Chapter 5: With Zachary Taylor in Northern Mexico

Following the official incorporation of Texas into the Union and as international relations with Mexico deteriorated in the spring of 1845, the U.S. government determined to put troops in Texas. In June Washington alerted Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor to prepare to move his army from Fort Jessup, Louisiana, into Texas. He concentrated his forces at New Orleans, and before the month was out Old Rough and Ready received orders to move into Texas after the state officially accepted annexation. While portions of his army went overland, Taylor accompanied the first troops, which set out on 23 July by sea for Corpus Christi. They reached the coast of St. Joseph's Island on the 26th and shortly thereafter moved by small boats to Corpus Christi.1

sumption! It is enough to make atheists of all to see such wickedness in the world whether punished or unpunished."2

Emory had actually prepared his map of the Southwest for the Department of State, and it was based on available information from the best authorities at the time. This included the explorations and maps prepared by Baron Von Humboldt, Lieutenant Zebulon Pike, and Major Stephen Long; from Fremont's 1842 expedition; and from various naval sources, atlases, and local materials. Although excellent for political purposes, Emory's small-scale map did not meet the needs of a military commander. Taylor's army needed a map with significant military information based on military reconnaissance patrols. To remedy the deficiency, the Topographical Bureau ordered several experienced topogs to report to General Taylor.3

One was 2d Lt. George Gordon Meade, who received his orders at home in Philadelphia on 12 August 1845 to report at once to Texas. Meade graduated from West Point in 1835, left the Army in October 1836, but then returned to active duty in 1842 as a second lieutenant in the Topographical Engineers. After an assignment as a topographer for the northeast boundary survey, he took on duties as a construction engineer to design and build lighthouses on Delaware Bay. The orders to report to Taylor's army came as an unexpected surprise to the young topographer.4

Meade followed a well-traveled route to his new assignment. From Washington he went by rail to Cumberland, Maryland. Next he took a mail stage to Wheeling in western Virginia, then continued his journey by land to Zanesville, Ohio. After reaching the Ohio River port town (where he took note of low river conditions), Meade boarded a river steamer which took him past Louisville and Cincinnati to the Mississippi River. After another river voyage,

Meade arrived in New Orleans on 4 September. The journey from Philadelphia took approximately nineteen days.5

Other topographers were reporting to what was being grandly called Taylor's "Army of Occupation." The newly designated chief Topographical Engineer for the command, Captain Thomas J. Cram, joined Meade in New Orleans, and on 12 September they met up with the third member of the topographic staff, Bvt. 2d Lt. Thomas J. Wood, at St. Joseph's Island. On the 15th, the three traveled twenty-five miles by steamboat to Corpus Christi. Meade recorded his initial impressions of the elderly Taylor in one of his many letters to follow to his wife: "I found [General Taylor] to be a plain, sensible old gentleman, who laughs very much at the excitement in the Northern States on account of his position, and thinks there is not the remotest probability of there being any war."6

Cram was an experienced topographer. Wood was just reporting to his first assignment. Cram received his commission as an Artillery officer from West Point in 1826; resigned from the Army in 1836, then returned to active duty as a topog in 1838. He had worked on a variety of internal improvements projects in the Midwest and was engaged in surveys of the Mississippi River near Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and harbor improvements in St. Louis before reporting to Texas. Wood, also a West Point graduate, received his commission in 1845 and reported directly to Taylor's army.7

Meade felt some uneasiness about his future assignment. He wrote to his wife, "I find matters pretty much as expected here; Colonel Abert's grand plan to carry out which, I was added to the number of officers asked for, is an entire failure, as General Taylor has his own views and plans, and does not intend to trouble himself with those of other people, so that there was not use in my coming, and I might have been of more services at the Tortugas." Apparently the old general's staff shared the same views. Meade, however, contended, "Now that I am here I want to see it out." Despite Taylor's failure to make full use of his staff, Meade grew to revere him.8

Taylor had definite plans to employ his topographers. Sending them forth to reconnoiter the region southward toward the Rio Grande, on 14 September he reported to Washington that he had directed his army to examine the nearby country in the direction of the contested river border. The general added that the reconnaissance would soon include surveys "of the Nueces and the Laguna Madra [sic] . . . in the event of a forward movement to the Rio Grande."9

Within a few days of their arrival at Corpus Christi, the three topogs were out in the field. Accompanied by a military escort they began systematic topographic surveys of the Nueces River, the Laguna de la Madre, and Aransas Bay. On the second day of their initial reconnaissance along the Nueces River to San Patricio, Wood became ill and returned to camp. The burden of work over the course of the thirteen day outing fell to Meade. The party struggled through tall prairie grass, described by the topog "as high as a man almost, which breaks you down marching through it." Roads in the area "are rendered impassable by a heavy rain; the soil is so soft they become boggy after a few hours, so that traveling and particularly marching large bodies of men, will be a very difficult operation."10

Upon his return to Taylor's encampment at Corpus Christi Meade felt a sense of accomplishment. On 10 October he wrote his wife, "I find my position here most agreeable." Regarding his topographic duties Meade added, "I have been much occupied in making drawings, which, as it has been done under the eyes of all the army, has enabled us to show them we are no idlers and mere civilians, but that, in anticipation of war, we are the first employed, and our duties of a most important nature."11

Shortly thereafter, the topog changed his heretofore positive views on the local climate. Meade had a mild bout with dysentery, this delayed a second reconnaissance to the Brazos Santiago, and a few days later all three topographers were seriously ill- Cram with

dysentery and Wood with a violent fever. Recovering, Meade said of the local environment, "Though I should not call the climate bad, I by no means call it good, for it is very changeable, the midday sun excessively hot, the nights cold, with very heavy dews." Meade also found it difficult to adjust to the "Northers" and the resultant violent temperature changes. He reported a forty degree change in a few hours and noted that "having been burned by the sun, you are frozen by the cold air, so that it requires a pretty stout constitution to stand the racket."12

Meade persevered, looked to the brighter side of his military duties, and tried to downplay the monotony and usual illnesses that plagued camp life. He believed he would remain in the area for quite a while even without a war. If negotiations improved, he thought he and the other topographers would be assigned to do the boundary survey. He cheerfully wrote his wife: "I have the pleasant prospect of spending a year here, at the least, if not more." Having regained his health, he began to tire of "A camp where there is not active service is a dull and stupid place, nothing but drill and parades, and your ears are filled all day with drumming and fifeing [sic]. All this is very pretty for such as have never seen it, but fifteen years of such business takes off the edge of novelty."13

On 13 November Meade began a reconnaissance of the Laguna de la Madre. He appeared to be the only effective topographer in Taylor's army, for Cram remained ill and Wood had departed for his home in Kentucky on two months' sick leave. This time Meade stayed out ten days exploring the area between the mainland and Padre Island. Illness again struck the young topog, this time he came down with a serious case of jaundice. By 9 December he managed to write his wife, "I have been as yellow as an orange, and although not sick enough to keep [to] my bed, yet I have felt very badly, and have been under the influence of medicine all the time." He refused sick leave and by the end of the month had recovered.14

As 1846 began Old Rough and Ready's Army of Occupation of regulars and volunteers had grown to nearly 4,000, almost half the strength of the entire U.S. Army. Units arriving over the course of

the six-month encampment at Corpus Christi settled down to a training routine, but the arrival of winter and its wet, miserable, and unhealthful weather, however, adversely affected training. The cold and often ill soldiers were forced to huddle in their tents, awaiting developments.15

Meanwhile, President Polk finally made his decision to move Taylor's army to the disputed Rio Grande boundary. On 3 February 1846, Old Rough and Ready received instructions to move, but he remained ignorant of the most direct land route to Matamoros almost until the last moment. During the preceding six months Taylor had directed the reconnaissances of the various routes, but unusually harsh winter weather inhibited good road surveys. By the 16th, however, he reported to the War Department that

Examinations are now in progress of the two routes to Point Isabel- that by the mainland and that by Padre island. The reports of the officers charged with these will determine the route of march. Our train, which is necessarily very heavy, is rapidly organizing, and we shall be to commence the movement by the 1st of March.16

Meade, now Taylor's Chief Topographical Engineer, busied himself doing field surveys. He accompanied Captain Joseph Mansfield, the senior Corps of Engineers staff officer, on a marine expedition near Corpus Christi to examine a coastal route along the Gulf of Mexico from Aransas Bay to Matagorda. The topog preferred to go by land on horseback, but he rationalized, "I would rather go in boats than be doing nothing." In another of his letters to his wife dated 18 February, Meade described what he had accomplished in the last month: "Since then we have been knocking about the bays between Corpus Christi and this place [Matagorda], making surveys, and visiting towns, and places where towns are to be." By the time he got back to Corpus Christi on 1 March, he learned of the orders for Taylor to march south to the Rio Grande.17

Also in Taylor's camp now was another Topographical Engineer, 1st Lt. Jacob E. Blake. He outranked Meade, though the latter still had the distinction of remaining as Taylor's chief Topographical Engineer. A graduate of the West Point class of 1833, Blake became an Infantry officer and then a Topographical Engineer in 1838. He served as a topog in Florida, worked on Lake Erie harbor construction between 1839-1841, surveyed the United States-Mexico boundary in 1841, and followed that with a series of military reconnaissance patrols of the approaches to New Orleans. He returned to Florida in 1842 as a command topographer and served there until reporting to Texas in September 1845.18

Blake reported his arrival at Corpus Christi to the Topographical Bureau on 27 September 1845, and regularly provided monthly reports of his activities. He scrupulously sent all available information back to the bureau, taking care on 25 January to send Meade's sketch of Laguna de la Madre to Colonel Abert. By 6 February Blake reported to the colonel of plans to reconnoiter Padre Island, and within three weeks he forwarded a copy of his completed report to the bureau.19

Blake's reconnaissance provided a detailed description of the route to Matamoros and the Rio Grande via Padre Island, and his report is a good example of providing crucial information to a tactical commander before the disposition of troops is decided. Blake reported on fording sites, the availability of wood, and the lack of grass- an important consideration in those days for an army's horses, mules, and oxen. After describing a feasible fording site across the Laguna de la Madre to Padre Island, Blake said that the next 106 miles down the island along the beach "were adapted to transportation by wagon, and for movement of Infantry."20

Blake also provided a detailed picture of Brazos Island, including comparisons between the port settlements of Brazos Santiago and Point Isabel. He determined that vessels with a draft of seven to eight feet could negotiate the narrow channel between Padre and Brazos islands near Brazos Santiago, where he observed sev-

eral Mexican vessels. He believed boats stood a better chance of not being blown ashore when compared to Point Isabel on the other side of the channel on the mainland. The topog added that barges could be used along the beaches around Brazos Santiago whereas only shallow draft vessels could navigate within 250 yards of Point Isabel. Blake also observed an American vessel at Point Isabel taking on a load of cotton and hides. One problem with Brazos Santiago, the topog noted, appeared to be its susceptibility to storms. Only the previous August a storm had virtually destroyed the town. Blake did not find suitable building materials for fortifications nor grass for the animals, and he concluded that the island "is merely a series of shifting sand hills or knolls liable to be washed or blown away by the violent gales."21

By contrast, Point Isabel had a good road leading to Matamoros. Grass, driftwood for fuel, and water appeared sufficient, and the area could be secured with a minimum of troops. Farther south, however, a shallow channel at Boca Chica between the mainland and Brazos Island seemed unfit for navigation or fording. Having continued up the mouth of the Rio Grande to Burrita, Blake reported that vessels with a five-foot draft could travel several miles up the river.22

About one month after receiving notification to move his army, and after carefully examining the various engineer reconnaissance reports, Taylor selected the mainland route over some 200 miles of sun-baked prairie. In retrospect, his decision appeared to be the right one. Meade was given the responsibility to examine the line of march and select and lay out positions for camps. He departed on 8 March with the advance guard under Colonel David E. Twiggs.23

Blake kept Colonel Abert and the Topographical Bureau informed of Colonel (Brevet Brig. Gen) William J. Worth's march to the Rio Grande. He inclosed a copy of the orders for the march, a sketch map, and pertinent remarks. His report also included a copy of orders he received near the Arroyo Colorado on the 22d

delineating the combat duties of a Topographical Engineer: "A subaltern and fifteen men of Dragoons will be kept about a mile in advance of the columns to communicate, at least hourly, intelligence of the enemy and of any obstructions to the march. The Topographical Engineer attached to the cavalry will accompany this advance." Following these orders, Blake recorded information on locations; the distances from Corpus Christi to Matamoros; the intermediate distances; appropriate information on the availability of water, wood, and grass; road conditions; and a geographic description of the route of advance.24

After reaching the disputed river boundary, Taylor set about fortifying his position opposite Matamoros and establishing supply lines to Point Isabel, now determined to be his base of supply. Under the supervision Captain Mansfield, the Americans hastily constructed an earthwork. By 2 April, Meade could describe "our position with the Mexicans on the opposite side of the river" as the "status quo." It was a grim land, "the most miserable desert, without wood or water, that I ever saw described, and perfectly unfit for the habitation of man." Listening to accounts of attractive women and congenial people on the other side of the river, a growing number of Americans deserted. Taylor ordered drastic measures to stop a mass desertion.25

ambushed and captured a small American force of dragoons, Taylor reported the opening of hostilities to Polk.26

Leaving behind enough men to defend the earthen fortification, Taylor set off on 1 May with the bulk of his army to secure Point Isabel. He returned on the eighth to find his garrison besieged and a Mexican army blocking his way at a watering hole called Palo Alto. Stretched out for more than a mile, at least 4,000 Mexicans faced 2,300 Americans. Taking the initiative, Taylor ordered an assault with bayonets. The advancing American infantry moved through knee-high, sharp edged grass, dodging solid cannon balls from smaller and ineffective Mexican artillery. Volleys from one of Taylor's infantry regiments repulsed a Mexican cavalry attack on the right, and mobile horse drawn "flying artillery" blasted the lancers as they tried to reform. By this time the gunfire had set the dry grass ablaze, and Taylor, using the cover afforded by the dense smoke, redeployed most of his force to the Mexican left. Heavy cannon barrages followed by enfilading fire from Taylor's mobile artillery threw back a Mexican counterattack. Next morning, the Mexicans, who had suffered heavy casualties, withdrew. Taylor had essentially won the battle by deadly effective use of his artillery.27

To obtain the important information, Lieutenant J. E. Blake, of the Topographical Engineers, dashed off from the right of our line to within musket-shot of the enemy's left. Here he dismounted, and with his field-glass coolly counted the number of men in one of the enemy's squadrons, which, of course, enabled him accurately to estimate the enemy's entire

cavalry force. Lieutenant Blake then remounted his horse, and galloped from left to right of the enemy's line, stopping from time to time, and carefully observing the formation and number of his infantry, as well as the position, number, and calibre of his field guns, all of which information was fully verified by the subsequent events of the day.28

Blake reportedly rode to within eighty yards of the enemy lines, where he dismounted. Two Mexican officers rode out to see if Blake intended to parley, but Blake remounted and went along the line. Incredibly, no shots came from the opposing line until he had returned to the American lines and had given his report to General Taylor. Another officer, riding next to Blake, later wrote that because of their nearness to the enemy lines: "Had they thought proper, they could have fired a volley from their main line, and swept us to Guinea; but they did not."29

The probability of a bright career for Lieutenant Blake ended tragically the morning after the battle. While riding with the general's train back to camp, he dismounted to get some refreshments and rest. When the topog unbuckled his holsters, they quickly fell to the ground accidentally discharging one of the pistols. The shot severely wounded him, and he died before evening. Blake's last thoughts expressed regret that he did not instead fall at Palo Alto. Taylor noted the sad news in his report of the battle and specifically mentioned Blake's valuable reconnaissance, which resulted in the discovery of at least two batteries of artillery amidst the Mexican cavalry and infantry.30

Taylor set out in the afternoon of 9 May with 2,000 men. The Americans again met the Mexican army a few miles to the south at Resaca de la Palma. This time they fought in a dry river bed on the road to the American encampment opposite Matamoros. Pushing units forward, Taylor directed assaults on both sides of the road. Dense chaparral forced the units into small groups, and fighting turned into an infantry battle with brutal hand-to-hand combat. The advancing infantry forced the Mexicans to abandon their positions east of the road, and soon the demoralized and leaderless Mexican soldiers turned about in panic and fled back toward Matamoros. The experienced American regulars and the leadership of the junior officers helped to carry the day. Again the Mexican army suffered much larger losses. Many Mexican soldiers, fleeing across the Rio Grande, either drowned in the swift current or died from the guns fired from the American earthwork, later named Fort Brown (now Brownsville) in honor of its fallen commander, Major Jacob Brown.31

Meade described the encounters at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Patina and of his role at Palo Alto. "I was in the action during the whole time, at the side of General Taylor, and communicating his orders," he told his wife, "and I assure you I may justly say I have had my 'bapteme de feu!' An officer of the General's staff had his horse shot under him, not two yards from me, and some five horses and men were killed at various times close, to me." Describing the Battle of Resaca de la Palma the following day, he sadly reported the wounding of Lieutenant Blake. Meade advised his wife, "Say also to him [Major Hartman Bache, a Topographical Engineer stationed in the area] that poor Blake, of ours, after having gallantly borne himself through the conflict yesterday, unfortunately shot himself accidentally today, just as we marched, and it is feared the wound is mortal."32

Shortly after the two battles, Taylor reported the details to Washington. He commended Blake and Meade for "promptly conveying my orders to every part of the field." After Resaca de la Palma, Taylor also wrote of Lieutenant Wood's help in setting up and firing of the artillery's eighteen pounder. Because of their as-

sortment of military skills, several other topogs had found also themselves later pressed into service as artillery officers.33

On 9 May 1846 President Polk received Taylor's report. Upon receipt of Polk's message that fighting had broken out in Texas, Congress approved a declaration of war and also passed a bill appropriating funds and authority to raise 50,000 volunteers.34

Surprisingly, the Regular Army was somewhat prepared for war. Though reduced to a strength of only 8,500 men, the cuts had not eliminated units. By this curious route, the expandable army envisioned long before by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun existed ready to be filled with new recruits. Congress also authorized the establishment of a regiment of mounted riflemen and a company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, the latter an engineering unit equipped with a new type of rubber floating bridge. The Topographical Engineers, however, remained unchanged; still to be a small branch composed completely of officers without any units or enlisted personnel. Altogether in the Mexican War, over 30,000 men served in the Regular Army and over 70,000 in the militia and volunteer units. The total number in service at a given time probably never exceeded 50,000.35

The U.S. government also began to formulate some rough strategic plans. President Polk, Secretary of War William L. Marcy, and Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, worked out a three-pronged strategy to defeat the enemy and acquire territory. Polk made clear his policy objective- to seize Mexican territory north of the Rio Grande and the Gila River and westward to the Pacific Ocean. Taylor's army opposite Matamoros would advance to the northern Mexican city of Monterrey; another army under Brig. Gen. John E. Wool would march from San Antonio to Chihuahua; and Colonel Stephen Kearny's Army of the West would depart Fort Leavenworth, occupy Santa Fe and New Mexico, and proceed to San Diego on the California coast. Later plans also

called for a force to land at Vera Cruz on the Gulf of Mexico, for a direct advance on Mexico City.36

When the Mexican army fled across the Rio Grande, Taylor lost an opportunity to destroy the demoralized enemy army. Instead, he delayed for over a week, blaming the War Department for not providing him with pontoon equipment back at Corpus Christi. Finally when the army did cross over the river to Matamoros, it discovered the enemy force had abandoned the town. Instead of pursuing the enemy, Old Rough and Ready elected to remain in the area to await the laborious effort to bring up supplies and their transport. July came before the first shallow-draft steamboat reached Camargo, a supply base established on a tributary of the Rio Grande. The wagons did not arrive until November, forcing Taylor to use Mexican pack mules and some native oxcarts to supplement his wagon train.37

You may probably ask, "What have you to do?" Well, after the battles I had to make surveys of each field; then I had to reconnoitre [sic] the river, eight miles above and five miles below our camp, to select a crossing place; and as soon as we entered Matamoros, instead of squatting down, as the rest have done, for a few days' quiet, I was immediately required to make an exact survey of the town and the adjacent country for one and a half miles. Upon this I am presently engaged.38

Two days later he had finished his survey and expected to take about a week to prepare the drawing.39

Regardless of his esteem for Taylor, the topog became somewhat frustrated with the old man's administrative inadequacies. Meade exclaimed in another of his frequent letters home that his commanding general's chief weakness

. . . is the entire and utter ignorance of the use to which the staff department can be put, and especially my own corps . . . . Did he have his own way, we should be perfectly useless; not from any unfriendly feeling on his part, but from absolute ignorance of what we can be required to do, and perfect inability to make any use of the information we do obtain.40

The topog also cited the general's failure to properly plan the bridging over the Rio Grande although he had more than ample time. Old Rough and Ready simply appeared to ignore his engineers' advice, and a nine-day delay resulted when he finally decided to cross the river. After the Mexican army quit Matamoros the engineers resorted to expedient measures by simply seizing some Mexican boats and the regular ferry. Meade cited this example as illustrative of the general's ignorance of the proper use of the command's engineers (both Corps of Engineers and Topographical Engineers):

Here is the General's defect. Had he knew [sic] how to use his engineers the month we were lying in camp, he would have had us at work experimenting, and when any plan proved successful, had a bridge constructed and put in depot, and then on the tenth, in three or four hours, the whole army, artillery and all, could have been crossed, and the Mexican army prevented from retreating with some twelve pieces of artillery.41

Also in late May Meade launched into one of his frequent diatribes against the volunteer troops now arriving in large numbers.

"The volunteers continue to pour in," he wrote, "and I regret to say I do not see it with much satisfaction. They are perfectly ignorant of discipline, and most restive under restraint. They are in consequence a most disorderly mass, who will give us, I fear, more trouble than the enemy." A few weeks later he also observed the volunteers' mistreatment of the indigenous population and added that this would prompt the Mexicans to rise en masse and obstruct progress into the country. Quite concerned, the observant topog added, "and if, when we reach the mountains, we have to fight the people as well as the soldiers, the game will be up with us."42

Meanwhile, Meade received instructions to examine the Rio Grande to Reynosa. He hopped aboard a steamboat and conducted the usual military reconnaissance along the way and jotted down more commentary of the country. The agricultural possibilities of the areas along the river impressed the topog. He believed the soil equaled that along the Mississippi and was particularly well suited for growing cotton and sugar. He correctly prophesied:

It is without doubt the finest part of Texas (if it belongs to Texas!) that I have seen and I anticipate its being densely populated, one day, when its resources are made available by the means of transporting its products to the sea. It has one advantage over the Mississippi Valley, which is its perfect salubrity.43

By July more Topographical Engineers reported for duty. Captain William G. Williams, another West Point graduate, arrived from his previous duty assignment as supervisor of the Great Lakes surveys. Williams, a member of the Class of 1824, received his commission in the Infantry and became a topog in 1834. His wide range of topographical duties included various surveys in the East, a reconnaissance of Cherokee lands in 1837-1838, and supervision of harbor work on Lake Erie.44

Second Lieutenant John Pope was also commissioned at West Point. He went directly into the Topographical Engineers in 1842 and served his first tour in Florida. Before reporting to Mexico the future Union general served as an assistant in the Northeast Boundary Survey.45

With Williams now as the senior topographer, Meade had hopes of serving in the same capacity in General Wool's army then gathering in San Antonio. Meade, however, remained with Taylor. On 9 July Williams and Meade received orders to reconnoiter the region from Camargo toward Monterrey. Delays prevented departure, and they did not reach Camargo until the 13th. On the 19th Meade got part of his wish to be a command topographer when orders attached him to Worth's division. Taylor had finally started to move his army deeper into the interior of Mexico with Monterrey as the next major objective. Now part of the vanguard again, the topog appeared contented. By the 26th they reached Cerralvo, about halfway to Monterrey from Camargo.46

Other reasons besides pressure from Washington forced Taylor to move on. By August his army had swelled to 15,000 men, but Camargo's unhealthy and hot climate began to take toll of the troops, especially the volunteers. Since the army's arrival on the Rio Grande a number of soldiers had deserted, some lured away by Mexican offers of land, and others, who were Catholics, by Mexican appeals to their common religion. Others found attractive senoritas as a good excuse to quit. The remainder simply found Army life distasteful and harsh. Now faced with a serious disciplinary problem among the volunteers, Old Rough and Ready decided to send many back home.47

Despite such distractions, most men remained loyal, and by the end of the month Taylor's army was heading toward Monterrey. With about 3,000 regulars and the same number of volunteers, Taylor organized the regulars augmented by some volunteers into

two divisions, and the balance of volunteers into a third division. A little more than a quarter of the American expeditionary force consisted of mounted troops, armed with the percussion-cap rifles. The infantry still carried flintlock muskets with fixed bayonets, the latter highly preferred by Old Rough and Ready as an assault weapon. His artillery consisted of four field batteries, two 24-pounder howitzers, and one 10-inch mortar, which remained the only weapon suitable for the forthcoming siege against strongly fortified Monterrey.48

Meanwhile, Meade roamed out front of Worth's column and reconnoitered the road to Monterrey. On one occasion he nearly encountered Mexican cavalry, and in a letter to his wife dated 3 September he outlined his next move:

Tomorrow I go forward in advance of the army with a strong working party and escort, to repair the road previously examined. The army will commence their march the next day, and in ten days from now we shall know whether Monterey is ours, by hard knocks or not.49

His road working party, however, did not depart until the 12th. The small mixed force, otherwise known as the Pioneer Advance consisting of ninety pioneers, cavalry, and rangers, made necessary road repairs for wagon traffic. A few days later, feeling confident that there would be little Mexican resistance, Meade confidently noted, "I have . . . pretty well made up my mind they will not fight." By the 19th the engineer work party and Worth's advance column reached the outskirts of Monterrey.50

Taylor's engineering staffs probed the city's defenses for soft spots. Major Mansfield, the chief of the engineer staff, informed Taylor of the town's strong fortifications, but they appeared vulnerable in the direction of Saltillo. Captain Williams' topog reconnaissance confirmed the weaker defenses. He reported the presence of makeshift fortresses on the two hills- Independence and Federation- protecting the western edge of town and overlooking the road to Saltillo. In addition, he reported that these positions ap-

peared difficult to reinforce. Based on these reports, Taylor decided to cut off Monterrey from this direction.51

On 20 September Old Rough and Ready ordered a double envelopment of the city. He sent Worth's division to the west, while the other two divisions struck from the east. The following day Worth succeeded in taking Federation Hill and cut the Mexican supply route to Saltillo. Two days later he moved his division up Independence Hill and captured the fortified ruins of the Obispado, an abandoned bishop's palace about halfway down the slope overlooking the city. Meanwhile, the main force made several feints followed by a series of assaults on the eastern edge of Monterrey and advanced into the city on the 23d. By midday the two attacks with bitter house-to-house and hand-to-hand street fighting closed in on the center of the city.52

Meade, of course, wrote a full description of his part in the battle for the city. He did not hesitate to alert his wife to the dangers of his reconnaissance duties and his close calls from the moment the first Mexican artillery rounds rained down on the Americans:

. . . one ball I assure you, came closer to me than I desire it to do again, just passing about two feet on one side of my knee. The remainder of the day was spent by the engineer officers in reconnoitering the positions of the enemy, a duty, I assure you, sufficiently hazardous, as they were obliged to go with small parties and far from the camp, giving enterprising enemy opportunity to cut them off.53

Meade continued to explain what happened the following day (20 September). While investigating enemy artillery positions, he received orders to accompany General Worth's flanking column. As the column advanced artillery began firing from Independence Hill, but the Americans managed to ensconce themselves near the

Saltillo road. Meade escorted Worth and a small party to the key road, and described the following action:

Our advance was covered by about fifty Texans, and we proceeded along the road for two miles, till we came into the gorge through which the Saltillo road runs, where the enemy were reported in large force to our front. Having seen all we wanted, we were about retiring, when they opened a fire upon us from a fence alongside of the road, where some of the rascals had sneaked up to cut us off, but it was promptly returned by the Texans, and we came quietly back to camp.54

On the 21st the Mexicans sallied out to attack Worth's flanking force along the Saltillo road. Meade recalled, "The Mexican cavalry charged on our people most gallantly, but were received with so warm a fire as to throw them into confusion." The attackers fled, and Worth pushed on to take Federation Hill. That afternoon the Americans captured the hill and its key fortification, Fort Soldado.55

During this time, Taylor moved the remainder of his attacking forces toward the city. The diversionary attack on the eastern part of town on 21 September met with stiff resistance from the defenders, who barricaded the streets and turned the stone houses into fortifications. The probe unexpectedly developed into a full-scale assault, and the Americans were raked with heavy fire from the Citadel, the fortified ruins of an uncompleted cathedral about 1,000 yards north of the city, and other defensive positions in the city. The Mexicans repulsed the American attack on the Citadel, and La Teneria, an earthwork on the northeast corner of the city, fell only after heavy losses.56

Officers of both engineering corps directly participated in the assaults on the city's northeastern defenses. The Topographical Engineers fought alongside their Corps of Engineers colleagues, often helping Engineer officers in reconnaissances and assaults. Mansfield used a map prepared by Meade, consulting it to designate points of attack on the town's defenses. When the diversionary attack developed into an assault, Mansfield called on Williams

and Pope to help him pick out other locations for the attacking units. As one participant later recalled, "Major Mansfield and Captain Williams were far in our front."57

Taylor's assault on the city turned out to be poorly executed, and many brave officers, including Williams, fell that day. "Captain Williams, of the topographical corps," recalled one observer, "lay on one side of the street, wounded; the gallant Major Mansfield, wounded in the leg, still pressed on with unabated ardor, cheering the men, and pointing out the places of attack."58 At the end of the first day only La Teneria remained in American hands. The attackers had to withdraw from other forward positions, and no major action occurred the following day. The critically wounded Williams remained in a Mexican hospital until his death on 23 September. Pope, at his side at the time, later wrote to Abert of this latest tragic loss to the Topographical Engineers, "he wished it to be made known, he fell while leading the advance and in the discharge of his duty."59

On the 21st Worth's division on the western edge of the city prepared for an assault on Independence Hill. Just before dark the assault force moved out in a rain storm to their attack position at the base of the hill. Meade helped guide these troops to their proper places. At three in the morning of the 22d the Americans moved up the steep, rough slope of the hill, and following a brief fight took Fort Libertad. After Captain John Sanders of the Corps of Engineers located a suitable path up to the fort, troops dismantled a 12-pounder howitzer and dragged it up to a position overlooking the city. Worth's men next seized the fortified ruins of the Obispado, and by late afternoon the western approaches to the city were firmly in American hands.60

By the 23d the Americans pushed into the city from two directions. As Taylor's main force cautiously advanced toward Monterrey's defense, Worth's artillery shelled the city from the west. Worth sent Meade to reconnoiter the Mexican artillery facing the hill, and the topog found that the enemy had abandoned that portion of the town. By the afternoon the Americans moved through the city, street by street, burrowing from house to house. Meanwhile, to their pleasant surprise they discovered that the Mexicans had abandoned their strong outer defenses, except the Citadel, and concentrated around the Cathedral in the town's central area.61

On 24 September an armistice was reached. The Mexican commander, fearing that his munitions would be detonated by the constant shelling, surrendered in return for an eight week armistice. That evening Taylor agreed to the lenient terms because of his own critical condition, and he believed that peace now could be worked out between the two nations. Meade approved of the general's generous terms, and noted, "Here was an army of six-thousand men giving up to us a town with twenty-two pieces of artillery and a vast amount of the munitions of war, and retiring eighty miles to the interior and leaving us in a place they had attempted to defend."62

Reports prepared by the commanders reaching Washington after the battle also singled out the topogs contributions. Meade and Pope received brevet promotions to first lieutenant. Colonel Abert also recommended brevets for the deceased Williams and Blake, the latter for his heroic service at Palo Alto.63

With Williams' death, Meade again became Taylor's Chief Topographical Engineer. As the Mexican army began its withdrawal from Monterrey, the topogs started to prepare detailed maps of the battle which Taylor included in his report to the War Department. Meade continued mapping the town and the surrounding area, but he received orders to report again to Worth's command for operations along the Saltillo road. Pope remained behind to continue the triangulation survey around Monterrey.64

They have a joke among the officers, that it is bad business for any officer to be sent here to command me, for he will be sure to be killed; and it is strange. Of the three superior officers who have been sent here at various times, the first (Captain Cram) had to leave the country soon after his arrival, on account of ill-health; the second (poor Blake) shot himself; and the third (Captain Williams) fell in recent operations against Monterey; leaving me each time the senior officer of the Topographical Engineers.65

In any case, Colonel Abert appreciated Meade's reports and maps. As noted, the topogs assigned to a field command did not have to report to the Topographical Bureau, but Colonel Abert insisted on receiving useful topographic information. In late November Abert acknowledged Meade's efforts: "The sketch and legends are highly creditable to you, and have been examined by the President and the Secretary of War." The colonel also verified the receipt of Williams' personal effects and accounts, which Meade took the time to administer.66

Meade also wrote his wife about the condition of the troops after the battle. He expressed concern over the increasing incidence of illness among the soldiers, a threat more serious to an army even than battle. On a more positive note, however, the topog noted that control over the volunteer troops seemed to improve. His superiors knew how the volunteers could antagonize the local populace, and they acted accordingly. Taylor, to avoid incidents between his troops and the people, established his camp with most of the army three miles from town. Worth kept only a few troops in Monterrey.68

Meade continued to pen his thoughts on the strategy of the war. The future Civil War general and Union commander at Gettysburg advocated a landing at Vera Cruz and a march on Mexico City. On 5 October he wrote his wife that a plan merely to hold the northern Mexican provinces would result in a long-term occupation and the needless sacrifice of American lives. He concluded,

We may go on in this way for five years, and not conquer peace. The loss of a few soldiers, and the temporary occupation of her frontier towns, is no embarrassment to Mexico; her capital and vital parts must be touched. Once occupy these (and we can do it as readily as we operate here, if we have the proportionate means), and she will be brought to terms.69

Taylor's armistice in Mexico did not meet with President Polk's approval. Learning of the terms, the president ended the armistice, declaring angrily that another opportunity to defeat the enemy and conclude the war had been lost. Major James D. Graham, a Topographical Engineer, arrived in early November with dispatches from Washington directing Old Rough and Ready to end the armistice and resume operations. Meade wrote home of his support for the "old gentleman" and the wisdom of the armistice terms as he saw it:

For myself, individually, you know my sentiments; opposed, at first, to this war, brought on by our injustice to a neighbor, and uncalled for aggression, she, in her stupidity and folly, giving our rulers plausible excuses for their conduct; but when once in it, I should and have desired to see it

conducted in a vigorous manner, and brought to a speedy conclusion by its being carried on with energy well directed. But such has not been the case, nor will it ever be so, as long as generals are made in the countinghouses and soldiers on farms.70

The struggle resumed with American forces occupying more of Mexico. In November, Taylor marched southwest to take Saltillo, the U.S. Navy seized the port of Tampico on the Gulf, and General Wool's army of 3,400 men began a long march from San Antonio to join Taylor's army. By December another column, the 850-man 1st Missouri Mounted Volunteers under Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, set forth from Valverde, New Mexico, crossing some 1,800 miles of difficult country, also to join Taylor. As the year ended the American forces occupied nearly all northeastern Mexico.71

Meade found Saltillo "a very pretty place, though not so beautifully situated as Monterey [sic]." He immediately noted a great difference in the agriculture of the newly occupied region which brought forth fields of wheat instead of orange and banana groves. The topog had little time to investigate the town, and he departed the next day on a three day reconnaissance. During the operation he covered twenty-five miles and boasted that such duties were "keeping up with my reputation of always being among those who penetrate farthest into the country."72

Meade returned with Taylor to Monterrey, where he prepared more sketches for the general's reports. There he noted that problems with the volunteer units had again surfaced. The astute lieutenant believed attaching regular officers and enlisted men to every volunteer regiment would bring order to the volunteers:

Let the colonel be taken from the lieutenant colonels, and the captains from the lieutenants. The army can well spare these officers, for it is organized for such a purpose. Then in each regiment you would have enough practical knowledge to give a tone to it, and the volunteer regiments would soon be as efficient as regular troops. But, as it is, the generals know no more than the privates, and it is only by attaching regular officers, as staff officers, that they get along at all.73

Meanwhile, Meade's tenure as Taylor's chief topog nearly ended again. Captain Thomas B. Linnard, a West Point graduate with sixteen years service, arrived in November to take over as the command's senior topographer. Linnard graduated in 1830 and received a commission in the artillery and served in combat in Florida during the Seminole War. He became a topog in 1838 and worked on harbor improvement projects in Delaware Bay, New York, and Mobile between 1843-1846. This time the bad fortune that seemed to afflict Meade's superiors did not strike the new chief topog too severely. Linnard soon came down with a fever rendering him unfit for immediate duty, but he soon recovered.74

In December Taylor, under orders from Washington, expanded his operations southeastward to Victoria to meet American forces at Tampico. By then Wool's army had reached Parras to the west of Monterrey, and an army task force under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson had occupied Tampico. Worth would remain at Saltillo, and Maj. Gen. William O. Butler and a force of volunteers would remain at Monterrey. With his rear secured Taylor set out on the 15th with a task force consisting of Brig. Gen. David E. Twiggs' division of regulars and Brig. Gen. John A. Quitman's division of volunteers. Meade came along as the topographer. Three days out on the march, Taylor received information that General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna had regained the presidency of Mexico and raised a view army. The wily Mexican leader appeared to be leading this army on a long march toward Monterrey. Taylor rushed back leaving Quitman to proceed to Victoria. The threat to Monterrey turned out to be a false alarm, and Old Rough and Ready resumed his march to Victoria.

Meanwhile, Quitman had the Topographical Engineer reconnoiter the road southward to Tulla. Based on information obtained from a local native the topog decided to turn back short of his destination. "I found the rascally Mexican had deceived me," Meade later wrote, "and that I was within six miles of one hundred and fifty Mexicans. The object of my expedition was, however, fully accomplished- the examination of the road- and I satisfied myself that the road was impractical for wagons or artillery."75

A change in U.S. strategy, however, shifted the bulk of American forces to a new theater of operations. Mexican leaders still had not come to terms. President Polk, realizing the impracticality of moving south from Saltillo over inhospitable terrain, decided to go ahead with the operation to land at Vera Cruz and march inland to take Mexico City. General Scott set into action his plans to assemble a force for the amphibious operation and march the shorter route overland to the Mexican capital. Upon arriving in Mexico Scott proceeded to take more than half of Taylor's army and almost all his regulars, including Meade. Scott then ordered Old Rough and Ready to deploy his remaining force to defensive positions around Monterrey.76

While excited over his new assignment, Meade admitted he "regretted exceedingly parting with the old man." The topog also heard that Scott had six Topographical Engineers with him at Brazos Santiago, and four of the officers outranked him. After serving several times as command topographer, he would now "have to play fifth fiddle."77

For a short time Meade served as Patterson's chief topog with orders to reconnoiter a healthful site for an encampment near Tampico. On 3 February Captain John McClellan reported to Patterson and became his chief Topographical Engineer. Although disappointed to be subordinate again, Meade did appreciate getting three extra pairs of spectacles that McClellan picked up from Mrs. Meade. "I was on my last pair," he wrote his wife, "and I have had some terrible frights lately when I thought I had lost them."78

John McClellan was an experienced topographer with twenty years of Army service. He received his commission at West Point as an Artillery officer in 1826, resigned in 1836, but returned to active duty as a Topographical Engineer in 1838. He served in various topographic assignments including two tours of duty in Florida during the Seminole War, harbor improvements in North Carolina, and duty at the bureau. Before reporting to Mexico McClellan supervised harbor improvement projects on Lake Michigan.79

While McClellan and Meade waited in Tampico for the next move, Meade continued his flow of letters. He filled his correspondence with the latest rumors and his feelings on the conduct of the war. He noted, "We are in a complete state of ignorance as to what is to be done," but when he learned of events the topog unleashed strong views. When Meade heard that Mexican troops retook Victoria and punished citizens who had cooperated with the Americans, he presented some perceptive thoughts on occupying and pacifying a country:

This I considered cruel treatment on the part of our government, to send troops to occupy a place, hoist our flag, give appearances of protection to all, threatening those who are unwilling to serve you, thus making and forcing them to perform acts for which they are punished by their own armies, on our evacuating the place. Either let the people alone, or when you once have taken a place, hold it and protect those who compromise themselves by serving you. When is the Government of the United States going to awaken from its lethargy and send into Mexico force sufficient to prosecute the war vigorously?80

Soon Meade departed to another theater of war. By 24 February Scott passed through Tampico en route to Lobos Island in preparation for the Vera Cruz landing. McClellan and Meade, both now officially in Scott's command, departed Tampico on 1 March aboard a ship destined for Lobos Island. They departed amidst news of a large Mexican force approaching Taylor's positions near Saltillo.81

Meanwhile, Old Rough and Ready had disregarded his instructions and moved his smaller forces too far forward. Earlier Scott had ordered him to remain passive, noting, "I must ask you to

abandon Saltillo, and to make no detachments, except for reconnaissances and immediate defense, beyond Monterrey." Advice or order, Taylor ignored it and moved about 4,500 of his remaining troops to advanced positions some twenty miles farther south of Saltillo to Agua Nueva on the San Luis Potosi road.82

About this time General Santa Anna had intercepted a message from Scott to Taylor revealing the American plans. He decided to march his army over the desert wastelands first to strike the weakened Taylor and then return south to deal with Scott. On 21 February news reached a surprised Taylor of an approaching Mexican army estimated at some 15,000 men. Withdrawing up the Saltillo road to a better defensive position about a mile south of Buena Vista Ranch, Taylor positioned his troops in a region of mountain spurs, deep ravines, many gullies, and high hills.83

Near Buena Vista Wool deployed troops in a strong defensive position that he and Taylor had agreed on earlier. His topogs examined the defensible terrain features and seemed quite pleased to observe a network of deep gullies, ravines, and heights overlooking the road. The road itself traversed three miles of a narrow corridor called La Angostura, or "Narrows." Shortly after midnight of the 22d, the remaining forces at Agua Nueva withdrew to the defenses outside Buena Vista.84

A bitter and complicated battle followed on the 23d. After a day of inconclusive fighting, Santa Anna launched an attack on the American left, sending the defenders reeling backward. U.S. infantry and mobile artillery crossed over from the right and reestablished the defense line. Taylor, returning from Saltillo with reinforcements, sent the Mississippi Rifles, a regiment commanded by Jefferson Davis, to halt the next attack. Joined by the 3d Indiana, the two regiments, reinforced by the mobile artillery, formed a wide angle- the "V" of Buena Vista and halted another assault, thereby marking the turning point of the battle. After another bloody day the exhausted Americans still held the field as nightfall

approached. Early the next morning they saw the dispirited Mexican columns heading south. As a result Taylor claimed another victory, this one by default.85

The topogs received due recognition for their part in the battle. Both Linnard and Pope, along with their Corps of Engineers colleagues and the topogs serving with Wool, went out on hazardous reconnaissance patrols and served as couriers. Taylor commended the topogs in his official report; Linnard received a promotion to brevet major and Pope became brevet captain.86

Another account reported that Linnard also helped Lt. Col. R. S. Dix to rally men of the retreating 2d Indiana. Dix took the unit's standard and derided the fleeing men for deserting their colors. Linnard joined him, and soon both officers had men gathering around the flag. Dix somehow found a fife and drum and had the national quickstep played, and the troops marched off behind him with Linnard bringing up the rear. They directed the Indianans toward the Mississippi Rifles, thereby bringing the once-fleeing men back into the battle.87

Buena Vista also became Taylor's last major battle. During the fighting he acted in his usual manner. He conspicuously perched himself on his horse "Old Whitey" in the center of the battle, disregarded the Mexican bullets, and calmly offered encouragement to the troops. The battle brought major campaigning in northern Mexico to an end. Santa Anna turned his battered army to the south. Following a long, harsh forced march the Mexican leader soon gathered another army to deal with Scott, then in the process of moving his army inland from Vera Cruz. During the remainder

of the war Taylor's army remained on the defensive. Operations consisted mainly of securing the roads, controlling Mexican guerrillas and bandits, and administering the occupied territories.

Taylor's Topographical Engineers settled down to more mundane tasks for the duration of the war. They mapped northern Mexico, drew up battlefield maps for the commanders' reports, and accomplished detailed reconnaissances of the area. By the end of March Linnard, using Lieutenants Franklin (who had arrived earlier as part of Wool's command) and Pope to help, completed a survey of the Buena Vista battlefield. In forwarding the finished map to the Topographical Bureau, Linnard confidently noted that it "may be relied on for accuracy." He considered this a significant accomplishment because the topographic instruments inherited from Meade turned out to be in poor condition. Linnard lamented, 'The prismatic compasses are disabled, the pocket chronometer and theodolite also. The latter when I received it had no legs. The telescopes are utterly worthless- far inferior to the common ships glasses."88

Linnard's topogs also had to satisfy other requirements for Colonel Abert. Because the original copies of reconnaissance reports prepared during Wool's march to Mexico did not reach Washington, Franklin began the laborious process of making new copies for the bureau. He also had the thankless job of deciphering the nearly illegible handwriting of their author, Captain George W. Hughes', Wool's chief topographer at the time. By August 1847, 1st Lt. Lorenzo Sitgreaves, also one of Wool's topographers, began a project to satisfy Abert's request for maps. Sitgreaves sketched a map of Wool's march to Saltillo and another from Saltillo to the mouth of the Rio Grande by way of Monterrey and Matamoros. The colonel also desired a detailed reconnaissance to the south toward San Luis Potosi.89

The topogs also faced difficulties in getting the required specialized equipment and materials to do their work. Linnard had re-

quested replacement instruments from New Orleans, but without success. Getting the delicate, hard-to-replace, and expensive equipment appeared almost impossible, and he complained to Colonel Abert, "An order for a reconnaissance is now before me, and we have not a prismatic or even a common pocket compass. It is very desirable that instruments should be sent out." His request included a theodolite, six prismatic compasses, a box of colors, good tracing paper, note books, mapping pens, pencils, a pocket chronometer, and a small spring wagon to carry instruments. He also needed funds to carry on his work. Logistically, the frustrated topogs found themselves much worse off than the rest of the Army in Mexico.90

Colonel Abert also succeeded in exerting some influence from far off Washington to insure an orderly flow of topographic information. With the resultant lull in the northern theater, the amount of information forwarded to the bureau had decreased. Abert could not understand this, and he prodded Linnard to get his topogs to use their time more productively. In November the colonel wrote, "I cannot forbear expressing to you my surprise at the little information from your command since you have been attached to the Army in North Mexico." To this he added his concern about the lack of topographic information received since the Buena Vista report.91

The Chief of the Corps of Topographical Engineers sternly suggested to Linnard that he should embark on a program. Colonel Abert wrote, "A complete survey should have been made of the road from Monterrey to Saltillo with plans of intricate passes on a more extensive scale; also the road from Saltillo to Agua Nueva, with details of passes, with memoirs describing the military, agricultural, manufacturing and fiscal resources of the country." He concluded that the area should be accessible and that surely enough Topographical Engineers were available to accomplish the work.92

This friendly advice spurred the topogs of the Army of North Mexico to increase their efforts. Linnard cautiously responded that not all the requested work could be accomplished. By April 1848, however, the brevet major forwarded a detailed report along with sketches of a reconnaissance that he and Pope made of the

roads from Saltillo to Mayapil. Pope enclosed a separate report of a reconnaissance that he made along the San Luis Potosi road to Cedral. Colonel Abert, happy to get whatever information he could, gratefully acknowledged Linnard's reports.93

This episode showed the little control that Abert had over the activities of his Topographical Engineers once they were assigned to the field commands. Abert normally depended on the topogs in the field to use their discretion in forwarding useful information to him. Strong admonitions to officers in the field, as in the case of Linnard, were rare.94

By the spring of 1847 the war appeared to be going well for the United States. Around the time Mexican forces departed from Buena Vista, American forces had successfully occupied California, the American Southwest, and northern Mexico. The U.S. Navy blockaded the Pacific and Gulf ports, and U.S. Army and naval forces occupied several ports. Peace, however, was still not at hand.