Chapter II

1 HQ Eighth US Army, G-3 Periodic Rpts, 29-30 Aug 45.

2 TF 38 and 39 covered both the amphibious and Atsugi air landings. (GHQ SWPA & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Aug 45 [S], Naval Sum, p. 6.)

3 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 17. US and British flags were raised at 0100.

4 Since Japanese chains of command were still intact, the requirements of the CinC as laid down in Manila were implemented through them. Accordingly, specific directives to the Japanese armed forces in the Initial Evacuation Area were contained in a series of orders as follows: Imp GHQ, Army Sec Ord No. 1387, 21 Aug 45; Imp GHQ, Navy Sec Ord No. 52, 21 Aug 45, Dir No. 533, 22 Aug 45, Dir Nos. 534, 535, 536, 23 Aug 45, and Dir No. 538, 24 Aug 45.

5 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 17.

6 GHQ USAFPAC, Basic Outline Plan for "Blacklist" Opns (3d ed), 8 Aug 45 (TS).

7 As General Eichelberger alighted, a sergeant of the 187th Para-glider Infantry turned to one of his men and was heard to say: "Do you know when the last time I saw that Joe was ? We were the lead battalion walking up the road to Tagaytay Ridge last February. We were hurrying to take Manila from the south. I looked over my shoulder and there was this big guy wearing a helmet with three stars. A few of the boys were talking to him, so I eased over too. He's a swell egg. All of a sudden this jeep comes wheeling up the road. It was General Swing. He stood up and yelled at us, 'Hey-break it up-disperse-keep moving-let's go. What's the matter with you men? There are Jap snipers all over the place.' We kind of broke up a little and there was Eichelberger standing there grinning, so he yells back ' that's the idea, Joe, that's the spirit, good advice, keep them scattered.' Yeh, I still think with a couple of breaks we could have been sleeping in the Manila Hotel by the time the 1st Cav hit town." (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 [C], p. 18.)

8 General MacArthur had ordered that there be no formal Japanese reception party. Gen Arisue was designated as liaison officer, between the US headquarters and the remnant Japanese staffs.

9 GHQ SWPA & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns (S), Aug 45, p. 12.

10 Requirements of SCAP Presented to Japanese Representatives at Manila, P1, 2o Aug 45, Doc II, Requirements for Entry and Opns of an Adv Party Representing SCAP within the Tokyo Bay Area.

11 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 20.

12 Personal notes of Carl Mydans, correspondent, Time and Life magazines.

13 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. 1, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 20.

14 Ibid, p. 21.

15 HQ XI Corps FO 23 had provided for alternate landings for the 12th Cavalry, one on Sagami Bay beaches, and the other at Yokohama docks. Since the docks were found to be in good repair, the unit was ordered to prepare for landing there.

16 The first US ship to enter Yokohama harbor was USAHS Marigold, carrying the 42nd General Hospital. Included with the concentration of US warships were the British battleships Duke of York and King George V and two Australian cruisers accompanied by two destroyers. (HQ Eighth US Army, CWS Hist Rpt, Mil Occupation of Japan through Nov 45, pp. 12-13.)

17 The actual signing by General MacArthur occurred at 0908 and four minutes earlier by the Japanese representatives. (GHQ SWPA & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns [S], Sep 45, p. 2.)

18 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 29.

19 This policy, which had concurrence of the State Department, had been announced by the President and given wide circulation throughout the world, (GHQ USAFPAC PRO Release No. 227, 23 Sep 45.) It specified that the ultimate objectives of the Post Surrender Policy were to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a responsible government which would respect the rights of other states and would support the objectives of the US as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter of the United Nations. Democratic processes would be instituted in determining the type of government the Japanese desired and the ideals of a democratic social and political order would be promulgated. The document specified that there would be military occupation to destroy despotic power in the land, disarm the country, free prisoners of war and internees, and carry out all such other operations as SCAP might direct. (See Ch. III for organization and operations of SCAP.) The Japanese people would be expected to comply completely with a program of announced regimentation in order to effect a rehabilitation of the economic structure of the land so that the population would be able to maintain itself within a reasonable time. This clause was to come into prominence later when certain of the Allied Powers challenged the right of SCAP to forbid strikes by government employees engaged in such vital fields as transportation and other public utilities upon which the day-to-day welfare of the people directly depended.

20 In developing the general agenda of the surrender negotiations in Manila, G-2/G-3 had already laid the ground-work for the demobilization of the Japanese forces in the Home Islands, which represented the major immediate problem for the Occupation.

21 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 21. Actually Navy units had "jumped the gun" (Halsey) in the matter of recovering PW's. For a detailed account of these activities and all others associated with the recovery of prisoners of war see Ch. IV. The Monograph quoted above credits Eighth Army with recovering a total of 23,985 persons.

22 This action was in keeping with a policy jointly concurred in by State, War, and Navy Departments as well as by the OWI, and radioed to SCAP a week previously. (Rad W-52702, WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 22 Aug 45.)

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid. News releases were subject to mild censorship through CCD (Civil Censorship Detachment), an operating agency of the theater G-2.

26 The fact of seizure could be reported.

27 (1) See Ch. VIII. (2) GHQ FEC, Int Ser, Vol. VIII, Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in SWPA and Occupied Japan (S), and Vol. IX, The Civil Intelligence Section: Occupation Phase, 1945-48 (S). This series was distributed to Service schools primarily.

28 GHQ USAFPAC, Opns Instns No. 4, Aug 45 (S), Amendment 12.

29 G-2 GHQ was charged with the development and surveillance of plans for the demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Forces, in view of expert knowledge of the internal structure of the Japanese Army. The first step to be taken was to abolish the Imperial General Staff but to retain (with qualifications) the Army and Navy Ministries which were essentially Zone of Interior administrative agencies and demilitarize them progressively, as required.

30 See Ch. V.

31 G-2 was charged with the GHQ staff supervision of plans and execution as developed by the Japanese authorities, in regard to demobilization and disarmament of the Imperial Forces in Japan. G-3 and US Navy took over repatriation movements of contingents abroad. See Ch. V.

32 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, No. 1, 5 Sep 45 (S), p. 1.

33 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, Sep 45 (S).

34 HQ Eighth US Army, G-3 Periodic Rpt, 2-3 Sep 45.

35Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 30.

36 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45 (S), p. 3. The 32d Division was assigned to Sixth Army which was not yet scheduled for occupation movements. The Division was still in the Philippines; the 127th Infantry thus became the first Sixth Army combat unit to enter Japan.

37 GHQ USAFPAC, G-2 Daily Sum, No. 5, 9 Sep 45 (S).

38 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 40- Jan 46 (C), p. 30.

39 Ibid, pp. 30-32.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid, p. 32.

43 HQ Eighth US Army, G-3 Periodic Rpt No. TO, 9 Sep 45 (R).

44 Ibid.

45 SCAPIN 17, 10 Sep 45. This measure indicated the close G-2 surveillance of general policy matters connected with the demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces. The Japanese General Staff was an operational entity for strategic decisions; it was not required for the administrative processes of repatriation, demobilization and disarmament: such matters were within the purview of the Ministries of War and Navy which were retained temporarily.

46 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 38.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid, pp. 38-39.

49 Ibid, p. 39.

50 On 17 September, General MacArthur moved his GHQ from Yokohama to Tokyo. Beginning at 0800 a fleet of 50 trucks shuttled back and forth between Yokohama and Tokyo transporting 600 officers and 1,400 enlisted men. Japanese residents stared in amazement as columns of trucks which seemed to continue for miles, rumbled to a stop near the side-entrance of the Dai Ichi building. In the vacated rooms of the building, Japanese electricians were still stringing wires while ten special units were cleaning the building. No formal ceremonies took place. The only outward sign that this building was to be the site of GHQ was that two guards stood at each entrance. The entire program was completed by 1700.

51 GHQ SCAP & USAFPAC, Mo Sum of Opns, Sep 45, P. 5.

52 Ibid, p. 8.

53 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 40.

54 Ibid.

55 Amendment to Eighth US Army FO No. 32, eff 27 Sep 45. (XIV Corps Rpt No. 1 on the " Blacklist " Opn, 20 Aug-30 Sep 45.)

56 The 27th Infantry Division, having left personnel on Okinawa and having lost a sizeable group by redeployment to the US, had only approximately 66 percent of its organizational strength in the objective area. By 28 September all elements of 27th Division had closed in their respective areas as assigned by the Division Commander, but a large Division rear echelon of assigned replacements, together with the Division's heavy equipment, was on Okinawa or en route to Japan under control of Eighth Army.

57 This was not the first US occupation movement at that northern port. On 9 September elements of the North Pacific Fleet entered Mutsu Bay and occupied the naval base and airfield at Ominato. Mine sweepers cleared the Bay, and several cruisers and destroyers were available to provide naval gunfire support if needed. Two CVE's provided air cover.

58 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 56.

59 The first Sixth Army troops to arrive in Japan occupied Kanoya airdrome in southern Kyushu in company with FEAF troops. The unit was the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, 32d Division. The Battalion reverted to Division control during November. An advance echelon of Sixth Army HQ of 19 officers and 2 enlisted men under Brig Gen H. W. Kiefer arrived at Wakayama, Honshu, 19 September, to initiate implementation of GO No. 2. (Sixth US Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan, 22 Sep-30 Nov 45, p. 23.)

60 Sixth US Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan, 22 Sep-30 Nov 45.

61 Ibid, p. 18.

62 By 1 October 1945 the demobilization of Japanese armed forces was approximately 87 percent complete. See Ch. V.

63 Sixth US Army Rpt on Occupation of Japan 22 Sep-30 Nov 45, FO 75, 21 Aug 45.

64 The "point system" provided for the early return of men who had 85 or more points. According to a memo issued by G-3 GHQ, 6 September 1945, sub: Readjustment, 80,000 high-point personnel would be returned during the first month of occupation. Between September and the end of 1945, 390,000 would be scheduled for return. General MacArthur requested that there be 25,000 replacements each month during November and December. (Rad [S] C-15173, CINCAFPAC to WARCOS. 26 Sep 45. In G-3 GHQ Adm 370.) All of this was in conformity with the plans of the War Department to reduce the total army to approximately 2,100,000 by 1 July 1946. The War Department was under great pressure from Congress. In the various theaters including the Pacific, the amazed citizens of occupied countries saw American soldiers participating in open protest rallies, demanding early action on their return to the ZI.

65 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. 1, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C).

66 Tokyo, Nippon Times, 7 Sep 45.

67 Ibid.

68 Tokyo Shimbun, 11 Sep 45

69 Ibid, 6 Sep 45.

70 Ibid, 9 Sep 45.

71 The so-called Public Safety Division (PSD), an operating agency of G-2, was established early to initiate and supervise certain police reforms; this section utilized US experts of the caliber of Mr. L. J. Valentine, former police Commissioner of New York City. See Ch. VIII.

72 Tokyo, Yomiuri and Tokyo Shimbun, which had been the worst offenders, completely reversed their attitude.

73 Tokyo, Nippon Times, 1 Sep 45. There should have been no doubt in the official mind: the carefully calculated treatment of the Japanese delegation in Manila set an official psychological pattern that was immediately persuasive.

74 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 23 Aug 45.

75 Tokyo Shimbun reported, 23 September, that railway employees in Tokyo Station were required to attend a morning drill in English language conversation.

76 Tokyo, Nippon Times, 1 Sep 45.

77 Ibid.

78 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 7 Sep 45.

79 (1) Tokyo Shimbun, 19 Aug 45; (2) Tokyo, Yomiuri, 23 Aug 45.

80 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 23 Aug 45.

81 Rad WX 56906, Wash to CINCAFPAC, 30 Aug 45.

82 Tokyo, Yomiuri, 26 Aug 45.

83 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), p. 42.

84 Ibid, p. 42. Originally scheduled to go on to northern Japan as part of the IX Corps command, soldiers of this unit entered Yokohama Harbor instead on 13 October for their first glimpse of the goal for which they had been destined when organized at Panama. On 14 October the combat team assumed responsibility for the occupation of Tochigi Prefecture.

85 Troop movements only; the tremendous task of administering the terms of the surrender had hardly begun, and would continue as long as the Occupation itself was maintained under SCAP.

86 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 (C), pp. 104-5. Preparing for the inactivation of the 112th and 158th RCT's in January 1946, and with approval from Army, 22 December, XI Corps directed that the 1st Cavalry Division relieve the 112th on 2 January and that the 97th Division relieve the 158th on 5 January.

87 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 101.

88 Divisions and other units assigned occupation duties outside the Tokyo-Yokohama area requisitioned their billets and bivouac areas through the Allocation Board, but this was done mainly for the purpose of keeping central records. Actually, there was little possibility of conflict in the outlying areas, because only one unit was in occupational control of a single area. For example, after an advance party of a corps had made reconnaissance with the aid of local officials, the corps submitted a requisition, with accompanying overlays, for approval of the Allocation Board. At first much delay resulted from slow action on the part of the Yokohama Liaison Office. It was necessary that this office learn from the local civil officials many miles away whether the use of facilities requested could be turned over to the Americans without serious loss, from the Japanese point of view, to the community. Later this condition was remedied by designating representatives in all the prefectures who could make spot decisions for the Liaison Office. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 [C], pp. 64-65.)

89 Ibid, p. 65.

90 HQ Eighth US Army, Adm Ord No. 15. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45 Jan 46 [C], p. 65.)

91 GHQ pursued the same policy. A Japanese Liaison Group was organized under G-2 to parallel the corresponding Japanese Government Central Liaison Office. The entire range of governmental contact was handled through this channel, as a buffer unit. It must be noted that in this period the bulk of GHQ had remained in Manila as the customary rear echelon; the tremendous problems of the initial crucial months from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946, were handled by the small forward echelon. G-2 entered the picture repeatedly because it was the only source of linguist talent and possessed inherent expert knowledge of the Japanese civil and military structure.

92 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 107.

93 GHQ USAFPAC Press Release, 14 Sep 45. The Occupation fell into two inescapable phases: (a) demobilization and disarmament and (b) political reform and economic rehabilitation. Impatient onlookers, safe from direct military contact, agitated for the second phase, completely ignoring the military risks of the first. Unlike the battered Germans in Europe, the Japanese Army in the Home Islands was entirely capable of combat ; potential reactions had to be carefully weighed.

94 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. I, Aug 45-Jan 46 (C), p. 108.

95 This period saw the creation of several predominantly civil agencies under SCAP in contradistinction to normal staffs under FEC. Among the earliest to begin to function were: Government Section (GS), Economic & Scientific Section (ESS), Public Health & Welfare (PH&W), and Civil Intelligence Section (CIS).

96 Inactivation of Sixth US Army took place on 26 January 1946.

97 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 20.

98 The current troop movements were revised to release all officers with 67 army service record points or with 45 months of service as of 30 April, and all enlisted men with 45 points or 30 months of service as of that dace. Then, to provide absolute assurance that all available space would be used, authority was granted to call officers with 65 points or 42 months as of that date, should such action prove necessary.

99 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 21.

100 At Okazaki the January record showed 1,425 officers and 33,304 enlisted personnel returned to the US. At Zama the total for the month came to 43,506, of which 296 were returned by air and 43,210 by water transportation. In all, 78,235 individuals were started homeward in January through these depots. Eighth Army losses for the month made up less than two-thirds of this total, the difference being accounted for by readjustment of personnel from GHQ, Fifth Air Force, Merchant Marine and other services in Japan. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 [C], p. 21.)

101 Ibid, pp. 22-23.

102 Ibid, p. 30.

103 The 3d Military Railway Service reported nearly 140,000 troops and 600,000 short tons of freight moved during January. The 11th Major Port in Yokohama broke all records in January by handling an average of 6,284 long tons daily. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 32.)

104 It was during the spring of this year that the worst epidemic in the post-war world hit Japan and placed serious demands on the Medical Corps. In the Kobe-Osaka area, typhus and smallpox reached epidemic proportions among the civilian population in February, when 3,000 typhus cases were reported; at the peak, in March, 7,841 persons died of typhus and 6,069 of smallpox. In one instance 377 new typhus cases were reported in Osaka in one day. Of 10 cases of smallpox among American soldiers, all died. Strict medical control measures were instituted and in April the authorities could announce that the epidemic had been brought under control. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 [C], P. 55.)

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid, p. 36. Other units of the 68th Brigade furnished security guards for the 11th Major Port, 71st QM Depot, Yokohama Ordnance Base Depot, the Engineer Depot, and other USASCOM-C installations.

107 Occupational Monograph of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 73.

108 Between 1 October 1945 and 30 August 1946, occupation troops disposed of nearly 866,000 tons of munitions of all types. Of this total, nearly 140,000 tons of explosives were returned to the Japanese for commercial use. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 [C].)

109 Additional material concerning this subject may be found in GHQ FEC, G-2 CIS Records.

110 The British Government proposed a combined force from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India to consist of a brigade group (regimental combat team) and elements of Air Force and Navy from each country. The Australian Government agreed to provide 1 brigade group, 3 air fighter squadrons and certain warships. New Zealand volunteered a brigade group, an air fighter squadron and small naval units. The United Kingdom Government's contribution was to be 1 brigade group, 2 air fighter squadrons and selected warships of the British Pacific Fleet. Canada,because of her commitments in Europe could not contribute towards the British Commonwealth Force. It was decided that Australia should provide the bulk of the headquarters and the commander of the Force, which would be under the direct operational control of SCAP. However, the commander of the Force would be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Australia (JCOSA). Agreements between Britain and India resulted in a decision to combine 5 Brigade (UK) and 268 Brigade (India) under British command. The senior regiment was the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. New Zealand's contribution was the 9th New Zealand Infantry Brigade renamed 2d New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Japan. The Australian units had fought in the Middle East and SWPA, while the United Kingdom and Indian troops had a splendid fighting record together in the Burma campaigns. The New Zealand Brigade had a distinctive record in the North African Campaign. (BCOF Hist, 1948, Part 1.)

111 HQ BCOF was moved to Eta Jima, an island near Kure, 16 May. (BCOF Hist, 1948, Part II.)

112 Lt Gen H.C.H. Robertson assumed command of BCOF on 7 June 1946.

113 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 41.

114 (1) BCOF Hist, 1948, Part I. (2) FO No. 35 was published by HQ Eighth US Army, 7 March 1946. This directed BCOF to: (a) Progressively assume responsibility for all occupation missions except military government, in the area assigned them on dates mutually agreed upon by the General Officers commanding I Corps and BCOF; (b) provide necessary troops to assist MG units in performance of their missions; (c) provide troops for military operations other than the occupation of its zone; (d) assume responsibility for supervision of operation of repatriation centers located in the zone of occupation. (Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 [C] p. 41.)

115 BCOF Hist, 1948, Part II.

116 The US divisions in Japan inaugurated a rotation roster so that representative units of each division would be given an opportunity to share in Honor Guard duties and to see Tokyo; the plan became effective in August 1946.

117 BCOF Hist, 1948, Part V.

118 Ibid, Part IV.

119 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan Vol. II, Jan-Aug 46 (C), p. 46.

120 Ibid, p. 50. By mid-year the 19th Infantry relieved the Marines in Oita and Miyazaki Prefectures. The 2d Marine Regiment moved to Sasebo at this time.

121 On 15 June the 8th Marine Regiment departed from Kyushu and reverted to control of CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, for disposition; on 5 July elements of the 5th Marine Regiment left Kyushu under the same conditions while the remaining elements followed shortly thereafter. (Eighth US Army, G-3 Periodic Rpts No. 67, 22 Jun 46; No. 69, 6 Jul 46.)

122 Occupational Monogr of the Eighth US Army in Japan, Vol. III, Sep 46-Dec 47 (C), pp. 5-6.


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