Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1990-1991



The Army Long Range Training Plan (ALRTP), published in July 1989, provided Army planners with broad guidance for training the Total Army for the next thirty years. The ALRTP made educated assumptions regarding future doctrine, force structure, weapons systems, and the training environment. In response to the ALRTP, Army training developers considered a series of training strategies. One of these strategies, distributed training, would cut costs by using technology to export training from resident schools to units and individuals. Creation of future training sites would require evaluation of both firing range and maneuver area needs for new weapons systems and effective employment of training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

Late in FY 88 the Army leadership began development of a comprehensive training strategy called the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). It will link near-term with long-term strategies for heavy, light, aviation, special operations, and support forces and the reserve components. The concept anticipates that Army training eventually will be based on devices rather than supported by them. Training will decrease at institutions and increase at home stations, while telecommunications technology will allow the linkage of institutions, combat training centers, and home stations. CATS envisions that commanders will readjust their available resources in order to bring their commands to required training standards. In FY 91 the Army continued development of the CATS concept and solicited comment from Army commanders.

Resources for CATS included training ammunition and operating tempo (OPTEMPO). In FY 86 the Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) produced Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training. This publication provided models for estimating training ammunition needs, but units continued to request more ammunition than they used. Planners then combined historical expenditure data with STRAC models to reduce overestimates. FY 90 and 91 training ammunition requests were computed at 110 percent of historical expenditures for tank, Bradley, artillery, and mortar systems and at 105 percent for all other systems. This resulted in a $200 million per year cost reduction.


Despite pressures to reduce budgets, the Army leadership succeeded in maintaining the level of OPTEMPO it felt was necessary to maintain combat readiness. OPTEMPO refers to the number of operating miles per year for major ground equipment and flying hours per month for aircraft. Training OPTEMPOs for active and reserve component units were prioritized. This was based upon the Department of the Army Master Priority List to ensure that those units most likely to enter hostilities early would have attained a higher level of readiness. During FY 90 and 91 allowances for ground OPTEMPO for the active component, Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (USAR) averaged 800, 288, and 200 miles per year, respectively. Air OPTEMPO figures for each were 14.5, 9.0, and 8.1 hours per month.

Copies of Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, which complements Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, were distributed to divisions and TRADOC schools in FY 90. Training the Force defined the process for training management, while Battle Focused Training provided guidance for implementing training at battalion and lower echelons. Field Manual 25-101 emphasized the importance of identifying mission-essential tasks, the relationship of individual and unit tasks, and the need for realistic training for battle. The Chief of Staff urged all officers and NCOs to apply the principles of Field Manual 25-101 in their training programs.

Individual Training

The Army has founded its leader development program upon three pillars-formal education or institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Its Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) consists of the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC), the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course (ANCOC), the Sergeants Major Course, and various functional courses. Prior to FY 90, promotion to staff sergeant required attendance at PLDC; promotion to master sergeant required successful completion of ANCOC; and graduation from the sergeants major course was mandatory for promotion to command sergeant major. Effective 1 October 1989 soldiers had to complete PLDC for promotion to sergeant. After 1 October 1990, BNCOC was mandatory for promotion to sergeant first class.

In FY 90 the Army's Leadership Assessment and Development Program (LADP) was implemented in selected Army schools for both senior NCOs and officers. To assist individual self-development programs, LADP utilized observations by the soldier, classmates, and faculty regarding a soldier's leadership potential. The emphasis upon self-development has resulted in replacement of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) for enlist-


ed personnel by the Self-Development Test (SDT). The SQT concentrated upon military occupational specialities (MOSs), whereas the SDT combines MOS questions with others on training and leadership. The Chief of Staff authorized SDT in July 1990, and its initial use was scheduled to begin in the active component in October 1991. For the first two years, SDT results will be released only to the persons who take the test.

In recent years the Army has adopted a comprehensive physical fitness program. All Army personnel must meet body weight standards and pass the semiannual Army Physical Fitness Test. The Army Physical Fitness School, located at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, developed doctrine on physical fitness and performance. In 1990 the VANGUARD Task Force recommended elimination of the school and transfer of its functions to the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In FY 91 HQDA decided to reduce the school's functions and move it to Fort Benning, Georgia, in FY 92. The Master Fitness Trainer Course, an on campus program of the school that taught senior NCOs and officers to advise commanders on their units' physical training, will be discontinued in FY 92. It has been replaced by the institution of physical fitness courses in the Army's leadership schools and the use of mobile training teams that conduct on-site physical fitness instruction for both active and reserve components' units. The Army has a sequential institutional officer education system that consists of the Officer Basic Course, the Officer Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff Officer Course, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Army War College. It also participates in the Joint Professional Military Education program. Military Qualification Standards (MQSs) is the Army's evolving officer leader development system that is based on common tasks and professional knowledge. MQS I encompasses precommissioning training, MQS II applies to company grade, and MQS III covers field grade officers. MQS I and II are centered on common and branch manuals. The MQS I manual was revised and distributed in 1990, and the MQS II manual was released in FY 91. Officers will be tested periodically on MQS I and II subjects. A draft of the MQS III manual, which emphasized broad areas of knowledge and self-development, was circulated for review and comment in FY 91.

Army officials expressed serious concern in 1991 that Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM created substantial backlogs in attendance at the leader development schools. The Chief of Staff remarked that "there will be no constructive credit given for experience in DESERT STORM- by itself, combat cannot substitute for the comprehensive development achieved in the Army's educational system." BNCOC, ANCOC, and the Sergeants Major Course were expected to underfill by 35 to 45 percent, 25 to 35 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, in FY 91. A one-time exemption


was granted for soldiers eligible for promotion to sergeant first class and master sergeant who were unable to attend BNCOC/ANCOC because of participation in the Persian Gulf war. Officer Basic Courses were not adversely affected by the war, but Officer Advanced Courses were. The Combined Arms and Services Staff School was running near minimum fill in early FY 91, but Command and General Staff College selectees who served in the Persian Gulf obtained priority status for the next academic yea r. School officials anticipated a period of one to two years to eliminate the attendance backlogs. During FY 90-91 the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) initiated two major self-development programs targeted at the NCO. These programs were Read-to-Lead, designed to help NCOs achieve the Army's reading standards, and the NCO Leader Education and Development (NCO LEAD) initiative, intended to improve soldiers' academic competencies. Thousands of soldiers assigned to Saudi Arabia and Ku wait received ACES services. The ACES staff worked sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and provided both traditional classroom instruction and nontraditional options. This instruction included language and cultural programs operated by the Defense Language Institute (DLI).

Unit Training

Readiness for the complexities of contemporary warfare requires frequent unit training under conditions similar to combat. Effective unit training employs both field maneuvers and deployment exercises supplemented by battlefield simulations. The increasing speed and lethality of weapons systems created in recent years called for large maneuver areas which home stations could not provide. By 1987 the Army formulated its Combat Training Centers (CTCs) program which consisted of three instrumented tactical field sites and a wargaming program. The four CTCs are the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

Opened at Fort Irwin, California, in 1981, the NTC has concentrated on training heavy battalion/brigade forces under mid- to high-intensity conditions. In FY 90 twelve of fourteen scheduled unit rotations were accomplished. This included three heavy/light rotations. Rotation 90-8 served as the NTC's first contingency operations (CONOPS) rotation involving elements of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 5th Special Operations Forces Group. In FY 91 Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM reduced twelve scheduled rotations at the NTC to five.

The JRTC was established at Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, in 1987 to conduct training in low- to mid-intensity


CONOPS. Army special operations and armored forces and Air Force Military Airlift Command and Tactical Airlift Command elements contributed varied and joint training to rotating units. During FY 90 the JRTC conducted nine rotations; one of them involved the ARNG 47th Infantry Division. Nine brigade rotations, which included nine light and four special forces battalions, took place at the JRTC in FY 91. The BRAC 91 study determined that the JRTC will be relocated permanently to Fort Polk, Louisiana, in FY 93.

The CMTC began limited training operations in mid- to high-intensity combat for USAREUR heavy battalions at Hohenfels, Federal Republic of Germany, in FY 89. Recent acquisition of a permanent opposing force and an instrumented battlefield permitted realistic training and standardized feedback to rotating units. In FY 91 CMTC conducted eleven brigade rotations in which twenty-nine heavy and four light battalion task forces participated.

Begun in late 1987 and headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the BCTP trained division and corps commanders and their staffs in their wartime duties. BCTP consisted of a three-part program conducted at the unit's home station. The first part was a five-day AirLand Battle seminar followed several months later by a nine-day warfighter computer battle simulation exercise. The third part, a proficiency sustainment package, helped the unit staff retain the knowledge gained during the warfighter experience. In FY 90 BCTP performed eleven AirLand Battle seminars and six warfighter exercises; two National Guard units participated, the 28th and 40th Infantry Divisions. The Persian Gulf war reduced the BCTP's FY 91 schedule to five divisions.

The Army Exercise Program, organized into Army-only, joint, and combined exercises conducted both in CONUS and overseas, has provided valuable unit training in recent years. Army units have trained annually in about fifty JCS exercises that enhance their combat readiness to support unified commands. These exercises have ranged from small, unannounced interoperability exercises to planned worldwide command post or large overseas deployment exercises. Because of the lessened Soviet threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers cut the NATO exercise package by about 50 percent for 1989-90. The Department of Defense scaled down American participation in training exercises for FY 90 and 91, while the demands of the Persian Gulf war resulted in cancellation of some exercises. These cancellations included POSSE LEADER 90, WINTEX 91, and LOGEX 91.

REFORGER (return of forces to Germany) is an annual joint/combined exercise that tests rapid reinforcement of NATO from CONUS and the state of U.S. warfighting capabilities. The emphasis on curtailing large exercises postponed REFORGER 89 to 1990 and resulted in both a substan-


tial reduction in people and equipment and heavy reliance on computer simulations for REFORGER 90. USAREUR developed a concept, the REFORGER Enhancement Program (REP), that allowed field training, command post, and command field exercises to run concurrently by the use of simulations. With 56,000 U.S. personnel, 15,000 of them from CONUS, REFORGER 90 took place from late December 1989 to late February 1990. The maneuver phase, named CENTURION SHIELD, pitted the V Corps against the VII Corps, and focused on training staffs, from battalion through corps, primarily by simulation. The Distributed War Game System (DWS) orchestrated operations, while the Joint Exercise Simulation System (JESS) did tactics. Two brigades of the 10th Mountain Division performed most of the actual field maneuvers of CENTURION SHIELD. In two other new developments used in REFORGER 90, U.S. forces employed no tanks and combined the use of umpires with computer calculations for adjudicating the outcome of battles.

REFORGER 91, like REFORGER 90, relied heavily upon simulations and employed only 28,000 allied troops, who included about 7,000 U.S. Personnel from CONUS. In the June 1990 London Declaration, NATO leaders proclaimed a new allied strategy based on a small, flexible multinational force. This decision endorsed creation of a rapid-reaction corps that led to the debut of a prototype multinational air assault division in REFORGER 91. Commanded by a British officer, the division consisted of 7,000 British, German, and Belgian troops. The live field training exercise, CERTAIN SHIELD, was limited mostly to the multinational air assault division and a battalion of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division, opposed by a Dutch armored brigade.

U.S. Army units engaged in other major deployment exercises during FY 90 and 91. TEAM SPIRIT 90, another annual exercise, was conducted in early 1990 in the Republic of Korea (ROK) by U.S. and Korean units. It involved a broad spectrum of training-joint/combined air, ground, sea, amphibious, and unconventional warfare operations. A large undertaking, the field training exercise included the headquarters of two field armies and four corps that commanded six active and two reserve divisions. BRIGHT STAR, a biennial exercise, deployed CONUS forces to Southwest Asia, CENTCOM's area of responsibility. BRIGHT STAR 90, which occurred in late 1989, deployed 6,000 CONUS soldiers to Egypt. American paratroopers airdropped into the desert, and U.S. Army personnel cross-trained with the Egyptians in both staff and ground maneuver operations. ROVING SANDS 90 assembled 8,000 U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines for a joint air defense/air control exercise at the White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas, in the spring of 1990. The Army used virtually all of its air defense weapons and conducted live firing of the Hawk and Patriot missiles.


Reserve Components Training

The Army formalized a comprehensive reserve components training strategy in 1989 to improve readiness in the areas of individual, leader, and collective training, as well as improved training support and management. In order to attain reserve components combat readiness, it sought several major objectives that included a successful MOS skill level of at least 85 percent among battalion personnel and a C3 unit readiness rating. In May 1989 the Chief of Staff approved the Reserve Components Training Development Action Plan (RC TDAP), which identified thirty-eight problems in reserve components training that required resolution. The initial emphasis centered upon improved MOs qualification, leader development, and more productive inactive duty training.

Because of unacceptable MOs qualification levels among reserve components personnel and inadequate home station training facilities, the Army inaugurated a reserve components regional training sites program in the 1980s. Begun in 1985, a regional training sites maintenance program called for twenty-one facilities manned by Active Guard/Reserve instructors. Seventeen facilities, fifteen standard and two high-technology, were operational by the end of FY 91. With state-of-the-art diagnostic and treatment training devices and deployable medical systems, three regional training sites-medical were ready in FY 91 to train reserve components hospital units. As part of the Army's distributed training strategy, in 1990 the Army completed development of exportable training packages for use by regional training sites, ARNG academies, and reserve forces schools. A test video teletraining program that focused on the common leader portion of RC-BNCOC at various sites in Kentucky began in FY 91.

Reserve components leader development programs are based upon the same three pillars as are the active component programs-institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. Institutional training for the reserve forces includes professional development and functional resident courses at active component schools and courses designed either for use in reserve components schools or individual study programs. The current version of RC-NCOES became effective in October 1987. RC-BNCOC and RC-ANCOC have two phases-common leader and MOs-specific Common leader courses were in place in 1987, but TRADOC had not formulated the majority of MOs-specific courses until FY 91. Because the ARNG has most reserve forces combat units, the Guard received responsibility for combat BNCOC and ANCOC courses for the ARNG and the USAR. Army Reserve forces schools, in conjunction with state military academies, will conduct most of the reserve components combat support and combat service support courses.


In 1988 a training strategy task force studied the problems encountered by reserve components officers in accomplishing their required training. Limited time and conflicting family, civilian employment, and civilian education interests were the major issues. The Chief of Staff then directed a Command and General Staff College task force to devise a plan to reduce course length without seriously reducing content for the Reserve Components Officer Education System (RC-OES). Approved by the Chief of Staff in November 1989, the plan made several recommendations. The Officer Advanced Course, a prerequisite for attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), should be reduced to two branch-specific phases and focus on company/battery command skills. The CAS3 Course should be shortened from the four-phase pilot course to three phases and be mandatory for promotion to major. Phase one would be taken by correspondence, the second phase would be taken during eight inactive duty training periods at reserve forces schools, and the third phase would be taken during a two-week active duty period. The task force recommended changing the Nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course to two phases. The first phase would teach tactics and be required for promotion to lieutenant colonel, while the second phase would focus on operations and be a prerequisite to become colonel. The Army leadership approved the plan's fundamentals and proposed implementation in October 1991.

Overseas deployment training (ODT) is an important element of the Army's role in America's overseas defense commitments. Reserve components units sharpen their combat readiness by conducting mobilization deployment plans and strengthening associations with their assigned active components units in Army-only, joint, and combined exercises. Army officials seek an ODT program that permits early deploying units, between D and D+30, to participate in ODT every three years, and units that deploy after D+30, to undertake ODT every five years. In a recent survey, fourteen Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and Army component commanders strongly endorsed ODT and requested more personnel than authorized in the Army budget. In FY 90 these commanders asked for more than 60,000 reserve components soldiers but received only 40,000. Budget constraints and Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM cut the number of participants in ODT during FY 91 to 28,000.

In the 1980s several governors challenged the federal government's authority to conduct ODT. Before 1952, federal statutory authority to order ARNG units to active duty was limited to national emergencies. In 1952 Congress authorized active duty training for Guardsmen without emergencies if the respective governor agreed. Gubernatorial consent to training missions was routinely obtained until the mid-1980s, when eleven governors objected to the Reagan administration's sending their Guardsmen to


Honduras for training. Then followed the Montgomery Amendment to the FY 86 Defense Authorization Act that prohibited any governor from withholding approval for active duty outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for that state's Guard units because the governor objected to the location, purpose, or type or schedule of such active duty. In the late 1980s Governors Rudy Perpich of Minnesota and Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts filed litigation asserting that the Militia Clause of the Constitution reserved to governors the authority to train the Guard; therefore, they could legally cancel ODT in Central America for their Guard units. A series of judicial processes ensued ending with an 11 June 1990 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. The court stated that governors cannot pr event Army National Guardsmen from participating in ODT because they object to the location, purpose, or type or schedule of such active duty.

Budget cuts canceled several ODT exercises in FY 89, including REFORGER and BRIGHT STAR. In FY 90 some of the canceled FY 89 ODT exercises resumed. About 6,800 reserve components soldiers participated in REFORGER, while another 4,500 built roads and provided medical aid for the native populace during FUERTES CAMINOS (North) in Honduras. Western Command (WESTCOM) continued ODT engineer and civil affairs projects in the Pacific Basin, including in FY 90 the Republic of Tonga, Vanatu, and the Fiji Islands. Humanitarian/civic assistance projects went forward in LANTCOM locations such as St. Lucia, Grenada, and in Jamaica, where Hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo caused serious property damage. Funding reductions and the Persian Gulf war resulted in renewed cutbacks in ODT during late FY 90 and in FY 91.

Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations

Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) are not new to the Army's training methodology. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations not only enhance live training, but they also minimize such constraints as time, funding, insufficient land area, and environmental issues. The Combined Arms Training Strategy decision that Army training would be based more on devices, rather than simply supported by them, has accelerated TADSS development. The Army has planned to use simulators and simulation for a broad range of skills and knowledge, from equipment operations and technical proficiency to the conduct of combined arms training exercises currently obtainable only at the CTCs. Other instructional technologies under development include independent voice recognition, artificial intelligence, robotics, holographic projection systems, fiber optics, and sensor screens.

Continuing experimentation in simulation networking (SIMNET) by the Army created the Combined Army Tactical Training System (CATT),


which performs combined arms maneuvers training on a simulated battlefield for crews through battalions. By the end of 1990 the CATT consisted of a network of eight active component company and battalion sites located in CONUS and Germany. Three additional CATT sites were planned for ARNG units. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is the lead CATT program. Three other branch trainers, Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ADCATT), and Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ENCATT) were in the requirements development process stage by late FY 91.

In late 1989 the Army began formulating a major TADSS initiative, the Family of Simulators (FAMSIM) Master Plan. It charted a command and control training course for platoons through corps. FAMSIM contemplated linking battalions and brigades, whether training at home station or a CTC, to other battalions and brigades, and perhaps divisions and corps that were training at home station. As conceived, FAMSIM would link a number of simulations being designed for the various echelons. Janus-supported platoon and company training, while Brigade/Battalion Battle Simulation (BBS) trained combat and combat support battalions and brigades. Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) supported division and corps staffs, and Joint Wars (JWARS) trained theater commanders and their staffs. Other programs were the Combat Service Support Training Simulation System (CSSTSS), to be located at the Army Logistics Center, and PANTHER, which instructed battalions through regional CINCs in low-intensity conflict.

Devices that simulate tactical engagement and weapons effects represent another element of TADSS. The Army's principal device for this function is the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES). Development of the Air Ground Engagement System-Air Defense System (AGES/AD) received high priority in 1990 along with delivery of MILES to the UH-1, AH-1, and OH-58 helicopters, the A-10 aircraft, and the Stinger SA7 and SA14 air defense systems. Delivery of the Mobile Independent Target System (MITS), a MILES system designed for combat support and combat service support vehicles, began in January 1990. The CTCs have long sought a system that could simulate indirect fire. Work continued in 1990 on the Combined Arms Team Integrated Evaluation System (CATIES) project which, through integration with MILES, performs this function.

In late 1988 the Army began development of a distributed training strategy (DTS) intended to save resources, reduce resident training, and improve instructional quality and standardization. DTs will rely heavily upon new technologies-computer-based instruction, expert systems, interactive video disc, and video conferencing. A DTs implementation


plan, the TRADOC Long Range Training Plan, was staffed in June 1990, and the first major DTs pilot project was assigned to the Kentucky ARNG. Among the systems being developed for DTs is the Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS), which combines a personal computer with an interactive video disc to provide realistic individual and small group instruction. TRADOC facilities received their full shipment of EIDS in early 1990, but funding was unavailable for distribution of EIDS to active component units.


Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented the first major test of the Total Force Policy adopted in the early 1970s. This policy called for a DOD force structure that integrated the active and reserve components to provide maximum military capability within the fiscal restraints imposed by Congress and the White House. At the outset of the Persian Gulf war, Army training, doctrine, and combat development planners considered the Army fundamentally ready for war. The training system, which had evolved since the 1970s, had produced high quality performance by means such as intense individual training, the CTC program, and unit readiness testing through the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). By August 1990 AirLand Battle doctrine, a combined arms concept, was firmly embedded in most Army training literature and all resident courses.

Army active component units were alerted and began deployment to Southwest Asia on 7 August 1990. On 22 August the President invoked his authority to activate Selected Reserve units and individuals. HQDA issued a mobilization order on 27 August to forty-five reserve components units. USAR units began reporting to their mobilization stations on 30 August, and some of them deployed by 7 September. By early December some 400 reserve forces units had received activation orders. Mobilization assistance teams (MATs) of five to twenty people from Army Readiness Groups assessed the readiness of reserve components units at each installation and specified needed training prior to validation for deployment. This training concentrated on common tasks (map reading, weapons qualification, and basic survival skills), but it also included some specialized training. Personnel in activated reserve components units who had not completed initial entry training (IET), which included basic combat training and advanced individual training, were required to complete IET before deployment with their units.

Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM presented challenges to the Army school system, such as unanticipated expansion in the training base and disruption of scheduled leader development courses. The Chief of


Staff directed that all combat units deployed to Southwest Asia be at 100 percent strength, and he also insisted that the Army education system continue to operate as normally as possible. Substantial expansion of the training base never became an issue. As previously discussed in the Individual Training section, underfills occurred in several of the leadership development courses. Army schools experienced some shortages, although not serious ones, in staff and materiel. For example, Fort Benning, Georgia, compensated for staff losses by reducing the size of opposing forces assigned to its force-on-force training program. The Army Aviation Center recouped its instructor pilot losses to Southwest Asia by borrowing pilots from FORSCOM, AMC, and SOUTHCOM and by utilizing activated reserve components pilots.

U.S. Army participation in the Persian Gulf war emphasized several types of specialized training. The decision to haul, rather than drive, heavy equipment overland in the Persian Gulf created a demand to train an additional 1,000 heavy equipment drivers quickly. The Transportation School reduced the normal training time of eight weeks to four for motor transport operators, MOs 88M, and successfully trained the additional drivers. Water purification specialists, MOs 77W, were in great demand. Fourth Army initiated an expedited program that trained 100 soldiers as water purification specialists in fourteen days. Also, 400 to 500 reserve components personnel were qualified on the 150,000 gallons per day Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU). The Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, California, and the DLI element in Washington, D.C., devised a number of special courses in Arabic and its Iraqi dialect. DLI put together a video teletraining capability and taught Arabic to deploying units at Forts Campbell, Hood, and Riley. From December 1990 to February 1991 the U.S. Army staged several one-week crash training courses in basic combat subjects for several hundred Kuwaitis who had been attending U.S. colleges. As members of Operation DESERT OW L, these young Kuwaitis were inducted into the Kuwaiti Army and served as linguists and intelligence analysts with U. S. Army units in the Persian Gulf.

President Bush authorized deployment of additional active and reserve components troops to Southwest Asia in November 1990, and in January 1991 he extended the reserve forces mobilization to the IRR. Individual reservists were called according to their MOs; 42 percent of the MOSs were in the combat arms, while mechanics and vehicle operators added another 20 percent. TRADOC mobilized elements of the 70th, 78th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 98th, 100th, and 108th Training Divisions and decided to utilize the annual training portion of the Reserve Component Course Configuration Program (RC3) courses for refresher training. This training, which lasted only eight days, was often perfunctory. Some indi-


vidual weapons were fired just enough to zero them in, and in some cases the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare refresher session was limited to donning masks. The expected numbers of activated IRR personnel initially ranged as high as 100,000, but the sudden end to active hostilities reduced that figure to about 15,000.

The expanded mobilization of reserve components units in November 1990 resulted in activation of three ARNG roundout brigades-the Georgia 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), the roundout brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized); the Mississippi 155th Armored Brigade (Separate), a roundout unit for the 1st Cavalry Division; and the Louisiana 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), a roundout brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Activated in early December 1990, the 48th, 155th, and 256th moved to mobilization stations at Fort Stewart, Camp Shelby/Fort Hood, and Fort Polk, respectively. Initially, the brigades concentrated on crew training and tank gunnery tables, while their commanders and staffs underwent an abbreviated Tactical Commander's Development Course and a modified Staff Skills Enhancement Program at Fort Leavenworth.

During late December and early January the 48th moved to the National Training Center (NTC) at the same time that the other brigades rotated through maneuver and gunnery phases, primarily at Fort Hood. The 48th completed its NTC rotation on 28 February, the 155th finished its NTC rotation on 22 March, and the 256th remained at Fort Hood. The performance of the roundout brigades during the training period revealed some deficiencies in readiness. Many soldiers did not meet Army gunnery standards, and some Bradley crews lacked cohesion. The 256th, however, had just been issued its Bradleys and had received no training on these vehicles. Equipment was sometimes found to be the wrong kind, old, or in poor condition. Instances of inadequate leadership were discovered from squad leader through battalion commander.

On the other hand, it was never envisioned that the roundout brigades would deploy as part of an immediate response contingency. In addition, the initial reserve call-up specifically excluded combat units. When the call-up came, it was for only 180 days. Other problems were encountered because of the wholesale incompatibility of the active Army and the Guard's logistical and administrative equipment, management procedures, and automated information systems. In the end, training the three roundout brigades to validation for deployment took considerably longer than originally estimated. For this reason and also because of the brief duration of the ground war, the 48th and the 155th Brigades did not join their parent divisions in Southwest Asia. Since the 5th Infantry Division never deployed to the Persian Gulf, the 256th Brigade likewise remained in CONUS.


Reserve component mobilization demonstrated that many planning assumptions regarding the Cold War containment strategy-forward deployed forces, reinforcement, and national mobilization-were not valid for short-notice contingencies. Capitalizing upon lessons learned from the roundout brigade mobilization, the Army leadership launched the BOLD SHIFT initiative. Under the direction of FORSCOM, BOLD SHIFT consisted of battle-focused training and readiness programs designed to make reserve components units more accessible and deployable for executing national military strategy. In late 1991 the Army initiated the Total Army Training Study (TATS) to provide structure and resources for meeting reserve components pre- through post-mobilization training needs.

The Army leadership organized a training program in Southwest Asia soon after troops began arriving in theater. Army Forces, U.S. Central Command (ARCENT), had a training section in place by early September 1990. Units of XVIII Airborne Corps began training on breaching techniques and attacks on strong positions. The 82d Airborne Division built its own model of an Iraqi triangular defensive emplacement, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) used an abandoned village to practice street fighting. Small arms and tank firing ranges were created, but training ammunition was in limited supply until December. Nevertheless, Army units conducted joint live-fire exercises with the U.S. Air Force, and most crew-served weapons were fired, except for air defense artillery. The XVIII Corps emphasized chemical warfare instruction, which involved detection, quick changes into protective suits, and the use of antidotes.

Concern about the reported Iraqi chemical warfare arsenal resulted in fielding the German Fuchs, or Fox, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle (NBCRS) to U.S. Forces in Southwest Asia. Before the Persian Gulf war, active component NBC reconnaissance platoons, equipped with M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), provided NBC reconnaissance support to armored and mechanized infantry units. The German government donated sixty Fox NBCRSs to the United States for use in the Gulf. With a four-person crew, this six-wheeled, armored/amphibious vehicle, while in motion, used highly sophisticated sensors to detect all known chemical warfare agents and radiation. The German Army trained U.S. Army, Europe, NBC reconnaissance platoons to operate the Fox NBCRS during an intensive three-week course in Sonthofen, Germany, during August and September 1990. The U.S. Army Chemical School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, began a similar, highly expedited course in November 1990. By mid-January 1991, seven Army and two Marine Corps NBC reconnaissance platoons were operational in Southwest Asia. Both the crews and the equipment performed well.

In November 1990 ARCENT solicited a training assessment team from CONUS to prepare a long-term training plan for Army units in


Southwest Asia. Specialists from TRADOC, FORSCOM, and the office of the Program Manager for Training Devices went to Southwest Asia and prepared an extensive training plan for ARCENT. The plan included building improved firing ranges, distributing training devices and simulators, and assigning training advisers to units. The introduction of up graded and new equipment to units during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM prompted TRADOC to field Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and New Equipment Training Teams (NETTs) who served in CONUS, in Southwest Asia, and with the VII Corps in Europe. In early November ARCENT requested mine rollers, plows for breaching minefields, and the Cleared Lane Marking System. Abrams M1 tank crews who received the Abrams M1A1 required familiarization, and soldiers schooled only on the older Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV) needed training when they were assigned the M2A1 and M3A1 models. At the inception of DESERT SHIELD in August 1990 the BCTP, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, began collecting detailed information on the Iraqi armed forces. The BCTP staff ran several U.S. Army divisions deploying to Southwest Asia through a condensed three-day course on the Iraqi Army and on Saudi Arabia. In September the BCTP staff published its findings on the Iraqis in Iraq: How They Fight. BCTP then wargamed a series of defensive scenarios for the XVIII Airborne Corps in CONUS. By November the BCTP staff had designed offensive scenarios and had sent a team to the VII Corps in Germany for exercise and intelligence updates. From December 1990 to January 1991 the BCTP deployed to Southwest Asia teams that served with the VII and XVIII Corps and also the Third Army and ARCENT. Assistance provided by BCTP teams in preparing for potential ground action in Southwest Asia included an XVIII Corps command post exercise and an ARCENT map exercise in late December and two VII Corps command post exercises in January 1991.



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