LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES, VOLUME II: SEPTEMBER 1944-MAY 1945. By Roland G. Ruppenthal.(1959, 1983; 540pages, 14tables, 11 maps, 65 illustrations, bibliographical note, glossaries, index, CMH Pub 7-3.)
This volume moves from mid-September 1944 to the end of hostilities in May 1945 along the same general lines as Volume I described above. As in that volume the focus is on the influence of adequate or inadequate logistical support on the planning and conduct of tactical operations by the field armies, in short, the relation of logistics to combat. Considerable space is given to theater organization and command because of the influence that these exerted on effective administration and support.
The main divisions of the volume correspond to the two broad phases of tactical operations in the period covered: the period of relatively static warfare from mid-September 1944 to early February 1945 (Chs. I-XII) and the period of offensives leading to the surrender of Germany in May 1945 (Chs. XIII-XVIII). The main topics examined within each period are organization and command (Chs. II, XII, XIII, XIX); port discharge (Chs. III, IV, XIV); transportation (Chs. V, VI, XIV, XV); supply (Chs. VII, IX, XVI); and manpower (Chs. XI, XVII).
The reader will find (in Ch. I) an assessment of the logistical basis of General Eisenhower's decision in September 1944 against concentration of his resources on a single thrust to the Rhine. In Chapter XII the author surveys, in the light of the Somervell-Lutes "tour of inspection" in December 1944-January 1945, the structure of theater administration and supply as tested by the logistical problems encountered between D-day and the Ardennes offensive of mid-December. The book concludes with general observations on the logistical experience of the European theater (Ch. XIX).
Logistical Support of the Armies serves not only as an integral part of the ETO subseries of the United States Army in World War II, but also as a complement and capstone to the portions of The Technical Services subseries that deal with the wartime activities of each of these services in ETO.
1. Theater command and organization, with particular reference to the relation-ship of tactical and administrative commands (Chs. II, XII, XIII, XIX).
2. The influence of logistical support on the tempo of tactical operations (Chs. I, XIX).
3. Manpower problems, particularly with respect to economy in the use of personnel and in adjustment to unexpected requirements (Chs. XI, XVII).
4. Theater relations with the zone of interior on such matters as organizational policy, supply requirements, and manpower management (Chs. IV, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, XVII).
5. The use of indigenous resources, both human and material, in the theater of operations (Ch. XVIII).
6. The response to emergencies in military operations, notably with respect to the logistic problems imposed by a reverse (Ch. VI).
7. The accommodation to unusual demands, notably with respect to transportation, as in the case of the final offensive (Ch. XV).
8. The control and allocation of supplies in critically short supply (Chs. IX, XVI).
9. The effect of changes in the scheduled buildup of forces on the prospect of logistic support (Ch. X).
10. The influence of personalities on the working of a theater command and organizational structure (Chs. XII, XIX).
Return to the Table of Contents