1 Memo, Br CsofS, 22 Dec 41, sub: Amer-Br Strategy, ABC 337 ARCADIA
(24 Dec 41), 2. This is the first version of WW-1, which in the revised
form accepted by the American Chiefs (but not submitted to the President
and the Prime Minister for approval) acquired the American serial number
2 (1) Min, JB mtg, 13 Dec 41, G-3 Regd Does. (2) Memo, CofS for Admiral Stark, 18 Dec 41, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8. (3) Notes
by G. C. M. [Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes of Mtg at White House
with President and Br Prime Minister Presiding, WPD 4402-136. For the statement of the Soviet Government's position, see above, p.
3 For the War Department's interest in this subject, from Pearl Harbor
through the ARCADIA Conference, see: (1) WPD draft memo [SW for
President], 13 Dec 41, sub: Aid to Russia, WPD 4557-29; (2) memo for
rcd, Maj Gailey, 24 Dec 41, WPD 4557-29: (3) memo, G-2 for WPD, 1 Jan
42, no sub, WPD 4557-10 (the memorandum discusses British conferences
with Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov and a speech made, off
the record, by Ambassador Litvinov) ; (4) memo, Ridgway for Marshall
(through Gen Gerow), 8 Jan 42, sub: Conf with Vice President, Tab Misc,
Book 2, Exec 8 ; and (5) memo, Col Bissell for Col Handy, 10 Jan 42,
no sub, WPD 4557-43.
4 Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for AAF,
Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.
5 See for example, memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present
Attitude in the War, WPD 4557-35. This memorandum includes a paraphrase
of a message from the American ambassador in London, giving remarks made
by Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after a
conference with Marshal Stalin. The memorandum stated: "His
[Stalin's] attitude about the Far East is perfectly loyal, and he
thought he would be able to help there in the Spring. However, at the
moment he doesn't want to provoke Japan. Therefore Eden thought it would
be very unwise to speak to him about air bases for the United States in
6 (1) Notes cited n. 2 (3). (2) Min, 1st mtg CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41,
ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41) , 1.
7 See various drafts of WW.-1 (ABC-4/CS-1) under Tab K, ABC 337
ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2.
9 Annexes to ABC:-4/3, 28 Dec 41, title: Supporting Measures for SW
Pacific (Far East and Adjacent Regions), ABC: 337 ARCADIA (24
Dec 41),1. This report from the joint Planning Committee was adopted
by the Chiefs on 31 December. As presented, it born the British serial
WW (JPC) 3: as adopted, the serial WW - 4.
10 ABC- 4/3, 31 Dec 41. The principal changes made in the planners'
draft resolution contained in ABC-4/3, 28 Dec 41 ) were the addition of
"land" forces to paragraph .(a) on defense of the Malay
Barrier, and of "and to the defense of India" to paragraph
11 For the declaration of British policy at the conference, see: (1) notes cited n.
2 (3) ; (2) conf in Stark's Off, 27 Dec 41, WDC:S:1
334 Mtgs and Confs ; (1-28-42) (SS) : and (3) min cited n. 6(2). Cf. Churchill, Grand Alliance. Ho has omitted (p. 668) the remarks
dealing with Singapore in his original paper for the President on the
war against Japan. The volume includes (p. 668) a reprint of a message
of 25 December 1941 to Prime Minister Curtin of Australia,
expressing Churchill's hope and determination to hold Singapore for
scene time. In his concluding estimate of 10 January for his Chiefs
of Staff (1).(P. 703). he indicated that hr still hoped that Singapore
would hold out longer than any other Allied position north of Australia.
In a later volume Churchill explains that, assuming Singapore Island
had been fortified against attack from the mainland, he expected a siege
to last at least two months. (Hinge of Fate, pp. 47 ff.) This is entirely credible, though at sonic damage
to American illusions about the close, effective liaison between
British political leaders and their military staffs.
12 The directive to the planners began with the qualification:
"Until such limo as the wider problem of the unified control of all
available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved . . . . The planners made their recommendations on dispositions, and the
Chiefs adopted them, subject to this qualification. (See ABC-4/3, 31
13 (1) "ABDACOM Directive to Supreme Comdr , dated
3 January 1942, App A to "ABDACOM-An Official Account
of Events in the South-West Pacific Command, January-February 1942 (New
Delhi, Government of India Press, 1942). (2) ABC-4/5, 10 Jan 42,
title: Directive to Supreme Comdr in ABDA Area, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24
Dec 41),, 1. The 10 January version of the directive is identical with
the one of a January, except for modifications with respect to the
manner in which the Allied governments involved would exercise
"higher direction" over the ABDA Command.
14 For Marshall's introduction of the proposal, see (1) min,
2d mtg CsofS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1 ; and (2)
memo for file, Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Notes Taken at Jt Conf of
CsofS on Afternoon, Dec 25, in envelope (Data and memos on mtg at White
House . . .), with WPD 4402-136.
15 Min, 4th mtg CsofS Conf, 27 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41)-
16 The remarks on Wavell appear in conference cited in n. 11
(2), on the choice of Wavell, compare the remark of Hopkins to the Prime
Minister: "Don't be in a hurry to turn down the proposal the
President is going to make to you before you know who is the man we have
mind." (Churchill, Grand Alliance, n. 673)
17 Annex 2, title: Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area, to
ABC-4/5, cited n. 13 (2) . It was agreed that thereafter the term
"Combined" would be used to refer to British-American
18 For these transactions, see: (1) min and memo for file cited n.
14; (2) conf at White House, 1630, 26 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42) (SS): and (3) conf cited n. 11(2).
See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 439-78, and Churchill,
Grand Alliance, pp. 644-706.
19 Min cited n. 15. The draft proposed by Marshall is appended as Annex I
USA). Eisenhower drafted the proposed letter of instructions. A draft with corrections in his hand and the hand of Marshall is among those filed with
Tab ABD.4-COM, Book 1 Exec 8.
20 Marshall did press and, over Churchill's initial objection, won
the point that Wavell should control naval dispositions, and thus gave
meaning to Wavell's very limited authority over the disposition of
reinforcements. (See conf at White House, 1145, 28 Dec 41, WDCSA 334
Mtgs and Confs (1-28-42) (SS).) For a statement of the responsibilities and limitations on Wavell's
authority as contained in his directive, see ABC-4/5, cited n. 13 (2)
21 Admiral King summarized and explained his proposal to British and American colleagues at their meeting of 29 December. (Min, 5th mtg
CsofS Conf, 29 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41),).
22 Informal memo, G. C. M. [Marshall] for Gerow, 29 Dec 41, Tab
Book 1, Exec 8.
23 Annex I to rein cited n. 21.
24 (1) Min cited n. 21. (2) Their memorandum to the President to
this effect is in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 468.
25 Paper, sub: Proposed Method of Handling Matters Concerning SW
Pacific Theatre, incl with note, Hopkins to Betty [Stark], 30 Dec 41.
Copies of the note and the inclosed draft were circulated as Annex I to
rein, 6th mtg CsofS Conf, 30 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. The original redraft, with the
President's corrections in his hand, is reproduced in Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 468.
26 Memo, CofS, CNO, COMINCH, and CAAF for President, 30 Dec
41, sub: Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area, Annex I, Part II, min
cited n. 25. An unsigned note in pencil on the bottom of a copy (filed
under Tab F, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2), states that the memorandum
was signed and sent to the President on the afternoon of 31 December. The modified proposal of the Chiefs of Staff was circulated as Annex
I, Part II, min cited n. 25.
27 (1) Min, 7th mtg CsofS Conf, 31 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA ( 24
Dec 41) , 1.(2) Rcd of mtg at White House, 1830, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA
334 Mtgs and Confs (1 -28-42) (SS). In its final approval form- -not yet accepted by the Netherlands and Australian
Government - the provision for "higher
direction" of the ABDA Command was printed and circulated on 10 January. (See n. 13, above).
28 Part 1 of msg, Wavell for Br CsofS [ABDACOM to WO], 11 Jan
42, ABDACOM 9, Vol I, Item 1i, Exec 2. Wavell's permanent
headquarters was to be set up at Lembang (Java) .
29 ABC-4/CS-3. 10 Jan 42, title: Assumption of Comd by Gen Wavell,
ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41 ), 1.
30 Msg, Wavell to . . . Br Army Stf, Washington, for CsofS . .
., 14 Jan 42, ABDACOM 48, WPD 4639-19. For brief accounts of how
the establishment of the ABDA Command affected the Philippines and
Burma, see: (1) Morton. Fall of the Philippines, and (2) Romanus
and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.
31 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A.W. 7, OPD file of
msgs to and from ABDA (hereafter cited as OPD ABDA Msg File).
32 Msg WO to Br Army Stf, Washington, 12 Feb 42, 72057, OPD ABDA
33 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 13 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01156, CCOS 7,
OPD ABDA Msg File.
34 Msg, Wavell to CIGS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01288,
OPD ABDA Msg File. Part of Wavell's message is quoted in
Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 140-41.
35 (1) Memo W PD for CofS, 11 Jan 42 no sub, Tab Misc, Book 2,
Exec 8. (2) Memo, WPD for Hoard of Economic Warfare, 17 Jan 42, sub:
Australia as Base of Supplies and Opns, WPD 4630-41.
36 Draft memo, D. E. [Eisenhower] for CofS, n.d., sub: WD Contl of Australian Opns,
Item 27, Exec 10. This penciled draft, in
General Eisenhower's hand, was written some tune in late January or
early February 1942. It is filed with an extremely interesting
personal letter to Eisenhower and strategic estimate for WPD from Lt.
Col. Willard G. Wyman, and copies of later papers of Eisenhower on grand
37 See msg, Gen Wavell to Lt Gen V. A. H. Sturdee [Chief, Australian
Army Gen Stf), 31 Jan 42, ABD.4COM 00576, OPD ABDA Msg File, for plans
to send the 148th Field Artillery Regiment (minus one battalion) to
Timor. The convoy with reinforcements for Timor, escorted by the U.S.
cruiser Houston and the destroyer Peary, finally set out on 15 February,
but had to turn back because of heavy air attacks. ; Msg, Wavell to
Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01308, OPD ABDA Msg File.) Wavell assigned the 147th Field Artillery Regiment to Port Darwin and
requested that it should be left there, even though it involved a change
in the plans of the War Department, which had intended to use one of the
regiments in General Patch's task force., The War Department agreed to do
so. ((1) Msg, Wavell to Marshall, 14 Feb 42, ABDA 0 1173, Vol I, Item
1i, Exec 2. (2) Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 14 Feb 42, . 130, WPD Msg
File 9, 890.)
38 (1) Ltr, CofS to Admiral King, 20 Jan 42, sub: Loading of
Transports, WPD 3718-19. (2) Unused memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jan 42, sub:
Def of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-14. (3) Memo, CofS for Dill [11 Feb 42),
no sub, WPD 3718-25.
39 Memo for rcd, Gen Crawford, 14 Feb 42, WPD 4630-66.
40 Unused memo ,WPD for CofS  Feb 42, sub: Reinforcements for
"X" WPD 4630-66. The proposed shipment also included two
battalions of light artillery for New Caledonia, so as to leave General Wavell both field artillery regiments in Australia.
41 Memo, G-3 for TAG, 15 Feb 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipments 4656 and
6924, AG 370.5 (2-1542), 1. See memo for rcd on original.
42 Informal memo, G. C. M. [Marshall] for Eisenhower, 14 Feb 42, WPD
43 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 14 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4630-65.
44 (1) Min, War Council, 16 Feb 42, WDCSA, SW Confs. (2) Memo, WPD
for G-3, 17 Feb 42, sub: Mvmt of Trs to SUMAC, WPD 4630-66. (3) D/F, WPD
for G-3, 19 Feb 42, same sub, WPD 4630-70.
45 (1) Msg, Br Admiralty to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58. This message
contained the recommendations of the Pacific War Council that had been
set up in London. (2) Msg, CCS to Wavell, 20 Feb 42, DBA 19. Both in OPD
ABDA Msg File. According to Churchill (Hinge of Fate, p. 157), the United States had
suggested that the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions also be diverted to
Burma. From what follows in the present text, it would appear that the
suggestion came rather from Wavell and Dill. It is clear that as
Churchill says, he himself did not endorse the suggestion.
46 Msg, Australian Prime Minister to Br Prime Minister, 21 Feb 42, incl
with msg, Australian Prime Minister to President, 21 Feb 42, OPD ABDA
Msg File. The message to the President was in answer to one from him to
the Australian Prime Minister of 20 February 42, cited below, n. 48.
47 For views of Br Chiefs, see msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 21 Feb
42, COS (W) 70, OPD ABDA Msg File.
48 Msg, President to Curtin, 20 Feb 42, No. 330, OPD ABDA Msg File.
49 For War Department policy on allocations of aircraft between ABDA
Command and the RAAF in early February, see: (1) msg, Marshall to
Wavell for Brett, 5 Feb 42, 10. 77, Tab ABDA, Book 3, Exec 8: (2) memo
WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit !this contained msg for Maj
Gen Julian F. Barnes; and (3) memo WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, same sub
(this contained a paraphrase for General Wavell of the message sent to
Barnes. Last two in Tab ABDA, U.S. Reps, Book 3,Exec 8.
50 Memo ;WPD] for CofS, 6 Feb 42, sub: Subs for Possible Discussion
Other Than Those Mentioned by You on Tel, Tab Misc, Book 3, Exec 8.
This figure corresponds to the following breakdown by shipments:
Bloemfontein (Pensacola convoy)
Coolidge and Mariposa (12 Jan convoy)
The AAF history gives a lower figure, which apparently includes only
planes unloaded in Western Australia during January. (Craven and Cate,
AAF I, p. 374.)
51 For the program initiated in mid-December, see above, Ch. IV. For the totals allocated by the end of December, see: (1) Annex I,
min, 2d mtg CsofS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1 ; (2) memo, Col Edgar P.
Sorensen ( for CofAS ) for ACofS W PD, 27 Dec 41,
sub: Sum of Aircraft Currently Assigned to or Destined for
"X," WPD 4630-6 : and (3) table annexed to ABC-4/3, 31 Dec
41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.
52 For the totals allocated during January and February, see WPD
Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).
53 On 3 February the AAF announced projected shipments during the
month, including 19 P-40's and 212 P-39's (which presumably included
P-400's). (WPD Daily Sum, 3-4 Feb entry, copy in Exec 7.) The shipments
announced by AAF on 23 February as then en route actually exceeded these
totals. They included 259 P-39's and 48 P-40's. (WPD Daily Sum, 23-24
54 ABC-4/5, 10 Jan 42, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.
55 For this enterprise, see Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 384-86.
56 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 30 Jan 42, ABDA 00522, OPD ABDA Msg File.
57 (1) Msg, ABDACOM Info 8, 31 Jan 42, ABDA 00606. (2) Msg, ABDACOM
Info 9, 1 Feb 42, ABDA 00654. (3) Msg, ABDACOM Info 11, 3 Feb 42. All
in Vol I, Item li, Exec 2. (4) Msg, Wavell to Br CsofS and CCS, 3 Feb
42, ABDA 00717. (5) Msg, ABDACOM Info 12, 4 Feb 42, ABDA 00757. (6) Msg,
ABDACOM Info 13, 5 Feb 42, ABDA 00799. Last three in OPD ABDA Msg File.
The message of 5 February reports the attack mentioned in the text. For an account of the attack on Bali, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.
58 For a documented, detailed account, see Craven and Cate, AAF I,
pp. 387-88, 393.
59 Msg, CCS to Wavell, 4 Feb 42, DBA 9, OPD ABDA Msg File. Owing, apparently, to an error in transmission, Wavell understood that
the United States would furnish a carrier, and the CCS had to send a second message to correct the mistake.
See ( 1 ) msg, Wavell to CCS, 9
Feb 42, ABDA 00945: (2) msg, CCS to Wavell, 12 Feb 42, DBA 15; and (3;
msg, Wavell to CCS, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01316. All three in OPD ABDA Msg
60 Msg cited n. 59 (1) .
61 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 19 Feb 42, ABDA 01679, repeated as 01987, CCOS 15, OPD ABDA Msg File.
For an exchange of messages concerning supply by the Indomitable, see:(1)
msg, Br CsofS to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58 ; (2) msg, Wavell
to Br CsofS and CCS, 18 Feb 42, ABDA 01581, CCOS 13: and (3) msg, Br
CsofS to Wavell (SWP) 23, repeated to Br Jt Stf Miss in Washington, 19 Feb
42. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.
62 Msg, CCS to Wavell, 20 Feb 42, DBA 19, OPD ABDA Msg File.
63 Both this paragraph of instructions .(paragraph 1 of the above cited
message.) and the quoted authorization to commit naval forces and
American planes to Java (paragraph 2 of the above cited message) were
adopted from a message from London containing the recommendations of the
Pacific War Council. (See msg cited n. 61 (1).)
The CCS soon liberalized the instructions and made their application
even clearer. See (1) msg, CCS to Wavell, 21 Feb 42, DBA 20; (2) msg,
Br ,Jt Stf Miss to Br CsofS, 21 Feb 42, JSM 58; and (3) msg, CCS to Wavell, 22 Feb 42, DBA 22. All three in OPD ABDA Msg
64 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 21 Feb 42, ABDA 01864,
COOS 16, OPD ABDA Msg File. Hr stated: "No more fighters can reach
from east and consignment from INDOMITABLE cannot arrive in time.
Reinforcements of heavy American bombers from India has been stopped
from Washington and would in any case have been insufficient."
65 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 01996, CCOS 17, OPD ABDA
Msg File. The Langley sailed the same day. It was unfortunate that the wording of the paragraph of instructions
in DBA 19 (cited n. 62), was slightly changed from the recommendation on
which it was modeled, drawn up by the Pacific War Council (in COS (W)
58, cited n. 61(1)). The recommendations of tier Pacific War Council
were repeated to Wavell (as % 1398 MO. 1), in spite of the attempt of
the CCS to forestall this action. Wavell may haw inferred from the
changes in wording that the instructions of the CCS did not apply simply to the problem of evacuating forces from Java.
66 Msg, Wavell to Br CsofS and CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02047, A.W. 12,
OPD ABDA Msg File.
67 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02076, CCOS 19,
OPD ABDA Msg File.
68 Ibid. This and other messages indicate how great the pressure was
on Wavell to do something to placate authorities in the Netherlands
Indies, including Dr. H. J. van Mook, the lieutenant governor, who had
just returned from the United Stags. They continued to insist that the
situation in Java was not irretrievable. See, for example: (1) msg, Lt Gov van Mook to Gen Marshall, 22 Feb 42, no number; (2)
msg, Dutch CinC Java to Netherlands Govt in London, quoted in full in
msg, Br CofS to Jt Stf Miss, 24 Feb 42, W. 83 ; 131 msg, Br CsofS to Jt
Stf Miss, 25 Feb 42, COS (W) 82: and (4) msg, Lt Gen H. ter Poorten to
Gen Marshall, 28 Feb 42, no number. All four in OPD ABDA Msg File.
69 (1) Msg, Marshall to Brett [as CG USAFIA], 25 Feb 42, No. 424,
AG 381 (11-27-41), 2-C. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG  Feb 42, sub:
of Gen Brett to Comd U.S. Trs in Australia, Tab ABDA U.S. Reps, Book
4, Exec 8. Notation on this memo states msg was sent from Marshall to
Brut on 23 Feb, as . 196.
70 Msg, Marshall to Brett, 1 Mar 42, . 478, WPD Msg File 10, 31.
On 28 February Brett replied to the War Department message of 25
February (No 424) that he considered further shipments of pursuit planes
"unwarranted wastage." For Brett's message of the 28th ; (No 391) to which the War Department referred in the message of 1 March,
OPD ABDA Msg File. The British ship Athene, also under orders to take planes to Java, was
recalled to Melbourne. (Msg, Brett to TAG, 4 Mar 42, . 498,WPD Msg
File 10, 310.)
71 See Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 387-92, 397-99, 411.
72 Msg, Brett to Marshall, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 231, Tab ABDA, U.S. Reps,
Book 3, Exec 8.
73 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.
74 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 26 Jan 42, ABDA 00357, OPD ABDA
75 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsofS, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A. W.
7, OPD ABDA Msg File.
76 Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 1 I Feb 42, No. 116, AG 381 (11-27-41),
2-B. The message was specifically in response to messages from Brett of 29 January
(ABDA 108) and 7 February (ABDA 231).
77 Msg, Brett to Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 372, AGWAR 17, OPD ABDA Msg
File. Brett referred to the message of 11 February (No 116, cited n. 76)
from the War Department and the earlier messages from him referred to
78 Msg, Brett to WD, 18 Feb 42, ABDA 448A. Vol IA, Item li, Exec 2.
79 For the component parts of the convoy, see msg, Butt to Arnold, 2
Feb 42, No. 339, Vol LA, Item li, Exec 2.
80 See (1) msg, Wavell to CIGS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42,
ABDA 01288, OPD ABDA Msg File, and (2) msg cited n, 78.
81 Msg, AMMISCA (Chungking) to TAG, 23 Feb 42, No.307, Vol IA, Item li, Exec 2. This transmitted the report from
Brady, who was
thin in Calcutta, that Brett had directed "no definite plans be
made to employ B-17 planes in Burma or China in immediate future
because of military situation in Java."
82 Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 395 96, 493.
83 For detailed memoirs of the story of the AVG through 7 December
1941, see. Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1949),Chs.VII IX..
84 Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for
AAF, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.
85 (1) WD msgs to Gen Magruder under Tab China, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo
[U. S. CsofS] for Br CsofS, 8 Jan 42, sub: Immediate Assistance
to China, ABC 4/CS 2, Tab J, ABC: 337 ARCADIA 124 Dec 41 ), 2.
86 These are the shipments mentioned above in the message to Wavell
of 11 February (cited n. 76). The date on which action was initiated was
9 January, and it was then decided that AAF would "furnish air
support to the Chinese Government in the China Theater." (See WPD
Daily Sum, 9 Jan entry, copy in Exec 7.)
87 During the ARCADIA Conference the Chiefs mentioned once, vaguely
and briefly, the project of sending heavy bombers-General Arnold
declared that it would not be worth sending less than fifty to bomb the
Japanese home islands from advance bases in China. ((1) Min, 1st mtg
CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. (2) "Notes
on China" [Jan 42], Item 17, Exec 10.)
88 For a brief history of HALPRO, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp.
89 (1) The Doolittle raid answered the long-held wishes of the
President. See the President's directive to the Navy, as reported in
memo, CofS for Gen Gerow, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf, Thursday Jan
16, 1941, WPD 4175-18. (2) The execution of such a raid was also
recommended by the Pacific War Council in London after the fall of
Singapore. See msg, Br CsofS to CCS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58, OPD ABDA
For the history of the Doolittle mission, see Craven and Cate, AAF
pp. 438-44, and Morison, Ruing Sun in the Pacific, pp. 389-98. Both rely
heavily on a manuscript history of the raid by S. L. A. Marshall in OCMH
90 (1) Directive memo, Col John Y. York, Jr. (by direction of CofAS) for AAF,11
Feb 42, sub: Experiments with Gasoline for China
Theater, Tab 10. (2) Memo, Col Clayton L. Bissell for CAAF (Alto Maj
Gen Millard F. Harmony, 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 4. (3)
Memo, Col. Nathan F. Twining (for CofAS) for Col Howard A. Craig (Plans
Div), 1 Apr 42, sub: HALPRO, Tab 11. All three in OPD China Green
Book, OCMH Files. This file was compiled by Lt. Col. Thomas S. Timberman
91 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Magruder for
Generalissimo, 1 Feb 42, 10. 167. (2) Ltr of instns, CofS to Gen
Stilwell [2 Feb 42], sub: Instns as U. S. Army Rep in China. Both in W
PD 4389-64. For a full account of the negotiations, which began at the end of
December 1941, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to
92 Some such review of Stilwell's qualifications seems to have
gone on during the ARCADIA Conference, when the War Department was
starting to make plans and to negotiate with the Chinese Government for
the appointment of a senior American officer to go to China. ( See Romanus and Sunderland,
Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.)
93 Msg, Arnold to Brett, 20 Feb 42, No. 178, WPD Msg File, 1.
94 (1) Msg, Brett to TAG, 21 Feb 42, ABDA 492. (2) Msg, Arnold to
Brett, 24 Feb 42, . 409. Both in AG 381 (11-27-41), 2C.
95 Memo, AAF [Col Harold L. George for Gen Arnold] for CofS, 24 Feb
42, sub: Estab of an Amer Air Force in India, OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.
96 (1) Msg, Marshall to AMMISCA, 25 Feb 42, . 228, AG 381(l1-27-41, 2C;.
(2) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell (AMMISCA) 28 Feb 42,
No. 239, WPD Msg File 10, 40.
97 Msg, Brereton to Arnold, 2 Mar 42, AMSEG 516, WPD Msg File 10,
98 Craven and Cate., AAF I, p. 494.
99 Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Mar 42, No. 308, WPD Msg File
100 For the program as a whole, see: (1) memo, Col Bissell for CAAF (Attn Gen Harmon), 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 3: (2)
chart, title: China Aviation Project, forwarded with memo, Col Bissell
for Gen Arnold, 20 Feb 42, no sub, Tab 3: (3) memo [Col Bissell] for Gen
Harmon, n.d., sub: Chinese Project this memo refers to and modifies memo of 18 Feb cited
above)., Tab 3:
and (4) memo, Col Twining (for CofAS) for Dir War Orgn and Movmts,
14 Mar 42, sub: Pilot Replacements for China Theater, Tab 1. All four in
OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.
101 Chart cited n. 100 (2) copy filed Tab 3, OPD China Green Book,
102 For the Soviet declaration of neutrality, see above, Ch. IV. See
also mono, AAF [Asst SAS] for CofS, 16 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air
Bases, WPD 4557-43.
103 Soviet representatives then rejected the proposal as
impracticable. See mono, Lt Col George C. MacDonald for Robert A.
Lovett [ASW for Air], 5 Aug -41, no sub, WPD 4557-1.
104 See (1) Extract of Rpt of Sp Miss to USSR on Allocation of
Aircraft from U. K. arid U. S. Pdn, WPD 4557-18: (2) study, 2 Nov 41, OCAC, sub: Plan for Delivery of Airplanes to Russia, Air AG 452.1 Russia
(45); and (3) ltr, SW to Secy State [22 Nov 41], no sub, WPD 4557-26.
105 (1) Memo, AAF [SAS]- for WPD, 28 Oct 41, sub: Airport
Info, Nome-Moscow. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Oct 41, sub: Airport
Info, Russia. (3) Ltr, SW to Secy State, 31 Oct 41, no sub. (4) Memo,
WPD for CofS, 8 Nov 41, sub: Airport Info, Russia. All four in WPD
106 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present Attitude in War,
WPD 4557-35. This included a paraphrase of a
message from Faymonville.
107 Memo, AAF for CofS, 17 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air Bases, and ltr [SW for President], 14 Jan 42,
both in WPD 4557-43. For the whole transaction, see: (1) memo, Col Ridgway for Chief of
Plans Gp, WPD, 9 Jan 42,sub: Proposed Air Serv to Siberia via Alaska, and (2) memo, WPD for
Orme Wilson [Ln Off, State Dept], 27 Jan 42, sub: Air Route to Siberia
via Alaska, both in WPD 4557-43.
108 See memo cited n. 107 (2) .
109 For initiation of this review, see: (1) memo, President for
Stark and Marshall, 4 Mar 42 (circulated as JCS 16, 6 Mar 42, title: U.
N. Action in Case of War Between Russia and Japan), and (2) memo, CofS
for President, 5 Mar 42, sub: War Between Russia and Japan, both in OPD
110 Memo, CofAS for WPD, 8 Mar 42, sub: Assistance to Russia in Event of Russian-Japanese Hostilities, OPD 380.3, 2.
To encourage co-operation the AAF also suggested that military relations
with the Soviet Union should be put on the same basis as military
relations with Great Britain. (This memo was submitted in response to
memo, WPD for CAAF, 7 Mar 42, same sub, OPD 380.3, 2.)
111 WPD study, 8 Mar 42, sub: .An Analysis of Lines of Action
Open to U. S. for Rendition of Assistance to Russia in Event of
Hostilities Between Russia and Japan in Spring of 1942, incl with memo,
WPD for CofS [8 Mar 42], sub cited n. 110. There is no indication that
the study left the Strategy Section, where it was prepared, although
there is a forwarding memo, Lt Col R. H. Givens, Jr., for ACofS WPD 
Mar 42, sub cited n. 110. Both items with JCS 16 in ABC 381 (1-23-42).
112 Memo, Capt John H. Caughey for Gen Eisenhower, 11 Mar 42, sub
cited n. 111, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1-23-42). Caughey was a member
of the Combined Subjects Section, S&P Group, WPD.
113 The JCS referred the problem to the JPS (see min, 5th mtg JCS,
9 Mar 42) in JPS 19/D, 10 Mar 42. The JPS referred it to the JUSSC (see
min, 4th mtg JPS, 11 Mar 42), in JPS 19/1D, 12 Mar 42. The JUSSC study
is JPS 19; 2, 20 Mar 42, title cited n. 109(1). The JPS discussed this
paper in their 7th meeting (21 March) and their 8th meeting (25 March),
and at the latter meeting Admiral Turner was directed to draw up a paper
for the JCS. The paper, as drafted by Turner, is incl with memo, Turner
for JPS, 28 Mar 42, sub: U. .N. Action in Case of War Between Russia
and Japan, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1-23-42). (The paper, as
circulated to the JCS, is JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42.)
114 The question of staff conversations was raised by G-2. See
memo, G-2 for CofS (through WPD), 16 Feb 42, sub: Stf Confs with Soviet
Mil Authorities, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. For an alternative proposal,
see memo, Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand for Gen Eisenhower, 2 Mar 42, sub:
G-2 Study . . ., OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. The WPD response is given in:
(1) memo, no sig, 25 Mar 42, no sub, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1; (2) notes,
H. [Col Handy] for Gen Crawford, n.d., atchd to above cited memo; and
(3) min, 7th mtg JPs, 21 Mar 42.
115 Memo, OPD for G- 2, 25 Mar 42, sub: G-2 Study on Stf Confs with
Soviet Mil Authorities, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1.
116 Memo cited n. 114 (1) .
117 JPS 192 cited n. 113.
118 (1) Min cited n. 114(3). (2) See D/F, WPD for CofAAF, 23
Feb 42, sub: Air Route Between U. S. and Soviet Union by Way of Alaska,
WPD 457-43. This D/F transmitted a letter from the Assistant Secretary
of State to the Secretary of War, 18 February 1942, asking for
suggestions on a memorandum then being drafted for transmission to the
Soviet Government with reference to the establishment of a commercial
airline between Alaska and Siberia. (See also memo for rcd on D/F. No
copy of the letter itself is in this file.)
119 JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42, title: U. N. Action . . . .
120 Files consulted do not contain a copy of the memorandum. Its
tenor is clear from a summary given in JCS 16/2, 19 Jun 42, title: U. S.
Aid to Russia in Case of Attack by Japan.
121 The JCS 16 series remained on the JCS agenda during the rest of
1942 and was taken up again in December. See ruin, 44th mfg JCS, 1 Dec
42. For the negotiations and plans during the second half of 1942, see below, Ch. XV.