1 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 568-70. See Hopkins' notes of a
meeting of 30 May and his copy of a cablegram he redrafted and sent to
the Prime Minister that day.
2 Quoted in memo, Br CsofS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Opns,
WP (42) 278 (also COS (42; 195 (O) ;, Tab 19, ABC: 381 (7-25 42), 4-B. In late May or early June a copy of the British
aide-memoire had been
given to Hopkins. The text of it is in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins,
p. 577, and Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 342.
3 Quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 575. Transcript of
interview of 1 June 1942.
4 Msg, President- to Prime Minister, 31 May 42, quoted in Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 569.
General Marshall had expressed the same idea at the morning conference
with Molotov on 30 May. (Op., cit, p. 564.) Compare with the President's
statement of 6 May to Hopkins, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the
JCS, quoted above, pp. 221-22.
5 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. p. 556. Sec also Churchill, Hintge
of Fate, pp. 340, 348-53.
6 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. pp. 582 83. Sherwood quotes the account
Mountbatten sent to the President summarizing the report he had made to the
Prime- Minister of the conversation. On 10 June Mountbatten gave an account of this conversation to the CCS. The
conversation, fie noted, had lasted five hours. The minutes contain only Very general
statements about it. Min, -11th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.: On 19
June the British Chiefs of Staff summarized for the American Chiefs of Staff the points the President had made.
(Min 27th mtg CGS, 19 Jun 42.)
7 Stf study, title: Occupation of NW Af by U. S. Forces, incl with
memo, CofS for President, 16 ,Jun 42, sub: GYMNAST Opn. GYMNAST and
SUPER-GYMNAST Development File, OPD Regd Does. The study is based on a
draft filed in Item 53, Exec 10. The memorandum itself bears no indication of its having been sent to
the President, but it is doubtless the
paper that Marshall took with him to the White- House on the following
day, spoken of by Stimson in his diary. "Marshall had a paper already
prepared against it [GY1tN.ASTJ for he had a premonition of what was
corning." (Stimson and Bundy, On Active .Service, p. 419.) Another
reference, undoubtedly to the same
memorandum, indicates that it must have
been prepared in a great hurry to be taken to the meeting at the White
House. (See memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Jun 42, Book 5, Exec 8. ) For the plans (SUPER-GYMNAST), See Ch.
8 Memo, CofS for President, cited n. 7.
9 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 419 23. The account
contains a quotation, from the Secretary's diary for 17 June, concerning
the meeting of that day at the White House, and the full text of the
Secretary's memorandum to the President, dated 19 June, which had
"the unanimous endorsement of General Marshall and his staff."
10 See thin, 27th mtg CCS, 19 Jun 42. The Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, General Sir .Alan Brooke, "explained that the Prime
Minister's visit was the outcome of conversations with Admiral
Mountbatten who had given an account of his talks with the
President." Brooke then listed the problems
which, according to Mountbatten 's report, the President had been
considering. The list corresponds with the
account of Mountbatten's conversation with
the President, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, pp. 582 83.
11 Msg, JIC, London to JIC, Washington, 9 Jun 42, WDCSA Russia
(S). This message (FEUDAL 26) was a summary of a British JIC paper, JIC
12 Marginal note in pencil on copy of JIC msg cited n. 11 and atchd
note signed DE.
13 (1) Min, 27th mtg CCS, 19 Jun 42. (2) Min, informal mtg
between Marshall and members of his stf, representing U. S. WD, and
Field Marshall Dill, Gens Brooke and Ismay,
19 Jun 42, at Marshall's off, Tab Misc, Book a, Exec 8. (3) Min, 28th
mtg CCS, 20 Jun 42.
14 Min cited n. 13 (3).
16 Min cited n. 13 (2).
17 Min cited n. 13 (3).
18 CCS 83 21, Jun 42, title: Offensive Opns in 1942 and 1943.
19 See note by Secretaries on cover sheet, CCS 83/1, 24 Jun 42.
20 Memo, Prime Minister for President, 20 Jun 42, Book 5, Exec 8. The
memorandum, although bearing the
date 20 June, appears to have been given to the President the day before.
See memorandum, cited n. 21 (1) by which Hopkins, through Captain McCrea,
forwarded it to Marshall and King. The policy on SLEDGEHAMMER that the Prime Minister at this time
expounded to the President had been formally adopted on 11 June. (See below,
21 Memo, McCrea for Marshall and King, 20 Jun 42, no sub, the text
of which contains memo, Hopkins for McCrea, 20 Jun 42, no sub, .ABC 381
Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 2. The original draft by the President and
Hopkins is reproduced in facsimile in
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 586-87.
22 (1) Draft memo [CofS for President], n.d., no sub. (2) Draft memo [CofS
for President], n.d., sub: Offensive Action Prior to Sept 15, 1942, to
Compel Germans to Withdraw Forces from Russian Front. Both in Item 53,
Exec 10. On 23 June Marshall sent a memorandum to the President based on the
first of these drafts. Memo, CofS for President, 23 Jun 42, no sub, OPD
381 Gen, 62.
23 Draft memo, cited n. 22 (1). This begins: "My comments on the
Prime Minister's memorandum of June 20th to the President follow."
A penciled note states that Hull prepared the draft and that a copy went
to Arnold. On Marshall's initiative, the War Department staff had already been
investigating possible reductions in
transport vehicles for the assault divisions. See (1) min, 18th mtg
JCS, 4 Jun 42; (2) memo, CofS for Eisenhower, 4 Jun 42, no sub, (3)
memo, OPD for CofS, 19 Jun 42, sub: Reduction of Transport and Heavy
Equip in BOLERO Assault Divs, and (4) memo, OPD for SOS, 19 Jun 42, no
sub, last three in Item 4, Exec 1.
24 Draft memo cited n. 22 (1) .
25 Draft memo cited n. 22 (2) .
26 For accounts of this meeting, see: (1) Stimson and Bundy, On
Active Service, pp. 423-24 (the account of the Secretary, who was not
present, was based on reports from Hopkins and Marshall) ; and (2)
Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 591-92.
27 Paper, incl with memo, Gen Smith for CofS, 21 Jun 42, Item 4,
Exec 1. The memorandum begins: "Attached is a draft of General
Ismay's notes of today's conference approved by General Brooke."
28 British paper [21 Jun] cited n. 27.
29 Stf paper, incl with memo cited n. 27.
30 Memo cited n. 27. They had apparently brought the difference up
with Brooke, for they passed on his suggestion that they "wait
until tomorrow before discussing the
31 CCS 83/1, 24 Jun 42. The original version by General Ismay was
also modified to provide for study of operations both against the
Iberian Peninsula and against northern
Norway. (For later considerations of these
alternatives, see below, Chs. XII and XIV.) The Prime Minister, whose personal project it was, expected the
invasion of Norway to be an affair mainly for British forces. But partly
in response to his eagerness to invade Norway, the War Department
organized a special regimental combat force of selected L'. S. and
Canadian volunteers, the First Special Service Force, under Lt. Col.
Robert T. Frederick. The project (PLOUGH) provided for training the
force to operate in snow, using a special-purpose tracked vehicle in the
development of which the Prime Minister had taken an active interest.
The existence of this elite unit turned out to be something of an
embarrassment. The Prime Minister did not readily give up the Norway
venture, but it was not well regarded by his own staff; it was out of
keeping with American views on operations against Germany; and its
specific value to him became relatively less as operations in North
Africa lessened his need for a great military success, and development
of other routes to the Soviet Union reduced the importance of the
protection of the northern route, the principal military purpose of
JUPITER. (See below, Ch. XIV, p. 310.) The PLOUGH Force was finally
committed to the Kiska operation (15-19 August 1943) and was sent to
Italy in November 1943 to participate in the Italian campaign. (See
especially, Lt. Col. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force
(Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1947).)
32 Churchill received the news of the fall of Tobruk at the White
House while on his second visit to Washington. For his reaction to this
heavy blow, see Hinge of Fate, p. 383.
33 For the negotiations in London, see above, Ch. X.
34 WD Itr, 16 Jun 42, sub: Comd in African Middle Eastern Theater,
AG 320.2 (6-13- 42 ) MS-E-M. For preceding action, see: (1) memo, OPD for CofS [8 Jun 421, sub:
Comd in African-Middle East Theater, (2) D/F, OPD for TAG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Comd in African
Middle Eastern Theater (with this are filed a memo for red and an
undated first draft), and (3) memo, Upston for Exec OPD, 19 Jun 42, same
sub, all three in OPD 384 Africa, 7: and (4) 1700 Rpt, 11 Jun 42, OPD
Current Gp Files, DRB AGO.
35 (1) WPD ltr cited n. 34. (2) See Motter, Persian Corridor
and Aid to Russia, Ch V.
36 See (1) memo, SOS for G-3, 20 Jun 42, sub: Activation of Units
for Militarization of N Af and Iranian Missions, and (2) memo, G 3 for
SOS, 23 Jun 42, same sub, both in OPD 320.2 Africa, 5.
37 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 15 Jun 42, CM-OUT
3813 (6/16/42) (R).
38 For HALPRO, see Ch. VI, above.
39 See memo, AAF for CofS, 16 May 42, sub: Modified Plan for HALPRO,
WDCSA, HALPRO (SS), for a description of the project as of this
time. The British had earlier worked out plans for the same enterprise. The
U. S. military attaché in Cairo, Col. Bonner F. Fellers, reporting the
plans, had recommended that the United States should furnish the planes.
See (1) msg, Fellers to G-2, 6 Apr 42, CM-IN 1711 (4/ 7/ 42) (R) :
(21 msg, Fellers to G-2, 24 Apr 42, CM-IN 6969 (4/26/42). (R) ; and .(3)
msg, Fellers to G- 2, 1 May 42, CM-IN
1043 (5/4/42) (R). Air War Plans had also been in favor of assigning
planes for the purpose, whereas the Strategy Section in OPD had objected to it, "due to other commitments."
(Memo, Col Nevins for Chief, S&P Croup, 9 May 42, sub:
Recommendation for Execution of War Plan
BLACK and Bombing of Ploesti, OPD 381 Africa 5. For the President's personal
interest in carrying out a raid over
Ploesti, see ltr, Maj Chester Hammond to
CofS, 28 Apr 42, sub: Info Relative to Certain Bombing Flights, WDCSA
381 War Plans (S).
40 four of the planes were forced down in Turkey,
where the crews were interned. The others landed at various places in Syria and Iraq. (See OPD Daily Sums for 13-17 Jun 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.)
41 (1) Msg, Br CsofS to Dill [War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, COS
W 197], 8 Jun 42, Item 15, Exec 10. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall
to Halverson, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2175. (31 OPD Daily Sum, 17 18 Jun 42,
and work sheet of African-Middle East See with OPD Daily Sum, 18 19 Jun
42, Current Gp File, DRB .AGO.
42 Msg, Halverson to Marshall, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 5576 (R).
43 See msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell,
18 Jun 42, CM-OUT 4477 (R) , sent in reply to msg cited n. 42.
44 (1) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 24 May 42, CM-OUT
5022 (R). (2) See also pp. 227 ff., above.
45 (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Stilwell,
23 Jun 42, CM-OUT 5699 (R). Information copies went to Brereton (CM-OUT
5700) and to Maxwell (CM-OUT 5701). (2) Msg, Brereton to Marshall, 25
Jun 42, CM-IN 8183 (R). (3) OPD Weekly Status Rpt, 25 Jun 42, AGO 061 (4
Sep 45). (9) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's
Mission to China, Ch. V.
46 Msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 29 Jun 42, CM-IN 9610 (R).
47 See (1) Ch. VI, above, and (2) memo for red, sub: Activation
of 23d Pursuit Gp, OPD 320.2 CTO, 31, for the history of the flight.
48 The Chinese Government learned of the decision,
as then understood by OPD, from Stilwell, who had received an
information copy (CM-OUT 6083) of msg (originator OPD), Marshall to
Brereton, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6075 (R). For the Generalissimo's protest,
see msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 26 Jun 42,
CM-I 8586 (R). The War Department's message was written in ignorance of the
President's precise intention, a result of haphazard liaison with the
White House. See (1) memo, Brig Gen St. Clair Streett for Gen Handy,
29 Jun 42, sub: Restrictions on Mvmt of Dawson Miss . . . , OPD 452.1
:Middle East, 2; and (2) tel conv, Gen Handy with Gen Smith, 29 Jun 42,
Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.
49 Msg, President (through Stilwell) to Generalissimo,
27 Jun 42, CM-OUT 7014 (R). Successive drafts, concluding with the memo
for WDCMC and with notes of each action taken, are filed in Item 19a,
Exec 10. General Arnold in mid-July asked the President to release the A -29's
arriving at Khartoum, but the President refused, saying he would make a
decision when all the planes were assembled there. (Msg, Lt Gen Joseph
T. McNarney to Gen Marshall, 18 Jul 42, CM-OUT 4970.) For further indication of the President's
see remarks by Assistant Secretaries Lovett and McCloy and General
Arnold. (Notes on War Council, 20 Jul 42, SW Confs, Vol II, WDCSA.1
50 (1) Memo for red, Handy, 24 Jul 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8. (2)
Msg, Brereton to Marshall, 28 Jul
42, CM-IN 8953. (3) Msg (originator OPD),
Marshall to Maxwell, 28 Jul 42, CM-OUF 8212.
51 For a brief account of the "three demands," in
connection with American planning later in the summer, see below, Ch.
XIV. A full account is to be found in Romanus and Sunderland,
Mission to China, Chs. V and VI1.
52 See above, Ch. X.
53 Memo, Col Upston for Gen Streett, 20 Jun 42, sub: Opns Rpt-Tobruk
Area, OPD 381 Africa, 15.
54 CCS 61/1, 22 Jun 42, title: Aircraft Sit of U. N. The schedules
contained in Annex A of the agreements are given in Craven and Cate, AAF
I, pp. 568--69.
55 (1) Memo, CofS for Prune Minister, 23 Jun 42, sub: Prospective Mvmts of Planes to Middle Fast, Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8. (2) Memo, CofS
for President, 26 Jun 42, same sub, WDCSA Middle East (s). (3) Msg
(originator OPD), Marshall to Brereton, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6203
(6/25/42) (R). (4t OPD Daily Sum, 2
5- 26 Jun 42, Current Gp File, DRB
AGO. (5) Min, 29th mtg CCS, 25 Jun 42.
56 (1) Min cited n. 55(5). (2) Memo for red, Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD 381
Middle East, 7. (3) Msg (originator SGS), Marshall to Brereton and
FitzGerald, 1 Jul 42, CM-OUT 0162.
57 Memo, CofS for Dill, 25 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 452.1, 51. This action
superseded the action that Colonel Wedemeyer was taking through the JPS
and the British planners with the same end in view. (See informal memo,
A. C. W. [Wedemeyer] for Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD 452.1, 51.)
58 Min, 30th mtg CCS, 2 Jul 42.
For remarks on the qualification, which was extremely
important, see: (1) memo, Lt Col Russell L. Vittrup for JPS, 25 Jun
42, sub: Aircraft Sit of U. N, with CCS 61 /1 in ABC 452.1 (1-22 -42),
1 ; and (2) min, 21st mtg JPS, 26 Jun 42.
59 See p. 235, above.
60 Min (rev), 27thmtgCCS, 19 Jun 42.
62 Min, 28th mtg CCS, 20 Jun 42.
63 CMT 24/D, 22 Jun 42, title: CMTC/ Directive/ U.
S. Reinforcements for Middle East.
64 Memo, Lt Col Richard C. Lindsay- for Col Wedemeyer, 24 Jun 42, sub:
Mtg of CMTC in Conjunction with CPS on Jun 23, 1942, 4:00 P. M., ABC:
381 Middle East (3-10- 42) , 1 - B, before 1. For the schedules drawn up at this meeting, see annexes to min, 29th
mtg CCS, 25 Jun 42, circulated as CCS 84,
title: U. S. Reinforcements for Middle East.
65 See paper, unsigned, n.d., no title, Tab Misc-, Book 6, Exec
8, for the expected composition of a task force built around the 2d
Armored Division. This paper bears initial H [Gen Handy] in tipper
right-hand corner. For the selection of General Patton to command the American task force
for Egypt, see: (1) : memo for rcd, 23 Jun 42, sub: U. S. Army Comd in
Midd1e Fast, OPD 384 Africa, 1, and (2)
memo for rcd, Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD 381 Middle East, 7. This notes only
that Patton was to be released and to see the Chief of Staff before leaving. The decision
had already been made not to send a task force. Army planners concluded that it would take as much as five months from
the time an American armored division was alerted until the time it
actually reached the fighting front in the Middle East. This finding in
itself raised serious doubts of the practicability of the project. (See
Tab A to draft memo [OPD for CofS, probably written 22-23 Jun 42], sub:
Mvmt of One U. S. Armored Div to Middle East, Item 56, Exec 10, and ltr,
Lt Col William H. Baurner, Jr., for Gen Ward, OCMH, 3 May 51, OCMH
66 For discussion of the project in July and August, see below, Ch.
67 Min, 29th mtg CCS, 25 Jun 42.
68 (1) Memo for rcd, Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD 381 Middle East, 7. (2)
Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6557
(R). (3) Memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 26 Jun 42, sub: U. S. Armored Forces
in Middle East, OPD 370.5 Middle East, 1, amended by memo, same
addressees, same sub, 27 Jun 42, OPD 370.5 Middle
East, 2. (4) Memo, 4 Jul 42, sub: Tanks and Self-Propelled Mounts for
Shipt to Middle East, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8. (5) Memo, OPD for CofS, 4
Jul 42, sub: Sum of Sit in Middle East, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42),
1-B, 4. (6) See also OPD 381 Middle East, 17, 18. The Middle East Command declined the offer of cadres to train an
armored division in the United Kingdom in the use of American equipment,
but otherwise welcomed the proposal. (See mtg of Gen Council, 7 Jul 42,
OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 9, and pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 27 Jun 42,
WDCSA Middle East (S).)
69 The strength of heavy bombers in the Middle East from 25 June
through 16 July was between one and two squadrons. By the end of July,
with reinforcements beginning to
arrive from the United States, it had reached three squadrons-besides five
medium bombers. (OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 14 Sep 45).)
70 OPD Daily Sums, 7-8, 16-17, 17-18 Jul 42, Current Gp File, DRB
.AGO. In .August the 33d Pursuit Group was also ordered
to be moved to Cairo. (OPD Daily Sum, 18-19 Aug 42, Current Gp File, DRB
AGO.) This order was soon countermanded, and the 79th Fighter Group
substituted. (Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 21 Aug 42,
CM-OUT 7145 (8/23/42) (R) and OPD 381 Africa, 26, and other cases in
that file.) The needs of the North .African campaign (TORCH) required
the change. (For the discussions, see Ch. XIV, below.)
71 (1) Informal memo, Marshall for Arnold, 28 Jul 42, WDCSA 452.1
(S). (2) Memo, AAF for CofS, 29 Jul 42, sub: Aircraft Status and Commitments
in Middle East, WDCSA Middle East (S. (3) OPD Weekly Status Rpts, AG
061 (4 Sep 45). (4) OPD Daily Sum, vols for Jul and Aug 42, Current
Gp File, DRB AGO. A large group arrived on 27 and 28 July.
72 (1) OPD weekly Status Rpts, AG 061 (4 Sep 45 ) . (2) OPD Daily
Sum, vol for Aug 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.
74 (1) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 29 Aug 42, WDCSA Middle East (S).
(2) Paper, unsigned, 8 Sep 42, title: Sit in Middle East, OPD 381
Middle East. 30.
75 Memo G-2 [Gen Strong] for CofS, 29 Jun 42, sub: Stoppage of
Reinforcement and Supplies for Egypt, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42),
76 Tel conv, Handy with Smith, 30 Jun 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.
77 See paper, title: Recd by Telephone from Hopkins
at 12:10, Jun 30, 1942/from the President to Marshall, WDCSA Middle East
(S). Quoted in full in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 595.
78 Memo, CofS for President, 30 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 381 Middle
East, 14. For OPD draft corrected in ink by
Handy, see Item 53, Exec 10.
79 For interest in British plans see, besides papers cited above, tel
conv, Handy with Smith, 1 Jul 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8, and papers
filed with memo, OPD for CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub: Notes on Mtg in Off of
Secy State, Book 6, Exec 8. The subject of the meeting was British
policy with reference to the French Fleet units in Alexandria. General Maxwell at once withdrew part of the mission personnel to
Asmara, Eritrea. On preparations for
withdrawal of U. S. forces and equipment, see: (1) msg (originator OPD),
Marshall to Maxwell, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6044
(R) : (2) msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 3 Jul 42, CM-IN 1253 (7/4/42) (R) ;
(3) msg (originator SGS), Marshall to
Brereton and FitzGerald, 1 Jul 42, CM-OUT
0162; (4) memo, OPD for CofS, 4 Jul 42, sub: Sum of Sit in Middle East,
ABC 381 Middle East (3-10--42), 1-B, 4; (5) notes on War Council,
6 Jul 42, SW Confs, Vol II, WDCSA: and (6) OPD Daily Sums, 2-3, 9- 10
Jul 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.
80 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 599. (1) Brereton, with Maxwell's concurrence, had recommended on 29 June
the diversion of the entire consignment, of which twenty planes were
then reported operational. (Msg, Brereton
to Marshall and Arnold, 29 Jun 42, CM-IN 9738 (R).) (2) The War
Department had replied that "in view of military situation as a
whole," it was "not considered
advisable" to ask for the release of the planes. Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 30 Jun 42, CM-OUT 7832
(R).) The President and Stalin acted very promptly on Churchill's hesitant
request (of 4 July), and the War Department notified Basra of the
release of the planes on 7 July. (Msg (originator AAF ), Marshall
to AMSIR, 7 Jul 42, CM-OUT 1958 (7/ 8/42) (R).)
81 (1) Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 3 Jul 42. (2) Informal memo, Col Deane for CofS, 9 Jul 42. Both in WDCSA Middle East (S).
82 (1) Memo, Deane for Dill, 9 Jul 42. This was to inform Dill that
all the necessary orders had been given. (2) Vote, Dill to Deane, 9 Jul
42, acknowledging Deane's memo. (3) Memo,
SOS [Brig Gen Lucius D. Clay] for SGS, 16 Jul 42, sub: Airplane Shipt of 37-mm Am to Egypt. This memorandum listed steps taken, noting
that 900 rounds had been lost in transit. Note and memos in WDCSA Middle
83 Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 30 Jul 42, WDCSA Middle East (S).
84 For Fellers' estimate of the situation in June, see, in
particular, msg, Fellers to G, 2, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 6008 (6/19/42) (R),
and paraphrased rnsg, Alexander C. Kirk to State Dept, 30 Jun 42, Tab
Misc, Book 5, Exec 8. Mr. Kirk, the American minister in Cairo, was in perfect agreement
with Colonel Fetters and more outspoken. See, for example: ( 1) msg,
Kirk to Secy and Under Secy State, 2:i Jun 42, No. 1058, WDCSA Middle
East (S), and (2) paraphrased msg, Kirk to Under Secy State, 2 Aug 42,
OPD 381 Middle East. 25.
85 For this proposal and War Department reaction,
see:(1) memo for red, Handy, 1 Apr .12, and 2 ) paper, Hull, title:
Comments Regarding U. S. Orgn of Alien Mil Forces in Middle East, filed
with memo cited above, both in OPD 320.2 Middle East, 1: (3) msg,
Fetters to G-2, 25 Apr 42, CM-IN 7165 (4/27/42). (R) : (4) mtg of
Gen Council, 4 May 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 1: (5) memo, Hull for
ACofS OPD, 11 May 42, sub: Formation of an Allied Legion in Middle East
Theater, OPD 322.9 Foreign Legion, 1: and (6) msg (originator OPD),
Marshall to Fetters, 15 May 42, CM-OUT 2983 (R).
86 See, for example, msg, Fellers to G-2, 24 Apr 42, CM-IN 6969
(4/26/42) (R). This message carne to the attention of the President.
87 (1) Msg, Fellers to G-2, 30 May 42, CM-IN 9024 (5/31/42) (R). (2) Msg, Fellers to G-2 21 Jun 42, CM-IN 7184 (6/22/42) (R). He recommended
sending two armored divisions, one infantry division, and two tank
destroyer battalions, the Tenth Air Force, and an air support command
mainly of B-24's.
88 (1) Msg, Fellers to G 2, cited n. 84. (2 ). Msg, Fellers to G
2, 19 Jun 42, CM-IN 6311 (6/19/ 42) (R),. (3) Msg, Fellers to G-2, 19 Jun 42,
CM-IN 6491 (6/20/42) (R). (4) Msg, Fellers to G-2,
21 Jun 42, CM-IN 7266 (6/22/42) (R). (5) Paraphrased msg cited n. 84.
89 Memo, CofS for President, 23 Jun 42, sub: Amer Forces in
Middle East, WDCSA Middle East (S). No. 1156 is msg cited n. 87 (2).
90 See below, Ch. XIII.
91 On memo cited n. 89 appear the following notes in pro:
"Secretary of War, Please glance at this. /G. C. M.." and
"I approve/ HLS."
92 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 2 Jul 42, drafted by Col Upston and
forwarded via CofS for signature of SW, by memo, OPD for CofS, 1 Jul
42, sub: Designation of CG USAFIME,
OPD 384 Middle East, 3.
93 Msg, Brereton and Maxwell to Marshall, 29 Jun 42, CM-IN 9515.
94 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell and Brereton, 29 Jun
42, CM-OUT 7389 (R).
95 (1) Msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 30 Jun 42, CM-IN 9743 (6/29/42).
(2) Msg, Brereton to Marshall, 30 Jun 42, CM-IN 0044 (7/1/42).
96 (1) Note, Dill to Marshall, 7 Jul 42. (2) Informal
mono, Marshall for Dill, 6 Jul 42. (3) Drafts of msg, Dill to Auchinleck. All three in WDCSA Middle East (S). (4)
Msg, Br Minister of
State in Cairo [Richard G. Casey] to Dill, 16 Jul 42, incl with pers ltr,
Dill to McNarney, 17 Jul 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.
97 Memo, Arnold for McNarney, 18 Jul 42, sub: Replacing Comdr in
Middle East Theater, WDCSA Middle East (S).
98 Note, GCM to McNarney, atchd to pers ltr cited n. 96(4).
99 The idea that Maxwell would in time be given command of SOS USAFIME, with another officer taking over command of
USAFIME, remained under consideration. (See for
example, note for rcd, OPD 384 Middle East, 8.) This eventually happened
in the fall (4 November 1942), when Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews became CG
100 (1) Notes on War Council, 29 Jun 42, SW Confs, Vol II, WDCSA.
(2) Cf. Ibid., 22 Jun 42. Marshall said, "We have had a series of
conferences with the British including the Prime Minister . . . . The
main issue has been with regard to plans for Bolero and diversion from
this project. The fall of Tobruk has made the situation more
complicated. Our main consideration has been to keep political
considerations and British face-saving diversions from interfering with
strategy and thus disrupting the Bolero plan."
101 (1) Samuel Eliot Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and .Submarine
Actions: May 1.942-August 1942 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company,
1949), p. 158. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 457-61. The AAF units that took part in the Battle of Midway claimed credit
for having sunk or damaged several Japanese vessels during the
engagement. These claims were disputed at the time and have since been
discredited, but they did influence Army views on operations in the
102 Penciled note, D. E., at bottom of memo, Streett for Eisenhower, 10
Jun 42, sub: Gen Richardson's Rpt on
Hawaii, OPD 320.2 PTO, 4.
103 (1) Ltr, Richardson to CofS, 1 Jun 42, sub: Hawaii, OPD :320.2
PTO, 6. (2) Memo cited n. 102. (3) Memo, McKee for ACofS OPD, 15 Jun 42,
sub: Reinforcements for Central Pacific Area, OPD 320.2 P-1-O, 7. (4) Memo, McKee for Streett, 16 Jun 42, sub:
Hawaii, OPD 320.2 P110, 4. For Richardson's mission see OPD 333 Gen Richardson's
Trip. For McKee's mission, see msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons,
2 May 42, CM-OUT 0418 (R).
104 The bsc study was memo, Col Joseph Smith ,S&P, OPD), Col Carl D.
Silverthorne (Theater Group, OPD), and Col Frederic E. Glantzberg
(AWPD), for ACofS OPD, 3 Jul 42, sub: Garrison of Hawaii and Central
Pacific Bases, OPD 320.2 P-FO, 6. For initiation of the study, see other
papers in the same file, Cases 4 and 6. See also (1) memo, Col Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., for Col
Wedemeyer, 3 Jul
42, sub: Reinforcement for Central Pacific Areas, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6: (2)
memo, Wedemeyer for Streett, 3 Jul 42, sub: Add Pers, Armament, and
Equip for Def of BIRCH and HOLLY, OPD 320.2 PTO, 7: and (3) memo,
Wedemeyer for Handy, n.d., no sub, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6.
105 OPD's recommendations were approved by General Marshall at a
conference with General Handy and Colonel McKee on 13 July. For this
conference, see memorandum for record filed with the directive that
followed (metro, OPD for .AGF and SOS, 16 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcements
for Hawaii, OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 18). For staff action immediately thereafter on the defense of Hawaii,
in particular: (1) OPD 320.2 Hawaii, 121, 126, 145: (2) OPD 320.2 PTO,
6: and (3) OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 18, 40.
106 Of the correspondence dealing with the performance
of Army aviation and Army-Navy command
relations in the North Pacific, see in particular: I ; msg, Gen Marshall to Gen DeWitt, 6 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1492 (R) : (2)
msg, Maj Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., to COMALSEC, 7 Jun 42, copy in
OPD 384 WDC, 5: (3) msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2348 (R)
:(4) msg, DeWitt to Marshall, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 5444: and (5) msg, Buckner to Marshall, 20 Jun 42, CM-IN 6347.
107 See note for red, 9 Jun 42, with OPD 320.2 ADC 7 5, and msgs, Marshall to DeWitt, 9 and 17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2170
(R) and 4143
(R). Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, held a more
extreme view than that of the General Staff. (1) Msg, DeWitt to
Marshall, 23 Jun 42, CM-IN 7506. (2) Msg, Marshall to Buckner, 23 Jun
42, CM-OUT 5708 (R). (3) Ltr, DeWitt to CofS, 2 Jul 42, WDCSA Alaska
(SS). (4) Memo, AAF for OPD, 5 Jul 42, sub: Miss of Army Forces in
Alaska. (5) Memo, Streett for Col Stephen H. Sherrill, 8 Jul 42, same
sub. (6) Memo, OPD for AAF, 10 Jul 42, same sub. Last three in OPD 381
108 The units taken from WDC were the 53d Infantry,
the 203d Coast Artillery (AA), and the 75th Field Artillery Battalion.
See (1) msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 9 Jun 42,
CM-OUT 2170 (R) ; (2) note for red cited n. 107; and (3) D/F, OPD for
TAG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Mvmt of Trs to Alaska, OPD 370.5 WDC, 52. For the shifting of troops already assigned to Alaska to more exposed
positions, see msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 9 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2170 (R) : msg,
Marshall to DeWitt, 11 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2847 (6/12/42) (R) ; and memo, OPD
for CofS, 15 Jun 42, sub: Augmented Garrison for Nome, Alaska, OPD 320.2
109 For background on the temporary diversion of the 54th Fighter
Group to WDC, see: (1) memo, AAF for OPD, 3 Jun 42, sub: Transfer of
Pers from 33d and 54th Fighter Groups, OPD 370.5 WDC, 33 ; (2) msg,
Marshall to DeWitt, 4 Jun 42, CM-OUT 0859 (R) ; and (3) memo, AAF for
OPD, 5 Jun 42, sub: Air Reinforcement for WDC, and (4) D/F, OPD for AAF,
10 Jun 42, same sub, last two in OPD 320.2 WDC, 116.
Marshall personally authorized sending one squadron of B-24's at once.
See msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 12 Jun 42, CM-OUT 3037 (6/13/42) (R) :
notation by Marshall on Navy msg, DeWitt to Marshall, 12 Jun 42, and OPD
memo for red, 13 Jun 42, sub: Reinforcements for Alaska, both in OPD
320.2, WDC 124.
110 (1) Memo, DeWitt for CofS, 21 Jun 42, sub: Plan for Suggested
Offensive Opn in NW Pacific. (2) Memo, DeWitt for CofS, 6 Jul 42, same
sub. Both in OPD 381 Security, 206. (3) AAF R&R sheet, Arnold for
Handy, 28 Jun 42, sub: Air Opns in Aleutian Islands. (4) Memo, Handy for
Arnold, 5 Jul 42, same sub. Last two in OPD
384 ADC, 2. (5) Msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 11 Jul 42, CM-OUT 3385 (R).
111 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 May 42, CM-IN 8352 (5/29/42)
112 (1) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jun 42, CM-OUT 0095 (R).
(2) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 2 Jun 42, CM-IN 0469 (R).
113 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 Jun 42, CM-IN 2264 (R).
114 For stf studies, see: (1) memo, Chief of Strategy
Sec for ACofS OPD, 8 Jun 42, sub: Offensive Action in SWPA in Case of
War Between Russia and Japan, OPD 381 SWPA, 63: (2) memo, Col Robert H.
Wylie for CG SOS, 8 Jun 42, sub: Transportation Plan-Amph Div, SW
Pacific, ind to OPD, 10 Jun 42, OPD 370.5 SWPA, 1; and (3) msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 10 Jun 42,
CM-OUT 2319 (R).
115 General McNarney, representing Marshall, and Generals Handy, Streett, and Crawford of OPD, took part. (1) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur,
8 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1815 (R). (2) OPD memo for red, 8 Jun 42, with OPD 381
116 Memo, OPD for CofS, 11 Jun 42, sub: Admiral
King's Communication to Honorable Walter Nash, New Zealand Legation, OPD
370.5 Fiji, 6.
117 Memo, CofS for King, 12 Jun 42, sub: Opns to SW Pacific, OPD
381 SWPA, 73.
118 (1) Msg cited n. 114(3). (2) Msg, MacArthur
to Marshall, 11 Jun 42, CM-IN 3328.
119 (1) Memo, Col Ritchie for Gen Streett, 23 Jun 42, sub:
Offensive Opn in SW Pacific. (2) Sum, 22 Jun 42, title: Est South. Both
in OPD 381 SWPA, 80. (3) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Jun 42, CM-OUT
5704. (4) OPD memo for rcd, 23 Jun 42, OPD 381 SWPA, 75. (5) Memo, OPD
for CofS, 24 Jun 42, sub: Opns in SW Pacific,
OPD 381 SWPA, 76. A detailed account of the divergent Army and Navy plans and views is
contained in John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 8-21.
120 Memo cited n. 119 (1) . It should be noted that from 21 to 25
June, the JCS were preoccupied with a critical situation in the Middle
East and the reconsideration of strategy for 1942. (See section on
"Crisis in Egypt," pp. 250-55, above.)
121 For an early anticipation of such a proposal, see memo, CofS for
COMINCH, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of U. S. Garrisons in Efate . . ., Tab
Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. This memo is quoted and discussed
in Ch. VII, above.
122 Memo, King for President, 5 Mar 42, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 4,
123 See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Jun 42, CM-IN 7976.
MacArthur declared that in his message of 8 June (cited n. 113) he had
omitted purposely the step-by-step explanation of what he proposed to
do, and that the Navy had misconceived his
plan for the operations in the New Britain-New Ireland region.
124 Memo, King for CofS, 25 Jun 42, sub: Offensive Opns in S and
SWPA, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.
125 Memo, CofS for King, 26 Jun 42, sub cited n. 124, OPD 381 SWPA,
126 Memo, King for CofS, 26 Jun 42, sub cited n. 124, OPD 381 SWPA,
127 Memo, CofS for King, 29 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.
128 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Jun 42, CM-IN 9329. (2) Sec msg, COMINCH to
CINCPAC, 27 Jun 42, Tab
Navy, Book 5, Exec 8, for the message from King to Nimitz referred to in
129 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Jun 42, CM-IN 9591. (2)
Cf. earlier protestation in msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 Mar 42, No.
41, Item 7a, Exec 10.
130 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur,
29 Jun 42, CM-OUT 7501.
137 Unused memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jan 42, sub: Def of New Caledonia,
138 Informal memo, EJK [King] for ACofS WPD, 19 ,Jan 42, WPD
3718-14. King objected that "this set-up" was "not
consonant with (a) the projected creation of the ANZAC area, (b) the
facts of the case in connection with the U. S. Army General comdg U.
S. troops, etc. in Australia."
139 For the continued confusion over Emmons' responsibilities, see: (1) msg, Emmons to Marshall, 27 June 42, CM-IN 9002; and (2) msg
(originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT 1179.
140 For the arrangements made in May for joint action in the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands group, under a state of "fleet
opposed invasion," by which Emmons was made the "task force
Commander Hawaiian Defense Sector," see: (1) msg, COMINCH to
CINCPAC, 14 May 42, OPD 384 Hawaii 1; and (2) ltr, Gen Richardson to
CofS, 1 Jun 42, Rpt 2, copy under Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.
141 Navy paper, title: Agenda for Evening of Monday
16 Feb, WPD 4449-8. The War Department staff advised General Marshall on
the first question that the limitation of Emmons' assigned mission
doubtless did make him "unwilling to commit his long-range striking
aircraft to any offensive mission planned by the CinCPac which might
contribute only indirectly to the defense of Hawaii." On the other
question, the staff expressed doubt that Nimitz had authority to move
Army units outside the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. (See WPD study, sub:
Notes for CofS, WPD 4449-8. For details of the transaction, see also
other papers filed with the above. )
144 Ltr, Emmons to CofS, 20 May 42, sub: Army Comd in SPA, OPD 384
145 Memo for rcd. OPD 384 PTO. 16.
146 (1) Draft memo, OPD for CofS, n.d., sub: Army Comd, .SPA,
with atchd informal memo, Handy for Harmon, 13 Jun 42, OPD 384 PTO, 18.
(2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 25 Jun 42, same sub, with incl ltr, CofS to
King, 26 Jun 42, same sub, OPD 384 PTO, 16.
147 Ltr, King to CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub cited n. 146, with atchd
informal memo, GCM for Handy, OPD 384 PTO, 18. For notification to the Army commanders in the Pacific, see: (1) msg,
:Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Jul 42, CM-OUT 0840: and (2) msg, Marshall to
Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT 1100. The 19th Bombardment Group (H) was designated
as the Australian Mobile Air Force, and the 11th Bombardment Group (H)
as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force. (See msg, MacArthur to Marshall,
11 Jul 42, CM-IN 3694, and msg, Emmons to Marshall, 16 Jul 42, CM-IN
148 Ltr, OPD to Harmon, 7 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Instns to CG USAFISPA, with atchd memo for red, OPD 384 PTO, 18. Harmon arrived in
the South Pacific and assumed command at the end of the month.
149 See above, Ch. X.
150 Msg, MacArthur and Ghornley to Marshall and King, 18 Jul
42, Navy 081012, with JCS 112 in ABC 370.26 (7-8-42 ), 1.
151 Memo, King for CofS, 10 Jul 42, sub: MacArthur-Ghornley
Seven-Part Despatch on SW Pacific Offensive Opns, Item 67a, Exec 10.
152 Pointed out in OPD brief [14 Jul 42], Notes on . . . JCS 25th
14 Jul 42, Strategic Police and Deployment of U. S. and Br Forces (CCS
91 , with CCS 91 in ABC 381 ( 9-25 42 ), 2.