In leading the Eighth Army according to the uncommon prescriptions of his instructions from General Ridgway, General Van Fleet would culminate a long career already noted for unusual episodes. Graduating from West Point in 1915 with the class "the stars fell on," he initially matched the rise of classmates such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar N. Bradley, commanding a machine gun battalion as a very young major during World War I and becoming a colonel in command of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division, by the time of American entry into World War II. A hiatus then developed when Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, who mistook Van Fleet for a similarly named intemperate officer who had served under Marshall years earlier, disapproved his promotion to brigadier general. Ironically, Van Fleet was a teetotaler.1
Rectification came with remarkable swiftness after Van Fleet led the 8th Infantry ashore at Normandy on 6 June 1944. Within five months he rose from colonel to major general and within nine months from regimental to corps command. General Eisenhower later rated his battle record as the best of any regimental, division, or corps commander in the European theater. Van Fleet received his third star early in 1948 along with an unprecedented assignment as head of a joint U.S. military advisory and planning group in Greece, where he received wide acclaim as he guided Greek government forces to victory over a Communist-supported insurgency. After thirty-six years of service and at age fifty-nine, he would receive the additional star of a full general in Korea at the end of July 1951.2
From Normandy to Korea, Van Fleet's career had benefited from the attention of the current Army chief of staff. As commander of the VII Corps during World War II General Collins instigated Van Fleet's initial rise into general officer ranks, as deputy chief of staff in 1948 he nominated Van Fleet for the post in Greece, and it was Collins who originally recommended Van Fleet as Ridgway's successor. "Van," in Collins' estimation, "was cast in the same mold as Ridgway as a fighting man," and "could take over the Eighth Army without a falter in its high morale and aggressive spirit."3
Van Fleet showed some variation in "mold" when asked during his first press conference on 22 April to explain the goal of Eighth Army operations under his direction. Notwithstanding
his rather explicit instructions from Ridgway, he replied that he did not know. The answer, he said, would have to come from higher authority. But if he had yet to attune himself to the conditions and requirements of the war as Ridgway saw them, from the start he otherwise would compare closely with his predecessor in attitude and tactics as commander of the Eighth Army.4 It was perhaps a reflection of his experience in Greece that Van Fleet, in his initial inspection of the front, went first to the ROK Army zone in the east.5 In December President Rhee had requested American weapons and equipment to place more South Koreans under arms, an appeal that had generated interest in Washington. But General MacArthur had twice recommended disapproval, most recently on 6 April, largely on grounds that the ROK Army's past poor performances raised doubt that anything would be gained by increasing its size. The need to improve the quality of the ROK Army was one reason General Collins had recommended Van Fleet for the ground command in Korea. One of Van Fleet's bigger projects, and successes, in Greece had been to build its army into an effective organization.6
The Enemy's Conspicuous Absence
There was little activity in the South Korean Army zone when Van Fleet reached Kangnung on 16 April for a conference with ROK Defense Minister Sign Sung Mo; General Chung; General Farrell, the KMAG chief; and General Paik, the former commander of the ROK 1st Division now in command of the ROK I Corps. Since occupying positions around Yangyang above line Kansas on the 10th, the ROK I Corps had had no contact on its front, and on the 11th a company from the 29th Regiment, 9th Division, had patrolled some fifteen miles north of Yangyang without encountering enemy forces. (See Map 31.) (The 69th Brigade, the corps' longtime, if weak, opponent, had been taken off the line and disbanded, and the North Korean 2d Division, now
responsible for the coastal area, had yet to deploy forces in contact.) Currently moving to join the corps for seasoning- small as that prospect was at the time-was the ROK 11th Division, green to combat except for antiguerrilla operations conducted in southwestern Korea since October.7 In the narrow ROK III Corps zone high in the Taebaeks, the ROK 3d Division, despite having to be resupplied entirely by air and carrying parties in the virtually roadless mountains, had beaten back detachments of the North Korean 45th Division to reach line Kansas on the 14th, and its patrols since then had encountered few enemy forces above the line.8 The scant opposition to the South Koreans, and especially the ROK III Corps' want of a good supply road, would prompt one of Van Fleet's first operations orders.
Next to the west, the three divisions of the X Corps were just beginning to consolidate positions along the Kansas line on 16 April. Since the 10th, after it became obvious that North Korean 1st Division forces opposite the corps left were withdrawing hastily eastward from the ground below the Hwach'on Reservoir, the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division had swung east along the lower shore in pursuit. Abandoned ammunition, food supplies, and a fully stocked aid station evidenced the enemy's haste. Ahead of the pursuing forces, the bulk of the enemy division's 1st Regiment (also known as the 14th Regiment) crossed the reservoir at a narrow point three miles northwest of Yanggu, using boats and rafts that were burned after the crossing; the remainder moved to Yanggu and then north around the eastern end of the reservoir. Leading forces of the 23d Infantry entered Yanggu and reached line Kansas on the 15th.9
The hard spots of North Korean resistance encountered just above the Soyang River by the 7th Division at X Corps center and the ROK 5th Division at the right had begun to dissolve on 13 April. The 5th Division cleared North Korean 45th Division forces out of their defenses around Inje on the 15th, and after artillery pounded the ridges north of town during the night, dawn attacks carried the South Koreans to line Kansas with negligible contact. The 17th Infantry, advancing on the 7th Division's left through decreasing opposition from North Korean 15th Division forces, found Route 29 leading into Yanggu obstructed by booby-trapped fallen trees and cleverly placed wooden box mines but gained line Kansas and made contact with the 2d Division in Yanggu on the 15th and 16th. On the division's right, the 32d Infantry pushed through brief but sharp resistance to reach the line early on 17 April.10
Beginning on the 17th, X Corps patrols ranging above line Kansas found progressively fewer enemy forces. Gen-
eral Almond attempted to follow the North Korean withdrawal by establishing forward patrol bases in all division zones, whence strong patrols were to advance farther north each day in search of enemy positions. As of 20 April the patrolling had reached a depth of about two miles without meeting significant resistance.11
On the opposite side of the Hwach'on Reservoir, IX Corps patrols sent forward of line Kansas by the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions began to bring back reports of Chinese withdrawal when forces engaged in Operation DAUNTLESS to the west drew closer to line Utah. (See Map 29.) By 17 April the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had replaced the 7th Cavalry after the latter's unsuccessful effort to capture the Hwach'on Dam, established outposts near the dam on the ridge inside the Pukhan loop and on heights above the Pukhan to the west. On the 18th a Marine patrol crossing the Pukhan four miles west of the dam found Hwach'on town on Route 17 unoccupied except for eleven Chinese, whom the patrol took captive. Intelligence officers appraised the voluntary withdrawal ahead of the two IX Corps divisions as a realignment of forces with those dropping back in the DAUNTLESS sector but did not overlook the possibility that the Chinese were coaxing the IX Corps into a vulnerable deployment. A recently captured document, dated 17 March, extolled the virtues and explained the purpose of "roving defensive warfare," defined as defense through movement without regard for the loss or gain of ground which could "conserve our own power, deplete the enemy's strength, and secure for us more favorable conditions for future victory."12 (This scheme of defense had a pronounced similarity to the tactical concepts General Ridgway set for the Eighth Army in February.)
As General Van Fleet completed an east-towest tour of the front on 17 April, the first phase of Operation DAUNTLESS was a virtual success. On the east flank of the advance, the British 27th Brigade of the IX Corps had cleared minor 40th Army forces from Paegun Mountain above the headwaters of the Kap'yong River to reach line Utah the day before. The 19th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division was currently relieving the brigade, which, except for the New Zealand artillery assigned to stay forward in support of the South Koreans, was withdrawing into corps reserve near Kap'yong town. The relief in part was in preparation for the second DAUNTLESS phase in which the IX Corps would make a full advance with the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions. While in reserve, the British brigade also was to begin rotating units under a British policy calling for annual replacement. The 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was to be replaced on 23 April by the 1st Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borders; on the 25th, brigade headquarters itself was to leave the line and be replaced by a new staff and commander from Hong Kong. The brigade at that time would become the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade under
the command of Brigadier George Taylor.13
On the west flank of the DAUNTLESS attack, at approximately I Corps center, the 65th Infantry of the 3d Division, reinforced by the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team and two companies of the 64th Tank Battalion, had easily defeated 26th Army detachments in a narrow zone between the Imjin River and Route 33 to reach line Utah on 14 April. In the right half of the corps zone, delaying forces of the 26th and 40th Armies had been more reluctant to give way before the 25th and 24th Divisions advancing toward Ch'orwon and Kumhwa. The 25th Division spent four days crossing the Hant'an River and getting a foothold in the Pogae-San heights, a series of steep north-south ridges between Routes 33 and 3, and needed two days more to cover half the ten-mile distance between the Kansas and Utah lines. East of Route 3, the 24th Division attacking through the Kwangdok-san ridges shouldering the Yongp'yong River gained scarcely a mile in three days. But by 17 April resistance weakened in both division zones. On that date a company of the 6th Tank Battalion, 24th Division, moved up Route 3 within seven miles of Kumhwa without contact. On the following day, in the 25th Division zone, a battalion of the 35th Infantry, two companies of the 89th Tank Battalion, and an artillery battery moved through the upper Hant'an River valley within five miles of Ch'orwon before receiving fire. Impeded by rugged ground, heavy rains, and somewhat stiffer resistance beginning on 19 April, the two divisions were on line Utah on the 20th except at the left of the 25th Division where enemy delaying forces held up the attached Turkish brigade along Route 33.14
Stretched by the DAUNTLESS gains of the 65th Infantry, the western I Corps front by 20 April lay along thirty miles of the meandering Imjin, from its mouth northeastward to a point on Route 33 ten miles below Ch'orwon. At the left, the ROK 1st Division sat astride Route 1 with its tank destroyer battalion (still organized and fighting as an infantry unit) and 11th and 12th Regiments stretched out from the mouth of the Imjin to the river's Korangp'o-ri bend fifteen miles upstream. The 3d Division occupied the Korangp'o-ri -Route 33 sector with the attached British 29th Brigade adjacent to the South Korean division and the 65th Infantry on the ground taken during its recent advance. It was a gaping front, manned for the most part in a series of separated battalion strongpoints.15
As the Imjin River front had developed to its present width since the beginning of the month, the two divisions manning it had patrolled extensively above the river. The patrols encountered thinly disposed forces of the North Korean 8th Division along the far bank, most of them ahead of the ROK 1st Division, until the 10th, when they discovered that the North Koreans had vacated their positions. South Korean
patrols later moved along Route 1 as far as Kaesong, the ancient capital of Korea some twelve miles above the Imjin, without making contact. The 8th Division appeared to have joined the remainder of the North Korean 1 Corps west of the Yesong River.16
Other ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade patrols ranging up to five miles above the Imjin after 10 April began to encounter a sprinkling of Chinese, mostly across the tenmile British front between Korangp'o-ri and a near ninety-degree bend in the river where its flow changes from southeast to southwest and where it receives the water of the westwardflowing Hant'an. Although intelligence agents had in the meantime identified the XIX Army Group in the general Kumch'on-Kuhwa-ri area and had discovered the neighboring III Army Group (but misidentified it as the XVIII Army Group), the minor engagements within five miles of the river were the first indication that any of these forces had displaced forward. Five captives taken at scattered locations between 11 and 14 April all belonged to the 561st Regiment, 187th Division, from the 63d Army of the XIX Army Group. One prisoner stated at interrogation that the 561st had a defensive mission pending the arrival of reinforcements. The light contact and wide dispersion of a single regiment did suggest a screen, but as South Korean and British patrols continued to probe the thin enemy positions through 20 April, no evidence appeared of Chinese forces massing behind them.17
Perhaps the most dramatic- certainly the most visible- evidence of enemy activity to appear as Eighth Army forces closed on the Kansas and Utah lines were billows of smoke rising at numerous points ahead of them. By midApril, belts of smoke up to ten miles deep lay before much of the I, IX, and X Corps fronts.18 Air observers confirmed that enemy troops, some in groups of fifty to five hundred, were setting fire to grasslands and brush. Some observers reported that smoke generators also were being used. Fires doused by rain showers were rekindled. Maritime air that frequently stagnated over the battlefront, added sea haze and moisture to the smoke and produced smog. On a number of days-varying from sector to sectorrain, haze, fog, smog, and particularly smoke hampered ground and air observation, the delivery of air strikes, and the adjustment of artillery fire.19
Though the smoke was intended to shield daylight troop movements, there
was not much evidence that enemy forces were moving toward the front. During the last three days of the advance to line Utah the 65th Infantry captured a member of the 181st Division, part of the 60th Army of the III Army Group. Two captives taken by the 24th and 25th Divisions were from different regiments of the 81st Division, which belonged to the 27th Army of the IX Army Group. One of the latter told his captors that his unit would be committed to offensive operations after the 27th Army finished relieving the 26th. By 20 April these three prisoners and the sprinkling of Chinese discovered above the Imjin were the only indications that fresh forces might have moved forward under the smoke.20
To give some order of probability to the opening of the expected enemy offensive, Eighth Army G-2 Tarkenton advised General Van Fleet on 18 April that a "survey of all sources," while failing to indicate conclusively any specific date or period for the initial attack, pointed to 20 April through 1 May. Tarkenton considered the latter date especially significant since it was the "most important day of the year to International Communism." Having learned that two fresh army groups (the XIX and III) were in the general Kumch'on-Koksan-Ich'on area, he believed the "greatest enemy potential" for a major attack to be from the north and northwest across the Imjin. As of the 20th, however, I Corps patrols had seen no signs of offensive preparations in this sector, nor had any evidence that the enemy was about to attack appeared elsewhere. Incoming reports to Van Fleet from corps commanders and Colonel Tarkenton's own daily intelligence summaries all described enemy forces as maintaining a "defensive attitude."21
Since all units were on or near their Utah and Kansas objectives, and since there was no clear sign that the impending enemy offensive would start immediately, Van Fleet elected to open the second phase of DAUNTLESS. In notifying General Ridgway that the I and IX Corps would move toward line Wyoming on 21 April, Van Fleet also proposed that the X, ROK III, and ROK I Corps attack to secure the segment of Route 24 running northeast ahead of the ROK III and I Corps to a junction with the coastal highway near the town of Kansong, twenty-three miles above Yangyang. This move would give the two South Korean corps a supply route in the higher Taebaeks, needed in particular by the ROK III Corps. To secure the road, Van Fleet wanted to hinge an advance at the eastern end of the Hwach'on Reservoir and swing the forces between the reservoir and the coast northwestward to line Alabama seven to fourteen miles above Route 24. Ridgway approved a sweep that would achieve the same end but with a substantially shorter eastern arc. Van Fleet set the 24th as the opening date.22
One Day's Notice
The I Corps' final DAUNTLESS objectives lay in the zones of the 25th and 24th Divisions stretching north of line Utah to Ch'orwon and Kumhwa at the base of the Iron Triangle. Ahead of the ROK 6th Division and 1st Marine Division in the IX Corps zone, line Wyoming curved southeast from the Kumhwa area to the Hwach'on Reservoir. On the 21st the two IX Corps divisions moved two to five miles above line Kansas against almost no opposition. Immediately west, the 24th Division did not test the opposition below Kumhwa but deliberately stood fast in the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the neighboring ROK 6th Division to come abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th Division attacked toward Ch'orwon but made no substantial progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the Utah line, especially in the zone of the Turkish brigade along Route 33.23
Neither corps developed evidence of enemy offensive preparations during the day. The absence of opposition in the IX Corps zone only confirmed the recent patrol reports of withdrawal. Below the Iron Triangle, the resistance that began to stiffen on 19 April had been expected to grow progressively heavier as I Corps forces moved above the Utah line. On the Imjin front, daylight patrols working above the river again found only a scattering of Chinese. General Milburn concluded in an evening wrap-up report to General Van Fleet that the "enemy attitude remains defensive."24
The only appreciable change in enemy activity on the 21st occurred east of the Hwach'on Reservoir in the X Corps zone. North and northeast of Yanggu, 2d and 7th Division patrols, after several days of nearly fruitless searches, located several groups of six hundred to a thousand North Koreans immediately above the corps front. These groups suggested, as General Almond reported to Van Fleet, that a relief or reinforcement of enemy units was taking place.25
Summing up the day's findings late on the 21st, the Eighth Army G-2 reported that his information still was not firm enough to "indicate the nearness" of the impending enemy offensive with any degree of certainty. A worrisome fact, as he earlier had pointed out to General Van Fleet, was that a lack of offensive signs did not necessarily mean that the opening of the offensive was distant. In preparing past attacks, Chinese forces had successfully concealed their locations until they moved into forward assembly areas immediately before they attacked.26
The first indication that the enemy would repeat this pattern appeared during the night when I Corps patrols reconnoitering above the Imjin ran into Chinese positions that were stronger and nearer the river than those encountered during past searches. There was no question that the XIX Army Group was setting out a covering force.27
More evidence appeared on the 22d as the I and IX Corps continued their DAUNTLESS advance toward line Wyoming. The progress of the attack resembled that on the previous day, IX Corps forces making easy moves of two to three miles, the two I Corps divisions being limited to shorter gains by heavier resistance. On the east flank of the advance, the Hwach'on Dam, defended so stoutly by 39th Army forces only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment without a fight. But a Chinese captive taken elsewhere in the 1st Marine Division zone during the afternoon told interrogators that an attack would be opened before the day was out. In midafternoon the ROK 6th Division captured several members of the Chinese 60th Division, and, immediately west, the 24th Division took captives from the 59th Division. These two divisions belonged to the fresh 20th Army. The full IX Army Group had reached the front. In the 25th Division zone on the west flank of the advance, six Chinese who blundered into the hands of the Turkish brigade along Route 33 during the afternoon were members of a survey party from the 2d Motorized Artillery Division. The division's guns, according to the officer in charge, were being positioned to support an attack scheduled to start after dark.28
For the scheduled advance to line Alabama east of the Hwach'on Reservoir, the X CorpsROK III Corps boundary was to be shifted four miles west at noon on 23 April to give the ROK III Corps, which had been operating with only the ROK 3d Division on line, a two-division front. The III Corps reserve division, the ROK 7th, began occupying the added frontage on the 22d, its 5th Regiment relieving the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and the X Corps right early in the evening. On the 23d the incoming division's 3d Regiment was to move into a two-mile gap directly above Inje between the 5th Regiment and the 35th Regiment, now the right flank unit of the 5th Division. The latter's 36th Regiment meanwhile assembled three miles below its former position in preparation for moving west into the redrawn 5th Division zone the following day as the remainder of the ROK 7th Division came into its new area.29
A similar shifting of North Korean forces above the X and ROK III Corps was indicated when the ROK 5th Division, previously in contact with the 45th Division of the North Korean III Corps above Inje, captured a member of the 12th Division, North Korean V Corps. Farther east, the ROK 3d Division, which had had almost no contact since reach-377
ing line Kansas, received hard local attacks that drove in its outposts and pressed its main line before easing in the evening of the 22d. Thus the North Korean 111 Corps could be shifting west toward the reservoir and the North Korean V Corps returning to the line from a point above Inje eastward.30
Aerial reconnaissance after daybreak on the 22d reported a general forward displacment of enemy formations from rear assemblies northwest of the I Corps and north of both the I and IX Corps, also extensive troop movements, both north and south, on the roads above Yanggu and Inje east of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Though air strikes punished the moving troops bodies, air observers reported the southward march of enemy groups with increasing frequency during the day. On the basis of the sightings west of the Hwach'on Reservoir, it appeared that the enemy forces approaching the I Corps would mass evenly across the corps front while those moving toward the IX Corps would concentrate on the front of the ROK 6th Division.31
Civilians entering I Corps lines from the northwest confirmed the enemy approach from that direction, and through the day British 29th Brigade forces along the Imjin observed enemy patrols investigating the north bank of the river for crossing sites. The 3d Division meanwhile found evidence that the III Army Group was included in the forward displacement when a patrol operating north along Route 33 above the division's right flank picked up a member of the 34th Division, which belonged to the group's 12th Army.32
At 1700, 25th Division air observers reported a long column of trucks, some towing artillery pieces, moving down Route 33 toward the Turks. Aircraft and artillery attacked the trucks until they dispersed off the road into wooded areas. By 1800 enemy foot troops were seen on Route 33 marching south in close column and just before dark were observed occupying foxholes along the sides of the road. Ten batteries of artillery kept the road and the suspected enemy artillery positions under fire.33
Immediately east, artillery pilots spotted enemey columns nearing 24th Division lines late in the afternoon and brought them under fire as they came within range. The approaching forces simply accepted casualties as they massed above the center of the division front. At 1900 the division commander, General Bryan, notified I Corps headquarters that he expected to be attacked in about two hours. "I think this is what we have been waiting for," he added.34 It was. Bryan's prediction of attack on the 24th Division proved correct almost to the exact minute. The initial assault of the enemy spring offensive opened an hour earlier, howeveralmost as if signaled by the rise of a full moon-in the adjacent sector of the ROK 6th Division.
1 Biog of Gen Van Fleet, prepared by Office of Pub Info, DOD, 12 Mar 53, in CMH; Time, vol. LVII, no. 20, 14 May 1951, pp. 29-31; Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 294-95.
3 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 295.
4 Eighth Army CG Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 255; Middleton, The Compact History of the Korean War, p. 188.
5 Earlier, at General Ridgway's urging, General Chung, the ROK Army chief of staff, had established a forward command post at Hajinbu-ri. Thereafter the two ROK corps zones in the east were considered as the ROK Army zone.
6 Rad, W99238, DA (G3) to CINCFE, 20 Dec 50; Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 169; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 315.
7 The 11th's rear area mission was taken over by the ROK 8th Division, now rebuilt after being shattered in February.
8 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 16 Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52.
9 Rads, X 18473, and X 18493, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 and 15 Apr 51, respectively; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; the North Korean 1st Regiment's withdrawal is described in 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51.
10 See following Rads from CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army: X 18473, 14 Apr 51, X 18484 and X 18493, 15 Apr 51 and X 18505 and X 18513, 17 Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
11 Ibid.: X 18513, 17 Apr 51, X 18523, 18 Apr 51, X 18535, 19 Apr 51, and X 18650, 20 Apr 51.
12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div POR 23, 16 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, p. 102.
13 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Wood, Strange Battleground, p. 79.
14 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div G3 Jnl, 10-20 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 24th Div G3 Jnl, 11-20 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-4, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 11 Apr 51.
15 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
16 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-3, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 10 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 263-279, 1-17 Apr 51.
17 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 273-282, 11-20 Apr 51; the following Rads from CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army: CICCG 4-4, 11 Apr 51, CICCG 4-5, 12 Apr 51, CICCG 4-6, 13 Apr 51, CICCG 4-7,14 Apr 51, CICCG 4-8, 15 Apr 51, CICCG 4-9, 16 Apr 51, CICCG 4-11, 18 Apr 51, and CICCG 4-13, 20 Apr 51.
18 The smoke, first noticed about 9 April, apparently was not mentioned on the 13th when General Ridgway, just before transferring to Tokyo, canvassed corps commanders for recent evidence of enemy offensive preparations.
19 Of seventy close support sorties dispatched on one day, all but fourteen had to be aborted because of smoke in the target areas. Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Sum, Apr 51; Tech Rpt, Weather Effect on Army Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, vol. II, p. XII-I; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 56, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads, X 18493, X 18505, and X 18523, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 17, and 18 Apr 51, respectively; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51.
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 280-282, 18-20 Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-12, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 19 Apr 51.
21 Eighth Army PIRs 276-282, 14-20 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-7, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 Apr 51; Rad, X 18473, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, X 18484, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-9, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 56, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads, CICCG 4-10, CICCG 4-11, CICCG 4-12, and CICCG 413, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 17, 18, 19, and 20 Apr 51, respectively.
22 Rad, GX-4-3900 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 19 Apr 51; Rad, G-4-3901 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 19 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 19 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; Rad, C 60648, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-4497 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 22 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-1520 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 22 Apr 51.
23 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad IXCCG 63, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
24 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51.
25 Rad, X 18863, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51.
26 Eighth Army PIR 283, 21 Apr 51.
27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
28 Montross Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, p. 103; Ltr, Lt Col Willard Pearson (Sr Advisor to ROK 6th Div) to Chief, KMAG, 2 May 51, sub: 6th ROK Div; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 78-79.
29 Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; X Corps 01156, 21 Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Entry 2355, and Briefing Notes for CG, 22 Apr 51.
30 Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 230810 and 230817, 22 Apr 51; ibid., Sum and Entry 1000, 23 Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
31 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.
32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Brigadier C.N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Limited, 1954), pp. 60-61; Lieutenant General Albert Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, 1951-1955 (Brussels: Imprimerie Medicale et Scientifique [S.A.], 1967), p. 75; Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1954), p. 17; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.
33 Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf, p 79.
34 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
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