Chapter VI: 
Services1 for the Army
Procurement and supply were not the only activities of the Army Service Forces; a wide variety of other duties were also assigned to it. Before the reorganization of 9 March 1942, most of these duties had been performed by a heterogeneous group of administrative agencies. With the creation of the ASF, these agencies were brought together under one superior other than the Chief of Staff.
Medical Service 2
Some idea of the size of Medical Department operations in World War II can be obtained from a few statistics. During the years 1942-45, the number of admissions to Army hospitals from the Army alone was 14,700,000. This does not include thousands of other patients who received treatment in these hospitals certain personnel of the Navy and Coast Guard, members of Allied forces, prisoners of war, and civilians. From November 1942 to the end of 1946, the Army moved more than 660,000 patients from overseas areas to the United States; of these, 533; 000 returned by water and 127,000 by air. The movement reached a peak in May 1945 when a total of 60,000 patients were returned to this country.
The Surgeon General of the Army, who became a part of the Army Service Forces on 9 March 1942, was the chief of all Army medical activities. His status as such was not altered by the War Department reorganization. While he had certain procurement and supply responsibilities, these were incidental to his larger task: the direction and supervision of professional medical service throughout the Army.
In the strictly technical field, the Medical Department made valuable contributions to the fields of medical research, preventive medicine, and therapy. It worked in close collaboration with governmental and private agencies, both in the United States and in Allied countries. From this collaboration resulted such spectacular achievements as the successful use of Atabrine as a malarial suppressive and of penicillin in the treatment of a wide range of wounds and general infec-

tions, and further progress in the use of the sulfonamide compounds. Even more noteworthy was the development of new insecticides, especially DDT, which proved so effective in the control of such diseases as louse-borne typhus, one of the scourges of armies from the earliest times.
The use of Atabrine was only one, though a highly important, item in the Army's program of preventive medicine. The policy of immunizing every soldier against typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, smallpox, and tetanus kept the incidence of these diseases so low as to be almost insignificant. With a better vaccine available, the incidence of typhoid dropped from 0.37 in World War I, to 0.03 in World War II, and that of paratyphoid from 0.05 to 0.03. (These figures represent the number of cases per 1000 of Army strength per annum.) Only 12 cases of tetanus occurred during 1942-1945, a rate of 0.44 per 100,000 wounds and injuries as compared with 13.4 in World War I, during which a policy of universal immunization against tetanus was not adopted. The number of smallpox cases declined from 853 in World War I to 116 in World War II, a noteworthy result in view of the larger forces engaged and the difficulty of maintaining the effectiveness of a highly sensitive vaccine under extreme climatic conditions. Immunization against other diseases was limited to troops serving in regions where these diseases were a hazard, as for example, in the case of troops serving in areas where there was yellow fever. In spite of the fact that troops were exposed to it in these areas, there were no cases of the disease. Unfortunately 50,000 cases of jaundice were traced to the use of certain faulty lots of yellow-fever vaccine before these could be eliminated.
In the field of curative medicine, a notable example of the military importance of improved methods of treatment was the decline in non-effective rates for venereal disease. The average number of men absent from duty each day on account of this disease (or group of diseases) in World War I was 45 per 100,000; in World War II the number had dropped to 13. Another advance resulted from the growing reliance on plasma, later supplanted in large part by whole blood, especially for the treatment of shock as an incident to wounds or surgery. Surgery also profited from the practice of "phasing," which consisted of treating severe wounds by a series of predetermined procedures taking place at the points where each could be most efficiently performed. This reduced the gap in space and time between disablement and expert attention. Aiding in this reduction was the revival of mobile surgical units, a form of which had been used in World War I; these enabled highly skilled surgeons to be rapidly concentrated very near the front at points of greatest need. Improved means of transport served the same purpose, and the rapid movement of patients by air to centers of definitive treatment became a factor of increasing value in promoting recovery. Another important factor enabling World War II surgeons to keep the mortality rate low among the wounded was the use of improved agents and equipment for inducing anesthesia.
Neuropsychiatric disorders constituted a major problem for both preventive and curative medicine throughout the war; no less than 18.7 percent of all patients evacuated to the United States during 1942-45 were returned for this cause. At first much stress was placed on the screening process-"diagnosis and disposal"-

as a preventive. The great loss of manpower through this process and the growing evidence that anyone could develop a psychoneurosis under certain conditions caused a shift of emphasis to the prevention of mental casualties by alleviating the circumstances which helped to create them: among other things, excessive length of combat, misassignment, poor leadership, and lack of personal conviction about the necessity of the war. With this approach went a more determined effort to improve psychiatric treatment so that as many of the mentally ill as possible would be fit for at least a limited kind of military service. Part of this program was carried out through an elaborate system of rehabilitation which developed gradually during the war and which was designed not only for psychoneurotics but for the physically disabled in the final stages of their treatment.
The extensive use of "consultants" highly trained experts from civilian life to supervise the professional and in some cases the administrative activities of the Medical Department was an important development of World War II, although it had its precedent in World War I. These experts were armed with authority to work out policies and standards of practice which would give the Army the highest type of service in every branch of medicine.
Professional decisions about medical care, so far as they could be separated from administrative action, remained the exclusive province of the Medical Department throughout the war. General Somervell followed clinical developments with interest and tried to keep himself informed, but he never bypassed The Surgeon General in seeking advice on such matters.3 The administrative problems to which ASF headquarters gave some attention during the rear included such subjects as the procurement and use of personnel, the number and administration of hospitals, the procurement and distribution of medical supplies, and the organizational structure of the Medical Department. Since decisions in these fields often had an important effect on the standards of professional care, and since the Medical Department rightly considered itself the proper guardian of those standards, it was not always easy to reconcile the viewpoints of ASF headquarters and The Surgeon General's office. As a result, one or the other sometimes acquiesced in a particular line of action with considerable reluctance.
The Surgeon General reported short ages of medical personnel throughout the war. Most constant and most serious was the shortage of physicians particularly the various categories of specialists but periodically there  was also a shortage of nurses, dentists, veterinarians, and other types of medical personnel. The ASF insisted that the Medical Department economize in the use of doctors and other members of the medical profession, and it was largely in  response to the urging of ASF headquarters that members of the Medical Administrative Corps, composed of non-medical officers, were increasingly used for administrative duties instead of doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. The Medical Department also found it possible


    Admissions for disease     Death from disease     Death from wounds     Death from injuries
World War I 
(Apr 17-Dec 18)   
*946.8     *16. 5     4.4     1.4
World War II 
(Jan 42-Dec 45)   
 580.4     0. 6     1. 1     2. 3
*These figures were swelled by the incidence of influenza, which reached epidemic proportions in late 1918. 
Excluding influenza. disease admission and disease death rates for World War I would be 715.0 and 9.1 respectively; for World War II they would be 573.1 and 0.6 to turn over a sizable portion of the Army nurse's duties to civilian graduate nurses who could not meet the requirements for a commission, and to cadet nurses, nurses' aides, and male and female enlisted technicians. Nevertheless, at no time during the war was The Surgeon General's demand for medical personnel fully met; nor was the problem of efficient and full-time use of this personnel ever solved to the satisfaction of all parties.
The construction and maintenance of hospitals in the zone of interior was a joint responsibility of The Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers. ASF headquarters took a hand in negotiations between them not only as a superior authority but as a controlling force in the distribution of materials and supplies among the various branches of the Army. A similar division of authority existed in the movement of patients, which devolved upon the Chief of Transportation as well as The Surgeon General; here, ASF headquarters had to mediate between the services in order to establish proper priorities in transportation and to insure full use of facilities. Medical training and medical supply also were subjects in which ASF headquarters took great interest. Thus, while Army medical service was a responsibility of the Medical Department, its duties were performed as a part of the work of the Army Service Forces.
A rough means of gauging the success of that medical service is to compare World War II with World War I as to rates of admission (to hospital and "quarters") for disease and as to rates of death from disease, wounds, and injuries. These rates as shown in the table on this page represent the number of cases per 1000 of Army strength per annum.
Communications and Photographic Activities
The Chief Signal Officer was more than a buyer of communications equipment. He was also in charge of the Army communications system, a network of radio, teletype, and wire communications linking the War Department with Army installations in the United States and Army commands overseas. This work was highly technical, and had greatly improved through the years with the growth in technological knowledge.4
The Army Communications Service was frequently called upon to provide

message facilities on short notice. At the Yalta Conference in January 1945, for example, the meeting between the political heads of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia was scheduled at a place lacking communications facilities. Some 250 tons of equipment, including radio transmitters and receivers, teletypewriter apparatus, and a complete telephone system for local use were transported to the Crimea. The telephone network covered an area of 2,376 square miles, with land line telegraph circuits crossing two mountain ranges. The long-range radio transmitting facilities were installed in a ship anchored sixty-five miles from the conference site the first use of such a device in American communications history. Yet this complex, extensive installation was completed and placed in operation in nine days.5
The work of the Communications Service was of special interest to the Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War Department General Staff for two reasons. In the first place, it was essential to insure the secrecy of messages transmitted to and from overseas. To maintain this secrecy, a variety of technical devices was used, ranging from automatic coders and decoders to "scramblers." 6 Secondly, radio interception of enemy messages became one of the important sources of information about enemy plans and intentions. It was inevitable then that the Communications Service should operate under the closest scrutiny of G-2. This was a relationship with which ASF headquarters was entirely satisfied.7
On the other hand, the operation of the Army Pictorial Service was a constant source of concern to General Somervell. Essentially, the Signal Corps had two basic photographic missions. The first was to prepare training films and film strips for use at Army training posts; the second, to provide pictures of Army activities. These films and pictures might be used for combat analysis, for training purposes, for public relations, or for an historical record.
The production of training films involved close working relationships with the motion picture industry centered in the Los Angeles area. Producers and actors were among the first groups in this country in 1940 to volunteer their services free or on a cost basis to the government. However commendable their actions may have been, motion picture producers and their staffs were difficult to work with. Partly because of this situation, and partly because of the photographic service itself, many of the training films that were produced failed to meet the needs of the Army.8 After 1942 more and more training films were prepared at the Signal Corps Photographic Center on Long Island.9 For a time, the Army Pictorial Service was removed from the jurisdiction of the Chief Signal Officer and placed directly under the Commanding General, ASF. This action was shortly reversed when a new Chief Signal Officer, Maj. Gen. Harry C. Ingles, took over on 1 July 1943.10
General Somervell was quite unhappy about "this picture business." Shortly after Ingles assumed command of the Signal

Corps, Somervell sent him an extract from a report he had received which read:
The utter confusion that surrounds the photographic departments in the field, is unbelievable. There are thousands of Signal Corps photographers and they take millions of pictures but what happens to them no one knows . The photographers are encouraged by public relations officers in many cases to bear down hard on pictures of the Commanding General whether or not he is a photogenic type. In one base, out of 4,000 pictures, more than 2,500 were of the commanding general eating lunch, picking roses, riding horses, going to the latrine, what have you .11
As a result of such prodding, there was a marked improvement in the management of the Army Pictorial Service, and as time passed Somervell and his assistants gave less and less attention to photographic activities.
The Office of the Chief of Engineers in December 1941 was the Army agency responsible for the construction of all types of military installations, from Ordnance factories to military posts and airfields. This agency was also responsible for the operation of utility systems and for the maintenance of the structures at army installations both in the United States and overseas.
The work of the Chief of Engineers began with the acquisition of building sites. From 1 July 1940 to the end of the war, the War Department acquired title to about thirty-nine million acres of land, an area larger than the state of Illinois. More than five sixths of this total involved simply the transfer of public land from one custody, primarily that of the Interior Department, to that of the War Department. Much land and many facilities were leased rather than purchased. Whether wanted or not, real estate problems became a big job for the Army.12
The Army's construction program was one of the first and largest phases of defense mobilization to get under way. As of 30 June 1942, the Army's authorized construction program amounted to about 7.5 billion dollars, of which 2.7 billion dollars was for Ordnance plants and depots, 2 billion dollars for air installations, and 1.4 billion dollars for Army camps to train ground troops. The remaining 1.4 billion dollars was divided among a large number of other installations. Only about one half of this total program was then in place.13
During the period from July 1942 to June 1943, the construction program expanded in total volume from 7.5 billion dollars to 9.3 billion dollars, of which 95 percent was in place by 30 June 1943. In the following two years only an additional 1.3 billion dollars was spent on new plants inside the United States. Much of the construction in the late war years was for production of the atomic bomb and for air facilities to accommodate large bombers. The construction program during World War II was the largest construction program ever undertaken over a five-year period of time under single direction in American history.14
As construction slowed down in 1943 and 1944, maintenance problems increased. By the end of fiscal 1945, the Corps of Engineers was supervising the

maintenance of 75,000 miles of road, 23,000 miles of electric wire, 13,000 miles of water mains and an almost equal mileage of sewer lines, nearly 3;000 miles of gas mains, and 1,600 miles of steam pipe.15
That General Somervell should be interested in the construction work of the Engineers is not surprising. An Engineer officer himself, he had been head of a major part of Army construction work from December 1940 to November 1941. He had a personal knowledge of the whole program. Since certain groups in the War Production Board were critical of the size of Army construction, after 1942 General Somervell tried to make sure that the additional facilities were actually needed and that materials and manpower would be available for their operation.16 After 1944 the efficient utilization of space in Army posts was a major objective of ASF headquarters. For example, it was more economical to operate a few training posts at or near full capacity than to operate twice as many at 50 percent capacity. But to convince others accustomed to time-honored methods of operation was a difficult chore.
Between March 1942, when the Army Service Forces was created, and August 1945, some 6,881,011 men were inducted into the Army. Through The Adjutant General's office the ASF became the operating agency for performing this work.
Induction consisted of four basic procedures: medical examination, formal induction, classification, and initial assignment. An important question in medical examination was setting the physical standard required for Army service. At various times during the war, the actual physical qualifications for "general service" were altered. Medical rejection of men having a venereal disease, for example, decreased during 1943 as the Army found penicillin effective in combating syphilis.
Another problem was "limited service." For a time in 1943, the War Department refused to accept "limited service" men from the Selective Service System because of difficulty in making good use of them. Beginning in November 1943 the War Department tried to assign such men to the type of work for which they were best suited physically. A committee was organized to work out a new physical classification system with the Deputy Chief of Staff for the War Department as its chairman. Part of this burden fell upon the Army Service Forces.
On 18 May 1944, the War Department officially announced a Physical Profile plan. The plan identified six primary physical characteristics: stamina, hearing, eyesight, motion and efficiency of upper and lower extremities, and neuropsychiatric condition. Within each characteristic there were four grades the first two qualified a man for general service, grade three for limited service, while a person falling predominantly in grade four was rejected for military service. The complexity of the new classification system was troublesome, but at least fuller information about the physical condition of each person became available. With the introduction of this plan, initial assignment

tended to be based primarily upon physical condition. 17
After being inducted, the men were sent to reception stations operated by the ASF where they were issued Army clothes and given a number of tests. The most important of these was the Army General Classification Test which divided men into five grades according to a person's ability to learn. Those in Grades IV and V were "slow learners" one might say, persons impossible to teach. Other tests were intended to indicate mechanical, technical, and clerical aptitudes. On the basis of these tests and of personal interviews, a provisional classification was made of the kind of military work for which the individual seemed best fitted. Various types of military duties had been classified into a system of "military occupation specialty" numbers.
While this system was useful, the effort to match military assignment with classification was difficult to administer. In a time of mass induction, assignments could not be made on an individual basis. Moreover, personnel demands at a particular moment did not necessarily fit the classification qualifications of the group of men currently being inducted. Classifications did identify those particular specialists who were in "critical supply" at any one time, such as radio operators. These could be individually assigned. But with the specialized manpower needs of war, and with ten times as many different types of occupations in civilian life as in the Army, the classification process could not insure that all inductees would be placed at tasks related to their previous training and experience. It was very important in selecting specialists to fill Army needs to find men who had had equivalent civilian occupations. Encouragingly, a sample survey in 1943 indicated that 78 percent of the men studied were doing military work related to their civilian occupational specialty.18
Shortly after it came into existence, the Army Service Forces began to study procedures in commissioning officers from civilian life. The Army had earlier adopted the practice of training young officers for combat assignments in officer candidate schools open to men selected from the ranks. Other combat officers came from National Guard and Reserve Corps rolls. But many non-combat branches and higher headquarters of the Army necessarily recruited officers directly from civil life. This had always been the practice, for example, in the Medical Corps, since the Army never had a school to train doctors. Similarly, the Ordnance Department, the Transportation Corps, the Air Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, the Signal Corps, the Corps of Engineers, The Judge Advocate General's Department, the Chief of Chaplains, and other units, especially in ASF headquarters, needed many officers with special nonmilitary skills. All these agencies separately recruited officers who were subject only to hasty review by a Personnel Board appointed by the Secretary of War.
The commissioning of so many officers in so little time involved many problems, one of the most complicated of which was weeding out incompetents. Time was pressing and officer procurement officials necessarily relied heavily on recommendations. Occasionally this had its humorous side as when one bank executive recom-

mended a West Texas county judge in the following terms:
The old gentleman was a pretty good old guy in his day, but he has approached the age of senility, in addition to which he is probably the laziest man in West Texas. Although he is a veteran of the Spanish War, he still has ideas about his prowess, and is continually chasing blondes. He drinks a case of Budweiser every day, and his wife has to put him to bed every night. The least said about his honesty and ability is too much. If the Army can find any use for this old bastard, they are welcome to him .19
Very few recommendations were so outspoken. In fact one of the most serious drawbacks to this method of obtaining officers was that too often influential individuals tried to get a job for the man rather than a man for the job. There were many complaints that only people of political or social prominence were eligible for commissions, and that "pull" rather than merit was too often the deciding factor.20 Such protests were natural in any situation where so many people seeking commissions had to be turned down. Remedial measures were taken when criticism seemed legitimate, but undoubtedly there was much truth in Secretary of War Stimson's jest that to satisfy, everybody, the Army would have to abolish the rank of private.21
In fact, if it had been left entirely to Secretary Stimson, very few commissions would have been given to civilians. The Secretary believed that the honor of a commission should be reserved for fighting men. In September 1942 he approved the creation of an Army Specialist Corps where men were selected on the basis of nonmilitary skills and wore uniforms different from those of the Army. The experiment was abandoned in November 1942 and the practice of commissioning civilians in the regular branches of the Army was resumed.22 This attempt to establish an Army Specialist Corps failed because the Army did not recognize the importance of technicians and other experts in modern war and because such men could be more easily obtained if they were offered commissions in the Army of the United States.
The ASF established an Officer Procurement Service to recruit specialized officer personnel.23 During the year 1942 approximately 104,000 officers were commissioned from civilian life. Nearly half of these were medical personnel, with most of the remainder about equally divided between special units of the Army Air Forces and of the Army Service Forces. 24 In July 1943 the Acting Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson, directed that, with certain exceptions, officer recruitment from civilian life be discontinued. In the year ending 30 June 1944, only 16,119 persons were commissioned from civilian life, 80 percent of whom were doctors and chaplains.25
A major innovation in Army personnel policy came in the summer of 1942 when Congress authorized a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, renamed in September 1943, the Women's Army Corps (WAC). The ASF supervised the recruitment and training of this corps; by April 1945 its

personnel totaled nearly 100,000 women. 26 After legislation in November 1942, lowering the induction age limit from twenty to eighteen years, the War Department developed the Army Specialized Training Program for assigning some 150; 000 young soldiers to institutions of higher education. The program was administered by the Army Service Forces. The principal fields of study were engineering, medicine, mathematics, and various other branches of science, with a few assigned to personnel psychology and foreign area study. The program served in part to provide uninterrupted training for professional specialties of importance to the Army; it also served to insure continued operation of institutions of higher education, many of which might otherwise have faced financial ruin. Because of Army manpower shortages, the program was almost completely liquidated on 1 April 1944, the medical phase being the major survivor .27
The War Department General Staff abolished the limited service classification in July 1943, and directed that all men be discharged who could not meet the current medical definition of "general service." 28 The policies of discharging physically disqualified and overage enlisted personnel, discussed earlier, caused the ASF to separate nearly 70,000 men a month in 1943.29 The experience brought the realization that existing separation processes were slow and clumsy. The ASF staff then set up new and simplified separation practices. The effectiveness of these changes was evident in the rapidity with which men were able to leave the Army at the end of the war.
In June 1943, the War Department decided upon a policy of rotation in order to return to the United States men with lengthy overseas service. Rotation was a basic morale problem. There was a saying common among battle weary troops, that "the Army consists of this division and eight million replacements." 30 Such troops needed relief. In September 1943 the ASF set up fourteen stations to receive soldiers returning from overseas and to assign them to new duties in the United States. In the year ending 30 June 1944, some 74,000 men were handled by these reception stations.31 As more and more overseas personnel became eligible for return to the United States, General Marshall grew concerned about the arrangements for their reception. He talked the matter over with General Somervell and others, and suggested the use of resort hotels to which enlisted men and officers might bring their wives for a period of ten to fourteen days before receiving a new assignment.
In September 1944, the Army Service Forces accordingly opened five so-called redistribution centers at well-known resort hotels located at Lake Placid, Asheville, Miami Beach, Hot Springs, and Santa

Barbara. A sixth was opened at Atlantic City in December. Two Army posts also became redistribution stations. This arrangement came to an end on 12 May 1945, just after V-E Day. Altogether, more than 130,000 officers and men and 20,000 dependents went through these redistribution stations.32
In January 1944 the Personnel Division of the General Staff made new efforts to retain men regarded as essential. Previously, each of the commands in the United States the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Army Service Forces had its own procedures for shifting enlisted personnel from one type of work to another. The ASF created three reassignment centers which received about 23,000 persons between February and June 1944. Reassignments of some kind were found for all but about 1,000 of these. The operation ceased on 1 July 1944.33
Two new activities in the personnel field, started by the War Department after 1940, came under the ASF in 1942. One, originally called morale services and later designated information and education activities, involved primarily an effort to maintain morale and to provide useful information. The media of communication ranged from a weekly newsmagazine, Yank, to motion pictures (the "Why We Fight" series), radio broadcasts, and booklets about foreign lands. 34 Correspondence courses, discussion materials, and eventually European schools for soldiers awaiting transportation home, were also parts of this program. Much of the material produced in furtherance of this work was imaginative and marked by excellent craftsmanship. How effective it proved was always uncertain. Soldiers' attitudes were ascertained through questionnaires and the results used to determine policies.
For example, the War Department scheme of discharges after V-E Day on a point system was devised after a survey of soldier opinion.
The second activity was recreational, involving organized sports, motion pictures, USO shows for troop entertainment, books (specially printed pocket editions), musical materials and records, handicraft and art materials, and the management of post exchanges (the soldiers' general store).
In February 1944 ASF headquarters established a personal affairs program to provide individual counseling to soldiers. The biggest single task was to make certain that officers and enlisted men fully understood the arrangements for making allotments to dependents. Soldiers or their families also sought advice about insurance and bond matters, employment, housing, maternity and medical care, and death benefits. Personal affairs officers and their assistants not only provided a central source of information for those needing help but were also expected to help make arrangements to insure that the necessary aid was actually provided .35
In connection with this program, a Women's Volunteer Committee, national in scope, was established to promote the participation of Army wives and others in Army welfare activities. Women were encouraged to volunteer their services to the American Red Cross and Gray Ladies. Others worked directly with the Army Emergency Relief Fund and with personal affairs officers in visiting the homes of sol-

diers' families when children were born, when there was an illness or other emergency, and when word of overseas death was received .36
ASF Relations With G-1
The Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff, G-1, was responsible for over-all policy, but the actual administration of most War Department central personnel policies was in the hands of the Army Service Forces .37 It was inevitable, perhaps, that the ASF should regard its personnel responsibilities somewhat differently from its duties with respect to procurement and supply. General Somervell tended to give more attention to procurement and supply matters than to personnel administration, since the former seemed always more crucial. In fact the assignment of extensive personnel operating duties to the ASF had not been a part of the reorganization which Somervell had himself desired. To a real extent, the Personnel Division of the WDGS (G-1) remained the top planning unit on personnel matters, and ASF personnel officials closely consulted G-1 about all personnel policies. The ASF director of personnel, Maj. Gen. Joseph N. Dalton, therefore did not exercise the control over personnel matters that General Clay did over procurement activities or General Lutes over supply matters.
The close relationship between G-1 and ASF was formalized when on 4 April 1945 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, sent a memorandum to the War Department Deputy Chief of Staff entitled "Personnel Operating Responsibilities of Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces." This memorandum reiterated that the Military Personnel Division, ASF, would be the operating arm for G-1 on all questions involving military personnel throughout the Military Establishment.
In a memorandum on 29 June 1945, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, informed the Commanding General, ASF, of the military functions, Army-wide in scope, which were being delegated to him, subject to WDGS policies. The delegated functions included a wide variety of duties, among which were the preparation of legislation and executive orders affecting military personnel, staff supervision of the naturalization of worthy aliens serving in the armed forces, the operation of War Department personnel centers, the processing of prisoners of war, War Department liaison with the national headquarters of the Selective Service System, and the preparation of recommended changes in personnel policies and procedures.38
In effect this memorandum restated the existing operating duties of the ASF. It served primarily as a reminder to both the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces that the ASF was the central personnel agency for the War Department and that as such, it was expected to take the lead in this field. This memorandum was welcome to the ASF. It confirmed that G-1 would confine itself to review of personnel administration by the ASF and would not try to duplicate activities which the ASF was prepared to perform. The ASF felt that this memorandum made for continued harmonious relations with the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff.

Police Activities, Internal Security, and Custody of Military Prisoners
The Provost Marshal General, who became a part of the Army Service Forces in 1942, had three major responsibilities: the organization and training of military police units, the protection of vital military and industrial installations from sabotage, and the custody of prisoners of war. In 1942 the Provost Marshal General also began the task of supervising the recruitment and training of military government teams for service overseas.
Military police personnel guarded military installations, apprehended soldiers "absent without leave," and patrolled trains and major cities to insure the proper behavior of soldiers. In the year ending 30 June 1945, the Provost Marshal General investigated over 47,000 complaints of alleged criminal acts performed by military personnel within the country, about 20 percent involving crimes against other persons, and about 80 percent crimes against property.
Internal security operations were troublesome because the extent of military responsibility was not clearly defined. Of the Army's duty to insure the security of its own installations, there was no doubt. But there was uncertainty about what the Army should do to protect vital industrial properties, especially when local police forces and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were on the job. As the war progressed, the number of industrial plants whose security arrangements were inspected by the ASF declined from a peak of 13,701 in May 1943 until by 30 June 1945, only 698 remained.39 Fortunately sabotage was never a great problem during World War II, partly because of the relatively small number of people inclined to be disloyal and partly because of the careful anti-sabotage precautions which were taken.
The training of personnel for military government duties overseas created more than the usual number of difficulties, including controversies with other agencies in Washington. Army doctrine stipulated that military government was primarily responsible for preventing interference with military operations. But in attempting to conform to this doctrine broadly in the Army's training program, Somervell was accused of trying to take over the duties of other American Government agencies. Then on other. occasions, the ASF was accused of being indifferent to the need for reconstructing the civilian economy in occupied areas previously devastated by the enemy. The Army doctrine just mentioned in general confined military government to those activities necessary to maintain order and public health.
With mounting victories abroad, the custody of prisoners of war within the United States became a major task. By 30 June 1944 there were about 200,000 German and Italian prisoners of war in the United States, and about 569 Japanese. A year later the number had increased to over 425,000, mostly Germans.40 General Somervell insisted that these prisoners play a part in easing the manpower shortage, and he took pride in the fact that from 86 to 94 percent of all prisoners of war were usefully employed.41
Beginning in the autumn of 1944, the

custody of American military prisoners came under the jurisdiction of The Adjutant General, who supervised rehabilitation centers and disciplinary barracks, the two types of Army penal institutions where military prisoners convicted by courts martial served their sentences. The Under Secretary of War named a board of prominent penologists to advise in this work. Any military prisoners not guilty of a capital offense or certain other major crimes might be sent to a rehabilitation center where an effort was made through rigorous training and psychological guidance to restore men to military duty. Of the 34,209 prisoners admitted to rehabilitation centers during the war, about 13,940 were restored to military duty and 10,562 were sent on to disciplinary barracks to serve out their sentences. By the end of the war, the numbers held in disciplinary barracks (penitentiaries) had reached 13; 468.42
Legal Activities
The Judge Advocate General was the legal officer of the War Department. Throughout the war his major responsibility was the supervision of the system of military justice. His office received the records of all general courts martial held in the United States some 18,000 in the year ending 30 June 1945.43 Boards of review, established overseas, studied the records of general courts in their respective areas. Cases were also reviewed to determine the desirability of clemency. A special effort was made to cut the time lag between the specification of charges against an officer or enlisted man and the conclusion of his trial.44 Secretary Stimson and Under Secretary Patterson took a great interest in all aspects of military justice, and sought, through review of cases, to prevent malfunctioning of the system. During the war the Judge Advocate General's office reviewed a total of 67,318 cases.45
The Judge Advocate General's office studied all legislation pending in Congress affecting the Army, and prepared written opinions on all legal matters on which the War Department General Staff or any of the three commands sought advice. This office also handled tort claims against the Army, tax problems of Army procurement, land and patent law matters, and a variety of other legal matters. In September 1944 the judge Advocate General, upon the direction of the Secretary of War, began preparations for the trial of enemy individuals charged with cruelties, atrocities, and acts of oppression against members of the armed forces. Also, the Judge Advocate General took the lead in behalf of the United States Government in preparing evidence on war crimes after the creation of the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London.46
Fiscal Activities
The Chief of Finance was the War Department's disbursing and accounting agent, and in addition, was responsible for a number of other financial services which had grown up in the Office of the Under Secretary of War. With the reorganization in 1942, all financial activities were consolidated within the Army Service Forces.
An important fiscal problem through-

out the war was to insure that War Department obligations were promptly and accurately paid. In the month of June 1945, for example, the Army paid 940,000 commercial invoices and had only a backlog of seven days' bills at the end of the month. Another 1,100,000 bills for common carriers were paid in that month for the transportation of troops or war supplies. None of the bills unpaid at the end of the month had been on hand for more than twelve days. In one year, the War Department, in paying its various obligations, issued more than 130 million checks.47
As troops arrived overseas in increasing numbers, two new problems appeared. One was to devise a method of handling foreign currency that would enable the Army to pay for local purchases. The other was to find a way to discourage individual soldiers from obtaining local currency with American dollars. Troops were urged to send more money home, to save through deposit accounts paying 4 percent interest, or to buy savings bonds. Through these measures, it was estimated that the amount available to military personnel overseas for making local purchases was reduced to about 15 percent of total pay.48 Moreover, special currency was devised for soldiers to use in post exchanges and in paying military bills. This currency was useless to local inhabitants.
The Office of Dependency Benefits became one of the big operations of the Army Service Forces. This office, located in Newark, New Jersey, kept control records on all family allowances (for the support of dependents of enlisted men going overseas) and family allotments (voluntary assignment of officers' and enlisted men's pay to dependents). Under the family allowance program, the government contributed about two dollars to every one by a soldier up to a maximum, of about $60.00 a month. By June 1945 there were 4 million family allowance accounts and 3.8 million family allotment accounts. The speedy payment of these obligations was a vital morale factor, and even at the risk of overpayment and duplication, these checks were mailed promptly.49
Payroll deductions from civilian and military payrolls for the purchase of war bonds, adequate banking facilities for civilian and military personnel, the careful examination of all disbursements, the management of nearly 7 billion dollars in advance payments to contractors and of another 7.6 billion dollars in guaranteed loans from banks, the auditing of terminated contracts, property accountability these were just some of the fiscal problems of the ASF.
Among the deductions from military pay handled by the Army were premium payments for National Service Life Insurance administered by the Veterans Administration. Every officer and enlisted man in the armed forces was entitled to term life insurance up to a total amount of $10,000. The ASF urged every inductee to purchase the full $10,000 policy. General Somervell believed that this insurance should be compulsory, but he was never able to persuade the War Department General Staff to agree.50
The ASF Fiscal Director, General Carter, convinced Somervell that since the

government assumed administrative costs, the rates on National Service Life Insurance were too high. New mortality tables had been adopted by private insurance companies, while the Veterans Administration ignored the new data on the increased life span. General Somervell forwarded this information to the General Staff with a strong recommendation for remedial action which would have reduced the average monthly cost of a $10,000 policy from $6.95 to $2.25. The Personnel Division of the WDGS on 3 February 1944 opposed the recommendation. Finally, Secretary Stimson on 27 April 1944 signed a letter, drafted in the ASF, to the Veterans Administration suggesting the distribution of premium dividends to all policy holders. Administrator Hines replied to the Secretary on 12 May, agreeing that arrangements should be made for dividend payments and outlining the policies his office would follow in making such payments. But the letter said nothing about when dividend payments would begins51 Somervell thereupon wrote a memorandum for the files the only time in his nearly four years as commanding general of the ASF that he ever wrote this type of document stating that the action taken by General Hines did not remove the "abuse of premium rates greatly in excess of those which current actuarial tables provide." 52 Five years later, Somervell's position was substantiated when on 1 January 1950, the Veterans Administration began to pay dividends resulting from insurance premiums paid during World War II.
Postal Service and Publications
The Adjutant General operated the Army Postal Service, whose biggest problem was the overseas delivery of mail to troops. In the months of March through June 1945, air mail expanded to 2 million pounds, while mail hauled by surface ships reached a peak of 1.7 million pounds in January 1945. Parcel post reached a peak of 1.7 million sacks in October 1944. V mail, whereby letters were microfilmed and then reproduced at their destination, was especially advantageous in the early years of the war when airlift was scarce, but the volume declined as air-mail service became available. By April 1945 the average time for an air-mail letter to reach the European continent from any part of the United States was 10.2 days; for the South Pacific it was 7.3 days.53
The Adjutant General was also the central publications office of the War Department, publishing and distributing all kinds of War Department orders and instructions, as well as Army manuals, the text books of military activities. Each month in the year ending 30 June 1945, the office handled an estimated 6,000 tons of forms, and publications. The time required to print and distribute this volume of matter, and the prevention of unduly large stock age at any one point or at any one time were continuing problems.54
The Management of Posts, Camps, and Stations
Most of the activities just mentioned, and much supply work in the United States

focused upon the posts, camps, and stations where troops were trained. The management of these posts for the Army Ground Forces, and the supervision of certain functions at air bases, fell to the Army Service Forces. Army posts were areas where transportation, communication, and other facilities had to be provided; hospitals, motion picture theaters, and post exchanges operated; supplies furnished to troops, publications distributed, chapel services conducted, and eventually, troops and trains moved to ports of embarkation for shipment overseas. This housekeeping job in the United States was a major concern.
The Army Service Forces was also, to a limited extent, a training command. The procurement, supply, and service duties of the ASF often obscured the fact that the command also trained individuals and troop units for overseas duties. The component services of the ASF, such as the Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance Department, trained individual men for assignment to the quartermaster battalions and ordnance companies which were an integral part of a ground combat division. These services also trained individuals for assignment to similar duties for the Army Air Forces. In addition, each higher tactical command, such as a corps or particularly an army, had to have communications, transportation, motor maintenance, medical, construction, and other service units. These units, as well as individuals assigned to them, were trained by the ASF.
More than this, each overseas theater as a whole had ports of debarkation, storage depots, medical facilities, financial offices, maintenance shops, communications units, and recreational facilities. Theater commands needed units for guarding military prisoners and prisoners of war, units for construction and repair of military installations, units to operate or manage transportation, units to take care of records and general office management, units to handle the legal work of the overseas command, chaplains, and others. Personnel, both officer and enlisted, were trained to meet all of these needs in overseas commands. In other words, the ASF had to train people to do, on a somewhat more limited scale for each overseas command, the same services that the ASF performed within the United States for the War Department itself.
When training statistics were first collected in January 1943, there were 519,000 persons undergoing some form of instruction at ASF installations. This number rose to a total of 700,000 in the month of September 1943 and then declined to a low of 207,000 in March 1945. Altogether, from the beginning of 1942 to the end of the war, some 6,000 troop units with a total personnel of more than 1,000,000 men with more than 300,000 individual replacements were trained and shipped overseas for supply and service activities within theaters of operation .55 But in spite of this seemingly large total, the role of the ASF in this field was relatively small when compared to that of both the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces.
The Organization and Training Division, G-3 of the WDGS, provided the over-all supervision of training. Apart from General Somervell's constant concern about the insufficient number of sup-

ply troops available to perform the overseas support operations, the ASF had few disputes with G-3 of the WDGS. Since a small part of the G-3 personnel had been transferred to the ASF at the time of the War Department reorganization, the ASF had to construct a training staff almost from scratch in 1942. These training responsibilities tended to grow with the course of the war, but the personnel in charge found no difficulty in working closely with G-3. The quality of the training staff within the Army Service Forces was such that General Somervell was content largely to leave training problems to its discretion. This staff in turn, seldom embarked upon any new training policies without prior informal consultation with G-3.
The ASF developed its own schedules for activating and training supply troops, and occasionally disagreed with the AGF about the division of training responsibilities between the two commands for supply troops .56 The ASF was ready to accept G-3 as arbitrator, and the resulting division of organization and unit training responsibilities between the ASF and AGF was on the whole satisfactory to the ASE
Occasionally the ASF felt that G-3 was not sufficiently prompt in issuing revised military unit organization programs (the so-called troop basis), but recognized that the fault was not controllable by G-3. Every time a general change was made in the number of divisions, air groups, and nondivisional units to be organized, or in the size and internal organization of troop units, the Army Service Forces had to revise its procurement plans. Therefore, the ASF constantly sought to keep abreast of any changes in the thinking about troop organization and strength. G-3 was dependent in turn upon the strategic and tactical planning of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff before it could introduce official changes in military organization.
No summary can give adequate attention to the multitude of problems which arose in the service activities of the Army Service Forces. But it is important to understand that the ASF had many responsibilities extending well beyond the procurement and distribution of supplies and the operation of a transportation system. It was a cardinal element of General Somervell's thinking at all times that the ASF was a service command of the Army, and that its role had to be understood in terms of the ramifications of its many and widely varied duties.

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