Chapter XIX

[1] Middleton recalls that he directed McAuliffe to reinforce the 10th Armored roadblock on the Longvilly road. (Ltr, Middleton to Col. Marshall, 1 Jul 45.) The S-3 journal of CCB, 10th Armored Division, notes at 0740 on 19 December that Ewell's mission is to relieve "the surrounded groups" and assist CCB. The 101st AAR simply states that Ewell was ordered to attack to the east and "secure Bastogne." The story as given in the text is based on Ewell's recollections (in a conversation with the author on 22 July 1961) and squares with information given the author by Middleton and McAuliffe.

[2] On the earlier actions by the armored units see Chapter XXI and also the documents cited there. The CCB, 10th Armored, AAR and S-3 journal are among the most valuable of the documents describing the Bastogne operation. The personal recollections of the CCB commander have been incorporated in Nichol's Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division.

[3] Generals Kokott and Bayerlein were responsible for the initial investiture of Bastogne, and their accounts, basic for "the other side of the hill," can be found in eight manuscripts: ETHINT-44, B-040, and P-32d by Kokott; and A-941 through A-945 by Bayerlein.

[4] S. L. A. Marshall, who interviewed Bayerlein says that the Panzer Lehr commander momentarily lost his nerve on the 19th and failed to prod his troops forward personally. (Marshall, Bastogne pp. 184-86.) Bayerlein admits to his great surprise when he encountered strong armored opposition east of Bastogne. MS # A-941 (Bayerlein).

[5] For bravery in this action Pfc. Gilbert Van Every was awarded the DSC.

[6] It is indicative of the confusion and lack of precise information then current that the 2d Battalion journal reports, as if in surprise, that no casualties were sustained during this move.

[7] Ezell's excursion is treated with the 4th Armored story in Chapter XXI. The news of Ezell's subsequent departure from Bastogne is reflected only in scant journal notations.

[8] The records of the badly fragmented armor absorbed in the lines of the 101st Airborne are so scanty as to give no really precise strength figures.

[9] In the vernacular of the time, SNAFU stood for: Situation Normal, All Fouled Up. Thus Team SNAFU was named in a typical soldier cock of the snoot at adverse fate and the sensibilities of higher command.

[10] General McAuliffe subsequently was given the DSC for the defense of the town.

[11] Both the German and American records for the Ardennes contain, from time to time, reports of "attacks" which in fact were never noticed by the alleged targets and which probably were no more than dutiful commotion in response to the promptings of higher authority.

[12] Team Yantis (1st Lt. Ray J. Yantis was sent back on the night of 22 December to find a way through the enemy and bring back badly needed artillery ammunition from Neufchâteau, The team was ambushed and shot up near Pinsamont and had to abandon its vehicles. Special AAR, Company C, 55th Armored Engineer Battalion.

[13] See above, Chapter XIV, pages 328-29, for the rest of the story of the 58th Armored Field Artillery.

[14] In a television interview early in 1960 General von Luettwitz admitted that he was responsible for the ultimatum to the Bastogne garrison. This confirms a like statement made to Colonel Marshall in 1945 but later denied by Luettwitz.

[15] A complete listing of the Bastogne airdrop missions, carrier losses, weather conditions, and similar information can be found in Thompson's MS, Air Supply to Isolated Units, pp. 64-135.

[16] The official records credit Pfc. N. A, Osterberg, a bazooka man of headquarters company, with driving back the German tanks that assaulted the 2d Battalion positions. Private Osterberg was wounded during the three-hour fight. He was awarded the DSC.

[17] He received a posthumous award of the DSC.

[18] All of the higher German field commanders appear to have been in a quandary at this stage as to Hitler's intention toward Bastogne. See Manteuffel's queries to his superiors as described in MS #B-151a, and ETHINT-46, Fifth Panzer Army, Mission of November 1944-January 1945. In a conference which the author held with Manteuffel and his chief of staff, Generalmajor Carl Gustav Wagener, in Karlsruhe on 10 June 1960 Wagener said that Hitler expressed no particular interest in Bastogne during the offensive phase, nor did he insist that his original orders to capture Bastogne be followed.

[19] The history of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division is related by the commander of the detachments at Bastogne in MS # P-032c, Ardennes Project: Report on the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, 16 December 19442 February 1945 (Maucke).

[20] Colonel Chappuis later was awarded the DSC.

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