Chapter VI: 
The Post-Korean Army
The Army Organization Act of 1950 became law with President Truman's signature on 28 June 1950. Three days earlier, at dawn on 25 June, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of South Korea. President Truman almost immediately ordered troops of the Eighth Army in Japan under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to support the small and ill-equipped South Korean Army. Thus began a war lasting three years until an armistice was negotiated in July 1953.
The Korean War was a test of the effectiveness of the Department of the Army created by the Army Organization Act of 1950. The Army expanded in three years from 600,000 in June 1950 to 1,500,000 in June 1953, while the Army's appropriations tripled during the same period from $6 to $17 billion without requiring a major reorganization. The limited nature of the Korean War was one cause, although the Army was required at the same time to provide troops to support the recently negotiated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There was no major reorganization of the Army because it was not necessary to raise, train, and equip a mass army almost from scratch, a major reason for reorganizing the Army in World War I and World War II.
The reduction in the size of the Army and its budgets after the Korean War was also more moderate than after the earlier global conflicts. During the 1950s the Army did not drop much below 900,000 men, while its budgets fluctuated between $9 and $10 billion, considerably higher than after World War II. The Army continued to be deployed all over the world, in Europe to support NATO and in the Far East to support South Korea, the Nationalist Chinese regime on Formosa, and Japan. Additionally it provided small and large military advisory

groups to help train the armies of anti-Communist governments in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.
The principal internal adjustments within the Department of the Army during this period involved the perennial issue of effective control of the Army's supply system, particularly the still autonomous technical services. To solve this problem a series of reorganizations of the Army staff was put through between 1955 and 1956. Two other serious logistical problems were the research and development of new weapons systems and the development of new combat doctrines for their battle­field deployment. The revolution in science and technology and the increasing complexity and costs of new weapons in a period of financial austerity focused attention on these problems. A determined drive by scientists to remove research and development from the control of agencies primarily concerned with procurement and supply led to creation of a new General Staff division, the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, in 1955.
The war in Korea, fought mainly with the same weapons and doctrines as World War II, demonstrated a need for development of new weapons and tactical doctrine. Consequently, in 1952 a combat developments program was initiated under the Army Field Forces which, among other things, employed modern scientific operations research techniques developed since World War II.
Shortage of funds for the operation of Army installations throughout the continental United States aggravated the continuing dispute between the continental armies and the technical services over responsibility for housekeeping functions at Class II (technical service) installations. This dispute was solved in 1955 by assigning financial responsibility for such functions to the technical services involved. At the same time the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces was reorganized as the United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) and, following the pattern of the Army Ground Forces in World War II, placed in command of the continental armies and the Military District of Washington.
The Palmer Reorganizations of the Army Staff,1954-1956
In a valedictory letter to President Truman on 18 Novem-

ber 1952 Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett commented on the difficulties he had had in asserting effective control over supply matters because "certain ardent separatists occasionally pop up with the suggestion that the Secretary of Defense play in his own back yard and not trespass on their separately administered preserves."
There are seven technical services in the Army . . . . Of these seven technical services, all are in one degree or another in the business of design, procurement, production, supply, distribution, warehousing and issue. Their functions overlap in a number of items, thus adding substantial complication to the difficult problem of administration and control.
It has always amazed me that the system worked at all, and the fact that it works rather well is a tribute to the inborn capacity of team-work in the average American...
A reorganization of the technical services would be no more painful than backing into a buzz saw, but I believe that it is long overdue.1
Explaining the lack of progress in carrying out the financial reforms called for in the National Security Act amendments of 1949, Lovett told a Congressional investigating committee that it was very difficult to obtain accurate statistics from the Army's technical services. Adequate supply control was impossible at that level, he said, because a single depot might receive its funds from fifty or a hundred sources. The basic problem, he said, was the resistance of the technical services and the Army's General Staff to change combined with a natural dislike of outsiders trespassing on their preserves of authority. All this had led to a "mental block," he maintained, in some of the services against financial reforms.2
Karl R. Bendetsen, an attorney and former Under Secretary of the Army, submitted a proposal to Secretary Lovett in October 1952 for reorganizing the Army and the technical services along functional lines. The weakness of previous reorganizations, he said, had been that they treated symptoms instead of attacking the basic issue, the Army's fragmented field organization where seven major commands were each involved in buying, mechandizing, warehousing, distributing, and even

research and development. They were "virtually self-contained" autonomous commands, each with its own personnel and training systems, no matter what its designation might be as part of the Army staff. He could not identify any consistent functional pattern in their arrangement. They were organized rather on a professional basis with civil engineers, electrical engineers, and mechanical engineers in separate commands. There was fragmentation and duplication of effort in research and development and no effective means of bringing the user, the combat soldier, into the picture. Disagreement among the technical services forced the General Staff, particularly G-4, to intervene in matters for which it lacked both the staff and authority to act. The continental Army commands followed different personnel policies and procedures, forcing G-1 into personnel operations of the Army although it lacked the necessary staff. There was the administrative chaos and friction created by housekeeping functions, especially repairs and utilities, performed for technical service installations by local Army commanders. Here again disagreement forced administrative details "which have no business in the Pentagon" to the top.
To provide more effective management Mr. Bendetsen proposed to reorganize the Army from the bottom up, replacing the continental armies with seven nationwide functional commands, using the Secretary's new authority to distribute nonmilitary functions within the Army as he saw fit. (Chart 19)
A Personnel Command would be responsible for all personnel operations in the Army, including manpower procurement, induction of draftees, replacement training centers, prisoner of war camps, and disciplinary barracks. It would provide basic training for individuals. A Combat Command would take up where the Personnel Command left off, concentrating on organizational training and mobilization. It would have four subordinate commands: an Eastern Defense and a Western Defense Command, an Antiaircraft Command, and the "Army University," a school command including all training schools, Reserve training, ROTC, and the U.S. Military Academy. A Development Command would be responsible for both research and development and for combat development functions, including operations research, war gaming, and human resources research. A Service Command would include most of the

Source: OCM Files.

Quartermaster Corps functions, Army hospitals, finance centers, transportation, maintenance facilities, and surplus disposal facilities. A Procurement Command would combine the procurement and production functions of the Ordnance Department with the construction activities, both military and civilian, of the Corps of Engineers. It would be, like them, organized geographically into regional divisions or districts.
Bendetsen thought there might be a continued need for a separate Army headquarters command like the Military District of Washington. Turning to the organization of the General Staff and the Department of the Army, Bendetsen criticized the Pershing tradition of attempting to run the department as if it were a field command. The organization of a field army, he said, was inappropriate for the department because the latter's mission was not to direct military operations but to supply materiél and trained manpower for such operations. He would relieve the General Staff of all operational responsibilities, leaving five staff divisions: Manpower, Intelligence, Operations, which he would separate from Force Development (Training), and Procurement, Supply, and Services. The technical services would become staff agencies with no field commands or installations under them. At the special staff level he would assign Military History and Troop Information to the Adjutant General's Office.
There would be a vice chief and two deputy chiefs, Bendetsen went on, to assist the Chief of Staff, one for Plans and Research who would link long-range strategic planning with research and development and a deputy for Operations and Administration. Like others, he insisted that combining plans and operations in one agency did not make sense. He would also appoint special assistants for political-military affairs and for Reserve Components.
The Secretary of the Army would have three assistant secretaries, one for Personnel, another for Procurement, Supply, and Services, and a third, the Comptroller, because the latter should parallel the role of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense who was a civilian.3
While nothing came of Mr. Bendetsen's plan at the time, it

was representative of the continuing criticism of the Army's organization and management outside the department. Some of its criticisms and recommendations were also reflected in the reports of various committees that were appointed by or under General Eisenhower when he became President in 1953.
President Eisenhower appointed Charles E. Wilson as Secretary of Defense. One of Wilson's first acts was to designate Nelson A. Rockefeller on 19 February 1953 as chairman of an ad hoc committee on the organization of the Department of Defense. It was a blue-ribbon jury, consisting of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, both of whom had publicly criticized the national defense organization; Dr. Milton Eisenhower; former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett; Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; and Brig. Gen. David A. Sarnoff, U.S. Army Reserve, of RCA. Other senior military consultants were General of the Army George C. Marshall, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and General Carl Spaatz, U.S. Air Force.
The Rockefeller Committee examined the entire spectrum of defense organization and procedures. It sought a Department of Defense so organized and managed that it could "provide the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost and without danger to our free institutions." This required a flexible military establishment "suitable not only for the present period of localized war, but also in time of transition to either full war or relatively secure peace."
The committee severely criticized the various boards created under the National Security Act of 1947 which had been hamstrung, as Mr. Lovett pointed out, by interservice rivalry. It recommended replacing them with seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense with power to act for the Secretary. For the Research and Development Board, the committee recommended one Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and another for "Applications Engineering," who would act in the area of development engineering, thus linking research and production. To replace the Munitions Board it recommended an Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics. Other assistant secretaries would be responsible for Properties and Installations, for Legislative Affairs, and for Health and Medi-

cal Services. It also recommended adding a General Counsel for the department.4
President Eisenhower accepted many of the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee in forwarding his Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 to Congress. The new organization strengthened the authority of the chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff over his colleagues and over the joint staff. Following the Rockefeller Committee's recommendations Reorganization Plan No. 6 abolished the several defense boards, assigning their functions to the Secretary of Defense, and provided him with six new assistant secretaries and a General Counsels.5 Finally it made the service secretaries "executive agents" for carrying out decisions of the JCS. The chain of command now ran from the JCS through service secretaries to the various overseas commands.
The three service secretaries, at Secretary Wilson's request, were also studying ways of improving the effectiveness of their own organizations. The new Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, on 18 September 1953 appointed an Advisory Committee on Army Organization which looked like a gathering of Ordnance alumni. The chairman was Paul L. Davies, vice president of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation and a director of the American Ordnance Association. Other members were Harold Boeschenstein, president of Owens­Corning Fiberglas; C. Jared Ingersoll, director of the Philadelphia Ordnance District during World War II and president of the Midland Valley Railroad; Irving A. Duffy, a retired Army colonel who was a vice president of the Ford Motor Company; and Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research.
Secretary Stevens had requested the committee to consider all elements of the Army, field commands as well as the departmental organization in Washington. Areas of particular interest

were the organization of the Army's top management in the light of President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6; the organizational changes required to carry out the Secretary's new assignment as the JCS's executive agent for certain overseas commands; organizational changes necessary in supervising and co-ordinating the technical services effectively; changes required for proper direction of the Army's research and development program; the proper locations within the department of its legal and legislative liaison functions; and, finally, the organization and functions of the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.6
The committee hired McKinsey and Company, a Chicago management consulting firm, as its full-time civilian staff with John J. Corson as its head, and interviewed 129 witnesses over a three-month period, including the heads of every major organizational unit in the Army. The committee submitted its report to Secretary Stevens on 18 December 1953.
The committee proposed four major changes in the organization of the Army. Among other things it would strengthen the Secretary's fiscal control by adding an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and increase the authority of the newly appointed Chief of Research and Development-within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research­ by transferring responsibility for research planning to his office from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The most important recommendation would remove the Army staff entirely from "operations" by creating two new field commands, a Continental Army Command which would be responsible for supervising Army training instead of G-3, and a Supply Command which would relieve the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, of the responsibility for "directing and controlling" the technical services.7
The Davies Committee recommended that the Secretary of the Army "participate actively in the formulation" of basic national policies and strategies affecting the Army by, among other things, attending National Security Council meetings as

an "observer." The Under Secretary would be replaced by a deputy secretary who would act for the Secretary in administering the department. Adding a third assistant secretary would permit each to specialize in one functional area, that is, manpower, materiél, and financial management.
The Chief of Staff, the committee asserted, should be the "operating manager" of the Army. "The view is often expressed in the Army that the Chief of Staff commands no one and is merely chief of the Secretary's staff. In practice this is not the case. He is the operating manager of the Army Establishment . . . ." It recognized his role as a member of the joint Chiefs of Staff and suggested reducing the number of agencies reporting directly to him.8
Other organizational changes proposed were to strengthen the Army's Reserve program; to place the Secretary's Office of Civilian Personnel under the control of the Chief of Staff because he was ultimately responsible for the work done by Army civilians; to place greater emphasis on Civil Affairs and Military Government; and to make the judge Advocate General the responsible legal adviser in the department with supervision over all legal staffs throughout the Army.9
The committee rejected the concept of a separate Operations Division such as proposed by Mr. Bendetsen because, it said, strategic planning was now largely a function of the joint staff and much of the responsibility for training would now be delegated to a new Continental Army Command. It also rejected the idea of a separate "intelligence corps" because this would create additional operating responsibilities for G-2. It recommended that the Corps of Engineers retain its civil works functions rather than 'transferring them to another department of the government.10
The committee's proposal for a training command was a return to the wartime concept of Army Ground Forces. The Continental Army Command, operating under the supervision of G-3, would be responsible for all "combat arms" training in the Army, individual as well as unit, basic and combined, Regular and Reserve.
A training command was necessary, the Davies Committee

said, because the six continental armies and MDW were attempting to serve too many masters. The General Staff divisions each supervised a part of their activities. Under a single Continental Army Command there would be snore effective control and direction over their activities.11
The Davies Committee proposals concerning the Army's supply system represented a partial return to the concept of General Somervell's wartime ASF. Its members suggested three major changes in this area: creation of a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply; creation of a Supply Command; and elimination of the division of responsibility between the ZI armies and the technical services for operating Class II installations. A Vice Chief of Staff for Supply and another for Operations were necessary, it said, because direction of the Army's supply system required the full-time services of "a highly experienced and qualified individual" familiar with all aspects of supply management and planning.12
A Supply Command was necessary for the effective control over the technical services. Under the existing organization G-4, although responsible for directing and controlling the activities of the technical services, shared authority over them with other staff divisions, principally the Army Comptroller and G-1. A Supply Command would have greater control over the technical services in these areas and over training, while G-4 would remain responsible for logistical planning and policies.
The committee did not think it would be necessary or desirable to reorganize the technical services along "functional" lines. "The controlling consideration," it said, "is whether the advantages of greater specialization, coordination, and uniformity with respect to a function . . . are more important than the need for coordinating and resolving all differences among functions with respect to an item . . . . Coordination of the development, procurement and distribution of an item is a more meaningful basis for organization . . . than specialization in each function." This view accorded with that of the Ordnance Department.13
For research and development as mentioned above the

Davies Committee proposed to strengthen the existing authority of the Chief of Research and Development in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research by transferring to his office the planning functions in this area then assigned to G-4. Research and development operating responsibilities it would transfer to the Supply Command.
The existing organization of the Army staff, it admitted, diffused responsibility for research and development, and it acknowledged that many people felt that research, essentially a planning function, had been subordinated to current production and procurement operations.
The committee, on the other hand, believed a separate research and development division on the General Staff or the creation of a separate "Development" Command would cause more difficulties than it would overcome. It did not believe that a special staff division would improve the co-ordination and management of research and development in the Army. A separate "functional" command would "separate research and development from closely related procurement and distribution activities." The Army would then have to find a new means of integrating these "essentially integral activities." Removing "development" from the influence of those concerned with production and procurement would "insulate" research personnel from the views of the user of weapons and other materiél. This, too, was the view of the Ordnance Department.
A more effective research and development program it believed would come from employing qualified civilian scientists and "project managers" and from contracting directly with civilian institutions "for special research undertakings."14
Eliminating the existing division of responsibility between the technical services and the continental armies for operating Class II installations was also necessary. Commanders of such installations were responsible to the technical service chiefs for the performance of their missions. At the same time they depended on the continental Army commanders for housekeeping funds. This violated the principle of unity of command and made it impossible to determine the costs of operating such installations. The committee recommended that housekeeping funds and personnel be allotted directly to the technical services

who would then have complete financial responsibility over the operations of their field installations.15
Another area the committee investigated was financial management. The addition of another assistant secretary with responsibility for such matters it hoped would strengthen the program. But further improvement required aligning fiscal responsibility with the department's organizational structure. The new budget and program system had not yet produced satisfactory results, partly because it did not conform to the Army's organization pattern and partly because it did not extend all the way down to the installation level.16
Like earlier civilian reorganization proposals the Davies Committee report insisted the Army staff should get out of operations, while military officers like those on the Patch­Simpson Board had asserted that this simply could not be done. The proposal that met the strongest opposition within the Army; creating a Supply Command, involved this principle. The basic military argument against it was simply that it was impossible to divorce the General Staff from its responsibility for supply operations. The Army staff's reaction was to turn the Davies proposal upside down. Instead of a Supply Command the Army staff proposed making the G-4 a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics with greater "command" over the technical services.
The principal protagonist of this view was Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, the new G-4. General Palmer, unlike his predecessors, Generals Somervell, Lutes, and Larkin, who were primarily logisticians, was a combat veteran. Most recently he had served in Korea as commanding general of the X Corps. As a combat commander General Palmer insisted on unity of command and felt that he should have all the authority and resources needed to carry out his command responsibilities. In his view it was necessary either "to give G-4 substantial command over the Technical Services" or to resurrect Army Service Forces, which would cause considerable confusion. If the first alternative were chosen, the G-4 should be given authority over personnel, organization, and review and analysis. While he had

Picture - GENERAL PALMER (Photograph taken in 1955.)
GENERAL PALMER (Photograph taken in 1955.)
no wish to interfere with the responsibilities of his colleagues, General Palmer said, "I must have within my own hands the management tools and the primary control over personnel and organization questions within the logistic area." In these arguments General Palmer reiterated General Aurand's position in 1948 concerning greater substantive control over the technical services.17
In briefing the new Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, on 19 August 1953 General Palmer resorted to the Constitutional doctrine of "implied powers," quoting Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in McCulloch versus Maryland to support his point. His authority under Special Regulation 10-15-1 included not only logistic staff functions but also direction and control of the technical staffs and services. "All the responsibility is given me, and all powers necessary to discharge the responsibilities must be inferred as granted.
The Chiefs of Technical Services are commanders, and their commands are huge. I would judge it to be true that real control over them lapsed when ASF was disbanded." For this reason he requested greater authority over personnel, including general officers in the technical services, and over Class II

industrial installations. He also wanted better qualified "management" personnel because "the civilian secretaries are challenging us to show that the Army staff is capable of running the Army supply system."18
While the Davies Committee deliberated, there were rumors within the Army staff that creating a Supply Command would be one of its major recommendations. A General Staff committee requested the G-4's formal position on the Army's "Logistic Structure at the Departmental Level." Speaking for General Palmer, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, his deputy, said that G-4's existing authority, based on applying the theory of implied powers, was adequate for managing the Army's supply system. "Creation of a Logistics Command," he said, "would require a large headquarters and would interpose a ponderous additional step in doing business, with no obvious improvement in management." The experience of both world wars demonstrated that the supply organization finally evolved combined both logistical staff planning with command over the supply services. General Somervell himself, General Magruder asserted, "favored an ASF commander who would also be the Chief of Staff's advisor on logistics." The organization of the technical services themselves was "fundamentally sound." Simple directives could reassign functions among them whenever necessary. What they needed was "vigorous direction, control, and coordination by a single authority."
General Magruder's principal complaint was that civilian officials in the Secretary's Office and above were becoming increasingly involved in administrative details. "Many decisions have to pass three [sic] Army secretaries and then go to more than one secretary in Defense." 19
General Palmer encountered opposition from Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on control over technical service personnel. The latter said that, according to "the General Staff concept," G-4 should not exercise authority over personnel. General Palmer's spirited rebuttal was that every effort on his part to obtain authority matching his

responsibility met objections based on the "General Staff concept." ". . . Experience since 1917 in three [sic] national emergencies shows that we always come to the same solution, of placing on one man the dual function of principal logistic adviser and logistic commander. That is where the facts of life push us every time. The General Staff concept needs to be rewritten if it doesn't conform."20 He objected on the same basis to a statement by another colleague that "The Assistant Chiefs of Staff do not command, and it is not consistent with Army doctrine to show the administrative services under G-1 and the Technical services under G-4." 21
General Palmer's reaction to the Davies Committee report was mixed. He seemed to accept the general outlines of the report in principle, including a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply, because he thought it would improve the conduct of the Army's "business affairs." But he firmly objected to interposing a Supply Command between the technical services and the Chief of Staff. "The Chiefs of the Technical Services must remain at as high an echelon as now. In a thousand cases a day, they must be spokesmen for the Department. Displacement from their departmental functions would hopelessly snarl Congressional, executive, and inter-service relations, and could only end in creating a whole new set of technical staffs which would, inevitably, include the Chiefs of Services personally." As an alternative he proposed placing a "Director of Logistics Services" directly under the Vice Chief of Staff for Supply and so avoid "futile argument" over creating a field "Command" within the department.22
General Palmer continued his argument with General Young over personnel functions. General Young proposed removing responsibility for career management from the technical services and placing it along with responsibility for career management for combat arms officers in G-1. General Palmer and the chiefs of the technical services all strongly disagreed with this proposal. Among other things it was contrary to the Davies Committee's recommendation that responsibility for

technical service career management be placed under the new Supply Command.23
The Department of the Army publicly announced "the Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization," known as "the Slezak Plan" after the new Under Secretary of the Army, John Slezak, on 14 June 1954, and the Secretary of Defense approved it on 17 June 1954. In general the plan followed the recommendations of the Davies report except in the field of logistics. There it reflected the views of General Palmer in rejecting the concept of a Supply Command and giving a new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics "command" over the technical services.24  (Chart 20)
The plan agreed with the Davies Committee that G-4 lacked the authority needed to control and direct the technical services. "The major weaknesses in the Army's structure and operations," it said, "do not lie in the field of military operations, but are traceable to a lack of recognition of, and preparation for, changes in the character, size, and complexity of the Army Establishment necessary to produce and support the combat forces." But the Slezak plan in disagreeing with the Davies Committee's remedy said:
If an integrated Army logistics system is to be achieved, the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is a vital first step. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics must be given full authority for the provision, administration, and control of military personnel, civilian personnel, and funds for, and the direction and control of, the seven Technical Services.
He "should have a command relationship to the Technical Services" and exercise staff supervision over "wholesale-level logistics activities overseas."
The Army should first transfer from other Army staff agencies to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics all functions involving the technical services, "including, but not limited to, career management, personnel administration, and manpower control; budgeting, apportionment, and allocation, of all funds among the Technical Services, and other financial management functions and activities; materiél research and development;

1 General Management, Analysis and Review
2 Panama, Alaska, Civil Functions, Politico-Military- Economic Affairs
3 Direct working relationships with civilian and military personnel elements of Army staff
4 Additional direct responsibilities to Assistant Secretary (Civil Military Affairs)
Source: Secretary of the Army's (the Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954.

requirements, procurement, supply, services, and programing and control functions in the logistics field; and legal functions of the Technical Services." It would also transfer responsibility for technical service training to the new deputy chief. For the time being at least responsibility for logistics planning would remain with a vestigial Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. The General Staff was thus removed from logistics operations entirely.25
An ad hoc Committee to Implement the Reorganization of the Army composed of the Comptroller, the G-4, and other General Staff divisions under the chairmanship of George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, met repeatedly during the summer of 1954 to work out the details of the reorganization.26
Mr. Slezak, in a memorandum for General Ridgway on 8 September 1954 approving the detailed reorganization plan, called his attention principally to the Charter for the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
a. The purpose is to combine the seven technical services into an integrated logistical system, subordinating the Chiefs of Technical Services to the head of this system and giving him authority to modify the respective Technical Service missions in order to achieve one integrated system in place of seven autonomies.
b. Accordingly, it is intended that wherever the authority granted the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics involves transfer to him of authority heretofore exercised by other parts of the Army staff, the extent of the transfer shall be interpreted so as to insure that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics can carry out the objectives set forth in paragraph a. above.
Specifically this meant that he would have authority over "the career management of all Technical Service personnel, whether serving under their Chiefs or not." 27
The Charter to which Mr. Slezak referred was published as Change 4 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 of 8 September 1954. As revised-later in Change 6 of 17 January 1955, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had "Department of the Army Staff responsibility" for "development and supervision of an integrated Army logistics organization and system, including all controls over policies, procedures, standards, funds, manpower,

and personnel which are essential to the discharge of this responsibility." He would be responsible for the development of logistics doctrine and manuals, for supervising logistics training and education where more than a single technical service was involved, for logistics planning, for development of logistics programs and budgets, for development and supervision of financial management, including stock and industrial funds within the technical services, and for development of the Army's logistics requirements. Acting on the basis of this authority he was to prescribe the missions, organization, and procedures of the technical services, to supervise their training, develop and supervise "a single, integrated career system" for technical service personnel, to exercise manpower controls over both their civilian and military personnel, to administer their civilian personnel programs, including industrial and labor relations, and to supervise all aspects of financial management within the technical services, including budgets, funding, allocation of personnel ceilings, review and analysis, and statistical reporting controls under the authority of the Comptroller of the Army. The Surgeon General was allowed direct access to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff on matters involving the health and medical care of troops and utilization of medically trained military personnel. Responsibility for the civil functions of the Chief of Engineers was not included. Change 6 also removed from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics responsibility for directing the research and development activities of the technical services. The organization of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to carry out these new duties is outlined in Chart 21.
The Secretary of the Army reappointed McKinsey and Company on 8 February 1955 to conduct an "Evaluation of Organizational Responsibilities" within the Department of the Army. This review concentrated on the Army's civilian secretariat, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the new Continental Army Command.28
The only major recommendation made concerning the Sec-

Source SR 10-5-1 Change 4,8 Sep 54, and Internal Deplog Organization Chart of 9 Sep 54.

retary's Office was that an Office of Director of Research and Development be created separate from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development. This change was adopted and announced in General Order 64 of 3 November 1955. The remainder of McKinsey and Company's comments in this area concerned redistributing the work load among the various assistant secretaries and preventing them from becoming involved in minor administrative operations.29
McKinsey and Company thought that the responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics under Changes 4 and 6 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 were not clear, particularly in the areas of overseas supply activities, doctrine, training, and logistics planning. The report warned that this office might become so involved in operations that it could not give sufficient attention to logistics planning which might better be assigned to a new G-4 division. Greater responsibility for operations ought to be given to the chiefs of the technical services as "operating Vice Presidents." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics should instead concentrate his efforts on developing policies and programs common to more than one technical service and follow the principle of "management by exception," or troubleshooting, in dealing only with critical problems. He should limit reports to those providing information needed to develop and review policies and programs. Other minor suggestions concerned personnel management, program review and analysis, and financial management. 30
The Comptroller of the Army asked Karl R. Bendetsen, then a Reserve colonel on active duty, to prepare a special study on "A Plan for Army Organization in Peace and War," which he submitted on 1 June 1955. While he repeated the recommendations he had made to Secretary Lovett in 1952 for a series of functional field commands, he also reviewed recent developments in departmental organization. He thought the only real advantage of the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics was his increased authority over career management in the technical services. He still was not a "commander," no

matter how that term was defined, but a General Staff officer acting for the Secretary of the Army.
Mr. Bendetsen thought the Army had been following a "circular course" since World War II of first rejecting the idea of ASF and then working back toward it gradually. There were still seven independent technical services. General Somervell had tried hard to get rid of them, but he had failed. Since then the deficiencies which General Somervell had tried to correct had repeatedly come to the department's attention. It had tried to solve them, but so far without success. The one major weakness, the independence of the technical services with their duplication of each other's functions, had not been rectified. "Every proposal which has advanced the concept of bringing like functions under effective management has met the same fate-it has been rejected." So far as the new organization of the Army's supply system was concerned, he saw no reason why it should succeed where its predecessors had failed, since it did not deal effectively with this critical issue.31
The new organization had other critics besides Mr. Bendetsen. Civilian scientists had repeatedly complained about the continued subordination of research and development to procurement and production. When General Williston B. Palmer had been promoted to Vice Chief of Staff, he warned that research and development needed "rank and prestige which would place the Army on equal terms with the other services before the innumerable outside scientists and advisory groups get into the act." The result was Change 11 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 of 22 September 1955 creating the Office of Chief of Research and Development at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. The designation chief was necessary because Congress had specifically limited the Army to three Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army Organization Act of 1950.32
This organization left a General Staff of five Deputy Chiefs of Staff co-ordinating operations with three Assistant Chiefs of Staff below them, presumably divorced from operations. General Palmer's view was that "The General Staff has always

operated." If it was responsible only for plans and policies, "what agency would supervise their execution?" On this basis the Army staff was reorganized as of 3 January 1956 under Change 13 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 of 27 December 1955 into three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for Personnel, another for Military Operations, and the third for Logistics, a Chief of Research and Development, the Army Comptroller, and an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. (Chart 22) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel absorbed the functions of the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration plus G-1. He was also assigned direct supervision and control over The Adjutant General's Office, the Chief of Chaplains, the Provost Marshal General, and the Chief of Information and Education. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations absorbed the functions of the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans plus G-3. He was also assigned General Staff supervision and control over the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and the Chief of Military History.33
Thus was abandoned the three-deputy concept for co­ordinating and supervising the operations of the Army staff. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans (Research) and for Operations and Administration as well as the Comptroller, which had performed these functions since 1949, were now demoted to the status of coequal General Staff agencies. To fill the vacuum left at the top the Chief of Staff created two new agencies within the secretariat of the General Staff, a Coordinating Group and a Programs and Analysis Group (initially called the Progress Analysis Group). The secretariat thus began to develop into a super co-ordinating and planning staff between the General Staff and the Chief of Staff. 34
The Coordination Group's formal mission was to assist the Chief of Staff in the development and evaluation of long-range strategic plans. It acted as liaison also with other Army and defense committees, including the joint Chiefs. In practice

1 Not an Official Organization Chart.
2 For Practical Purposes Those Agencies Listed as Technically Subordinate to DCSOPS, DCSPER, and DCSLOG, Actually Reported Direct to the Chief of Staff. Source: DA, DO No 70, 27 Dec 1955. CSR 10-1, 3 Jan 56.
Prepared by TAGO

this meant the Coordination Group assisted General Maxwell D. Taylor, the new Chief of Staff, in developing an integrated Army philosophy which would serve to revitalize the Army's missions and roles. Some such conscious, explicit philosophy, General Taylor believed, was necessary, spelling out the role of the Army in the national defense establishment, if the Army were to obtain the support of the administration, Congress, and the public. General Taylor first presented his ideas in "A National Military Program" to the JCS in the fall of 1956. The Coordination Group, meanwhile, prepared a Department of the Army Pamphlet, A Guide to Army Philosophy, which was widely distributed within the Army in 1958. Later in The Uncertain Trumpet General Taylor published the substance of this program, which became the basis of the Army's program in the 1960s. 35
Co-ordinating the Army's program system was the responsibility of the new Programs and Analysis Group. This meant the proper balancing of Army programs with resources in men, materiél, and money. The planning, execution, and review and analysis of the Army's programs at the Army staff level were now under one small agency in the Chief of Staff's Office.
Under the new dispensation the Management Office within the secretariat became, in effect, the Comptroller of the Army staff but the relationship between this agency and the Office of the Comptroller of the Army was not clear. In theory the Management Office's responsibilities for management functions within the Army staff included the Comptroller's Office, while the Comptroller of the Army was responsible for such functions throughout the Army. Theoretically the Comptroller's Office would review the Army staff's budget and manpower ceilings, including those of its own headquarters, prepared by the Management Office. In practice, the Comptroller had been reduced to the level of a Deputy Chief of Staff coequal with but not superior to his colleagues as he had been before 1956.
No major change took place in the organization of the Army staff or the Chief of Staff's Office from 1956 until John F.

Kennedy became President and appointed Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in January 1961. The size of the Army staff and of the secretariat both remained fairly constant during this period. 36
The Feud Over Research and Development
The emergence of the Office of Chief of Research and Development on 10 October 1955 as an independent General Staff agency ended a strenuous five-year campaign for recognition by civilian scientists both within and outside the Army. It was also part of the continuing struggle for control over the technical services because they performed most of the research and development within the Army.37
Under the Eisenhower reorganization of 1946 recognition of research and development within the Army as an activity separate from logistics seemed assured with the creation of a separate Directorate for Research and Development. The War Department Equipment Board, known as the Stilwell Board, in its report of 29 May 1946 reiterated General Eisenhower's statement of Army policy on research and development.
Scientific research is a paramount factor in National Defense. It is mandatory that some procedure be adopted whereby scientific research is accorded a major role in the post war development of military equipment. The scientific talent available within the military establishment is not adequate for this task and must be augmented . . . . In general the scientific laboratories of the Technical Services should be devoted to those problems so peculiarly military as to have no counterpart among civilian research facilities, meanwhile utilizing, on a contract basis the civilian educational institutions and industrial laboratories for the solution of problems within their scope.
The board recommended a separate Directorate of Research and Development as the best means for supervising the program. The director should be a senior general officer of the Army, it said, and key personnel should include knowledgeable

officers from each technical service, a nationally known scientist as senior assistant to the director, and an outstanding scientist in each major field of science assigned on rotation from the major scientific colleges and industrial laboratories. General officers from the field commands and officers from each arm and service should represent the using arms in the development of new or improved weapons.
The mission of the Directorate of Research and Development was to supervise all Army research activities and to co­ordinate the research and development activities of the arms and services. It would establish priorities, make certain that the technical services and arms maintained contact with civilian research programs, supervise and review the Army's long-range research and development program, confirm the need for new and improved equipment, and advise the Budget Division on the funds required for its work.
To increase the Army's scientific talent, the Stilwell Board report recommended commissioning outstanding civilian scientists in the Army Reserve or National Guard, sending Army officers as students to leading scientific colleges and industrial laboratories, granting commissions annually to graduates of scientific colleges, and providing salaries that would attract qualified civilian scientists to work for the Army.38
The department neglected most of the Stilwell Board's recommendations because of reduced budgets following World War II. Dr. Cloyd H. Marvin, the first "Scientific Director," complained in late 1947 that the Army lacked a vigorous, modern research and development program. He recommended a reorganization with an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development and conversion of the General Staff to a purely planning agency supporting functionally organized field commands. One of the commands would consolidate the Army's research laboratories, and another would determine the development of tactical doctrine and military requirements for new material. It would be responsible for testing new weapons and equipment and for operating the Army's advanced schools. For an effective program the Army

ought also to have a separate research and development budget.39
Abolishing the Research and Development Directorate and subordinating the function to Logistics in December 1947 was a step backwards. Severe budget limitations, a factor beyond the Army's control, forced the Army to get along with surplus weapons and equipment left over from World War II. New weapons, except for missiles, were out of the question. General Aurand, the first Director of Research and Development, also complained he had found it extremely difficult to obtain agreement from the Logistics Directorate on research and development projects.40
None of the reorganization studies of the Army by the Management Division, Cresap, McCormick and Paget, and the Hoover Commission Defense Task Force dealt with research and development. In recommending a functional Army staff and functional field commands, their proposals contained no provisions for research and development as a separate activity at any level. The only important advance in this otherwise sterile period for Army research and development was the signing of a contract with the Johns Hopkins University in July 1948 setting up a General Research Office, later known as the Operations Research Office (ORO), to perform research for the Army. As the title indicated, ORO's principal activities were limited to employing scientific methods, specifically operations research techniques, in improving current tactical doctrine rather than developing new weapons or equipment.41
Distinguished civilian scientists like Dr. Vannevar Bush complained about the way the services were handling research. A major irritant was the relationship between scientists and their military superiors in the development of new weapons. Writing in 1949 Dr. Bush, the first chairman of the Research and Development Board, asserted:
The days are gone when military men could sit on a pedestal, receive the advice of professional groups in neighboring fields who were maintained in a subordinate or tributary position, accept or reject

such advice at will, discount its importance as they saw fit, and speak with omniscience on the overall conduct of war . . . . If military men attempt to absorb or dominate the outstanding exponents in these fields, they will simply be left with second-raters and the mediocre . . . . The professional men of the country will work cordially and seriously in professional partnership with the military; they will not become subservient to them; and the military can not do their full present job without them.42
As a member of the Army Policy Council, Dr. Bush also expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress of the Army's research program to Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray in the spring of 1950. Gray in turn sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff complaining that the Army was placing too much emphasis and spending too many dollars on maintaining its current arsenal at the expense of the future. Given the pace of scientific advance, the next war was not likely to be the same kind of "total war" as World War II.43
Secretary Gray's memorandum led to a formal staff study of the entire Army research and development organization. The Kilgo report, so designated because Mr. Marvin M. Kilgo of the Comptroller's Office reportedly collected most of the information, was sent to the Secretary on 12 January 1951. In substance it argued that the Army's research and development program lacked effective leadership from the Defense Department and inside the Army. It recommended a separate Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development with control over funds for such activities and a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. There should be a direct link, it said, between these programs and the Army's strategic planning, and greater use should be made of "operations research" techniques by setting up organizations for this purpose in all major commands.44
General Larkin, the G-4, spoke for the Army staff in rejecting the major proposals of the Kilgo report. He and all the technical service chiefs were opposed to a separate Research and Development Division on the General Staff. It had been tried and found wanting, they said. The Army could perform this mission just as well under the supervision of G-4, and it was

important to retain the link between research and procurement. Besides, the technical services ought to report through only one direct command channel.
The Chief of Staff, General Collins, repeated General Larkin's comments in his recommendations to the new Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr. Staff responsibility for research and development should remain, he said, with G-4. It was also essential to integrate this program with production because at the technical service level they were combined. Further, he did not see how "pure" research could be separated from development.45
Secretary Pace accepted these recommendations but left the issue of a separate Research and Development Division open. Some Army staff officials believed that the main current problem was the lack of firm strategic planning on which to base projections of future research and development requirements. The Chief of Research and Development in G-4 believed a change was desirable in the technical services, which would make the head of research and development in each service responsible directly rather than indirectly to the chief of the service. Civilian personnel shortages were also hindering progress.46
In the fall of 1951 Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Organization and Training, sought to reopen the question of a separate Research and Development Division because "its increased importance and extended scope make increasingly, apparent the lack of logic in assigning Research and Development to G-4." Secretary Pace agreed that "the departmental research and development functions must be removed from G-4." By this time opinion within the General Staff had shifted. Most favored a separate General Staff division in some form, but the G-2 and G-3 suggested placing this function under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. General Larkin and General Collins still opposed a separate staff agency.
At this point General Taylor canvassed senior officers of the Army including the chiefs of the technical services on the subject. The G-1, Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, strongly

urged removing the function from G-4. Placing it under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans with additional research and development elements in each major staff agency he thought "a screwy idea" that would further fragment responsibility for the program. General Taylor himself favored such a plan because he thought it would force all General Staff agencies to focus attention on the subject. No one at this time proposed changes at the technical service level where the greater part of the Army's research and development work was done. 47
After considerable debate the Army staff reached a compromise acceptable to Secretary Pace. As a result, on 15 January 1952 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. He was responsible for co-ordinating the Army's research and development activities with JCS assigned missions, war plans, and with the latest tactical doctrines. A Chief of Research and Development under him was directly responsible for supervising this activity as Program Director for Army Primary Program 7, "Research and Development," including responsibility for allocating its appropriations within the Army. He would also be the Army's spokesman on such matters in dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other government agencies.48

Severe personnel limitations forced the new Chief of Research and Development to delegate much of his authority to the General Staff, particularly G-4. G-3's new responsibilities included supervising the Operations Research Office, while G-1 became responsible for supervising the activities of the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) established at George Washington University in 1951 under contract to the Army for research involving "human factors," the individual soldier, his training, and combat environment. What remained of the old Research and Development Division in G-4 was responsible for supervising these activities in the technical services.49
Secretary Pace thought the "new organization had elevated the research and development function from its former position subordinate to the logistics function in the Army," and there the matter rested until the Army staff reorganization proposals of 1954.50
Civilian scientists continued their efforts to separate research and development completely from logistics at the General Staff level. In November 1951 Secretary Pace appointed twelve "outstanding scientists and industrialists" as members of an "Army Scientific Advisory Panel" to assist him and the Chief of Staff in creating a fighting force "as effective, economical, and progressive, as our scientific, technological, and industrial resources permit." Dr. James Killian was the first chairman of this group and a leader in the effort to remove research and development from G-4.51
Scientists now had more direct influence within the Army itself as part of the establishment. They played a direct role also in the Korean War when representatives of ORO went there to apply operations research techniques. These scientists returned certain that "something had to be done to improve our capability to conduct land warfare." 52 Out of this developed

Project VISTA, conducted by the California Institute of Technology under the joint auspices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and designed "to bring the battle back to the battle field." One major recommendation was to create a Combat Developments Center for testing new tactical concepts on troops in the field. The Combat Developments Group set up in 1952 under Army Field Forces was a direct consequence of this recommendation.53
President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 reopened the question of the relationship of research and development to logistics within the Army. The new Defense Department organization had strengthened control over research and development by replacing the unwieldy Research and Development Board with two assistant secretaries, one for Research and Development and another for Applications Engineering, both separate from the Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics. The Davies Committee on Army organization considered separation of research from supply in its own deliberations.
General Palmer, the new G-4, opposed any change, asserting the main issue was control over the technical services. Another General Staff division for research and development to whom the technical services would have to report would make matters worse.54
Dr. Killian told the Davies Committee he was unhappy with the Army's research program. There was still little co­ordination between strategic planning and research and development. He had welcomed the appointment of Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols as the Chief of Research and Development, but the latter's emergency assignment to the Army's guided missiles program obviously interfered with his main job. Dr. Killian still wanted a separate General Staff division for research and development with direct access to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army together with a separate Assistant Secretary for Research and Development. He did not think creation of a separate research and development command, such as Mr. Bendetsen had suggested, would be practical because of

the necessarily close relationship between the researcher and "the user" who developed and produced the finished product.55
The recommendations of the Davies Committee regarding the Army's research program were a compromise. While the committee did not advocate removing this function entirely from G-4, it suggested transferring research and development planning from G-4 to the Chief of Research and Development. Operating functions should be transferred from G-4 to the new Supply Command. In the Secretary's Office it recommended transferring responsibility for this program from the Under Secretary to the Assistant Secretary for Materiél. It also recommended making the Army Scientific Advisory Panel permanent 56
The final Slezak plan on Army organization irritated Dr. Killian. Writing to Secretary Stevens he complained that the proposed organization "would serve seriously to handicap the management and further development of the Army in Research and Development activities . . . ." It had two serious defects. "It brings Research and Development under the domination of logistics and procurement philosophy, and this has repeatedly been demonstrated to be the wrong environment for the top direction of research in military services." Second, it actually reduced the status of the Chief of Research and Development by making his role ambiguous.57 General Lemnitzer, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, endorsed Dr. Killian's views. Stressing the incompatibility of research and logistics, he wrote George H. Roderick, chairman of the ad hoc Committee for Implementation of the Reorganization of the Army, that the only solution was to consolidate under the Chief of Research and Development all of the existing G-4 research and development work as well as those portions of the program scattered among other General Staff agencies.58 Maj. Gen. John F. Uncles, Chief of the Research and Development Division, wrote Lemnitzer, his superior, that "we are paying too high a price for rigid adherence to the prin-

ciple that only a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics can issue instruction to the Technical Services." He favored centralizing all Army staff research and development functions under General Lemnitzer's office rather than the "present dispersed and inadequate staff organization." 59
James Davis, special assistant for research and development to Under Secretary Slezak, warned that G-4's Research and Development Division was currently too involved in administrative details. What was needed was an agency devoted to original studies and analyses which would bring together problems of new weapons or equipment needed in combat with new technical ideas. This would give concrete direction to the research and development program. For years relating weapons and technology had been swept under the rug as a secondary mission of the Army schools, which were also so isolated from technology and science that they could not perform the function properly.60
The Palmer Reorganization and the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics represented another defeat for those who demanded separation of research and development from logistics. The deputy chief now supposedly had greater control over the operations of the technical services, including research and development, than before. The scientists, led by Dr. Killian, refused to surrender. A Congressional investigation of the Defense Department's research and development programs under Congressman R. Walter Riehlman, Republican of New York, supported their efforts. General Uncles, Dr. Killian, and Dr. Bush in testimony before this group publicly ventilated the arguments they had been urging within the Army staff.61
The Riehlman Committee's report warned that "unless the military departments, and our military leaders in particular, choose to correct these problems caused largely by military administrative characteristics, the forces of logic and civilian scientific dissatisfaction could well dictate that research and

development be rightly considered incompatible with military organization.62
The report also discussed the Davies Committee recommendations, concluding that the Secretary of the Army's plan had treated the problem too superficially. It agreed with Dr. Killian and other scientists that research and development were incompatible with logistics and that the Army Scientific Advisory Panel should be strengthened in numbers and authority. It urged creation of an additional Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and criticized the Department of the Army for failing to "attract adequate support and interest from civilian scientists" largely because of massive red tape and an apparent lack of interest in the subject.63
The struggle entered a new phase when the now permanent and expanded Army Scientific Advisory Panel (ASAP) held its first formal meeting on 16 November 1954. It discussed the continued conflict between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research and the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics over the research and development program. The new Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development, Frank Higgins, a former president of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, concluded that "the Army Research and Development Program, especially at the top, should be reorganized without delay." 64
Dr. Killian, as chairman of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, then personally urged Secretary Stevens to separate research and development from logistics and raise the status of the Chief of Research and Development to the Deputy Chief of Staff level. Secretary Stevens finally agreed, and on 28 December 1954 all research and development functions and responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics were transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. A new General Staff division under a Chief of Research and Development would be responsible for "planning, supervising, coordinating, arid directing" all Army research and development.65

The new organization was not satisfactory because both the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research were overburdened with work. The McKinsey and Company report of March 1955 said that the Army should create a new Research and Development Directorate, relieving the existing Assistant Secretary for Logistics of this burden. The Second Hoover Commission of 1955 recommended assigning to the Assistant Secretary for Logistics responsibility for almost all Army logistical functions, including research and development and supervision of the technical services, removing these functions entirely from the General Staff.
Brig. Gen. Andrew P. O'Meara, the new Chief of Research and Development, on 3 August 1955 formally proposed creating a new deputy chief of staff for Research and Development. The Army staff agreed, including Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin and General Palmer, who had become Vice Chief of Staff. The new Secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker approved, and the new office began operations on 10 October 1955 with General Gavin appointed as the Army's first Chief of Research and Development. A new civilian post, the Director of Research and Development, was created on 3 November 1955 at the assistant secretary level. Dr. William H. Martin, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Applications Engineering, became the first director.66
Despite these changes the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics still controlled the technical services, including their budgets and personnel. As the historian of OCRD noted:
The Chief of Research and Development had little or no say in the placement of personnel . . . in responsible research and development positions within the Technical Services. And even if he were consulted there was no means by which he might reward outstanding effort or penalize unsatisfactory performance.
A management subcommittee of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel in the fall of 1958 concluded it was unrealistic "to expect the Chief of Research and Development to assume responsibility for success in this field without having direct control

over funds, personnel, and facilities to accomplish his mission." 67 The full ASAP urged that the Chief of Research and Development have sole responsibility for all policy decisions in his area and sole control of funds required to carry out his missions, including the construction, evaluation, and testing of prototypes.
Another development came with the announcement by the Department of Defense in November 1958 that beginning with fiscal year 1960 all research and development appropriations as well as identifiable research and development activities under other budget programs would be included in one new research, development, test, and evaluation budget category.68
During this same period the ASAP conducted a series of studies and held conferences aimed at reducing the lead time between the point when a new weapon is conceived and the time it reaches the soldier on the battlefield. The ASAP believed that much time was wasted simply in unproductive red tape and that more authority for the Chief of Research and Development would reduce it.
As an example it took ten years, from 1950 to 1960, for the Army to produce a replacement for the World War II amphibian veteran known as the DUKW. Research was not involved, just development engineering. The Ordnance Corps received the assignment in late 1950. Six years later in 1956 only an unsatisfactory prototype had been produced. The Transportation Corps in the meantime had produced a larger amphibian, the BARC, for testing in less than two years. Disagreement between the Transportation Corps and Ordnance Department over the type of smaller amphibian required stalled progress for more than two years. In late 1958 a contract for developing a prototype of a new small amphibian, the LARC, was finally negotiated by the Transportation Corps. Two more years passed, again partly because of continued opposition by the Ordnance Corps, before the LARC was finally accepted or "type classified" as standard equipment for

the Army on 20 July 1960. As this case demonstrated, a major reason for delay in developing new equipment was disagreement among the technical services.69
ASAP pressure also resulted in establishing the Army Research Office (ARO) on 24 March 1958 under the Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) "to plan and direct the research program of the Army," to make maximum use of the nation's scientific talent, to provide the nation's scientific community with a single contact in the Army, and ensure that the Army's research and development program emphasized the Army's future needs. ARO would also co­ordinate the Army's program with similar programs in the Navy, Air Force, and other government agencies. Within the Army it would co-ordinate the research and development programs of the technical services.70
The next official to grapple with the issue of control over the technical services' research and development programs was the Army's new Director for Research and Development, Richard S. Morse, formerly president of the National Research Corporation and vice chairman of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel. The 1958 reorganization of the Department of Defense had created a Director of Defense Research and Engineering. President Eisenhower had also established a special White House Assistant for Science and Technology, appointing Dr. Killian, former chairman of ASAP, to that post. These events led Mr. Morse to suggest a complete reevaluation of the Army's research and development organization. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, General Gavin's successor as Chief of Research and Development, agreed. Following recommendations from the Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Secretary Brucker appointed a seven-man board under the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, George H. Roderick. The Roderick Board, which included Mr. Morse, General Trudeau, and Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was to study the problem and make recommendations "without disturbing the existing organization of the Department." Mr. Morse tried to resurrect

the idea of a separate research and development command, but the chiefs of the technical services remained unanimously opposed.71
The Roderick Board report, submitted in March 1959, suggested only a few minor changes, most of them aimed at improving the management of the Army's research and development programs. The Chief of Research and Development should improve long-range planning review and analysis, and change the Army's procedures for advising industry and the scientific community of its research objectives and requirements. His office should improve its performance in making scheduled reports on time. Greater emphasis on combat developments was also necessary.72
A year later, on 23 March 1960, Mr. Morse once more submitted his own proposal for a separate research and development command. His chief targets were the technical services which did not, he believed, enjoy "an unqualified reputation in the scientific community." The Army would have a satisfactory research and development program only if it were to increase its prestige and "overcome tradition." The command, he proposed, would serve under a Chief of Research and Development with full Deputy Chief of Staff status and an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development.
Such a field command would mean at least partially dismantling the technical service organization. The technical service chiefs naturally considered it as another attempt to functionalize them out of existence.73
The Army Scientific Advisory Panel approved Mr. Morse's proposal, but Secretary Brucker turned the matter back to the Roderick Board. General Trudeau opposed the Morse plan because it would involve "drastic changes in the basic structure and operating procedures of the Army." What was essential for a workable program was control over the men and money required to do the job. To achieve this goal he thought the Chief of Research and Development should be given "operational control" over technical service funds and personnel for research and development. He should be given a voice in assigning key research and development personnel throughout the Army and

should rate the performance of technical service research and development chiefs. This would require giving research and development officials in the technical services greater authority over funds and personnel also.74
The senior officials of the department and the Army staff met on 15 June 1960 to consider the Roderick Board report, the Morse plan, and General Trudeau's proposal. Secretary Brucker requested that General Trudeau submit specific examples of difficulties he claimed he had been having with the technical services. General Trudeau came back with twelve instances, nearly all of them involving the Ordnance Corps, which accounted for over two-thirds of the Army's research development, testing, and evaluation funds. In one case the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had told the technical services chiefs to ignore instructions from the Chief of Research and Development if they thought they conflicted with instructions from his office or were "not otherwise in the best interest of the service." Other complaints involved shifting research and development funds without the approval of the Chief of Research and Development, failure to consult with him on key personnel assignments, and failure to notify him of major development problems.75
After additional prodding from the Secretary of Defense, the Roderick Board recommended changes on 6 July along the lines suggested by General Trudeau. On 30 July 1960, Secretary Brucker repeated that no changes would be made in the existing structure of the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics would still remain the principal channel of command between the Army staff and the technical services. The Chief of Research and Development would have a "parallel" line of authority to the technical services on matters in his area. He would control research and development personnel within the technical services through the bulk allotment of civilian personnel spaces to his office for further allocation to the technical services. He would contribute to the efficiency reports of research and development personnel in the technical services and be consulted on the assignment of key personnel throughout the Army's research and development organization. He would

control allocation of such funds among the technical services. Finally, in line with the recommendations of the Roderick Board, he was instructed to improve the Army's long-range research and development planning, including forecasts of future requirements and technological developments, and to improve the Army's relations with industry and the scientific community.76
In summary, after World War II the Army's research and development program went through three distinct phases. Before the Korean War declining appropriations and the department's constant preoccupation with current daily crises led to the disappearance of "Research and Development" as a major effort. The Korean War renewed interest in the subject, and a struggle began between scientists, who wished a separate General Staff division, and elements of the Army staff, who insisted on its continued subordination to logistics. Between 1955 and 1961, as Chiefs of Research and Development, General Gavin and General Trudeau fought to remove controls from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics over the men, money, and materiél required for their programs. Except for the civilian scientists, the Army staff continued to oppose creating an independent research and development command because it involved the independence and integrity of the technical services.
Combat Developments
In the fall of 1950 General Gavin, then Director of the Defense Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, accompanied a group of scientists, including Dr. Edward Bowles, to Korea to investigate tactical air support problems. They came away convinced that "something had to be done to improve our capability to conduct land warfare." 77
The Army, Navy, and Air Force jointly requested the California Institute of Technology to investigate the problems of tactical air support and of generally how to improve weapons, techniques, and tactics. In addition to specific recommendations for developing new weapons, Project VISTA advocated

creation of a "Combat Developments" organization within the Army to include a Combat Developments Center for testing new tactical doctrine of troops in the field.78
Following these recommendations the Chief of Staff in June 1952 ordered the Chief of Army Field Forces to establish a combat developments organization within his office. This was done with the creation on 1 October 1952 of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. The Chief of Army Field Forces in turn ordered that combat developments departments be established at the Command and General Staff College and the four combat arms schools. An Office of Special Weapons Developments was set up at Fort Bliss, Texas, in December 1952 as the first combat developments field agency of the Army to assist in developing and testing "the military application of atomic energy as it affects the doctrine, organization, equipment, and training of the Army in the field." At the same time Army Field Forces contracted with the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University to set up an operations research office within the headquarters of the Chief of Army Field Forces.79
As Army Field Forces defined the concept in 1953, combat developments was "The research, development, testing, and early integration into units in the field, of new doctrines, new organization, and new materiél to obtain the greatest combat effectiveness using the minimum of men, money, and materials." There were thus three distinct areas, the development of doctrine, the development of organization, both former functions of G-3, and also the development of weapons and mat6riel, a function of the Research and Development Section in Headquarters, Army Field Forces.80 Under Change 3 to Special Regulation 10-51 of 16 July 1953 Army Field Forces responsibilities for developing new tactics and techniques included determining the effect of new weapons, materiél, and

techniques on tactics and doctrine, formulating new doctrines and procedures for their employment, and supervising the various boards and agencies which tested them. In the development of materiél Army Field Forces responsibilities were limited to determining military requirements for new weapons and equipment normally used by field armies. The technical services remained responsible for materiél not normally used in field armies.
This regulation indicated the complex organizational relationships that were involved in combat developments. Co­ordinating the efforts of Army Field Forces with those of individual Army staff agencies, with the technical services, and with the Air Force and Navy in joint projects involved an enormous amount of administrative delay.
Within Army Field Forces one of the earliest problems arose out of the difficulties the Combat Developments Division within G-3 experienced in developing long-range programs. Understandably, it had become too involved in current operations. The solution was to form a special study group of military officers, who were to work closely with the Johns Hopkins University civilian analysts as a combat operations research group, known as CORG.
At approximately the same time the Combat Developments Division itself was abolished and reorganized as the Combat Developments Group. While the G-3 division remained responsible for short-range developments in doctrine, the new group would project requirements for and develop necessary changes in organization, doctrine, tactics, and requirement for new materiél "at least ten years in the future."81
Dissatisfaction with the progress of combat development led Secretary of the Army Stevens in February 1954 to appoint Dr. Leland J. Haworth, Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, chairman of a small group of civilian scientist known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Combat Developments to investigate the problem. The committee's report recommended strengthening the Army's combat developments program through greater centralized control. The Davies Committee and Slezak reports agreed, and on 1 February 1955 the formal controls of the U.S. Continental Army Command, successor of

the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, over the Army's combat developments program were strengthened. Supervised by the General Staff divisions most directly concerned (Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and later the Chief of Research and Development), CONARC was henceforth responsible for the general direction of this program throughout the Army, including the technical services. The department made this clear by directing the seven technical and three administrative services to create their own combat developments agencies to work with CONARC's combat developments organization. This forced the technical services to concentrate their previously scattered combat developments functions into a single agency.82
The Combat Developments Section became a CONARC general staff division in September 1956. The U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California, was established on 1 November 1956 to conduct tests and experiments with new concepts, organizations, doctrine, and tactics for future combat operations armies in the field. At about the same time a scientific research office, the Research Office Test and Experimentation Center (ROTEC) , was set up in Monterey, California (later moved to Fort Ord), to work with this new agency.83
CONARC's responsibilities for the development of materiel also increased. The Development and Test (later called the Materiél Development) Section became a fifth general staff section of CONARC, reflecting similar changes in the Army General Staff. This agency was to supervise development of materiél for use in combat, advise CONARC and the Department of the Army on materiél requirements; co-ordinate preparation of the military characteristics of new weapons and equipment, supervise materiél testing by CONARC boards, maintain contact with development agencies like the technical services and outside contractors, evaluate CONARC materiél service tests, and, finally, to recommend adoption, or type classification, of materiél by the Army for combat deployment.84
The Armour Research Foundation (ARF) of the Illinois

Institute of Technology, under contract to CONARC, submitted a "Management Engineering Study of the Combat Developments System" on 31 March 1959. This study suggested among other things that the combat developments activities of the technical and administrative services be placed under the direct command of the Deputy Commanding General for Development, CONARC, and that the combat developments groups at the CONARC schools report directly to the Commanding General, CONARC, rather than through the school commandants. CONARC rejected these recommendations on two grounds. It said that current procedures for dealing with the technical and administrative services were satisfactory and that the change proposed would conflict "with established command channels within the overall Army organization." As a practical matter the suggested change in the relations between the combat developments groups in the schools and CONARC, the latter asserted, would require establishment of "an autonomous command which included at one site the.staff, facilities, and troops necessary to execute all aspects of combat developments." The Haworth Committee had recommended this, but CONARC was not prepared to go this far. 85
CONARC's organization indicating the status of its combat and materiél development agencies in January 1959 is outlined on Chart 23. After ten years the Army's program for combat developments was still a loose-jointed arrangement among CONARC, the General Staff (where three agencies were involved), and the technical and administrative services. Co­ordination and concurrences required to reach decisions on new weapons and equipment among so many agencies still required an enormous amount of time. This was equally true of the Army's research and development programs and symptomatic of the lack of effective executive control in these areas.
The Continental Army Command
The continental armies went through three major changes in their relations with the Department of the Army during the 1950s. One change was the inauguration of a combat developments program, discussed above. Another concerned the house-

Source: Organization & Functions Manual, Hq, USCONARC, 1 January 1959.
keeping functions performed by the continental armies for the technical service Class II installations within their jurisdiction. A third change involved resurrecting the principle of Army Ground Forces as a field command with command authority over the continental armies.
The housekeeping functions performed after World War II by continental Army commanders as landlords for their tenants, the Class II technical service installations, became a chronic source of irritation for the Army commanders who had to perform them, the technical services chiefs who complained service was inadequate, and the Army staff which had to referee the disputes that constantly arose.
The Army commanders in 1948 had sought full command and authority over all installations in their areas. This led to setting up Operation TACT in the Third Army area as a pilot project for testing the practicality of the Army commanders'

proposals. The Army staff considered the test a failure and attempted only to define more precisely the housekeeping responsibility of Army commanders for Class II installations in Special Regulation 10-500-1 of 11 April 1950.
This regulation listed more than sixty administrative and support functions that Army commanders were responsible for providing for Class II installations in their areas. The principal functions were repairs and utilities, accounting for 48 percent of the funds involved, and motor transport, accounting for another 17 percent. Others included manpower ceilings and authorizations; personnel funds; security and intelligence; information, education, and special services for military personnel and public relations; inspections; and common supply services such as food, medical care, and general supplies for installation operation.86
Despite this effort Army commanders and technical service chiefs continued to quarrel over responsibility for repairs and utilities, personnel authorizations, and motor pools. The Management Division of the Army Comptroller's Office, after a series of detailed investigations of technical service installations between 1950 and 1953, concluded that at least budgets and personnel required for repairs and utilities at these installations should be charged to the technical services.87
During this same period the Management Division of Headquarters, First Army, surveyed the housekeeping problems of selected technical service installations within its area. One major finding was that First Army did not have sufficient personnel to carry out its assigned housekeeping responsibilities. On the average, 32 percent of the military personnel spaces authorized in 1953 were not filled. Requests to convert these spaces to civilian positions were rejected by the General Staff because of arbitrary manpower ceilings imposed by Congress. As a result, Class II installations often had to divert their own funds to these functions.88
Repairs and utilities (R&U) created conflicts between

Army commanders and their technical service tenants because failure to perform these functions directly interfered with the latter's primary functions. Without them they could not operate. These functions included changes to and maintenance of real property, permanently installed equipment, utility services, plants and systems, fire protection, packing and crating, and insect and rodent control. Ordnance Department and Chemical Warfare Service industrial plants and arsenals which built and operated their own utilities were exempted.
It was difficult to determine what was properly repairs and utilities and what was the responsibility of the technical services. Maintaining and repairing production machinery and equipment, a responsibility of the technical services, was "dependent upon" maintenance functions paid for by R&U funds. Often there were separate repair shops set up for each category.
Planning and budgeting through two separate command channels created frequent delays, particularly when there was disagreement over priorities. The technical services resorted to diverting funds from their primary missions when they could not obtain sufficient funds from Army commanders. The First Army survey pointed out that had the technical services not diverted these funds the operations of their installations might have broken down or at least been seriously impaired. At one Quartermaster depot in upstate New York there were no R&U funds for snow removal. Prompt shipments in and out of the depot were considered vital for national defense; therefore Quartermaster funds were diverted to meet the immediate emergency. The Ordnance Corps often used emergency "expediting-production" funds for R&U projects. In defense of the Army commanders, the First Army survey said that they were often not informed sufficiently in advance of Class II requirements for R&U projects, a weakness it attributed directly to the system of dual command.
The survey concluded that, while there were many areas that could be improved within the existing system, basically the system of dual command was at fault. The Army commanders ought not to be assigned responsibility for support functions directly affecting the primary operations of Class II installations. Such matters as Red Cross, military police and justice, or fire protection did not fall in this category and

should remain the responsibility of Army commanders. These minor functions aside, "Class II installations and Class II activities should be provided with funds and personnel authorizations for mission and support functions through a single channel-the Parent Department or Army agency."89
The Davies Committee studied the First Army survey and recommended that responsibility for funds and personnel required to support Class II installations be assigned to the technical services. The Slezak report agreed and decided that this time unity of command, the basic concept that "a Commander must have control of the resources required for the accomplishment of his mission," should be decided in favor of the technical services instead of the Army commanders. As a result, under Army Regulation 10-50 of 25 March 1955 Army commanders were relieved generally of responsibility for providing funds, personnel, and other resources for principal Class II mission and support activities. They retained responsibility only for common support functions incidental to these primary missions: chaplains, military justice and provost marshal services, counterintelligence, medical and dental services, public information and troop education programs, and general inspection and review. Thus ended a decade of constant irritation and friction between the continental armies and the technical services.
The Establishment of CONARC
The Davies Committee's major criticism of the continental armies was that the Army's organizational framework for military operations and training was diffuse and confusing. The commanders of all the continental armies and the Military District of Washington reported directly to the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff was too involved in minor administrative decisions concerning the continental armies that ought to be made at a lower level.
The committee believed a Continental Army Command along the lines of the wartime Army Ground Forces would provide more effective control over the continental armies and relieve the General Staff of unnecessary involvement in operations. In addition to absorbing the current functions of the

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, a revitalized AGF should review plans, programs, and budgets for the continental armies, supervise individual and unit training, and direct the activities of the testing boards and the preparation of long-range combat developments plans.90
The Slezak report approved these recommendations, and under Change 7 of 1 February 1955 to Special Regulation 10-5-1 the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, was redesignated Headquarters, Continental Army Command, with command over the six continental armies, MDW, the five service test boards, an Arctic Test Branch, and three Human Resources Research units.91
In addition to performing the functions recommended by the Davies Committee, CONARC was also to be responsible for logistical and administrative support of the continental armies, except Class II installations. It assumed the functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for approving tables of organization and equipment and for preparing and reviewing tables of allowances. It was also assigned responsibility for preparing and executing plans for the "ground defense of the United States" and for preparing plans to assist civil authorities in disaster relief and controlling domestic disturbances.92
Despite its increased responsibilities on paper for financial management CONARC remained in concept and practice a tactical command like an Army group headquarters, "with the ZI Army Commanders acting as deputies to the CG, USCONARC for the administration of their own army areas," functions they had been performing since 1948. McKinsey and Company in its 1955 report thought effective control over the continental armies required that CONARC assume greater administrative responsibilities for supporting the ZI armies and eliminating General Staff involvement in these functions.93
More specifically McKinsey and Company recommended

that CONARC be assigned responsibility for distributing bulk manpower authorizations and for allocating personnel spaces within its command. Instead of confining itself to the Army's troop training program, CONARC should direct development and execution of all programs and missions of the CONUS armies, including supply and administrative support. The essential requirements, it asserted, was that CONARC gain "control over missions, programs, money, and manpower resources for managing the ZI Armies." 94
Under Army Regulation 10-7 of 4 April 1957 the Army group concept of CONARC was replaced by that of an overseas theater command with full control over the resources needed to direct the operations of the ZI armies as McKinsey and Company had recommended. CONARC's new responsibilities included manpower controls over both civilian and military personnel and the planning, direction, and control of nearly all major administrative and logistical support activities within the ZI armies. Under the Army's revised "Program System," as outlined in Army Regulation 11-1 of 31 December 1956, CONARC was made responsible, beginning in fiscal year 1959, for development, execution, and review and analysis of the new installations, mat6riel, reserve components, and research and development programs. Its new financial management responsibilities included the direction of progress and statistical reporting and the provision of "management engineering" assistance. It was also assigned responsibility for intelligence activities within the continental armies and for the management and direction of Army aviation training except for units under the command of the Chief of Transportation.
Further changes gave CONARC control over training of civil affairs and military government personnel and units in both the active Army and Reserve Components and over the management of hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical facilities. Following the 1958 recommendations of the "Report of the Officer Education and Training Review Board," in September 1960 the Commanding General, USCONARC, was designated Director of the Army Service School System and assigned responsibility for supervising curricula and instruction, among other things. The Military Academy and certain

advanced Army schools like the War College, the Army Logistics Management School, and professional medical courses were excluded. At this same time, CONARC's practical control over technical and administrative service schools remained very limited.95
The organizational changes discussed in this chapter were internal ones within the Department of the Army and the continental armies. The Palmer reorganizations of the Army staff represented a swing of the pendulum away from the effort made in 1950 to centralize control over the department and the Army under the three-deputy system. General Palmer sought instead to centralize control at the next lower level under the several General Staff divisions, vesting them with greater authority over the technical services and special staff agencies.
Despite General Palmer's efforts, control over Army logistics and the technical services remained necessarily fragmented among the General Staff divisions. The addition of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, created as the result of pressure from the scientific community both within and outside the Army, complicated the problem further.
The establishment of CONARC as a unified field command represented a return to the wartime concept of Army Ground Forces. In this change the fragmented control over the continental armies among the General Staff divisions was abandoned for centralized control in a single command. At the same time the divided authority exercised by the continental Army commanders and the chiefs of the technical services over housekeeping functions performed at technical service installations, a constant headache for all concerned after World War II, was abolished. The technical services were made responsible for the bulk of their own housekeeping functions.
The same technological developments which led to creation of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development and a separate Assistant Secretary for Research and Development resulted at the level of CONARC in efforts to set up an effective combat developments program which would combine new weapons and equipment with new tactical doctrines. The pro-

gram was still in its infancy at the end of the decade, plagued by the same fragmented control over its operations that bedeviled Army logistics generally.
These internal changes within the Department of the Army took place within the framework of organizational changes at the Department of Defense level that not only influenced Army structure but also changed the position of the Department of the Army within the Department of Defense. Particularly important were changes in the fields of financial management, common supply activities, and control over military operations.


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