THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: MOVEMENTS, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY. By Chester Wardlow. (1956, 1978, 1990; 564 pages, 40 tables, 12charts, 59 illustrations, bibliographical note, glossaries, index, CMH Pub 10-20.)
This volume deals extensively with movement, the heart of the Transportation Corps mission. The narrative focuses on the massive movements of men and materiel within the zone of interior and between the United States and overseas theaters of operations.
In meeting its responsibilities in the zone of interior the corps was drawn into active relationships with the common carriers of the United States by rail, highway and waterway and with the civilian Director of Defense Transportation, in the effort to ensure proper handling of essential civilian traffic as well as extraordinary military demands, since nonmilitary traffic was also greatly increased by the war. The author also deals with the problems of the Chief of Transportation in providing shipping capacity, the most needed and scarcest logistical requirement of the war, to move troops and supplies to the overseas theaters of operations. This responsibility required collaboration with the U.S. Maritime Commission, the War Shipping Administration, and the British Ministry of War Transportation, under direction of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. In examining these relationships the author particularizes the role of the Chief of Transportation and his corps in the broader picture presented in the volumes on Global Logistics and Strategy.
The work takes up the conflicts of jurisdiction, common to all the technical services, which the Chief of Transportation had with Headquarters, Army Service Forces, over the issue of centralization of function and control. Also treated are disputes with the Army Air Forces, since the exemption of air transport from the control of the Transportation Corps made it more difficult for it to ensure prompt and uninterrupted deliveries and to enforce traffic priorities.
In the training and timely deployment of specialist officers and troops the Chief of Transportation had special difficulties since neither his office nor the corps had been established until three months after Pearl Harbor. The effect of this late start on training and procurement was never fully overcome.
1 . Limitations on the supply of transportation equipment and its mobilization for wartime use (Chs. I, III, IV).
2. Collaboration of the Army and the railways in wartime (Chs. I, III, IV, VIII).
3. Operation of ports of embarkation and debarkation (Chs. II, III, V).
4. Control of the flow of military freight traffic in the United States (Chs. IV, V, VIII).
5. Conflict of military and civilian interests (Chs. II, III, IV, VIII).
6. Inter-Allied shipping control (Ch. II).
7. International aid; lend-lease (Ch. III).
8. Security problems in wartime (Chs. I, II, V).
9. Operation of special troop trains (Ch. I).
10. Transportation problems involved in furlough travel (Ch. I).
11. Staging areas and troop staging at ports of embarkation (Chs. II, III, VIII).
12. Troopships and troopship administration (Ch. II).
13. Transportation of ammunition and explosives (Ch. V).
14. Transportation officers, specialists, and troop units; requirements and training (Ch. VI).
15. Transportation equipment for theaters of operations: requirements
and procurement (Ch. VII).
16. Movement of military patients (Chs. I, III).
17. Handling of prisoners of war (Ch. I).
18. Movement of soldiers' dependents (Ch. III).
19. Repatriation of war dead (Ch. III).
20. Maintenance and spare parts (Ch. VII).
21. Research and development (Chs. VII, VIII).
22. Mounting of amphibious assault forces (Chs. II, V).
Return to the Table of Contents