11 Other than the foregoing, the Allied Council had no obvious relationship to the Far Eastern Commission. There have been recognizable instances, however, in international press releases, in which the timing of publicity indicated that certain foreign powers simultaneously presented the same subject, agenda, comment or argument in the Council and in the Commission.
13 The Sixth US Army occupied the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and the western half of Honshu from 22 September to 31 December 1945, at which time control passed to the Eighth US Army. The Sixth Army was inactivated on 26 January 1946. (8th Info and Hist Sv, Sixth Army Occupation of Japan, 22 Sep-30 Nov 45.)
14 The Japanese Central Liaison Office also maintained a representative in the grade of Chokunin (Minister) in the G-2 Foreign and Japanese Liaison Section. The ever-increasing problems of interpretation and translation were handled by wartime ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service) which adjusted its operations to meet Occupation conditions.
18 Several of the SCAP Civil Sections were headed by officers who remained chiefs of Staff Sections of GHQ AFPAC ; for example, Gen Willoughby was Chief of Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) as well as G-2 for GHQ, SCAP and AFPAC; Brig Gen G.I. Back was Signal Officer of AFPAC as well as Chief of the Civil Communications Section; Gen F.S. Besson was Transportation Officer for AFPAC as well as Chief of the Civil Transportation Section.
33 As a corollary, the 441st CIC, an operating agency of the AC of S, G-2, in his dual role as Chief, CIS, SCAP, deployed immediately into the field detachments, on initial landing in 1945, and maintained a complete coverge throughout Japan in each prefecture.
34 (1) SCAPIN 756, 19 Feb 46, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (2) SCAPIN 853, 25 Mar 46, sub: Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction; (3) SCAPIN 1218, 19 Sep 46, sub: Amendment of Memo on Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction.
39 SWNCC 150/4, 6 Sep 45. Subsequent basic Occupation directives repeated the substance of this provision. (GHQ SCAP, Hist of the Non Mil Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, 2 Sep 45-1 Jan 47, p. 7.)
49 SCAP sections have no exact counterparts in a normal military staff. Their establishment was caused by conditions peculiar to the Occupation and they played an important part in the outstanding success of the control and rehabilitation of a nation of over 77 million people.
64 See Ch. VIII. In general terms, this section operated in a manner analagous to the American FBI. Adapted to Occupation conditions its activities became important in view of the rise of international communism.
78 SCAP instituted a Foreign Liaison Section, under control of G-2, through which communications with diplomatic missions and the Japanese Government were initially handled. ( SCAP Staff Memo No. 41, 9 Jun 46, sub: Official Relations and Contacts with the IJG, with Staff Secs of GHQ, and with US Occupational Forces;  SCAP Staff Memo No. 49, 27 Jun 46, sub: Channels of Communication with Foreign Govts.)
86 GHQ FEC Opns Instns No. 2, 1 Feb 48 (S). In addition, the FEC was assigned the following missions (a) Discharge of US military responsibilities in the Philippines, under the terms of a Military Assistance Agreement and a Military Bases Agreement negotiated in March 1947. These responsibilities included the roll-up of wartime bases in the Philippines and the disposition of supplies accumulated there for the support of a full-scale offensive against Japan. (b) Maintenance of the security of the FEC, including the protection of sea and air communications. (c) Support of US policy within the scope of CINCFE's command responsibility. This mission involved carrying out the terms of numerous property sale and transfer agreements, the conduct of military government in the Ryukyus, and the conduct of a program of mapping land areas in and adjacent to the FEC, the latter in accordance with international agreements which provided for making such maps available to the Allied governments concerned. However responsibility for civil and military government functions in the Marianas-Bonin-Volcano Islands was specifically excluded from CINCFE's mission and assigned to the Pacific Command under the CinC, Pacific and US Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Command comprised the forces throughout the Pacific other than FEC forces. (d) The conduct of an extensive program of mapping and procurement of terrain intelligence in accordance with international agreements (See "c" above) Field operations covered the establishment of ground control and execution of aerial photography for mapping and charting Japan, Korea, Ryukyus, Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and other areas in the South and Southwest Pacific.
90 Specific objectives of the Ryukyus Command were: (a) Liquidation of political, social, and economic ties with the Japanese mainland. (b) Restoration of standards of living consistent with those existing prior to the war by: physical restoration of damaged property and facilities; continued improvement of health and sanitation; institution of a sound program of economic development of trade, industry, and agriculture along lines which would insure that the profits and benefits thereof accrued to the native inhabitants and which would assist them in achieving the highest possible level of economic independence; and establishment of an educational program adapted to native capabilities and to local environment.
92 Under the terms of the Philippine Military Assistance Agreement, signed March 1947, the US, subject to a mutual agreement to be arrived at later, was committed to furnish unspecified military assistance to the Republic of the Philippines in the training and development of armed forces, and in the performance of other services which might devolve upon the Republic under its international agreements. It was specified in the Agreement that the US would furnish equipment and technical supplies for training, operations and certain maintenance of a Philippine armed force of such strength and composition as might mutually be agreed upon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated a policy as to the general extent to which the US would aid in its development. No clear-cut agreement as to the size of such a force had been reached between the two governments as of the end of December 1948.
Also specified in the Military Assistance Agreement was the establishment of a U. S. Military Advisory Group composed of Army, Navy, and Air officers whose duty it was to assist and advise the Republic on military and naval matters. This Group, known as "USMAG", was set up at Manila and placed under the command of CINCFE. However, since, by the terms of the Agreement, it had to deal through the local State Department officials on all policy matters, and, since the extent of US aid was governed by policies established in Washington, CINCFE could exercise little control over its activities.
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