Chapter XVIII: 
Procurement Collaboration With the Navy
The Army Service Forces was by no means the only military procurement agency during World War II. Within the War Department the ASF shared procurement and supply duties with the Army Air Forces, an arrangement that has already been discussed.1 Within the federal government as a whole the ASF shared war procurement responsibilities with the U.S. Maritime Commission (which contracted for cargo vessels) and with a number of bureaus in the Department of the Navy.
The Navy bureaus-Ordnance, Ships, Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, and Aeronautics-were not organized into a command comparable to that of the ASK Rather, on procurement activities these bureaus operated under general policies determined by two units of the Secretary's office the Under Secretary's office (assisted by the General Counsel) and the Office of Procurement and Material.2 On supply activities the bureaus received instructions from a Vice-Chief of Naval Operations.
Necessarily there were many common interests between the ASF and the Navy. Many of the items purchased and used by the Army and Navy were similar if not identical. Both Army and Navy procurement officers entered into contracts with the same manufacturing companies. Contractors in turn needed the same raw materials and component parts in order to provide Army and Navy supplies. These factors gave the ASF good reason to seek Navy collaboration on procurement and supply activities. Throughout the war, General Somervell was a strong advocate of joint action with the Navy, and after the war he was a firm believer in the unification of the armed forces under single direction. Some of the difficulties that grew out of efforts at voluntary co-operation no doubt helped to produce this attitude.
The Army and Navy Munitions Board might have become a joint agency for promoting co-operative procurement relationships, but it practically went out of existence in 1942.3 In 1944 the only reminder of the ANMB that remained was a periodically revised statement jointly approved by the Production Division,

ASF, and the Office of Procurement and Material in the Navy labeled: The Army and Navy Munitions Board List of Prohibited Items for Construction Work. This was first issued in May 1942 and the ANMB designation was continued in the succeeding years, even though meaningless.4 In December 1945 an official announcement was issued by ASF headquarters saying that "the Army and Navy Munitions Board has been reconstituted." 5 This order implicitly acknowledged that the board had lapsed.
In almost every instance where procurement cooperation eventually developed between the ASF and the Navy, it was only after some difficulty had first begun to hamper operations. In many cases the technicians concerned with a common problem got together and worked out a solution. Sometimes Army or Navy personnel anticipated a problem and sought the cooperation of the other. Most relationships were either informal or were set up to meet a special need. Two examples will illustrate. When the War Department began its Army Specialized Training Program in December 1942, the Navy was already using various university facilities throughout the country for officer and other training programs. For a time, universities and colleges were able to pit Army and Navy needs against each other in obtaining the most favorable contract terms for training facilities. Accordingly, in March 1943 the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy signed a joint directive creating a joint Army and Navy Board for Training Unit Contracts and agreed upon a single individual to be chairman and to represent both services. The agreement was revised and extended in August 1943. The second example involved packaging. After long discussions among staff officers, the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy on 10 February 1945 established a joint Army-Navy Packaging Board to set up uniform procedure in issuing packing and packaging instructions to contractors for various kinds of supplies.6 These two examples of jointly solving a special problem's and setting up a standard practice were not unusual.
Fortunately, a complete and systematic account of Army and Navy procurement relationships was prepared before the end of World War II. This report arose out of peculiar circumstances. When in the autumn of 1943 the War Department began to work closely with the Office of War Mobilization on policies for contract termination, the Navy was invited to participate. A joint Contract Termination Board was organized in the Office of War Mobilization on 11 November 1943 under the chairmanship of Mr. John M. Hancock. This board consisted of the Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretaries of War and the Navy, and representatives of other agencies such as the WPB, the FEA, and the Treasury Department. A uniform ter-

mination article to be used in prime contracts having a fixed price was agreed upon and officially promulgated on 8 January 1944. To meet the need of guidance in terminating fixed price subcontracts, the board framed and recommended for use a termination article on 21 May 1944. Then a series of four interpretations of the uniform termination article was agreed upon. Thus, substantially complete understanding was achieved between the War and Navy Departments on termination policies, except for cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. Thereafter, additional negotiations were begun in an effort to achieve procedural uniformity in the termination practices of the two departments. Eventually, on 1 November 1944 a joint Termination Regulation was issued by the War and Navy Departments. A Joint Termination Accounting Manual accompanied this regulation. Collaboration was extended even to the point where one department arranged to settle the terminated contracts of the other on a company-wide basis. The achievement in the field of contract termination is probably the most outstanding example of success in the effort to unify War and Navy procurement activities during World War II. Within the War Department the entire termination effort was directed by Col. William H. Draper, Jr., of ASF headquarters. His counterpart in the Navy was Capt. Lewis L. Strauss.
With the successful conclusion of Colonel Draper's work, Somervell thought the time propitious for a review of all Army-Navy procurement relationships. In April 1944 both Under Secretary Patterson and General Somervell had appeared before the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy to urge unification of the armed forces.7 Somervell hoped Colonel Draper, by exploring desirable collaborative relations between the Army and Navy, might make a substantial contribution toward better Army-Navy procurement arrangements and at the same time, lay the groundwork for the larger problem of service integration after the war.8
A final report was submitted on 8 February 1945 by Colonel Draper and Captain Strauss and was accompanied by two volumes of studies on existing procurement relations.9 The Functional Studies of the Draper-Strauss Report described the many different relationships which had grown up during the war between ASF headquarters and the Navy. The Mat6riel Studies presented the various collaborative arrangements existing between the technical services of the ASF, the AAF, and the procurement bureaus of the Navy. The two types of studies together enumerated most of the formal and informal contacts between the War and Navy Departments. The number of these was impressive. Equally noteworthy was the wide variety of measures taken to bring about common action. In general, they fell into one of four broad categories. First, the studies indicated extensive exchange of information on research and development projects and an occasional division of development responsibility between the Army technical services and the Navy bureaus. Second,

for a number of different items, Army technical services procured the requirements as indicated by a Navy bureau, while Navy bureaus procured certain items for Army technical services. In the third place, there were a few instances of joint Army-Navy procurement. Finally, there had been considerable effort to work out joint procurement policies, specifications, and procedures to be followed by the actual procuring agencies. Each of these types of collaborative endeavor can be briefly illustrated.
The technical services of the Army and the procurement bureaus of the Navy exchanged technical information on virtually all research and development projects of any possible common interest. The meetings of technical committees in each technical service were ordinarily attended by Navy representatives, and reports and other development papers were interchanged on a systematic basis. Frequently, co-operation on research matters went much farther than attendance at meetings and exchange of reports. The Ordnance development program is a case in point. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance had for years done much work in the development of armor plate for ships. Tank development in the Army brought many of the same problems into Army research and procurement. The Navy made its heavy armor testing facilities at Dahlgren Proving Ground available to the Army, while the Ordnance Department in turn made experimental facilities at Aberdeen Proving Ground available to the Navy. All information from research in ballistics was likewise exchanged between the two services. The Ordnance Department and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance also divided up much of the work in developing rockets. Facilities were used in common by both services, and agreements were made whereby each service would tend to specialize in a different field of rocket development.10 In the field of communications, the Signal Corps of the Army, on the one hand, and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance and the Navy Bureau of Ships, on the other, worked closely together, through the Office of Scientific Research and Development, in using the private research facilities at Westinghouse, General Electric, and Western Electric plants. The Joint Communications Board under the joint Chiefs of Staff was utilized as the agency for co-operation in the development of radar equipment. This board had nine subcommittees, with representatives from the two departments directing joint work on the design and development of equipment for Army and Navy use.11 In 1943 a joint Army-Navy Standardization Committee for Vehicles and Construction Equipment was established which resulted in agreement on standard automotive equipment for the two services. The Navy agreed to use Army specifications for automotive equipment. 12 In 1944 the Chemical Warfare Service was engaged in fourteen research projects set up and financed by Navy funds. In its turn, the Navy Bureau of Ordnance stationed Naval officers at both Edgewood Arsenal and Dug-way Proving Ground to keep in touch with the research developments of the Chemical Warfare Service.13 All of these examples show the procedures used to achieve the maximum benefit for both services in their common interest in research and development.
In the second place, for a number of

different items the Navy obtained its requirements from the Army, while the Navy in turn purchased some items and delivered them to the Army. Thus the Marine Corps obtained all of its tanks from the Army. The same was true of small arms, machine guns, and ammunition. Marine Corps requirements for these items were incorporated in the ASF Army Supply Program and deliveries were made to the Navy on a reimbursable basis.14 The Bureau of Ships purchased all landing craft for the Army. Early in 1941 the Office of Production Management designated the Chrysler Corporation to produce 40-mm. antiaircraft guns for both the Army and Navy. In addition, Army arsenals such as Watertown and Watervliet produced heavy guns for the Navy, while the Navy frequently produced large guns and heavy ammunition for the Army.15 During the calendar year 1944 approximately 46 percent of the Navy's total purchases of motor vehicles were obtained directly from the Army.16 The Chemical Warfare Service purchased incendiary bombs, gas masks, protective materials, and other items for the Navy Department.17 A somewhat different arrangement was employed for the procurement of crawler tractors and spare parts. In March 1942 the WPB froze all deliveries of tractors because of competing demands from the military services. Thereafter the WPB agreed to make 85 percent of all crawler tractor deliveries available to the armed forces. This was a lump sum allocation and was not divided between the Army and the Navy. Thereupon the Army Service Forces took the lead in developing a plan whereby the Corps of Engineers purchased and accepted delivery of all tractors under the WPB orders. The distribution of these tractors was then controlled by a War Department Conference Group for Tractors and Cranes. This committee was composed of representatives from three bureaus of the Navy, the Marine Corps, seven ASF representatives, the AAF, and representatives from the War Department General Staff. Working under the aegis of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), this conference group agreed upon the division of total deliveries among all the services.18 In all these instances the Army or the Navy was completely responsible for all procurement, delivering the desired completed items to the other service on a reimbursable basis.
In the third place, there were a number of examples of joint procurement operations where the ASF and the Navy bureaus worked together in the procurement of common items. The foremost example of joint procurement occurred in the subsistence field. Procurement of all nonperishable foodstuffs for the Army was directed by The Quartermaster General through the Chicago depot. This office also let the contracts for the Navy or assigned portions of contracts to the Navy. The Navy Bureau of Supplies and Accounts then received grade certificates from the War Food Administration and gave its contractors separate shipping instructions. Moreover, the Navy paid all of its food bills directly to contractors. Perishable subsistence items were bought through Quartermaster market centers and buying offices scattered throughout the nation. The Navy maintained offices at fifteen of these market centers and paid

a proportionate share of the salaries of civilian employees. The Navy market offices received requirements from Navy yards and, depots for fresh foodstuffs and then turned these over to the Quartermaster officers to be incorporated in the Army's buying program. Delivery instructions to contractors were furnished by Quartermaster officers, but reports of delivery went to the Navy market officer, who prepared the voucher and arranged for payment. About 90 percent of all perishable food supplies for the Navy were thus procured, while 85 percent of Navy nonperishable foodstuffs were purchased through the Chicago Quartermaster Depot.19
Another joint procurement operation was established in 1942 for the purchase of lumber for both the Army and Navy. Because of difficulties in obtaining desired lumber supplies, the chairman of the ANMB in August 1942 arranged for the creation of the Central Procuring Agency on Lumber Procurement. The agency was staffed by both Army and Navy officers but operated under the direction of the Army Chief of Engineers. This device permitted one agency to present lumber requirements to the War Production Board and to deal with contractors. The Central Procuring Agency established various field offices, some of which were in charge of Army personnel and others in charge of Navy personnel. In all instances both services had men in each office. Each service paid directly for the lumber delivered to it, but contract letting, production expediting, and production inspection were handled on a joint basis under single direction.20 Close co-operation in the procurement of petroleum products was obtained through the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, another agency of the joint Chiefs of Staff. This board consolidated Army and Navy requirements for petroleum products, presented these requirements to the Petroleum Administration for War, and then designated producers to deliver petroleum products to the Army or Navy. Joint action was also taken in shipping such products overseas.21 Because of competing demands for diesel engines, a Diesel Engine Subcommittee of the Joint Army-Navy Munitions Assignments Committee was appointed to schedule and allot production deliveries to the armed services.22 From 1942 to 1943 a joint Army-Navy Electronics Production Agency expedited deliveries of tubes and other essential radar equipment.23 In the examples just cited, various co-operative methods were employed by the two departments to bring about close collaboration in the procurement of identical supplies. Each maintained certain phases of the procurement process under its own control, but contracts were let on a joint basis and duplication of facilities and personnel was avoided.
Finally, ASF headquarters worked closely with the Chief of Procurement and Material in the Navy Department in developing joint procurement policies. The outstanding achievement in this field was the issuance by the two departments of the joint Termination Regulation and the Joint Termination Accounting Manual, as already related. Another important achievement in joint Army-Navy action was realized on 22 December 1942 when the Chief of Procurement and Material of the Navy Department and the command-

ing general of the ASF established a joint Army-Navy Committee on Specifications. This committee set up various subcommittees to work out common specifications for such items as textiles, chemicals, electronics, engineer equipment, transportation equipment, communications equipment, medical supplies, photographic supplies, and packing and packaging materials. No effort was made to duplicate standard federal specifications. By the end of 1944 there were some 155 joint Army-Navy specifications in use by both agencies.24 The two departments exchanged considerable information about pricing methods and policies. Some contact was maintained through the WPB Procurement Policy Board, but direct communication between pricing officials of the two departments resulted in the adoption 'of many identical practices. On the other hand, the two departments used different contract provisions and forms and very different processes in administering contracts.25
A joint Army and Navy Patent Advisory Board advised the U.S. Patent Office on which patent applications should be kept secret for reasons of military security. This was the extent of co-operation in the patent field.26
To a considerable degree, through mutual co-operation and discussion, the two departments obtained substantially uniform insurance policies. Thus both departments followed the same practices in insuring government-owned property used by contractors, in using a comprehensive rating plan for workmen's compensation, in providing marine war risk insurance through the .War Shipping Administration, and in fixing the insurance provisions for repair time-and-material contracts.27
On 31 March 1943 the Under Secretary of War and the Under Secretary of the Navy adopted a joint statement of principles to govern the renegotiation of contracts. This was worked out in large part by the Renegotiation Division in ASF headquarters. The two departments then voluntarily created a joint Price Adjustment Board to fix renegotiation policies and procedures on a continuing basis. In February 1944, Congress, by law, directed the establishment of a War Contracts Price Adjustment Board representing all procurement agencies of the government. The Price Adjustment Board of the War Department included a member from the Navy, and the Price Adjustment Board of the Navy Department included a member from ASF headquarters sitting on behalf of the Under Secretary. This brought about a considerable degree of uniformity in renegotiation procedure.28
In the course of their studies, Colonel Draper and Captain Strauss found a number of opportunities for further procurement co-operation between the two departments. Interim Report 1 on 21 December 1944, recommended the creation of a joint Army-Navy Medical Mat6riel and Specifications Board to design and develop medical equipment, a joint Purchasing Agency for Medical and Surgical Equipment and Supplies, and a joint Inspection and Laboratory Service. These recommendations were approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of War. A second interim report on 28 December recommended that Army and Navy procurement officers be placed

in the same office for the procurement of standard stock items, textiles, clothing, and shoes. This also was approved. Interim Report 3 on 8 January 1945 recommended the creation of a centrally located joint Army and Navy Petroleum Purchase Agency. Interim Report 4 on 11 January recommended the immediate establishment of a joint Marine Procurement Board as a co-ordinating agency between the Navy's Bureau of Ships and the Army Transportation Corps. Interim Report 5 on 23 January recommended detailed studies of possible further co-ordination in the procurement of various types of ordnance materiel. Interim Report 6 resulted in the creation of a joint Army-Navy Packaging Board to resolve differences between the Army Packaging Board and the Navy Packaging Board and to insure uniform instructions on packing and packaging. Interim Report 7 on 1 February merely pointed out that further co-operation in procurement of electronics equipment seemed desirable, but it made no recommendations. Interim Report 8 on 5 February pointed to the need for further co-operation in the procurement of construction machinery and mechanical equipment and resulted in instructions from the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for further effort at realizing common basic specifications and for assignment of procurement to a single agency. Interim Report 10 on 9 February resulted in instructions from the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for further study of the advisability of unifying the procurement of chemical warfare supplies.29
In their final report of 8 February 1945 Colonel Draper and Captain Strauss both agreed that all studies demonstrated "the need for further co-ordination between the two departments in procurement." While in some fields of procurement excellent results had been obtained, in others very little had been accomplished. Moreover, there was serious danger that the benefits of existing co-operation might be lost without additional steps to put all of these arrangements "on a firm and permanent basis." The report stated that the mere creation of many joint committees and boards was not sufficient. Accordingly, it recommended the creation of a staff organization patterned after the joint Chiefs of Staff to insure uniform policies and procedures and to insist upon further co-operation between the two departments. This joint staff organization was to be known as the joint Materiel Chiefs and was to function under the direction of the Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The Joint Materiel Chiefs would consist of the Commanding General, ASF, and the Commanding General, AAF, or a representative designated by him, and two flag officers designated by the Secretary of the Navy. Under the Joint Materiel Chiefs would be a joint Director of Materiel who would establish general policies and procedures to be followed in some twelve phases of procurement such as purchasing and pricing, contract forms and procedures, financing of production, insurance, renegotiation, contract termination, and the disposal of property. The Joint Director of Materiel would also further co-ordination between the two departments in item identification, inspection, design and specifications, the use of facilities, production scheduling, production controls, and the allocation of materials. He would also supervise co-op-

erative arrangements between the actual procurement offices.30
The recommendation for the creation of the Joint Materiel Chiefs and a joint Director of Materiel was approved by the Under Secretary of War but was opposed by the Navy Department. At first, in their joint conferences on the report, Secretary Forrestal indicated his approval to Under Secretary Patterson .31 Then, after long discussion inside the Navy Department, Secretary Forrestal changed his mind and decided against action on any of the Draper-Strauss recommendations. As a result, none of the broad proposals set forth in the report was carried out.
In individual instances, further co-operative action was achieved before the end of the war. The Surgeon General of the Army and the Surgeon General of the Navy established a joint Medical Materiel and Specification Board with a joint Catalog Branch and a Joint Specifications Branch in New York City to bring about a greater degree of interchangeability of medical items. The Quartermaster General and the Navy Bureau of Supply and Accounts established a joint Purchasing Agency for textile procurement in New York City and a joint Petroleum Purchasing Agency in Washington. The creation of these three boards was the chief accomplishment of the Draper-Strauss report. Little progress was made in attempting to further co-operation between the Corps of Engineers and the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks; likewise, the Ordnance Department and the Navy Bureau of Ordnance opposed a joint Procurement Agency for Rockets or the establishment of a co-ordinating board for the two agencies. The Army and Navy Packaging Board made some progress in developing and publishing joint packaging specifications and instructions for use by all procurement agencies.32 With the conclusion of hostilities in August 1945 pressure for joint Army-Navy procurement action came to an end. The whole issue was dwarfed by the larger, more basic question of a single department of national defense.
Thus, under wartime conditions there was a good deal of co-operation between the two military departments on procurement matters. All of this effort was purely voluntary. There were also instances of non-co-operation, as when the Army cut back 40-mm. ammunition production at a plant in Erie, Pennsylvania, at the same time that the Navy was expanding 40mm. ammunition production at a plant in Elgin, Illinois, and when both bought Tenton bridge trestles from the same manufacturer in Covington, Kentucky, but set different specifications on the tolerance and spacing of drill holes. During World War II there never existed any systematic, institutional device for promoting and directing procurement co-operation by the two departments. The Draper-Strauss report recommended such machinery but, as already indicated, no action was taken before the end of the war.
Desirable Organization for Army-Navy Collaboration
While the Draper-Strauss report was under consideration General Somervell hoped it would be possible to create joint

Army-Navy machinery in the procurement field comparable to that which had been built up under the joint Chiefs of Staff. He felt that such an arrangement would be entirely feasible, even though in many respects he was inclined to believe that the JCS machinery was not entirely satisfactory.
The elaborate structure of committees and subcommittees functioning under the JCS were all intended to bring about necessary co-operation between the armed forces in overseas operations. As far as the Army Service Forces was concerned the most important of these committees was the Joint Logistics Committee, which reviewed strategic plans in the light of available supply and transportation resources. Through this and other committees the various agencies of the War and Navy Departments arrived at a common understanding of what was to be done. Each department then proceeded more or less on its own to carry out these agreements. It remained for the single commander in the field to weld the Army, Navy, and Air Forces components assigned to his command into a unified military operation.
Somervell was not always satisfied with these arrangements, as noted earlier. One of the steps he took, through General Lutes, his deputy, was to persuade Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific to create a joint Army-Navy staff, with an Army officer in charge of logistics. Somervell even went further on one occasion when he recommended that there be a unified Army-Navy supply and transportation system in the Pacific. 33 The Navy was not enthusiastic about the proposal, since the top operations command of the Navy believed that prospective naval activities in the Pacific would differ too much from those of the Army to permit a single supply and transportation service. For example, the Navy was already planning the "floating" supply system which in 1944 was to enable combat task forces to remain at sea much longer than previously thought possible.34 But even so, Somervell was convinced that much waste motion would be avoided by joint action in overseas supply and transportation, especially as the number of common problems increased with the establishment of more and more advance bases in the steady progress across the Pacific .35
Many common Army-Navy concerns in supply and in non-procurement operations began back in the United States. Somervell enumerated some of these when he testified before the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on 26 April 1944.36 An Ocean Shipping Section of the Army and Navy Munitions Board (it was so designated even though the ANMB had ceased to exist) was a body for bringing together Army and Navy officials concerned with port operations, especially in the San Francisco Bay area. In the early days of the war there was considerable competition between the Army and Navy for piers, warehouses, and other loading facilities. President Roosevelt spoke to Somervell about the situation on one occasion, and Somervell went to work at once to push for Army-Navy collaboration on the

west coast.37 A Storage Control Board was set up in 1944 to prevent competition for storage space along the west coast, and some joint use of storage facilities followed. A joint Military Transportation Committee, on which General Gross represented the Army, studied ocean shipping plans and adjusted various military cargoes to available shipping space. An Army-Navy Allocations Committee worked with the War Shipping Administration in the actual process of allocating cargo vessels to both services. In San Francisco a Pacific Coast Ship Repair and Conversion Committee and a joint Routing and Scheduling Committee were set up, representing the Army, Navy and WSA. Co-operation was complicated by the existence of varying procedures. The Army exercised a close central control over surface transport while the Navy left most of the control to the commandants of Naval districts or to the chiefs of sea frontiers.
In addition to noting these supply and transportation methods General Somerrvell called the attention of the House committee to two other arrangements. A Joint Communications Board under the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a means for common action on some communications problems, although no standardization of engineering and operating practices in this field was ever realized. A Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation provided a clearinghouse for exchanging information and materials on educational and other services to armed forces personnel.
But in Somervell's eyes all of these arrangements in procurement, in supply, and in other fields, did not seem to go far enough. Too much depended upon voluntary co-operation, leaving many important fields uncovered. Thus, there were separate storage operations in the interior of the United States, separate maintenance facilities for the repair of automotive and other equipment, separate rail transportation arrangements, separate hospital systems, separate construction activities, separate military police practices, separate fiscal systems, and separate personnel systems.
Like other military officers Somervell was convinced that the JCS machinery had accomplished much, and he hoped that joint procurement machinery would extend co-operative arrangements further in this field. But in the long run, he believed the existing staff structure would prove inadequate. On this point Somervell joined with others in advocating a single department of national defense with a single chief of staff and general staff. He believed that on procurement, supply, and other matters, such a unified staff could and would do much to establish joint procedures and unified operations between the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
Somervell parted company with other ranking officers of the War Department in his belief that in the future there should be four component branches of the nation's armed forces: an Army (the ground forces), a Navy, an Air Force, and a Service Force (to perform procurement, supply, and many other services for all combat forces).38 His thinking was based upon

two primary considerations. In the first place, he believed in 1944 and thereafter as he had believed in 1941, that procurement and supply were too inextricably combined to warrant two separate supervisory organizations. He was willing in 1945 to contemplate a joint Chiefs of Staff and a joint Materiel Chiefs only because on the Army side he expected to combine procurement and supply in his own person and at the same time be subordinate on all operational matters to the Army Chief of Staff. As a long-term proposition, however, he thought this a faulty concept of organization. Second, he believed that only a single command under one person would be able to achieve maximum economy in the purchase and supply of common items of equipment and in the performance of various services for the three combat forces. In other words, Somervell was so convinced of the usefulness of the Army Service Forces as a War Department organizational arrangement that he wished to see it applied to all the armed forces in terms of a single service force to procure military supplies and participate in all matters pertaining to national economic mobilization.
Postwar events are not a proper part of this present volume. It may be interesting to glance beyond 1945, however, to note that when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed, it did not provide for a fourth military command, a service force. It did create a Munitions Board under the Secretary of Defense to exercise some supervision over procurement and supply operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. While this board had new fields to conquer, it also operated in fields that had already been explored by voluntary Army-Navy collaboration and by the Draper-Strauss report.

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