Endnotes - Introduction
1. This article originally appeared in Military Review 77, no. 5 (September–October 1997): 32–47. It is reprinted here by permission of the author and the editors of Military Review.
2. The developments of the 1920s are summarized in James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1994), chs. 5 and 6.
3. R . A. Savushkin, “K voprosu o zarozhdenii teoni posledovatel’nykh operatsiy” [Toward the Question of the Origin of the Theory of Successive Operations], Voyennoistoricheskiy zhurnal [Military-Historical Journal] (hereafter cited as VIZh) (May 1983): 79–81.
4. A superb analysis of the changing nature of strategy within a theater is Georgiy S. Isserson, Evolyutsiya operativnogo iskusstva [The Evolution of Operational Art], 2d ed. (Moscow: Gosvoyenizdat, 1937), pp. 18–28.
6. The acute perceptions of a contemporary appear in Freiherr Hugo F. P. von Freytag-Loringhoven, Deductions from the World War (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1918), pp. 101–06.
7. The classic example of this trend was Aleksandr A. Svechin’s textbook, Strategiya [Strategy], 2d ed. (Moscow: Voyennyî Vestnik, 1927), which has been edited by Kent D. Lee and translated into English as Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy (Minneapolis, Minn.: East View Publications, 1992); the first chapter describes “strategy in a number of military disciplines.”
8. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy” in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1989), pp. 3–7.
9. Anton A. Kersnovskiy, Filosofiya voyny [The Philosophy of War] (Belgrade: Izd. Tsarskogo Vestnilka, 1939), p. 31.
10. See the commentary in Freiherr Hugo F. P. von Freytag-Loringhoven, Heerführung im Weltkriege, 2 vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1920–1921), I: iii, 41, 45–46; cf. John English, “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War,” in The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B. J. C. McKercher and Michael Hennessy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), p. 13.
11. The origin of the term is categorically ascribed to Svechin by N. Varfolomeev, an early student of operational art, in “Stategiya v akademicheskoy postanovke” [Strategy in an Academic Setting], Voyna i revolyutsiya [War and Revolution] (November 1928): 84.
12. Svechin, Strategy, p. 269; see also Jacob W. Kipp, “Two Views of Warsaw: The Russian Civil War and Soviet Operational Art,” in McKercher and Hennessy, Operational Art, pp. 61–65.
13. The officer most frequently associated with the comparative analysis of operations was V. K. Triandafillov, whose ground-breaking Kharakter operatsiy sovremennykh armiy [The Nature of the Operations at Modern Armies], 3d ed. (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1936) has been edited by Jacob W. Kipp and translated into English as The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies (Essex, U.K.: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1994); see especially part two.
14. Varfolomeev, “Strategiya v akademicheskoy postanovke,” pp. 84–85.
15. This argument is clearly enunciated in Georgiy S. Isserson, “Osnovy glubokoy operatsii” [Fundamentals of the Deep Operation], as cited by Cynthia A. Roberts, “Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941,” Europe-Asia Studies (December 1995): 1323.
16. R. A. Savushkin, Razvitiye sovetskikh vooruzhyennykh sil voyennogo iskusstva v mezhvoyennyy period (1921–1941 gg.) [The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces and Military Art during the Inter-War Period (1921–1941)] (Moscow: VPA, 1989), pp. 90–100.
17. Schneider, Structure of Strategic Revolution, pp. 231–65.
18. A comprehensive and provocative account of these and other continuities in modern German military development is Jehuda L. Wallach’s The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), especially pp. 229–81.
19. See the discussion, for example, in John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (New York: Viking Press, 1982), p. 243.
20. The most recent critique of Blitzkrieg in operational-strategic perspective is Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende, 2d ed. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), chs. 1 and 2; for the Soviet-German comparative perspective, see Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 221–38.
21. The attainments and difficulties of the prewar era are summarized in Georgiy S. Isserson, “Razvitiye teorii sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva v 30-ye gody” [The Development at the Theory of Soviet Operational Art during the 1930s], VIZh (March 1965), especially pp. 54–59.
22. The most recent treatment of the Eastern Front in World War II is David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); the classic account of 1943 to 1945 in English remains John Erickson’s The Road to Berlin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).
23. Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History 1992), pp. 185–94.
24. An eloquent summary with an emphasis on military geography is John Keegan, Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), pp. 325–33.
25. See the overview in James J. Schneider, “War Plan RAINBOW 5,” Defense Analysis (December 1994): 289–92.
26. L. D. Holder, “Educating and Training for Theater Warfare,” in On Operational Art, ed. Clayton R. Newell and Michael D. Krause (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), pp.171–72.
27. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 32–49, 128–56.
28. The most recent account is Roger J. Spiller, “In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the U.S. Army After Vietnam,” RUSI Journal 142, no. 6 (December 1997): 41–54.
29. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), pp. 25–36.
30. An engaging survey of doctrinal development between 1976 and 1982 is Richard Swain’s “Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army,” in McKercher and Hennessy, Operational Art, pp. 154–65.
31. For an indication of the renewed emphasis on operational art, see then Chief of the Soviet General Staff M. V. Zakharov’s “O teorii giubokoy operatsii” [On the Theory of the Deep Operation] VIZh (October 1970): 10, 20. Overall context is provided by David M. Glantz, “The Intellectual Dimension of Soviet (Russian) Operational Art,” in McKercher and Hennessy, Operational Art, pp. 135–39.
32. John English, “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War,” in McKercher and Hennessy, Operational Art, pp. 17–18.
33. For an overview, see John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), pp. 66–73.
34. William R. Richardson, “FM 100–5: The AirLand Battle in 1986,” Military Review 66, no. 3 (March 1986): 4–11.
35. See, for example, William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Jr., Campaign Planning (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1988), pp. 5–15.
36. David A. Sawyer, “The Joint Doctrine Development System,” Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1996–1997): 36–39.
37. See chapter 5, “Doctrine for a New Time,” in John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post–Cold War (Fort Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996).
38. On the legacy of Isserson, see Frederick Kagan, “Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100–5,” Parameters (Spring 1997): 139–40.
39. See, for example, James K. Morningstar, “Technologies, Doctrine, and Organization for RMA,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1997): 37–43.
Return to Introduction
Return to Table of Contents
 |
|
Last updated 1 June 2007 |