Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989
By FY 1989 the Total Force policy had placed 50 percent of the Army's peacetime force structure in the reserve components (RC), the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the Army National Guard (ARNG), which included both combat and noncombat units. The transfer of missions from the active to the reserve components has compensated in part for the decline in active force strength. Many USAR and ARNG units that participated in the CAPSTONE and Affiliation programs with the active component (AC), including roundout combat units, must be ready to mobilize, deploy, and perform their assigned wartime missions with the same dispatch and competency as their active force counterparts. The RC, insofar as they are effectively integrated into the Total Force, are an essential ingredient of the Army's deterrent and combat capabilities. By FY 1989 many active and reserve units were aligned under the CAPSTONE system in wartime organizations to meet mobilization requirements for one or more of three wartime scenarios-Europe, Southwest Asia, or the Pacific-and to support the stateside sustaining base. A unique feature of CAPSTONE was that the commander of the senior organization, whether active, USAR, or ARNG, exercised command. Roundout, an HQDA man-agreement program, brought selected active component units up to a designated structure by filling organizational voids with RC units.
The RC constituted the initial and primary augmentation for active forces in an emergency that required rapid or sustained expansion of the Army. Despite the priority given to attaining a high state of readiness for CAPSTONE and roundout units, the basic intent of the Total Force Policy was s not to bring reserve component elements to the same readiness level as the AC. Rather, the Army has sought to mesh the strengths of both components to obtain the maximum capability within Army budget and manpower constraints and to overcome the problems that limited RC training placed upon readiness. The Army hoped to maintain a reserve force capable of making a timely transition to a contingency or wartime posture and also of meeting its peacetime responsibilities to federal and state authorities.
Other factors also detracted from RC readiness. Fewer funds were available in FY 1989 than in FY 1988 to support annual, school, and special training; their respective decreases were 1.3, 11.4, and 17.5 percent. Funds for refresher and proficiency school training were also insufficient. RC training was adversely affected by a high incidence of personnel turbulence that stemmed from the loss or reassignment of reservists caused by changes in their civilian jobs, modernization and changes in force design, the assignment of additional missions, and revisions in CAPSTONE alignments. These disruptive factors affected manning levels and contributed to the widespread mismatch of MOSes. The latter often necessitated reclassification and individual and unit retraining that further degraded readiness. Shortages of full-time support (FTS) personnel and the geographical dispersion of units and unit members affected readiness. Approximately seven thousand RC company-level units, for example, were based at more than forty-six hundred separate locations.
Recent mobilization exercises had highlighted deficiencies that impaired the Army 's ability to collect current data essential to mobilize the RC. As a remedy, the Army was fielding the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS), an automated information system consisting of two subsystems: Mobilization Command and Control, and Unit Administration. With complete fielding expected in FY 1992, the RCAS would provide an efficient automation capability for more than ten thousand RC units. Congress had a special interest in RCAS and appropriated $109.9 million for the program in FY 1989. The GAO 's findings, congressional concerns, and internal assessments that highlighted RC shortcomings emphasized the underlying debate about the Army 's shifting missions from the active to the reserve components. The RC leadership cautioned that the GAO 's sampling of units was too small. Much of the information used by the GAO, they noted, was two years old; many of the deficiencies that the GAO cited had been rectified, and RC readiness had improved.
Notwithstanding the questions raised about the Total Army policy, the Army in FY 1989 became increasingly dependent on the RC. Peacetime command and control of the USAR and ARNG not only defined relations between active and reserve components but were crucial to the readiness, mobilization, and wartime roles of the Total Force. Command and control of the USAR attracted considerable scrutiny during the year. FORSCOM, a major Army command, exercised extensive responsibilities for directing and monitoring RC activities in peacetime. The FORSCOM commanding general commanded assigned USAR Troop Program Units (TPU) in the continental United States and Puerto Rico through five subordinate continental United States armies (CONUSAs)-First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. The CONUSAs commanded USAR units in their areas and also supervised the training of area ARNG units based on HQDA and FORSCOM guidance. They assisted RC units in attaining and maintaining a prescribed readiness status, developed and remained prepared to execute designated contingency plans, and controlled mobilization and deployment operations for all mobilization stations (MOBSTAs) in their areas. Upon mobilization, the CONUSAs would become Joint Regional Defense Commands (JRDCs). In Alaska, FORSCOM commanded all assigned USAR units and monitored ARNG training through the 6th Infantry Division (LID).
The USAR chain of command extended from the CONUSAs to commanders of the Major US Army Reserve Commands (Mosaics) and then to the assigned Thus. The 46 Mosaics consisted of 21 US Army Reserve Commands (Arcos), the 12 US Army Reserve training divisions, and 13 selected General Officer Commands (GOCOMs). Major exceptions were the 157th Infantry Brigade (Mech) and the 187th Infantry Brigade, both assigned directly to the First US Army, and the 205th Infantry Brigade (LID), which was the roundout brigade of the 6th Infantry Division (LID) and was assigned to the Fourth US Army. These high-priority brigades were further assigned to the 79th, 88th, and 94th ARCOMs in order to permit their division commanders to concentrate on improving each brigade's combat effectiveness. Twenty-nine Readiness Groups were subordinate to the five CONUSAs. During FY 1989, through Project JUMPSTART and other measures, FORSCOM assigned highly qualified active component officers to the Readiness Groups as advisers. FORSCOM assigned promotable officers as advisers to avoid the stigma attached to career advancement often associated with reserve assignments. Readiness Groups were control headquarters for USAR units in their region and monitored ARNG units in their execution of the Army Readiness and Training Program.
Each state had a State Area Command (STARC), which consisted of a mobilization entity within an ARNG headquarters and headquarters detachment that would go on active duty when the state's ARNG units were alerted for mobilization. Once ordered to active duty, the STARC would exercise command and control of all mobilized ARNG units until they arrived at their mobilization stations. The STARC would also exercise command and control of USAR units selected by the appropriate CONUSA and coordinate the movements of AC and RC units to their mobilization stations. As mobilization progressed, the STARC would convert to a Joint State Area Command (JSAC). Although the Army did not command the ARNG in peacetime, HQDA established training criteria and evaluated the training of the ARNG in the continental United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Alaska through FORSCOM. The ARNG had most RC combat units-10 divisions, 18 separate brigades, 3 armored cavalry regiments-and most of the roundout units for AC combat forces. FORSCOM also played a leading role in organizing RC units into Total Army Force packages for contingencies.
The command and control of USAR units had changed little since FORSCOM was established in July 1973. By FY 1989 the diffusion of authority and responsibility for the USAR TPUs spawned growing dissatisfaction with the existing system in some quarters of the Army and Congress. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), commanded the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) and those USAR troops not affiliated with a unit. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), and FORSCOM shared control of USAR resources. The CAR appeared before Congress to request funds for the USAR but doubted his authority to determine the allocation of those resources.
Two major studies addressed USAR command and control in FY 1989, one by FORSCOM and the other by a special Army panel. FORSCOM stressed the importance of a single chain of command for the USAR and the active component as well as Army Staff agencies performing common functions for both components. The single most important corrective action, according to FORSCOM, was to fill full-time manning positions in USAR units and commands and to relieve USAR commanders of onerous administrative burdens. FORSCOM proposed a full-time USAR lieutenant general as Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs at HQ, FORSCOM, and also a full-time USAR lieutenant general as Chief, Army Reserve, on the Army Staff or as an Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, US Army. General Colin L. Powell, who assumed the dual position as Commander in Chief/Commanding General of FORSCOM on 4 April 1989, endorsed the FORSCOM study. In April 1989 HQDA established its US Army Reserve Command and Control Study Panel at the request of the House Appropriations Committee, chaired by General
Many of the panel's key recommendations, released in September 1989, were diametrically opposed to FORSCOM's. The Richardson Study Panel suggested that the Chief, Army Reserve, be elevated to the rank of lieutenant general, but that a US Army Reserve Command be established as a four-star command. This proposal required removing the command of CONUS-based USAR units from FORSCOM and disestablishing the five CONUSAs. The panel further concluded that FORSCOM should have sufficient personnel to handle all mobilization planning and the land defense of CONUS. General Powell opposed the Richardson Panel's proposals. He rejected the establishment of a separate USAR command; it would violate FORSCOM's charter to provide forces to overseas commands that were trained and ready to fight as a combined arms team in joint and combined operations. Moreover, he protested that a USAR command violated the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which required that all operating forces be assigned to a combatant commander. Powell defended the role of the CONUSAs in integrating the USAR and ARNG into the Total Force. Elimination of the CONUSAs, he felt, would cause problems in the command and control of widely dispersed USAR units. The House Appropriations Committee recommended that the Secretary of the Army plan to increase the command and control authority of the CAR and also his role in formulating the FY 1991 budget. The divergent views on USAR command and control continued into FY 1990.
Manpower and Force Structure
The assigned strength of the Army's ready, standby and retired reserve components at the end of FY 1989 was 1,649,850. Of this total, the ARNG accounted for 467,086, the USAR for 594,464, and the retired reserves for 588,300. Total RC strength increased from the FY 1988 strength of 1,635,920. Guard strength increased from 464,308 in FY 1988, while the USAR declined from an FY 1988 strength of 597,392. The USAR's FY 1989 strength was divided as follows: 312,825 members in the selected reserve, 274,588 in the individual ready reserves, and 632 in the standby reserve. The FY 1989 ARNG end-strength consisted of 456,960 in a selected reserve status and 10,126 guardsmen in the IRR. The total RC shortfall from its authorized strength was 38,375 and was almost exclusively in the USAR, with shortfalls of 20,619 in paid drill status and 17,416 in the IRR. The ARNG was 340 under its FY 1989 authorized strength. In its demographic makeup, the ARNG was approximately 79 percent white and the USAR about 70 percent white; blacks constituted
just over 16 percent of the Guard and 25 percent of the USAR. Almost 93 percent of ARNG members were male, while the USAR had 80 percent males. Officers constituted almost 9 percent of the ARNG and 18 percent of the USAR; enlisted personnel were 89 percent and 80 percent, respectively, with warrant officers comprising the difference. Nearly 14 percent of the ARNG enlisted force and 11 percent of the USAR enlisted personnel did not have high school diplomas. Approximately 52 percent of ARNG officers and 81 percent of USAR officers were college graduates. The IRR reflected similar demographic patterns.
Projected RC strength beyond FY 1989 indicated that the Army would not realize its RC strength goals. Reducing over structure, improving force accounting, inactivating obsolete units, delaying unit activations and conversions, and modifying TOE and reducing T DA organizations were measures the Army contemplated to match authorized with actual end-strength more closely. In March 1989 the Vice Chief of Staff approved force structure reductions designed to align ARNG and USAR authorized with actual end-strength by FY 1995. Neither the ARNG 's nor the USAR's force structure allowance was fully funded in FY 1989; the USAR received only 92 percent of its TPU positions. Even though the budgeted shortage was only a small percentage of drill-pay strength, it was unevenly distributed by grade, skill, and geographical area and had a detrimental effect on RC readiness.
Strength alone was not a true indicator of the RC's value to the Army 's force structure. Fifty-two percent of the Army 's total combat force was in the ARNG and USAR. Of the Army 's 28 combat divisions, 10 8 infantry and 2 armored were in the ARNG, and 6 active divisions were assigned a roundout brigade from the RC (5 ARNG and 1 USAR). All of the Army 's 21 separate combat brigades were in the RC (18 ARNG; 3 USAR); 11 were infantry, 7 mechanized infantry, and 3 armored. The ARNG force structure also contained 18 field artillery brigades, 4 armored cavalry regiments, 2 separate armor brigades, 2 special forces groups, 2 air defense artillery brigades, 1 aviation brigade, and a separate infantry group (Alaskan Scouts), for a total of 179 maneuver battalions. During FY 1989 the number of ARNG armored cavalry regiments (ACR) was reduced to three when the 163d ACR of the Montana ARNG converted to the 163d Armored Brigade. Because of budget cuts, plans for activation or conversion of three ARNG and two USAR attack helicopter battalions were canceled.
The USAR contributed only 8 percent of the Army's total combat force structure in FY 1989, but it provided 27 percent of the Army's combat support, 44 percent of its combat service support, and 44 percent of the special operations forces. The USAR and ARNG had 62 percent of all combat support and combat service support assets. The USAR had all
twelve Army training divisions and two brigade-size training units. These training units would be transferred to TRADOC upon mobilization, but FORSCOM held peacetime responsibility for training and equipping them. The USAR also contained all Army military intelligence (strategic research) detachments. Of the Army's expected wartime needs, nearly 55 percent of the doctors and 76 percent of the nurses were relegated to the USAR. Certain wartime medical specialties, Judge Advocate General detachments, civil affairs units, and psychological operations units existed almost exclusively in the USAR. Army Reserve units assigned an early deployment role included 5 civil affairs commands, 3 medical brigades, 3 military police brigades, 2 engineer and 2 transportation brigades, and 1 signal command comparable to a brigade. The ARNG had 13 percent and the USAR 44 percent of all Army special operations forces.
Army mobilization plans also entailed the recall of individual reservists either to replace members of the active force who deployed or to provide individuals with specialized skills. These persons, members of the IRR, must be qualified and, if possible, preassigned. With a strength of approximately 275,000 in FY 1989, the USAR (IRR) consisted of soldiers who had not completed their military service obligation following active or ready reserve duty. Questions have been raised in recent years about the IRR's value as a mobilization asset. A GAO study of the IRR released in FY 1989 noted that the Army lacked current information on the residence and availability of more than 5 percent of the IRR pool. Others estimated that 5 to 7 percent of the IRR could not be located in an emergency, and it would be difficult to locate another 10 to 15 percent.
In FY 1987 the Army began its IRR Screening Program to determine the readiness and availability of the IRR for mobilization. Federal statute (10 US Code 271/672[b]), and DOD Directive 1215.6 required an IRR annual muster to active duty for one day to update records. Since the program's inception, more than 240,000 reservists have been screened. In FY 1988 approximately 187,231, or 62 percent of the total IRR pool of 293,000, were selected for screening. Less than 100,000, or 33.6 percent of the total pool, showed up for the muster. The Army took aggressive action in FY 1989 to track down those who did not comply. Because of funding limitations, the RC screened only 23 percent of the IRR in FY 1989. With a budget of about $9 million for FY 1989, the IRR Screening Program was carried out by the Army Reserve Personnel Center and the Army Recruiting Command. TRADOC was conducting a qualitative analysis of the skill qualification test data collected during screening. Despite a significant number of "no-shows," the exercise helped the Army update its mobilization data base and gave a clearer picture of IRR readiness and availability. The Army estimated that about 27,000 IRR members need skill retention training each year. In FY 1989 approximately twelve
thousand Army IRR members participated in skill retention or professional development training. Another four thousand IRR members performed active duty tours for special work.
In FY 1989, 14,708 members of the USAR participated in the Army Reserve's Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program . Members of the IMA program are distinct from the IRR and are part of the Selected Reserve. IMA members did not attend weekly drills, but attended twelve days of active duty training annually with the unit to which they would be assigned upon mobilization. In FY 1989, by soliciting IRR members for possible assignment to a TPU or IMA position, the Army Reserve Personnel Center assigned 4,823 IRR soldiers to TPUs and 3,469 to IMA positions. Finally, retirees are also subject to recall to active duty. From a pool of approximately 503,000 retirees who have been classified by age, physical condition, and skill, 124,000 received assignment orders to specific duty locations in the event of mobilization. They would free active duty soldiers for deployment to more critical assignments and fill shortages.
An important factor in sustaining RC readiness is the Full Time Support Program. This support took several forms: Active Component; Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel; Military Technicians (MTs); and Department of the Army civilians (DACs). The FTS assigned strength in FY 1989 was 86,484; the required number was 121,716. The ARNG had 76 percent of its required FTS and the USAR 60 percent. FTS personnel performed administrative, recruiting, planning, maintenance, and training functions and afforded part-time RC personnel the maximum time for training. The FTS program also allowed the RC to activate new units, modernize existing units, and assume new missions. The AGR consisted of full-time support by active Guard and Reserve members at units and headquarters. Active component augmentation included skilled officers and NCOs who served in selected staff positions in personnel, operations, plans, training, and logistics. Active component personnel were concentrated in key positions at the division level and in deployable ARNG units and some USAR CAPSTONE units. Full-time Department of the Army civilian technicians supported the RC from state headquarters to units and generally augmented unit maintenance programs.
The MTs were full-time civilian personnel who, as a condition of employment, were members of the USAR or ARNG and performed day-to-day sustainment tasks for the RC unit to which they were assigned. Congress took a keen interest in this program and imposed a hiring floor of 8,356 Mts. In July 1989 HQDA redefined a USAR TPU to liberalize the hiring of military technicians. In FY 1989, for budgetary reasons, the Army decided to hold AGR strength to its FY 1988 level and to reduce USAR MT strength by 397. Congress sanctioned modest increases for
The distribution of AGR personnel in the RC during the next few years would be guided by findings of the Full Time Support Task Force, established in FY 1988 by ODCSOPS. The task force continued into FY 1989 and reviewed ARNG/USAR staffing levels to revise criteria for FTS requirements. ARNG leaders, for example, believed that the number of MTs assigned to the Guard was inadequate to cope with the increased logistical requirements associated with more advanced weapons such as the Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter. T h e National Guard Bureau forecast a need for about eight thousand more technicians. Army leaders felt that limitations on FTS growth could hinder and possibly delay changes in the RC force structure, modernization , and assumption of new missions.
Recruitment and Retention
Manning RC units became increasingly difficult in view of regional shifts in population, a strong economy, and changing demographics. With the growing population of the sunbelt, RC units in that region were filled or near capacity, so recruiters were unable to exploit the manpower potential of the region. In other areas RC units had problems fulfilling recruiting and manning requirements as attrition rates in the RC reached historical highs in the early and mid-1980s. The unacceptably high rates of attrition were traced to conflicting personal and military obligations. Extended periods of training, such as Overseas Deployment Training or ARNG antidrug operations under state auspices, sometimes lasted six months. Reservists often were forced to choose between gainful employment and continued participation in RC units.
The RC tried to improve training, pay and benefits, and incentives. The ARNG expanded leadership training, improved sponsorship programs, established more realistic attrition reduction goals, and augmented family-oriented activities. The USAR inaugurated a revised promotion policy, employed consolidated promotion boards that allowed competition for promotion within geographic areas rather than just units, and adopted a new pay system. As the executive agent for the OSD's National Committee for Employer Support for the Guard and the Reserve (NCES-GR), the Army sought to encourage greater understanding among employers, families, and RC members during FY 1989. NCESGR's goal was to develop public backing of the RC and to enlist employer support through advertising and such volunteer programs as Mission One. In this program every ARNG armory and USAR center would be supported by a community organization or business. Other Army programs, the Total Army
Career Counseling Program and RC Transition Program, both conducted by TRADOC, encouraged enlistment in the RC and the retention of personnel.
Recruiting objectives and criteria for the ARNG and USAR were governed by the Total Army Enlisted Accession Plan. The ARNG's recruiting goal for FY 1989 was 77,736, a decrease from its FY 1988 objective of 81,644. The Guard sought 42,755 recruits with no prior service, with at least 89 percent of them high school graduates and no more than 9 percent in Test Category IV. The USAR's recruiting target for FY 1989 was 77,500, 74 fewer than the previous year. It hoped to attract 30,167 non-prior-service recruits with 90 percent high school graduates and a maximum of 10 percent in Test Category IV. Despite a shrinking pool of non-prior-service men and women (persons with 180 days or fewer of active duty and not MOS qualified), the ARNG fell short of its FY 1989 authorized strength of 457,300 by just 360. Its attrition rate for enlisted personnel in FY 1989 was 17.7 percent, the lowest in several years. The ARNG also obtained a 90 percent rate of non-prior-service enlistees with high school diplomas, and only 9 percent in Category IV.
The RC's ability to attract and retain personnel with prior military service was a matter of concern. The total RC reenlistment objective was 82,324: 34,981 for the ARNG and 47,333 for the USAR. Prior-service accessions were 35,571 for the ARNG and 44,056 for the USAR. For the USAR, FORSCOM also established a first-term reenlistment objective of 10,494, and actual reenlistment amounted to 9,460. The actual career reenlistment rate was 108.2 percent. To improve prior-service enlistment in the RC, the Army examined the possibility of training active component soldiers nearing the end of their enlistment for specific RC unit vacancies to reduce problems of MOs mismatch and subsequent retraining in the RC.
The RC succeeded in attracting new officers, yet it had substantial MOs shortages for wartime requirements. The number of officers who entered the RC from ROTC declined as the number of ROTC cadets commissioned into the active component increased in 1989. The recruitment of medical personnel into the RC was a critical problem in FY 1989. (See Table 7.)
Incentives to reduce its medical manpower deficit included a program that allowed nurses and doctors to substitute service in a teaching hospital for weekly drills. With a recruiting goal of 1,250 nurses in FY 1989, the US Army Reserve Army Nurse Corps (USAR ANC) exceeded its objective by recruiting 1,600 but still had a mobilization shortfall of several thousand. Other incentives were stipend support to continue professional training and bonuses. A disincentive was the requirement that all nurses who entered active or reserve service in FY 1989, regardless of
|Operating Room Nurse||
|Licensed Practical Nurse||
Source: Reserve Component Programs FY 1989, p. 110.
prior civilian experience and skills, begin as second lieutenants. The Army deleted the requirement that associate degree and diploma nurses must have one year of full-time work experience before joining the RC, and the requirement for six months of full-time employment during the year preceding application was changed to allow part-time employment. During FY 1989 Dorothy Pocklington became the first USAR nurse and the first female USAR officer to become brigadier general as an Assistant to the Chief, ANC, for Mobilization and Reserve Affairs.
The National Army Medical Department Augmentation Detachment (NAAD) offered flexible training for RC physicians and nurses in critical specialties who were unable to train regularly with a unit. Physicians and nurses could be members of the NAAD and assigned to an understrength USAR unit anywhere in the country. At the end of FY 1989, 250 medical doctors and 209 nurses were members of the NAAD.
To help RC recruitment, Congress extended the Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits to the RC in FY 1985. By the end of FY 1989, 61,722 ARNG and 38,152 USAR members, or 34 percent of the ARNG and 53
percent of the USAR eligible to apply, had applied for benefits. For RC members it was a general entitlement program for which participants must meet specific terms of enlistment, whereas active component soldiers had to contribute to their benefits. In addition, benefits for reservists could be applied only to college undergraduate programs, while active component personnel could use them for undergraduate, graduate, vocational, technical, or apprentice educational programs. Vocational training benefits for reservists were expected by FY 1991.
Full-time support for the RC's recruiting efforts was provided by AGR soldiers, civilian recruiting specialists (USAR only), and AGR In-Service Recruiters. Under the control of state adjutants general, 2,457 AGR recruiters supported the ARNG. The USAR had 1,975 AGR and 58 civilian recruiters and some support from active Army recruiters. The 177 In-Service Recruiters complemented those of the ARNG and USAR by assisting soldiers leaving active duty and joining RC units. While the long-term solution to the RC's recruiting difficulties suggested relocating units near population density, congressional approval was doubtful. As a temporary solution, the Army sought to increase its AGR recruiters in more difficult recruiting areas.
Approximately 10.8 percent of the FY 1989 budget was earmarked for the reserve components. The ARNG operations and maintenance budget was $1.83 billion, of which $179 million was allotted to programmed training time. The total Department of the Army funds appropriated for ARNG procurement in FY 1989 was $1.436 billion. Approximately $440 million of this amount was for modern equipment that included 178 M1 Abrams tanks. In FY 1989 Congress appropriated $248 million for the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA). Complementing the regular RC budget, the NGREA was designated by Congress to purchase specific equipment, with any remainder to be used at the ARNG's discretion to acquire equipment that would enhance readiness. To reduce the backlog of deferred equipment maintenance, Congress also provided $111 million to the ARNG to acquire spare parts. To fund new construction and maintain and repair existing Guard facilities, Congress appropriated $229 million. Although the ARNG completed fifty major construction projects and the USAR sixteen in FY 1989, the appropriation made only a small dent in the estimated $2.66 billion ARNG construction backlog. The lack of adequate facilities for training and storage of equipment was exacerbated by the growing backlog in maintenance and repair funding.
Congress appropriated $3.299 billion in FY 1989 for pay ($1.849 billion), training ($280 million), administrative support ($1.128 billion), and
educational benefits ($40 million). Members of the ARNG trained twelve weekends per year and two weeks in the summer, with weekend pay ranging from $21 to $200 depending on rank and longevity. During 1988, for the first time, social security was withheld from drill pay. A provision of the 1988 Defense Authorization Act that became effective in FY 1989 stipulated that RC members injured on active duty would receive more liberal incapacitation pay.
The operations and maintenance budget for the USAR was $831 million, and approximately $446 million of that was slated for the training TPU forces. The USAR received $30 million of the $256 million provided by the NGREA. Congress appropriated $86 million for USAR construction projects, but a construction backlog of $1.91 billion remained at the end of FY 1989. USAR personnel costs for FY 1989 were $2.241 billion: $1.387 billion for reservists in organized units, $24 million for Imams, $46 million for IRRs, and the remainder absorbed by the costs of active duty reserve augmentation, incentives, and recruiting.
For the past several years the USAR had experienced numerous difficulties with pay procedures. In July 1988, 91 percent of USAR personnel were paid correctly, a 38 percent improvement over a six-month period. For further improvement, the US Army Finance and Accounting Center fielded two new systems to provide RC soldiers timely and accurate pay while on short tours of active duty-the Short Tour Pay System for low-volume payroll offices, and the Reserve Component Automated Pay System Support for high-volume payroll off ices. The former is a computerized system that replaced manual pay procedures and was fielded during December 1988-February 1989. Deployment of the second system began in January 1989. The 6th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, conducted in August 1988, recommended more than seventy changes in RC pay and compensation. Many of the proposals were expensive; one would allow reservists to draw reduced retirement pay after twenty years rather than wait until age sixty. The Bush administration submitted six recommendations as separate bills to Congress in FY 1989. They included a pay increase for reserve medical officers while on active duty, a test of new incentive pay and educational benefits to curb personnel turbulence, and pay for IRR members recalled for one day to update records. Congressional action was not expected until FY 1990.
Readiness is a combination of manpower, training, and logistics. RC success in FY 1989 in meeting many manpower requirements and attracting better qualified men and women helped raise RC readiness. In 1985 only 60 percent of ARNG units had an acceptable readiness level (C-3 or
better). Unit readiness, as measured by the availability of personnel, was 80 percent by mid-FY 1989. Major combat units that reported low readiness levels included the 50th Armored Division (New Jersey ARNG), the 163d Armored Brigade (Montana ARNG), the 205th Infantry Brigade (Minnesota USAR), and the 27th Infantry Brigade (New York ARNG). These four units were being activated or reorganized in FY 1989. The 205th and the 27th suffered organizational turbulence because of their conversion from separate to organic infantry brigades. The 205th Infantry Brigade lacked sufficient equipment and training funds. Many 27th Infantry Brigade members were in a nondeployable status or not MOs qualified. The brigade's organic elements were widely dispersed and had few opportunities to conduct weapons qualification and coherent unit training. By mid-FY 1989, 1,806 of the 2,777 RC units under FORSCOM had achieved a readiness status of C-3 or better.
Throughout the year HQDA and FORSCOM devoted special attention to improving the readiness of the 200,000 Presidential Call-up Package. In addition to efforts to bring units to a minimum of C-3, H Q DA authorized substitution of higher rated units for lower rated ones. For the first time, assignment of parent active component unit equipment to USAR units was also authorized to improve their readiness. Six of ten ARNG divisions had achieved a readiness status of C-2 or C-3 by FY 1989. Nevertheless, all six divisions experienced some personnel shortages and insufficient levels of MOs qualification. Although available for deployment, the divisions would require twenty-eight to fifty training days before deployment. The four lowest-rated divisions were undergoing force modernization or major reorganization. Of the RC's 21 separate combat brigades (18 ARNG, 3 USAR), 13 were deployable (C-3 or better), and 6 had a roundout status. All of the deployable brigades would require twenty-five to forty postmobilization training days to prepare for deployment. Corrective actions brought a noticeable improvement to the ARNG's equipment readiness rate in FY 1989. In the third quarter the fully mission capable (FMC) equipment readiness rate of the Guard attained the Army 's goal of 90 percent. The ARNG's progress was largely attributable to Army Materiel Command (AMC) support and increased emphasis on unit maintenance by state maintenance managers.
RC logistics readiness was enhanced by distribution of the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS); the ARNG and USAR received 50 percent of the TACCS issued in FY 1989. A Reserve Unit Priority System (RUPS) equipment module that improved the ability of active and RC commands and agencies to manage equipment inventories and readiness had been developed based on a similar Marine Corps model and was being installed in HQDA and FORSCOM.
In the USAR all remaining armored battalions replaced M48A5 tanks with M60A3 tanks. Two aviation assault battalions received UH-60 helicopters to replace aging UH-1 aircraft, and three battalions were equipped with the AH-1S version of the Cobra helicopter. USAR units received additional M113A3 armored personnel carriers, five-ton trucks, and night-vision goggles. Budget restrictions in FY 1989 delayed the acquisition of additional automatic weapons and field kitchens for the ARNG and Bradley fighting vehicles and squad automatic weapons for the USAR. Major equipment shortages in the ARNG included five-ton trucks, tactical radios, maintenance and support equipment, chemical defense and decontaminating equipment, helicopters, and aviation night-vision devices. The USAR lacked authorized helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, modern trucks, night-vision devices, generators, communications equipment, test and diagnostic equipment, and materials handling equipment (MHE). RC force modernization was also supported by the congressional appropriation of $286 million for RC procurement separate from procurement funds in the Army budget.
Slack maintenance was a vexing problem in the RC, evident during annual summer training and overseas deployment training (ODT) in Honduras and Panama in FY 1989. Poor maintenance led to cancellation of some training and operational activities. Setting an ARNG maintenance agenda, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in FY 1988 set a goal of 90 percent for equipment readiness in every ARNG unit. He stressed preventive maintenance and proper training for maintenance personnel. The fluid nature of the AirLand battlefield necessitated maintenance on the move. The ARNG formulated a concept to train General Support (GS) maintenance units at specialized regional training sites. Many training activities in the continental United States were modeled on USAREUR's Equipment Maintenance Center (EMC) at Kaiserslautern, West Germany, established in 1988. Intended as a Pershing missile maintenance facility, the site was modified in early 1989 for repair of heavy equipment by RC maintenance units. Congress determined that DOD should explore more peacetime overseas missions for the RC to enhance their training and readiness. In FY 1988 the Army submitted a concept for
In FY 1989 the following six HEMCOs rotated to Europe on an experimental basis: the 115th Heavy Maintenance Company (Utah), the 307th Heavy Maintenance Company (Kentucky), the 665th Heavy Maintenance Company (South Dakota), the 1071st Heavy Maintenance Company (Michigan), the 3670th Heavy Maintenance Company (Oregon), and the 238th Heavy Maintenance Company (USAR) from Texas. The six companies tallied 38,888 productive maintenance man-hours during FY 1989 and saved approximately $700,000 in labor costs to USAREUR. The Army envisioned the participation of twelve RC HEMCOs in FY 1990 and a possible permanent annual RC rotation to support USAREUR's maintenance mission. The Em’s permanent complement of 29 personnel included 20 AGR personnel (9 USAR and 11 ARNG). The EMC became a permanent facility on 5 May. EMC training sites in the continental United States were also staffed by AGR personnel and by active component augmentation assigned to the ARNG and USAR. AMC managed the maintenance workload at the stateside sites. Each RC GS maintenance unit benefited during its annual training by working as a unit in a fixed maintenance facility using its assigned organizational equipment and also performing a meaningful maintenance mission. The construction of RC regional training sites at Tobyhanna and Sacramento Army Depots for the maintenance of high-technology equipment was completed in FY 1989. Regional sites at Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Camp Dodge, Iowa; Camp Roberts, California; Camp Blanding, Florida; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Camp Custer, Michigan; and Gowen Field, Idaho, also were completed in FY 1989. Regional training sites for aviation maintenance and new equipment training and sustainment training on the Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS) were opened in FY 1989. Throughout the RC older training facilities needed repair and modernization. Facilities utilization at USAR training centers averaged 200 percent. A backlog of $2.3 billion existed for repair and replacement of overburdened facilities.
RC readiness to assume its wartime missions rested largely upon pre-mobilization training for both individuals and units. Army leaders and Congress identified several detractors, which included limited time to train, chronic administrative distractions due to heavy reporting loads and
multiple inspections, frequent unit reorganizations, extensive mismatching of Moses (27.3 percent in July 1989), limited access to local training areas, and a lack of equipment. HQDA's goal was a minimum of 80 percent of an RC member's drill time devoted to mission-essential training, while informal Army surveys revealed that the time varied from 10 to 90 percent. A major training detractor for both Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) was a chain of command insensitive to the negative consequences caused by multiple administrative requirements imposed upon units. The GAO recommended that the Army introduce a full-time trainer in RC companies to stress training for mission-essential tasks. Congress responded to the RC's relaxed response with the requirement that soldiers take a Skill Qualification Test (SQT) every two years, and Army leaders promised faithful compliance.
Recognizing the time and funding constraints imposed on training, the Army formulated a comprehensive RC Training Strategy. The Reserve Component Training Strategy Task Force (RCTSTF) began work in October 1987 and addressed the five essential dimensions of training- individual, leader, and collective training; training support; and management. The RCTSTF agreed that RC soldiers and units would train to the same standard as the active component but on fewer Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks. The task force made fifty-two recommendations; the most important included the need of the RC to attain and maintain an 85 percent MOs qualification rate in battalions, to obtain proficient command and staff at all echelons, and to achieve proficiency in battalions on mission essential task lists (METLs) by an emphasis on unit combat operations. General Vuono approved the RC Training Strategy concept in August 1988. ODCSOPS formulated the concept into the RC Training Development Action Plan (RCTDAP), which Vuono approved on 18 May 1989. The Army bracketed $35.5 million in its FY 1989 budget for the plan. On 9 January 1989, ODCSOPS formed the RC Training Integration Division (DAMO-TRR) in its Training Directorate as the Army Staff 's focal point for the RCTDAP.
Nearly half of the RCTDAP recommendations were initiated before the plan was formally approved. Late in FY 1988 General Vuono directed the Deputy Commander, Command and General Staff College (C&GSC), to review reserve component officer education. The resultant task force completed its work in FY 1989 and recommended closer alignment between educational requirements and promotions, sharpening the focus on wartime skills, and making better use of the latest educational technology to compensate for limited training opportunities. Most of the task force's recommendations were incorporated into the RCTDAP. In May 1989 the Army published the FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training. It constituted the first comprehensive guide
Reflecting recent changes in NCO training and education in the active force, the ARNG began to adopt the new RC NCO Education System in FY 1988. By FY 1989 the Guard conducted RC-PLDC and Phase 1 of RC-BNCOC training at state military academies and five regional NCO academies. The regional academies were at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; Leesburg Weekend Training Site, South Carolina; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Camp Ashland, North Dakota; and Camp Williams, Utah. An arrangement between the NGB and FORSCOM directed the CONUSAs to manage Phase II of BNCOC and ANCOC training for the ARNG. During FY 1989 leadership training became a prominent element in all RC training. Several issues urged by the RC Training Strategy Task Force that pertained to RC leadership training were selected for accelerated implementation in FY 1989-transferring funds to enable an additional 1,500 USAR lieutenants to attend the Officer Basic Course, linking the RC NCO education system to training required for promotion to the appropriate grade, establishment of a Senior Sergeants Staff Course, and concentrated training for key battle staff positions. Early in 1989 TRADOC directed service schools to implement a two-week course to provide branch-specific training for RC company commander designees who had not trained in the branch of the unit to which they were assigned. The first course began at the end of FY 1989.
The RCTDAP stressed realistic tactical training, particularly for CAPSTONE and roundout units. WARTRAIN, which FORSCOM implemented at the start of FY 1989 as defined in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE, 1 August 1988, emphasized increased involvement of wartime commanders in training CAPSTONE-aligned combat units. During FY 1989, 45 percent (2,028) of the ARNG and USAR units trained with wartime commands during annual training. Twenty percent (874) of the USAR units trained with CAPSTONE commands during inactive duty training. The Dedicated Training Association (DTA) Program, an essential component of WARTRAIN, nurtured year-round training assistance between a host active unit and an affiliated reserve unit. The new FORSCOM regulation discontinued two earlier programs: the Partnership and Counterpart Programs. WARTRAIN's companion program, CORTRAIN, fostered similar training opportunities for corps commanders and staffs of active and reserve components. The Counterpart Contingency Training Program, sponsored by the unified commands, allowed higher echelon commanders of major Army commands and pertinent USAR commands to familiarize with mutual wartime missions and requirements. The
Tactical training under RCTDAP was to be as realistic and mission oriented as possible. Reserve components were encouraged to use the Battlefield Operating System (BOS), a computer-generated exercise that simulated the tempo, scope, and uncertainty of the battlefield. The best training, however, was field training such as annual training at combat training centers and Overseas Deployment Training (ODT). To enhance training further, the Army realigned the Maneuver Area and Maneuver Training Commands at each CONUSA to establish a single Maneuver Exercise Command (MEC) on a trial basis. The test MEC, established at Fourth US Army, was organized into a headquarters element, a corps/division exercise detachment, and five training exercise detachments without any increase in manning. Projections for a permanent MEC program included several hundred additional spaces.
By the end of FY 1989 two ARNG infantry divisions (IDs), the 38th ID of Indiana and the 28th ID of Pennsylvania, had participated in the Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The 28th Division began its participation in the BCTP in November 1988 with in-house seminars. In April and May 1989 the division conducted two weekend Command Post Exercises (CPXes) keyed to the forthcoming WARFIGHTER exercise in August. The WARFIGHTER phase began during the 28th's fifteen- day annual training exercise at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. In this phase the division's battle staff engaged in realistic decision-making akin to a fluid battlefield situation.
During FY 1989 the Army instituted a new mobilization evaluation program that featured three types of exercises-Selected Reserve call-ups, mobilization station exercises, and CSS exercises. OPTIMAL FOCUS exercises tested the mobilization ability of Selected Reserve individuals and units by notifying 10 percent of those units subject to the Presidential 200,000 call-up. OPTIMAL FOCUS 89, conducted by FORSCOM from 3 through 5 March, alerted 54 RC units (17 ARNG and 37 USAR). CALL FORWARD exercises, scheduled to begin in FY 1990, would test the ability of mobilization stations to handle the surge in personnel and equipment during a call-up. Elements of three USAR training divisions conducted Mobilization Army Training Center (MATC) exercises in FY 1989. Other training exercises addressed the readiness of combat service support forces. With 70 percent of the Army's total medical strength in the RC, the USAR 8th Medical Brigade, the largest Army medical brigade in the continental United States, participated in Exercise ORCHID SAGE 89 at Fort Drum, New York, between 17 and 22 August 1989. For most of the 6,000
troops who took part, ORCHID SAGE 89 was their first field test of medical equipment and combat medical support procedures. Four deployable medical systems were used in the exercise.
Although eight ARNG and twenty-four USAR medical units received DEPMEDS new equipment training by the end of FY 1989, only two DEPMEDS sets were distributed to the RC through FY 1989, and they were at ARNG medical regional training sites. The lack of DEPMEDS among USAR medical units was a critical equipment deficiency. The Army planned to provide twenty-five DEPMEDS sets to the ARNG and ninety-four sets to the USAR by FY 1996, but expected to distribute only five sets to the USAR between 1991 and 1993. Many RC units would not receive complete DEPMEDS sets until mobilization. MEDEX 89, which involved nearly three thousand active and reserve components medical personnel from eighteen states and Puerto Rico, tested their medical capabilities for wartime conditions.
To improve individual MOs proficiency levels and to reduce the burden of individual training on RC units, TRADOC devised computerized courses which could be taken locally that focused on mission-essential wartime tasks and Skill Qualification Tests. The Training Reserve and Action Instructional Network System (TRAINS), formerly the Reserve Component Instructional Information Management System (RIMS), was incorporated into the Army's distributed training strategy. TRAINS was tested in September 1989 with transmission of a two-week language course from the Defense Language Institute to Fort Stewart and Fort Campbell where RC members participated in the course.
During FY 1989 ODT by the RC developed mutual training and planning relations with active component counterparts, enhanced readiness, and demonstrated the Army 's resolve to support US commitments overseas. ODT began in 1976 and grew to 3,364 units, or 55,532 reservists, by FY 1987. In FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget constraints reduced the program; 47 percent of the ARNG 's requests for ODT we r e rejected. Reduced training money resulted in the cancellation of REFORGER in FY 1989 and a decrease in the number of reservists taking part in ODT. Reserve component units participated in numerous security assistance and humanitarian relief operations that qualified as ODT. T hey included the Expanded Relations Program in the US Army Western Command (WESTCOM) that employed RC engineer and civil affairs elements and humanitarian assistance in Jamaica in the wake of Hurricane Gilbert, as well as specialized engineer projects elsewhere in the Caribbean. In Southwest Asia, a small number of reserve engineer units participated in the Central Command's Exercise BRIGHTSTAR, and the USAR 412th Engineer Command sent elements to Egypt, Somalia, and Jordan.
Extensive ODT was carried out in Latin America, especially Honduras. Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 89 fostered road-building projects in that country between February and July 1989 that involved approximately eleven thousand reservists. Exercises FUERTES CAMINOS 89 North and South, conducted in north-central Honduras, entailed the rotation of RC heavy engineer battalion-size task forces on overlapping seventeen-day training tours. Participating units were assigned to either Task Force 16, formed from the 16th Engineer Group of the Ohio ARNG, or to Task Force 164 under the control of the 164th Engineer Group of the North Dakota ARNG. ARNG units worked on a stretch of highway that would eventually link the Honduran capital, Tegucigalpa, with the Caribbean coast. The exercise included a medical readiness exercise, the provision of medical support for Army troops at Camp Tejas, and medical civic action programs. Other RC elements established shower and laundry points, water purification, and POL supply points. Active component forces also participated in both FUERTES CAMINOS North and South. Other USAR medical units trained in Panama and Bolivia in FY 1989.
Because of the controversy surrounding American military assistance programs in Central America, a suit was brought by several governors who contested the authority of the federal government to deploy the ARNG overseas for training. On 6 December 1988, a three-judge panel of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis, Missouri, nullified a provision of the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Act that prohibited state governors from interfering, except in times of state emergencies, with Army plans to send ARNG units overseas for training. The appellate court reversed the earlier decision of the district court and upheld the right of the governor of Minnesota to refuse participation by his state's militia in training exercises in Central America. The Minnesota governor contended that the purpose of the deployments was to support the Contra-led insurgency against Nicaragua and that Article 1 of the Constitution gave the states supremacy in training their militias. Despite the ruling, the governor of North Dakota, whose state was under the jurisdiction of the 8th Circuit, supported the Army's authority to dispatch units of the 164th Engineer Group (ARNG) to Honduras in February 1989. On 28 June 1989, however, the full 8th Circuit Court of Appeals voted seven to two to confirm the constitutionality of the 1986 law that authorized DOD to order ARNG units to train overseas. A ruling by the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, moreover, rejected a similar argument propounded by the governor of Massachusetts.
The enlarged antidrug participation of both the active and reserve components in FY 1989 stemmed from provisions of the 1989 Defense
Authorization Act that made DOD the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of air and sea transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1982 amended the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which prohibited active component forces from exercising domestic police powers and authorized them to support local police forces through the loan of equipment, personnel support, training, and sharing of information. The activities of ARNG units operating under state jurisdiction were not restricted by the prohibitions of the 1878 act. Some states have used National Guard units to eradicate marijuana and interdict drug traffic since 1977. The Army and Air National Guard have supported federal law enforcement agencies in similar tasks since 1983.
In FY 1989 Congress appropriated $400 million for DOD antidrug operations and earmarked $40 to $60 million for the ARNG. During 1988 forty-four states submitted plans to the NGB for a more active role by the ARNG in the war against drugs. By early FY 1989 thirty-one states and the District of Columbia were employing ARNG elements to support local law enforcement agencies, usually for transportation or the loan of equipment. California submitted the largest request for ARNG support, about $20 million. Operation BORDER RANGER II, conducted during a thirty-day period in FY 1989, involved ground and air elements of the California National Guard in cooperation with federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities (LEAs) from six counties. The ARNG provided an aviation battalion of more than thirty helicopters to help county sheriffs locate drug smugglers along the Mexican border. BORDER RANGER II was a sustained operation that addressed all modes of illegal drug traffic in a specified geographic area. The operation was marred by the loss of a UH-1H Iroquois helicopter and three members of the ARNG; the aircraft crashed after hitting a power line while observing a suspicious vehicle.
Florida guardsmen were used on a variety of antidrug missions. ARNG members were called to active duty for as long as six months to assist in the inspection of planes and ships in South Florida. Members of the 705th Military Police Company aided both state authorities and the US Customs Service in searching for illegal drugs at the Port of Miami. The number of days of active duty service was limited to 179 to avoid recalled guardsmen from being counted against congressionally mandated active component strength ceilings. Some DOD officials argued that the Customs Service misused the ARNG by primarily assigning them manual labor tasks.
Guard units from eleven states worked with the US Border Patrol and the US Customs Air Service to identify and track illegal ground and air drug traffic in FY 1989. Guard units also provided aerial and infrared photo reconnaissance support and ground-to-air radar along the US southern border and in the Caribbean. In urban areas the National Guard
furnished military police for traffic control, information processing assistance, aircraft for command and control, and specialized training to local law enforcement agencies. Forty-seven states have loaned specialized equipment, such as night-vision devices and communications equipment, to law enforcement agencies. During FY 1989 some seven thousand Army and Air National Guard personnel from fifty-three states and territories supported 1,811 drug interdiction and eradication operations. The value of drugs and other contraband seized exceeded $12 billion. Approximately 4 million marijuana plants, 46,000 pounds of processed marijuana, 10,000 pounds of cocaine, and 39 pounds of heroin were seized.
At the end of FY 1989, despite improvements in manning, equipment, and training, the RC faced an uncertain future influenced by strategic changes, fiscal austerity, and nagging doubts by some critics of the RC's competency. The possibility that USAR and ARNG would acquire more missions created an uneasy tension between ends and resources. The possibilities of either a reduction or an increase in the nation's investment in the RC gave further urgency to the challenges the RC would face in the 1990s. Among the most immediate challenges were consolidating and building upon the initiatives started in FY 1989, maintaining authorized strengths with quality soldiers, ensuring that RC members were MOs qualified, improving unit training, and modernizing both USAR and ARNG units.
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