Soviet Operational Art Since 1936 - Endnotes
1. The newly published Soviet casualty figures resulting from the purges include: 3 of 5 marshals of the Soviet Union, 14 of 16 army commanders (first and second rank), 60 of 87 corps commanders, 136 of 199 division commanders, 221 of 397 brigade commanders, all 11 vice-commissars of war, 75 of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, and all military district commanders as of May 1937. The estimated 35,000 purged represented half the officer corps, 90 percent of all generals and 80 percent of all colonels. The purges were, in fact, still in progress when the German invasion of June 1941 began. O. F. Suvenirov, “Vsearmeiskaya tragediya” [An all-army tragedy], Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal [Military-historical journal] (hereafter cited as VIZh) no. 3 (March 1989): 41. These update already published Western estimates. See Leonard Shapiro, “The Great Purge,” in The Soviet Army, ed. Basil H. Liddell Hart (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), p. 69.
2. Analysis of the experiences of Soviet tank units and armored specialists who participated in the Spanish Civil War cast doubt on the feasibility of using large tank units in modern combat. The units proved difficult to command and control; enemy fire separated tanks from supporting infantry; and the light tanks were vulnerable to destruction by artillery fire and even crude infantry antitank weapons (including explosives and bottles filled with flammables). The Kulik Commission ultimately acted upon these reports. Since most high-level defenders of armored operations had been purged, the defense of armored operations before that commission was weak. The Soviet occupation of eastern Poland in September 1939 illustrated command and control difficulties experienced by the tank corps. In addition, their logistical support proved inadequate. At Khalkhin-Gol in August 1939, a large Soviet force, commanded by G. Zhukov, used mechanized and armored forces to encircle and ultimately destroy two Japanese divisions. Critiques of Zhukov’s performance gave him credit for surprising and encircling the Japanese force but criticized the time it took to destroy the encircled force and the heavy casualties his force incurred.
3. The Kulik Commission recommended changes that resulted in a subsequent order to form eight motorized divisions in 1940 and seven more in the first half of 1941. Details of the commission’s work are found in A. Ryzhakov, “K voprosy o stroitel’stve bronetankovykh voîsk Krasnoy armii 30–e gody” [Concerning the question of the formation of Red Army armored forces in the thirties], VIZh no. 8 (August 1968): 109–11.
4. Contemporary Soviet critiques of the invasion include A. Konenenko, “Boy vo flandrii (Mai 1940 gg.)” [The battle in Flanders (May 1940)], VIZh no. 3 (March 1941):3–25; A. I. Starunin, “Operativnaya vnezapnost’” [Operational surprise], Voennaya mysl’ [Military thought] no. 3 (March 1941): 27–35.
5. The new mechanized corps consisted of 2 tank divisions, 1 motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, a signal battalion, a motorized engineer battalion, and an aviation troop. Each had an armored strength of 1,031 tanks. The average materiel strength of these corps in June 1941 was 53 percent, consisting primarily of obsolete T–26 and BT–5 tanks. Just over 1,475 new T–34 and KV tanks and 10,150 older models were deployed with corps in the border military districts, but they were distributed unequally. See S. P. Ivanov, Nachal’nyî period voîny [The initial period of war] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974), pp. 260–62; V. P. Krikunov, “Kuda delis’ tanki?” [Where were the tanks shared?], VIZh no. 11 (November 1988): 29.
6. For details on the state of the Red Army in June 1941, see David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998).
7. See S. K. Timoshenko, Zaklyuchitel’naya rech narodnogo komissara oborony soyuza SSR geroya i marshala Sovetskogo Soyuze S. K. Timoshenko no voyennom soveshchanii 31 dekabrya 1940 g. [The concluding speech of the people’s commissar of defense of the USSR, hero and marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko at a military conference 31 December 1941] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1940). Timoshenko verbally and graphically sketched out the nature and purpose of deep operations without specifically using the term.
8. For the sake of analysis, prior to 1960 Soviet theorists subdivided the war into four periods by treating 1944 and 1945 separately. See K. S. Kolganov, ed., Razvitiye taktiki sovetskoî armii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voîny (1941–1949 gg.) [Development of Soviet Army tactics in the Great Patriotic War years, 1941–1945] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1958), pp. 5–6.
9. Soviet defensive plans called for covering armies to engage enemy forces as they attacked across the borders. Armies deployed corps laterally along the border, with reserve rifle corps dispersed in the depths under front control. The rifle corps deployed their divisions in depth, with divisions covering extended frontages along the border interspersed with border guards units and fortified regions. The Soviet mechanized corps were deployed in echelons, one echelon backing up forward rifle corps and a second well to the rear, with additional corps farther east in the “strategic depths.” The echeloned defense conceded the German capability to penetrate border defenses but emphasized defensive fighting along successive distinct defense lines to erode German strength as Blitzkrieg unfolded. The mechanized corps were to launch counterattacks in support of each successive Soviet defense line to hasten the attrition of advancing German forces. Ultimately, these successive struggles and the introduction of newly mobilized Soviet armies and mechanized corps deployed from the “strategic” depths would halt and repulse the German advance (ideally along or forward of the Dnepr River line).
These plans evidenced that the Soviets clearly understood the nature of Blitzkrieg, but subsequent operations demonstrated that they underestimated the power of the German threat. In addition, the Soviets mistook where the main German thrust would occur: in the south rather than along the Brest-Minsk axis. The mechanized corps failed to do requisite damage to German forces, the Soviet air force was largely destroyed on the ground, and successive Soviet defense lines crumbled before they were fully prepared (Minsk, Dnepr, and Smolensk). The defensive system would have worked more effectively if forces had been fully prepared and not in the midst of both reorganization and reequipment. Ultimately, by December 1941 the Soviet defensive scheme of successive barriers worked, albeit much later than expected and at much higher cost.
10. For details, see David M. Glantz, Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941– 1945), Vol. I: The Summer–Fall Campaign (22 June–4 December 1941) (Carlisle, Pa.: Self-published, 1999).
11. The truncation process paralleled one in the rifle forces. The Soviets abolished the rifle corps and decreased the size of armies and rifle divisions. New armies consisted of rifle divisions and newly created rifle brigades (light divisions consisting of rifle and artillery battalions). The high command stripped armor, artillery, and engineer assets from the divisions and former corps and centralized them in newly created specialized units under high command control to allocate to armies where they were most needed.
12. I. V. Pavlovsky, Sukhoputnye voîska SSSR [Ground forces of the USSR] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985), pp. 65–69. On paper, tank brigades had forty-six tanks each.
13. I. K. Bagramyan, Tak nachinalas’ voîna [How war begins] (Kiev: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury Ukrainy, 1984), pp. 391–435; Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 1303–21.
14. For details on the use of operational maneuver forces in the Moscow counteroffensive, see I. Y. Krupchenko, ed., Sovetskye tankovye voîska 1941–1945 [Soviet tank forces, 1941–1945] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), pp. 46–51; F. Tamanov, “Primeneniye bronetankovykh voîsk v bitve pod Moskvoî” [Use of armored forces in the battle of Moscow], VIZh no. 1 (January 1967): 14–23; P. A. Belov, Za nami Moskva [Behind us Moscow] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1963). Belov was 1st Guards Cavalry Corps commander. The Soviets also created and used separate ski battalions for deep maneuver in the German rear area during the Moscow operation. The weather, terrain, and unequal mobility of these diverse forces made them difficult to coordinate in combat. Their lack of firepower exacerbated the problem, as their heaviest weapon was the 50-mm. mortar. Soviet units could seize the countryside but could not expel German forces from the towns, villages, and main road network.
15. O. A. Losik, ed., Stroitel’stvo i boevoye primenenie Sovetskykh tankovykh voîsk v gody Velikoî Otechestvennoy voiny [The formation and combat use of Soviet tank forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), pp. 50– 53. Initially, the tank corps consisted of two tank brigades and one motorized rifle brigade with 100 tanks. In late April the Soviets added an additional tank brigade to the corps. The Soviets created 28 tank corps by the end of 1942. Ultimately, the tank corps’ strength rose to over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns each.
16. For details on the Khar’kov operation, see David M. Glantz, Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster (Rockville Center, N.Y.: Ian Allan and Sarpedon), 1998.
17. Krupchenko, Sovetskye tankovye, pp. 58–60; A. I. Radzievsky, Proryv [Penetration], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1979), pp. 25–29; I. K. Bagramyan, Tak shli my k pobede, [As we marched to victory] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977), pp. 47–128; K. S. Moskalenko, Na yugo-zapadnom napravlenii 1941–1943 [On the southwestern axis 1941–1943] (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), pp. 187–218. The German deception plan is discussed in E. F. Ziemke, “Operation Kreml: Deception, Strategy, and the Fortunes of War,” Parameters 91, no. 1 (March 1979).
18. A. I. Radzievsky, Tankovyi udar [Tank blow] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977), pp. 24–25. The actual tank army composition was as shown in Table 2.
19. The counterattacking forces included the 5th Tank Army (the 2d, 7th, and 11th Tank Corps); the 1st, 16th, 4th, and 24th Tank Corps; and the 8th Cavalry Corps. This force totaled about 1,500 tanks commanded by such future luminaries as Generals Katukov and Rotmistrov. Poor command and control during the month of fighting seriously reduced the forces’ effectiveness. For details on these forgotten operations, see David M. Glantz, Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Vol. II: The Summer Campaign (12 May–18 November 1942) (Carlisle, Pa.: Self-published, 1999).
20. The 1st Tank Army was disbanded in August 1942, and its staff formed a nucleus for the new Southeastern Front. In October 1942 the 4th Tank Army, which its soldiers referred to derisively as “the 4-tank Army,” was redesignated 65th Army. See Anan’yev, “Tankovye armii.”
21. Radzievsky, Tankovyi udar, p. 24. Initially, the Soviets created three types of mechanized corps organized as shown on Table 3. The Soviets created eight mechanized corps by the end of 1942.
22. To effect this encirclement, General N. F. Vatutin, the Soviet Southwestern Front commander, employed two tank corps (the 1st and 26th) of General P. L. Romanenko’s secretly regrouped 5th Tank Army, while a cavalry corps (the 8th) of 5th Tank Army formed the protective outer encirclement line. A separate mechanized corps (the 4th) and a tank corps (the 13th) of the Stalingrad Front formed the southern arm of the great pincer. By virtue of the Stalingrad experience, the Soviets identified five steps in an ideal encirclement operation, which included: (1) penetration of tactical defenses; (2) exploitation and linkup of mobile force; (3) creation of an inner encirclement; (4) formation of an outer encirclement; (5) continued exploitation by forces forming the outer encirclement. At Stalingrad, the Soviets were able to carry out the first four steps but had difficulty with the fifth step. The 5th Tank Army’s strength in the operation was about 400 tanks.
23. Armor attrition rates for the tank army and mobile corps exceeded 50 percent and at times reached 70 percent, due to purely logistical and mechanical causes. This rate would fall later in the war; but for the moment it became a major factor in the determination of future unit strength authorizations and prompted the Soviets to stress improvements in logistics. See “Nekotorye vyvody po ispol’zovaniyu tankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh korpusov dlya razvitiya proryva” [A few observations regarding the employment of tank and mechanized corps in the exploitation of the breakthrough] in Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voîny No. 8 Avgust–oktyabr’1943 g. [Collection of materials for the study of war experience no. 8: August–October 1943] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1943), pp. 48–81, classified secret. Hereafter cited as Sbornik materialov. For subsequent loss rates, see Radzievsky, Tankovyi udar, pp. 211–30.
24. For details, see David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); David M. Glantz, Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945): Vol. IV: The Winter Campaign (19 November 1942–21 March 1943) (Carlisle, Pa.: Self-Published, 1999), pp. 18–67.
25. The first group consisted of four tank corps (17th, 18th, 24th, and 25th), which attacked south and southeast from bridgeheads across the Don River along parallel axes to link up with a second mobile force (1st Guards Mechanized Corps), attacking westward across the Chir River. “Planirovaniye i podgotovka nastupatel’noy operatsii Yugo-zapadnogo fronta v dekabre 1942 g.” [Planning and preparation of the offensive operations of the Southwestern Front in December 1942], in Sbornik materialov, vol. 8 (1943), pp. 3–24; K. K. Rokossovsky, ed., Velikaya pobeda na Volga [Great victory on the Volga] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), pp. 336–70. The combined strength of the four tank corps was about 660 tanks, but logistical attrition rates quickly reduced this number. By 28 December most corps counted about 25–35 tanks.
26. A. G. Yershov, Osvobozhdeniye Donbassa [Liberation of the Donbas] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), pp.1–68. The operations of one tank corps are detailed in A. V. Kuzmin and I. I. Krasov, Kantemirovtsy: boyevoy put’ 4–go gvardeiskogo tankovogo Kantemirovskogo ordena Lenina Krasnoznammennogo korpusa [Kantemirovtsy: The combat path of the Kantemirovka, Order of Lenin and Red Banner 4th Guards Tank Corps] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971), pp. 50–68.
27. For details on these forgotten operations, see Glantz, Forgotten Battles, IV: 83–183.
28. For details on the failed February–March offensive, see Ibid., pp. 213–311.
29. A. M. Zvartsev, 3-ya gvardeiskaya tankovaya [3d Guards Tank] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), pp. 50–54. General P. S. Rybalko’s 3d Tank Army, after about thirty days of continuous operations, received orders to attack directly into the path of the unfolding German counteroffensive. Already reduced in strength to as few as thirty tanks, the army was destroyed in the process. Within two months, however, Rybalko received command of the new 3d Guards Tank Army.
30. Losik, Sovetskykh tankovykh, pp. 70–73. A sixth tank army would be formed in January 1944. All tank army components possessed similar mobility, although Soviet efforts were still hindered by the absence of a true armored personnel carrier.
31. S. A. Tyushkevich, ed., Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily [The Soviet armed forces] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978), pp. 320–21. By 31 December 1943, the Soviet armored and mechanized force structure consisted of 5 tank armies, 24 tank corps, 13 mechanized corps, 80 separate tank brigades, 106 separate tank regiments, and 43 separate self-propelled artillery regiments.
32. See David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, The Battle of Kursk (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999); P. Rotmistrov, “Bronetankovye i mekhanizirovannye voîska v bitva pod Kurskom” [Armored and mechanized forces in the battle of Kursk], VIZh no. 1 (January 1970): 12–23; I. Krupchenko, “Osobennosti primeniya bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voîsk v Kurskoy bitve” [Characteristics of the use of armored and mechanized forces in the battle of Kursk], VIZh no. 7 (July 1983): 19–25. For details concerning the operations of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies, see A. K. Babadzhanyan et al., Lyuki otkryli v Berline [They opened the hatchway to Berlin] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1973), pp. 62–94; P. Y. Yegorov et al., Dorogami Pobed [By the roads of victory] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1969), pp. 55–86. Initially, the 1st Tank Army contained 571 tanks and selfpropelled guns and the 5th Guards Tank Army 543 tanks and self-propelled guns.
33. These diversionary offensives were conducted on 17 July by the Southwestern Front near Izyum and by the Southern Front along the Mius River. The two offensives continued until 27 July and 3 August, respectively — up to the very time the Belgorod-Khar’kov operation commenced.
During the Belgorod-Khar’kov operation, tank armies and subordinate corps led operations with forward detachments of reinforced tank-brigade size that performed tactical maneuver. The forward detachments were tasked with securing key objectives, preempting defenses, and facilitating the advance of their parent units (later with deception). The question was how large should the detachments be and how far in advance should they operate? At Belgorod-Khar’kov, they were as much as 60 tanks each, operating up to 20 kilometers in advance of the main body. The initial German counterattacks destroyed these detachments and in so doing severely reduced the strength of the parent tank army. Later, the Soviets better task-organized the detachments (principally with antitank and artillery elements) and matched their distance of advance to enemy strength and the nature of terrain to ensure support was available if needed. The Belgorod-Khar’kov experience, the first case when both front and army commanders possessed dedicated operational maneuver forces, indicated what could be achieved in the future once all problems were solved.
34. Zvartsev, 3-ya gvardeiskaya tankovaya, pp. 86–111. The 3d Guards Tank Army began the pursuit with a strength of 686 tanks and self-propelled guns. See also David M. Glantz, A History of Soviet Airborne Forces (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 262–89.
35. For details on the Belorussian offensive, see David M. Glantz, Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), Vol. V (The Summer Campaign, 22 March–31 December 1943) (Carlisle, Pa.: Self-published, 2000), pts. 1 and 2.
36. The Soviet Southern Front employed cavalry-mechanized groups consisting of the 4th Guards Mechanized and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps in the Donbas operation (13 August– 22 September 1943) and the 19th Tank and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps in the Melitopol’ operation (26 September–5 November 1943).
37. For details on the lower Dnepr operations, see Glantz, Forgotten Battles, V: pt. 2.
38. For details on the failures near Kiev, see Ibid.
39. Zvartsev, 3-ya gvardeiskaya tankovaya, pp. 111–13; S. Alferov, “Peregruppirovka 3–i gvardeîskoy tankovoy armii v bitve za Dnepr (oktyabr 1943g.)” [The regrouping of 3d Guards Tank Army in the battle for the Dnepr (October 1943)], VIZh no. 3 (March 1980): 16–17. Confirmation of the successful deception is found in the German Eighth and Fourth Panzer Armies’ intelligence reports. See 8. Armee. lc/AO, Feindlage vom 2–6.11.43; Pz. A.O.K.4. Lagenkarten vom Kriegstagebuch, Feindlage am 28.10–6.11.43. The 3d Guards Tank Army regrouped and attacked with 621 tanks and self-propelled guns.
40. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1989), pp. 278–85. The armored strength of the 1st Guards and 2d Guards Tank Armies was, respectively, 546 and 419 tanks and self-propelled guns.
41. Zhitomir-Berdichev, 24 December 1943–14 January 1944; Kirovograd, 5–11 January 1944; Korsun’-Shevchenkovskiy, 24 January–17 February 1944; Rovno-Lutsk, 27 January–11 February 1944; Krivoy-Rog, 30 January–29 February 1944.
42. Proskurov-Chernovtsy, 4 March–17 April 1944; Uman’-Botoshany, 4 March–17 April 1944; Bereznogevotoye-Snigirevka, 6–18 March 1944; Odessa, 26 March–14 April 1944; Crimea, 8 April–12 May 1944.
43. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, pp. 130–32. Prior to the operation, the 5th Guards Army’s 8th Guards Mechanized Corps conducted operations well to the north of its parent army, distracting the German attention from the point of main effort.
44. Yegorov, Dorogami Pobed, pp. 169–72.
45. The 1st Guards and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps acted as mobile groups for the 13th Army in the Rovno-Lutsk operation, and the 4th Guards Mechanized and 4th Guards Cavalry Corps formed a cavalry-mechanized group in the Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka and Odessa operations.
46. A. N. Grylev, Dnepr-Karpaty-Krym: Osvobozhdeniye pravoberezhnoy Ukraîny i Kryma v 1944 gody [Dnepr-Carpathians-Crimea: The liberation of the right bank of the Ukraine and Crimea in 1944] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), pp. 135–39. The 3d Guards and 4th Tank Armies conducted the initial exploitation and were joined by the 1st Guards Tank Army less than two weeks later. Armored strength of the tank armies was: 1st Guards, 239; 3d Guards, 310; and 4th, 253.
47. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception. In order, the planned strategic offensives and the period of their conduct were Belorussia, 22 June–29 August 1944; L’vov-Sandomierz, 13 July–31 August 1944; Baltic, 5 July–October 1944; Yassy-Kishinev, 20–29 August 1944.
48. A. M. Samsonov, ed., Osvobozhdeniye Belorussii, 1944 [The liberation of Belorussia, 1944] (Moscow: Nauka, 1974). The 5th Guards Tank Army’s strength at the beginning of the operation was 534 tanks and self-propelled guns. During the operation the army suffered heavy losses, largely due to tank ambushes, for which its commander received strong criticism. In late July Rotmistrov was replaced as army commander by General V. T. Vol’sky, probably because of these losses.
49. M. A. Polushkin, Na sandomirskom napravlenii-L’vovsko-Sandomirskaya operatsiya (iyul’–avgust 1944g.) [On the Sandomierz direction — The L’vov Sandomierz operation (July–August 1944)] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1969). The armored strength of the tank armies was 3d Guards, 555; 4th, 464; and 1st, 416.
50. S. Petrov, “Dostizheniye vnezapnost’ v L’vovsko-Sandomirskoy operatsii” [The achievement of surprise in the L’vov-Sandomierz operation], VIZh no. 7 (July 1974): 33–36. Confirmed by German intelligence reports contained in OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres], Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung, “Der grosse Durchbruch bei HGr, Nord-Ukraine u, kampfe am grossen Weichselbruchenkopf v. 8.7–20.–.44.”
51. B. Petrov, “O sozdanii udarnoy gruppirovki voîsk v lyublinsko-brestskoy nastupatel’noy operatsii” [Concerning the creation of the shock group of forces in the Lublin-Brest offensive operation], VIZh no. 3 (March 1978): 83; F. I. Vysotsky et al., Gvardeyskaîa tankovaya [Guards tank] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1963), pp. 109–28. This is a history of the 2d Guards Tank Army. The tank army began the operation with 732 tanks and self-propelled guns.
52. M. V. Zakharov, ed., Osvobozhdeniye yugo-vostochnoy i tsentral’noy evropy voiskami 2–go i 3–go ukrainskikh frontov 1944–1945 [The liberation of southeastern and central Europe by forces of the 2d and 3d Ukrainian Fronts 1944–1945] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); G. T. Zavizion and P. A. Kornyushin, I na Tikhim Okeane [And to the Pacific Ocean] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1967), pp. 60–94. This is a history of the 6th Guards Tank Army, which had 531 tanks and self-propelled guns. The Soviets treat this operation as a modern Cannae — a perfect encirclement — although the process was helped along a bit when elements of two Romanian armies quit the fight early in the operation and left their German allies to fend for themselves.
53. Polevoy ustav Krasnoy armii 1944 (PU-44) [Field regulation of the Red Army 1944] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1944]. Translated by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, GSUSA, 9–16. The Soviets expressed their faith in the new operational maneuver techniques in their 1944 regulations. The 1944 Ustav stated: “Maneuver is one of the most important conditions for achieving success. Maneuver comprises the organized movement of troops for the purpose of creating the most favorable grouping and in placing this grouping in the most favorable position for striking the enemy a crushing blow to gain time and space. Maneuver should be simple in conception and be carried out secretly, rapidly, and in such a way as to surprise the enemy.” The regulation went on to articulate the function of tank corps, mechanized corps, and cavalry. Together they formed an echelon to exploit success “for the purpose of breaking up and encircling the main groups of enemy forces and smashing them in cooperation with aviation and ground troops of the front.” Cavalry, with its high degree of mobility, was capable of “executing wide operational maneuver and striking swift and sudden blows in both mounted and dismounted formation.” The largest mobile force, the tank army, could perform operational maneuver with possible strategic consequences.
54. Soviet losses by late 1944 probably exceeded 9 million men. For German estimates of those losses, see Fremde Heere Ost (IIc), Die Personelle Starke der Roten Armee. Entwicklung seit Kriegsbeginn [The personnel strength of the Red Army, developed since the beginning of war], [1945]. Soviet sources reflect manpower deficiencies by emphasizing the low strength of rifle units and the draconian measures used to enlist soldiers in liberated regions. By 1945 Soviet rifle divisions were often below 50 percent strength, with only 3,500–5,000 men each.
55. In fact, the array of operational and tactical maneuver forces in the three fronts and the manner in which they operated resembled a graduate exercise in how such operations should be conducted and remains today as something of a Soviet model for mobile deep operations by operational maneuver forces.
56. Principal accounts of mobile operations are contained in Babadzhanyan et al., Lyuki otkryli v Berline, pp. 222–69; Vysotsky, Gvardeyskaîa tankovaya, pp. 144–69; Zvartsev, 3-ya gvardeiskaya tankovaya, pp. 191–220; D. D. Lelyushenko, Moskva-Stalingrad-Berlin- Praga [Moscow-Stalingrad-Berlin-Prague] (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), pp. 276–308. The tank armies’ respective armored strengths were: 1st Guards, 752; 2d, 873; 3d, 922; and 4th, 680. Separate tank and mechanized corps had between 220 and 260 tanks and self-propelled guns each.
57. The German Panzer divisions in the operation were relatively strong. For example, the 17th Panzer Division, opposite the Sandomierz bridgehead, had over two hundred tanks, half of which were heavy King Tiger models.
58. Zvartsev, 3-ya gvardeiskaya tankovaya, pp. 212–14. This maneuver is reminiscent of the turning movement of Patton’s army during the 1944 Ardennes campaign. Although Rybalko’s and Patton’s armored strengths were roughly equivalent, Patton’s army was over twice the size of Rybalko’s in manpower and supporting units. Throughout the operation the Soviets kept the entire advancing force coherent, well organized, and mutually supporting. Tank armies led advancing fronts by up to 100 kilometers and were separated from one another by as much as 80 kilometers. The tank armies marched in corps columns, usually with two tank corps leading, separated by as much as 30 kilometers. The mechanized corps either deployed forward or provided a reserve. Advancing slightly to the rear of and in between the tank armies, separate tank corps of rifle armies formed in multiple brigade columns, with one brigade in the lead as forward detachment and one brigade (usually motorized rifle) in reserve. Tank army and mobile corps forward detachments operated up to 20 kilometers in front of their parent force. Rifle armies led their advance with reinforced tank brigade–size forward detachments, which rode hard on the heels of the tank armies or separate tank corps. Rifle corps and divisions also fielded smaller forward detachments, which closely cooperated with army forward detachments and mobile groups. This wellorchestrated array of operational and tactical maneuver forces facilitated the swift and steady advance by both fronts and in large part accounted for the depth to which operational maneuver was sustained.
59. Losik, Sovetskye tankovye, pp. 257–65; Yegorov, Dorogami Pobed, pp. 289–329. The 5th Guards Tank Army’s armored strength was 585 tanks and self-propelled guns.
60. In preparation for the Berlin operation, between 1–15 April, twenty-eight Soviet armies had to regroup, fifteen of them a distance of up to 385 kilometers and three between 530 and 800 kilometers. See N. M. Ramanichev, “Iz opyta peregruppirovki armii pri podgotovke Berlinskoy operatsii” [From the experience of regrouping an army during the preparation of the Berlin operation], VIZh no. 8 (August 1979): 9. The armored strength of the tank armies participating in the operation was 1st Guards, 709; 2d, 672; 3d, 632; and 4th, 395.
61. David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth Papers no. 7 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1983); Zavizion and Kornyushin, I na Tikhim Okeane, pp. 206–44. The 6th Guards Tank Army’s initial strength was 1,019 tanks and self-propelled guns.
62. The average size of a forward detachment for a tank, mechanized, or rifle corps was a reinforced tank brigade. The reinforced brigade normally consisted of the tank brigade (three tank battalions and one motorized rifle battalion), a rifle regiment or battalion (on trucks), a tank destroyer battalion, a guards mortar (Katusha) battalion, a light artillery battalion or regiment, a self-propelled artillery battalion, an antiaircraft regiment, a mortar battalion, and a sapper company or battalion.
63. “Iz doklada komandyushchego bronetankovymi i mekhanizirovannymi voîskami Gruppy sovetskikh voîsk v Germanii marshala bronetankovykh voîsk P. A. Rotmistrova na voenno-nauchnoy konferentsii po izucheniyu Berlinskoy operatsii” [From the report of the commander of armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Marshal of Armored Forces, P. A. Rotmistrov, at a military-scientific conference on the study of the Berlin operation], VIZh no. 9 (September 1985): 43–50.
64. Tyushkevich, Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily, p. 393; A. Dunin, “Razvitiye sukhoputnykh voîsk v poslevoennyy period” [The development of ground forces in the postwar period], VIZh no. 5 (May 1978): 34–35.
65. Pavlovsky, Sukhoputnye voîska, pp. 208–12; Tyushkevich, Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily, pp. 392–94.
66. “Osnovy obshevoyskobogo boya (Lektsiya)” [Principles of combined arms battle (a lesson)], Vystrel’ [Advanced infantry course], trans. Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, 1954.
67. In the mid-1950s the United States reorganized its ground forces into pentomic divisions, which were designed to operate on an atomic battlefield.
68. Dunin, “Razvitiye sukhoputnykh voîsk,” p. 38. At this point the Soviet description of their force structure shifts into use of generic terms and comparisons between old and new units on the basis of percentage changes in strength and firepower. More detail is available in “Recent Changes in Soviet Divisional Organization,” Intelligence Review no. 222 (August– September 1955): 10–14; “Organizational Employment of Soviet Line Divisions,” Intelligence Review no. 254 (July 1962): 9–12.
69. The new Soviet attitude is best articulated in V. A. Semenov, Kratkiy ocherk razvitiya Sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva [A short survey of the development of Soviet military art] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1960), pp. 290–91.
71. B. Arushanyan, “Manevr v nastupatel’nykh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny” [Maneuver in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh no. 12 (December 1963): 3–12. Most Soviet works of this period replaced the term mobile group with older terms such as exploitation force or echelon to develop success.
72. V. D. Sokolovsky, Voennaya strategiya [Military strategy] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1963), p. 383.
73. Dunin, “Razvitiye sukhoputnykh voîsk,” pp. 38–39; “Soviet Field Armies: Organizational and Operational Concepts,” Intelligence Research Project No. P3–10 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 1962), declassified. Average-size wartime fronts would consist of a mixture of combined-arms and tank armies; the combined- arms army of three or four motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, and the tank army of two to four medium tank divisions; possibly one heavy tank division; and under special circumstances, a motorized rifle division.
74. Among the many articles, see F. Sverdlov, “K voprosy o manevre v boyu” [Concerning the question of maneuver in combat], Voennyy vestnik [Military herald] no. 88 (August 1972): 31; V. Savkin, “Manevr v boyu” [Maneuver in battle], Voennyy vestnik no. 4 (April 1972): 23.
75. Sverdlov, “K voprosy o manevre v boyu,” p. 31.
76. David M. Glantz, The Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: The Role of the Forward Detachment (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988).
77. For further explanation of these views, see David M. Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of War (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1987); Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. “Strategic Deployment: Mobilizing and Moving the Force,” Military Review 68, no. 12 (December 1988): 58–70. Extensive Soviet analysis of this theme of initial war has produced many studies, including S. P. Ivanov, Nachal’niy period voiny [The initial period of war] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974); M. Cherednichenko, “O nachal’nom periode Velikoi Otechestvennoi voîny” [Concerning the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh no. 4 (April 1961): 28–35; P. Korkodinov, “Fakty i mysli o nachal’nom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voîny” [Facts and ideas about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh no. 10 (October 1965): 26–34; V. Baskakov, “Ob osobennostyakh nachal’nogo perioda voiny” [Concerning the peculiarities of the initial period of war], VIZh no. 2 (February 1966): 29–34; A. Grechko, “25 let tomu nazad” [125 years ago], VIZh no. 6 (June 1965): 3–15; I. Bagramyan, “Kharakter i osobennosti nachal’nogo perioda voîny” [The nature and peculiarities of the initial period of war], VIZh no. 10 (October 1981): 20–27; V. Matsulenko, “Nekotorye vyvody iz opyta nachal’nogo perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voîny” [Some conclusions from the experience of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War], VIZh no. 3 (March 1984): 35–42; A. I. Yevseev, “O nekotorykh tendentsiyakh v izmenenii soderzhaniya i kharaktera nachal’nogo perioda voîny” [Concerning some tendencies in the changing form and nature of the initial period of war], VIZh no. 11 (November 1985): 11–20.
78. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–2–3, Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1984), pp. 4–48.
79. In a review of a book by A. Babakov on the Soviet armed forces in the postwar years, A. Reznichenko challenges Babakov’s description of postwar periods of military development. Babakov had postulated that the distinct periods were 1945–1953, 1954–1961, 1962–1972, and 1973–1986. Reznichenko argues that the subdivisions should be 1945–1960, 1962–1970, and 1971–1985. His argument clearly delineates the period of the revolution in military affairs (1961–1970) and the period when the Soviets adopted a dual option (1971–1985). He strongly implies that a new period began in the mid-1980s, characterized by the rapidly changing pace of conventional technology and the emergence of high-precision weaponry as the first noticeable facet of that change. The growing importance of new weaponry will probably accentuate techniques the Soviets developed in the 1970s to deal with the menacing presence of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the Soviets will further develop operational and tactical maneuver techniques aimed at preempting or neutralizing effective enemy use of any weapons of mass destruction, nuclear or conventional. See V. Reznichenko, “Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily v poslevoyennyi period” [The Soviet armed forces in the postwar period], Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil [Communist of the armed forces] no. 1 (January 1988): 86–88. See also M. A. Moyseyev, “S pozitsii oboronitel’noî doktriny” [From a position of defensive doctrine], Krasnaya zvezda [Red Star], 10 Feb 89, pp. 1–2.
80. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987), p. 200.
81. For example, see I. Vorob’yev, “Novoye oruzhiye i printsipy taktiki” [New weapons and tactical principles], Sovetskoy voyennoye obozreniye [Soviet military review] no. 2 (February 1987): 18.
82. Stanislaw Koziej, “Anticipated Directions for Change in Tactics of Ground Forces,” Przeglad Wojsk Ladowych [Ground Forces Review] no. 9 (September 1986): 9, trans. Harold Orenstein in Selected Translations from the Polish Military Press (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988), I: 7. Colonel Koziej, a graduate of the General Staff Academy of the Polish Armed Forces, has written extensively in the Polish journal of the general staff, Mysl Woiskowa [Military thought], on, among other topics, air-land operations and the Polish theory of operational art.
83. Jacob W. Kipp, “Gorbachev’s Gambit: Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control in an Era of Reform,” in The Soviet Army in an Era of Reform (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989). This article exhaustively investigates the roots of Soviet defensiveness.
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