1 Fourteen sessions were held. Although
the conversations are often considered to have
ended on 27 March 1941 (see statement in opening
paragraph of ABC-1), a fourteenth meeting was
held on 29 March, at which time approval was
given to ABC-1. (Min, mtg U. S.-Br Stf Confs,
29 Mar 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 14th mtg, W PD 4402-89.
ABC -1 (American-British Conversations), Report
of United States-British Staff Conversations,
27 March 1941, U.S. ser 011512-12R, Item 11,
Exec 4 (hereafter cited as ABC-1 Report) is
also reproduced in Pearl Harbor
Hearings, Part 15, pp. 1485-1542. Unless
otherwise indicated, all documents cited in
this chapter which are identified by either
a B.U.S. or U. S. (Navy) serial number are
filed in Item 11, Exec. 4.
2 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 26 Dec
40, sub: Army Reps for Stf Confs with Gt Brit,
WPD 4402. This memorandum, written by General
Gerow, was approved by the Chief of Staff on
28 December 1940, and Maj. Gen. William Braden,
Deputy Chief of Staff, got in touch with the
Secretary of War the same day. (2) Orders designating
the Army members were issued on 30 December
1940. Ltr, TAG to Gen Embick, 30 Dec 40, same
sub, AG 334.8 Confs (12-26-40). Later, at the
suggestion of Admiral that an Army secretary
be appointed-the Navy had appointed Commander
Lewis R. McDowell, and the British, Lt. Col.
A. T. Cornwall-Jones, as secretaries-General
Embick added Colonel Scobey as secretary of
the Army section. (Min, 2d mtg U. S. Navy and
Army Members, 29 Jan 41, U. S. ser 09212-2.
3 Admiral Turner, Captains Cooke and
Kirk, Capt. DeWitt C. Ramsey, USN, Lt. Col.
Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC, and Commander McDowell
were members of the Navy section. (Ltr, CNO
to Admiral , 24 Jan 41, sub: Appt of Navy Com
to Conduct Stf Confs with Br, U. S. ser 09212.)
4 (1) Memo, Orme Wilson, Ln Off State
Dept for Dir Central Div, Navy Dept, 16 Jan
41, sub: Br Aide-Memoire, Jan 15, 1941,
WPD 4402-1. (2) On the outward voyage on the
British battleship, King George V, Admiral
Ghormley and General Lee presented a list of
questions, to which the British furnished written
answers on 31 January. Note by U. K. Delegation,
Br-Amer Tech Convs, 31 Jan 41 B.U.S. (J) (41)
5 (1) Min, plenary mtg Br-U. S. Stf
Convs, 29 Jan 41, B.U.S. (41) (J) 1st mtg,
WPD 4402-89, Part 1 a. (2) Cf. min cited n.
2. Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand advisers
were available for consultation with members
of the British delegation but did not participate
in the conversations.
6 Statement by U. K. Delegation,
U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 29 Jan 41, B.U.S. (J) (41)
7 Agenda for U.S.-Br Stf Convs, 27
Jan 41, U.S. ser 011512-2.
8 General Lee sent this report to
the War Department on 7 January 1941, a month
after he had been instructed to secure information
and report to the War Department. (Msg, Lee
to Miles, 7 Jan 41, No. 647, WPD 4402-1.) Admiral
Ghormley had also failed to get advance information,
and had so reported to Admiral Stark.
9 Statement cited n. 6.
10Ibid. Significantly the
British representatives proposed, as an example
of the principle that the partner having predominant
forces in an area should exercise command over
the Allied forces in the area, that "a
United States Admiral should have command over
British and Dominion naval forces in the Pacific
and Far East." General Gerow wrote a marginal
comment on this passage: "Watch out."
11 ABC-1 Report.
12 Min, 6th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs,
10 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 6th mtg.
13 The message is quoted in full in
Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 23-25.
See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 141, 174, and Hull, Memoirs,
14 The message of the Former Naval
Person (Churchill) to President Roosevelt,
4 October 1940, is quoted in Churchill,
Their Finest Hour, pp. 497-98. Churchill
asked the President whether he might not send
an American naval squadron to pay a friendly
visit to Singapore. He suggested that the visit
might provide a suitable occasion for discussions
by American, British, and- Dutch staff officers
concerning technical problems of naval operations
in East Indies and Philippine waters.
15 (1) Min, Standing Ln Com, 5 Oct
40, Item 58, OCS Binder 1. (2) Memo, CofS for
SW, 7 Oct 40, sub: Mtg of Ln Com Saturday Oct
6, 1940, filed with min of Standing Ln Com,
Item 58, OCS Binder 1. (3) Cf. Watson, Prewar
Plans and Preparations, p. 118.
16 At the same time that the British
were presenting their appreciation on the Far
East to the United States staff committee,
Lord Halifax communicated the substance of
this paper to Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
(See min, conf in OCofS. 18 Feb 41.)
17 (1) Min, conf in OCofS, 18 Feb
41, WDCSA CofS Confs, I. (2) Declaration by
U. S. Stf Com, U. S.-Br Stf Convs, 19 Feb 41,
U. S. ser 011512-7.
18 The Far East-Appreciation by U.
K. Delegation, Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 11 Feb 41,
B.U.S. (J) (41) 13.
19 Memo, Gens Embick, Gerow, and Miles,
and Col McNarney for CofS, 12 Feb 41, sub:
Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore,
20 Min, Jt mtg of A&N See, U.
S. Stf Com, 13 Feb 41, U. S. ser 09212-11.
21 (1) Min, Jt mtg of A&N See,
U. S.-Br Conf, 19 Feb 41, U.S. ser 09212-15.
(2) For the offensive strategy of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, as proposed by the Navy, see
par 33, Statement by U.S. Stf Com, "The
U. S. Military Position in the Far East,"
19 Feb 41, U. S. ser 011512-8.
22 The Far East-Appreciation, cited
24 Statement by U. S. Stf Com, "The
U.S. Military Position in the Far East,"
Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 19 Feb 41, par 26, U. S.
25Ibid., pars 37-39. Nothing
was said of the defenselessness of Singapore
against land attack, though there is good reason
to believe that the Navy was well informed
on this score.
26 Note by U.K. Delegation, 3 Feb
41, Provision and Employment of U.S. Air Forces,
B.U.S. (J) (41) 8.
27 The Air Corps 54-group program
called for a total delivery by 1 April 1942
of 21,470 tactical and training planes. Wesley
F. Craven and James L. Cate, Plans and
Early Operations-January 1939 to August
1942, I, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR
II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press,
1948), 129, (hereafter cited as Craven and
Cate, AAF 1).
28 (1) Draft, Provision and Employment
of U.S. Air Forces, n.d., no sig, Item 11,
Exec 4. (2) See Colonel McNarney's discussion
on air allocations and deployment on the occasion
of General Arnold's pending trip to England.
Memo, McNarney for Arnold, 7 Apr 41, sub: Stf
Convs, WPD 4402-7.
29 The work of an Air subcommittee,
ABC-2 was submitted two days after the ABC-1
Report was completed. (ABC-2, ltr, Gen Embick,
Admiral Ghormley, and Admiral Beliers, to CofS,
CNO, and (Br) CsofS, 29 Mar 41, sub: Air Collab.
This document is reproduced in Pearl Harbor
Hearings, Part 15, pp.1543-50.) The members
of the Air subcommittee were Air Vice Marshal
J. C. Lesson, RAF, Captain Ramsey, USN, and
Colonel McNarney, USA.
33 Statement by U.K. Delegation, 29
Jan 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 2.
34 (1) Min, 7th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs,
14 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 7th mtg. (2) For
the definition of the agreed areas of British
and American strategic responsibility, see
Annex 2, ABC-1.
35 Min, 8th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs,
15 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 8th mtg.
36 (1) The organization of the U.S.
Military mission in London as envisaged at
that time did not provide separate Air representation.
General Arnold wanted an Army Air officer to
be assigned to each board and committee so
that American organization would correspond
to the British organization. Arnold expressed
this view to Ambassador John G. Winant during
his visit to London in April 1941. See Henry
H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, Harpers
& Brothers, 1949), p. 217. (2) For the
influence of the British pattern on American
organization, see Ray S. Cline, Washington
Command Post: The Operations Division,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 102-03.
37 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Apr 41,
sub: U.S. Mil Miss in London, WPD 4402-5. The
Army staff for the nucleus mission was to consist
of sixteen officers including the head of the
mission and, upon the entry of the United States
into the war, was to be increased to forty
officers. (2) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 7 Apr 41,
same sub, WPD 4402-5.
38 (1) Ltr, Marshall to Chancy, Sp
Army Obsr, London, 24 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of Instns,
WPD 4402-5. (2) Notes on conf in OCS, 11 :00
O'clock, 28 Apr 41, WDCSA, CofS Confs, Vol
II. General Lee, the military attaché in London,
acted in the dual capacity of military attaché
and special Army observer until General Chaney's
39 Ltr, Stark, CNO, to Ghormley, SPENAVO
in London, 5 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of Instns, WPD
40 Msg, Chancy to TAG, 23 May 41,
AG 210.684 (5-23-41) MC.
41 Memo, Capt A. W. Clarke, Secy to
Br Mil Miss in Washington, no addressee, 18
May 41, sub: Appts to the Br Mil Miss in Washington,
WPD 4402-10. The British mission itself was
to consist of about thirty-one officers, although
a number of other British officers were coming
to Washington at this time to be assigned to
Admiralty Missions in North America, and to
the administration of the British Air Training
Plan which was being implemented in the United
States. The joint secretaries selected for
the mission were Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN,
and Mr. W. L. Gorell-Barnes of the Foreign
42 See above, p. 8.
43 Incl A to rpt, JPC [Gen McNarney
and Admiral Turner] to JB, 30 Apr 41, sub:
Jt Bsc War Plan RAINBOW 5 and Rpt of U. S.-Br
Stf Convs, Mar 27, 1941, JB 325, ser 642-5.
46Ibid. The "Malay Barrier,"
as used in RAINBOW 5, was defined as including
the "Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and
the chain of islands extending in an easterly
direction from Java to Bathers Island, Australia."
47 The Navy had stated that it would
not transport reinforcements from the United
States to the Philippines after Mobilization
Day (M Day). Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Jan 41,
sub: Measures to be Taken in Event of Sudden
and Simultaneous Action by Germany and Japan
Against the U.S., WPD 4175-18.
48 (1) Sec VII, Incl A to rpt cited
n. 43. (2) Par 2, memo, Admiral Stark, CNO,
for CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans
for Overseas Expeditions, RAINBOW 5 Development
File, G-3 Regd Does.
49 Draft memo, WPD [Col Bundy] for
CofS [May 41 ], sub cited n. 48 (2) . This
memorandum was drafted not earlier than 22
May 1941, as it contains a reference to a memorandum
from the Chief of Naval Operations of that
50 See VIII, Incl A to rpt, cited
51 Min, JB mtg, 14 May 41.
52 The Secretary of the Navy approved
joint Board 325, serial 642-5 (RAINBOW 5 and
ABC-1) on 28 May 1941. Memo, Col Scobey, SJB,
for CofS, 2 Jun 41, sub: Approval of JB Sers
by SN, JB 325, ser 642-5. The Secretary of
War gave his approval on 2 June 1941. (1) Ltr,
JB to SW, 28 May 41, sub: Approval of War Plans.
(2) Ltr, Stimson and Knox to President, 2 Jun
41. Both in JB 325, ser 642-5. The second letter
forwarded RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1 to the White
53 Memo, Col Scobey for CofS, 9 Jun
41, sub: JB 325, ser 642-5-Jt A&N Bsc War
Plan-RAINBOW 5 and Rpt of U. S.-Br Stf Convs-ABC-1,
JB 325, ser 642-5. On 5 July 1941 Under Secretary
Welles informed President Roosevelt that Lord
Halifax wished the President to know that the
British Government had in fact approved the
ABC-1 Report. (Ltr, Welles to President, 5
Jul 41, and atchd Itr, Lord Halifax to Welles,
4 Jul 41, Roosevelt Papers, Secy's File, Box
54 Min, conf in OSW, 10 Jun 41, WDCSA,
SW Confs (War Council), Vol I. The Army planners
quickly drew up detailed plans to send to Army
commanders. The War Department Operations Plan
RAINBOW 5 (WPD WDOP-R5) and the War Department
Concentration Plan RAINBOW 5 (WPD WDCP-R5-41)
were approved by the Chief of Staff on 19 August
1941 and issued to the Army commanders shortly
thereafter. (See copies of plans in G-3 Regd
Does.) RAINBOW 2 and 3-providing for American
concentration in the Pacific in the event of
war-were canceled at the Joint Board meeting
of 6 August 1941. RAINBOW 1 and 4-the hemisphere
defense plans-were not formally canceled until
May 1942. RAINBOW 4 supplanted RAINBOW 1 in
the spring of 1940 and, although its assumptions
were actually superseded by events, it continued
to serve for some purposes of hemisphere defense
planning until 7 December 1941. Such long-range
planning as the Army did in 1941 for future
military operations was done under the assumptions
of RAINBOW 5.
55 (1) See ltr, Gen Chaney, Off of
Sp Army Obsr, London, for CofS, 8 Sep 41, sub:
Air Def of Nav and Air Bases in U. K., WPD
4497-7. (2) A list of other reports submitted
by General Chaney is in memo, WPD for TAG,
27 Oct 41, sub: Preparation for Plans for Task
Forces, Bases and Def Comds as Provided in
WD Opns Plan, RAINBOW 5, 1941, WPD 4497-7.
56 For examples, see: (1) memo cited
n. 55 (2), and (2) notes on conf in Gen Gerow's
off, 29 Oct 41, memo for red, L. C. J. [Lt
Col Lawrence C. Jaynes], 29 Oct 41, sub: Augmentation
of Pers and Functions of Chaney Miss, Tab D,
Item 4, Exec 4.
57 (1) Ltr, Gen Chaney to CofS, 20
Sep 41, sub: Comd Arangements, U.S. Army Forces
in Gt Brit, OPD 320.2 Ireland, 14. (2) Memo,
W PD for SW, 3 Oct 41, sub: U. S. Trs for British
Isles, WPD 4497-5. The proposed forces, exclusive
of Iceland, were listed as follows:
Token (England) Force
(3) Gen Gerow's Diary, 16 Jul, 12 Aug 41
entries, Item 1, Exec 10. The number of Army
troops contemplated in WPD planning for Iceland
fluctuated throughout the summer of 1941 between
five and thirty thousand.
58 Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, for
instance, believed that the idea of a token
force was a mistake but, since it had been
agreed upon, its strength should be held to
a minimum. He maintained that, outside of the
Western Hemisphere, the U.S. military effort
should be, as much as possible, offensive.
(Memo, Gen McNair, CofS GHQ, for ACofS WPD,
8 Nov 41, sub: U.S. Token Force ABC-1, WPD
4497-8.) Early in 1942 the token force for
England was scratched. For a detailed account
of the divergent views within the American
staff, in late 1941 and early 1942, on the
especially troublesome problem of the control
and command of U.S. Army Air Forces in the
United Kingdom, see Craven and Cate, AAF
I, pp- 579-87.
59 For over-all strength figures,
see: (1) Strength of the Army Report, Machine
Rcds Branch, AGO, STM-30; and (2) Biennial
Report of the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943
to the Secretary of War, p. 2. The Regular
Army divisions were: the 1st-9th Infantry Divisions,
24th Hawaiian Infantry Division, and the Philippine
division; 1st-4th Armored Divisions; and the
1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions. The National
Guard divisions were: the 26th-38th, 40th,
41st, and 43d-45th Infantry Divisions.
60 See Logistics in World War
II, Final Report of the Army Service Forces
(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948),
pp. 10, 12.
61 For a War Department review of
the state of preparedness of the Army in the
early fall of 1941, see: (1) memo, WPD for
CofS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Overseas Possessions,
Task Forces, and Leased Bases, WPD 4564-1,
and (2) memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Oct 41, sub:
Ground Forces, with corrected copy of incl,
memo, CofS for President, 14 Oct 41, sub: Est
of Ground Forces Req, etc., WPD 4594. (A copy
with various rough drafts is filed in Env 8,
62 In addition to reinforcing the
U.S. overseas garrisons-Alaska, Hawaii, Panama,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines-the War Department
in 1941 had to provide troops to garrison the
leased British bases in the Bahamas, Jamaica,
Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana.
Troops were also deployed, under separate agreements,
to Newfoundland and Bermuda. From June through
November, other Army movements overseas were
to Greenland, Iceland, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana).
An account of the overseas deployment for hemisphere
defense in 1941 will appear in Conn, Defense
of the Western Hemisphere.
63 Ltr, Stark to CofS, 22 May 41,
sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions,
RAINBOW 5 Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.
64 Memo, WPD for CofS [May 1941],
sub cited n. 63, RAINBOW 5 Development File,
G-3 Regd Docs.
65 (1) Ltr, JPC [Gen Gerow and Admiral
Turner] to JB, 28 May 41, sub: Submission of
Jt Bsc Plan for Capture and Occupation of Overseas
Positions, JB 325, ser 694. (2) For the diplomatic
action taken by the United States, see Hull,
Memoirs, p. 940.
66 Min, JB mtg, 24 May 41.
67 Ltr cited n. 65. The plan bore
the Army short title, GRAY, and the Navy short
title, WPD 47. For fuller information, especially
on the War Department position, see WPD 4422.
68 See JPC rpt, 11 Jun 41, JB 325,
ser 696. See also (1) John G. Winant, Letter
from Governor Square (Boston, Houghton
Miffing Company, 1947), pp. 203-04, and (2)
Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p.
69 Gerow Diary, 4 Jun 41 entry, Item
1, Exec 10.
70Ibid., 19 Jun 41 entry.
71 Memo, H. R. S. [Admiral Stark,
CNO] for Dir of War Plans [Navy], 1 Jul 41,
no sub. Copy in Gerow Diary, atchd to 1 Jul
41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
72 See (1) Jt A&N Directive for
Reinforcement of Defenses of Iceland (Short
Title-INDIGO-1) [10 Jul 411, JB 325, ser 697-1;
(2) memo, WPD for TAG (through Gen Arnold),
15 Jul 41, sub: GHQ Carry Out INDIGO-1, WPD
73 On 8 August the Senate passed Senate
Joint Resolutions 92 and 93, extending the
period of service. The House accepted them
with amendments on 12 August, by the close
vote of 203 to 202. The House amendments were
accepted by the Senate and the measures sent
to the White House for signature on 14 August.
(For a discussion of the problem and legislative
action during 1941, see Watson, Prewar
Plans andPreparations, Ch. VII)
74 A detailed account of the occupation
of Iceland by Army forces is contained in Conn,
Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
75 (1) Gerow Diary, 29 Aug 41 entry,
Item 1, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Gen Marshall for
President, 6 Sep 41, sub: Orgn of first Army
Contingent for Iceland, WPD 4493-125.
76 See Sherwood, Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 291-92.
77 Notes on conf in OCofS, 16 Apr
41, WDCSA, CofS Conf, Vol II.
79 Memo [WPD] for CofS, 16 Apr 41,
sub: Strategic Considerations Peace or War
Status, WPD 4402-9. This document was initialed
by Colonel Anderson, acting head of WPD in
the absence of General Gerow, who was then
on sick leave.
80 Notes on conf cited n. 77. Colonels
McNarney, L. S. Gerow, Anderson, and Bundy
were WPD representatives.
81 Notes on conf cited n. 77.
82 (1) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 19 ,dun
41, sub: Est of the Russo-German Sit, IB 85,
filed in G-2/370.2 USSR (6-23-41). (2) Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-04. (3)
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War:
The Grand Alliance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1950), p. 393.
83 The American delegates to the military
staff talks were Admirals Stark, King, and
Turner, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Comdr.
Forrest P. Sherman, and Colonel Bundy.
84 "General Strategy Review by
the British Chiefs of Staff," 31 Jul 41,
Item 10, Exec 4. Colonel Bundy noted that this
review was read paragraph by paragraph by Admiral
Sir Dudley Pound to the assembled British-American
staff on board the H. M. S. Prince of Wales
on 11 August 1941.
85 For the Prime Minister's theory
advanced during the conference, see memo for
Admiral Stark, no sig, n.d., sub: Notes of
Speech by Prime Minister on USS Augusta,
9 Aug 41, Item 10, Exec 4.
86 For the staff discussions at the
Atlantic Conference, see: (1) memo, Comdr Sherman
for CNO, 18 Aug 41, sub: Notes on Stf Confs,
11-12 Aug 41, and (2) memo, Col Bundy for CofS,
20 Aug 41, sub: Notes of Stf Confs, Aug 11-12,
1941 on board Prince of Wales, both
in Item 10, Exec 4; and (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, p. 358.
87 WPD draft memo [W PD for CofS,
Sep 41], sub: Gen Strategy-Review by Br CofS,
WPD 4402-64. The memorandum was not delivered
but was used informally in drawing up the joint
88 For the JB reply, see: (1) ltr,
JPC [Col Robert W. Crawford and Admiral Turner]
to JB, 25 Sep 41, sub cited n. 87, JB 325,
ser 729; (2) memo, Maj. Charles K. Gailey,
Jr., Exec OPD, for CofS GHQ, 14 Oct 41, sub:
JB 325 (ser 729)-Gen Strategy Review by Br
CsofS, WPD 4402-64; and (3) memo, Col Scobey,
SJB, for JPC (Army Sec), 3 Jan 42, sub: JB
325 (ser 729)-Gen Strategy, JB 325, ser 729.
(JB 325, serial 729 was superseded by the paper
entitled: Tentative U. S. Views on Subject
of British Memorandum, Dec. 18. ) For other
pertinent references to material in War Department
files about the Atlantic Conference and its
aftermath, see note for red, Lt Col Clayton
L. Bissell, 31 Oct 41, sub cited n. 87; WPD
4402-64; WPD 4402-62; and Item 10, Exec 4.
89 (1) For a very brief account of
the China aid program, see below, pp. 63-64.
(2) For a full account, see Charles F. Romanus
and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to
China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1952 ), Ch. I.
90 For a detailed treatment of the
War Department's part in the lend-lease program,
including administration, policies, and missions,
see Richard M. Leighton, and Robert W. Coakley,
The Logistics of Global Warfare, a volume in
preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II.
91 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41,
sub: Mil Miss in Iran, WPD 4596. Actually SPOBS
became a lend-lease mission only in a very
limited sense. U. S. civil representatives
in the United Kingdom were given important
responsibilities for lend-lease, and heavy
reliance was also placed on regular British-American
channels in Washington.
92 For the setting up of the Magruder
mission, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's
Mission to China, Ch. I.
93 For pertinent papers on the establishment
of the Maxwell Mission, see: (1) WPD 4511-9,
(2) WPD 4559-3, (3) Item 6, Exec 4, and (4)
94 The American (Harriman) mission
to Moscow included Admiral William H. Standley,
Generals Burns and Chancy, Col. Philip R. Faymonville,
and Colonel Bundy. For references in War Department
files to the Harriman mission, see especially:
(1) Item 2, Exec 10; and (2) WPD 4557-4, -6,
-12, and -46.
95 (1) For the protocol, see agreement,
n.d., title: Confidential Protocol of Conf
of Reps of U.S.A., U.S. S. R., and Gt
Brit . . ., copy filed in separate folder annex,
title: Russia (Moscow Confs), with WPD 4557.
(2) For the formal decision to transfer supplies
to the USSR under the Lend-Lease Act, see ltr,
President to Lend-Lease Administrator Edward
R. Stettinius, Jr., 7 Nov 41, WPD 4557-25.
(3) For a detailed discussion of the Moscow
conferences and aftermath, see Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, pp. 384-97. For the texts
of the Russian-aid protocols, see U.S. Department
of State, WARTIME INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS,
Soviet Supply Protocols, Publication
2759, European Series 22 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, n.d.).
96 For the Greeley mission, see for
example: (1) WPD 4557-10 and -17, and (2) OPD
210.648 Iran, 38.
97 For references to the Iranian mission,
see especially: (1) W PD 4549-3, and (2) W
98 A detailed treatment of the Wheeler,
Greeley, and Maxwell missions is found in T.
H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and
Aid to Russia, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office,
99 (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and
Preparations, Ch. XI, treats the rearmament
program and problem of foreign aid, and discusses
in considerable detail the whole story of the
development of the Victory Program in the War
Department. (2) Cline, Washington Command
Post, Ch. IV, contains an account of the
role of WPD in Victory Program planning.
100 Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41,
Photostat copy filed in WPD 4494-1.
101 Memo, Gen Gerow for John J. McCloy,
ASW, 5 Aug 41, no sub, Tab G, Item 7, Exec
102 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Sep
41, sub: Resume of Confs, etc., WPD 4494-12.
(2) Cf. memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Dec 41, sub:
A&N Est of U.S. Over-all Pdn Reqmts, WPD
103 The results of the studies furnished
him were incorporated in: (1) "Estimate
Army Requirements . . .," September 1941
; (2) "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations
Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies (September
1941)"; and (3) a supplementary report,
"War Department Strategic Estimate . .
. October 1941."
104 The detailed study of Army air
needs, for the initial Victory Program estimates,
had been prepared by the newly established
Air War Plans Division in a paper known as
AWPD/1. This document, based on ABC-1 and RAINBOW
5, contained the blueprint for AAF expansion.
It called for 2,164,916 men and some 60,000
combat planes. (For a detailed discussion of
AWPD/1, see Craven and Cate, AAF 1, pp. 131-32,
146-47, 149-50, 594, 599-600.)
105 JB 355, ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title:
JB Est of U.S. Over-all Pdn Rqmts, App II,
Part II and Part III, JB 355, ser 707, in WPD
4494-13. Appendix II contains the Army estimate,
Parts I and II being W PD's study-including
Army Air Forces summary statistics-and Part
III being a detailed study by the Army Air
Forces War Plans Division. For a brief of the
Army Air Forces study, including references
to B-29's, see Appendix II, Part III, Section
I. Appendix I contains the Navy requirements.
As a result of the unrecognized differences
between the Army and Navy, the Secretaries
of War and Navy, on 25 September, forwarded
to the White House, along with a single joint
Board report on strategy to defeat the enemy,
separate estimates of ultimate requirements-Army
ground, Army air, and Navy. ((1) Memo, Actg
ACofS WPD for CofS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Ultimate
Rqmts of Army, Ground, and Air Forces. (2)
Ltr, S W and SN for President, 25 Sep 41. Both
in WPD 4494-13.)
106 Brief of Strategic Concept of
Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential
Enemies (September 1941)," App II, Part
I, JB 355, ser 707, 11 Sep 41, title cited
n. 105. As summarized in the joint Board report,
submitted to the White House along with the
separate Army and Navy estimates on 25 September
1941, national objectives as related to military
policy were: (1) "preservation of . .
. the integrity . . . of the Western Hemisphere";
(2) "prevention of the disruption of the
British Empire"; (3) "prevention
of further extension of Japanese territorial
dominion"; (4) "eventual establishment
in Europe and Asia of balances of power which
will most nearly ensure political stability
in those regions and the future security of
the United States; and, so far as practicable,
the establishment of regimes favorable to economic
freedom and individual liberty." The first
three items in effect supplemented the Army
statement. The fourth, seemingly a long-range
political objective that might have had significant
implications for U.S. strategic planning in
World War II, was presented without elaboration
as to meaning or manner of achievement. (See
JB rpt atchd to Victory Program Est, JB 355,
ser 707, copy filed with WPD 4494-13.)
107 This "short of war"
program was a summary of recommendations which
were to be made in greater length in the "War
Department Strategic Estimate . . . October
1941." In this estimate, the "short
of war" steps involved military and naval
protection of the Western Hemisphere and American
shipping; establishment of military bases in
Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, Bermuda,
the Antilles, British Guiana, the United Kingdom,
Alaska, and on U. S. islands in the Pacific;
and finally the release of "merchant shipping,
planes, foodstuffs, munitions to Russia, China,
Great Britain and other powers opposing the
Axis." ("War Department Strategic
Estimate . . . October 1941," Vol I, especially
pp. 1-3, WPD 4510.)
108 (1) "Brief of Strategic Concept
. . .... App 11, Part I. (2) Chart, "Ultimate
Requirements Ground Forces," App II, Part
II, Sec I. Both in JB 355, ser 707.
109 Chart cited n. 108 (2) . For fuller
discussion on ways of defeating Germany, see
App II, Part II, Sec II, "Estimate Army
Requirements, Supporting Study," JB 355,
110 It is remarkable in the light
of subsequent events in World War II, that
the Army planners should have settled on 1
July 1943 as the target date for the all-out
effort against Germany. It is equally remarkable
that their calculation of an 8,800,000-man
Army came so close to the figure ultimately
reached-8,300,000 (though with great variations
in types and composition of units from those
111 Memo, Gen Gerow for SW, 13 Nov
41, sub: Strategic Est, Vol I (Copy 11), Item
9, Exec 4.