During the twelve years that elapsed between the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953 and the first commitment of American combat troops to defend South Vietnam in 1965, the Army was affected by the fluctuations of U.S. national security policies and defense management structures. Responding to American dissatisfaction with the bloody and ultimately indecisive fighting in Korea, the Eisenhower administration that took office in 1953 adopted a "New Look" in defense policies. America, it declared, would no longer be bogged down in ground warfare at a time and place of the adversary's choosing. Instead, the United States would meet aggression with the "massive retaliation" of strategic atomic weapons.
This policy called for a reduction of land forces. The Army was drastically retrenched. Policy makers' belief that increasingly available tactical nuclear weapons would be decisive in any future conflict led to the revamping of the basic force structure in 1957. New "pentomic" divisions supposedly capable of operating in a nuclear environment were organized, and the Army regiment was abolished as a tactical entity in favor of smaller and more flexible battle groups. However, massive retaliation was never invoked. The Soviet threat continued after the death of Stalin, but its initiatives evolved in ways that could not be countered suitably by American preponderance in the nuclear weapons arena. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 led to the creation of a new Communist state in North Vietnam. Soviet power, hitherto confined to the Eurasian land mass, catapulted across the oceans. Soviet arms and influence appeared in Egypt, and a pro-Communist regime came to power in Cuba. Simultaneously the Soviets startled the Americans with their success in the area of guided missiles; "Sputnik," the first orbiting satellite, was launched in 1957.
Taking advantage of a belief that the United States was not coping adequately with these new Soviet challenges, Democratic presidential candidate John F Kennedy's campaign of 1960 focused on the need to meet the broad Communist challenge. Upon election, Kennedy and his secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, scrapped the strategy of massive retaliation in favor of a new doc-
trine, "flexible response," in which America would meet any military challenges with the gradually increasing employment of deterrent force.1 Coupled with a fresh crisis regarding the status of Berlin, the new emphasis on conventional forces powered the expansion of the Army, which soon rose to a strength of 1.2 million. New Army leaders found the pentomic division organization unsatisfactory for protracted fighting in a nonnuclear environment, and introduced a new divisional structure, the so-called Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD). Finally McNamara's zeal for cost effectiveness led to a substantial restructuring of the whole Defense Department and of the individual services. As usual, Army Intelligence was affected by the currents of the times.
Military Intelligence at the Center: The 1950s
At the Army General Staff level, intelligence benefited from an expansion of its sources and technological capabilities during the post-Korean War era. Previously, the foreign intelligence collection resources of the Army intelligence staff during peacetime had been confined to overt human intelligence provided by the attache system and signals intelligence collection. Now the Army augmented these sources with other types of intelligence collection. Its capabilities for collecting both human and electronic intelligence became increasingly significant. In addition, photographic intelligence became a viable peacetime source for the first time. After 1956 imagery from national-level sources became available to the Army. To take better advantage of this, the Army's existing Photo Interpretation Center at Fort Holabird established a special exploitation unit in the Washington, D.C., area.
Other developments at the Army Staff level under the Eisenhower administration were also significant. On the domestic front, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, regained control of the Industrial Security Program from the Provost Marshal General's Office in 1953, a reorganization that gave it custody of the extensive investigative data base compiled on Army contractor employees. Exploitation of growing masses of intelligence data was enhanced also by G-2's use of automatic data processing techniques. In 1957 the Radio Corporation of America began work on Project ACSI-MATIC, an intelligence data system that became operational in 1960.
However, intelligence was still something of a second-class citizen in the Army. In 1955 the Army's deputy assistant chief of staff, G-2, confessed that he viewed his appointment "almost as the kiss of death."2 And in two important respects, the Army Intelligence staff lost ground during the Eisenhower years
it declined both in status and in budget. In 1955 the assistant chief of staff, G-2, lost command of the Army Security Agency. In 1956, during the course of another Army-wide reorganization, his office lost both its name and its equality with other major staff elements. Under the terms of the reorganization, the three other principal staff functions-personnel, operations, and supply-were assigned to deputy chiefs of staff. But Army Intelligence, now headed by the assistant chief of staff for intelligence (ACSI), remained at the assistant chief level.3 The implicit downgrade preceded budget cuts and pressure on the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI) to move operational personnel out of its official table of distribution and to reduce personnel occupying headquarters slots. Ever since the late 1940s the intelligence section of the General Staff had maintained smaller operating elements in the field. After 1956, however, ACSI was forced to shift as many operational functions as possible from headquarters to field agencies.
The first step in this process began in 1956, when the ACSI staff element assigned to manage the industrial security program was reorganized as the Industrial and Personnel Security Group and transferred to Fort Holabird. In 1960 the new Technical Intelligence Field Agency assumed the mission and functions of ACSI's technical intelligence branch. The agency soon moved to Arlington Hall Station, where it was collocated with the intelligence elements of five of the seven Army technical services. Similarly, the OACSI component of the National Indications Center, a joint-service element designed to provide warnings of impending hostile attack, became a separate field detachment, as did the topographic collectors incorporated into the U.S. Army Geographic Specialist Detachment in early 1961.
Pressures on the existing structure of the Army's Intelligence staff came from outside as well as from within the Army. In 1958 the Department of Defense was reorganized. The old organizational concept, under which one service had served as executive agent for the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in war (as the Army had done in the Korean conflict) was abolished, and the armed forces of the country were placed in a system of unified and specified commands under JCS control.4 The U.S. Communications Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Advisory Committee were concurrently abolished and their consolidated functions transferred to the new U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). This reorganization reduced the role of the individual services to procuring, training, and fielding forces that would then pass under a JCSdirected command structure. Although the new arrangement did not immediately affect the Army's departmental intelligence agency, its implications for the future of Army Intelligence would soon become apparent.
Reshaping the Tools
One of the most significant developments within Army Intelligence during the 1950s was the conversion and expansion of the existing Counter Intelligence Corps Center at Fort Holabird into an Army Intelligence Center. This came about as an indirect byproduct of two separate initiatives. One of them was a movement begun during the Korean War to make intelligence more professional. Knowledgeable intelligence officers had become concerned about the difficulties of retaining a cadre of trained intelligence personnel in peacetime. Intelligence was not a basic branch of the Army, and most intelligence officers were reservists on detail. In 1950 a legislative oversight had even temporarily eliminated the Military Intelligence Reserve first created in 1921. This had been corrected in 1952 with the creation of two separate reserve branches, Military Intelligence (redesignated Army Intelligence in 1958) and Army Security But since only reserve component officers could be commissioned in these branches, the active Army lacked any focus for intelligence career professionals.
The massive opposition of Army traditionalists to the establishment of an Intelligence Branch in the Regular Army led the assistant chief of staff, G-2, to advocate a more modest reform. In early 1952 he put forward a proposal to create the new Corps of Reconnaissance, U.S. Army This corps would have incorporated all intelligence assets at the division level and above, including the units of the Army Security Agency The plan would have provided Army Intelligence with a centralized institutional framework, but still would have allowed commanders their traditional prerogative of selecting their own intelligence staffs regardless of the branch to which they belonged. Even though this concept posed less threat to vested interests than a new separate branch, it never won acceptance.
As a fallback position, in June 1953 the assistant chief of staff, G-2, came up with a new program. He recommended that an intelligence board be established and collocated with a single intelligence school, a field intelligence center, and the intelligence units in the Army's central reserve in the continental United States. Fort Holabird, with its existing Counter Intelligence Corps School and Center and its counterintelligence records facility, would be the most logical site for the new arrangement.
The second factor leading to the expansion of Holabird's role was the Army's decision to make its collection of human intelligence more professional. The experience of the Korean War, when the Army had to improvise a collection apparatus, had caused the Army see that such work was a permanent peacetime requirement. At the end of 1952 General Matthew Ridgway, then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, specially recommended that the Army organize its own institutionalized human intelligence collection element. Such a force would meet Army needs and at the same time prevent any future diversion of Counter Intelligence Corps assets from their assigned functions. Ridgway's recommendations were accepted and endorsed by the chief of staff in early 1953. In
November 1953 the Army issued a regulation that set standards for procurement of personnel to carry out this new function.
These twin developments resulted in a steady expansion of the scope and nature of the responsibilities assigned to the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps. In April 1954 the Department of Field Operations Intelligence was added to the existing training facility at Fort Holabird. As a result, collection personnel began to train side by side with CIC agents. This was just the beginning of a snowballing accretion of new activities that fell under the control of the CIC chief. In August 1954 he assumed command of the former G-2 Records Facility at Holabird, which contained the Army's counterintelligence files. At this point, the Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the Army Intelligence Center, and the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed a new title as the center's commanding general. In March 1955 an Army Photo Interpretation Center was established at Fort Holabird. Finally, during the same month, responsibility for conducting training in combat intelligence transferred from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the new U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Holabird.5 The arrangement centralized almost all intelligence training at one post. Only the G2's Strategic Intelligence School in Washington, D.C., and the Army Security Agency facility at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, remained outside the complex.
In practice, the original concept of an all-embracing Army Intelligence center was never quite realized. It seems to have been the intention of Maj. Gen. Arthur C. Trudeau, the assistant chief of staff, G-2, that Holabird would become the directing hub for Army Intelligence. Under the original plan, the chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, in his capacity as commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, would not only assume responsibility for training all Army Intelligence personnel, but would also take over responsibility for their administrative supervision. This arrangement would have extended the benefits of the CIC personnel structure to the rest of the Army Intelligence community. Although the concept was approved by the Army chief of staff, it was not completely implemented, and the center never achieved the position of importance originally envisioned for it. However, it did serve as a basis for more modest reforms and initiatives.
The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an intelligence civilian career program within the Army. This step, first advocated by the second Hoover Commission on governmental reform, would augment nontactical Military Intelligence units with trained civilian specialists who would provide continuity to operations. Three hundred such positions were authorized originally. Actual implementation began in 1957, overseen by an Administrative Survey Detachment organized within the Army Intelligence Center. However, the Army soon began to have second thoughts about the program. Civilians were limited
to working a forty-hour week and were not under court-martial jurisdiction. Moreover, Army leaders believed it was counterproductive to keep civilians on indefinite assignments in any one single geographic area. As a result, they limited the effort to employ more civilians.
Meanwhile, the Army Intelligence Center became involved in an attempt to remedy some of the perceived deficiencies in field intelligence programs. Initially, the commanding general, Army Intelligence Center, was responsible for training new field operations intelligence specialists, but had no authority over their assignments in the field. Some human intelligence collectors were in units under theater control, organized years before the field operations intelligence program, as such, had come into existence; others served in a detachment under direct ACSI control. The field operations intelligence program thus operated under a separate and less rigid personnel system than the Counter Intelligence Corps. Its military occupational specialty (MOS) could be awarded by ACSI and by theater commanders as well as by the Army Intelligence Center, and the Army could recruit individuals whose foreign connections would have barred them from enlisting in the Counter Intelligence Corps.
The differences between these two intelligence elements soon led to an unhealthy rivalry. As one report pointed out, "there is too much bickering and snideness at the [Intelligence] Center regarding these two fields."6 The situation was made worse by the fact that intelligence officers on the Army Staff and in Europe considered field operations intelligence personnel better qualified to handle especially sensitive counterespionage operations than CIC agents. But Counter Intelligence Corps members saw any such transfer of functions as "an emasculation of CIC."7 Another problem area arose when field operations intelligence personnel, because of the nature of their mission requirements, lacked an adequate rotation base in the continental United States. Although a majority of CIC billets were in the United States, four-fifths of those billets in the field operations intelligence program were overseas.
Eventually, the ACSI decided that it would be more economical and efficient to merge all field operations intelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as counterintelligence agents and as human intelligence collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence Corps, commanded by the former CIC chief and operating under tight centralized control, was created on I January 1961. The new organization incorporated slightly over 5,000 personnel, about 85 percent of whom came from CIC. Entrance requirements for the Intelligence Corps were less restrictive than they had been for the old Counter Intelligence Corps.
Attempts to bring the new organization even closer to the Army mainstream soon followed. During the 1950s the Counter Intelligence Corps had embodied the "best and the brightest." Ever since the Korean War, the draft had furnished it with a steady stream of college-trained applicants attracted to the idea of fulfilling their service obligation by working in civilian clothes in a glamorous and exotic field, and the CIC had been able to choose among them. Unfortunately, most of these individuals did not show any propensity for making intelligence work a career. The retention rate was abysmal- 7 percent for lieutenants and just 3 percent for enlisted personnel. Accordingly, the Army decided that "selection of applicants must be made with consideration for those offering the best career potential and not necessarily the bright college student."8 The Intelligence Corps would accept only applicants who volunteered for a threeyear enlistment. At the same time, the age limit for enlisting in the corps was lowered and brought into line with the rest of the Army; eighteen-year-old personnel now became eligible for entry-level positions involving clerical rather than investigative duties. Finally, in 1965 the minimum Army General Test score for joining the Intelligence Corps was lowered from 110, the same requirement imposed on officer candidates Army-wide, to 100, which more closely approximated the Army average.
The Army Security Agency
If Fort Holabird was one pole of Army Intelligence in the 1950s, Arlington Hall Station was the other. Arlington Hall continued to serve as headquarters for the ASA, the largest single intelligence and security element in the Army, and it also came to house intelligence elements of five of the Army's technical services after the consolidation of NSA headquarters at Fort Meade in 1957 made office space available. During the Eisenhower administration, Arlington Hall's main Army tenant, the Army Security Agency, grew steadily. Personnel strength rose from 11,500 in 1952 to 18,300 by 1957; new field stations and tactical units appeared; and a substantial restructuring of the agency's mission took place.
By 1954 the Army Signal Corps was fielding a number of units to collect electronic intelligence and continued to be responsible for the conduct of electronic warfare. In April 1954 the Department of the Army analyzed the feasibility of combining all these capabilities into a single agency As a result of this study, the Army Security Agency took over responsibility for electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic countermeasures (ECM) from the Signal Corps in 1955, assuming control of a number of dispersed units and a battalion and four companies stationed at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In return, the agency surrendered its responsibilities for Army cryptologistics and cryptomaintenance, along with associated personnel, to the Signal Corps.
In budgetary terms, the reorganization was significant: the Army was introducing a new generation of machine cipher devices to replace the venerable M209, and purchase of the new machines had consumed 60 percent of the Army Security Agency's fiscal year 1953 budget. However, the change had the important benefits of eliminating duplication of facilities and allowing for proper integration of signals intelligence with electronic intelligence. The term signals intelligence (SIGINT) was now redefined and used to refer to both of these functions. Actual implementation of this mission transfer was delayed for a short time until the Signal Corps personnel transferred to the Army Security Agency had their clearance levels upgraded.
The new arrangements meant that the Army Security Agency was no longer exclusively an intelligence organization. By acquiring responsibility for electronic warfare, the agency now managed a weapons system, even though the weapon was invisible. In recognition of this change, the Army Security Agency became a Department of the Army field operating agency on 23 June 1955.9 It now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, not to the assistant chief of staff, G-2. However, the agency continued to focus primarily on the cryptologic mission, and electronic warfare in practice did not receive much emphasis.
Having acquired responsibility for electronic intelligence and electronic warfare, the Army Security Agency made further attempts to enlarge the scope of its mission. In September 1955 the chief, Army Security Agency, recommended to the Army chief of staff that his organization be given the responsibility for dissemination and protection of sensitive compartmented information Army-wide, thus eliminating the special security officer system maintained by the assistant chief of staff, G-2, which had just been consolidated into a single element, Detachment M. The rationale for this proposal was economy. However, both the Army's intelligence staff and commanders in the field vigorously resisted it. Intelligence personnel claimed that the Army Security Agency was not qualified to produce the all-source intelligence which special security officers provided to their supported G-2s. Field commanders unanimously endorsed the existing arrangement, pointing out that ASA units were not conveniently located in or near the major Army headquarters and that eliminating the special security officers would deprive them of their secure "back-channel" communications. The Army chief of staff tabled the proposal, but the Army Security Agency refused to drop the issue. The bureaucratic struggle over the matter would go on for the next two decades, at times fought with considerable acrimony
The Army Security Agency pursued other initiatives with greater success. In 1956 the agency became aware for the first time of the possibility that emissions radiating from electronic data processing equipment might compromise security and initiated a program, nicknamed TEMPEST, to counter the threat. In 1957 the U.S. Army Security Agency Board was created to provide long-range planning,
and in 1960 its functions were expanded to include combat development. At the same time, the Army Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird acquired parallel responsibilities for overseeing combat developments in the field of human intelligence. Meanwhile, the ASA and its field stations underwent redesignation. As a result of an Army-wide change, the agency became the U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) on 1 January 1957. Concurrently, its fixed field stations, which previously had been known as numbered Army administrative units in the 8600 series, acquired new designations as numbered USASA field stations. 10
The agency's tactical elements underwent a more significant restructuring during this period. During the Korean War, the Army Security Agency had operated with flexible battalion headquarters overseeing the operations of independent security and collection companies. In 1955 fixed battalions with organic companies combining both functions were created, and in 1956 all communication reconnaissance units were redesignated as Army Security Agency units. However, in 1957 the secretary of defense's decision to cut the Army's strength by a total of 50,000 threw the force structure of the agency into disarray. The decrement left the ASA without sufficient personnel to fill its existing tactical TOE units, which at the time accounted for about a quarter of its total strength. In response, the Army Security Agency inactivated all its TOE units and replaced them with mission-tailored units based on individual tables of distribution. The new TD units included the 507th and 508th U.S. Army Security Agency Groups, located respectively in Germany and Korea, and six U.S. Army Security Agency battalions numbered from 316 to 321. These units were given the designator U.S. Army Security Agency to distinguish them from Army Security Agency TOE units. The battalions retained the fixed structure of their TOE predecessors.
Originally, the Army intended this as a temporary measure, to remain in force only until new organizational tables could be drawn up. In practice, however, the ASA continued to operate exclusively with TD units until 1962, when tactical TOE units were formed in the continental United States to support the Army's new strategic reserve for contingency operations. Later, additional TOE elements were activated to serve in Vietnam. Some of the mission-tailored TD units soon acquired new and exotic designations as special operations units and special operations commands.
The U.S. Army Security Agency was the principal tenant at Arlington Hall after 1957, but not the only one. Intelligence elements of five technical services ultimately located there. Only the Corps of Engineers, the intelligence arm of which was concentrated in the Army Map Service, and the Quartermaster Corps held back, although the Ordnance Corps also maintained a separate missile intelligence center at Redstone Arsenal. Although most of these technical service intelligence units engaged in analysis and production, the Signal Corps contin
ued to engage in some specialized collection activities even after it had surrendered its electronic intelligence and communications-related electronic warfare functions to the Army Security Agency
Military Intelligence in the Field
Until the late 1950s the tactical formations of the Army received their intelligence support from Military Intelligence specialist units put together on the cellular principle. Combat intelligence units were organically separate from counterintelligence units under this arrangement, and the G-2s of the supported units had to coordinate the efforts of the two diverse elements themselves.
At the end of 1957 the Army introduced a new category of intelligence units organized under a concept plan entitled the Military Intelligence Organization. Under this plan interrogators, photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and other combat intelligence personnel were integrated into single units with counterintelligence and collection elements. These new units operated under a fixed table of organization and were designed to be administratively selfsufficient.
Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, the basic building block was the Military Intelligence battalion supporting afield army. This unit had its own specialized organic companies: a headquarters and headquarters company containing photo interpreters, order of battle and technical intelligence specialists, and censorship personnel; and lettered linguist, security, and collection companies. In addition, the battalion furnished tactical units down to the division level with attached multidiscipline intelligence detachments.11 The creation of the Military Intelligence Organization was one of the first steps in bringing truly multidiscipline intelligence support to the field. Only ASA units remained outside the new organizational structure because of the Army Security Agency's vertical, or "stovepipe," command structure and its tight centralization and compartmentation.
In practice, implementation of the new force structure was limited. Under the Military Intelligence Organization concept, four Military Intelligence Battalions eventually were reorganized: the 319th and 519th in the continental United States; the 532d in Germany; and the 502d in Korea. However, only the headquarters and headquarters companies and linguist companies were initially activated in the two battalions in the United States.12 Meanwhile, the bulk of Army
counterintelligence and field operations intelligence personnel continued to serve in singlediscipline cellular units supporting the theaters and the Zone of Interior armies until 1961, when consolidated intelligence Corps groups and detachments were formed.
Not all intelligence disciplines were well served by this new arrangement. In the continental United States, linguists had to be concentrated at battalion level, rather than spread among the detachments that were attached to divisions and other tactical units, as the Military Intelligence Organization concept dictated. Each detachment might be involved in several contingency plans, and each plan often required expertise in a different language. There was simply no way to assign the appropriate linguists to a Military Intelligence detachment until actual implementation of a specific plan or major field exercise began.
Photo interpreters also fit rather uneasily into the new structure. At the tactical level such personnel lacked access to the imagery that national-level reconnaissance elements began to generate in the late 1950s, and thus felt that their skills were not being adequately used. Units based in the United States had no operational mission, and photo interpreters found themselves all too often assigned to housekeeping and administrative positions unrelated to their specialty. Detailed to kitchen police and other "rock-painting" chores, many felt slighted and complained of "harassment." 13
To remedy the situation, in 1963 the Army Intelligence Center proposed that all photo interpreters in the United States be placed under centralized control in the same fashion as the Army's linguists. They could find more useful employment either at the Army Photo Interpretation Center or with the Army's lone specialized tactical photo unit in the United States. However, field commanders strongly resisted the proposal on the grounds that stripping Military Intelligence detachments of their photo interpreters would deprive G-2s of access to this intelligence field and would result in equipment maintenance problems. The status quo thus continued.
Finally, the Army continued to neglect tactical-level technical intelligence. There were no provisions for a technical intelligence company in the initial TOES for the Military intelligence battalion (field army), and it would take ten years for the Army to remedy this discrepancy. By that time, the Vietnam conflict would be in full swing, creating an insatiable demand for personnel resources, and only one field army-level battalion would ever receive its technical intelligence company.
At the tactical level, intelligence organization was also influenced by the Army's increasing reliance on aircraft. By 1960 there were 5,000 aircraft in the Army inventory. Many of them were helicopters, items that had first seen extensive use in medical evacuation during the Korean War. It soon became apparent
that improved versions of rotary-wing aircraft could serve as useful reconnaissance assets. During the course of the 1950s the Korean-vintage L-19 that had served as the all-purpose workhorse within the division was phased out in favor of the helicopter, and aircraft within the division were concentrated in larger formations. Under the structure of the pentomic division fielded in 1957, Army aviation within the divisions was consolidated into company-size units. The ROAD division of 1962 included a complete aviation battalion, one company of which was equipped with scout helicopters. In addition, observation helicopters were assigned to divisional artillery, and a helicopter-borne aerial cavalry troop formed part of the divisional reconnaissance battalion. 14
Along with its helicopters, the Army also developed more sophisticated fixedwing aircraft for reconnaissance. In 1962 it acquired the AO-1 Mohawk. This twin-engine craft came in three configurations: one equipped with a high-performance camera; one with newly developed infrared night vision equipment; and the third with the equally new side-looking airborne radar device. Mohawks were employed both in divisional aerial surveillance and targeting platoons, as well as in aerial surveillance companies that operated at corps level. 15
In addition to developing its own aerial assets, the Army took steps to improve its interaction with Air Force tactical reconnaissance. To better exploit aerial photography produced by Air Force reconnaissance squadrons, the Army fielded the 1st Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion in 1959. The unit consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a signal air photo reproduction and delivery company, and a photo interpretation company. A similar unit, the 24th Air Reconnaissance Support Battalion, was activated in the Army Reserve the same year, thus becoming the first non-ASA intelligence battalion active in the reserve components since the Korean War. In 1961 the Army activated another Regular Army air reconnaissance support battalion to support the Seventh Army in Germany, and in 1962 these units were reorganized and redesignated as Military intelligence battalions (air reconnaissance support), or "Mibars." Two years later it devised a new TOE for this type of unit that provided for a headquarters and headquarters company and four lettered imagery interpretation detachments.16 The diverse nature of the products which photo interpreters now had to manage-infrared and radar imagery, as well as conventional photography-led to the Army's redesignating photographic intelligence as imagery intelligence in 1964.
There were also new developments in the Army's arrangements for ground reconnaissance. From 1957 on, each combat division had its own reconnaissance battalion. The successive restructurings of the division in 1957 and 1962
meant that reconnaissance assets previously held at the regimental level were moved down, first to battle group, and then to battalion. An armored cavalry platoon and a ground surveillance section equipped with mobile radar sets became part of the headquarters company of each infantry battalion.
Intelligence Support to the Theaters
By the late 1950s the deployment of the Army overseas had become fixed in a pattern that would remain largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War.17 The completion of the European buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, and the signing of a peace treaty with Japan resulted in a force structure that gave the Army five divisions in Europe and two in Korea, commanded respectively by the Seventh and Eighth Armies. The diversity of the theaters, the disparate numbers of the supported forces in each one, and the differing nature of intelligence requirements in Europe and in the Pacific dictated that arrangements for intelligence support would not be uniform. Moreover, even if the positioning of troops on the ground remained relatively static, theater command relationships did not, and these shifts also impacted on the theater intelligence structure.
In Europe a continuing flood of refugees from behind the Iron Curtain provided American forces with ample opportunities for intelligence exploitation. From 1951 to 1962 collection of intelligence from border crossers was carried out by the Seventh Army's 532d Military Intelligence Battalion, a field-army type of unit organized under the Military Intelligence Organization concept and headquartered in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Federal Republic of Germany During an average year, the battalion screened between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees.
At the theater level, counterintelligence support for U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), was provided by the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group. This unit, with headquarters in Stuttgart, provided counterintelligence coverage through a network of regional and field offices that not only extended over West Germany but also reached occupied Berlin and the USAREUR Communications Zone in France. The 513th Military Intelligence Service Group, activated at Oberursel, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1953 to take over operations previously performed by the 7077th USAREUR Intelligence Center, soon was redesignated the 513th Military Intelligence Group and then expanded its scope of activities to include active collection. With the inception of an Army civilian intelligence career program in the 1950s, both units received large TD augmentations of civilian specialists.
In 1959 USAREUR experimented with organizing intelligence work on an area rather than on a functional basis. Consequently the 513th Military
Intelligence Group was given northern Germany as its area of responsibility, and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group (later successively redesignated as the 66th Military Intelligence Group and the 66th intelligence Corps Group) was allotted the south, where the preponderance of American forces was stationed. This arrangement caused more problems than solutions and was later abandoned.
Meanwhile, opportunities for exploitation of sources began to diminish. In 1961 the construction of the Berlin Wall and the simultaneous imposition of tighter border controls by East Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow This development reduced the need to have three large intelligence units with partially overlapping responsibilities in Europe. As a result, in 1962 there was a major realignment of intelligence resources. The 513th Intelligence Corps Group, as it was now designated, assumed complete responsibility for active intelligence and certain sensitive counterespionage missions for USAREUR, while the 66th Intelligence Corps Group was reassigned to Seventh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated 532d Military Intelligence Battalion. During this process, the group lost its regional form of organization and emerged as the command headquarters for various numbered Army Intelligence units, including the tactical intelligence elements attached to the Seventh Army's corps and divisions. 18
Cryptologic support in the theater was provided by an entirely separate organizational structure, in conformity with Army practice. The U.S. Army Security Agency maintained a theater headquarters in Frankfurt that exercised command and control over various field stations in Europe and over a group headquarters with three subordinate battalions and some other units operating in support of the Seventh Army.
In the Pacific, following the conclusion of the armistice in Korea, the Army broke up its elaborate intelligence and special operations organization, the 8240th Army Unit. Under conditions of relative peace, the Korean partisan forces it had mustered were transferred to the control of the South Korean government, the least productive of its operations terminated, and its mission restricted to intelligence collection. The unit's Korean-based element, the Army Collection Detachment, continued to report to a theater-level Army command reconnaissance activity until 1961, when a number of Army Intelligence assets in Korea combined to form the 502d Military Intelligence Battalion. The other elements used to form the battalion came from the 308th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and the Eighth Army's 528th Military Intelligence Company, which were concurrently inactivated.
At the theater level, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the Army's principal headquarters element in the Pacific until 1957. It was supported
by an elaborate intelligence architecture directed by the USAFFE G-2 in Tokyo, Japan. The organization's principal human intelligence collection arm was the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East. The other major field elements were the 500th Military Intelligence Group, an interpreter unit, and the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Group. These three units reported to the U.S. Army Intelligence Support Center, Japan, under command of a brigadier general.
The Eisenhower-Kishii agreement of 1957 led to a drawdown of American troop strength from Japan and relocation of the Army's main Pacific headquarters from Tokyo to Hawaii. The discontinuance of USAFFE and the establishment of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), led to a rapid decrement in Japan-based Military Intelligence assets. The 500th Military Intelligence Group was inactivated, the Intelligence Support Center discontinued, and the functions of both organizations absorbed by the successor of the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East, the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific. Following the departure of most American troops from Japan in 1959, the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, as it was now known, was in turn inactivated. In 1961 the U.S. Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Pacific, was discontinued and the 500th Military Intelligence Group once more reactivated to carry out all aspects of the human intelligence mission. This group redeployed to Hawaii in 1965, a move dictated by the U.S. government's attempts at that time to reduce the outflow of gold reserves overseas.
U.S. Army Security Agency operations in the Far East were under the direction of a regional headquarters located in Tokyo until 1958. This was consolidated briefly with ASA headquarters elements in Hawaii from 1958 to 1960 to become the U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific. In 1960 it returned to Tokyo, where it remained until it again relocated to Hawaii in 1965. The withdrawal of the agency's Pacific headquarters back to American soil also came about because of the government's concern over the balance of payments.
After 1957 the Eighth Army in Korea received its cryptologic support from the 508th U.S. Army Security Group (a TD unit) and the 321st U.S. Army Security Agency Battalion, another TD unit. The battalion was discontinued in 1964-another casualty of the government's worries about the gold flow.
One unique feature of the Pacific theater was the existence of the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Pacific. Unlike other Army intelligence training facilities overseas, the Pacific intelligence school, set up on Okinawa in 1958, trained foreigners, not Americans. The students from seven different countries bordering the Pacific basin took courses in combat intelligence and counterintelligence techniques until the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty brought operations to a halt in 1975.19
The McNamara Revolution
The outcome of the presidential election of 1960 led to major changes in the structure of the Army and the Army's intelligence components. President John F Kennedy rejected the strategic assumptions of the previous administration, believing that any military challenge had to be met through graduated deterrence. This approach placed a new emphasis on the importance of the nation's conventional forces, including the Army Kennedy selected Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to implement the new strategy. In carrying out his assignment, McNamara, a former Ford Motors executive with a background in systems analysis, proved to be the very model of a rationalizing, centralizing bureaucrat. Making the most of the powers of his office, McNamara introduced a series of reforms that altered the way the American military machine was constructed and had a profound effect on the Army Intelligence community.20
Since 1958 there had been discussions at the national level concerning the advisability of setting up some kind of intelligence agency at the Department of Defense (DOD) level to better coordinate the intelligence elements of the armed services. In 1960 a Joint Study Group had criticized the existing arrangements within the Military Intelligence community. Three separate and uncoordinated service intelligence agencies, each with its own parochial bias, could not provide DOD with the integrated intelligence it needed to formulate a coherent national strategy. Air Force Intelligence in particular had embarrassed policy makers, since its estimates of alleged "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps" between the United States and the Soviet Union were widely disseminated and later demonstrated to be incorrect.21
Once in office, McNamara became a vigorous proponent of centralization, especially with respect to Military Intelligence operations under DOD. As a result, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) began operations on 1 October 1961. The new organization would impose the same kind of centralized direction and control on the general Military Intelligence program as NSA was already providing to signals intelligence. Its creation meant that Army Intelligence would become a distinctly subordinate element within a wider Military Intelligence structure and marked a further cutback in ACSI's powers and responsibilities. However, this did not happen immediately At its inception, DIA consisted of a cadre of twenty-five people housed in 2,000 square feet of borrowed office space in the Pentagon. The new agency pulled together rather slowly at first, initially taking on only the estimative, current intelligence, and requirements missions from the service intelligence agencies.
Meanwhile, McNamara was reorganizing the Army itself in ways that had a substantial effect on the Army's intelligence architecture. In 1962 the secretary of defense implemented Project 80, which involved the wholesale restructuring of the Army into functional, centralized commands. In the process, ACSI lost control over intelligence training, research and development, and doctrinal matters. Five of the Army's technical services were abolished, with only the Corps of Engineers and the Office of the Surgeon General remaining in place, and their intelligence personnel were split up among a number of different elements.22
A few order of battle specialists from the dissolved technical services joined the ACSI staff. A larger group engaged in scientific and technical intelligence became part of a new Foreign Science and Technology Center or stayed in place at the Army Missile Intelligence Agency which the Ordnance Department maintained at Redstone Arsenal. Both of these centers were assigned to the Army Materiel Command, which McNamara had just created. The largest group, consisting of 700 persons engaged in area analysis, was absorbed into the Area Analysis Intelligence Agency established at the direction of the chief of Engineers.
The Area Analysis Intelligence Agency was intended to be only a temporary holding area. When DIA assumed production responsibilities in 1963, the organization was discontinued, and its personnel, together with part of the OACSI staff, transferred to DIA. All in all, the Army contributed 1,000 spaces and its ACSI-MATIC computer system to the new DIA Production Center. In the process, OACSI lost 235 spaces, one-third of its strength, to the new agency. The centerpiece of OACSI had been its Directorate of Foreign Intelligence, the intelligence production unit. This was reduced to a shell, retaining only a residual responsibility for analyzing and interpreting national agency production in support of the Army and in maintaining liaison with DIA. As a result of this devolution of responsibilities, the center of gravity of Army intelligence would move from the staff in Washington, D.C., to the units in the field.
However, even after the reorganization of 1963 DIA did not hold a complete monopoly over the production of intelligence for the Army Subordinate elements within the Army continued to conduct production activities. These included the Army Materiel Command, with its two scientific and technical intelligence centers; the Office of the Chief of Engineers, which administered the Army Map Service; and the Office of the Surgeon General, which still had the responsibility of meeting some of the Army's medical intelligence requirements. In addition, a new production element was formed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support the mobile reserve forces assigned to the Continental Army Command (CONARC).
Other intelligence-related functions previously performed by the Army were also centralized. In 1963 the Army's Strategic Intelligence School was merged with its Navy counterpart to form a new Defense Intelligence School, which
began to provide training for attaches from all the military services. The process was carried through to its logical conclusion in 1965, when DIA assumed control over the military attache system that had served as an Army information source since 1889. All service attaches were integrated into the new Defense Attache System. Meanwhile, the Defense Language Institute had replaced the separate language schools previously maintained by the services.
Although DIA acquired production and collection assets from Army Intelligence, another new McNamara creation (the Defense Supply Agency) asserted itself on the counterintelligence front. In March 1965 this agency took over the whole field of industrial security, absorbing all the related spaces from ACSI's Industrial and Personnel Security Group. Ever since World War II, the function had rebounded between G-2 and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The new arrangement seemed to mark a definitive end to this particular jurisdictional dispute within the Army.
OACSI responded to these institutional challenges in much the same way as ASA had met the threat of the Armed Forces Security Agency: it found a new role in devoting itself to Armyspecific needs. Shorn of many of its operational functions, OACSI reoriented itself and began providing intensified staff supervision to intelligence areas of growing interest to the Army. In the summer of 1963 the Directorate of Surveillance and Reconnaissance was added to the Army's Intelligence staff to develop the doctrine and hardware that would allow the Army to glean information from the battlefield through innovative technologies. Additional new Directorates of Security and Combat Intelligence were formed in 1964 to supervise functional areas of primary interest to the Army The Combat Intelligence Directorate included a section responsible for overseeing developments in the fields of special warfare and foreign assistance. Finally, OACSI found ways to edge back into fields of activity theoretically preempted by DIA. In 1963 it set up a Special Research Detachment as a liaison element at NSA, soon expanding it into an all-source production element. The same year the Special Security Detachment formed an Intelligence Support Branch to provide the Army Staff with current intelligence.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Command and the U.S. Army Security Agency
The McNamara-directed reorganization of the Army had significant consequences for the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The center, commanded by the chief of the Intelligence Corps, had functioned as a field operating agency under direct ACSI control. Two of its main assets were the Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence Board, charged with framing doctrine and developing specialized equipment. The McNamara restructuring intruded on both of these arrangements. The Intelligence School was resub-139
ordinated to CONARC and the functions of the Intelligence Board split between the Army Materiel Command and another McNamara creation, the Combat Developments Command.
As a result, ACSI created a new administrative entity, the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity, which took over the remnant of the former Intelligence Center's assets and residual functions. The organization served as a vehicle through which the chief of the Intelligence Corps could exercise control over those elements the McNamara restructuring had left under ACSI jurisdiction. These consisted of the Army's counterintelligence records facility, a new Intelligence Corps Supply Activity, the Strategic Intelligence School (until its transfer to DIA), the Army Photo Interpretation Center, and the Administrative Survey Detachment that supported the Intelligence Civilian Career Program which ACSI had started in the 1950s. However, the establishment of the Army Intelligence Corps Activity did nothing to alleviate the confusion in the intelligence command chain resulting from the reorganizations. Since the chief of the Intelligence Corps continued to act as commandant of the Army Intelligence School and commander of Fort Holabird, he now reported simultaneously to three different superiors. As commanding general of the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Activity and chief of the intelligence Corps he was responsible to ACSI, but he was under the jurisdiction of CONARC in his capacity as school commandant and subordinate to the U.S. Second Army in his role of post commander. This Rube Goldberg-like arrangement offered no promise of stability
These changes represented only the beginning of the restructuring of Army counterintelligence organization. In 1963 and 1964 the Army undertook a major study of its personnel security system, an effort spurred by the discovery that an Army sergeant in a sensitive position at the National Security Agency had been passing information to the Soviets for years without being detected.23 The study, Project SECURITY SHIELD, found serious weaknesses both in the traditional decentralized approach to counterintelligence operations and in the coordination that existed between Army counterintelligence and the criminal investigators of the Provost Marshal General's Office. SECURITY SHIELD led to yet another wholesale reorganization of Army counterintelligence.
On 1 January 1965, the Army created the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command as a Department of the Army major field command. Operating under a new design concept, the command took over centralized direction over all counterintelligence operations in the continental United States. The Intelligence Corps Command assumed authority over the seven Intelligence Corps groups that had previously operated under six armies and the Military District of Washington. (The large CIC detachments in the United States had been redesig
nated as "groups" between 1956 and 1959.) At the same time, the Army ordered the field offices of the Intelligence Corps Command and the provost marshal's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to be brought together wherever possible, and the records of the CID repository removed from Fort Gordon, Georgia, and collocated with the counterintelligence records at Fort Holabird.
The creation of the Intelligence Corps Command gave its commander, the chief of the Intelligence Corps, operational responsibilities for the first time in the history of Army counterintelligence. At the same time, he lost certain assets. Not all the elements of the former Army Intelligence Corps Activity were transferred to the new command. Since the Intelligence Corps Command was intended to be purely a counterintelligence organization, the Army Imagery Interpretation Center, as the Photo Interpretation Center had been redesignated, reverted back to the direct control of the ACSI.
There were still certain anomalies in the new pattern of organization. Despite its title, the Intelligence Corps Command controlled only about half of all Intelligence Corps personnel in the continental United States. The rest were on school or organizational staffs, with the TOE organizations supporting tactical elements in the field, or in the "pipeline." Intelligence Corps personnel deployed outside the continental United States were not a part of the new command. The Intelligence Corps Command's commander, in his other capacity as chief of the intelligence Corps, thus had substantial administrative responsibilities extending beyond his own command; and the intelligence Corps he headed was engaged in active intelligence collection as well as in counterintelligence. The creation of the new headquarters also had left the chain of command more tangled than ever. Its commander now wore four hats. As head of a major field command, he now reported directly to the Army chief of staff, in addition to reporting to ACSI, the commander of CONARC, and the commander of the U.S. Second Army in his other various roles.24
In one sense, this arrangement conformed to the civilian theories of matrix management popular in the 1960s. Matrix management held that someone marketing refrigerators to Latin America should report to a vice president for marketing, a vice president for refrigerators, and a vice president for Latin America. But the scheme did not accord with normal Army command procedures and was in practice unworkable. Not surprisingly, reorganization plans were begun as soon as the new command had been assembled. The U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command lasted just six months.
There seemed to be only two possible solutions to the organizational tangle created by the existence of the Intelligence Corps Command. One duplicated
the Army Security Agency's centralized, vertical command structure, creating a self-sufficient organization. However, because of its mission, that agency was a special case, and its organization had no parallel in the rest of the Army The other solution, the one adopted, decentralized the structure of the Intelligence Corps Command.
The U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) was created on 1 July 1965 to conduct counterintelligence operations within the continental United States.25 The combined headquarters organization of the former Intelligence Corps Command was broken up, and the Army Intelligence School and Fort Holabird placed under separate commanders. Functions previously performed by the Intelligence Corps Command that were unrelated to counterintelligenceadministering the intelligence civilian career program and procuring intelligencerelated supply items-reverted to ACSI, resulting in the establishment of the Administrative Survey Detachment and the Intelligence Materiel Development Support Office as separate field operating activities. Finally, the Intelligence Corps itself was discontinued in March 1966, and its personnel functions shifted to the Department of Army level. This ended the Army's attempts to integrate human intelligence and counterintelligence personnel under a single organizational structure. Discontinuance of the Intelligence Corps also resulted in the redesignation of all Intelligence Corps units as Military Intelligence units.26
The creation of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command meant that the Army counterintelligence organization had been turned inside out. The old Counter Intelligence Corps had selected, trained, and administered Army counterintelligence personnel, but counterintelligence operations themselves had been decentralized under the control of local Army commanders. The new major Army field command was a centralized operational organization without any personnel or training functions. The demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a special tradition that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World War I, but the new arrangements meant that Army counterintelligence was now aligned with the rest of the Army.
If McNamara's organizational innovations destroyed the Intelligence Corps, they left the Army Security Agency substantially untouched. Because of its specialized mission and compartmented operations, the agency escaped the loss of its training and research and development functions. Instead, it expanded physically, geographically, and functionally An ASA element, with the in-country designation of the 3d Radio Research Unit, deployed to Vietnam to support the ongoing advisory effort as early as 1961.27 The agency also acquired an impor-
tant new acoustical intelligence mission in 1962, following the abolition of the Signal Corps as an Army technical service. A year later, the Army Security Agency achieved a monopoly of Army electronic warfare functions when it took over control of the noncommunications jamming function and associated units from the Signal Corps. In 1964 it set up its third field station in the continental United States at Homestead, Florida, to better meet new mission requirements which had evolved in the early 1960s. Finally, the agency's independence and unique position within the Army was ratified on 14 April 1964, when it achieved the status of a major Army field command.28
The Army Intelligence and Security Branch
The changes within the Army Intelligence community during the 1960s were not confined to shifts in function and in command relationships. Army Intelligence took a giant step in the direction of full professionalism in 1962, when the Army Intelligence and Security Branch was set up as a basic branch of the Regular Army. This development was long overdue. Since World War II, intelligence professionals had argued that the very existence of intelligence units created the need for a separate intelligence branch. The logic of this argument was increasingly reinforced by practical necessities. The pool of reserve officers capable of filling intelligence slots was becoming exhausted. Without a reform in the Army personnel system, analysts projected that half the Army's intelligence officer positions would be without qualified occupants by 1965. The incumbent ACSI, Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, pushed vigorously for the creation of a new branch to remedy the situation. Yet even the Army Intelligence community was divided on the issue. The ASA chief protested that the proposed integration of signals intelligence officers with other intelligence personnel would be like putting infantry and artillery into one branch. But Fitch won his case. The new branch came into existence formally on 1 July 1962.29
The Army Intelligence and Security Branch embraced about 5 percent of officers in the active Army The initial group joining the branch consisted of 283 Regular Army and 3,652 reserve officers who had a background in intelligence or were assigned to intelligence positions. A quarter of the group consisted of cryptologic specialists; the remainder broke down about evenly into combat intelligence personnel and members of the Intelligence Corps. The formation of the new branch significantly enhanced the Army's capacity to promote and retain qualified intelligence officers.
However, the new branch had problems initially It contained only a small number of Regular Army officers, and many of the reserve officers brought into the Army Intelligence and Security Branch lacked higher education or prospects for career advancement. The branch was designated as one that performed a combat service support function, not the most prestigious role in the Army. Finally, it was the only branch in the Army without a common basic course. Although most Intelligence officers attended Fort Holabird for training, Army Security Agency officers still trained separately at the U.S. Army Security Agency Training Center and School (USASATC&S) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Nevertheless, within the space of four years, much of Army Intelligence had been reconfigured. The new structure would meet its first test in the foreign and domestic challenges during the war in Vietnam.
1 A useful overview of defense and intelligence-related developments during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations can be found in Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense; A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 508-41.
2 Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, p. 116.
3 Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 239.
4 Ibid., pp. 297-98.
5 General Order (GO) 20, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), 11 Mar 55.
6 Memo, Maj C. A. Lynch for G-3, U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC), 11 Nov 58, sub: Proposed Advisory Committee for USAINTC, RG 319, NARA.
7 Memo for Commanding General, 10 Dec 58, sub: Long Range Policy and Planning Committee for USAINTC, RG 319, NARA.
8 Min, Intelligence Corps Commanders' Conference, 1961, sec. 10, p. 7, RG 319, NARA.
9 AR 10-122, Organization and Functions, Army Security Agency, 23 Jun 55.
10 GO 58, Army Security Agency, 13 Dec 56.
11 A major factor behind the Military Intelligence Organization concept was the belief that under the new arrangement, "personnel losses resulting from decentralized administration or misassignment are less likely to occur." Folder, Military Intelligence Support in the Field Army, 1960, Background of MI Branch/Corps file, INSCOM History Office, Fort Belvoir, Va. A more detailed description of the organization can be found in Irving Heymont, Combat Intelligence in Modern Warfare (Harrisburg: Stackpole Co., 1960), pp. 124-29.
12 The 519th Military Intelligence Battalion eventually received active Companies B and C in 1962.
13 Memo, 8 Feb 63, sub: Centralization of Image Interpreters under USAPIC, RG 319, NARA.
14 John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), p. 10.
15 Ibid., p. 12.
16 373 Card, 1st Military Intelligence Bn, Unit Data Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
17 Strategist Edward M. Luttwalk noted in 1984, "Our deployment overseas resembles geological layers, each the enduring residue of some past crisis or war, now hardened into a 'commitment.'"The Pentagon and the Art of War (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984), p. 73.
18 It should be pointed out that in addition to the units which supported USAREUR and Seventh Army during this period, the 450th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment provided security to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, from 1951 on. The unit was redesignated the 650th Military Intelligence Detachment in 1966 and upgraded to group status in 1970.
19 History of the U.S. Army Intelligence School Pacific, U.S. Army Intelligence School Pacific, 1971, copy in INSCOM History Office files.
20 One standard biography of the secretary of defense, Henry L. Truehitt's McNamara (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971), has little to say about his role in Army reorganization.
21 The role of Air Force Intelligence as a "loose cannon" and how this helped bring about the formation of DIA is documented in John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Military Strength (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 43-44, 93, 115-16, 124.
22 Hewes, From Root to McNamara, p. 364.
23 The errant sergeant was Sfc. Jack Edward Dunlap. The story of the case can be found in James Bamford's popular but highly unauthorized book, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 150-53.
24 As the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command's own fact sheet noted at the time, "USAINTCC is only one facet of the intelligence complex located at Fort Holabird. The integrated staff serves four masters." Fact Sheet, U.S. Army Intelligence Corps Command, p. 2. U.S. Army Intelligence Command file, INSCOM History Office.
25 GO 23, HQDA, 1 Jul 65.
26 Intelligence Corps groups were redesignated Military Intelligence groups on 16 October 1966.
27 One member of the 3d Radio Research Unit was Sp4c. James T. Davis, who was killed in action on 22 December 1961, and whom President Lyndon Johnson later described as the first fatality of the Vietnam War.
28 GO 14, HQDA, 14 Apr 64. As a result of this upgrade in status, the chief, Army Security Agency, assumed the new title of commanding general, Army Security Agency.
29 Marc B. Powe and Edward E. Wilson, The Evolution of American Military Intelligence (Fort Huachuca, Ariz.: U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, 1973), p. 105.
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