The KILLER Operation

The Concept

Even before the Chip'yong-ni engagement came to a close, General Ridgway had instigated planning for an attack to clear the Chinese from the Chip'yong-ni area and the mountains to the southeast as far as the Som River. He assigned the task to the IX Corps on 15 February. On the 17th, after the Chip'yong-ni battle had abated, he shifted the IX Corps-X Corps boundary eastward almost to the Som, a move which returned the ROK 6th Division and the British 27th Brigade to IX Corps control and, for the time being, also placed the 23d Regimental Combat Team under General Moore's jurisdiction.1

General Moore scheduled a relatively short advance for 18 February in which the 1st Cavalry Division, British 27th Brigade, and ROK 6th Division were to seize high ground overlooking a segment of the Wonju-Seoul rail line from the town of Hajin, three miles northwest of Chip'yong-ni, southeastward to the Som. This line of heights offered a strong defensive position from which to block enemy attempts to drive into the Han River valley.2

The attack was widened to the west early on the 18th after resistance in Moore's zone west of the Han, now reduced to include only the enemy bridgehead area below the river, seemed to have disappeared. Forces of the 5th Regimental Combat Team, 24th Division, made this discovery when they investigated heights inside the lower edge of the bridgehead near midnight on the 17th. The investigation revealed that the Chinese had abandoned the heights and in doing so had left behind six hundred dead as well as weapons and equipment, which indicated a hurried withdrawal. When Moore notified Ridgway of this development, Ridgway instructed him to seize a line running from the corps left boundary eastward through Yangp'yong to Hajin. This tactic would clear the bridgehead and help block an enemy entry into the valley of the Han.3

Assigning the 24th Division to attack through the bridgehead area, Moore opened a full corps attack early on the 18th. The I Corps assisted by sending the 25th Division through the western third of the bridgehead area. Meeting some light, scattered resistance but in the main uncovering more indications of a hasty enemy withdrawal, all IX Corps units were on or very near their


objectives by 1800. The 24th Division reached the heights overlooking the Han at its bend at Yangp'yong. The 1st Cavalry Division occupied the Hajin-Chip'yong-ni area. In the process, the 5th Cavalry relieved the 23d Regimental Combat Team, which then moved south into an assembly three miles east of Yoju. Slightly above Chuamni, the British 27th Brigade deployed athwart Route 24 (where it would be reinforced on the 19th by the Canadian battalion, the 2d of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which had just completed its training at Miryang). The ROK 6th Division filled in the remainder of the IX Corps front between the British and the X Corps positions northwest of Wonju.4

Evidence available by evening of 18 February, not only from the results of the IX Corps advance but also from the lull and lack of contact in the X and ROK III Corps zones, made clear that the Chinese and North Koreans were retiring from the salient they had created in the central region. The withdrawal fit the pattern of enemy operations observed before, especially Chinese operations, in which assault forces were obliged to pause for refitting after a week or so of battle.5

During the evening of the 18th Ridgway planned an advance designed to deny the enemy any respite in which to prepare new attacks and, in particular, designed to destroy those enemy forces moving north out of the Chech'on salient. He intended that two principal thrusts by American forces, up Route 29 from Wonju beyond Hoengsong and up Route 60 from Yongwol beyond P'yongch'ang, would block the main paths of enemy withdrawal. (Map 25) Other forces were to move through and clear the adjacent ground. Given the particular purpose of the attack, he called it Operation KILLER.6

Intelligence Problems

Ironically, as Ridgway developed the concept of Operation KILLER with confidence in the spirit of his line units, he found reason still to question the attitude of principal members of his own staff. On 18 February he received the staff recommendations he had asked for in late January on the terrain lines the Eighth Army should attempt to occupy during the spring and summer months. In sum, the staff proposed that the Eighth Army abandon offensive operations, defend in place until spring, then voluntarily withdraw to the old Pusan Perimeter. Astonished that his staff would recommend the voluntary and complete surrender of the initiative, Ridgway disapproved the recommendations immediately and informed his staff once again that they would think primarily in terms of attack.7

Meanwhile, his largest concern as he moved to capitalize on the enemy's withdrawal was his want of definite knowledge about his adversaries, especially about enemy reserves. His best information was an estimate of enemy forces at the front prepared by his intel-


Map 25. Operation KILLER, 20 February-6 March 1951


ligence staff on 16 February. According to this estimate, five Chinese armies and three North Korean corps were on the line, and three Chinese armies and a North Korean corps were immediately behind them. In the area along the Han from Seoul eastward to Yangp'yong the intelligence staff had identified the North Korean I Corps and the Chinese 50th and 38th Armies. The staff also determined that the I Corps was now composed of the 8th, 17th, and 47th Divisions and that the 17th Division was now a mechanized unit with perhaps twenty tanks. With some uncertainty, the staff placed the Chinese 42d, 40th, and 66th Armies on line between Yangp'yong and Hoengsong and, with even less sureness about both identification and location, showed the 37th, 39th, and 43d Armies behind these units. The staff estimated that the North Korean V and II Corps held the region between Hoengsong and P'yongch'ang with the North Korean III Corps concentrated in rear of them and identified the North Korean 69th Brigade, now controlled by the II Corps, in the Kang-nung area on the east coast.8

Ridgway's intelligence sources had not yet picked up recent organizational changes in the North Korean II and V Corps made as a result of the high casualties incurred over the past several weeks. In the II Corps, the 31st Division was inactivated and its troops distributed among three other divisions, the 2d, 9th, and 27th. (The reduced 10th Division, behind Eighth Army lines in the P'ohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok area, also was still carried on II Corps roles.) In the V Corps, the 38th and 43d Divisions were inactivated and their troops transferred to the remaining 6th, 7th, and 12th Divisions. This kind of up-to-date information was an example of what Ridgway had been urging and continued to urge his intelligence sources to produce. Beyond the general location of the enemy mass at the front, he wanted to know its composition and strength; the identification, specific location, and status of supply and morale of all enemy units; and the trend of their movements. In making these items the essential elements of an immediate intelligence campaign on 18 February, he emphasized the influence such information could have on plans for future operations and insisted on its timely dissemination, even in fragmentary form.9

Of particular relevance to Operation KILLER, scheduled to begin at 1000 on 21 February, was Ridgway's very limited knowledge about enemy reserves except for a rear area buildup that was under way. His intelligence officers had reported that seven new Chinese armies had entered Korea, four assembling in the Pyongyang-Sinanju area, the remainder joining the three armies of the IX Army Group in the Hungnam-Wonsan region. But they could not tell Ridgway definitely whether any of these reserves were moving south. Nor was there any helpful response from Tokyo when Ridgway asked UNC headquarters for accurate intelligence on the movement of fresh enemy forces to the front. As of 20 February none of his attempts to obtain precise information about the ten Chinese armies now re-


ported to be in North Korea had succeeded. Thus, while he proceeded to open Operation KILLER, he was forced to do so without a full picture of the possible opposition and with the realization that the entry of enemy reserves in the battle might compel him to cancel his attack.10

Adopting the prudent course, Ridgway credited enemy reserves with the capability of appearing at the front within any 24-hour period. In so advising his corps commanders and the South Korean chief of staff on 20 February, he frankly admitted that he did not know when or whether a reinforcement of enemy forward units would occur. This uncertainty was all the more reason, he told them, for taking proper precautions while advancing in Operation KILLER. They must maintain major units intact, make proper use of terrain, and carefully coordinate movements within and between corps. With the recent experience above Hoengsong in mind, he warned them against being "sucked in and destroyed piecemeal, whether by ruse, or the temptation to your own aggressiveness to pursue beyond your capability of providing powerful support, or of timely disengagement and local withdrawal."11

Ridgway's wariness over possible enemy moves increased on 20 February when General MacArthur, after learning of the KILLER plan, came to Korea. MacArthur characteristically appeared on the scene at or near the beginning of an operation.12 Ridgway met him at the X Corps forward command post in Wonju, where he gave MacArthur fuller details. At a following press conference, which customarily ended each of MacArthur's visits to Korea, Ridgway was disturbed to hear MacArthur announce that he had "just ordered a resumption of the offensive." MacArthur, of course, had had no part in conceiving or ordering the operation. More to the point, the incident drew Ridgway's attention to the possibility that the predictable pattern of MacArthur's visits to Korea and the open ceremony always attending the excursions would alert the Chinese and North Koreans to future operations. Here was enough danger, Ridgway decided, to risk repercussions and try to discourage MacArthur from appearing in the future to sound the starting signal.13

The Plans

When the code name Ridgway had chosen for the coming attack was heard in Washington, he received a courteous but immediate protest from the Army chief of staff. The word killer, General Collins indicated, was difficult to deal with in public relations. Ridgway nevertheless kept the name, which fully


described his main objective.14 He instructed the IX and X Corps to destroy enemy forces located east of the Han and south of a line, designated Arizona, running from Yangp'yong eastward across Route 29 three miles above Hoengsong and across Route 60 six miles above P'yongch'ang. The principal thrust up Route 29 was to be made by the IX Corps, the one up Route 60 by the X Corps. To accommodate the scheme of attack, the IX Corps-X Corps boundary was to be relocated east of Route 29 and the X Corps-ROK III Corps boundary shifted to the east side of Route 60 when the advance was opened on the 21st.15

The west flank of the advance would be adequately protected by the I Corps and 24th Division positions along the lower bank of the Han. To protect the east flank, the ROK III Corps was to send its leftmost division, the ROK 7th, north through the heights east of Route 60, gaging the division's rate by the progress of the X Corps. The ROK III Corps' remaining divisions, the 9th and Capital, were to secure the lateral Route 20 winding southwest through the mountains out of Kangnung on the coast. If General Yu was unable to develop continuous defenses above the road, he was at least to guarantee possession of Kangnung, the road's eastern gate. If necessary, Yu was to set the Capital Division in a strong perimeter around the coastal town, and Ridgway would see that the division thereafter was supplied by sea or air and supported by naval gunfire.16

During the week past, as Chinese forces broke up the X Corps' ROUNDUP advance and threatened to strike deep through the Han valley, Ridgway had ordered the 1st Marine Division from P'ohangdong to Ch'ungju. With the exception of the 7th Marines, scheduled to leave P'ohang-dong on 21 February, the division was in Ch'ungju by evening of the 18th.17 For the KILLER operation, Ridgway attached the division to the IX Corps. The marines were to relieve the 2d Division and 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in the Wonju area, which on the 21st would fall within the zone of the IX Corps. The 2d Division and the airborne unit then were to shift east and rejoin the X Corps.18

General Moore chose the 1st Marine Division to make the IX Corps drive


along Route 29. The division initially was to seize high ground just south of Hoengsong from which it could control that road center. To the west, the ROK 6th Division, British 27th Brigade, and 1st Cavalry Division were to clear the mountains between the marines and the Han.19

In the X Corps zone, the 7th Division and ROK 3d Division were to open the advance to line Arizona; they were to be joined later by the 2d Division after it shifted east from Wonju. The damaged ROK 5th and 8th Divisions were to move off the line, the 5th to help protect the corps supply route, the more severely reduced 8th to go south to Taegu, where it was to be rebuilt under ROK Army control.20

The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, when it moved from Wonju, was to assemble northeast of Chech'on ready to assist the 7th Division's attack. General Almond was not to commit the unit, however, without Ridgway's approval. Depending on the favorable progress of Operation KILLER, Ridgway intended to move the airborne troops to the Taegu airfield for refresher jump training. He was looking to possible future operations, in particular to plans prepared at his direction in January for the seizure of Seoul. These plans in part called for an airborne landing behind the capital to block enemy escape routes.21

General Almond assigned the 7th Division to make the X Corps' thrust up Route 60 on the corps right. Initially the 7th was to clear P'yongch'ang and seize the junction of Routes 60 and 20 five miles north of the town. Almond wanted General Ferenbaugh then to block Route 20 to the northeast and at the same time strike west across the corps front along Route 20 to a juncture with the IX Corps to seal off enemy forces remaining in the Chech'on salient. At the left of the corps zone, the ROK 3d Division was to clear enemy forces from an area narrowing to a point on Route 20. The 2d Division, less the 38th Infantry (which was to become corps reserve), was to start north on 22 February to clear a wide area of rough ground in the center of the corps zone and to occupy positions commanding Route 20. If the timing was right, General Ruffner's forces could hammer enemy units against an anvil provided by 7th Division troops driving west over Route 20.22

The Advance

By 21 February the Chinese and North Koreans had had at least three days in which to withdraw from the salient and had given no indication that they would stop before they had moved north beyond line Arizona. If these forces were to be destroyed, Ridgway's assault had to advance rapidly. But the weather made speed impossible from the outset.

For the first twenty days of February, weather conditions in the battle zone had been within their normal range.


The average extremes of temperature varied from scarcely a degree above the freezing point to fifteen degrees below, and precipitation was largely snow that remained on the ground, sometimes as ice. An abrupt and unexpected change accompanied the opening of Operation KILLER. The temperature rose to almost 50 degrees on the 21st and that night barely fell to the freezing mark. The higher temperature range persisted during the remainder of the month. The 21st and the three days following saw steady to intermittent rainfall. Together, the unseasonable rain and warmer temperatures changed rivers and streams into courses of deep, fast water filled with floating ice. Fords became unusable, and low bridges were washed out or damaged beyond use. The rain and daytime thawing made quagmires of the roads and countryside, and landslides blocked or partially blocked tunnels, roads, and rail lines. Night freezes made the roads difficult to negotiate, especially where grades were step and curves sharp.23

The KILLER operation, as a result, became at once a plodding affair, not so much an advance with two main thrusts as a more uniform clearing operation in which assault forces fought hardest to overcome the effects of weather. Ahead of the advance, the Chinese and North Koreans concentrated on evacuating the salient, leaving behind only scattered forces to fight occasional but strong delaying actions.24

Ridgway kept a careful watch over the operation, reconnoitering much of the zone of advance from the air and questioning corps commanders closely during the first three days of the operation on the problems weather had created. Although Moore and Almond were experiencing difficulty in supplying the operation, neither advocated abandoning or postponing the advance. Frequent airdrops kept the supply problem from becoming critical, and by 25 February engineers had repaired much of the damage to main lines of communication. The advance continued, if far more slowly than anticipated.25

As the impeded operation entered its fourth day, the IX Corps lost its commander. About 1030 on 24 February the helicopter carrying General Moore crashed into the Han River. Neither the corps commander nor his pilot was seriously hurt in the crash, but General Moore died a half hour later of a heart attack.26

When General Ridgway notified Tokyo of the loss of the officer he personally had selected to command the IX Corps, he named Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, currently the commandant of the Army War College, as his preference to succeed General Moore. While his request for General Swing was being considered, Ridgway appointed the 1st Marine Division commander, General Smith, to assume temporary command of the corps. As he took the rare step of placing a Marine officer in command of a major Army unit, Ridgway coun-


seled the IX Corps staff and the commanders of the Army divisions in the corps to cooperate fully with General Smith.27 The interim command arrangement, Ridgway believed, offered an excellent opportunity to bring the Army and Marine Corps closer together.28

Laboring forward through the remainder of February, Ridgway's central forces largely eliminated the enemy's recent ground gains. From west to east, the IX and X Corps front on the last day of the month traced a shallow concave arc from positions five miles above Chip'yong-ni, along high ground overlooking Hoengsong and Route 20 from the south, to the high hills four miles north of the Routes 2060 junction. The two corps thus were on or above line Arizona on the extreme west and east but somewhat short of it elsewhere.29


Meanwhile, in the ROK III Corps zone General Yu opened a lateral attack, sending two regiments of the Capital Division from the Kangnung area westward over Route 20 across the fronts of his other two divisions as a preliminary to establishing defenses above the road. The regiments, moving in column, advanced easily until late in the afternoon of 3 March when the leading regiment ran headlong into an ambush near Soksa-ri, some twenty-five miles west of Kangnung. Hit from both north and south by a regiment of the North Korean 2d Division, the South Korean regiment lost almost a thousand men- 59 killed, 119 wounded, and 802 missing. The damaged regiment returned to the Kangnung area to reorganize and Yu canceled what from the outset had been a decidely risky movement.30

To the west, in the meantime, those IX and X Corps units not yet on line Arizona continued their advances to reach it. In the IX Corps zone, the 1st Marine Division cleared Hoengsong against little opposition on 2 March en route to Arizona objectives three miles north of town. By evening of 6 March all IX Corps assault units had established positions near or slightly above the Arizona line, the final advances encountering no resistance at all. The X Corps units met stiff opposition over the first five days of March, particularly the 2d Division as it attempted to occupy the high ground just above Route 20. But during the night of the 5th the North Korean defenders vacated their positions, and by 7 March General Almond's forces were for far the most part in full possession of their Arizona objectives.31

Over the fourteen days the two corps took to reach and consolidate positions along line Arizona, each reported having inflicted substantial enemy casualties. The IX Corps alone reported 7,819 enemy killed, 1,469 wounded, and 208 captured. But from the outset it had become steadily clearer that the primary KILLER objective of destroying all enemy forces below the Arizona line would be only partially achieved. The enemy forces' head start in withdrawing, their disinclination to take a defensive stand below the objective line other than in spotty delaying actions, and Eighth Army difficulties in negotiating the ground had prevented any other result.32

The Ripper Concept

As the KILLER operation had entered its final week with limited results already predictable, General Ridgway published plans for another attack, again with the main effort in his central zone but with all units on the Eighth Army front involved. As in KILLER, the primary purposes of the attack, which Ridgway called Operation RIPPER, were to destroy enemy forces and equipment and to interdict enemy attempts to organize an offensive. A secondary purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area north of the city as far as the Imjin River. Aware of General MacArthur's interest in recapturing Seoul but pre-


ferring to avoid a direct assault across the Han into the capital (although plans had been prepared for such an operation), Ridgway hoped to gain a position from which he could take Seoul and the ground to the north by a flanking attack from the east or simply by posing a threat that would induce enemy forces to withdraw from that area.33

Ridgway published the RIPPER plan on 1 March but deferred setting an opening date because of forward area supply shortages, particularly in food, petroleum products, and ammunition. The shortages resulted partially from conscious efforts during February, especially during the enemy offensive in midmonth, to hold down stockpiles in forward dumps as a hedge against losses through forced abandonment or destruction. In addition, as stocks were expended in the KILLER advance, the damage to roads, rail lines, bridges, and tunnels caused by the rains and melting ice and snow severely hampered resupply. Before setting a date for the RIPPER operation Ridgway wanted a five-day level of supplies established at all forward points. The best estimate at the beginning of March was that this level could be reached in about five days.34

Regardless of success in meeting this logistical requirement, Ridgway intended to cancel the RIPPER operation if in the time taken to raise forward supply levels new intelligence disclosed clear evidence of an imminent enemy attack. Neither the capture of new ground nor the retention of ground currently held were essential features of Eighth Army operations as Ridgway conceived them. "Terrain," he maintained, "is merely an instrument . . . for the accomplishment of the mission here," that of inflicting maximum losses on the enemy at minimum cost while maintaining major units intact.35

Information available at the moment indicated that those forces giving ground before the KILLER advance in the IX and X Corps zones were moving into defensive positions just above the Arizona line. Colonel Tarkenton, the army G-2, believed these forces would tie in with the existing enemy front tracing the north bank of the Han in the west and passing through the ridges above Route 20 in the east. Lending support to this judgment, the Chinese 39th Army had moved up on the line in front of the IX Corps, and the North Korean III Corps, less its 3d Division, had entered the line before the X Corps. Thus, as of 1 March six Chinese armies and four North Korean corps were arrayed between Seoul and the spine of the Taebaek Mountains.36

On the 1st, as he had earlier, Colonel Tarkenton carried the Chinese 37th Army in his enemy order of battle, locating it immediately behind the center of the enemy front in the vicinity of Ch'unch'on. In his earlier estimate he tentatively had placed the 43d Army in the same area but had since decided that this unit was not in Korea at all. Tarkenton now also had reports that


two Chinese armies, the 24th and 26th, had moved south from the Hungnam-Wonsan region to a central assembly just above the 38th parallel north of Ch'unch'on. Thus three reserve armies might be immediately available for offensive operations in the central region. To add substance to this possibility, agents recently returning from behind enemy lines brought back reports that the enemy high command at one time had planned to open an offensive on 1 March, then had postponed the opening date to the 15th. During interrogation, recently taken prisoners of war partially substantiated the agent reports by stating that their forces were preparing to launch an offensive in the Eighth Army's central zone early in March.37

It also now appeared that the North Korean VI Corps, one of the units that had withdrawn into Manchuria the past autumn, had returned to Korea and was moving toward the front in the west. At last report the corps, or a part of it, was approaching the 38th parallel northwest of Seoul and thus was near enough to join an enemy offensive. Tarkenton concluded, however, that although the enemy high command was


preparing an offensive, its opening was not imminent. He reached that conclusion mainly on grounds that the bulk of the enemy's reserves were too far north for early employment.38

Amid efforts to acquire fuller information on enemy preparations and plans, Ridgway arranged an amphibious demonstration in the Yellow Sea in an attempt to fix enemy reserves and to distract enemy attention from the central zone in which the main RIPPER attack was to be made. Minesweepers of Task Force 95 began the demonstration with sweeps along the west coast and into the Taedong estuary in the vicinity of Chinnamp'o. A cruiser and destroyer contingent followed to bombard pretended landing areas. Troop and cargo ships next left Inch'on, steamed part way up the coast, then reversed course. On 5 March the same ships made an ostentatious departure from Inch'on to continue the illusion of an impending amphibious landing. In the Sea of Japan, Task Force 95 had placed the Wonsan area under bombardment in February and continued the campaign into March. This bombardment, coupled with the occupation of an offshore island by a small party of South Korean marines, added to the impression of imminent landing operations.39

Ridgway had learned that two recently federalized National Guard infantry divisions, the 40th and 45th, were soon to leave the United States for duty in Japan. In an attempt to enlarge the amphibious threat, he proposed to General MacArthur that the departure of the divisions be publicized and a deception plan be developed to indicate that the two units would make an amphibious landing in Korea. Extending the idea further, Ridgway also proposed creating the illusion of forthcoming airborne operations by having three replacement increments of six thousand men each put on 82d Airborne Division patches after arriving in Japan and wear them until they reached Korea. He made this second proposal on the basis of intelligence indicating that the enemy thought the 82d was in Japan. Nothing came of either proposal.40

A continuing interdiction campaign opened by the Far East Air Forces in January and about to be joined by the carriers and gunnery ships of Task Force 77 offered possible help in blunting enemy offensive preparations.41 In laying out this campaign General Stratemeyer had emphasized attacks on the rail net since its capacity for enemy troop and supply movements was much greater than that of the roads; he had stressed in particular the destruction of railroad bridges. To date, results had been less than originally hoped for, because of both an overestimate of Far East Air Forces capabilities and an underesti-


mate of enemy countermeasures.42 But as the attacks continued, a principal point in the selection of targets remained that dropping the railroad bridges and keeping them unserviceable would leave the Chinese and North Koreans with no usable stretch of rail line more than thirty miles long.43

On 5 March General Ridgway had his five-day forward supply levels in all items except petroleum products. Severely taxed railroad facilities would need two more days to complete petroleum shipments. In the meantime, intelligence operations provided no confirming clues that an enemy offensive was an immediate threat. In evaluating the enemy's most likely course of action Colonel Tarkenton predicted that the Chinese and North Koreans would defend the line he had described at the first of the month, but with changes in the frontline order of battle. The Chinese 39th and 40th Armies appeared to have withdrawn from the front. This withdrawal left the North Korean I Corps and Chinese 50th Army in the western sector of the line, the 38th, 42d, and 66th Armies in the central area, and the North Korean V, III, and II Corps and 69th Brigade in the remaining ground to the east. With supply requirements all but met, the IX and X Corps finishing their advance to line Arizona, and no clear indication of an imminent enemy offensive at hand, Ridgway on 5 March ordered Operation RIPPER to begin on the morning of the 7th.44


1 Eighth Army, SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Ind 15; Rad, GX-2-1171 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and CG X Corps, 16 Feb 51.

2 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Opn O 12, 17 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3Jnl, Entry 0805, 18 Feb 51.

3 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0200, 18 Feb 51; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 18.

4 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0805 and 2340, and Sum, 18 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

5 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

6 Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 108; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 18; Rad, GX-2-2002 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et A., 19 Feb 51.

7 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 386-87.

8 Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51.

9 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 16 Sep 51; Rad, GX-2-1812 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CG Eighth Army (Forward), CG I Corps, CG IX Corps, CG X Corps, CG 1st Marine Div, and Chief KMAG, 18 Feb 51.

10 Eighth Army G2 Estimate, 16 Feb 51; Rad, 6-21760 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, Personal for Gen Hickey, 17 Feb 51; Eyes Only Memo, Ridgway for All Corps Commanders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb 51.

11 Eyes Only Memo, Ridgway for All Corps Commanders and C/S ROKA, 20 Feb 51.

12 General Mark W. Clark, chief of Army Field Forces, also was in Korea at this time. He was after a firsthand view that would help him improve the training of recruits. He talked with commanders at all levels, and they emphasized the Chinese and North Korean preference to attack at night and in heavy weather. Clark thus saw a need to increase training for nighttime operations, and he did so immediately after returning to the United States. See Mark W. Clark From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 25-28.

13 Eighth Army, SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 20; Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 108-09.

14 Ridgway later wrote, "I did not understand why it was objectionable to acknowledge the fact that war was concerned with killing the enemy .... I am by nature opposed to any effort to 'sell' war to people as an only mildly unpleasant business that requires very little in the way of blood." See Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 110-11.

15 Rads, GX-2-2002 KGOO and GX-2-2193 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 and 20 Feb 51, respectively; Rad, GX-2-2195 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 20 Feb 51.

16 Rad, GX-2-2202 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2-2209 KGOO and GX-2-2255 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 20 and 21 Feb 51, respectively; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

17 The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had been attached to the Marine division, joined the ROK III Corps in the Yongwol area. The ROK 2d Division, which was protecting segments of the X Corps supply route, received the added responsibility of securing the area vacated by the marines.

18 Rad, GX-2-1220 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 12 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2-1247 KGOO and GX-2-1268 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S
ROKA and CG 1st Marine Div, 12 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1285 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 1st Marine Div, 12 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1424 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 13 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1942 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and CG 1st Marine Div, 19 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-2002
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Feb 51; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 13; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Entry 0923, 20 Feb 51.

19 IX Corps Opn O 13, 21 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl Entry 0925, 20 Feb 51.

20 X Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-1987 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 19 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-2205 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 20 Feb 51.

21 X Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Rads, GX-2-2182 KGOO and GX-2-2293 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 20 and 21 Feb 51, respectively; Hq, Eighth Army, Outline Plan, Seizure of Seoul, 27 Jan 51.

22 X Corps Opn O no. 14, 19 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Entry 0845, 21 Feb 51.

23 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

24 Ibid.

25 Rad, GX (TAC) 38 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 22 Feb 51; Rad X 17970, X Corps to Eighth Army, 22 Feb 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 43 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 23 Feb 51; Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl 23; Rad, G-23145 KGLK, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 25 Feb 51.

26 Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, p. 71; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

27 In other instances of marines commanding major Army units, Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune led the 2d Infantry Division in World War I and Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger commanded the Tenth Army during the closing days of the battle for Okinawa in World War II.

28 Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Inds 24 and 26. In other command changes in February under the Department of the Army rotation policy, General Gay relinquished command of the 1st Cavalry Division to Brig. Gen. Charles D. Palmer, and General Kean relinquished command of the 25th Infantry Division to Brig. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley.

29 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Situation Overlay, 28 Feb 53; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.

30 Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, 6 Mar 51; Eighth Army PIR 237, 6 Mar 51.

31 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.

32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51.

33 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 114; Eighth Army Outline Plan, Seizure of Seoul, 27 Jan 51.

34 Rad, GX-3-134 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps and 187th RCT, 1 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb and Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51.

35 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51. 

36 Eighth Army PIR 232, 1 Mar 51; Operation Ripper, Annex "A" (Intelligence), 1 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.

37 Operation Ripper, Annex "A" (Intelligence), 1 Mar 51 ; Conference Notes, Eighth Army CG with Corps Comdrs, 1 Mar 51.

38 Operation Ripper, Annex "A" (Intelligence), 1 Mar 51.

39 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 326-31.

40 Rads, G-3-245 KGOP and G-3-1033 KGO, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 and 6 Mar 51, respectively; Rad, C 57127, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 7 Mar 51.

41 Rear Adm. Ralph A. Ofstie now commanded Task Force 77. In other naval command changes, Rear Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland had replaced Admiral Doyle as commander of Task Force 90, and Vice Adm. Sir William G. Andrewes, Royal Navy, had replaced Admiral Smith as commander of Task Force 95. On 28 March Vice Adm. Harold M. Martin would replace Admiral Struble as commander of the Seventh Fleet.

42 Because of strong enemy air opposition between the Ch'ongch'on and Yalu rivers in the far northwest, that area became known as "MIG Alley."

43 CMH Study, "Air and Naval Interdiction in the Korean War," 1964, copy in CMH; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 289-92; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 309, 318-19, 328-31, 341.

44 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army PIRs 233237, 2-6 Mar 51; Rad, GX-3-884 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 1, IX, and X Corps, 187th Abn RCT, and C/S ROKA, 5 Mar 51.

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