Chapter IV

[1] Bauer, Planning for German Ardennes Offensive 1944 ... and l440, app. 8.

[2] MS #B-038, 116th Panzer Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg.

[3] Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 510-12.

[4] The detailed deception scenario is given by Maj. Percy Schramm, then historian at OKW headquarters, in MS #A-862.

[5] OB WEST KTB, 13 Dec 44.

[6] Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954). p. 316.

[7] See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 597-98.

[8] Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Jan 45, in SHAEF message file, Plans and Operations, folder 27.

[9] Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 361-72. This is the best treatment of the problem of personal responsibilities for the various Allied intelligence estimates.

[10] The intelligence sources bearing on the Allied failure to appreciate the coming German counteroffensive have been gathered by Royce L. Thompson in a study entitled American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2 vols. (1949). MS in OCMH files.

[11] Royce L. Thompson has compiled a complete collection of excerpts from pertinent Air Force records bearing on the operations of the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Ardennes battle: Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign, 2 vols. (1950). MS in OCMH files.

[12] Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 675.

[13] Ibid., p. 681.

[14] The best study on German rail movements and explanation of pertinent German sources will be found in Charles V. P. von Luttichau's manuscript, German Rail Communications in the Ardennes Offensive, 194445 (1952). OCMH. See also the OB WEST KTB and Anlage for the supply build-up prior to the attack.

[15] Detailed troop movements have been worked out in Luttichau, Rail Communications, ch. VII, passim.

[16] The several postponements of the German D-day are described in ETHINT-20, Hitler's Conduct of the War (Rittmeister Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt).

[17] The timing at the end of the German concentration is given unit by unit in Luttichau's German Rail Communications and in his study entitled The Ardennes Offensive, Progressive Build-up and Operations, 9 December 1944. MS in OCMH files.

[18] For the Hitler speeches of 11 and 12 December 1944 see Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, p. 157.

[19] On the German artillery preparations see MSS#B-311, Army Group B Artillery, Ardennes (General der Artillerie Karl Thoholte); B-347, Sixth SS Panzer Army Artillery (Generalleutnant Waffen-SS Walter Staudinger); B 759, Sixth Panzer Army, 15 December 1944-21 January 1945 (Staudinger)

[20] The very difficult task of evaluating and reconciling the various tank strengths given in individual (and fragmentary) German documents has been ably done in Charles V. P. von Luttichau's manuscript, Armor in the Ardennes Offensive (1952). OCMH. Cf., MS#P-059 (Mueller-Hillebrand) and the OB WEST KTB for 16 December 1944.

[21] See Luttichau's Armor in the Ardennes Offensive, Table II.

[22] These figures have been gleaned from various secondary sources and are estimates only. Joint Intelligence Survey, Some Weaknesses in German Strategy and Organization (1946).

[23] MS#P-031b.

[24] The general problem of artillery and ammunition is discussed by General Thoholte, the artillery representative of Army Group B, in MS #B-311 (Thoholte).

[25] A contemporary memorandum on the supply and POL status written by a Colonel Poleck is found in Schramm's Merkbuch under the date of 3 January 1945

[26] The German Intelligence Estimate for 15 December 1944 is given in OB WEST KTB.

[27] MS#P-038, German Radio Intelligence (1950).

[28] This situation map may be found in Thompson's American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive.

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