LOCATION OF JAPANESE FORCES, 31 December 1946:
5 SCAP Dir No. 1, 2 September 1945, ordered immediate dissemination and compliance with GO No. 1, 2 September 1945, which outlined the methods for surrendering of Japanese armed forces in Japan and abroad, named SCAP representatives to accept the surrender of troops, and ordered immediate disarming of all Japanese troops.
SCAP Dir No. 2, 3 September 1945, Part II, Japanese Armed Forces, outlined in detail controls and procedures concerning disarmament and demobilization of Japanese armed forces deemed necessary to insure orderly compliance with terms of surrender. The Imperial Japanese GHQ was ordered to conduct a speedy and orderly demobilization of all Japanese forces and outline specific procedures to be followed.
GHQ USAFPAC Operations Instructions No. 4 (S), 31 August 1945, Appendix 11, SCAP Control, Disarmament and Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, outlined instructions to the commanding generals of the Sixth and Eighth Armies. In general, these instructions were to establish a system of surveillance and inspection, effect coordination of movement of Japanese troops, and aid in the transfer of arms and equipment to insure rapid and complete demobilization and disarmament.
7 "The following instances are cited as being indicative of the magnitude of the quarantine problem and the value of strict procedures enforced by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The occurrence of 711 proven cases of cholera and 479 carriers aboard 114 vessels resulted in 232,907 persons being detained in quarantine. Two hundred fifty-five cases of typhus fever were found among repatriates on some 52 vessels, most of which arrived from China, Manchuria and Korea. Two hundred seven cases of smallpox were discovered on 54 vessels from China and Manchuria. At no time has there existed in this program any threat of danger among the Occupation forces." (GHQ SCAP, PH&W Rpt, 31 Jul 48, p. 38.)
10 When the Sixth Army entered Japan, approximately 80 percent of the Japanese armed forces in the area of entry had been demobilized. The active troops, in most cases, were employed as guards for military installations and as administrative personnel in the demobilization and disarmament program. The Japanese commander, in collaboration with the chief of police, submitted lists of all Japanese installations and inventories of materiel within the area for consolidation and forwarding to SCAR As soon as the US Army accepted custody of Japanese military installations, the Japanese authorities were informed that there was no further need for the guard and service personnel who were then relieved and subsequently demobilized. See Ch. II.
14 ATIS Translation, 21 Aug 45, "Documents Furnished to SCAP by the Japanese Mission to Negotiate Surrender," delivered at the pre-surrender conference in Manila on 18 August 1945. Data later corrected to show 1,178,750 personnel.
20 In addition to troops assigned to the three major ground force units, there were some 460,546 personnel in units under direct control of the War Ministry not including air force personnel, in military schools and administrative offices; the largest unit was the Army Ordnance Administration Headquarters with 38,294 assigned personnel; 95 percent of this group was demobilized by November and the remainder by December 1945. (GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. 12.)
22 Otaru, Niigata, Tokyo, Kobe, Osaka, Maizuru, Hiroshima, Moji, Shimonoseki, and Hakata. (SCAPIN 70, 28 Sep 45, sub: Rad Designating Certain Ports and Their Facilities to be Prepared for Use in Repatriation of Japanese.)
24 (1) Plans were submitted to the CofS GHQ SCAP by the Japanese Government on 2 October 1945. They consisted of draft programs for further demobilization of military and naval forces. (2) SCAPIN 137, 14 Oct 45, sub: Demob, Japanese Armed Forces.
27 The employment of ex-service personnel declined rapidly from a total of 190 ex-generals and ex-admirals in January 1946 to 6 in July 1948. Total employment dropped from 80,474 demobilization employees (50,227 Navy; 30,247 Army) to 5,232 in July 1948 (1,364 Navy; 3,868 Army) or a total loss of 75,242 persons. (GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, Plates 20, 21 and 22.)
32 Ltr, Central Liaison and Coordination Office, Japanese Govt No. 1578 (2P), 4 May 48, sub: A New Plan for Reorg of Domob Machinery. (GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, Incl 7.)
33 Apparently this policy is not followed by all nations. A rejected Soviet proposal suggested that a Japanese military unit be considered demobilized when disarmed and disbanded. (Tokyo, Nippon Times, 15 Feb 48, Kyodo-AP Rpt)
34 GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Jul 48, p. 16. The Japanese servicemen had been completely repatriated and subsequently demobilized from all areas except those controlled by the Soviet Government and certain sectors of Manchuria. Since no information has been made available by Soviet authorities concerning the Japanese troops detained in Soviet controlled areas, it is not possible at this time (May 1949) to estimate the number dead or missing among the Japanese forces that surrendered to the Soviets and which were removed to Soviet territory or left in Communist dominated areas of Manchuria.
On 21 May 1949, an announcement was made through the official Soviet news agency Tass that "the remaining 95,000 Japanese P W's" would be repatriated between May and November 1949. The announcement made no mention of thousands of civilians which Japanese claim were in Soviet controlled areas. SCAP figures, based on those prepared by the Japanese Government, showed a total of 408,729 military and civilian prisoners still to be repatriated from Soviet controlled areas. See Ch. VI.
41 Japanese armed forces were defined to include all Japanese-controlled land, sea, and air forces and military and para-military organizations, formations, or units and their auxiliaries and civilian volunteer corps, wherever situated. (Memo, SCAP for IJG, 24 Sep 45. In AG 402.5.)
43 DISPOSAL OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT (Progress Report, 31 Dec 46):
46 To the average US soldier in Japan one of the more interesting aspects of the demilitarization program was something that affected him personally : the distribution of war trophies. WD Cirs No. 155 and 267 (1945) authorized the issue of souvenirs to military and naval personnel who had served in the SWPA during World War II. On the basis of these circulars, each officer and enlisted man received one of the following articles: rifle, carbine, saber, bayonet, pistol, or pair of binoculars. Responsibility for collection of these items rested with corps commanders, who issued instructions for their distribution to field units under their respective commands. The War Trophy Depot, located in Yokohama, issued trophies to officers and men who were on orders to return to the US. A central issuing agency for fleet units within the Eighth Army area was established at Yokosuka Naval Base for distribution to naval personnel at sea. GHQ and FEAF personnel were supplied by Eighth Army facilities.
47 (1) USAFPAC, Adm Hist of the Ord Sec, 24 Jun 45 to 13 Dec 46, p. 16. (2) GHQ SCAP, Progress of Demob of the Japanese Armed Forces, 21 Jul 48 p. 20, gives the following statistics on progress of munitions disposal as of that date
(a) The only weapons returned to Japanese were a small number of pistols for use of civil police.
48 More than 21,000,000 pairs of socks, approximately 7,000,000 woolen blankets, and over 5,000,000 pairs of leather shoes were returned to the Japanese Government for distribution to Japanese citizens.
52 SCAP Dir No. 2, 3 Sep 45, Annex B established in GHQ USAFPAC, a Naval Liaison Group representing CINCPAC. The Japanese Senior Naval Commanders were ordered to adjust their boundaries to coincide with those of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and to report to the commanders of the Fifth and Seventh US Fleets for instructions in demobilization and disarmament.
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