1 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 15.
2 Quintard, 301st FA (PA), p. 5; Quintard, CO 301st FA (PA), Diary p. 5; Shreve, Diary, pp. 21-22.
3 Description of the Japanese plan is based on 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 42, 1800, 8 Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, App. 3, pp. 44-48.
4 The attached artillery consisted of the 1st and 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiments and the 9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion, Colonel Irie was commander of the first-named unit.
5 The Mt. Natib trail extended from Mabatang westward to the slopes of Mt. Natib. The 57th Infantry and part of the 41st Division had placed their main line of resistance along this trail. Farther west the trail ran below the main line of resistance. The Balantay River appears in many sources and on some maps as the Lavantan or Labangan River. A tributary of the Calaguiman River, it is formed by two streams joining about a mile west of Abucay Hacienda; it then flows northeast until it joins the Calaguiman. The Balantay is shallow and easily fordable; its virtue as a military obstacle was due to the fact that it flows through a deep gorge.
6 Probably more has been written on the fight at Abucay than on any other episode in the Philippine campaign. The sources for the action of each unit will be cited in the appropriate place but the fight as a whole can be reconstructed from 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 15-30; 14th Army Opns, I, 88-92; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 29- 35; Lt Col Edmund J. Lilly, Jr., Rpt of Opns, 57th Inf (PS), 8 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, pp. 3-4, copy in OCMH; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, pp. 2-4.
7 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 16.
8 Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 49. Only Wainwright mentions the order directing him to assemble the general officers. It is assumed that Parker received similar orders.
9 Ibid., p. 50; Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan, pp. 52-53; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 45. Colonel Mallonée recalls MacArthur's answer to Wainwright as, "Don't need to see 'em. I hear 'em." Mallonée, Bataan Diary, II, 31.
10 MacArthur quoted the Japanese message in a radio to the War Department, 27 Jan 42, WPD, Ready Reference File. On the reverse side of his message to MacArthur, General Homma later wrote a separate warning for the Philippine troops. In it he advised the Filipinos to save their "dear lives" by throwing away their weapons and surrendering before it was too late. "MacArthur had stupidly refused our proposal," declared Homma, "and continues futile struggle at the cost of your precious lives."
11 The account of the action on the right of the II Corps line is based upon: Olson, Opns of the 57th Inf (PS) at Abucay, pp. 10-17; Brown, Opns of 57th Inf (PS) at Abucay, pp. 9-12; Capt William C. Anderson, Hist of 57th Inf (PS), pp. 2-5, Chunn Notebooks; Capt Harry J. Stempin, Opns of Co G, 57th Inf (PS), 7 Dec 41-30 Jan 42, pp. 9-12, and Maj William E. Webb, Opns of 41st Inf (PA) in Defense of Abucay Line, 10-18 Jan 42, pp. 15- 21 (both are papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course in 1946-47 and 1949-50, respectively, The Infantry School) ; Lt Col Harold K. Johnson, "Defense Along the Abucay Line," Military Review (February 1949), pp. 50-51; Col Malcolm V. Fortier, Notes on 41st Div (PA), pp. 1-2; memo, Lt Col Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., Asst G-4 USAFFE, for G-4 USAFFE, 14 Jan 42, sub: Rpt of Inspection Trip, 13 Jan 42, AG 319.1 (8 Jan 42) Phil Rcds; unsigned account of the 41st Div (PA), pp. 2-4.
12 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 6, 26.
13 Ibid., p. 21.
14 65th Brig Opns Orders, Series A, Nos. 49 and 53, 11 and 12 Jan 42, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, Apps. 6 and 7.
15 Ltr, Col Loren A. Wetherby to author, 23 Oct 50, OCMH.
16 The date of the attachment of the 21st Division units to the 57th is variously given in the sources used. The weight of evidence as well as the sequence of events and Japanese sources point to the evening of the 12th as the most likely date. On this point as well as the action which follows, in addition to the sources already cited in note 11, see: O'Day, 21st Div (PA) I, Part 2, 1-2, II, 23-25; ltr [CO 21st Inf] to TAG (PA), Opns 21st Inf (PA), p. 4; Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 14-20; Capts Roy Oster and Grover C. Richards, 21st Inf (PA), p. 2, Capt John C. Ellis, 23d Inf (PA), p. 8, and Lt Col Eugene T. Lewis, 43d Inf (PA), p. 30, all in Chunn Notebooks.
17 Brig Gen Arnold J. Funk, Comments on Draft MS, 12 Jan 52, p. 2, OCMH. For Clarke's views on this action, see his interview with a G-2 WDGS officer on his return to the United States, 14-15 August 1942. Mil Intel Library.
18 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 23; see also Apps. 8 and 9, pp. 53, 55.
21 The account of the action on the left of the II Corps line is reconstructed from: Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, pp. 1-4; Col Virgil N. Cordero, My Experiences During the War with Japan (Nuremburg, privately printed, n.d.), pp. 20-23; MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, pp. 16, 17; 52d Inf (PA), p. 36; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, pp. 8-9; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, pp. 11-12; Maj William R. Nealson, Opns of a Prov Bn, 41st Div (PA) at Abucay, 15-25 Jan 42 (paper prepared for Advanced Officers Course, 1947-48, The Infantry School), pp. 9-11; Cummings, 53d Inf (PA), p. 4, Chunn Notebooks; Funk, Comments on Draft MS, p. 3, OCMH.
22 MacDonald, Supplement to Jones Diary, p. 16.
23 Sutherland made this statement in an interview with the author on 14 November 1946, five years after the events. Contemporary sources support Sutherland's foresight in predicting Japanese intentions.
24 Ltr Order, USAFFE, 11 Jan 42, sub: Plans for Counterattack, AG 381 (10 Nov 41) Phil Rcds. General Parker did not recall later any discussion with Sutherland on this subject, but added that he, too, was greatly concerned at the time and never able to work out a satisfactory solution to the problem. "There were just not enough units . . . to cover the front effectively," he later wrote. Those in the line were already overextended and lacked sufficient deployment in depth. He felt then and still did after the war that it would have been unwise to weaken his line at any point to shift troops to the west, to the center of the peninsula. Ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH.
25 Memo, Marshall for CofS USAFFE, 13 Jan 42, AG 370.2 (19 Dec 42) Phil Rcds.
26 Ibid. In this memorandum Marshall stated that he was sending Colonel Funk, who had not yet assumed command of the 57th Infantry, to see Wainwright again to find out what was being done to protect the right flank of I Corps. When Funk took command of the 57th, the visit was canceled.
27 The battalion was to arrive at Abucay Hacienda at about 0400 of the 16th. There is a difference of opinion in the source as to the identity of the unit given Jones. Some claim it was the 21st Engineers; others, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. This confusion may arise from the fact that the 21st Engineers got into the fight in this sector later, and that the battalion of the 21st was late in reaching the 51st Division.
28 Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, p. 3.
29 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 24.
30 There is a good deal of confusion and controversy in contemporary records and in diaries and interviews over the movements and action of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. Since it did not take an important part in the counterattack of the 16th, the activities of this battalion have not been covered in detail here. Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 17-19; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 25; Oster and Richards, 21st Inf (PA), p. 3, Chunn Notebooks; ltr, Jones to Ward, 3 Jan 52, OCMH; ltr, MacDonald to Jones, 21 Dec 51, OCMH.
31 One officer in Boatwright's party states that all he ate for three days was a can of pineapple, which he shared with several other officers. 1st Lt Eugene Forquer, 53d Inf (PA), p. 42, Chunn Notebooks; ltr, Boatwright to George Groce, research asst, 22 Mar 49, OCMH; ltrs, Boatwright and Mac- Donald to Jones, 12 and 6 Nov 50, lent to author by General Jones.
32 Ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH. For the movements of the 31st and 45th Infantry, see: Phil Div Rpt of Opns, p. 12; Conrad, 2d Bn, 31st Inf, Opns of 31st Inf (US), pp. 12-13; Maj John I. Pray, former CO Co G, Action of Co G, 31st Inf (US) Abucay Hacienda, 15-25 Jan 42, pp. 6-7, Maj Louis B. Besbeck, Opns of 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, 15-25 Jan 42, pp. 10-12, and Maj Henry J. Pierce, Opns of Co L, 45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, p. 7. All three papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course, the first two in 1946-47 and the last in 1949-50, at The Infantry School.
33 As in the section preceding, the Japanese side of the story has been reconstructed from 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 25-28 and 14th Army Opns, I, 92-97. The plan outlined above is derived from the 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 42, 1800, 8 Jan 42, App. 3, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 44.
34 Collier, Notebooks, II, 48-49; ltr, Boudreau to author, 12 Dec 47, OCMH; Harbor Defenses Rpt of Opns, p. 23. Neither Boudreau nor General Moore mentions the loss of armament or ammunition but Colonel Collier states there was such a loss and the Japanese claim that they captured a number of guns and a large supply of ammunition when they seized the island. 14th Army Opns, I, 88-92. General Bluemel states that four 155-mm. guns were moved to Olongapo and from there moved by tractor into Bataan. Bluemel, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 14 and 16, OCMH.
35 In addition to the sources cited below, this account of the fight in I Corps is based upon: USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 48; NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-21; Berry, Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), 19 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, pp. 2-5; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Parts 2 and 3, Armored Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), p. 15, (July-August 1947), pp. 15-16; Col John H. Rodman, Engagement of 91st Div (PA) on Moron-Bagac Road, p. 1, copy borrowed from Rodman, OCMH; ltr, Col Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH; ltr, Lt Col Houston P. Houser, Jr., to author, 18 Mar 49, OCMH; ltr, Rodman to author, 30 Mar 49, OCMH; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 18; ltr, Berry to Ward, 11 Jan 52, OCMH.
36 First name unknown.
37 14th Army Opns, I, 92, 96.
38 14th Army Opns Order, Series A, No. 167, 2200, 15 Jan 42, App. 21, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 75. For a description of the regimental and rapid-fire guns, see Handbook of Japanese Military Forces, TM-E 30-480, 1 Oct 44, pp. 217-18, 220.
39 Berry, Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 3.
40 Locations along the roads and trails on Bataan are frequently given in terms of the distance from Manila in kilometers. In the absence of towns and villages on Bataan, this description sometimes is the only way to fix a point precisely on a map. These locations corresponded to road and trail markers which read simply "KP" and the number of kilometers from Manila.
41 There is some disagreement as to the date the road was cut. Some officers gave the date as 20 January; Wainwright and other officers say the block was established on the 21st. The Japanese give the 21st as the date, and that date has been accepted in this account. The time is fixed by the evaluation of Japanese and American sources. See especially Rodman, Engagement of 91st Div (PA) on Moron-Bagac Road; ltr, Rodman to author, 30 Mar 49, OCMH; ltr, Skerry to author, 15 Jul 52, with inch, OCMH.
42 Berry, Hist of 3d Inf, 1st Reg Div (PA), p. 4.
43 Ltr, Berry to Ward, 11 Jan 52, OCMH; ltr, Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH. Wainwright confirms Berry's responsibility and the fact that he was acting without orders. Ltr, Wainwright to TAG, 27 Jun 47, sub: Recommendation for DSC for Col Berry, copy in OCMH. Colonel Collier tells an entirely different story about the withdrawal of the 1st Division but this account has not been accepted in the absence of corroborating testimony. Collier, Notebooks, III, 36.
44 Ltr, Fowler to author, 11 Mar 49, OCMH.
45 USAFFE G-4 Journal, Bataan Echelon, 25-26 Jan 42, Extract from G-2 Rpt of 1200, 25 Jan 42 [erroneously written as 24 Jan], AG 461 (25 Dec 41) Phil Rcds.
46 There is some confusion as to the exact number of pieces lost as a result of the withdrawal and the figures given are the best that could be worked out from the conflicting sources.
47 General Berry stated in an interview that there was not a single American officer with the 31st Field Artillery and that it withdrew without orders from Mt. Silanganan. No light is cast on this subject by General Bluemel's report since the 31st Division at this time was in II Corps. Interv, author with Berry, Jan 48; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, passim.
48 Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 119, 25 Jan 42, AG 381 11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East.
49 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns. p. 32.
50 The account which follows is based on the following sources: On the Japanese side, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 25-31; 14th Army Opns, I, 94-98. On the American side, SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 32-37; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, pp. 12-13; Lt Col Jasper E. Brady, Jr., Diary, pp. 2-3, in Brady Papers, OCMH; Pray, Co G, 31st Inf (US) Abucay Hacienda, pp. 9-17; Besbeck, Opns 3d Bn, 45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, pp. 12-27; H. J. Pierce, Opns of Co L, 45th Inf (PS) at Abucay Hacienda, pp. 7-14; Conrad, Opns of 31st Inf (US) 8 Dec 41-9 Apr 42, pp. 14-15; Fortier, Notes on 41st Div (PA), p. 2; Bluemel, 31st Div (PA) Rpt of Opns, p. 10; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 27-29; Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, 29 Dec 41-26 Jan 42, pp. 4-5; Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 20-21; Mead, Opns and Mvmts of 31st Inf (US), p. 21 ; Maj Clarence R. Bess, Opns of Service Co, 31st Inf (US), 5 Jan 42-9 Apr 42, pp. 22-23, and Maj Kary C. Emerson, Opns of II Phil Corps on Bataan, 10 Jan-8 Apr 42, pp. 18-19 (both papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course in 1947-48 and 1949-50, respectively, The Infantry School) ; interv, Stanley Falk, research asst, with Col Wright, formerly S-3 45th Inf (PS), 5 Oct 50; ltr, Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH.
51 Ltr, Weaver to Wainwright, 20 Nov 45. Weaver, in his comments on this manuscript, states that his remark was made with reference to the use of tanks in the earlier action in the 57th Infantry area and that no request for tanks was made by General Parker at this time. Comment 41, OCMH.
52 65th Brig Opns Order, Series A, No. 82, 1800, 19 Jan 42, App. 11, 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 58-60. The order gives the date 21 January for the attack, but this is evidently a misprint since there is no indication of a delay.
53 Conrad, 31st Inf (US), p. 15. Conrad commanded Company F.
54 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 29.
55 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 34.
56 The maps used were drawn to the scale 1:200,000. Takechi was not sure where he was and may not even have known he was following the Abo-Abo River. General Nara was not even aware that Takechi had entered the Abo-Abo valley. 65th Brig Opns, Mt. Natib, pp. 26-31; 14th Army Opns, I, 98.
57 Jones, 51st Div (PA) Order of Events, p. 4.
58 The reasons for the withdrawal of the 21st Division (PA) elements on the afternoon of the 19th is not clear. One explanation given is that its task was to reorganize stragglers of the 51st Division (PA). O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 28. This does not seem a compelling enough reason for a withdrawal. Col Robert J. Hoffman, and Bluemel, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 9 and 18, OCMH.
59 USAFFE-USFIP Kr. t of Opns, p. 48.
60 SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 37. See also General Parker's letter to author, 14 Feb 48, in OCMH, in which he states that Sutherland did not announce the decision to him at this time.
61 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 108, 23 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East. The losses which MacArthur mentions in this message refer to the entire campaign since 8 December and not to the action on Bataan alone. Since there are no casualty tables for this campaign, it is not possible to state what the losses for the action along the Abucay-Mauban line were. It is extremely doubtful that they were serious enough to force a withdrawal, as implied in the message cited. The reasons for the withdrawal were tactical.
62 Ibid. The author has been unable to find in the records any response to this message.
63 USAFFE FO 9, 22 Jan 42, AG 300 (28 Dec 41) Phil Rcds.
64 This supposition is supported by Colonel Collier, who, in his notebooks and in an interview with the author, declared that the orders had been prepared in advance. Collier, Notebooks, III, 37; interv, author with Collier, 20 Nov 46.
65 The quotation is from a poem entitled "Abucay Withdrawal" in Henry G. Lee, Nothing But Praise (Culver City, Calif., 1948). Lieutenant Lee was in Headquarters Company, Philippine Division, and wrote the poems included in this small volume during the campaign and in prison camp. He was killed when the prison ship on which he was being transferred to Formosa was hit by an American bomb. The poems had been buried in the Philippines and were recovered after the war. BRIG. GEN. MAXON S. LOUGH, left, with Col. Harrison C. Browne (CofS Phil Div) and Capt. Joseph B. Sallee (ADC), near the front lines.
66 USAFFE FO 9, 22 Jan 42; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 30; Phil Div Rpt of Opns, p. 14.
67 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, p. 156. For the withdrawal of each unit the author used the sources relating to the various units already cited. See also ltr, Doyle to Ward, 8 Jan 52, OCMH, in which Colonel Doyle states that at about 0230 of the 25th he "took over this mess of men and trucks" and "cleared the congested area."
68 In prison camp Maj. Kary C. Emerson of the Philippine Division and II Corps staff talked with many small unit commanders and they all agreed that "coordination was poor, that all roads were clogged with troops and vehicles, and that had the Japanese artillery fired on the roads . . . our losses would have been very severe ... in fact, mass slaughter." Emerson, Opns of II Phil Corps, p. 19.
69 Mead, Opns of 31st Inf (US), p. 21.
70 Lee, "Abucay Withdrawal," Nothing But Praise, p. 25.
72 Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 161-70; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 21-22; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 50. General Nara claimed to have "routed the American tanks." 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Samat, 26 Jan-29 Feb 42, ATIS Enemy Pub 289, 19 Jan 45, p. 7.
73 Ltr, Wainwright to TAG, 27 Jun 47, sub: Recommendation for DSC for Col Berry, copy in OCMH; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 48-49.
74 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 33, 38. Each infantry regiment entered combat with 1,919 men. The 122d Infantry, which fought on the west coast, suffered 108 casualties; the 141st, 700; and the 142d, 613. American and Filipino casualties for this same period are unknown.
75 Lee, "Abucay Withdrawal," Nothing But Praise, p. 26.
76 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 108, 23 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East.
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