Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1970


Force Development

Fiscal year 1970 was a period of appreciable adjustment in Army force posture. Most of the elements withdrawn from Vietnam were inactivated, as were other supporting units of various types in the United States. Strength in terms of active Army division forces worldwide fell from 19 2/3 to 17 1/3. There were corresponding reductions in military and civilian strengths as the Army sought to cut expenditures by $1 billion as part of a $3 billion reduction imposed upon the Department of Defense in October 1969.

Priorities were assessed worldwide and personnel reductions were keyed to base closures, adjustments in force levels, and modifications in priorities. A total of 17,441 direct hire civilian employees, both U.S. and foreign nationals, supporting military functions were released.

In December 1969 the President directed that the number of U.S. personnel in certain foreign countries be reduced by 10 percent from the level of June 30, 1969. The Army's target was established at 3,093 military personnel (excluding Vietnam) and 2,321 U.S. civilian employees, to be completed by June 1970. Some of the personnel released as a result of the October 1969 action were credited to this reduction.

In March 1970 the Secretary of Defense announced military and civilian manpower reductions within the United States. These reductions were geared to base closures, mission changes, lower training loads, and other actions that would make it possible for the Army to achieve its programmed fiscal year 1970 end strength. This step involved reductions of 9,055 military and 6,414 civilian personnel. Headquarters activities shared in the personnel cuts. The departmental headquarters and certain class II field activities were assessed a 15 percent reduction, although in many instances the mission and work load remained unchanged despite the reduced staffing.

At the same time that mission and support activity resources were decreasing, there was an increase in the Army's contribution to federal programs to alleviate domestic problems and provide opportunities to the disadvantaged. Among these were the President's Stay-in-School Campaign and the program for summer employment of youth. The manpower and funds required to support


these and other important programs had to be absorbed within the diminishing resource levels authorized to the Department of the Army.

The downward personnel trends emphasized the importance of manpower management. Priorities and allocations were under close review to insure that only essential functions and activities were continued.


Changes in personnel and fund authorizations, as well as in oversea commitments and the nature of external threats, give mobilization and contingency planning their evolutionary character. Various mixtures and sizes of military forces must be applied against existing or potential menaces and related to various locations around the world today and in the future.

In October 1969, new instructions were issued on the planning, programming, and budgeting system for the military services which introduced new procedures for developing the Five Year Defense Program. The projected availability of funds is used as the starting point in developing future programs, and the services, the joint Chiefs of Staff, and separate agencies are given greater latitude in developing forces and materiel and supporting programs within the fiscal guidance. As the fiscal year closed, the Army was operating in the first annual cycle of the new system and there were indications that the development schedules of several Army plans would have to be changed.

The contingency planning process starts in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, with the joint Chiefs of Staff assigning major commanders to plan for certain contingencies. The major forces available for planning are listed in this document and in the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, and include only existing forces. Both plans specify the contingencies for which either partial or full mobilization may be required. Commanders in turn list force requirements which may become the basis for mobilization planning.

The heart of contingency planning is the joint Chiefs of Staff deployment reporting system, an automatic data processing system that facilitates emergency deployment or redeployment actions, one that is integrated into the worldwide military command and control system, in which the Army station is the Army Operations Center System. The deployment reporting system displays data for each type force required by a commander in a time-phased force deployment listing; provides the Army capability by unit to support the requirement; determines transportation requirements;


computes resupply requirements; and determines force routing of the unit.

The mobilization planning concept was recently redefined. A new annex, Force Mobilization Planning Guidance, was being added to the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, incorporating guidance and direction needed by major commands to prepare their force mobilization plans to support contingency plans. Two major appendixes list mobilization, deployment, or redeployment data for units of all components, and U.S. Army, Europe, requirements and capabilities.


The methods and techniques of managing Army installations were advanced significantly during the year as a result of the findings and recommendations of an Army team that studied the operation of continental U.S. installations in the light of their support missions and investigated ways of improving them. The study disclosed that extensive differences had developed in installation staff organization—differences that were wide enough to invalidate comparisons of management techniques and program effectiveness. It was apparent that a standard organization with uniform titles and duties for principal managers was required if installation management was to be improved. The Army Staff developed and put into effect a standard organizational structure for industrial and community activities common to Army installations. Modifications were included to permit adaptations to combat units, schools, training centers, and other activities located on an installation. These modifications defer to considerations of economy by requiring Army tenant units to perform self support to the degree that is possible without inhibiting their primary functions and missions. By the year's close, thirty-eight installations were prepared to open the new fiscal year under the new standard structure, and other commands would be added as modifications were developed suitable to their individual situations.

An equipment survey program was established during the year under which equipment authorization and use in table of distribution and allowance units would be analyzed on-site at Army installations. A Defense Department requirement that major equipment authorizations be reviewed periodically was incorporated in the new survey program.

Training and Schooling

As a result of withdrawals from Vietnam and changes in fiscal year 1970 manpower programs, the Army's need for new soldiers


diminished. The lower training requirement, coupled with fiscal constraints, dictated a corresponding reduction in the training base structure. Beginning in December 1969, the number of basic combat training companies was reduced from 560 to 460; infantry advanced individual training companies were reduced from 110 to 80 in January 1970. As a result of these and related reductions, training centers at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, were closed while operations at Fort Gordon, Georgia, Fort McClellan, Alabama, Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Lewis, Washington, were curtailed. Further training base adjustments were in prospect for fiscal year 1971.

For those who enter military service with less than a fifth grade reading ability, a six-week Army preparatory training program is conducted at all basic combat training centers. Classes are conducted for 6 hours daily, with 120 hours devoted to reading, writing, and English, and 60 hours to social studies, citizenship, and arithmetic. Trainees achieving fifth grade equivalency by the third week move out of the program into regular basic combat training; others remain for the full six weeks. Over 23,000 trainees have entered the program since it began in April 1968. Of this number, over 15,000 were reading at the fifth grade level by the end of three weeks. Another 3,400 achieved the goal in six weeks, while the same number failed to reach the desired goal in the allotted period.

Based on field commanders' comments and a personal visit to Vietnam, the commanding general of the Continental Army Command found that there were certain areas in combat arms advanced individual training that required emphasis. Initial consideration of extending this training to ten weeks (from the existing nine weeks for infantry and eight for other combat arms trainees) was dropped because of budgetary and manpower constraints, and it was implemented on a pilot basis for infantry trainees only. The test was conducted at Fort McClellan from May to December 1969. In the initial course a twelve-day field training exercise was substituted for the standard ninety-hour exercise of the nine-week program. The purpose was to apply all training given in the early stages and prepare the participants for the continuous field duty that they would experience in Vietnam. Since training motivation was difficult to maintain over the extended period, and because of budget and manpower constraints, the program was cut back to nine weeks with a seven-day field exercise. The new program was instituted with the training cycle that began on February 24, 1970.

Training with the M16 rifle was introduced in March 1965 in


infantry advanced individual training at Fort Gordon. By April 1967 all live firing in Vietnam-oriented infantry training had been converted from the M14 to the M16 rifle, and in February 1968 full conversion was approved subject to the gradual availability of weapons following priority shipment to Vietnam. By March 1970 the last M14's were phased out and the M16's were in general use.

In September 1968 the Army Chief of Staff directed that foreign weapons training be integrated into Army programs, and by August 1969 this order had been carried out. In basic combat training the program consists of an orientation, a static display of the Russian AK47 and six other principal small arms used by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, and a training film covering the nomenclature, functioning, and tactical employment of these weapons. In advanced individual training the program varies, from familiarization instruction on loading and unloading procedures and live firing demonstrations of the AK47 to illustrate its selective firing capability and cyclic rate, to "crack and thump" training using the AK47 intermixed with U.S. weapons.

One technique that has had considerable impact on Army training concepts, manpower management, and the Army's ability to meet its important requirements in the E-5 and E-6 grades is the skill development base program. The purpose is to train individuals so that they will perform satisfactorily in their initial duty assignment; this instruction comes right after basic combat and advanced individual training and normally lasts twenty-one to twenty-four weeks. During fiscal year 1970 about 16,000 enlisted men were graduated from forty-five courses and promoted to either E-5 or E-6 under the program. Reports from commanders in Vietnam indicated that these men were doing well in combat.

In the field of military logistics, attention was centered on increasing the number of trained logistic personnel in the Army and insuring that skills were properly utilized with regard to Vietnam. Officer and enlisted courses were structured to meet a continuing need throughout the Pacific region for personnel trained in inventory control and depot operations. On a longer range basis, steps were being taken to develop a rotation and training base for the more critical logistic skills.

There was an increase in adviser training in the year. The Vietnam Training Center of the Foreign Service Institute trained selected majors to be district senior advisers in a tailored 18-week course, a companion to the 33-week province senior adviser course.

Aviation training output continued at a high level during the year. Almost 7,000 active Army pilots were trained, as were 207


U.S. Marine Corps and 163 foreign military students. And in October 1969 the Army also began to give helicopter pilot training at continental U.S. bases to Republic of Vietnam Air Force personnel, in a program designed to produce over 1,000 qualified pilots by June 1971.

In the field of schooling, the Continental Army Command began system engineering all officer candidate school (OCS) courses to eliminate repetition of subjects given during pre-OCS training or officer basic courses. Studies were in progress to determine whether advanced individual training was necessary prior to OCS, and whether OCS could be cut from twenty-three to eighteen weeks and all graduates sent to a basic officer course. Manpower cuts in the coming two fiscal years will require that one of the OCS schools be closed.

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps continued to be the largest and most economical source of new officers for both the regular Army and the Army Reserve. During fiscal year 1970, fifteen new host institutions began enrolling students in the ROTC program. Three institutions—Harvard and Boston Universities and Dartmouth College—elected to discontinue the program during the same period. In addition, the senior ROTC program at Allen Military Academy was terminated because the institution will no longer conduct instruction at the college level. Opening enrollments were down 41,000 over the previous year; over half of the decline was attributable to the conversion of the ROTC basic course from required to elective status at thirty-nine host institutions. The remainder of the decrease could probably be attributed to reduced draft pressure, talk of an all-volunteer Army, and antiwar, antimilitary activity. Dissident activity directed against ROTC increased considerably over the previous year; there were 346 incidents as compared with 85 in 1969. About half of 166 incidents that occurred in the period May 1-23, for example, involved acts of violence such as riot, arson, bombing, and assault.

The Army announced the award of 1,242 four-year scholarships to selected high school graduates in April 1970. These along with two- and three-year scholarships that were to be allocated in the summer of 1970 would bring the Army scholarship ceiling up to its authorized 5,500 level. The ROTC program produced 16,581 officers in fiscal year 1970.

During the year the Army Command and General Staff College established co-operative advanced degree programs with the University of Kansas, Kansas State University, and the University of Missouri (Kansas City). The Army War College established pilot


advanced degree programs with Georgetown University and with Shippensburg State College of Pennsylvania.

Weapons Systems

When the President announced his decision on March 14, 1969, to proceed with the deployment of a limited ballistic missile defense system, designated as Safeguard, he conceived it to fulfill three basic objectives: protection of U.S. land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; and protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source. At that time, the President also had stated that "this program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of technical development, the evolving threat, and the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation," so as to "insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time."

Participating in the review this year were the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which made its own review of the threat, and the Department of Defense, including the joint Chiefs of Staff, the President's Defense Program Review Committee, and the National Security Council, which reassessed alternative courses of action. This review showed that technical progress on all the components of the Safeguard system had been satisfactory. It also revealed that the threat had increased. The Soviet Union, bearing out predictions of last year, continued to construct intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile-carrying submarines at a steady pace, and continued a very active research and development program on new weapons. The Communist Chinese did not, so far as is known, test an ICBM during fiscal year 1970. However, by the summer of 1970 they appeared to be in a position to begin tests within a few months, having demonstrated the ability to put a satellite into orbit. It is simply a matter of time until they have an operational ICBM.

The annual review indicated that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were not jeopardized by approval of the first phase of Safeguard, and that until and unless an agreement is reached in SALT, the program should be continued. On the other hand, the United States intended to make the Nixon Doctrine foreign policy workable by providing adequate defenses to prevent other nations from engaging in diplomacy by nuclear blackmail in coming years.

The review also considered several alternatives, including can-


celing the Phase 1 Safeguard deployment approved last year or continuing Phase 1 only with additional research and development. However, in view of the continued growth of the Soviet threat and the prospect of Chinese deployment of an ICBM force in the mid-1970's, a year's delay in taking additional measures could not be justified.

The review also considered the effectiveness of the full twelve-site Safeguard system for the defense of Minuteman against a possible Soviet first strike, and options to counter such a threat effectively.

During this year, the Safeguard program proceeded with the initial congressionally approved increment (Phase 1) of two site complexes located in Minuteman fields near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. The purposes of this Phase 1 deployment were to preserve the President's future options by establishing a minimum base for expansion if the need should arise; to work out the problems that inevitably arise in any new major weapon system; and to provide a beginning of protection for the Minuteman force against the mid-70's threat.

The research and development portion of the Safeguard program progressed satisfactorily. On Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, the prototype missile site radar (MSR) began radiating power in September 1968 and has been under checkout since that time. It met or bettered most of its design objectives and no serious deficiencies were found. MSR software for the first part of the system test program was completed and installed. Beginning in July 1969, tracking of local targets was accomplished, and in December 1969 two ICBM's launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, were successfully tracked. Also at Kwajalein, the Spartan interceptor satisfactorily completed the first phase of development testing. There have been 15 launches, of which 11 were completely successful, 2 partially successful, and 2 failures. Two system tests with the Spartan integrated under MSR control have been conducted. One test was completely successful and the other only partially successful. The Sprint interceptor tests proceeded satisfactorily at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Of 41 launches, 22 were completely successful, 9 partially successful, and 10 failures. Early problems were diagnosed and corrections confirmed by the last three successful flights. Plans called for an early conclusion of the White Sands tests and for system tests for Sprint to be started at Kwajalein.

The perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) was under fabrication, and the first installation was to be made at Grand Forks (the first


Safeguard operational site). No serious technical problems were encountered in this development, and there was confidence of meeting the schedule for the first PAR site. Certain important components were being tested as the year closed, and it was anticipated that by September 1970 about 95 percent of the PAR components would be released to production.

The task of integrating all of the major components into a system still lay ahead. Missile integration tests began during the year at Kwajalein, initially with the Spartan.

Command and control requirements for Safeguard joint operations with Air Force Minuteman missiles through interface at the CONAD-SAC level were defined. No problems were encountered.

Engineering design for the Grand Forks site was substantially completed and the contract was awarded. There was a delay of seven to nine months in the equipment readiness date of the Phase 1 sites, due in part to the delayed initiation of on-site activities pending congressional action on Phase 1 and in part to a need for a more economical and less compressed construction schedule.

In the year's Safeguard review, the developments in the threat that occurred in the last year since the administration decided to undertake Phase 1 were carefully evaluated. It was noted that Communist China continued to test nuclear devices which were expected to be suitable for ICBM application by the time their missile was developed. There was evidence that they continued to advance toward an ICBM capability, but the earliest date by which they could achieve this was considered to be in early 1973. This estimate represented about a one-year slippage. The Soviet buildup of SS9's deployed or believed to be under construction reached more than 300, as compared to about 230 in the spring of 1969. Development and testing of the 3-re-entry vehicle, SS9 configuration continued. The number of SS11's operational or under construction, estimated at about 700 last year, increased to more than 800. Soviet testing of the smaller SS11 ICBM suggested that certain improvements probably aimed at bettering the penetration capability were under development. And production of nuclear-powered, ballistic missile submarines continued at two Soviet shipyards, which together have a current construction rate of six to eight boats a year.

The administration's decision to request continuation of a phased Safeguard program for ballistic missile defense—going beyond the congressionally approved Phase 1—was based on several factors. Among them were careful consideration of the original objectives of Safeguard defense and of the need to maintain the President's flexibility on future options either to curtail or expand the


system; the continued Chinese progress in nuclear weapons and the evolving and increasing Soviet offensive threat; the options currently available, considering technical progress and budgetary factors; the current international situation; the desire to continue emphasis on strategic defensive systems to assure the survivability of the deterrent force rather than being forced immediately to deploy additional offensive weapons; and the intent to maintain flexibility to adapt programs to any agreement which might result from successful arms limitation talks.

The deployment schedule, on the other hand, for the three sites contemplated (Grand Forks and Malmstrom, North Dakota, and Whiteman, Missouri) all fell within the late 1974-early 1975 time period. These were equipment readiness dates, on which equipment would be installed and operable, ready to be turned over to military control.

In February 1970, the Secretary of Defense asked the Congress for authorization to proceed with a modified Phase 2 Safeguard ballistic missile defense program, which was considered to be the minimum effort necessary both in cost and in deployment to fulfill the President's national security objectives.

The modified Phase 2 program for fiscal year 1971 requested congressional authorization for deployment of only one additional site near Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. It also recommended that authorization be given to undertake long lead-time advanced preparation work for five other sites without a deployment commitment: Northeast, Northwest, National Command Authority (Washington, D.C.), Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, and the Michigan-Ohio area. The authorization request included advance purchase to make possible the eventual deployment of addition Sprint missiles at the original Phase 1 sites to further increase the defense of Minuteman.

The proposed program, although a minimum effort, maintained the President's options, after further review and decisions, to move, if necessary, toward a full Phase 2 twelve-site Safeguard defense, or to curtail the deployment if events or arms agreements dictated. Should they be needed, the full twelve sites could be installed by the late 1970's.

The twelve-site system would provide substantial protection for the U.S. population for a number of years against Communist Chinese or other third country attack, and adequate defense to allow most of the alert bomber force to take off even if subjected to surprise attack by submarine-launched missiles. Defense against an accidental launch from any source would also be provided by


the twelve-site deployment. Further, as a prudent hedge against possible increased future threats to the U.S. deterrent, the proposed modified Phase 2 program would allow increases in Minuteman defense levels as the three sites in the Minuteman fields became operational.

In terms of program costs, the fiscal year 1971 budget submission included a request for $1.45 billion for Safeguard. This amount was necessary to continue Phase 1 deployment, to begin deployment at the one additional site, and to undertake advanced preparations at the five potential future sites. Actual expenditures during fiscal year 1971 for the Phase 2 increment of the program would be substantially less than $100 million.

The total DOD acquisition costs (including military construction, purchase of radars and missiles, and the cost of research, development, test and evaluation, but not operating costs) for the Phase 1 sites and the new Phase 2 sites at Whiteman—namely, for completing modified Phase 2—were estimated at $1.38 billion for fiscal year 1971, and a $5.9 billion total. The $5.9 billion acquisition cost, which would be authorized and appropriated over the period of fiscal years 1968-75, included development through system testing of the modified Spartan. Approximately $1.05 billion would be required in fiscal year 1971, if the program were restricted to Phase 1 only, with a total acquisition cost of $4.6 billion for Phase 1 only. Expenditures for fiscal year 1971, however, were specifically restricted to a minimum level as part of the administration's anti-inflationary efforts.

During the year, critics of Safeguard argued, as they had in the past, that the system would not give effective protection long enough to justify its costs. Questions were also raised about the suitability and measure of protection in defense of Minuteman against a possible Soviet first strike. Congressional attention focused on these and other issues about Safeguard's capabilities, particularly during the early part of the fiscal year. Finally, on August 6, 1969, after long debate in the Senate and throughout the country on the desirability of deploying the modified system, two amendments that would have prohibited spending on construction were defeated by razor-thin margins. As the year closed, the Army had approval to proceed with the limited Phase 1, while a vote on the proposal to proceed with a modified Phase 2 was still pending in Congress.

There were advances in various other weapons systems during the year. The quick reaction capability of the Pershing missile system was greatly improved with the development of new ground


support equipment. The first battalion to receive the new equipment successfully completed annual service practice firings in September 1969, and all battalions in Europe were re-equipped by March 1970.

Deployment of the TOW antitank missile system to the training base in the continental United States was begun in the third quarter of the fiscal year. This weapon, which is tube-launched, optically tracked, and wire-guided, is designed for use by infantry and helicopter forces to destroy enemy tanks and other armored vehicles. It will upgrade the capability of U.S. forces to counter the armor threat that has existed in Europe since World War II.

Development of the Dragon guided missile system advanced during the year. This weapon is light enough to be carried and operated by one man and will give the foot soldier a lethal capability against enemy armor. Dragon will replace the 90-mm. recoilless rifle, which fails to meet the requirements for a medium antitank weapon in terms of range, portability, and kill probability.

In March 1970, following discussions with other nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States notified NATO headquarters that U.S. Army NATO forces would be equipped with the M16A1 rifle. Shipments were begun in May 1970 and were to be completed by September.

In August 1969 the Army accepted the M203 40-mm. grenade launcher attachment for the M16A1 rifle. The M203 replaces the M79, uses the same ammunition, and provides the grenadier with a weapon that is both a rifle and a grenade launcher. The M79 served only as a launcher and deprived the rifle squad of two rifles.

U.S. Army air defense forces were further reduced during the year by thirty-seven Nike-Hercules and sixteen Hawk firing batteries. All surface-to-air missiles were withdrawn from Vietnam and the total defenses in Hawaii and at Cincinnati-Dayton and Niagara-Buffalo were eliminated. Selected batteries were also inactivated in the area defenses of Detroit, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, Fort Bliss (Texas), Alaska, Germany, and Okinawa.

Some air defense battalions were reorganized, equipped, and trained as Hawk self-propelled units and several were deployed to Germany; one was retained at Fort Bliss, Texas. Some Chaparral and Vulcan batteries were activated during the year, and half were deployed overseas. This missile and gun combination provides defense against low altitude air attack.

Advanced development of the SAM-D surface-to-air missile system continued during the year. The Army has retained tight control over system specification, and plans the most austere design


that is compatible with an efficient system to meet anticipated threats.

Army Aviation

During fiscal year 1970 an aviation structure for the Army in the post-Vietnam period was re-examined to incorporate the results of recent studies and to take advantage of Southeast Asia experience. A revised structure was developed that would make it possible to attain the most urgent airmobility objectives within established manning and dollar constraints. Resources for what were considered to be essential additions were provided for in part by trade-offs involving selected aviation and ground units. As over-all Army priorities were revised, some lesser priority aviation units were eliminated from the postwar structure in favor of new additions.

The revised structure improves force effectiveness by placing more aircraft and aviation units at key places; increases were obtained in divisional command and control aircraft, air cavalry units and aircraft, aerial firepower, and airmobile lift. The initial examination established priorities, guidelines, and procedures, which have since been applied to numerous alternative structures. In general, as the size of the total force decreases, proportionately more aviation support is both feasible and desirable, to provide additional firepower and mobility to the smaller force.

Several advances in aircraft safety have been introduced into Army aviation operations. Airborne proximity warning devices were installed at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for test and evaluation. These systems are designed to reduced the hazards of midair collision and the resultant loss of life and equipment. The ideal is to develop a system that would be adaptable to fleetwide use.

Development of an aircraft crash-resistant fuel system proceeded on schedule during the year. The first UH-1H production helicopter containing the new system was delivered to the Army on April 8, 1970. A program to install the system in older models will begin in July 1970. Development for the AH-1G and UH-1B/C helicopters was near completion at year's end, and development for other aircraft was proceeding. The program is scheduled to be completed by 1975.

There were developments in several Army aviation projects during fiscal year 1970. The OV-1D Mohawk, the latest version of the Army's medium observation aircraft, was introduced. It is a two-place, twin turboprop aircraft equipped with photographic and electronic sensors capable of monitoring enemy operations in daylight, dark, and inclement weather. The aircraft's external ap-


pearance is deceptively similar to the earlier versions, but a rapid modification capability enables a single OV-1D to perform the surveillance functions of any previous Mohawk. Three photographic systems can be installed or removed in less than an hour, and its radar and infrared systems are interchangeable. Thus the OV-1D can be quickly prepared to respond to a field commander's intelligence requirements. Several additional features were incorporated in this model to enhance its surveillance capabilities. It has an automatic data annotation system to identify all sensor imagery. There is a more accurate inertial navigation system as well as improved infrared and radar performance and displays. A vertical panoramic camera system photographs terrain from horizon to horizon. A radiological monitoring system is included, along with an aural recorder to transcribe crew descriptions of visual observations. And finally, there is electronic countermeasure equipment to provide greater assurance of mission success. In addition to this surveillance equipment, improvements have been made in areas of engine power, wing and landing gear strength, equipment accessibility, communications, and cockpit instrumentation.

The first CH-47C Chinook helicopter equipped with the new powerful T-55 and L-11 engines was deployed to operating units beginning in July 1969. This helicopter is the latest model of the Chinook fleet, capable of lifting a ten-ton payload, almost double that of the original model. This craft provides airmobility for military forces in the field, by transporting personnel, weapons, and cargo and providing rapid evacuation of wounded and recovery of downed aircraft.

The Army accepted delivery of the first CH-54B Tarhe helicopter in December 1969. The latest model of the Tarhe fleet, it provides improved performance and reliability, reduced maintenance, and a two-ton payload increase over older models. It is the Free World's largest flying crane helicopter and is capable of airlifting large bulk items of equipment - (up to twelve tons) , including artillery weapons, heavy engineer equipment, and downed aircraft.

And finally, delivery of OH-58 helicopters continued during the year. Produced under a five-year contract that calls for 2,200 aircraft by fiscal year 1972 and includes provisions to deal with escalation for inflation, the third year deliveries brought the total to 392 aircraft, of which 288 had been deployed to Southeast Asia as the year closed. The aircraft is performing well, meeting or surpassing Army expectations.


Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs

Presidential policy decisions, congressional legislation, and public opinion all had an unprecedented impact on the Army's chemical warfare and biological research programs during fiscal year 1970.

On November 25, 1969, the President announced a major change in national policy on chemical warfare and biological research; reaffirmed U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical weapons in warfare; extended that renunciation to include incapacitating chemicals; confirmed that the United States would maintain a deterrent and a capability to retaliate with chemical agents if they are first used by an enemy against us; and banned all methods of biological warfare.

On February 14, 1970, the President renounced the use of toxins in warfare and directed the destruction of all such materials not required for research for defensive purposes. Concurrently, the term "biological warfare" (BW) was deleted as the designation of the biological research program.

The President also announced that the administration would submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the first use of toxic chemical agents and bacteriological agents in war, to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

A week before his November policy statement, President Nixon had signed Public Law 91-121, which imposed far-reaching controls over the chemical warfare program. Under its provisions the Secretary of Defense must submit annual reports to Congress concerning funds spent for research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement of chemical warfare agents. It also imposed controls on the testing and transportation of lethal chemical agents within the United States and on the testing, development, storage, and disposal of such agents outside the United States. It further prohibited the use of fiscal year 1970 appropriations for procurement of any delivery system specifically designed to disseminate any lethal agents, or any part or component of such a system, unless the President certified to Congress that such procurement was essential to the safety and security of the United States.

Because of public opinion and congressional protest, the Army deferred plans to dispose of obsolete chemical munitions and agents by dumping them in the Atlantic Ocean beyond the continental shelf. The National Academy of Sciences was asked to study the entire subject of disposal of chemical munitions. The academy recommended that mustard gas be destroyed by burning under strict pollution control, and that cluster bombs containing the nerve agent GB be disassembled and the agent chemically detoxi-


fied. By the close of the year, the Army had completed plans to dispose of these categories of munitions by the means proposed. In a more difficult case, the academy recommended that a panel of specialists study methods for disposing of another type of stockpiled materiel—rockets filled with a nerve agent and encased in concrete coffins as a safety measure until disposal. As the year closed, the study committee had suggested several ways of disposing of these items, and a decision was pending. (For additional details of the effects of the new policy on the Army's research and development program and the shipment of hazardous materials, see chapters 9 and 11.)


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