1 Memo, OPD for G-2, 8 Jul 42, sub: Est of Russian Sit, OPD 381 Russia,
2 Quoted in memo, Br CsofS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Opns,
WP (42) 278, (COS (42) 195 (O)), ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 19.
3 Memo, Minister of War Transport for Br CsofS, 30 Jun 42, sub: Opn
SLEDGEHAMMER, COS (42) 192 (O), circulated as Annex I to memo cited n.
4 Memo, Chief of Combined Opns [Mountbatten] for Br CsofS, 30 Jun 42,
sub: Certain Implications of Mounting Opn SLEDGEHAMMER, COS (42) 194
circulated as Annex II to memo cited n. 2.
5 Memo cited n. 2.
6 Msg, War Cabinet offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington,
8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Item 9, Exec 5. The British themselves proposed
to investigate further the prospect of
operations in northern Norway (JUPITER).
7 Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 25 Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in
Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD 381
8 Min, 24th mtg JCS, 10 Jul 42. For similar reasons advanced by
MacArthur, see above, Ch. IX.
9 Min cited n. 8.
10 Memo, CofS, COMINCH, and CNO fub: Latest Br Proposals
Relative to BOLERO and GYMNAST. This
memorandum was drafted in OPD. Various copies, with corrections by
Marshall, are filed Item 4, Exec 1, and Item 53, Exec 10. A copy in the
latter file bears the note, dated 10 Jul 42: "Chief signed this C.
K. G." The initials are those of Colonel Gailey, OPD Executive.
Secretary Stimson, it may be noted, "cordially endorsed" the
proposal of a "showdown" with the British. Later, his attitude
changed, and he became "not altogether
pleased with his part" in the transaction. (Stimson and Bundy, On
Active Service, pp. 424-25.)
Two other statements of the Pacific alternative, incorporating
arguments apparently intended to influence
British opinion, are contained in: (1) msg (originator OPD), Gen
Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 Jul 42, CM-OUT 3546 (R)
(there was no distribution of this msg in WD: for text, see memo, OPD
for WDCMC, 13 Jul 42, sub: Opns for this Year, several copies filed in
Army files, incl copies in OPD 381 ETO, 2 and under Tab 9, ABC 381
(7-25-42 ), 4-B) : and (2) OPD draft msg, President to Prime Minister,
n.d., Item 9, Exec 5.or President,
10 Jul 42, no sub, OPD 381 Gen, 73.
11 Memo, CofS for President, 10 Jul 42, sub: Latest Br
Proposals Relative to BOLERO and GymNAST. This memorandum was drafted in
OPD. Various copies, with corrections by Marshall, are filed Item 4, Exec
i, and Item 53, Exec 10. A copy in the latter file bears the note, dated
10 Jul 42: "Chief signed this C. K. G." The initials are those of Colonel
Gailey, OPD Executive.
Secretary Stimson, it may be noted, "cordially endorsed" the proposal of a
"showdown" with the British. Later, his attitude changed, and he became
"not altogether pleased with his part" in the transaction. (Stimson and
Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 424-25.)
Two other statements of the Pacific alternative, incorporating arguments
apparently intended to iniluenec British opinion, are contained in: (1)
msg (originator OPD), Gen Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 Jul
42, CM-OUT 3546 (R) (there was no distribution of this msg in WD; for
text, see memo, OPD for WDCMC, 13 Jul 42, sub: Opus for this Year, several
copies filed in Army files, incl copies in OPD 381 ETO, 2 and under Tab 9,
ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B); and (2) OPD draft msg, President to Prime
Minister, n.d., Item 9, Exec 5.
12 Memo, Deane for King [12 Jul 42], no sub, OPD 381 Gen, 73.
13 Memo, Marshall, King, and Arnold for President,
12 Jul 42, sub: Pacific Opns, OPD 381 Gen, 73.
14 Memo, J. R. D. [Deane] for CofS, 13 Jul 42, sub: Conf Held in
Marshall's Off Monday, Jul 13, 1942, at 8:1.5 A. M., WDCSA BOLERO
(SS). The officers were Generals Arnold, Somerwell, and Mc,
Maj. Gen. Thomas 'I'. Handy (Chief, OPD), Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer
(the Army planner), Colonel Ritchie (Chief, Southwest Pacific
Theater Section, OPD), and Colonel Deane (Secretary, General Staff).
15 Sec memo cited n. 14. Marshall may already have heard the report,
which he passed on to Eisenhower later in
the day, that he might he sent to London with Hopkins on Thursday or
Friday. (See msg cited n. 11 (1).)
16 ASF Plng Diary, Plng Br, 13 Jul 42 entry. The Planing
Branch, SOS, also asked the Services to recalculate the Service troop
basis in the British Isles.
17 Memo, Somervell for CofS, 14 Jul 42, sub: Opns in Pacific,
Tab 11, Item 1, Exec 5.
18 (1) OPD study, title: Effects of GYMNAST on our Bsc Strategy, the
second of seven studies in vol, title: Data Prepared by OPD, 15 Jul 42.
Handy's copy (No. 10) is filed Item 6, Exec 1. (2) OPD study, title:
Comparison of Opn GYMNAST with Opn Involving Reinforcement of Middle
East . . ., 15 Jul 42, Tab 4, Item 1, Exec 5.
19 Msg, President to Marshall, 14 Jul 42, WDCSA BOLERO (SS). The
President asked if Marshall could arrange to leave on the night of 16
20 Memo, A. C. W. [Wedemeyer] for Handy, 14 Jul 42, no sub, Tab 10,
Item I, Exec 5.
The official minutes of the JCS meeting (the 25th) give an
uninformative notation covering this item (Item 9) of the agenda, saying
only that Marshall read a communication
from the President and that the JCS then talked about "future
United Nations strategy."
21 (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 425. (2) Memo,
Marshall for King, 15 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA 381 War Plans (S).
22 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602.
23 Memo, President for Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 16 Jul 42, sub: Instns for London Conf-July, 1942, WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).
24 Two sheets of pencil notes on White House stationery, no sig,
n.d., Item 35, Exec 10.
25 The War Department draft of instructions is quoted in full in
Appendix B for comparison with the instructions issued on 16 July,
discussed below in the text, and printed in Sherwood, Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 603-05.
26 For the President's remarks on the point, see notes taken by
Hopkins on the President's conversation,
on the evening of 15 July, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.
For British professions with reference to
ROUNDUP, see: (1) msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington, 8 Jul 42,
COS (W) 217, Tab 6, and (2) msg, Prime Minister to Dill, 12 Jul 42,
Tab 5, both in Item 1, Exec 5. The second message is an answer to a
letter from Sir John Dill noting that the decision not to mount
SLEDGEHAMMER was likely to lead the Americans to turn to the Pacific.
(For this ltr, n.d., code JSM 293, sec WDCSA 381.) The Prime Minister
in replying ignored the subject. After alluding to the case against
and recapitulating briefly the case for GYMNAST, he concluded:
"However if the President decided against 'Gymnast' the matter is
settled. It can only be done by troops under the American flag. The
opportunity will have been definitely rejected. Both countries will
remain motionless in 1942 and all will be concentrated on 'Round-up' in
27 Sherwood observes, in this connection, that the President had the
more reason to deal gently at this moment with the Prime Minister,
because of the tatter's political difficulties at home, growing out of
the defeats in Libya. (Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 601-02.)
28Ibid., p. 603. The President was prepared to accept" a
"substantial reduction in BOLERO for the next three months." The Prime Minister had stated his view in his message to Field Marshal
Dill: " 'Gymnast' does not interrupt the vast preparations and
training for 'Round-up' now proceeding on this side. It only means that
6 United States divisions will be withdrawn
intact from 'Round-up'. These might surely be replaced by new U. S.
Divisions which would be ready before the transportation schedule is
accomplished." ( Msg cited n. 26 ( 2 ).)
29 Memo cited n. 23.
30Ibid. Compare with the statement of principles
(paragraph 4) in the draft instructions. (App B, below.)
31 Memo cited n. 23. Compare with the statement
(paragraph 3) in the draft instructions. (App B, below.)
32 There were several other changes in the paragraph
on SLEDGEHAMMER, perhaps the most important
of which was omission of the concluding sentence of the draft paragraph:
"SLEDGEHAMMER should be executed on the basis of our remaining in
France, if that is in any way practicable." (1) App B, below. (2)
Memo cited n. 23.
33 Memo cited n. 23. Compare with statement in draft instructions
(paragraph 3). (App B, below.)
34 (1) Memo cited n. 23. (2) For the President's
opposition to the Pacific alternative see paragraph
9, quoted above, pp. 272-73.
35 A detailed account of the plans and discussions appears in Harrison,
Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. I. An important account told from the point of
view of the two leading participants is in Sherwood, Roosevelt and
Hopkins, pp. 606-10.
Important documents for the American case and British views are: (1)
min, Combined Stf Conf . . ., 20 Jul 42, (2) paper, 21 Jul 42, title:
Reasons Supporting U. S. CsofS Proposals Re Opn SLEDGEHAMMER, and (3)
rev min, Combined Stf Conf Held at No. 10
Downing St, 22 Jul 42, all with CCS 83 in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-1642),
2; and (4) memo, Marshall and King for President, 28 Jul 42, no sub,
WDCSA 319.1 (TS).
36 (1) Msg, Marshall to SW, 23 Jul 42, No. 576, WDCSA
SLEDGEHAMMER (SS). (2) Drafts of rpt to President, 22 Jul 42, no sub,
WDCSA 319.1 (TS). (3) Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 23
Jul 42, WDCSA 381, 1. The President
added the latest intelligence with reference to North Africa. The American
legation in Berne had just passed on a report that the French were planning
to strengthen the coastal and air defenses of French Morocco; that an
Allied force of perhaps 150,000 would be able to seize control of all airfields
in French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia; and that troops in French Morocco
were likely to prove more co-operative than those stationed farther east.
37 (1) OPD study, 15 Jul 42, title: Comparison of Opn GYMNAST
with Opn Involving Reinforcement of Middle
East . . ., Tab 4, Item 1, Exec 5. (2) The operations chief, General
Handy, later in the summer still recommended sending the equivalent
of a corps to the Middle East in preference to undertaking TORCH in some
of its forms. Msg, Handy to Marshall, 22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8444 (8/23/42).(3) See also p. 290, blow.
38 For a brief allusion to these embarrassments, sec above, pp. 198-99.
39 Msg, Hopkins to President, 24 Jul 42, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, p. 611.
40 Memo cited n. 35(4).
41 Memo, U. S. CsofS for Br CsofS, 24 Jul 42, circulated as Annex
to min, 32d mtg CCS (held in London on the same day), with CCS 94 in ABC
381 (7-2-42) , 1.
42 Memo by CCS, 24 Jul 42, sub: Opns in 1942/ 43, circulated as CCS
94, ABC 381 (7-2-52), 1.
43 It was on this basis that OPD officers in Washington
were at this time redrafting studies of the operation, which was
therefore once more assuming the aspect of SUPER-GYMNAST. See section,
"TORCH: The Time and The Place," pp. 284 ff., below.
44 Besides provisions mentioned above, CCS 94 provided that in case
the British Chiefs of Staff should decide to move as armored division to
the Middle East, it should be an American armored division from the
United States, to be shipped in British bottoms. This provision was part
of the memorandum as proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
45 Min, 33d mtg CCS (London), 25 Jul 42.
46 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.
47 Msg, Marshall and King to President, 24 Jul 42, CM-IN 8566.
48 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.
49 Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 25 Jul 42, WDCSA
381, 1 (SS).
50 Msg, Mc to Marshall, 25 Jul 42, CM-OUT
51 Admiral Leahy had been appointed Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the United Stags Army and Navy following his
recall and resignation as Ambassador to
France in July 1942. When ('several Marshall suggested the desirability
of designating an officer to maintain liaison between the JCS and the
President, Admiral King at first objected, but later readily acceded
when Marshall proposed that Admiral Leahy, a former Chief of Naval
Operations, he named to the post. (See Leahy, I Was There, pp. 95-98.)
52 Min, 34th mtg CCS, 30 Jul 42.
53 For a specific statement on the point, see pers ltr, Marshall to
Eisenhower, 30 Jul 42, in G. C. M. file under Eisenhower, D. D.
54 Min cited n. 52.
For the "flash estimate" cf. msg, Br Jt Stf Miss for Br
CsofS, 31 Jul 42, JSM 329 (ref COS (W) 233), Tab 73, ABC 381 (7-25-42),
4-B. According to this message, the JPS had
hurriedly guessed that a landing on the west coast of forth Africa could
be made by 30 October.
55 Min cited n. 52.
57 Memo, Gen Smith for JCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: Notes of Conf Held at
White House at 8:30 P. M., July 30, 1942, Tab 14, Item 1, Exec 5.
Admiral Leahy, Generals Arnold and Smith, and the President's
naval aide, Captain McCrea, were at this meeting. For other topics
discussed at the meeting, see below, Ch.
58 The timing of the British offensive in the Libyan Desert
(LIGHTFOOT) and the congressional elections
of November 1942 apparently were not taken into account explicitly in the
selection of the final target date for TORCH. For evidence on these
points, see Appendix C, below.
59 Memo cited n. 57.
60 Memo, OPD for CofS, 2 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Tab 45, ABC 381 (7-25-42) , 4-B. Based only on availability of troops, the calculated
earliest date was 10 October. The staff also cited a tentative estimate of the British planners-30
on a calculation of the same factors. (Taken from msg, Eisenhower to
Marshall, 1 Aug 42, CM-IN 0472.)
61 Msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42 (COS (W) 236), WDCSA TORCH,1.
62 Memo, Marshall and King for President, 4 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, WDCSA
63 Memo, Marshall and King for President, 4 Aug 42, no sub, WDCSA
TORCH, 1. This memorandum, like the one
cited immediately above, was drafted by OPD and went to the President
via the Navy Department.
64 (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 5 Aug 42, no sub. This memorandum
contains questions of the President on the above cited memorandum to him
on Torch. (2) Memo, Marshall for President,6 Aug 42, sub: Torch. This
memorandum gives the answers. Both memos in Tab 18, Item1,Exec5.
(3)Msg,Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1632.
65 (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 6 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Tab 21, Item 1, Exec
5. (This memo consists of comments on msg cited n. 61.) (2) Draft
study, title: TORCH, n.d., Tab 21. (3) Study, Wedemeyer for JPS 10 Aug
42, no title, Tab 71. (4) Memo, OPD for CofS, 18 Aug 42, sub: Effect of
Different Dates on Strength of Effort in Sp Opn, Tab 69. Last three in
ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.
66 (1) Note, Handy for Wedemeyer, on memo, Secy JPS for JPS, 11 Aug
42, sub: Projected Opns, transmitting study cited n. 65 (3) . (2)
Msg cited n. 61.
67 OPD draft memo [CofS for President], n.d., sub: Date of TORCH
Landing Opns, Tab 70, ABC 381 (7-25-42) , 4-B. Cf, memo cited n. 65
(1) This contained the statement that the War Department
was determined TORCH should not be like the battles of Norway and Bull
68 The version of the British Chiefs was rather like that of the
President, expounded in his cable of 24 July to Hopkins. The President
envisaged an operation initially involving some 80,000 American troops, who would
land and establish themselves in the vicinity of Algiers, seize the
city, and then drive quickly eastward toward Tunis, while British
forces, landing on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco, should move
southward to seize Dakar. (See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.)
Apparently the President, like the British, considered
the landings on the Atlantic coast to be almost entirely irrelevant to
the success of the "main" operation inside the Mediterranean.
69 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Jul 42, CM-IN 10945. (2) Msg,
same to same, 1 Aug 42, CM-IN 0472. (3) Msg, same to same, 2 Aug 42,
CM-IN 0796. (4) Msgs, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42, COS (W) 236
and COS (W) 237, WDCSA TORCH, 1. (5) For the current British version
of TORCH, see OPD study, 7 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A.
70 The July studies were drafted by the War Department
planners on the "working level," who then had gone over them
with their associates in the Navy Department and the British Joint Staff
Mission. The officers directly concerned were
Brig. Gen. John E. Hull (concurrently the head of the European Theater
Section in OPD and senior Army representative on the BOLERO Combined
Committee and the JUSSC), Col. George A.
Smith, Jr., and Maj. William H. Baume, Jr. (members of the Future
Operations Section of the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD, in which the
basic studies were prepared), Capt. F. P. Thomas (head of the Atlantic
Section of the Navy's Plans Division) and Maj. E. H. Baume (British Joint
71 (1) The July studies are in Item 6, Exec I, Tab F, and incl
development file. (2) Cf. draft memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Jul 42, sub: Tr
Mvmts to Africa, Item 56, Exec 10.
72 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 1 Aug 42, CM-IN
73 Ltr, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower
to Gen Ward, OCMH, 15 Apr 51, OCMH Files. General Eisenhower, commenting
on the draft manuscript of this volume, filled a gap in the reword of
the events of 26 July. He recalled:
That afternoon, about 3 or 4 o'clock, I got a hurried
call from General Marshall, who was staying at the Claridge Hotel. I
walked into his room and, although he was in an adjoining bathroom
cleaning up, we talked through the door, and he started telling
me at once about the decisions reached. The gist of these decisions was
that the Allies would conduct joint British-American effort against North Africa, and that I would be in
command of the expedition. In this connection, he stated that the Chiefs
of Staff had agreed that the assaulting troops should be as nearly
exclusively American as possible, and, because of this, the British
Chiefs of Staff had asked for an American Commander. Admiral King had
suggested that I was already present on the ground and should be named,
and that, to this, the British Chiefs of Staff quickly agreed. General
Marshall added that my appointment was, of course, not yet official, but
that written orders would come through at an early date. In the
meantime, he said that I should get promptly started on the planning.
Eisenhower emphasized that ". . . certainly, on the afternoon in
question, in London, he [General Marshall] left no possibility of doubt
in my mind as to the finality of the [TORCH] decision and of my duty
with respect to it."
It was characteristic of General Marshall that he did not complicate
the task of Eisenhower as an overseas commander by mentioning the
reservations he had on the score of the TORCH decision-which he would
certainly have explained to Eisenhower as his plans and operations
74 For the directive, approved by the CCS on 13 Aug 42, see Incl A,
CCS 103/1, 27 Aug 42, title: Opn TORCH. The definition of Eisenhower's authority as an Allied commander took
some time. .4t the beginning
of August by common consent he took charge of Allied planning for
TORCH. (I) Pers ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Jul 42, in G. C. M.
file, under Eisenhower, D. D. (2) Msg, Br Jt Stf Miss for Br CsofS, 31
Jul 42, JSM 329, Ref COS (W) 233, Tab 73,.4BC: 381 (7-25-42),
4-B. (3) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 42, CM-I 0796. 4n On 6 August the JCS recommended to the President that Eisenhower
be formally designated the Allied commander for TORCH. See msg
(originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1791. (5) The
President and the Prime Minister both readily agreed. See msg
(originator OPD), same to same, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT
The organization of Eisenhower's staff also took time. See account in
George F. Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa, 1941-1943, a volume in
preparation for the series UNITED STATES
ARMY I WORLD WAR II, Ch. I.
75 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower,
3 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0728. The message had been shown to Admiral Cooke, and
Admiral King concurred in it.
A first draft (by Wedemeyer to Handy) allowed for an interval of up to
am week between the Mediterranean landings
and the landings on the Atlantic coast. (1) Copy filed in Tab 72, ABC
381 (7-25-42), 4-B. (2) See also memo, ACofS (Handy) for WDCMC, 3 Aug
42, sub: TORCH Opn, Tab 18, ABC: 381 (7-25-42) , 4-B.
76 Draft Outline Plan (Partial) Opn TORCH, Hq ETOUSA, 9 Aug 42,
copy in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A. The plan was "prepared jointly by a
British-American group of
For reports while the study was in progress, see in particular: (1)
msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 42, CM-IN 1344: (2) msg, same to
same, 8 Aug 42, CM-IN 2770: and (3) Howe, Operations in Northwest
Africa, Ch. II.
77 Brief of Appreciation of Opn TORCH, Br Jt Plng Stf, copy forwarded
with pees ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Aug 42, Tab 25a, Item 1, Exec
78 Pers ltr cited n. 77. Eisenhower at first wrote that the landings
on the Atlantic coast should come "five to ten days later . . .
," then changed it to "a few days."
79 (1) Memo, Br CsofS, 11 Aug 42, transmitted by pees ltr, Ismay
to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42. (2) See also Br CsofS min in COS (42),
85th mtg (O), and part of COS (42), 233d mtg, min 4, 11 Aug 42. Both in
WDCSA TORCH, 1.
80 Memo, President for Marshall and King, 12 Aug 42, (referring to
their memos of 5 and 7 Aug) Tab 14, ABC: 381 (7-25-42) , 4-B. The only evidence in the record of action by the War Department on the
President's directive is a draft of a memorandum to the President,
evidently in response to the above memorandum, confirming 7 November as
the earliest possible date. There is no evidence to show whether this or
some other memorandum was submitted to the President. (See Tab 70, ABC
381 (7-25-42), 4-B.)
81 Msg, Eisenhower to Handy, attn CofS, 13 Aug 42, CM-IN 4765.
82 Msg, Eisenhower to OPD, 14 Aug 42, CM-IN 5101.
83 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4272.
84 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Aug 42, CM-IN 5608.
For Patton's selection as the commander of the task force to be
embarked directly from the United States, and for his trip to London,
see: (1) tel conv, Gen Hull with Gen Patton, 1045, 30 Jul 42, Book 6,
Exec 8, and (2) msg (originator OPD), Marshall
to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 9255.
85 For the story of planning in August in London on TORCH, see Howe,
Operations in Northwest Africa, Ch. II.
86 Outline Plan Opn TORCH, Hq ETOUSA, Norfolk
Gp, 21 Aug 42. Original copy issued in London
is Tab 35, Item 1, Exec 5, also circulated as Incl B to CCS 103, 25 Aug
87 (1) Ltr, Eisenhower to Ismay (for CCS), 22 Aug 42, submitting the
outline plan and calling attention to his comments as commander in chief
of the operation, to be submitted for consideration with it, Incl A to
CCS 103, 25 Aug 42. (2) Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Aug 42, Incl C to CCS
88 Memo, CofS for President, 20 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn, WDCSA TORCH,
1. Attached to this memorandum were four charts, graphically presenting
the strength of initial forces as conceived on 30 July, 9 August, and
thereafter. (The last was derived froth memo, OPD far CofS, 18 Aug 42,
sub: Effect of Different Dates on Strength of Effort in Sp Opn, Tab 69,
ABC 381 (7-25- 42) , 4-B.) According to the third chart, the plans in progress in London were
being made on the basis of a reduction from
forces assumed on 9 August, as follows: one aircraft carrier, six
auxiliary aircraft carriers, five combat-loaded regimental combat teams,
and undetermined numbers of natal vessels other than carriers.
89 See (1) memo, CofS for President cited n. 88;and (2)msg,Handy to
Marshall,22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8444 (8/23/42). n 2 august, Eisenhower had suggested that someone from OPD come over
whit General Patton, naming General Handy, Wedmeyer, and Hull.
(Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2Aug 24, CM-IN 0796)
90 Msg cited n. 89(2).
91 Directive for CinC, Allied Expeditionary Force, as approved at 36th
mtg CCS, 13 Aug 42, Tab 26a, Item 1, Exec 5.
92 The difference between London and Washington
over objectives was accompanied by different estimates of enemy
intentions. In commenting on the draft manuscript of this volume,
Colonel Baumer, who as a member of OPD had been directly involved in TORCH
planning, concluded that this difference was decisive. (Ltr, Col Baumer
to Gen Ward, 17 Apr 51, OCMH Files.) But it is doubtful
whether the War Department was greatly influenced
by G-2. In this, as in other cases--,compare
for example, the decision whether to support the British after the first
battle of El Alamein, discussed above in
Ch. XI, pp. 251 ff.-General Marshall and
the planners appear to have asked themselves
simply whether the chance should be taken, and to have made up their
minds without being much influenced by intelligence estimates.
94 See (1) memo, Smith for Secy, Br Jt Stf Miss, 25 Aug 42, sub:
Directive for Opn TORCH, Tab 76, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B (this forwards
the text of the new directive proposed by the JCS requesting
that it be transmitted to the British Chiefs of Staff, in London, for
approval); (2) msg, Marshall to Eisenhower,
25 Aug 42, CM-OUT 7500; and (3) msg, same to same, 25 Aug 42, CM-OUT
7858. The original directive of 13 August, the proposed directive, and the
reply of the British Chiefs of Staff were circulated as CCS 103/1, 27
95 Msg, Handy to Marshall, 25 Aug 42, CM-IN 9478.
96 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall and OPD, 24 Aug 42, CM-IN 9341.
Eisenhower noted that the British Chiefs were relying on the
President's statement that TORCH and the convoys for the USSR should
take precedence over all other operations.
97 Msg cited n. 94(3). The Navy, facing the Japanese attack in the Solomons, had no ships to spare. The- U. S. Chiefs of Staff at the same
time failed to consider favorably Handy's recommendation to send
Patton's task force to the Middle East.
98 (1) msg, Br CsofS to CCS, 27 Aug 42, Incl C to CCS 103/1. (2) Msg, Eisenhower to SGS, 27 Aug 42, CM-IN 10397. (3) Msg cited n. 95.
(4) Min, 38th mtg CCS, 28 Aug 42. There were doubtless individual British staff members with different
opinions. (For one instance, sec memo, Marshall to Hopkins, 29 Aug 42,
Tab 34, Item 1, Exec 5.) It is to be noted that American opinion was less than unanimous.
Eisenhower's own position was that the proposed directive would put
American troop . in action with the least risk, but did not provide, as the second outline plan did for a "worth while strategic
purpose." (Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 Aug 42, CM-IN 9626.1 Admiral
Cooke took a position rather like that of the British. Hr envisaged
definite political commitments to guarantee Spanish neutrality. Sec memo,
Cooke for King, 29 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn and atchd memo, Cooke for
King, 29 Aug 42, no sub, Tab 43, Item 1, Exec 5.)
99 (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall and King, 31 :lug 42,
transmitting text of msg sent by President to Prime Minister, 30 Aug, WDCSA
TORCH, 1. (2) For 'Marshall's draft of reply to Prime Minister, see pees hr, Marshall to Hopkins, 29 Aug 42, Tabs '13, 31, Item 1, Exec
5. Substantively, the President's message differed in two respects from
the text of Marshall: in setting a definite limiting date of 30 October
for the landings, with the hope expressed
that they might be as early as 14 October: and in proposing the re-examination
of the problem of finding naval support for the landing at Algiers.
100 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Chief OPD, 31 Aug 42, CM-IN 12132. (2) Msg, Prime Minister to President (142), 1 Sep 42, Tab 38, Item
1, Exec 5.
102 See msg, Prime Minister to President, 3 Sep 42 (replying to
182), quoted in msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Sep 42, CM-I 1095.(1) See msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1354 (9/4/42)
(R), for the American proposal as drafted. (2) See msg, President to
Prime Minister, 4 Sep 42 (183), WDCSA TORCH, I, for the message as sent,
different only in phrasing. The definite fixing of the size of the
Algiers force remained in the text as sent only as a result of the last minute
intervention of the Chief of Staff, who wanted the message sent as soon
as possible, so that Eisenhower or Clark would not have to come to
Washington, as the British were then suggesting, to go over the whole
matter. (Memo CofS for Leahy, 4 Sep 42, Tab 42, Item 1, Exec 5.)
103 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 5 Sep 42 (144,
replying to 183), Tab 46, Item 1, Exec 5. (2) AFHQ (G-3) Outline Plan C
(Provisional) for Opn TORCH, 5 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A.