Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art - Part One: France

French Operational Art: 1888-1940

Robert A. Doughty

Although the French acknowledged between 1888 and 1940 the existence of a level of war between the strategic and tactical levels, they did not believe it was fundamentally different from the other two levels. Essentially, they saw the operational level, or in their words grand tactics, as being a transition between the other two levels. From their perspective, the key aspect of grand tactics was the combining of units into effective combat organizations and employing them in a coordinated fashion toward a common goal. While devoting very little time and effort to studying the theoretical aspects of grand tactics, French military leaders and thinkers devoted considerable effort to developing corps, field armies, and army groups as combat organizations and to studying the practical aspects of their employment. They believed the essence of grand tactics concerned the employment of these large formations.

Despite their interest in large formations, the French failed to develop a sophisticated understanding of the operational art of war. Even worse, they deformed its very nature by having operational concepts distort their tactical methods before World War I and by having tactical concepts distort their operational methods before World War II. These distortions significantly affected the performance of the French Army in both wars.

Origins of the Operational Level of War

The evolution of the operational art is rooted in institutional and conceptual developments, for the introduction in turn of the corps, field army, and army group as military organizations led thinkers to develop new ideas about their employment. In the late eighteenth century, French military leaders conceived and nourished the concept of grand tactics when they addressed the problem of moving and concentrating forces on the battlefield. As military forces became larger on the eve of the French Revolution and as the challenge of controlling and supplying them became more difficult, Marshal Victor de Broglie in 1760 came up with the idea of breaking large armies into divisions that could move to the battlefields separately. By marching in a number of individual divisional columns,

rather than in one or two huge columns, an army could approach a battlefield more quickly and enter into action much more decisively.¹ Thus, the initial idea relating to grand tactics was an organizational one that provided better command, control, and movement of large formations.

The next step, which was conceptual, occurred when General Pierre de Bourcet developed a better system for controlling divisions and, more important, addressed the issue of fighting them. In his seminal work, Principes de la guerre de montagnes, completed in 1764–1771, de Bourcet analyzed the operations of an army in mountainous terrain. Since such terrain would compel an armed force to operate in a number of separate, compartmented areas, de Bourcet recognized the importance of the divisions’ being able to function on their own. His ideas came from his having served in the Franco-Spanish campaign against Savoy-Piedmont in 1744 and provided basic concepts for the employment in battle of an army organized on a divisional basis. In 1787–1788 the French Army adopted the main points of his proposal.²

Amidst the development of the new organizational structure, General Jacques Guibert recognized that warfare was changing and offered a definition of grand tactics. In his Essai général de tactique, which was first published in 1772, Guibert wrote:

I have attempted, in the preceding part, to trace the principles by which the different units which comprise an army should be constituted and trained.… It is necessary to assemble these units, combine them, make them unite in the execution of the great maneuvers in a war. It is the art of conceiving the [method of] execution, planning it, directing it, that one calls grand tactics.³

The next step in the evolution of French ideas about grand tactics came with the development of the corps. In March 1796 General Jean Moreau formed a provisional corps in his Army of the Rhine and Moselle,⁴ and then in January 1800 Napoleon grouped his infantry divisions into corps, each of which had its own staff.⁵ When Napoleon formed his Grand Armée in 1805, it had seven corps, each of which included two to four infantry divisions, a brigade or division of light cavalry, approximately forty cannon, and appropriate detachments of engineers and supply troops. In subsequent years, Napoleon’s success often came from his ability to move his corps over long distances in a coordinated manner and to flexibly employ their combination of infantry, artillery, and cavalry. With these three arms organic, a Napoleonic corps could engage an enemy force much larger than itself for a limited period. As Napoleon’s subordinate commanders became more adept at their duties, his reliance upon the corps system provided him with a great deal of maneuverability and offensive capability. Moreover, his converging columns of corps often achieved victory over opponents whose organizational structure and operational methods were not as modern or flexible.⁶

Napoleon’s brand of operational art strongly emphasized the offensive and always focused on actions throughout the depth of an enemy’s position. His ideal battle usually included an enveloping attack by one or more of his corps that would create the opportunity for breaking through the enemy’s main position and unleashing an exploitation force. He disliked unimaginative frontal assaults and used them only in those cases when he thought he had no choice. He explained, “It is by turning the enemy, by attacking his flank, that battles are won.”⁷ Thus, Napoleon capitalized upon his ability to conduct war at the operational level and often used his corps to fix an enemy force, move deep into its rear, or deliver the decisive blow at a weakened but critical point. He explained, “The art of war consists, with an inferior army, of always having more forces than the enemy at the point of attack, or the point being attacked; but this art is learned neither from books nor from practice; it is a knack for command that appropriately constitutes the genius of war.”⁸

By the end of the Napoleonic wars, most French military thinkers thought of Napoleon’s battles when they thought of grand tactics. For many of them, his ability to move large forces simply and swiftly, shift units from one mission to another, combine separate columns near or on the battlefield, and achieve decisive success demonstrated the main characteristic of the operational art.

Despite the demonstrated success of Napoleonic corps, French political leaders remained reluctant to form corps in peacetime, and for much of the nineteenth century the French Army had only twenty divisional headquarters with nothing more than a bare skeletal command structure linking them to Paris. During the same period little or no effort was expended by the French officer corps in studying the operational level of war. Far more effort was expended in regimental schools in which reading, writing, and basic tactics were taught than in professional schools in which officers studied the operational art.⁹ A few officers attended staff schools, but their knowledge was not deeply appreciated and their influence limited. Despite the contributions of de Broglie, de Bourcet, Guibert, and Napoleon to the development of the operational level of war, most officers knew little or nothing about operational art on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War.

Institutional Changes After the Franco-Prussian War

The dramatic defeat of 1871 initiated a period of modernization and reform of the military, for the French could not ignore the ineffectiveness of their performance and the superiority of German methods and organizations. As part of their effort to catch up with the Germans, the army’s leaders sought to establish corps and field armies in peacetime. Before 1870 France did not have corps headquarters in peacetime, much

less functioning field armies, and the army’s performance in combat in 1870–1871 suffered because of the newly formed units’ inexperience. After 1871 French political leaders permitted the establishment of corps in peacetime, but fearing a possible threat to the republican government, many of them opposed the creation of field army headquarters.¹⁰ They feared another Louis Napoleon could overthrow the republican government if he had the support and prestige of higher-level army commanders behind him.

In 1888 France took an important step toward creating a de facto headquarters for field armies. The Minister of War inserted a provision into the army’s budget that allocated financial credits for the “inspection” of the nineteen army corps. After sharp debate in the Chamber of Deputies about the role and powers of these inspectors, the Minister of War was required to ensure that the missions for inspection were of “limited duration and constantly revocable.”¹¹ The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate then adopted the measure. Some progress had occurred, but the establishment of field army headquarters in peacetime had not been permitted. To an eager military, however, the door was open for change, and Charles de Freycinet, the first civilian Minister of War in the Third Republic, led the way. He declared that the changes he proposed were “inspired” by the deliberations of the request for credits for conducting inspections of corps-size units. On 26 May 1888, Freycinet submitted a proposed decree to the president of the Third Republic that would permit the establishment of field army headquarters as temporary, skeleton units during peacetime. The army commanders and their staffs would be officially designated but would be brought together only for short periods each year. The designated commanders had limited authority with “no right of interference in the command of the corps” and “no actual right of command.” Despite opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, the president of the republic soon approved the decree.¹²

Two years later another improvement occurred. A decree of 10 April 1890 more clearly defined the authority of the officers who had been designated as field army commanders. They could now be charged officially with the inspection of one or more corps to determine the degree of their preparations for war and for mobilization. Although the inspections could only be conducted when ordered by the Minister of War, the power of the inspectors was great. They could “prescribe reviews and order, as an exercise, the immediate mobilization of the combat troops or [combat service] support forces of a corps, and then have them conduct the defense of a fort or defensive works.”¹³ If any corps commander had questions about the authority of the designated army commanders, this decree probably answered them.

The Freycinet reforms thus prepared the way for the establishment of French field armies during peacetime. As one contemporary British

observer noted, commanders and staffs met as often as once a week by 1891.¹⁴ Such meetings obviously facilitated the exchange of ideas about the employment of field armies and thereby strengthened France’s abilities at the operational level of war. In 1899 another decree expanded the authority of the designated field army commanders, giving them power to inspect those army corps that would make up their wartime armies.¹⁵

Another improvement in France’s capabilities at the operational level came with the expansion of annual fall maneuvers so high-level commanders and staffs could improve their functioning in the field. Freycinet also played a key role in this important development. In the maneuvers of September 1891, which were held in Champagne on the northeast frontier, two out of the four designated field army commanders and their staffs participated. They controlled four infantry corps, two cavalry divisions, and other supporting troops, including artillery and engineers.¹⁶ The maneuvers were the largest heretofore conducted in France and involved more than 100,000 men.

The maneuvers were an obvious success. One British journalist noted, “Germany has this year lost that uncontested supremacy in Europe which she has enjoyed for twenty years.” He added, “The results of these [maneuvers of 1891] have been able to show that which was the weakest point in France in 1870 [staff organization and efficiency] is almost her strongest now.”¹⁷ In a speech at a banquet for the generals participating in the maneuvers and for the foreign representatives observing them, Freycinet emphasized the importance of the reforms and concluded, “No one doubts today that we are strong.”¹⁸

Operational Thinking Before World War I

As the French Army modified its organizational structure and conducted peacetime maneuvers with corps and field armies, thinkers, military schools, and publications devoted considerable effort to analyzing the techniques of employing large formations. The major concepts that came from this process and their evolution are most evident in the field manuals on large-unit operations that were published in 1895 and 1913. The 1895 edition was entitled Regulations on the Service of Armies in the Field and explained: “The army corps is the basic unit of all army formations. The combining of several army corps under a single leader forms a [field] army. When several [field] armies operate in the same theater of war, they are combined under a single commander and form an army group.”¹⁹ Despite the discussion of the field army and army group, the 1895 regulation devoted only a small portion of its attention to their employment in combat. In sharp contrast the 1913 edition was entitled Regulation on the Conduct of Large Units and included detailed information about field armies in combat. The report of the committee that

wrote the later regulation explained: “Studies undertaken in France for about twenty years on the operations of [field] armies and army groups have provided evidence about a certain number of principles that dominate the employment of large units. These principles have never, until the present, been assembled in an official document.”²⁰ Thus, the 1913 regulation included the latest information available to the French Army about the operational level of war and reflected concepts learned through more than two decades of development. In essence, the 1913 manual was the first official publication in France dealing with the operational level of war and its application through operational art.

A key difference between the 1895 and 1913 regulations pertained to the employment of the corps. While the 1895 regulation did not emphasize operations by units larger than corps and envisaged corps acting in a relatively autonomous fashion, the 1913 regulation strongly emphasized operations by field armies while acting as part of army groups. The 1913 regulation explained, “The objective of the maneuver of an army group is to impose on the enemy a … battle under conditions which may lead to decisive results and end the war.”²¹ The regulation made it clear that the maneuver of an army group came from the movement and actions of field armies whose subordinate corps were always united and acted closely in concert with the other corps. Thus, the relative autonomy that was foreseen in the 1895 regulation for corps was accorded to field armies in the 1913 regulation. French operational thinking thereby reflected the important changes in organizational structure that had occurred after 1871.

Despite the greater emphasis on units larger than corps, the influence of Napoleon and the “cult” of the offensive captivated French concepts for operations. This unfortunate development occurred even though interest in the intellectual study of war increased dramatically after 1871, particularly after the 1878 founding of the École Militaire Supérieure, which was renamed the École Supérieure de Guerre in 1880. In a remarkable about-face from the pre-1870 approach, which had frowned on having educated officers, the French energetically studied the many facets of waging war successfully.²² As officers returned eagerly to the academic study of warfare, they “rediscovered” the ideas of Clausewitz and the methods of Napoleon.²³ The study of the two important figures went hand in hand. Since Clausewitz’s works dealt primarily with Napoleonic warfare, his ideas were used to awaken interest in one of France’s greatest and most successful military leaders.

In the late 1880s and the 1890s, the ideas of Clausewitz and the examples of Napoleon dominated the École Supérieure de Guerre, which concentrated more on operations than strategy. One of the most influential of the instructors at the War College was Henri Bonnal, who frequently lectured on Napoleonic warfare. In a 1901 work on the battle of Sadowa, Bonnal argued:

The war of 1866 was prepared, undertaken, and carried out by [German] leaders and soldiers without any war experience.… Nevertheless, despite numerous errors … the Prussian army maneuvered, fought, and won a decisive victory by adhering to the Napoleonic principles of war, [which had] fallen into disuse or even [had been] completely forgotten in other armies of Europe.²⁴

Such words linked the German victory to Napoleonic methods and obviously served to heighten interest among French officers. Nonetheless, the intense interest in Napoleonic warfare led many French military thinkers to emphasize maneuver rather than firepower, misunderstand the effect of newly introduced weapons (breech-loading rifles, machine guns, rapidly firing artillery, etc.), and blur the distinction between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

The effects of this can best be seen in France’s adoption of the ill-fated offensive à outrance. Of those most responsible, Col. Louis de Grandmaison played a particularly important role in the development of the disastrous doctrine upon which the French offensives of 1914 were based. Grandmaison was highly interested in the employment of large formations.²⁵ Despite this focus on larger units, numerous officers attempted to apply his ideas at the tactical level in 1914. Many of those who died in 1914 were weaned on some of Grandmaison’s phrases, such as “To fight means to advance despite enemy fire.”²⁶ Most had paid little or no attention to the careful qualification he had made to the notion of infantrymen always advancing. In 1910, for example, he had written, “In open terrain, a frontal infantry attack is impossible. During the attack, it is the role of the artillery to establish superiority of fire needed to suppress the enemy.”²⁷ Instead of focusing on Grandmaison’s ideas about security and the operations of larger units, many officers concentrated instead on the will to attack and the need to overcome bullets and artillery fire with infantry charges. In this process they, without encountering strong disagreement from Grandmaison, thoughtlessly applied operational concepts to the tactical realm. The unfortunate result was heavy losses in 1914 among some of France’s best and most dedicated officers and soldiers.

Similarly, institutional changes fostered the development of the capability to perform at the operational level of warfare, but concepts within French doctrine for employment of field armies bore a strong resemblance to the mobile manner in which Napoleonic corps had been employed. The main difference was that a field army in 1914 was much larger than Napoleon’s corps in 1815. While primarily emphasizing maneuver and the offensive, and by seeking sharp, intensive battles relying on “curtains” of artillery fire and energetic infantry charges, the French army developed its abilities to fight mobile battles and campaigns with field armies in support of strategic goals. These capabilities enabled the army to survive the initial battles of World War I, but they proved woe

fully inadequate for the static trench warfare that replaced mobile operations a few months after the beginning of the war.

The First Battles of 1914

Offensive ideas also dominated the formulation of strategy. In the decade before 1914, France had gradually tightened its relations with Russia and slowly developed a coalition strategy with Russia that relied on simultaneous offensives on the east and west borders of Germany. By forcing Germany to fight a two-front war, French military planners anticipated an eventual victory no matter what the outcome of the initial battles between Germany and France. In March 1910 one officer asserted, “Even if beaten the French army will have opened the way for the Russian offensive and assured the final success [of the two allies].”²⁸

When General Joseph Joffre became Chief of the General Staff in July 1911, he shaped French strategy and doctrine to conform to the demands of the Franco-Russian Alliance and to his own preference for the offensive. Only six weeks after becoming Chief of the General Staff, he published the first change to Plan XVI²⁹ and in February 1914 replaced it with Plan XVII. Though the new plan was a concentration plan and not a war plan,³⁰ the main body of the document stated, “The intention of the commander-in-chief is to deliver, with all forces assembled, an attack against the German armies.”³¹ While refusing to reveal the details of his campaign strategy or the objectives of his operations, Joffre organized and prepared French forces to attack north or south of Metz-Thionville or north into Belgium toward Arlon and Neufchâteau. Depending on German actions, the French could attack into either Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium or both.

When the Germans began their attack against France in August 1914, they adhered to the outline of Count Alfred von Schlieffen’s plan and attempted to conduct a gigantic turning movement deep into the rear of the Allied forces. While maintaining minimum but sufficient forces on their left flank and center, the Germans concentrated the great mass of their forces on their right wing and planned on moving these forces through central Belgium and then north and west around Paris. Their attack began with a coup de main on the Belgian fortifications around Liège.³²

During the twelve days it took the Germans to clear these fortifications, General Joffre began revealing elements of his closely held strategy, first by launching a small, ineffective offensive into Alsace on his extreme right flank on 7 August.³³ This operation not only signaled to Russia France’s intentions to fulfill its obligations to the Franco-Russian Alliance for an early offensive and protected the flank of the subsequent attack by First and Second Armies, it also boosted the morale of the French people. On 8 August Joffre revealed his entire operational

concept when he issued General Instructions No. 1. He intended to send First and Second Armies on his right into Lorraine, south of the Metz- Thionville fortifications, and Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies on his left into Belgium and Luxembourg, north of the fortifications. While the supporting attack on the right fixed the German left, drew enemy forces to the south, and fulfilled alliance obligations, the subsequent main attack on the left would strike the German center and unhinge the enemy forces advancing into central Belgium.³⁴ Though many critics such as Basil H. Liddell Hart have mistakenly characterized French strategy as being nothing more than a “frontal and whole front offensive,”³⁵ Joffre retained a high level of flexibility and aimed his main attack toward what he thought would be a lightly defended armpit of an enemy arm swinging a fist no deeper than Sedan or Mézières. But the initial attacks into Alsace-Lorraine went badly.

On the morning of the fourteenth, Joffre’s First and Second Armies advanced on the southern prong of what would be a two-pronged attack. In consonance with General Helmuth von Moltke’s orchestration of Schlieffen’s concept, the German Sixth and Seventh Armies fell back, but they made the advancing French columns pay dearly. German machinegunners extracted a high toll from the charging French infantry, and German long-range howitzers, aided by aerial spotters, skillfully silenced the shorter-range French 75-mm. batteries early in the fighting. The two French armies crossed the frontier on 15 August, but their advance had halted by 20 August.

In one of the final attacks near Sarrebourg (fifty kilometers west of Strasbourg), the two brigades of the French 15th Infantry Division made a frontal assault at dawn on 20 August against entrenched German infantry. Since heavy artillery had not yet arrived, the French infantry gallantly moved forward in the open in their dark-blue overcoats and red trousers and kepis. With bugles blaring and banners waving, they charged forward with bayonets fixed against the German machine guns and artillery. By 0700 the attack had collapsed.³⁶

During the first battles of the campaign, the misplaced ardor and tactics of the offensive à outrance led some commanders to charge forward and commit their troops in ill-coordinated and poorly timed piecemeal attacks. French officers advanced as quickly as they could, usually refusing to prepare trenches and strong points on which their troops could fall back if the attack failed. When the suicidal charges did collapse, the French had nothing behind them to halt a German counterattack, and some units collapsed completely, their withdrawals turning into routs.

As the French offensive on Joffre’s right wing ground to a halt on the nineteenth and twentieth, the German Sixth and Seventh Armies under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria launched a counteroffensive at noon on the twentieth. Prior to the beginning of hostilities, General Moltke,

chief of the German General Staff, decided the forces on his left wing should conduct an early counterattack, thereby limiting the French penetration into Germany. After the French First and Second Armies began their attacks, he strengthened Crown Prince Rupprecht on his left wing with six more divisions. The German counterattack caught the French by surprise. While the French First Army withdrew in relatively good order, Second Army had two corps that, according to Joffre, “fell back under conditions that almost resembled a rout.”³⁷ Only the strong performance of General Foch’s XXth Corps prevented disaster.³⁸ By 22 August First and Second Armies had withdrawn to their starting position.

During the first days of First and Second Armies’ advance into Alsace, Joffre became aware of the Germans’ moving farther west through Belgium than previously anticipated, and he responded by moving Fifth Army farther to his left. He expected Fifth Army, as well as the Belgians and the soon-to-arrive British Expeditionary Forces (BEF), to meet the German forces on his left flank. He also thought that such a deep movement would result in even fewer enemy forces in eastern Belgium and make the task of his Third and Fourth Armies easier. Late on 20 August, the day the Germans unleashed their counterattack against First and Second Armies in Alsace-Lorraine, Joffre ordered Third and Fourth Armies to attack.³⁹ He expected the two armies to advance the following day in a northeasterly direction in eastern Belgium toward Longwy, Virton, and Neufchâteau⁴⁰ and to strike marching German columns (which were supposed to be heading west) in the flank or rear and rout them. Confident of success, he told the two army commanders, “The enemy will be attacked wherever he is encountered.”⁴¹

Meanwhile, the German Fourth and Fifth Armies had crossed the Ardennes in eastern Belgium and bided their time, waiting for the First, Second, and Third German Armies on their right to sweep through central Belgium. As they waited, the troops dug entrenchments and organized strong defensive positions. On the twenty-second, the French Third Army blindly bumped into the German Fifth Army near Longwy and the Luxembourg border. Though the terrain was hilly and heavily forested, the French had paid little attention to having advance or flank guards. Hoping to hit an advancing German army in the flank, the French instead stumbled into a killing zone and suffered thousands of casualties. Just as in the Lorraine offensive, the French infantry failed to coordinate their actions with those of the artillery and often did not bother to suppress machine-gun fire before advancing. True to their doctrine to the bloody end, they tried to dig out the Germans with bayonets, but were decimated by machine guns and artillery fire. Farther to the northwest, the French Fourth Army was no more lucky than the Third. Following several disastrous actions, the commander of Fourth Army used the word “disorderly” when he reported to the Grand Quartier General (GQG) that he was

withdrawing.⁴² After a futile attempt to renew the attack, Joffre reluctantly permitted the two armies to return to their defensive positions.

The collapse of the Lorraine and Ardennes offensives placed the French in an extremely awkward position. Without a reserve, much depended on the abilities of Fifth Army and the now arriving BEF, which was moving into position on the French left flank. Between 15 and 21 August, Joffre had moved Fifth Army north toward the angle formed by the Sambre and Meuse Rivers, but on 23 August the Germans crossed the Meuse River and forced Fifth Army to retreat. This was the final step in the collapse of Joffre’s strategy. Instead of concentrating superior force against the weak point or a decisive point, Joffre had diffused his offensive power in three separate and almost unrelated attacks, none of which succeeded. French forces soon began a demoralizing withdrawal.

The first battles on the French frontier thus relied on the maneuver of field armies, almost as if they were remnants of Napoleon’s Grand Armée. Though this resulted in huge casualties and disastrous defeats, the capability to maneuver at operational level soon enabled the French to avoid an even larger defeat.

The “Miracle of the Marne”

Despite the initial failures, the French had not yet lost the campaign and had some reason for hope. Unlike the Germans, they had an effective command and control system and a commander who did not lose his composure after the first losses. While the German communication system collapsed,⁴³ the French system continued to pass information smoothly and dependably. Joffre kept in close touch with the rapidly changing situation and moved forward on several occasions to meet with his major subordinate commanders. The French also had excellent and dependable railways at their disposal. After defeat in 1871, the French had made substantial improvements in their railway system and built several new lines to facilitate the movement of large bodies of troops and equipment from one portion of the frontier to another. In 1914 these improvements greatly increased Joffre’s ability to respond to the threat on his left wing by moving troops and equipment from his right to his left.

Although Joffre was slow to comprehend the German strategy and the location of the main attack, he carefully recast French operational dispositions after he understood what the Germans were doing. Fortunately for France, Moltke’s strategy played into Joffre’s hands by permitting him to reform shaken units and then transport them west rapidly to face the German First and Second Armies. On 24 August Joffre ordered First and Second Armies on his right to hold in place, while the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and British Armies withdrew to the south. He hoped they could hold the Germans along a line extending from the Somme River to Ver-

dun. To strengthen his left flank, he assembled two new armies. The new Sixth Army assembled under General Michel J. Maunoury around Paris; the new Ninth Army assembled under General Ferdinand Foch behind the retreating Fourth and Fifth Armies and soon entered the line when a gap appeared between the two armies.⁴⁴

Other changes increased French effectiveness. With regard to tactics, Joffre informed his army commanders that the infantry should attack only after artillery preparation, and he forbade mass attacks.⁴⁵ This bit of tactical wisdom had been learned only after nearly 300,000 casualties. Joffre also continued to weed out the command structure, including the commanders of Third and Fifth Armies. While dozens of brigade and division commanders were also relieved,⁴⁶ sometimes unjustly, the movement of officers such as General Louis Franchet d’Espèrey into the command structure signaled the promotion of hard-nosed, self-confident fighters. It also signaled the demotion of officers who had done well in the peacetime army but who had not done well in combat.⁴⁷

While Joffre acted to strengthen his left, the German operational plan continued to change. The key modification was the decision by the German First Army commander, General Alexander von Kluck, to move his army around the eastern edge of Paris, rather than encircling it by moving his army around the western edge. As the gigantic Schlieffen wheel continued to turn, Kluck’s decision exposed the German left flank to an attack from Paris and fundamentally altered the German operational concept.⁴⁸

On 2 September the French government placed General Joseph Gallieni in charge of defending Paris. After Maunoury’s Sixth Army entered the fortified city and came under Gallieni’s command, its strength slowly increased as reserve and colonial units arrived to join it. The French initially focused on defending the city, but as the strength of Sixth Army increased, and as the German right flank became more exposed toward the English Channel, the opportunity for decisive action appeared.

On 4 September Gallieni dispatched several aircraft to reconnoiter the area north and west of Paris. When the pilots returned, they informed him that four corps in Kluck’s First Army had crossed the Marne River northeast of Paris and that only one corps remained to protect the entire German flank. On the same day, Franchet d’Espèrey met with the British, and after he promised that elements in Paris would protect the BEF’s left flank, they agreed to participate in an offensive.⁴⁹ Later that evening Joffre received a message from Franchet d’Espèrey concerning his meeting with the British and also engaged in a heated telephone conversation with Gallieni, who demanded that a counterattack be made quickly against the vulnerable German flank. Though the extent of Gallieni’s influence is not clear, Joffre decided the counterattack would take place on the morning of 6 September.⁵⁰

At the German headquarters in Luxembourg on 4 September, Moltke learned, more than a day after Kluck made his fateful decision, that First Army’s right flank - the right flank of the entire German line - stood exposed to an attack from the French Sixth Army in Paris. Moltke had no choice but to halt the advance of First and Second Armies on his right wing. Recognizing a victory on his right could not come from First and Second Armies, he ordered Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies in his center to continue attacking, while the armies on his left continued attacking in the south. First and Second Armies were ordered to face Paris and protect the Germans’ right flank. Kluck’s First Army not only had to stay north of the Marne but also had to pull back from its exposed position.⁵¹

When the Allies launched their counteroffensive on the sixth, success or failure lay in the hands of Maunoury’s Sixth Army, Sir John French’s BEF, and d’Espèrey’s Fifth Army. The situation favored them, for Kluck’s army was split, with one portion south of the Marne and the other farther north facing west. Only the arrival of a message from Moltke finally convinced Kluck that he had no real choice but to pull his leading elements back across the Marne. As he shifted his forces north so he could concentrate his army against the French coming from Paris, he caused a gap to appear between his army and the German Second Army. Meanwhile French attacks against the right of the German Second Army resulted in an even larger gap between First and Second Armies.

As if on cue, the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) and elements from the left wing of the French Fifth Army moved north through this gap, opposed only by reconnaissance elements. Unaware of the significance of what they were doing as they passed between the German First and Second Armies, the Allied soldiers moved slowly. On the morning of 9 September, the British crossed the Meuse River near Chateau-Thierry and insured Allied possession of a bridgehead across the Meuse and between the two German field armies.⁵² This accomplishment made the position untenable for the two German armies.

As the British edged forward, Gallieni desperately reinforced Maunoury’s Sixth Army, using more than 600 taxicabs to transport one division from Paris. Kluck appeared capable of repulsing Sixth Army and perhaps moving into Paris, but neither the German First nor Second had any forces available for closing the gap between their armies or responding to the Allied forces moving through this gap. Though Joffre’s attempt to attack from Paris against the German left flank had failed, the advance of the British and French forces into the gap between the German First and Second Armies left the Germans little choice but to withdraw.

With the withdrawal of the Germans from the vicinity of Paris, the opening campaign of the war on the western front ended. The simultaneous withdrawal of the other field armies on the German right and the subsequent failure of the Germans and Allies to outflank the other in the

“race to the sea” resulted in a long line of entrenchments running roughly from Nieuport on the English Channel, south to Noyon (100 kilometers northeast of Paris), east to Verdun, and then southeast toward Colmar. While Joffre had not saved France from a long and bloody war and had made some inexcusable mistakes in the opening phases of the campaign, he had prevented the Germans from winning a decisive victory. In essence, the ability of the French Army to perform at the operational level enabled him to achieve the “miracle of the Marne.”

The Nivelle Offensive

From late 1914 through late 1917, the French continued to launch huge offensives with objectives deep in the enemy’s rear. To achieve a penetration, they concentrated massive amounts of men and materiel in desperate attempts to break through the extensive German defensives. Most of the assaults, however, yielded little more than long lists of casualties, and gains were measured in meters, rather than kilometers.

From the first desperate months of war, military leaders on both sides recognized the effectiveness of artillery in suppressing enemy fires and reducing friendly casualties,⁵³ and with each passing month the role of artillery became more and more important. As the amount of artillery fire in support of attacks began to be measured in the millions of rounds, the battlefield came to resemble a moonscape. Craters, trenches, and barbed wire served to delay the advance of the infantry, but they also served to delay the advance of artillery, which was extremely heavy and could easily become bogged down. Since the infantry could not advance without artillery support, the pace of an advance was set less by the infantry than by the ability of the artillery to displace forward and continue to provide supporting fires. Such displacements required time, thereby adding intervals or phases to attacks and making them step-by-step, methodical operations. To make matters more difficult, an army on the attack sometimes had to build roads through an area before it could make a successful advance. In contrast, the defenders’ efforts to rush reserve forces into areas threatened by a penetration were generally not impeded by such delays.

Because of constraints on mobility, fighting at the operational level during World War I was greatly influenced by the ability of a defender - usually the Germans on the western front - to reinforce a threatened sector faster than an attacker could pass through it. Using railroads and roads, a defender could move reinforcements easily and did not have to contend with the destruction an attacker faced. French commanders quickly recognized the importance of somehow tying down a defender’s reserves, so reinforcements could not be shifted into the area where an attack was being launched. The primary method for contending with the Germans’ reserves was through the launching of multiple attacks, usu-

ally on a successive basis, across a broad front. In 1917, for example, the Allies agreed that the British would attack at Arras before the French launched the main attack at the Chemin des Dames. By carefully locating and sequencing attacks, an attacker could compel a defender to commit his reserves piecemeal and thereby prevent him from using them more effectively. Such coordinated attacks became standard fare in most operational planning conducted by the French after 1914.

Almost all the attacks launched by the French from 1914 to 1917 were part of huge offensives seeking a breakthrough and the seizure of distant objectives. One operation, which greatly affected French military thinking and which reflected the French approach to operational art, was General Robert G. Nivelle’s offensive in the spring of 1917. Nivelle was an excellent officer who quickly rose from the rank of colonel in 1914 to corps and field army command. Although the French were unable to break through German defensive positions in 1915 and 1916, Nivelle developed a reputation during this period as an innovative artillery officer. He devised the first rolling barrage of the war and coined the slogan, “The artillery conquers; the infantry occupies.” By creating an intricate timetable, he enabled artillerymen to maintain a moving barrage of artillery in front of advancing infantrymen. In an era without mobile radios, the rolling barrage proved to be an excellent method for coordinating infantry and artillery and added substantially to the power of the offensive.⁵⁴

Nivelle’s initial attempt to use unusually heavy artillery barrages in support of infantry attacks failed in June 1915, but in October 1916 he launched a dramatically successful attack at Verdun. After detailed rehearsals and a four-day artillery preparation,⁵⁵ he used seven divisions along a seven-kilometer front to capture the extremely important objective of Fort Douaumont, a few kilometers northeast of Verdun. Although his forces penetrated no more than three kilometers, the advance seemed miraculously deep by the standards of the day. This successful attack was followed by a second one in early November that captured Fort Vaux.⁵⁶ In these attacks, he used more than a million rounds of artillery against German positions before beginning a rolling barrage of artillery in front of attacking infantry.⁵⁷ Ironically, Nivelle was one of the first in the French Army to notice German infiltration tactics, for in June 1916 he had warned Second Army about the Germans’ closely coordinating their artillery and infantry and using “infiltration” and “encirclement” to make their way through French defenses.⁵⁸ Despite this early insight, Nivelle’s method emphasized the firepower of artillery, not the mobility of infantry.

Nivelle’s success at Verdun suggested that he had found the “formula” for breaking through strong German defenses, and on 12 December 1916, he was named commander of all French armies. He soon began planning to smash through the German front in the spring of 1917 along the

Aisne River between Reims and Soissons. Recognizing that the intervals required for artillery preparation between successive assaults provided the defenders time to strengthen their positions and concentrate reserves, he concluded that the French should seek a rapid penetration under circumstances that prevented the enemy from reinforcing his defenses. To obtain this rapid penetration, Nivelle planned on using vast amounts of artillery (particularly from long-range, heavy artillery recently added to France’s inventory) to obliterate an enemy position throughout its depth. By concentrating simultaneous barrages on successive lines of German defenses, and by preceding the advancing infantry with a rolling barrage, he expected the infantry to rush through holes blown into enemy lines. He intended to punch through German defenses in one blow and capture the heights of the Chemin des Dames to the north of the Aisne in only twenty-four to forty-eight hours.⁵⁹ Less optimistic than the new commander of French forces, Pétain recognized the difficulties of applying a tactical technique to the operational level of war and warned, “Even the waters of the Lake of Geneva would have but little effect if dispersed over the length and breadth of the Sahara Desert.”⁶⁰

Other difficulties came from the Germans’ retiring from the Noyon salient, the shoulder of which ran parallel to the Aisne, and constructing a shorter defensive line to its rear. The Germans named this new line the Siegfried Position, but the Allies called it the Hindenburg Line. Adding to Nivelle’s troubles, the Germans also obtained crucial intelligence about his offensive and organized their positions into elastic defenses that placed only a minimum number of infantry in forward trenches. An important part of their method was the placing of troops on the reverse slopes of hills so they could obtain some protection from the flat-trajectory artillery fire of the Allies. They also reinforced the threatened sector with an additional field army.

Despite indications that the Germans had reorganized their defenses and expected an attack on the Chemin des Dames, Nivelle insisted on launching the offensive. On 1 April, he wrote: “It is necessary to maintain the qualities of violence, brutality, and swiftness. The success of the breakthrough lies in speed and in surprise, caused by the rapid and sudden rush of our infantry onto the third and fourth positions. No consideration should intervene which will weaken the élan of the attack.”⁶¹ Ignoring criticisms from Pétain and others,⁶² Nivelle scheduled the attack for 10 April, then delayed it until the fourteenth, and finally launched it on the sixteenth. Along a front of approximately sixty kilometers, he massed two armies for the attack and kept two armies in reserve, totaling 1,400,000 men in fifty-two divisions. In support of the four armies, the French had approximately 1,650 mortars and accompanying guns; 1,800 75-mm. guns; and 1,700 heavy artillery pieces. Stocks of ammunition included 24 million rounds of 75-mm. and 9 million rounds of heavy

artillery ammunition. To support the attack, the French also had to extend their railways in the region.⁶³

On the left, Sixth Army had fourteen infantry divisions; on the right, Fifth Army also had fourteen infantry divisions. When the infantry broke through the German defenses, Sixth Army was supposed to turn west and Fifth Army east. This would enable the Tenth Army to pass through them and to advance north. Nivelle confidently expected the Tenth Army to advance twenty-five kilometers by the end of the second day’s attack. First Army remained in reserve.⁶⁴

Before the attack began, nine days of artillery preparation pounded the German positions. After this preparation, the leading wave of attacking infantrymen occupied the first positions fairly easily, because the enemy had abandoned many of them as they had retired to the Hindenburg Line. As the French soldiers moved over the high ground of the Chemin des Dames, however, withering German machine-gun fire halted their advance. The commander of the 2d Colonial Corps on the right of Sixth Army and in the center of the offensive described the attack in his after-action report:

At H-hour, the troops approach in order the first enemy positions. The geographic crest is attained almost without losses; the enemy’s artillery barrage is not very brisk and is sporadic. Nevertheless, our infantry advances with a slower speed than anticipated. The rolling barrage is unleashed almost immediately and steadily moves ahead of the first waves, which it quickly ceases to protect. A few machine guns that are on the plateau do not halt the … infantrymen who are able to descend the northern side of the plateau to the edge of the steep slopes descending into the valley of the Ailette [River]. There, they are welcomed and fixed in place by the deadly fire of numerous machine guns that, located on the [reverse side of the] slopes, outside the reach of our projectiles, have remained undamaged.

A few groups utilizing the approaches incompletely covered [by fire] succeed in descending the slopes. But in general, the troops suffer considerable losses in a few minutes, particularly in leaders, and [after] not succeeding in crossing this deadly zone, halt, take cover, and at some point withdraw to the first trench in their rear.

They are joined by the battalions [from increment] B, which depart at the scheduled hour and dissolve on the line of combat. The battalions [from increment] C, conforming to the combat plan, advance in their turn. A few of them … occupy the first German trenches or our jump-off trenches. In less than an hour, the fighting is stabilized. All attempts to regain forward movement fail as soon as they arrive on the line covered by enemy machine guns. The only possible movement is through trenches using grenades and [soon] this encounters growing resistance.

The enemy’s reserves are in effect almost intact. Well protected in holes on the northern slope or in very strong dug-outs, they have not suffered from the bombardment, and the trench running along the northern edge of the plateau constitutes for them an easy way of departure.

During the rest of the day on the 16th and the days of the 17th and 18th, combat assumes the form of a series of partial attacks, preceded as much as possible by an artillery bombardment of the enemy’s positions and executed under the control of the local commander according to the availability of munitions and grenades.… Combat for the units of the corps is terminated during the night of the 18–19th.⁶⁵

Although the fighting continued until 7 May, the Nivelle offensive had failed dismally. After only three days of fighting, Nivelle concluded that Fifth and Sixth armies could not break through the strong German defenses and modified his plan. He ordered Fourth Army, which was on the right of Fifth Army, to attack in a northwesterly direction, while Fifth Army attacked to the northeast. He hoped these attacks would encircle Reims and slice off a large part of the German positions. But this effort was also doomed to failure. The Germans had assembled additional forces in the sector, and the attacks had little chance of success.

A week after the launching of Nivelle’s offensive, Paris became alarmed at Nivelle’s efforts to continue the offensive despite its costs and apparent failure. The casualties during the first week were approximately 117,000, including 32,000 dead. Perhaps more important, the senseless losses had sapped the morale of the French soldiers and contributed significantly to the mutinies of 1917.⁶⁶

Pétain’s Limited Offensives

Following the disastrous operation, Nivelle was relieved and replaced by General Pétain, whose first task was to end the mutinies and then restore the French soldiers’ fighting spirit. As part of his reforms, Pétain abandoned the notion of breaking through German defenses and began emphasizing limited offensives. On 19 May 1917, he published Directive No. 1, which outlined the new method of attacking. The directive stated:

Instead of great attacks in depth with distant objectives, it is preferable to conduct attacks with limited objectives, unleashed quickly on a front as large as permitted by the number and caliber of available artillery. For this concept to be realized, the attacks must be:

1) Conducted with as few infantry as possible and with the maximum amount of artillery.

2) Preceded by surprise which will provide the chance of acting with strong or weak forces and obtaining important results. It should be noted that surprise can be obtained only if the attack sector … is allowed to be quiet for several weeks or even months before the operation begins.

3) Applied successively on different parts of the front, chosen from those that the enemy has significant reason not to abandon readily.

4) Followed rapidly by other attacks which fix the enemy and deprive him of his freedom of action.⁶⁷

Instead of a single battle leading to a decisive victory, Pétain believed a series of simultaneous or successive battles had to be fought. Even then, victory in the near future was not guaranteed, but losses could be minimized and heavy casualties inflicted on the Germans.

Using the new method of limited offensives, Pétain launched an offensive at Verdun on 20 August 1917 and achieved moderate success. As soon as the Germans concentrated their reserves and offered stiff resistance, he halted the attack. From 23 through 26 October he launched a more elaborate offensive near the Fort of La Malmaison north of Soissons on the western end of the Chemin des Dames, relying on even larger amounts of artillery than had been used in the recent offensive at Verdun. With Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing watching the first large French offensive since the mutinies, the French launched an attack with Sixth Army along a front of about twelve kilometers. The objective was the high ground supporting the German right flank along the Chemin des Dames. With about 1,850 artillery tubes firing in support, including six days of preparatory fires, and with fourteen tank companies accompanying the infantry, the French advanced about five kilometers. This advance outflanked the Germans on the Chemin des Dames and forced them to withdraw behind the Ailette River.⁶⁸

Only 4 percent of the French soldiers who participated in the attack became casualties, and the victory served to revive the morale and confidence of the army. Pétain later observed that the units that took part in the offensive were swept with a “veritable intoxication of victory.”⁶⁹ The Germans had suffered heavy losses and were forced to pull back from the blood-soaked terrain of the Chemin des Dames. Pétain must have felt extremely pleased, for a limited offensive had seized the terrain that Nivelle’s all-out offensive had failed to gain. No one, however, knew how to use this operational method to end the war. To his critics who still sought a formula for a quick victory, Pétain replied, “I am waiting for the Americans and the tanks.”⁷⁰

The Model of Montdidier

Examples of limited offensives, particularly the battle of La Malmaison, were important in the development of French operational art thinking, but no battle was studied more intensively after the Great War than the battle of Montdidier. This battle occurred in August 1918 when the French First Army, commanded by General Eugène Debeney, delivered one of the final and most important blows of the war to the German Army. Occurring on what General Ludendorff termed the “black day” of the war for the German Army,⁷¹ the August attack represented a turning point in the conduct of French operations and inaugurated the form of open warfare that characterized the last months of the war. At the same time, the

French First Army was composed primarily of French units, with only the American 1st Division making an indirect contribution to the French success with the capture of Cantigny in June 1918. As such, the battle represented an extremely important achievement of French units during the Great War.

During the battle, General Debeney commanded a force of fifteen divisions (divided into four corps), supported by more than 1,600 artillery pieces and two battalions of light tanks.⁷² The initial concept was for a limited offensive by the French First Army to support an attack by the British Fourth Army under General Sir Henry Rawlinson. But General Debeney recognized that his army had an opportunity to strike a deadly blow at the Germans to his front. Rather than make a massive frontal assault, Debeney resolved to strike with a French corps on his field army’s left flank (near the British Fourth Army’s area of attack) and seize key terrain that would destroy the equilibrium of the enemy’s defenses. He would follow this attack with a second attack in the same general area and encourage the Germans to reinforce the threatened area. As the enemy reinforced his units on First Army’s left flank, the French would suddenly attack with two corps on First Army’s right flank.⁷³ By using successive operations, the French could take advantage of the Germans’ having shifted forces to the point of initial attack.

As Debeney had planned, the battle began with four French corps on line, and despite difficult resistance the two corps on the left soon pushed back the enemy defenders. When the attack on the French left was followed by an attack on the right, the sudden commitment of the two corps on the right caught the Germans off guard. Since they had already concentrated most of their reserves on the French left, the Germans could not respond to the unexpected maneuver and suffered a major defeat.

Following World War I, the battle of Montdidier became the basis for officers’ studying of operational methods. The French severely criticized the disastrous methods used from 1914 to 1917 and cited the controlled and deliberate operations at Montdidier as a model of centralized control and of effective planning and execution. When General Debeney reestablished the curriculum at the War College, he included the important battle fought by the field army he commanded. Since he later became a contributing author to the 1922 Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units⁷⁴ and served as Chief of the General Staff of the French Army from 1923 to 1930, the model of his successful operation had a remarkable influence throughout the Army.

To study this battle, students at the War College after 1918 used a book written by Maj. Marius Daille, an assistant professor of military history at the War College. They often spent four days at the end of May in their second school year walking the Montdidier battlefield and studying the details of the attack.⁷⁵ Maj. Daille’s analysis of the battle warned the

students that Napoleonic methods no longer applied to twentieth-century warfare. Napoleon had relied on bringing decisive firepower and forces against a single point, breaking enemy lines, and destroying the cohesiveness of the enemy force. In the Great War, the French tried similar methods but had taken enormous casualties at Artois, Champagne, and Verdun. Such methods had never achieved a breakthrough. To explain this failure, Daille argued that despite initial successes, an attack would eventually slow as the direction of attack became apparent and a defender’s reserves came into action. Instead of expanding like a balloon, the breach would progressively become smaller as the attacking forces pushed forward, and the friendly line ultimately would resemble a “narrow triangle” on the terrain, pointing into the enemy’s position.⁷⁶ Within this triangle, concentrated enemy fire from the flanks would preclude movement and eventually the attacker’s advantage would dissolve. Repeated and powerful attempts to punch through the enemy’s defenses could only lead to the creation of “pockets,” or salients, which were vulnerable to concentric artillery fires and enemy counterattack. Daille concluded that breaking through an organized defensive position would remain for a long time beyond the ability of an attacking army.⁷⁷

For Major Daille, the offensive by First Army in August 1918 at Montdidier demonstrated a new method for overwhelming an organized defensive position without attempting a breakthrough. He identified the new method as juxtaposing several powerful attacks along converging lines. The enemy could not reinforce one area without weakening another and thereby could not prevent the attacker from pressing forward. While attacking across a broad front may appear to be linear attack, according to Daille it actually consisted of concentrating powerful means along several portions of a defender’s line and then attacking. These simultaneous or successive operations insured that the attacker was always stronger than the defender and that the defender could not mass sufficient forces to halt the attacks. Clearly, Debeney had used this method at Montdidier, and it had succeeded beyond his wildest hopes.

While Daille preferred separate and powerful attacks along converging lines, he did not reject completely the single-axis attack in which new action was superimposed on top of another as it faltered. A single thrust sought depth, and according to Daille it could be used in the opening days of a campaign before a strongly organized defensive front had been established. It could also be used to strike at the boundary between different armies or the armies of different nations.⁷⁸ The main theme of Daille’s study, nevertheless, was that the battle of Montdidier provided the formula for future success: coordinated and carefully controlled attacks (either simultaneous or successive) across a broad front with concentrated efforts at selected points.

“Maneuvering” Masses of Fire

Between the two world wars, the French made no dramatic changes in the organization of their corps, field armies, and army groups, but they did carefully analyze possible changes in their employment. Given the obvious increase in amounts and accuracy of firepower, they expected a future war to be even more deadly and consuming than the Great War had been, and they did not wish to be unprepared. Despite an intense effort that included numerous field exercises, tests, and sometimes sharp debate, the operational methods they used in the battles of 1940 represented only modest changes from those of the past and proved inadequate for the demands of mobile warfare that was waged and thrust upon them by the Germans.

As the French developed their operational doctrine, they remained concerned primarily with the effects of firepower and placed increased emphasis on centralized control by higher-level commanders, particularly of the artillery.⁷⁹ The French had begun the Great War with a doctrine in which mobile artillery provided rapid fire during an attack; they had ended the war with a doctrine emphasizing massive fire prior to and during an attack and requiring artillery to be under the control of division and higher commanders. The concept of centralizing artillery assets corresponded with the concept of maneuvering masses of fire, which became an extremely important part of French operational-level doctrine. Such control was necessary for maneuver, according to the French, since it enabled the commander to concentrate his fires on the decisive point in battle. The decisive point, however, was defined by larger-unit commanders, and maneuver was viewed in terms of the movement of larger, rather than smaller units. In other words, concerns at the operational level overshadowed those at the tactical level.

Throughout the interwar period, the concept of maneuvering masses of fire became ever more important. General Frédéric G. Herr, Inspector General of Artillery at the end of World War I, noted that if the commander should decentralize his artillery, he would lose all control over the battle and become “disarmed.” By passing control of the battle to his subordinates, the higher-level commander could not maneuver and the battle would degenerate into a series of “isolated, disjointed, sterile local actions.”⁸⁰ The 1926 Regulation on Maneuver of the Artillery warned, “Finally, the systemic allocation of all artillery to subordinate elements must be avoided; it constitutes an abdication of command.”⁸¹

While the French recognized the need for decentralization during an advance, military leaders preferred having larger-unit commanders control major portions of the artillery. In an October 1922 meeting of the Superior Council of War, Marshal Pétain referred to some of this artillery as a “strategic reserve, suitable for great displacement.”⁸² Such

artillery provided a means for the higher-level commander to exercise a major influence over the battlefield and acted as a readily available reserve that could be shifted rapidly to another area. The requirement for such a reserve meant that a significant portion of the artillery was longrange, heavy artillery under the control of corps and higher commanders. This had been one of the important lessons of World War I. But the use of artillery in this manner favored a more stable battlefield, rather than a highly mobile one. The resulting distortion of tactical and operational mobility can be seen in the 1926 artillery regulation, which cited railway artillery as having “great tactical” value because of its ability to “occupy and leave” a position rapidly.⁸³

One of the critics of the organization of the French artillery was Marshal Foch. In a meeting of the Superior Council of War in October 1926, he stated, “It will be necessary from the first for the divisional artillery to be the most important, then the corps artillery, then the general reserves.”⁸⁴ The French emphasis remained the reverse of that suggested by Foch, and after World War II, General Maurice Gamelin noted that while the French had fifty-six regiments of artillery in general reserve in May–June 1940, the Germans had nowhere near that amount of artillery in reserve.⁸⁵ By misunderstanding the reluctance of the Germans to retain artillery as a reserve, he had misunderstood the thrust of German doctrine toward mobility, penetration, and decentralization and had missed an extremely important difference between the French and German employment of artillery.

As the French developed their doctrine, they accepted a dangerous degree of rigidity within their system for command and control. They believed the locus of decision making had to remain at higher levels, because a higher commander had to manage and coordinate the actions of numerous subordinate units. The army’s doctrinal and organizational system stressed the power and authority of corps, army, and army group commanders. Each lower level had less room for improvisation and adjustments than the level immediately above it. With the strongest emphasis being placed on the operational, rather than the tactical level, the entire system was designed to be propelled forward by pressure from above, rather than by being pulled from below. In contrast to a decentralized battle in which officers were expected to show initiative and flexibility, the French preferred rigid centralization and strict obedience. Unfortunately for France, this resulted in a fatal flaw: The French military establishment could not respond flexibly to unanticipated demands and could hardly capitalize upon an important gain made by a lower-level unit.

In the final analysis, the French emphasis on centralization and their doctrine of allocation of artillery placed the greatest premium on firepower and blurred the relationship between the tactical and operational levels. The resulting distortion is apparent in the changing of the name

of the French field manual on large units. While the 1913 edition was entitled Regulation on the Conduct of Large Units, the 1936 edition was entitled Instructions of the Tactical Employment of Large Units.⁸⁶ French concepts for the operational level thus rested on an extremely shaky foundation.

The Methodical Battle

By the beginning of World War II, the centerpiece in French operational thinking was what they called the bataille conduite, or methodical battle,⁸⁷ which bore a strong resemblance to Pétain’s battle at La Malmaison and Debeney’s at Montdidier. By this term the French meant a rigidly controlled operation in which units and weapons were carefully marshaled and then employed in combat. Such a battle was conducted deliberately and step-by-step, with units obediently moving between phase lines and adhering to strictly scheduled timetables as they moved toward relatively shallow objectives. With few radios available, these control measures facilitated the employment of massive amounts of artillery in support of the infantry. Such methods, the French believed, were essential for the coherent employment of the enormous amounts of men and materiel demanded by modern combat. They also kept the locus of decision making at higher command levels and provided for strongly centralized control to coordinate the actions of numerous subordinates. No audacious ideas such as those propounded by Nivelle or Joffre could ever thrive in headquarters manned by officers intensely schooled in such rigid methods.

Through the interwar period, French officers focused primarily on the methodical battle. In September 1938 a lecturer at the Center of Higher Military Studies described an operation of a field army consisting of five corps with fifteen divisions along a front of sixty kilometers. His description included a step-by-step approach to organizing the forces and synchronizing their actions in battle. His solution for how the forces should be employed included having the main attack launched by six divisions, each of which had a front of about twenty-two kilometers. The lecturer also suggested concentrating artillery assets, enabling the attacking force to have a high density of artillery tubes along each kilometer of attack frontage. As for the depth of the objective, the lecturer explained that it should not be deeper than one-half the length of the attack frontage - about seventy-two kilometers.⁸⁸

Unfortunately for France, this attack more closely resembled the battles of 1918 than those of May–June 1940. Though French doctrine placed some value on mobility, the methodical battle represented only a slight improvement over the static method employed before 1918 and signaled a decline in the French sense of maneuver. Simultaneous or suc-

cessive attacks such as those at Montdidier could be used, but no dramatic improvements in tactical or operational mobility were envisaged.

French concepts for the methodical battle had a profound effect on their views about the depth of the battlefield. Napoleonic ideas about actions throughout the depth of an enemy position disappeared from the minds of officers who focused on attacks of only seventy-two kilometers by an army of fifteen divisions. Though the French planned the employment of air attacks throughout the enemy’s position, notions of linking air attacks with deep land attacks appealed to few officers. In February 1939 the French published a manual on The Provisional Use of Armored Divisions.⁸⁹ Despite the increased power of large tank units, the manual included the concept for successive objectives and movement by bounds and anticipated the distance between the bounds to be only three or four kilometers. These shallow depths bore little or no resemblance to the depth achieved by the Germans in May 1940.

Emphasis on the methodical battle also affected French doctrine for the defense. The essence of their doctrine was the preparation and occupation of a position in depth, but the depth of their positions was far more shallow than what was required in modern warfare. When a French unit (from battalion to corps size) occupied a defensive sector, it organized its forces into three parts: an advance post line, a principal position of resistance, and a stopping line. The principal position of resistance was the most important and heavily defended portion of the French defenses. Theoretically, it could be located along an easily protected front, preferably in an area where the enemy could be channeled into carefully selected zones or fields of fire between natural and man-made obstacles. Because of the requirement for depth, the principal position of resistance rarely resembled a line. To its rear was the stopping line, along which an attacking enemy force was supposed to be halted after it had been weakened by forward defenders.⁹⁰

If an enemy managed to penetrate a stopping line, French doctrine called for a process known as colmater, or filling. A commander expected to meet a penetration by having his reserves, as well as the reserves of larger units, move in front of attacking enemy troops and gradually slow them down until they were halted. By shifting additional infantry, armor, and artillery units laterally into a threatened sector or forward from reserves in the rear, an attacker could be slowed and eventually stopped. After sealing off the enemy penetration, a counterattack would follow, but this counterattack would usually rely on the use of artillery and infantry fires rather than the charges of infantry and tanks.

Doctrine for the defense thus rested upon the belief that a defender could reinforce a threatened sector more quickly than an attacker could fight through the defenses to his front. For a variety of complex reasons, the French assumed that the rate of advance and depth of attack by an

army on the offensive would not be dramatically different from that during the Great War. Subsequent events at Sedan in May 1940 soon demonstrated the fallacy of this assumption.

The Battle of Sedan

With the opening of World War II, French military leaders prepared to fight a series of methodical battles as part of their defensive strategy. While holding along the fortifications of the Maginot Line on the northeastern frontier, and while placing a minimum number of forces along the Ardennes, General Gamelin planned for French forces to rush north into central and western Belgium. The French believed the German main attack would come à la Schlieffen through the broad avenue of approach known as the Gembloux Gap that extended through central Belgium from Liège to Gembloux to Mons. To meet the anticipated German attack, Gamelin concentrated his most mobile forces along the border of central and western Belgium and prepared them to move forward rapidly.⁹¹ After these forces entered Belgium, he wanted them to avoid an encounter battle. That is, he wanted French forces to move forward and establish a strong defensive position before the Germans arrived. After weakening the enemy and building up French and Allied forces, he intended to resume the offensive and achieve victory.

As for how far forward French forces would move into Belgium, Gamelin had several alternatives, but by May 1940 he had settled on moving them to a line that ran along the Meuse River from Sedan to Namur, across to Wavre, along the Dyle River, to Antwerp. Of the alternatives available, a defense along the Namur–Dyle River–Antwerp line would be about seventy or eighty kilometers shorter.⁹² By May 1940 the French and British were poised to carry out the Allied operational concept and move forward to the Dyle line. Army Group 1 had responsibility for the area between the English Channel and the western edge of the Maginot Line. From left to right in Army Group 1, Seventh Army, British Expeditionary Forces, First Army, and Ninth Army prepared to move forward and occupy the Dyle line, while Second Army (on the right of Ninth Army) remained in position in the Sedan sector.

Second Army was the easternmost field army in Army Group 1 and had responsibility for a front that extended from west of Sedan to Longuyon, a straight-line distance of about sixty-five kilometers but actually about seventy-five kilometers because of the tying of the defense to favorable terrain. Its defensive sector included portions of the Maginot Line and the area to its left, which had relatively few fortifications. Unlike the other field armies in the west, which planned on moving into Belgium when the Germans attacked, Second Army did not have to move forward and occupy new positions. While it remained in place, its west-

ern boundary served as the “hinge” for Ninth Army on its left and the other field armies that prepared to rush forward.⁹³

In May 1940 General Charles Huntziger, who commanded Second Army, had two corps headquarters and five infantry divisions under his command. To defend his sector, he identified a main position of resistance, which was south of the Meuse River in the area of Sedan, and a stopping line, which ran along the high ground of La Cassine–Mont Dieu–Stonne, sixteen kilometers south of Sedan. Second Army concentrated most of its defensive preparations along the forward edge of the main position of resistance. Huntziger placed the 41st Infantry and 3d Colonial Infantry Divisions under XVIII Corps on Second Army’s right and the 3d North African and 55th Infantry Divisions under X Corps on the left. For a reserve, he initially maintained control over the 71st Infantry Division. In coordination with the field armies on his right and left, he placed a security force forward of his main position of resistance and manned it with a cavalry brigade and two light cavalry divisions. He reinforced these cavalry units with the reconnaissance squadrons from the divisions in Second Army.⁹⁴

In his decision about the placement of his divisions, General Huntziger was primarily concerned with the possibility of a German attack pushing through his right flank and then turning southeast behind the Maginot Line. Consequently, he placed his strongest divisions on the right and his weakest on the left.⁹⁵ The 55th Division, which was a Series B division and thus manned by fewer active-duty officers and soldiers than Series A or active divisions, had the dubious distinction of being the farthest left division in Second Army. It was charged with the defense of Sedan, the sector where the three divisions from the German XIX Panzer Corps crossed on the afternoon of 13 May.

When the Germans attacked at 1500 on 13 May, the 55th Division defended the Sedan sector with two regiments on line in defensive positions along the Meuse River.⁹⁶ The 2d Panzer Division crossed at Donchery (three kilometers west of Sedan), the 1st Panzer Division crossed just west of Sedan, and the 10th Panzer Division crossed just east of Sedan at Wadelincourt. The 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions attacked directly into the 147th Regiment’s sector, while the 2d Panzer Division crossed just to its west in the 331st Regiment’s sector. Of the seven crossings made in the Sedan sector, only those made by the 1st Panzer Division west of Sedan managed to move quickly through the French defenders. In particular, the 1st Infantry Regiment from the 1st Division crossed west of Sedan and managed to reach Cheveuges by 2200 on the thirteenth, an advance of about six kilometers. In contrast to the success of the 1st Division, the 2d Division did not cross successfully until elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment cleared out the French defenders to its front. Similarly, the 10th Division initially managed only to get two squad-size elements across the

river and advanced extremely slowly against strong opposition. Because of the difficulties encountered by the 2d and 10th Panzer Divisions, the penetration was extremely narrow and very vulnerable. That night German engineers worked feverishly to build bridges across the Meuse so additional forces could be rushed across and the bridgehead expanded.

Reinforcing the Sedan Sector

Before the Germans reached the Meuse, the French High Command took significant steps to strengthen the Sedan sector. Neither General Alphonse Georges (who commanded the French forces along the northern and northeastern frontiers) nor General Gaston Billotte (who commanded Army Group 1, which included Second Army plus other field armies west to the English Channel) believed the Germans would make their main attack through the area of Sedan. Both apparently considered the German forces in the Ardennes part of a secondary effort aiming farther north and contributing to the main German effort through the Gembloux Gap. Nevertheless, the possibility existed of a German thrust moving around the left wing of the Maginot Line and then circling behind the important fortification through the Stenay Gap. Consequently, in a classic colmater operation, the high-level commanders began moving units toward Sedan to reinforce the sector west of the Maginot Line not long after the Germans entered Belgium.

General Huntziger, who commanded Second Army, notified X Corps on the night of 11 May that the 71st Division would be placed at its disposition and should enter the front line. The X Corps ordered the 71st Division to move forward into the main position of resistance to the right of the 55th Division.⁹⁷ Most of the units of the 71st moved into position on the night of 12–13 May and were still settling into position on the thirteenth when the Germans crossed the Meuse. On the morning of 12 May, Second Army placed two artillery regiments, which were already in the vicinity of Sedan, under the control of X Corps.⁹⁸ Increasing the artillery support for a threatened sector accorded completely with French doctrine, for such an action added to the defensive capability of the sector while placing sufficient forces on hand to conduct a counterattack with artillery fires. Moving the 71st Division and the two artillery regiments forward, however, left Second Army with extremely weak reserves.

Second Army also began moving additional infantry and tank forces into the sector and preparing for a counterattack by these forces against a possible German penetration. On 12 May at 1105 it sent out a warning order about the 4th and 7th Tank Battalions’ coming under the control of X Corps. The two tank battalions came under X Corps’ control at 0030 on 13 May, about half an hour before the Germans attacked across the Meuse.⁹⁹ The X Corps also sent infantry forward. On the night of 10–11

May X Corps ordered the 213th Infantry Regiment to move forward, and late on the eleventh it ordered the 205th Regiment to move forward. By the morning of 13 May both regiments occupied positions south of Sedan near high ground between Mont Dieu and Stonne. They were in excellent positions for use against the subsequent German penetration.

The French High Command took other steps to reinforce the Sedan sector. XXI Corps, under the command of General J. A. L. R. Flavigny and was part of the General Reserve, received a warning order on the evening of 11 May that it would “probably” be committed in Second Army’s sector.¹⁰⁰ Since XXI Corps had no combat divisions and consisted only of a corps headquarters and organic support units, Flavigny expected to assume control of two to three divisions after being committed.

At 0815 on 12 May General Georges, commander of northern group of forces, met with key members of his staff and decided to retain control over XXI Corps. Though he decided in this meeting to give one infantry division to Ninth Army and another to Second Army and to move a third division to the vicinity of the hinge between the two field armies, he was not yet willing to relinquish control of Flavigny’s corps headquarters.¹⁰¹ On 13 May at 1330 Second Army distributed a contingency plan for the use of XXI Corps when it came under Huntziger’s control.¹⁰² This plan mentioned the commitment of the 3d Motorized Infantry Division and “eventually” the 3d Armored Division. While serving as part of the General Reserve, the 3d Motorized Division received orders at 2000 on the twelfth to move toward Stonne. With the first group departing at midnight, the bulk of the division moved on the thirteenth and the final group closed in on the morning of the fourteenth.¹⁰³ At midnight on 12–13 May Second Army told X Corps to select the exact position of the motorized division but restricted X Corps’ options by saying the motorized division had to be employed in the vicinity of Stonne and the woods to its east. This restriction reflected Second Army’s concern about the Germans’ turning east behind the Maginot Line.

The 3d Armored Division also began moving toward Second Army’s sector. After receiving a warning order issued early in the afternoon of 12 May, the newly formed division received an order around 1500 to move northeast as quickly as possible. Although the division initially expected to move only one demibrigade, the division commander soon received orders to move his entire division. He did not learn the division’s final destination until 1700, but he began moving most of his combat elements forward on the night of 12–13 May and the remaining elements on the following night.¹⁰⁴ Both the 3d Armored and 3d Motorized Divisions soon came under the control of General Flavigny’s XXI Corps.

Thus, before the Germans crossed the Meuse, significant preparations had occurred for strengthening the Sedan sector. With two infantry regiments and two tank battalions reinforcing the 55th Division, with

plans being completed for the employment of six additional divisions (including the 71st), plus two regiments of artillery and a corps headquarters, and with all units already moving and soon to be in place, the French seemed well prepared for an enemy thrust against Sedan. Significantly, however, the major focus of the preparation - except for the ill-fated counterattacks by the 55th Division - had been to prevent a counterclockwise encirclement coming from east of Sedan toward the southeast. From Huntziger’s perspective, the threat seemed to be a push through Second Army and then a push or turn southeast toward the rear of the Maginot Line. He did not anticipate the Germans’ pivoting west, racing to the English Channel, and severing Army Group 1 from the remaining French forces.¹⁰⁵

Failing to Seal the Breach

During the night of 13–14 May, the penetration by the German 1st Infantry Regiment remained narrow and small, but General Heinz Guderian, commander of XIX Panzer Corps, rushed additional troops across the Meuse and began expanding the vulnerable bridgehead. During the same night the French took action to halt the German forces. Four hours after the Germans began crossing the Meuse, the X Corps commander, General Grandsard, called the 55th Division commander, General Lafontaine, and told him that the two infantry regiments and two tank battalions were placed under his command and were to be used to establish a defensive line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt. Half an hour later, a messenger from X Corps delivered a message to General Lafontaine to conduct a counterattack with these units.¹⁰⁶

Despite the vulnerability of the German penetration, the commander of the 55th Division, General Lafontaine, delayed launching a counterattack. Though additional forces from the reserves of Second Army had been made available to him, he preferred to have his infantry occupy defensive positions and to launch a counterattack with artillery fire. Having been schooled for years in the procedures of colmater for halting an enemy penetration, he had no desire to hurl his infantry forward. Because of his hesitation and his preference for a counterattack by artillery, Lafontaine did not issue an order for counterattack with infantry and tanks until about nine hours after his corps commander had instructed him to counterattack.¹⁰⁷

Around 0630 on the fourteenth the 55th Division’s counterattack from Chémery toward Chehéry and from Maisoncelle toward Bulson by the 213th Infantry Regiment and the 7th Tank Battalion began moving forward slowly, but the Germans soon pushed the French forces back. A short while later, the 55th Division launched another counterattack farther east with the 205th Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion, but it fared

even worse than the one by the 213th Regiment.¹⁰⁸ General Lafontaine’s unwillingness to act immediately and decisively had allowed an opportunity to slip away.

During the night of 13–14 May, General Georges ordered a massive aerial attack against the German bridges over the Meuse River at Sedan. On the morning of the fourteenth, shortly after the failure of the 55th Division’s counterattacks, the Allies launched their desperate aerial attack. Though the delivery means differed, the huge concentration of air power had all the trappings of a massive artillery barrage.

The attack began with ten British bombers attempting, but failing, to destroy the German bridges near Sedan. About 0900 the French launched their first attack against the concentrated enemy forces. Around noon, the few remaining French bombers (only 13) attacked the same area, but they suffered such severe losses from ground air defense fires and German fighters that they cancelled operations for the remainder of the day. Between 1500 and 1600 the entire force of British bombers in France, supported by 27 French fighters, struck at Sedan, but of the 72 bombers participating only 40 returned. The official British history notes, “No higher rate of loss in an operation of comparable size has ever been experienced by the Royal Air Force.”¹⁰⁹ That evening, long-range bombers from the British Bomber Command made another strike. Though they encountered fewer enemy fighters than the earlier strike, they suffered 25 percent losses. According to a high-ranking French air force officer, more than 152 bombers and 250 fighters concentrated over Sedan and completed more than 550 flying hours. To oppose them, the Germans flew more than 800 sorties.¹¹⁰ Despite the number of sorties and the relatively small size of the bridgehead, the attempt to halt the German advance with air power failed.

As the three Panzer divisions continued expanding the bridgehead around Sedan, the French expected the units rushed to Sedan to halt the German advance. Instead of the entire Panzer corps continuing south or turning southeast behind the Maginot Line, however, the 1st Panzer and 2d Panzer Divisions unexpectedly turned west and crossed the Bar River and the Ardennes Canal. At the same time, the 10th Panzer Division and Gross Deutschland Infantry Regiment began pushing toward the south to protect the flank of the corps as it pivoted toward the west.

Despite the awkward position of the XIX Panzer Corps, the French XXI Corps with the 3d Armored and 3d Motorized Divisions failed to launch a strong attack into the most vulnerable point of the expanding German penetration. Most of the 3d Armored Division was in place on the morning of the fourteenth, and even though General Flavigny attempted to push it forward, the newly formed division lacked confidence, communication equipment, and logistical support and responded more slowly and tentatively than did the 3d Motorized Infantry Division. In

stead of boldly charging ahead, the two divisions became involved in bitter and costly fighting in the heights of Mont Dieu. By the evening of the fifteenth, after substantial reinforcements by the Germans, it was clear that another opportunity had been lost.¹¹¹

Though General Georges did not yet know the results of the anticipated counterattacks on the fourteenth by X Corps (with two infantry regiments and two tank battalions) and on the fifteenth by XXI Corps (with the 3d Motorized and 3d Armored Divisions), he began planning on the night of 13–14 May for the possibility of a German penetration between Second and Ninth Armies. With the right of Ninth Army touching Dom-le-Mesnil along the Meuse (nine kilometers west of Sedan) and the left of Second Army touching Omont (ten kilometers west of Chémery), an opening of about twelve kilometers soon existed between the two armies. After the collapse of the 55th Division and the insertion of the 3d Motorized Infantry and the 3d Armored Divisions by Second Army into positions along the Mont Dieu, elements of the hard-pressed and tired 5th Light Cavalry Division and 3d Brigade of Spahis attempted to fill the gap between the 3d Motorized Division and the 53d Infantry Division, which was on the extreme right of Ninth Army. Yet, even before General Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps pivoted west it was clear that additional forces had to be moved forward to strengthen the two sorely pressed cavalry units.

In the middle of the night, General Robert Touchon received a telephone call ordering him to report to Georges’ office the following morning. During two meetings on the fourteenth, Georges informed him of his intention to place Touchon in charge of a provisional field army that would “colmater the breach [in the] vicinity of Sedan.” Revealing a late-blooming concern with the possibility of the Germans’ heading west, Georges wanted Touchon’s forces to be employed so that the avenue of advance between Sedan and Laon could be “interdicted.”¹¹² This discussion is the first indication of a high-level French concern with a German move or pivot to the west. It may have come from the recognition that the Germans crossing the Meuse near Dinant, Monthermé, and Sedan could combine their forces and pose a serious threat to the French center. Georges also explained that the German “pocket” had become much larger and was continuing to expand at an alarming rate. Touchon was told that he must act quickly and “assist General Huntziger in sealing the breach.”¹¹³

At 1500 on the fourteenth, Touchon left for Senuc, where he met with Huntziger. Despite the German gains, the situation probably did not appear impossible to Touchon, for by midnight he had two corps - consisting of two corps headquarters (XXIII and XLI), four divisions (including the 2d Armored), and additional units - under his control.¹¹⁴ Though the Germans had penetrated French defenses and had advanced much more rapidly than expected, the experience of World War I suggested that their

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rapid advance soon had to halt. Major advances in that war had rarely lasted longer than a week before physical exhaustion, dwindling supplies, and heavy logistical tails usually forced the attacker to halt. Since the German attack was already in its fifth day, Touchon expected it to stall and worked to assemble his forces and reestablish another line of defenses.

As XIX Panzer Corps turned west, the 2d Panzer Division initially moved west parallel to the Meuse River, while the 1st Panzer Division (about ten kilometers to the south) advanced to the west. The 1st Panzer Division fought against the 5th Light Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade. After pushing these units back, it next encountered elements of the 14th Infantry and 53d Infantry Divisions. Though the 14th Infantry Division had some success, neither the 53d Infantry Division nor the 2d Armored Division to its rear managed to delay the Germans, even though they were directly in their attack zone.¹¹⁵ Farther north, the 2d Panzer Division skillfully fought through French units to its front.

When General Touchon learned of the rapid advance of the German Panzer divisions, he concluded he could not halt the enemy breakthrough. During the night of 15–16 May and the morning of the sixteenth, he pulled the scattered remnants of his army back from in front of the advancing German columns and established a new defensive line running east-west along the Aisne River. As he pulled his units back, he opened the way in front of the Germans; little or nothing stood in front of them as they began their race west toward the English Channel and into the rear of most of Army Group 1. Attempts by X Corps with its two infantry regiments and two tank battalions, by XXI Corps with an armored and a motorized division, and by Touchon’s provisional army had failed to plug the hole in French defensive lines. And the concept of colmater proved completely inadequate.

Conclusion

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the French concentrated on the practical, rather than theoretical aspects of the operational level of warfare. Though they considered the operational level to be more a transition between strategy and tactics than something fundamentally different, they expended considerable effort in analyzing and studying the employment of corps, field armies, and army groups. They believed the employment of these larger units in operations or campaigns was the essence of operational art. For a variety of reasons, however, the French neglected to specify a function for the operational level and failed to distinguish clearly between operations and tactics. Before World War I, concepts of fighting at the operational level dominated tactical thinking, and before World War II, tactical concerns dominated operational thinking. The failure to separate operational and tactical con-

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cepts distorted the French view of the operational level of warfare and profoundly affected the performance of the army in the two world wars. In sum, the French approach to the operational level of warfare never approached the sophistication of operational art.

After the Franco-Prussian War, the French implemented important institutional changes that facilitated their adherence to an operational doctrine strongly focused on the offensive. By 1914 Joffre and other military leaders expected the battlefield to be more lethal than that of the past, but they prepared field armies to maneuver in a manner reminiscent of Napoleon’s employment of corps. Despite heavy losses inflicted by the Germans, the ability of the French units to maneuver contributed to Joffre’s success in the “miracle of the Marne.” The establishment of a continuous line of strong and extensive defenses on the western front after September 1914 reduced the possibility of maneuver. Nevertheless, the French did not abandon their hopes of achieving a penetration and continued using huge numbers of men and materiel in vain attempts to force their way through the German defenses. After the collapse of Nivelle’s offensive in April 1917, Pétain began launching limited offensives and demonstrated at La Malmaison in October 1917 how significant gains could be made with such offensives. In August 1918, Debeney launched his carefully sequenced attacks at Montdidier and drove the Germans back.

Debeney’s operational methods, which relied on tightly controlled and successive attacks along a broad front, differed dramatically from those with which the French had begun the war, but they became the model for the conduct of operations in the interwar period. Although the French devoted considerable time and effort to improving their operational doctrine from 1919 to 1939, they did not develop fundamentally new methods. When the Germans attacked in May 1940, they expected to fight a series of methodical battles - reminiscent of Debeney’s methods at Montdidier - in which huge masses of artillery would provide them an important advantage. They also expected the battlefield to be relatively shallow and anticipated moving reserves and placing them in front of attacking enemy units to seal penetrations. While such methods may have worked against an enemy using methodical techniques, they had little chance of success against a highly mobile enemy attacking deep into a defensive position and using supporting fires throughout the depth of that position.

As the French developed their ability from 1888 to 1940 to perform at the operational level, they moved from one extreme to another. In the opening battles of World War I, they emphasized maneuver and minimized the importance of firepower. Though some ill-conceived and poorly coordinated operations cost thousands of casualties, the ability of the French units to maneuver enabled Joffre to respond successfully

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to the unexpected German advance toward Paris. By May 1940, however, the French had moved to the other extreme. They displayed little concern for maneuver at the operational level, particularly in launching counterattacks, and placed much greater emphasis on firepower. Though significant French forces managed to move to the vicinity of the penetration of Sedan and attempted to halt the Germans, they could not prevent a breakthrough. The Germans could maneuver far more rapidly and effectively than the French, whose sense of maneuver had been eclipsed by too strong an emphasis on firepower.

Although French military leaders studied the operational level of warfare from 1888 to 1940, they devised doctrinal formulas that reflected an unwillingness to accept the possibility of the Germans doing something unexpected or of their encountering something dramatically different from their own methods. Their doctrine may have been perfect for the classroom, but terrible inadequacies in that doctrine became immediately apparent when it was exposed to the realities of combat and to the fog and friction that invariably appear in battle. In the final analysis, the French experience demonstrates why military professionals become students of the operational art, rather than students of the operational science.

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Endnotes

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