SPECIAL STUDIES
FROM ROOT TO McNAMARA
ARMY ORGANIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION
by
James E. Hewes, Jr.
CMH Logo
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1975

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-183069
Reprinted 1983

CMH Pub 40-1

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402


SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES
Maurice Matloff, General Editor
Advisory Committee 
(As of September 1973)

 

Joseph T. Glatthaar 
University of Houston 

Michael J. Kurtz
National Archives and Records Administration
Raymond A. Callahan 
University of Delaware
Brig. Gen. Fletcher M. Lamkin, Jr.
U.S. Military Academy
Maj. Gen. James J. Cravens, Jr. 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Carol A. Reardon
Pennsylvania State University
Carlo W. D'Este 
New Seabury, Mass.
Col. Everett L. Roper, Jr.
U.S. Army War College
George C. Herring, Jr.
University of Kentucky
Mark A. Stoler
University of Vermont
Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Inge 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Vollrath
Archivist of the Army

Gerhard L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina

U.S. Army Center of Military History 
Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History

Chief Historian Maurice Matloff
Chief, Histories Division Col. John E. Jessup, Jr. 
Editor in Chief Joseph R. Friedman
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Foreword

This volume is the first in a new series, SPECIAL STUDIES, which will deal with special topics of interest to the Army. The series is designed to treat selected Army activities on and off the battlefield and to provide accurate and timely accounts of neglected aspects as well as more familiar fields of military history. It will serve as a vehicle for publication of worthy monographs prepared within the Army Historical Program and of such outside scholarly works as may be deemed appropriate for publication and circulation to interested staffs, schools, and other agencies of the Army for ready reference and use. While military history abounds in the dramatic fare of battles and campaigns, definitive analysis of the evolution of the organization and administration of the departmental headquarters in the capitals has been a relatively neglected field. Yet upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative apparatus needed to build, train, equip, and supply armed forces depends much of the success in the test of battle. The present study grew out of a monograph originally designed to provide a simple guide to the principal changes in Army departmental organization since 1942. Expanded later to cover the period beginning with 1900, the era of reform introduced by Secretary of War Elihu Root, and to provide a larger measure of analysis, this study traces changes relating to Army management in the central headquarters down to the early 1960s when new and dramatic reforms in Army organization were carried out during the regime of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The account focuses on a single but important theme-the management of the Army administrative and logistical structure in the era of America's rise to global power. It fills a gap in the literature and is presented as a contribution to the field of organizational and administrative history.

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While the author's focus is on the Army headquarters staff, he indicates parallel trends in organization in industry and government and relates his theme to historic conflicts over centralization of control. The volume presents a useful survey in a field of continuing importance that should be of interest to administrators and managers both in and out of the Army as well as to students of military history and public administration.

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR 
Brigadier General, USA 
Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C. 
15 January 1974

vi

The Author

James E. Hewes, Jr., received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Yale University. His principal field of study was international relations. During World War II, after serving as an enlisted man, he became a 2d lieutenant in the Field Artillery. He joined the staff of the Office, Chief of Military History, in August 1962, specializing since that time in administrative history. The manuscript he is now working on, Army Organization and Administration, 1963-1974, continues the analysis undertaken in the present volume.

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Preface

The principal issue in the development of the organization and administration of the War Department/Department of the Army from 1900 to 1963 was executive control over the men, money, and other resources required to raise, train, equip, and supply the United States Army. The question was not whether there should be any centralized management of departmental operations. Tight control had existed throughout most of the nineteenth century within the headquarters of each of a series of autonomous bureaus, which largely governed themselves under the detailed scrutiny of Congress. The question was whether tight authority should be imposed on the bureaus at the level of the Secretary of War. Except during the Mexican and Civil Wars there had been little effective authority over the bureaus before 1900. By 1963 the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the Chief of Staff were able to rule departmental operations more effectively, while the once powerful chiefs of the bureaus had disappeared, except for the Chief of Engineers and the Surgeon General. The purpose of the present account is to trace the development of this central theme of executive control historically. It does not attempt to treat all aspects of Department of the Army organization. Nor does it deal with the usual substance of military history, military operations in the field. As administrative history it has less in common with operational military history, as such, than with similar historical treatment of American public administration and industrial management. Failure to recognize the distinction between the way in which the Department of the Army operates and the standing operating procedures of military organizations in the field has frustrated generations of field soldiers, who have taken for granted the necessity for tight management at the top, known to them as unity of command.This struggle for executive control within the Army has

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taken place during a period of increasingly centralized authority over individual and corporate activities throughout American life. This development has been a natural consequence of the increasing industrialization and urbanization of a once predominantly rural society. The bureaus, traditionally the basic administrative units of the federal government, had developed in the context of a rural America which distrusted centralized authority and held that government best which governed least. The War Department bureau chiefs, like their colleagues elsewhere in the federal government, were as zealous as any Americans in defending this tradition. They based their careers upon it. In this account they and their supporters are called traditionalists. Opposed to the traditionalists were those individuals and groups who believed, as a result of their own experiences, that increasing industrialization and urbanization required the abandonment or at least the modification of American rural traditions, values, and institutions. They foresaw only chaos and anarchy without greater centralized authority as urban industry and population expanded. Urban political bosses sought to impose order on a chaotic welter of independent, competing municipal agencies. Industrialists and bankers sought to impose order in major industries where unfettered competition, in their view, was leading to mutual destruction. Industrial technology was changing the character of modern warfare, demanding greater efficiency and control not only over armies in the field but over agencies responsible for their supply and equipment. Centralized control meant the substitution of rational order and regulation from the top down for previously unregulated activities. In industry the process became known in the United States and western Europe as rationalization. Those who sought similarly to rationalize the organization and structure of the War Department are called in this account rationalists. A more common term among American historians generally for such reformers is modernists. Among my colleagues at the Center of Military History, Dr. Robert W. Coakley should be singled out for his advice and detailed knowledge of Army logistics during World War II and after. He also prepared other helpful studies on Army military personnel management during and after World War

x

II, on the development of CONARC, and on the background and events leading to the establishment in 1962 of the Defense Supply Agency. Without Dr. Coakley's guidance and assistance it would have been almost impossible to prepare this volume. Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian during most of the period the undersigned was writing this work, assisted by providing information on the organization of the War Department before and during World War II. Miss Hannah M. Zeidlik, Deputy Chief of the General Reference Branch, was most helpful in locating historical manuscripts on file in that branch, particularly those relating to the General and Special Staffs, AGF, and ASF during World War II. Mrs. Hazel Ward, head of the Military Records Branch of the National Archives until her retirement in 1978, provided the source material employed in those sections dealing with departmental administration from 1945 to 1955. In tracing the growth of the Army's research and development programs after World War II the author has relied heavily upon an excellent and detailed draft manuscript by Mr. L. Van Loan Naisawald of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. Mr. Maxey O. Stewart, now retired, guided the writer through the files of Project 80 on the 1962 reorganization of the Army along with Col. Edward McGregor, U.S. Army, retired, Col. Lewis J. Ashley, Maj. Gen. Donnelly P. Bolton, and Lt. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom, now Comptroller of the Army, all of whom were members of the Project 80 team. Mr. Stewart's personal files, now in CMH, contain important material concerning departmental administration and management from 1950 to the mid-1960s. Miss Annie Seely of the Reference Branch in the Photographic Library of the Army's Audio-Visual Agency located all but one of the photographs, that of Secretary Stimson in 1911, which came from the National Archives. Maj. Edward M. Kaprielian, Chief of CMH's Graphics Branch, and his staff prepared the charts for this book. Mr. Roger D. Clinton also prepared two special organization charts illustrating personnel management and research and development during World War II. The author is much obliged to the people who assisted in providing the data for Appendix B: Miss Esther D. Byrne, now retired, who prepared the list of Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Army; Mr. Detmar H. Finke, Chief of the General Reference Branch, CMH, and his staff;

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and Mrs. Sylvia A. Crabtree, a personal friend who gave generously of her free time to the project. In addition to Dr. Coakley who read and criticized several drafts, Professor Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.; Col. John E. Jessup, Jr., Chief of the Histories Division; Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian; Dr. Walter G. Hermes, Chief of the Staff Support Branch; Lt. Col. Heath Twitchell; Mr. Alfred M. Beck; and my colleague, Dr. Vincent C. Jones, read and commented on the manuscript. Mr. David Jaffe, senior editor, and Mrs. Barbara H. Gilbert, copy editor, worked on the final draft. Mrs. Dorothy B. Speight patiently labored to decipher the author's handwriting and mangled copy in typing the several drafts through which this manuscript has gone. The index was compiled by Miss Margaret L. Emerson. The responsibility for the final product, of course, is the author's alone.

JAMES E. HEWES, JR.
Washington, D. C.  15 January 1974

xii

Contents

Chapter Page
I. THE WAR DEPARTMENT FROM ROOT TO MARSHALL 3
Creation of the New General Staff, 1900-1903 6
The Early Years of the General Staff, 1904-1917 12
World War 1: The Bureau Period, 1917-1918 21
World War 1: The March Period, 1918-1919 31
The Long Armistice, 1919-1939 50
II. THE MARSHALL REORGANIZATION 57
The Chief of Staff and the Secretary 58
The General Staff Breaks Down, 1939-1941 62
The Reorganization of March 1942 67
General Marshall's Command Post 76
Army Ground Forces 78
Army Air Forces 82
Army Service Forces 90
The ASF Control Division 94
The Technical Services 97
The Administrative Services 99
The Service Commands 101
III. CHANGES IN THE MARSHALL ORGANIZATION 104
The War Department General Staff 104
G-1 106
G-2 107
G-3 109
G-4 110
The War Department Special Staff 112
The Civil Affairs Division 112
Personnel and Manpower Problems 115
Research, and Development of New Matriel 120
IV. THE EISENHOWER REORGANIZATION 129
General Marshall's Views on Postwar Military Organization 129
The Special Planning Division and the Marshall Program 131
General Somervell and a Single Service of Supply 137
The Patch-Simpson Board 146
The Eisenhower Reorganization of 1946 154
V. BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR 163
Unification 163
Army Ground Forces and Unity of Command 167
Planning for a Logistics Command  174
The Comptroller of the Army 179
The Johnston Plan and War Department Circular 342 of 1 November 1948  182
The Cresap, McCormick and Paget Survey 193
SR 10-5-1 and SR 10-500-1, 11 April 1950 205
The Army Organization Act of 1950 208
The Command of the Army 212
VI. THE POST-KOREAN ARMY 216
The Palmer Reorganizations of the Army Staff, 1954-1956 217
The Feud Over Research and Development 242
Combat Developments 258
The Continental Army Command 262
VII. THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1950s 271
The Introduction of Functional Budgets 272
The Area of Common Supplies and Services 285
The Increasing Authority of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS 296
VIII. THE McNAMARA REVOLUTION 299
Mission or Program Budgets 306
Centralized Defense Functions 310
IX. PROJECT 80: THE HOELSCHER COMMITTEE REPORT 316
X. PROJECT 80: THE END OF A TRADITION 344
The Traub Committee Report 346
The Approval and Execution of Project 80 348
XI. CONCLUSION 366
APPENDIX A 375
APPENDIX B 379
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 411
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 429

Charts

1. The War Department, Late 1917  25
2. The War Department General Staff, 26 August 1918  46
3. Organization of Office, Director of Purchase and Storage, 1 November 1918 47
4. Organization of the Army (the Marshall Reorganization), 9 March 1942 75
5. The Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 12 May 1942  77
6. Organization of the Army Ground Forces, October 1943 81
7. Organization of the Army Air Forces, October 1943 84
8. Organization of the Army Service Forces, 15 August 1944 95
9. Fragmentation of War Department Personnel Functions, 1944-1945 116
10. Responsibility for Research and Development of New Weapons and Mat6riel Within the War Department, September 1945 121
11. The Marshall-Collins Plan for a Unified Department of the Armed Forces, 19 October 1945 135
12. Long-Range Organization Plan for Army Service Forces, October-November 1943 140
13. Postwar Organization, Army Service Forces, Proposed by ASF Headquarters, 15 July 1944 144
14. Organization of the War Department, 11 June 1946 159
15. The National Military Establishment, 1947 166
16. Organization of the Department of the Army, 10 March 1948 173
17. Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 November 1948 192
18. Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950 206
19. The Bendetsen Plan, 22 October 1952 220
20. Secretary of the Army's (the Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954 233
21. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 9 September 1954 236
22. Department of the Army Chiefs and Executives, 3 January 1956 240
23. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, Headquarters, USCONARC, 1 January 1959 263
24. Joint-Army Planning Relationships 281
25. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of Department of the Army Headquarters, October 1961 325
26. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of CONARC, October 1961 329
27. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for a Combat Developments Agency, October 1961 331
28. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for a Logistics Command, October 1961 335
29. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Office of Personnel Operations, October 1961 337
30. Department of the Army Reorganization Project, February 1962 356
31. Organization of the Department of the Army, April 1963 364

Tables

1. List of Major Projects and Sub-Projects Included in Fiscal Year 1949 Budget of the Army Military (Activities) Functions 274
2. Titles and Code Zone Designations of Major Activities Under the Army Management Structure 283
3. Major Programs, Total Obligational Authority 307

Illustrations

Elihu Root 7
William Howard Taft 14
Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth 14
Henry L. Stimson 16
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood 16
Newton D. Baker 22
General John J. Pershing 24
Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals 34
General Peyton C. March 38
General of the Army George C. Marshall 55
General George C. Marshall and Henry L. Stimson 59
Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney 70
General Brehon B. Somervell 91
Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes 94
General of the Army Dwight D Eisenhower 113
Maj Gen Thomas B Larkin 170
General Omar N Bradley 177
General Williston B Palmer 229
Frank Pace, Jr. 247
Robert S McNamara 303
Cyrus R Vance 304
Charles J Hitch 305
Leonard W Hoelscher 317
General Frank S Besson, Jr 351

All illustrations are from Department of Defense files, with the exception of the photograph of Henry L Stimson on page 16, courtesy of the National Archives


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