1. The Japanese Government had endeavored in the early stages to localize the hostilities and achieve a diplomatic settlement. Marquis Koichi Kido, later Lord Privy Seal and closest adviser to the Emperor, recorded in his Diary: "Prince Konoye (then Premier) was deeply concerned over the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities and exerted every effort to terminate the Incident and prevent its expansion. I did my utmost to support his stand." Kido Nikki: Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Kido Hikokunin no Sensei Kokyosho (Kido Diary: Affidavit of Defendant Koichi Kido in International Military Tribunal for the Far East) p. 34. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
2. In his speech announcing the New Order, Premier Ayamaro Konoye declared: "Japan does not reject cooperation with other Powers in China, or intend to damage the interests of third Powers. If such nations understand the true intentions of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions, Japan does not hesitate to cooperate with them for the peace of the Orient."
3. "The restrictions of exportation of scrap iron to Japan was paricularly alarmimg to all Japanese in view of the prevailing iron shortage and the production process in Japan." Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Hikokunin Tojo Hideki no Sensei Kokyosho (Affidavit of Defendant Hideki Tojo in International Military Tribunal for the Far East) Doc. No. 3000.
5. The fall of France in mid-July posed the question of the fate of French colonies in the Far East, and it also heightened the belief in high military circles that Germany would successfully overwhelm Britain. The result was to strengthen the hands of those demanding a stronger policy in the South and closer ties with the Axis Powers.
10. Japan's diplomatic strategists also entertained the idea that Soviet Russia might be induced to join the Alliance, thereby creating a favorable preponderance of power vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain.
13. "I recommended Admiral Toyoda for the foreign portfolio because of my ardent desire to further the Japanese-American negotiations. Admiral Toyoda had served as Navy Vice-Minister, and not only was he versed in Navy affairs.... but he was one of those who supported the view that an American Japanese conflict should be avoided by every means possible." Konoye Ayamaro Ko Shuki(Memoirs of Prince Ayamaro Konoye) p. 30.
14. In a conversation with Premier Konoye shortly after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance in September 1940, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, stated with regard to a JapaneseAmerican war: "If I am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year. The Tripartite Pact has been concluded, and we cannot help it. Now that the situation has come to this pass, I hope you will endeavor to avoid a JapaneseAmerican war." Ibid., p. 3.
15. This move was under a "Joint Defense Agreement" concluded 21 July between Japan and the Vichy Government. The agreement was announced in Tokyo on 26 July simultaneously with the United States freezing order. Japanese troops advanced into Saigon 28 July.
17. "Japan's dependence for materials, particularly war materials, on the United States and Great Britain was her one great weakness. The impossibility of overcoming this was repeatedly confirmed by researches of the Planning Board since the time of the first Konoye Cabinet. The conclusion reported was always: 'Impossible'." Konoye Memoirs, op. cit., p. 4.
18. These negotiations were initiated in April 1941, shortly after the arrival of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, newly-appointed Japanese Ambassador, in Washington. The talks virtually came to a standstill following Japan's move into southern Indo-China and the American freezing order.
20. At the 17 August interview between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, the President went so far as to mention Juneau, Alaska, and mid-October as the possible time and place for the proposed meeting. However, the formal reply handed to Admiral Nomura on 3 September "evaded a clear-cut expression of his (the President's) stand regarding the meeting and stated that Japanese agreement on fundamental principles was a pre-requisite. Here it became clear that the State Department's views had prevailed." Ibid., pp. 36, 38-9.
23. Hitherto the armed services had, at east outwardly, accepted diplomacy as the primary means of achieving Japan's objectives. In April 1941 Imperial General Headquarters had decided its Basic Policies f or the South as follows:
1. The aims of the Empire's immediate policy in the South are to hasten the settlement of the China Incidentand to increase the total national defense power. This requires:
29. From 15 November 1941 bi-weekly code reports were received in Tokyo from the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu. Statement by Rear Adm. Kanji Ogawa, Vice-Chief, Third Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.
32. A morale pamphlet entitled Kore Sae Yomeba Kateru (Read This And War is Won) was distributed to divisional commands in November 1941. Brief extracts follows: "The present war is a war with Japan's rise or fall at stake....What is at the bottom of America's action in gradually prohibiting the export of oil and iron to Japan, as if to strangle her slowly by silk-wool ?....Japan has waited too long. If we are patient any longer, our aircraft, warships and motor cars will not move....For the existence of Japan herself and her obligation under the Tripartite Alliance, not a minute longer must be endured. Japan is confronted with a great mission, as representative of the Oriental race, to bravely deliver the finishing blow against Occidental aggression of several hundred years." ATIS Research Report No. 131, Japan's Decision to Fight, 1 Dec 45, pp. 13-5.
33. Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section estimated that 15 October must be the deadline for the decision if war preparations were to be completed by the end of that month. Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
36. As paraphrased by the State Department, a dispatch sent by Ambassador Grew on 29 September 1941 stated: "The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments.... He raises the question whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan's program without war, or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war...." Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan, Simon & Schuster (New York, 1944) pp. 193-4.
38. "I personally know that on the morning of 18 October, after agreeing to take the portfolio of Navy Minister, Admiral Shimada went to see the new Premier, General Tojo, for the purpose of stipulating a condition for his entry into the Cabinet. This condition was that diplomatic negotiations with the United States must be continued with the avowed objective of reaching a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute. Admiral Shimada told me and several others at the Navy Ministry that Tojo had expressed complete agreement...." Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Shonin Sawamoto Yorio no Sensei Kokyosho (Affidavit of Witness Yorio Sawamoto, International Military Tribunal for the Far East), Doc. No. 2889.
43. Ambassador Kurusu, notified only two days previously of his mission, flew to Hongkong where, by arrangement with the United States State Department, departure of a trans-Pacific Clipper was delayed to accommodate him. This haste reflected the new war deadline.
44. Proposal "A" offered: 1. Gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, with the exception of garrisons in North China and Inner Mongolia, within two years after the conclusion of peace with China; 2. Withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China as soon as the China war ended. Proposal "B", in addition to calling a halt to fresh war moves in the Pacific, envisaged a limited restoration of commercial relations, including resumption of American oil shipments to Japan.
55. Testimony given before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East by Tateki Shirao, official of the Foreign Telegraph Section, Telecommunications Bureau, Ministry of Communications at the outbreak of war, indicated that on 6 December Lt. Col. Morio Tamura, on duty with the Communications Section of the Army General Staff, ordered Shirao to "delay the delivery of all foreign telegrams by five and ten hours on alternate days for security reasons", and that such instructions were issued to the Central Telegraph Office. Asked under cross-examination whether 7 December was a five or a ten-hour day, Shirao replied, "I believe that it may have been a ten-hour day." Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Shonin Shirao Tateki no Sensei Kokyosho (Affidavit of Witness Tateki Shirao, International Military Tribunal for the Far East) Doc. No. 2597.
56. Between 0030 and 0240, when he proceeded to the Imperial Palace, Foreign Minister Togo had the President's message translated and made arrangements for the special audience through the Imperial Household Minister and the Lord Privy Seal. He also took the translation to Premier Tojo at about 0200 before going to the Palace, where the audience lasted from 0300 to 0315. Affidavit of Togo, op. cit.