New York Avenue
From the Stone House drive west on Route 29, 1.1 miles to New York Avenue. En route, .5 miles west of the Stone House, notice the yellow, green-trimmed farmhouse on a rise on the north side of the road. It is on the site of the Dogan House, "Rosefield," marking the area where the Federals established a heavy gun line against the 30 August final Confederate assault. Then left into the avenue and park in the small lot on the right. Walk the 150 yards west up the hill to the 14th Brooklyn Monument.
On 30 August General McDowell ordered Reynolds to pursue the Confederates south of the Pike in conjunction with Porter's attack farther north.
About noon Reynolds' skirmishers crossed south of here and encountered Longstreet in force several hundred yards to the west. Reynolds recognized the situation and informed McDowell.
Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond, and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy formed for attack on my left flank when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies, who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed.
Thus about 1330 Reynolds recoiled to a position forward of the Chinn House on the southwest slope of Chinn's Ridge. About 1545, McDowell relayed Pope's orders for Reynolds to come north of the Pike to support Porter's failed attack.
Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the commanding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated, but before the rear of my column had left the position the threatened attack by the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it. Passing across the field to the right with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the retreating masses of the broken columns among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained both in men and material, Kerns losing his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper his caissons.
Colonel Hardin, commanding Twelfth Regiment was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted.
August thirtieth at 1345 Reynolds' withdrawal left Hazlett's Battery (D, 5th U.S.) unsupported on the ridge opposite the modern Ridge. First Lieutenant Hazlett reported,
in the afternoon I was ordered by Major General Porter to place the battery on a hill to the left of the road, in order to shell the woods in front of our position until our infantry advanced, and then turn my guns on the enemy's batteries. When the order was given General Reynolds' division occupied the woods on the left and front of the designated position, but as I was proceeding to it I saw his division withdrawing. I rode forward and found that all the troops had been withdrawn, not even leaving pickets. As this was a dangerous position to place the battery in without a strong support, I asked Colonel Warren, commanding the Fifth and Tenth New York Volunteers, if he could not give me some support while I sent back word to General Porter of the state of affairs. He did so, and in consequence saved the battery from capture. The firing from the battery in this position was extremely effective as the effect was very visible.
Soon Colonel Warren n e the enemy were approaching through the woods on my left, and immediately after they were upon him with an overwhelming force. Colonel Warren's troops were between the enemy and the battery, on the left of the battery, so that I could afford him no assistance by my fire. I immediately limbered up and left the field at a walk. Although opposed to an overwhelming force, Colonel Warren's men stood their ground until the battery was removed, though at a cost of half their number. I would give all praise and credit to Colonel Warren and his command for the noble manner in which they stood their ground, thereby preventing the capture of this battery.
Warren's Brigade (5th and 10th New York) moved west on the Warrenton Pike and overland to a supporting position, arriving a little after 1300. Warren reported,
this battery was then without support and our whole left flank was uncovered. I immediately assumed the responsibility of occupying the place Reynolds' division had vacated, and made all the show of force I could. For this purpose I deployed three-fifths of the Tenth New York Volunteers to hold the edge of the woods toward the enemy on our left, and keeping the Fifth New York Volunteers in reserve near H, out of view of the enemy's battery at C. Notice of this movement of mine I immediately sent by an officer to General Sykes or General Porter. He found the latter, who directed me to hold on, and sent me mounted orderlies to keep him informed. He was, I believe, near the point N, where Weed's battery was placed. From the point G, I probably had the best view of what followed that the battlefield presented.
As soon as General Butterfield's brigade advanced up the hill there was great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the wood swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails. The enemy fell back to the line of the railroad, and took shelter on the railroad cut and behind the embankment and lined the edges of the woods beyond. Butterfield's advance beyond the brow of the hill B was impossible, and taking his position his troops opened fire on the enemy in front, who from his sheltered position returned it vigorously, while at the same time a battery, somewhere in the prolongation of the line E B, opened a most destructive enfilading fire with special case-shot.
It became evident to me that without heavy re-enforcements General Butterfield's troops must fall back or be slaughtered, the only assistance he received being from Hazlett's battery, which I was supporting, and Weed's near N. After making a most desperate and hopeless fight General Butterfield's troops fell back, and the enemy immediately formed and advanced. Hazlett's battery now did good execution on them, and forced one column, that advanced beyond the point of the wood at A, to fall back into it. Unwilling to retire from the position I held, which
involved the withdrawal of this efficient battery and the exposure of the flanks of our retreating forces, I held on, hoping that fresh troops would be thrown forward to meet the enemy, now advancing. [The letters appear in Warren's report and refer to a map now lost.]
The 3d U.S. Infantry skirmish line north of the Pike in the modern Stonewall Memory Gardens broke up as Porter's attack disintegrated and six companies drifted southward to tie onto the 5th New York behind Hazlett.