5 G-3, GHQ, AFPAC, Memo, "Third Fleet Operations in Jul 45," 1 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 3 81 / 1 34 - 9 (TS); Adm. Ernest J. King, "Third Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy," 8 Dec 45 ; William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York, 1947), pp . 258-265.
9 The Cairo Conference in Egypt held on 22-26 November 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was for the purpose of forming an agreement upon future military operations against Japan. The heads of the three governments resolved to bring unrelenting pressure against Japan, to take away from Japan all the Pacific Islands which she had seized or occupied, to expel the Japanese from all territories which had been taken by violence, and to restore the independence of Korea. The Axis in Defeat, "Cairo Declaration," pp. 4-5.
10 State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee Memo, 11 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin (TS) ; WARCOS Radio No. WAR 48342 to CINCAFPAC, 12 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1118 (TS) ; WARCOS Radio No. W48672 to CINCAFPAC, 13 Aug 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 1119 (TS).
12 GHQ, APFAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse, 3rd edition, 8 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Planning File (TS). Hereinafter cited as: Blacklist.
16 CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-29035 to WARCOS, 26 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1092 (TS) ; CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-28810 to JCS, 27 Jul 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 5090 (TS); CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-30508 to WARCOS, 3 Aug 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 1099 (TS).
41 General MacArthur's message concerning the Manila mission was not received in Japan until the morning of the 16th. The change-over in cabinets at this time was another important reason for the inability of the Japanese Government to arrange for the dispatch of the desired emissaries by 17 August. The Suzuki Cabinet had resigned on the afternoon of the 15th and the succeeding Higashikuni Cabinet was not installed until the afternoon of the 17th. The problem of selection of the proper officials during this critical interim period, together with the task of preparing the numerous documents of information required by the Supreme Commander, necessitated the request for more time. Statement by Shunichi Matsumoto, former Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
42 Japanese Imperial GHQ Radio No. 2 to SCAP, 16 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files. General Prince Haruhito Kanin was sent to Saigon and Singapore; General Prince Yasuhiko Asaka to Nanking and Peiping; Prince Tsuneyoshi Takeda to Hsinking (Changchun) in Manchuria.
GHQ, AFPAC, " List of Japanese Emissaries to Manila," 21 Aug 45, G-3, GHQ Admin Files.
48 Careful planning preceded the actual flight, according to Japanese officers concerned with the arrangements. "In planning the course of the airplane taking the Japanese delegates to Manila ... precautions had to be taken to prevent interference by certain elements of the Japanese Air Force who, it was rumored, were planning to attack and destroy the plane. To insure the safe arrival of the delegates, the course to be taken by their plane was kept secret, and it was planned to fly a decoy plane on a direct route to Kyushu. At 0611 on 19 August, a Douglas-type naval transport plane, bearing the delegates, left Haneda, arriving at Kisarazu 14 minutes later. Here the group boarded two medium bombers, leaving Kisarazu at 0707. The planes proceeded southeast for approximately 100 nautical miles and, once outside the fighter-plane range, headed for Tanegashima. At 11 15 they were met just south of Tanegashima by two American Army fighter units, comprising two B-24's and twelve P-38's.... They arrived safely on Ie Jima at 1240...." Combined statement of Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, Navy Ministry; Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Naval General Staff; Capt. Hidemi Yoshida, Navy Ministry ; Cmdr. Yoshimoto Terai, Naval General Staff, 21 Nov 49, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
50 GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release, 19 Aug 45. During the conference, the Japanese and American representatives sat in the following order: Capt. Hidemi Yoshida opposite Maj. Gen. Lester Whitlock, ACofS, G-4; Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae oppsite Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, DCofS; Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama opposite Rear Adm. Forest P. Sherman, ACofS for Planning for CINCPAC; Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe opposite Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, CofS; Mr. Katsuo Okasaki opposite Maj. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, ACofS, G-3; Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano opposite Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, ACofS, G-2; and Lt. Col. Masao Matsuda opposite Brig. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson, CofS, FEAF. Interpreters sat at both ends of the table.
52 10th Information and Historical Service, HQ Eighth Army, Occupational Monograph of the United States Eighth Army in Japan, Vol I, Aug 45-Jan 46, pp. 11-12. Hereinafter cited as: Monograph of Eighth Army in Japan. G-2, GHQ, familiar with the structure 0f the Japanese armed forces and in control of the linguist service, was designated to supervise the Japanese plans for demobilization and disarmament.
54 On the first leg of their return trip in an American transport plane, the delegates arrived at Ie Jima at 1745 on the 20th. Since one of the Japanese planes waiting there to take them back to Japan had developed trouble, it was decided to split the mission into two groups and leave one group behind on Ie Jima until its plane was repaired. The members of the first group left Ie Jima at 1840 and were escorted by twelve P-38's to the vicinity of Tanegashima. From there their plane proceeded along the coast from Shionomisaki until 2345 when the fuel supply became exhausted and they were compelled to make a forced landing on a beach approximately three kilometers east of the mouth of the Tenryu River. Except for Katsuo Okazaki, who suffered slight injuries, there were no casualties.
By foot and then by truck the delegates finally arrived at the evacuated headquarters of the Hamamatsu Air School at o330 on the 21st. At 0700 they left Hamamatsu Airfield in an Army heavy bomber, arriving at Chofu Airfield at 0800. The second plane left Ie Jima at 0830 on the 21st and arrived safely at Kisarazu at 1400. Combined statement of Ichiro Yokoyama, Toshikazu Ohmae, Hidemi Yoshida, Yoshimori Terai, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
61 Although the American forces arriving on the 28th met with no incidents, the days before their landings had seen several outbreaks of violence among Japanese army and navy troops. On the night of the 24th, certain members of the Imperial Guard Division in Tokyo tried to seize and isolate the Palace grounds and prevent the Imperial Rescript from being broadcast. The attempted revolt was subdued by the following morning, however, and most of the rebellious participants committed suicide. On the 14th, also, the residence of the Prime Minister and the President of the Privy Council were attacked and burned.
Atsugi Airfield, the site chosen for General MacArthur's landing, was the scene of a five-day series of disorders during which naval Kamikaze pilots dropped leaflets over Tokyo denouncing the Emperor's advisors and exhorting the people not to surrender. It was not until 26 August, two days before the arrival of General Eichelberger's advance units, that the recalcitrant elements were brought under control. Court Record for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, pp. 31194-31198 and 29322-29326; Court Martial Decision, Captain Yasuma Kosono, IJM, 16 Oct 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
68 The representatives of the Foreign Office were Katsuo Okazaki, Shunichi Kase, and Saburo Ota ; the repre- sentatives of the Army were Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Lt. Gen. Yatsuji Nagai, and Col. Ichiji Sugita; the representatives of the Navy were Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Rear Adm. Ichiro Yokoyama, and Capt. Katsuo Shiba. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 1945, p. 1 and Tokyo Yomiuri-Hochi, September 3, 1945, p. 1.
72 In speaking of the problem of physical survival of the Japanese forces at this time, Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army said: "Staff officers and the rest of the personnel somewhere secured three meals a day, but the quantity of food decreased gradually and the illness increased.... According to the report of the Chief of the Administration Department, we could somehow get by the whole of August, but thereafter there was nothing on which we could rely. Each section of the Headquarters formed parties to forage afar for tubers and edible grasses." "Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto," p. 58, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.