower to Comdrs, 13- Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
16. Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-205, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
17. 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-525, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. Italics in the original. Capture of Rotterdam was considered from time to time but primarily in the event Antwerp could not be opened. See SHAEF Planning Staff: Relative Priority of Operations for the Capture of Rotterdam and Antwerp, 16 Sep 44, Rapid Capture of Rotterdam, 18 Sep 44, and Rapid Capture of the Antwerp Area, dated only September 1944 but probably issued 18 September 1944, all in SHAEF SGS 381, I.
18. Eisenhower to A Gp Comdrs, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
19. Montgomery to Eisenhower, 18 Sep 44; Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-223, 21 Sep 44, Pogue files.
20. Bradley to Eisenhower, 21 Sep 44, Pogue files. A detailed discussion of the strategy debate during this period may be found in Pogue, The Supreme Command, Ch. XIV.
21. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 20 Sep 44, Pogue files.
22. Montgomery was not present because of operational duties connected with MARKET-GARDEN but was represented by his chief of staff, General de Guingand.
23. Min, Mtg held at SHAEF Fwd, 22 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I.
24. Ibid. See also FWD 13510, Eisenhower to Bradley, 23 Sep 44, same file.
25. Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, in 12th A Gp 371.3, Military Objectives, I.
26. De Guingand to Smith, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II.
27. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II.
28. 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-527, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II.
29. For the First Canadian Army mission, see 21 A Gp, M-527. For the action west of the Maas, see below, Chapter X.
30. Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-260, 6 Oct 44, and M-264, 7 Oct 44, both in Pogue files. General Eisenhower consistently refused this request. Because a command change did not occur during the period of the Siegfried Line Campaign and therefore did not affect First Army operations directly, the subject is not considered in detail in this volume. The command controversy is discussed at length in Pogue, The Supreme Command.
31. Eisenhower to 21 A Gp for Bradley (msg undtd but apparently written 8 Oct 44), Pogue files.
32. Bradley to Hodges, 8 Oct 44, in 12th A Gp 371.3, Military Objectives, I.
33. 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-530, 9 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II.
34. S-61466, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 9 Oct 44, Pogue files.
35. M-268, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 9 Oct 44, Pogue files.
36. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10 Oct 44, Pogue files.
37. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Oct 44, Pogue files. For a discussion of the command relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery, see Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 289-90.
38 21 A Gp Gen Opnl Sit and Dir, M-532, 16 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 381, II. See also M-77, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 44, Pogue files.
39. M-281, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 16 Oct 44, Pogue files.
40. TWX, Army Group B to Fifteenth Army, 1830, 7 Sep 44, Army Group B, Operationsbefehle.
41. Cbl ADSEC (de Guingand) to TAC Hq EXFOR (Montgomery), 7 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 381, I. Basing their judgment on terrain and types of targets, General Brereton, the airborne army commander, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, recommended cancellation. General Eisenhower canceled the plan on 21 September 1944. See FWD 15384, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 21 Sep 44, same file.
42. For additional details, see Lucian Heichler, German Defense of the Gateway to Antwerp, a study prepared to complement this volume and filed in OCMH.
43. Rads, A Gp B to Fifteenth Army, 1530, 5 Sep, and 0100, 8 Sep 44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle.
44. Details and documentation of these developments may be found in Heichler, German Defense of the Gateway to Antwerp.
45. Daily Sitreps, A Gp B, 0130, 9 Sep, 0215, 12 Sep, and 0135, 23 Sep 44, all in A Gp B, Tagesmeldungen. Strength figures from Navy Special Staff Knuth as furnished by Historical Section (GS), Canadian Army Headquarters.
46. TWX, A Gp B to OB WEST, 1500, 23 Sep 44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle.
47. MS # B-274, 165. Reserve Division und 70. Infanterie, Division 1944 Holland (Daser).
48. Strength figures for all but the 64th Div are from TWX (Weekly Strength Rpt as of 16 Sep 44), A Gp B to OB WEST, 2400, 22 Sep 44, A Gp B, Operationsbefehle.
49. After 11 October 1944 Generalmajor Walter Steinmueller.
50. Unless otherwise noted, the story of the First Canadian Army operations is based upon Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 220-30, and Stacey, The Victory Campaign.
51. Daily Sitreps, A Gp B, 0045, 8 Oct, and 0115, 13 Oct 44, A Gp B, Tagesmeldungen.
52. Unless otherwise noted, the account of the Second British Army's October offensive is based on Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 251-67.
53. The 104th Division story is based upon official unit records; a comprehensive unit history by Leo A. Hoegh and Howard J. Doyle, Timberwolf Tracks (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 43-102; and Lt Oliver J. Kline, Action North of Antwerp, in Ninth United States Army Operations, Vol. III, Combat in Holland, a mimeographed series prepared by the 4th Information and Historical Service and filed with official Ninth Army records.
54. TWX, OB WEST to OKW, 1115~ 22 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen 27.X.-31.X.44.
55. Order, OB WEST to A Gp B, 2143, 26 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen.
56. Rpt, Rundstedt to Jodl (OKW), 1330, 28 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen.
57. Order, OB WEST to A Gp B (relaying Hitler order), 2355, 29 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen.
58. Rpt, A GP B to OB WEST, 29 Oct 44, OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen. British intelligence estimates are reflected in 104th Div, Annex 2, Intel Annex to AAR, 23-31 Oct 44, dtd 5 Nov 44.
59. Kline, Action North of Antwerp.
60. 179 killed, 856 wounded, 356 missing.
61. Orders, OB WEST to A Gp B, 20 Oct, 2355, 29 Oct (relaying Hitler order), and 2215, 31 Oct 44, all in OB WEST, Befehle/Meldungen.
62. In estimating German units on Walcheren, intelligence officers of the First Canadian Army drew a chuckle at their own expense. Having stated that one of the German battalions consisted of "Americans," the Canadians with tongue in check sought an explanation in their next intelligence summary. "The map has been inspected by a more experienced eye," the second summary stated, "and clearly indicates that '1/III/Armen/128' is the sub-unit in question. There are strong indications that this means 'Armenians.' That there may be elements of Americans operating to rearwards of almost any German force cannot be denied in the light of experience at Argentan and Elbeuf. But that they are an integral part of a German training division is considered on balance to be unlikely." See Incl 5 to VII Corps G-2 Per Rpt 115, 29 Oct 44, wherein the VII Corps follows the lead of SHAEF in reproducing the discussion "in the interests of Allied co-operation and North American unity."
63. Daily Sitrep, A Gp B, 0115, 4 Oct 44, A GP B, Tagesmeldungen.
64. 7th Br Armd Div Intel Summary 124, 14 Oct 44, as cited in FUSA G-2 Per Rpt 130, 18 Oct 44, found in FUSA G-2 TAC Jnl file, 18-19 Oct 44.
65. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 140, n. 37.
66. For a detailed study of the history and effect of the V-weapons upon Allied military operations, see Royce L. Thompson, Military Impact of the German V-weapons, 1943-1945, prepared in OCMH.
67. Labeled "Antwerp X," the antiaircraft defense of the city employed 18,000 troops and more than 500 antiaircraft guns