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AGAM-P (M) (24 Apr 67) FOR OT

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SUBJECT: ~~Operation Attleboro~~ Lessons Learned, Operation
Attleboro, 25th Infantry Division (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as Inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for
Operation Attleboro. Operation Attleboro was conducted by the 25th
Infantry Division during the period 14 September - 25 November 1966.
Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations,
and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT
OPERATION ATTLEBORO

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation ATTLEBORO was a Search and Destroy operation. For the purposes of this report, this operation has been broken into four phases.

Phase I: 14 Sep - 20 Oct, a series of Bn operations by the 196th Inf Bde (Lt)(Sep).

Phase II: 29 Oct - 5 Nov, operations leading up to and including contact with the VC 9th Div.

Phase III: 5 - 10 Nov, control of operation changed to 1st Inf Div and then II FFORCEV.

Phase IV: 10 Nov - 26 Nov, 25th Inf Div given mission to make a reconnaissance in force in sector.

2. DATES OF OPERATION: 14 September 1966 - 25 November 1966.

3. LOCATION: TAY NINH Province.

4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:

14 Sep - 5 Nov 196th Inf Bde (Lt)(Sep)

5 Nov - 6 Nov 1st Inf Div

6 Nov - 25 Nov II FFORCEV.

5. REPORTING OFFICER:

a. Major General Frederick C. Woyand, 14 Sep - 13 Oct, 25 Oct - 28 Oct.

b. Brigadier General George G. O'Connor, 13-25 Oct, 28 Oct - 25 Nov.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Phase I (14 Sep - 31 Oct)

196th Inf Bde (Lt)(Sep), Brigadier General DeSoussure commanding:
2d Bn, 1st Inf
3d Bn, 21st Inf
4th Bn, 31st Inf
3d Bn, 82d Apty

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b. Phase II (31 Oct - 5 Nov)

196th Inf Bde (Lt)(Sep)

- 2d Bn, 1st Inf
- 3d Bn, 21st Inf
- 4th Bn, 31st Inf
- 1st Bn, 27th Inf 1 Nov
- 2d Bn, 27th Inf 3 Nov
- 3d Bn, 82d Arty
- A Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty reinforcing 1 Nov, attached 4 Nov
- C Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty GS, reinforcing 2 Nov
- Plt, B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty attached 3 Nov

c. Phase III (5-10 Nov 66)

196th Inf Bde Task Force attached to 1st Inf Div

- 2d Bn, 1st Inf
- 3d Bn, 21st Inf
- 4th Bn, 31st Inf 8-10 Nov attached to 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf
- 1st Bn, 27th Inf attached to 1st Inf Div 5-11 Nov
- 2d Bn, 27th Inf attached to TAY NINH Base Camp commander
- 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf attached to 1st Inf Div 6-10 Nov

d. Phase IV (10 Nov - 25 Nov)

2d Bde Task Force

- 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf 10 Nov
- 1st Bn, 27th Inf
- 2d Bn, 27th Inf 11 Nov
- 2d Bn, 14th Inf
- 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf 13 Nov (from 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div)
- 1st Bn, 8th Arty DS

196th Inf Bde Task Force

- 2d Bn, 1st Inf
- 3d Bn, 21st Inf
- 4th Bn, 31st Inf
- 3d Bn, 82d Arty

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Air Support.

(1) General: During Phase I & II air support was provided by fighter bombers. During Phase IV both fighter bomber and heavy bombers were used. A total of 1029 sorties were flown in the area of operations from 16 Sep - 25 Nov. Eighty-four immediate sorties were flown and 53 sorties were flown by VNAF.

(2) Eleven B52 strikes were flown in the AO during the period 11-23 Nov. They were as follows:

3

<u>MISSION NO.</u>	<u>DATE/TIME OF MISSION</u>	<u>AREA COVERED</u>
25-10-1	110020 Nov 66	XT327843 - 340843 327813 - 340813
F 71	11710 Nov	XT305780 - 320780 305753 - 320753
25-11-1 (F96)	130730 Nov	XT140787 - 142758 158760 - 153790
25-12-1 (F98)	141100 Nov	XT313922 - 325927 326096 - 338902
Called by 1st Div in 25th Div AO (Danger 6)	161000 Nov	XT344780 - 320790 333752 - 353767
25-15-1 (F107)	180700 Nov	XT370810 - 320790 350810 - 350790
F102	190730 Nov	XT368866 - 377880 392851 - 400861
TN 38 25-18-1	221800 Nov	XT145390 - 173377 162358 - 138370
Quickrun 23 A93	210500 Nov	XT223970 - 223980 243970 - 243980
25-21-1 TV 43	230600 Nov	XT200820 - 200810 230810 - 230820

(3) Results of the tactical airstrikes* were:

- 4 VC KBA (BC)
- 115 VC KBA (poss)
- 88 buildings destroyed
- 17 buildings damaged
- 14 bunkers destroyed
- 8 bunkers damaged
- 2 sampans destroyed
- 12 secondary explosions
- 10 secondary fires
- 1 bridge destroyed
- 1 bridge damaged

* This includes the 196th Inf Bde from 16 Sep - 25 Nov and the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div from 15 Nov - 25 Nov.

b. Artillery Support.

(1) During Phase I, the 196th Inf Bde was supported by the 3d Bn, 82d Arty with B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (-). B Btry, 2d Bn, 13th Arty was in DS from 20-29 Sep. 4

(2) During Phase II & III, 3d Bn, 82d Arty (+) continued in support of 196th Inf Bde. On 1 Nov, A Btry, 1st Bn, 8th Arty reinforced their fires.

(3) During Phase IV, 3d Bn, 82d Arty (+) supported the 196th Inf Bde. 1st Bn, 8th Arty with A Btry, 2d Bn, 13th Arty; A Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty; B Btry, 3d Bn, 13th Arty supported the 2d Brigade Task Force.

(4) Artillery fire was utilized to:

(a) Suppress sniper fire.

(b) Soften areas in front of advancing maneuver elements.

(c) Prepare landing zones and suppress enemy fires during the assault and extraction phases of an airmobile operation.

(d) Fire false preparations to mislead the enemy as to intended or possible landing zones.

(e) Harass and interdict.

(f) Assist patrols navigating through dense terrain and during hours of darkness by firing high air burst WP rounds.

(g) Fire defensive concentrations for forward support bases.

(5) Total missions and rounds fired:

(a) Missions: Support - 2634; HEI 10,356.

(b) Ammunition expended: HE - 70,470; WP - 2085; ILL - 342.

(c) Results: 70 VC KIA (30), 132 VC KIA (poss).

c. Aviation Support.

(1) Units.

(a) 25th Avn Bn.

A Co

B Co

- 5
- (b) 11th Avn Bn
 - 116th Avn Co (Lt)
 - 147th Avn Co (Med)
 - 178th Avn Co (Inf)
 - (c) 13th Avn Bn
 - 175th Avn Co (Lt)
 - (d) 52d Avn Bn
 - 117th Avn Co (Lt)
 - (e) 145th Avn Bn
 - 68th Avn Co (Lt)
 - 71st Avn Co (Lt)
 - 118th Avn Co (Lt)

(2) Type and number of airmobile operations.

<u>Type</u>	<u>Bn</u>	<u>Co</u>
Combat Assaults	17	3
Extractions	12	2
Repositions	7	1

(3) Helicopter assets were utilized for command and control, airmobile assaults and extractions, reconnaissance, resupply and medical evacuation.

8. (c) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: Operation ATLELORO was initially a 196th Bde operation to the south and west of TAY NINH City. The AO was expanded to include the DAU TIENG area in exploitation of VC logistical bases located in this area and subsequently included all of War Zone C. VC units located in the area included elements of the 9th VC Division (271st, 272d and 273d Regts), 101st NVA Regt, 70th Guard Regt, U80 Arty Regt, COSVN HQ and associated facilities, the 320th LF Bn, 8 LF Companies, and local guerrilla elements. The area contained large supply/arms/ammo caches, factories, hospitals and base camps of the Rear Services Supply and Transportation sections of Group 82 and 83. It was anticipated that the VC would have the area well fortified against ground and airmobile assaults. The proximity of the Cambodian border, the rivers into the area, the well developed roads and trails attested to the fact that the VC were present and had the area well developed as a diversified military complex. There had been no significant ARVN/FWMAF operation in War Zone C since April - May 1966. Agent reports, PW's, CHIEU HOI's, II

reports, Visual Reconnaissance, LRRPs and USSF reports were utilized to assist in development of the enemy situation. Generally, the intelligence received before and during the operation proved to be useful when properly evaluated and collated.

b. Terrain: The terrain in the area of operations varied from low flat terrain and cultivated fields to scrub brush and forested areas with double and triple canopy. The latter offered excellent concealment and poor observation. Avenues of approach were generally limited to developed trails and cleared areas. The only key terrain in the area, in the traditional military sense, is NUI BA DUM mountain, the top of which is controlled by USSF with considerable VC activity on the slopes. Obstacles were to be found in streams, dense forests, inundated areas and paddies. The low land in the northern area was inundated with water, making movement of tracked vehicles and foot troops very difficult.

c. Weather:

(1) 14 to 22 Sep: Cloudy in the early morning hours becoming partly cloudy by noon, with almost daily rainfall.

(2) 23 Sep to 4 Oct: The skies were partly cloudy throughout the day with no rain or other restrictions to operations.

(3) 5 to 3 Oct: Conditions remained partly cloudy but occasional afternoon rainshowers were present in the area.

(4) 9 to 14 Oct: Conditions were again partly cloudy with only slight restrictions to visibility in the early morning hours due to fog or haze.

(5) 14 to 12 Oct: Conditions remained partly cloudy, but daily afternoon and evening rainshowers and thundershowers were present.

(6) 19 to 29 Oct: Cloudy conditions with frequent early morning fog and general rain present over the entire area.

(7) 30 Oct. to 8 Nov: Conditions were partly cloudy with no restrictions to operations during the period.

(8) 9 to 19 Nov: Sky conditions continued to be partly cloudy, and there were afternoon rainshowers or thundershowers present in the area.

(9) 20 to 25 Nov: Partly cloudy with no restrictions.

NOTE: Early morning helilift operations were restricted by fog or low clouds until mid-morning on the following dates: 14-15 Sep, 27-29 Oct and 13 Nov.

d. Operations:

(1) During the initial phase of the operation around TAY NIEN City, the VC units expected to be contacted were the C40 Company, 4 other LF Companies, 1 platoon operating near the TAY NIEN West airfield, and other local forces and guerrilla elements operating within 15 kilometers of TAY NIEN. The units were probably in the area, but due to the influx of a large US unit, they evidently preferred to avoid contact during the initial stages. Only light and sporadic contact was encountered by the 196th during this phase of the operation.

(2) The 196th, in October, shifted its operations to the DAU TLING area to concentrate on neutralizing the supply activities of Groups 82 and 83 of COSVN Rear Service units. This shift was prompted by the numerous reports of logistical complexes in this area and the location by the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div of 279 tons of rice via XT482423. Documents captured in the area identified Group 83, a COSVN Rear Service Group, and substantiated other reports that the area was a major VC supply activity. Other documents captured by the 1st Bde were VC plans for political activities, directives from higher headquarters concerning tax collection schedules and personality lists of the Finance Section and other infrastructure activities within TAY NIEN Province. The fact that all of the food and documents were found on the fringes of the woods without a major sweep into the interior made the area a very lucrative target for future US operations. During the first half of October, VC units in the area, including the 9th VC Division operated in their normal areas of operations with a gradual southerly movement noted towards the end of the month. Because of the southward movement of the VC units, it was anticipated that possibly elements of the 271st and 273d Regts would be contacted in the area. Local guerrillas operating in the area were expected to offer consistent harassment to US forces which proved to be an accurate estimate. Between 20 Oct and 3 Nov, the 196th Bde located several large rice/supply caches in vic XT4342 while making only sporadic contact with the enemy. Documents captured on 31 Oct XT440501 during a sweep through the YEN CUI Plantation indicated that the extensive rice and supply caches were maintained by the B160 Section, Group 82 of COSVN Rear Service Department. On 3 Nov, 196th Bde elements made contact with an unknown size VC force via XT415536 and XT442518. The VC used SA, hand grenades, rifle grenades, claymore mines and conducted a determined defense of the area indicating a main force element was involved. Documents captured via XT454534 on 3 November established that the VC unit contacted was the C95 Reconnaissance unit, subordinate to the 9th VC Division. Six documents contained the designation for the 273d Regt. Sporadic contact continued throughout the night of 3-4 November 1966. On 4 November, elements of the 196th Bde were again heavily engaged via XT417540. Three company size VC assaults were repelled during the day resulting in 40 VC KIA (BC). Documents captured on the battlefield identified elements of the 271st and 273d Regts. Shortly after midnight on 4 Nov, the 2d Bn, 272d Regt executed a coordinated attack on SOU CAU OP via XT453289 using mortars, FR, AW and a variety of Bangalore torpedoes and sachel charges in an attempt to breach the defenses of the camp. The attack was repelled and the VC took heavy personnel and equipment losses before withdrawing to the BO LAI Woods leaving over 50 VC KIA (BC) on the battlefield. Also on the morning of 4 November, between 0208-0230, 0540-0550,

the VC mortared the 196th Bde base camp vic XT165515. It is believed that the attacks were designed to relieve the pressure on VC units in the DAU TIENG area. On 5 November, vic XT4154 and XT4054 elements of the 196th Bde again made contact with a VC force well fortified in bunkers resulting in 123 VC KIA (BC) and 19 VC KIA (poss). Frontal assaults involving 80-100 VC each were again used by the VC against US forces. It is believed that the VC force was composed of elements of the 271st and 273d Regts. After the engagements with the 25th Division on 3-4-5 November, the 1st Inf Div made contact with the VC who were withdrawing. The 1st Inf Division had contact with the VC on several occasions and identified the 1st Bn, 2d Bn, and 3d Bn of the 101st NVA Regt and the 2d Bn, 271st Regt and 273d Regt.

(3) The 25th Division main effort was then directed north to War Zone C. It was anticipated that if heavy contact was made, it would be with main force elements. Food, supply, arms and ammo caches were expected to be found as US troops moved into the area. In order to disrupt operations and harass the US base camp at TAY MINH, the VC mortared the camp on the night of 11 November and the morning of the 12th. A search of the mortar position on 12 November revealed a document that indicated that the C16 Recon Company, subordinate to the 271st Regt could have been responsible for the attack. Contact with the VC was sporadic until 19 Nov when contact was made with a VC platoon vic XT216804 and XT229811 and a VC company vic XT274956. The company contacted vic XT274956 was the C2 Co, 1st Bn, 70th Regt. (The Security Regt for COSVN) Documents captured vic XT278908 disclosed the LBN 1751B which is the Signal Bn subordinate to COSVN. Documents captured vic XT229811 indicated the unit contacted was a medical unit subordinate to the 271st Regt with a convalescence center and a Rear Service Section also mentioned. Documents and capture of two 12.7mm barrels vic XT227813 indicated the presence of an Antiaircraft Battalion in the AO. This is believed to have been the 243 AA Bn which had previously been reported. Contact continued to be sporadic throughout the remainder of the operation with the majority of the VC contacted in squad size or less. The VC reaction anticipated by US forces because of the intrusion into War Zone C did not materialize. It is believed that due to the losses suffered as a result of contacts with the 25th and 1st Inf Divs, Main Force units withdrew to avoid major contact and begin retraining and resupply activities. Local forces were to continue to harass US forces and monitor our movement in the area. During the operation, it is believed that the 2d Bn, 70th Regt operated along Route 4 and had full responsibility for the road. The 3d Bn, 70th Regt had control and operated on Route 22. The VC controlled road running from vic XT396632 to XT380858 is now believed to be a primary LOC for resupply activities in War Zone C. The 1st Division found the majority of the caches in the area along the controlled road. The route runs both north and south, and it appears that the VC utilize the BOI LOI Woods, the SAIGON River and the controlled road to accomplish most of their major transport of supplies. There are no friendly units to harass the VC in the area. It is believed that major logistical complexes are still located along the road, and that the 25th Division did not locate any major caches in their area of operations in the heart of War Zone C because the USSF Camps at TRAI BI and SOUI DA are in an excellent position from which to harass the VC logistical routes. The VC prefer to have a

controlled route through War Zone C from which they can support operations in any direction with relatively no harassment. Indications are that AITIEBORO completely disrupted VC plans for a major winter offensive by the 9th VC Div and the 101st NVA Regt. Rice caches (1 ton or over), base camps, supply caches, ammo caches, and contacts of estimated platoon size or larger: (Ref: 25th Division INSUMS)

15 Sep XT079559	2.5 tons rice
17 Sep XT068543	1.25 tons rice
25 Sep XT496418-501417	Base camp
25 Sep XT487424	Base camp
25 Sep XT480427	1.75 tons rice
26 Sep XT488425-482425	279 tons rice
26 Sep XT486421	2 tons rice & 1.5 tons peanuts
29 Sep XT484426	1.25 tons salt
29 Sep XT520363	6 tons rice
9 Oct XT073545	1.7 tons rice
20 Oct XT487424	680 sheets of tin
21 Oct XT484425	13 tons rice - supply cache
22 Oct XT490413	1.65 tons cement
24 Oct XT509401	1 ton rice
29 Oct XT438500	420 tons rice, 25 tons salt, supply cache
30 Oct XT433496	60 tons rice
30 Oct XT441499	32.5 tons rice
30 Oct XT435501	Ammo cache
30 Oct XT445506	4.5 tons rice
31 Oct XT440501	23.7 tons rice, supply cache
31 Oct XT440501	59.8 tons rice, 3/4 ton beans, 4.5 tons tobacco
31 Oct XT438503	187.5 tons rice
1 Nov XT443501	55 tons rice, 15 tons beans, supply cache
2 Nov XT436501	Supply cache
2 Nov XT445493-445506	28 piles of laterite
3 Nov XT415536	Unknown number of VC
3 Nov XT442518	Unknown number of VC
3 Nov XT448518	Base camp
4 Nov XT417540	Elements 271st & 273d Regt
4 Nov XT417540	Elements 271st & 273d Regt
4 Nov XT436541	215 tons rice
4 Nov XT408543	1st Bn of 273d Regt
5 Nov XT4154-4054	273d Regt (element)
10 Nov XT270755	1 ton rice-supply cache
12 Nov XT303777	20 tons rice
14 Nov XT255807	20 tons rice
14 Nov XT263757	1.25 tons rice
17 Nov XT285897	Base camp
18 Nov XT361462	VC platoon
19 Nov XT274956	VC company
19 Nov XT216804-223811	VC platoon
19 Nov XT144496	VC platoon
20 Nov XT206812	VC platoon

21 Nov XT349940 Base camp
 22 Nov XT303775 12.4 tons rice & base area
 25 Nov XT130384 VC platoon

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<u>VC USE OF ARTAR</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ROUNDS</u>
9 Oct	XT298564	15
4 Nov	XT165515	150
11 Nov	XT165518	5
12 Nov	XT167518	84
22 Nov	XT269859	48
22 Nov	XT341581	20

9. (C) MISSION. The 25th Inf Div conducted search and destroy operations in TAY NINH Province to locate and destroy enemy forces and supplies.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION.

a. Phase I. 196th Inf Bde conducts search and destroy operations to destroy VC bases, supplies and interdict VC LOC's near the TAY NINH Base Camp.

b. Phase II. 196th Inf Bde conducts search and destroy operations in vic of DAU TIENG to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies and base camps.

c. Phase III. 196th Inf Bde is under the control of the 1st Inf Div.

d. Phase IV. 25th Inf Div (-), conducts a reconnaissance of force operation in assigned area of operation.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Phase I (14 September - 28 October).

(1) 14 - 21 September. B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an air-mobile assault to establish blocking position vic XT071534. A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf drove into the block and then helped establish a base camp vic XT073546. During the next 6 days, light contact was made with the VC. On 21 September, the battalion closed TAY NINH base camp.

(2) 18 - 25 September. The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted an air-mobile assault to establish a forward base vic XT191393. On the next day the battalion air assaulted in vic XT181468 having light enemy contact. On 20-21 September no contact was made with the enemy. On 22 September the battalion located a VC base area vic XT165490. From 22-25 September no further contact was made with the enemy. The Bn closed TAY NINH base camp on 25 September.

(3) 6 - 14 October. The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted S&D operations vic XT0954. Light enemy contact was made with negative results. On 7 October, A Co made contact with 3 VC vic XT073547, resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 1 VC

KIA (poss). On 8 October, Co D destroyed 250 lbs of rice vic XT062543 and 4 booby traps vic XT069546. On 9 October, the battalion moved its base camp vic XT066545. On 10 October no contact was made. On 11 October, Co A and Co B discovered and destroyed a tunnel complex vic XT055554. On 14 October, the Bn was extracted to TAY NINH base camp.

(4) 15 - 23 October. On 15 October, the 3d Bn, 21st Inf was airlifted to TRAI BI vic XT120686. All units were closed by 1710 hours. On 16 October, Co A conducted an S&D operation east of TRAI BI with negative contact. Continued operations to the east and west of TRAI BI resulted in negative contact. On 22 October, the Bn conducted an S&D operation toward TAY NINH base camp arriving on 23 Oct.

(5) 18 - 28 October.

(a) 18 October. Due to increased reports of VC caches in the area, an operation was directed toward the west side of the SAIGON RIVER vic XT4842. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf commenced air movement of troops and supplies to DAU TIENG.

(b) 19 October. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf completed their air movement to DAU TIENG.

(c) 20 October. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an airmobile assault vic XT483438 with Co A and Co C, and vic XT455436 with Co B. Co B set up a block while Co A and Co C drove against it.

(d) 21 October. B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf discovered 13 tons of rice, 500 cans of milk, 1000 lbs of salt and 2500 lbs of peanuts vic XT460420.

(e) 22 October. C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf discovered 3630 lbs of cement and 20 1"x12" planks vic XT461427.

(f) 23 October. B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an S&D operation from vic XT483421 to vic XT489400, resulting in 2 tons of rice, 15 lbs of sulfa drugs and 150 lbs of epsom salts captured and 6 VC structures, 10 lbs TNT and 7200 lbs of fish destroyed.

(g) 24 October. A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an operation vic XT4542, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC structures, 2 foxholes, 2 underground fortifications, 2 tunnels, 1.58 tons of rice and 400 lbs of wheat destroyed. In addition, 1 1/2 lbs of documents and 400 lbs of VC clothing were captured.

(h) 25 October. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted operations vic XT4542 with negative contact.

(i) 26 October. 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted operations in vic of XT485414 with light contact. Results were 2 VC KIA (poss).

(j) 27 October. 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted operations from vic XT451431 to vic XT747456, resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 8 VC KIA (poss) and 8 VCS apprehended. 11

(k) 28 October. 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted operations from vic XT478437 to vic XT442448, resulting in 34 VCS apprehended and 200 punji stakes destroyed.

b. Phase II (29 October - 5 November) (Diagram 16). On reports of a possible VC hospital in the area vic XT4348, attention was directed to that area.

(1) 29 October. 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an airmobile S&D operation vic XT430488 resulting in 1 VCC, 420 tons of rice and 15 tons of salt captured. In addition, 440 gals of tar, 450 gals of gasoline, 5 ox carts, 2 VC structures and 4 hand grenades were destroyed.

(2) 30 October. On this day, the 196th Inf Bde directed the 4th Bn, 31st Inf into area and the Bde CP displaced to DAU TIENG and was reinforced by G2 and G3 personnel from division. 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted an airmobile assault to vic XT45506 resulting in 4.5 tons of rice, 3 bicycles and 100 lbs of clothing captured. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf conducted an S&D operation vic XT440490 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC), 4 VC KIA (poss) and 92.5 tons of rice, 1 CHIOM rifle, 91 hand grenades, 26 rifle grenades and 2 bicycles captured.

(3) 31 October. The 196th Inf Bde directed 2d Bn, 1st Inf to conduct an S&D operation vic XT455500 and the 4th Bn, 31st Inf to conduct an S&D operation vic XT441498. At 0900, 2d Bn, 1st Inf received sniper fire and one claymore at XT438498 which resulted in 2 wounded and 1 killed. The battalion continued on its mission and discovered 83.5 tons of rice, 9000 lbs of tobacco, 1 CHIOM rifle, 300 "D" handle shovels, 600 gals of cooking oil, and 1500 lbs of beans. Meanwhile, 4th Bn, 31st Inf started their operation having no enemy contact until 1600 hrs, when C Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf discovered 187.5 tons of rice vic XT438503.

(4) 1 November. Due to finding additional foodstuffs, the Commanding General, 25th Inf Div placed the 1st Bn, 27th Inf under OPCON of the 196th Inf Bde. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf was given the mission of securing the 196th Inf Bde Hq at DAU TIENG and conducting eagle flights over the rice cache area. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf secured the rice caches and conducted saturation patrolling within 1000 meters of XT441491, the battalion base. C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf captured 55 tons of rice and 15 tons of beans vic XT4450. The 4th Bn, 31st Inf conducted saturation patrolling vic XT441491 resulting in negative contact.

(5) 2 November. A total of 843 tons of rice had been captured to date vic XT4450. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf and 4th Bn, 31st Inf continued conducting saturation patrolling while the 1st Bn, 27th Inf conducted eagle flights vic XT425458 and XT425530. The 4th Bn, 31st Inf discovered 6 bicycles, assorted medical supplies and 1/2 lb of documents vic XT440496. In addition, they searched

an ox trail via XT445505. On either side of the trail were foxholes and trenches. Twenty-eight piles of laterite were discovered from XT445493 to XT445506.

(6) 3 November. The 196th Bde planned to search for cache areas to the north. In order to do this, they had 3 battalions; 2d Bn, 1st Inf; 4th Bn, 31st Inf; and 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). (Diagram 1) The plan was to block with the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) from XT423547 to XT450538, on the general line of provincial route 19. (Diagram 2) The 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) would attack on AXIS RED from vic of the rice cache area XT4450 to the northwest 1000 meters, then guide on a trail as it goes to the northwest 1000 meters, then guide on a trail as it goes to the northeast. A coordinating point was established at XT434538. Co A, 2d Bn, 1st Inf was to attack north on AXIS BLUE which was on the west side of LTL 19 from the 50 east-west grid line to XT443538. A Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf would attack on AXIS WHITE which was on the east side of LTL 19, the 4th Bn, 31st Inf (-) would attack on AXIS PURPLE northeast from the rice cache area until they reached a trail vic XT461507 and would then guide on the trail until reaching a coordinating point at XT450538. The operation kicked off at 0900 hours when 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) and 4th Bn, 31st Inf (-) attacked along AXIS RED, BLUE, WHITE and PURPLE. At 0922, B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf landed at LZ #2 vic XT463529. The LZ was cold. The company then moved north and at 1207 discovered a VC fortified village at XT451538 which had new GHIKOM tools (axes, hoes, and shovels). Meanwhile at 0950, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf landed on LZ #1 vic XT410533. The LZ was cold. The company moved north for 1200 meters, through elephant grass to vic XT411538. At that time the company commander sent a point forward to discover the trail the company had to guide on. Upon moving 40 meters north into the wood, the point came under small arms and automatic weapons fire. The company in the elephant grass also came under fire from the front, both sides and the rear which cut off any escape route. (See Diagram #3 for disposition of the unit.) The company had come upon a fortified position of the Recon Company of the 9th VC Division. Upon coming under fire, the company suffered casualties immediately. By 1210 hours the company had 6 KIA and 6 WIA. One of the casualties was the commanding officer. At 1120 hours, B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf on AXIS BLUE ran into an enemy position on the 52 east-west grid line. The fight lasted a short while and the VC withdrew. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) continued on its mission. By 1230 hours, Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Inf had 10 KIA and 14 WIA. At that time, A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf which was at DAN TIENG was committed to reinforce C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. At 1248, the 1st lift of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf landed vic XT410534. At 1306, the 2d lift arrived and the company was ordered to attack west of C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf to roll up the VC flank. At 1330, C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf was moved to DAN TIENG and 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) was alerted to reinforce 1st Bn, 27th Inf. At 1425 the 1st lift of C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf landed at LZ #1. At 1505 the 2d lift landed. C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf was then ordered to attack east of C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. (See Diagram #4) At 1515 hours A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf married up with C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf vic XT411537. At 1550 hours, C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf married up with 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1600 hours, 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) was ordered to reinforce the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1800 hours 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) landed and a perimeter was formed vic XT410537. (See Diagram #5) Evacuation of

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the dead and wounded then began and lasted into the night. There were 8 light VC probes on the perimeter that night. Late that evening, the 196th Bde published orders for 4 Nov. (See Diagram #6) The 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) would attack northeast guiding on the same trail that C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was supposed to guide on the day before and set up a position vic XT424544. B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was to attack west along LTL 19 and link up with 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). The 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) was to attack east and establish a position at XT443537. A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf would attack west and link up with 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-). The 4th Bn, 31st Inf would attack northwest to a blocking position vic XT437553. The purpose of the operation was to prevent the 9th VC Division from moving to the southeast and at the same time to consolidate all subordinate commands.

(7) 4 November. At 0800, the 4th Bn, 31st Inf departed their battalion base vic XT450538 for a blocking position at XT439553. They encountered no opposition. B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) began moving west to link up with 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). A Co 2d Bn, 1st Inf also began their move west to link up with 2d Bn, 1st Inf. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) did not begin their move until their night kits had been evacuated. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf (-) began their move on the east at 1045. At 1140 hrs, the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) began moving to the northeast with A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf leading; the Bn Comd Gp; C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf; and C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf following in that order. The lead company was in a column of two with each column 20 meters apart. There was no advance guard; however, the 1st sqd, 2d Plt was leading in line formation and spread between the two columns. The lead element moved approximately 200 meters northeast when all of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf came under small arms, automatic weapons, and machine gun fire vic XT413541. Co C, 3d Bn, 21st Inf was ordered to establish a position on the left flank of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. In doing this, two plts went to the left flank and one plt went to the right flank. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) was still under heavy fire from both front and flanks with sniper fire from the rear even though the VC position was linear. (Diagram #7) The CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf ordered Co C, 1st Bn, 27th Inf to move two plts to the left flank of C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf and one to the right of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. By this time the misplaced plt of C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf had returned to its company position. The plt of C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf which was to tie in with the right flank of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was not able to accomplish this because of the heavy fire. The CO of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf noticed this and ordered his right flank plt to curve back and link up with the plt from C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. Diagram #8) This was immediately done. Only about 30 minutes had elapsed since the beginning of the fire fight. All elements of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf were committed. The battalion had no direct radio contact with the 196th Bde. However, contact was established through a VC who relayed the situation to the 196th Inf Bde. At 1246 C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was alerted for possible movement to reinforce the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The CO, 2d Bn, 27th Inf requested that he go into action with Co A and Co C, but this was denied because of the time element. At 1315, the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was able to contact the S3, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and request his assistance. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf immediately started going to the aid of the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. This was later approved by the Commanding General, 196th Infantry Brigade. At 1320, the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was wounded by mortar fragments.

The fire in the area continued to be intense. At 1435, B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was located at XT424543 and began heading southwest to attempt to aid the battalion. At 1440, C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf with the CO, 2d Bn, 27th Inf landed at XT408538. They then moved to the east in an attempt to roll up the VC left flank. At 1451, the 1st Platoon of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was attacked by an estimated 100 VC who came at the platoon in a line of skirmishers. This was the first of three frontal assaults against A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and artillery fire repulsed the attack. The artillery was firing from Diu TIENG at close to maximum range at this time. At 1440, C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf with a Battalion Command Group departed for an LZ at XT407538. They landed on a cold LZ. The company immediately moved to the east (See Diagram #8). At 1515 hours, the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and CO, 2d Bn, 27th Inf agreed that C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf should roll up the west flank of the VC. It took the company 2 hours to reach via XT411541 due to the dense jungle. At 1515 hours, a second frontal assault was launched against A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. At 1530 hours C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf had arrived in the vicinity of XT416539 after having traveled through the heavy jungle. C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf came under heavy fire from an extension of the fortifications which were pinning down the 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf was about 300 meters from A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf at this time. The CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf ordered B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf to fill the gap between the right flank of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and the left flank of A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf. By 1600 hrs, A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf had broken contact and was then ordered to swing to the southwest and cover the southeast portion of the perimeter. (See Diagram #9) B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf then was moved so that the company was oriented to the east. Also at 1600 hrs, A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf landed at XT407537. A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf then moved up and assisted 1st Bn, 27th Inf in securing a PZ and evacuating casualties. At this same time a third frontal assault hit the positions of A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. At 1700 hours, it was determined that C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf had gone too far to the north and was actually behind the VC positions facing 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1715 hours C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. The CO, C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was immediately killed. The ranking platoon leader took command at 1745 hours. C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf assaulted the position in an attempt to overcome the VC. They were unsuccessful. It was determined that the VC positions consisted of a series of concealed bunkers interconnected by trenches. Extending from the bunkers were cleared fire lanes which extended 100-150 meters from the bunkers. These lanes had only the underbrush cleared from them and an attacker could not see them unless he was standing in one. At this time the CO, 2d Bn, 27th Inf threw a smoke grenade, and a FAC determined that C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was approximately 100 meters from 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-). At 1730 hours, resupply and medivac began in 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) area. At 1734 the CO, 2d Bn, 27th Inf took one squad and attempted to link up with the 1st Bn, 27th Inf. He crossed a fire lane and was killed. Also by this time, the 1st Sgt, a platoon leader and a platoon Sgt had been killed. The company formed a tight perimeter. C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was completely isolated from the remainder of the units on the battlefield. At 1941 hours, C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf was ordered by CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf to conduct a night attack in an attempt to reach C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf intended to attack north and then west to relieve C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. They came under heavy fire

immediately and were unable to link up with C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. At about this time the 4th Bn, 31st Inf; A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf who had earlier been ordered to assist 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) from the north was ordered to withdraw and establish a perimeter via XT424525. (See Diagram #10) As night wore on and crippled C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf returned, they relieved A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf of responsibility for the LZ as A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was scheduled to make a daylight attempt at rescuing her sister company. C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf was ordered not to fire regardless of how many times it was probed. They were probed four times during the night, took casualties but by this tactic the VC were not able to determine exactly where the Company was located.

(8) 5 November. In the early hours, additional DUST OFF's were needed to evacuate the wounded of C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and as the 1st aircraft came in and switched on his landing lights, the VC began a mortar attack. The CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf called the aircraft and told the pilots either they had to come in blind and land by flashlights or wait until daylight. The pilots of the DUST OFF decided to come in blind and evacuated the wounded of C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf by morning. As day light came, the fire fight continued. At 0745 hrs, A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf moved out to the east and then north and then west to relieve C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. (See diagram #11) After moving 30 meters, the company came under heavy automatic weapons and machine gun fire and immediately sustained 8 casualties. A Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf laid down a base of fire and overran three bunkers and a trench but they could not breach the VC lines. The company again laid down a base of fire and evacuated their wounded and dead. At 0830, A Co, 2d Bn, 1st; B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf and A Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf who were in a position in the vicinity of XT424546, attacked southwest in order to assist 1st Bn, 27th Inf (-) and C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. The three companies came along different axis and coordinated their movements between each other. At 1000 hours, the Commanding General, 196th Inf Bde placed these three companies under the control of the CO, 1st Bn, 27th Inf. The companies were navigated by sound and smoke. B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf was directed into the northeast corner of 1st Bn, 27th Inf perimeter. A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and C Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf were directed into C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf perimeter. By 1200 hours B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf reached the perimeter, having received only one casualty. Also by 1200 hours, A Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf and C Co, 4th Bn, 31st Inf reached C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. Upon arrival; however, the fighting began again in the location of C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf. The three companies were ordered to move north, west and then south to rejoin the main force. (Diagram 12) This, the force successfully accomplished. The extraction of C Co, 2d Bn, 27th Inf began immediately and was completed at 1600 hours. At 1610 hours, 1st Bn, 18th Inf from the 1st Inf Div landed and the extraction of 1st Bn, 27th Inf Task Force began. At 1630 hours, C Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew. B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf withdrew. B Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf set up a secondary block. B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Inf followed by C Co, 3d Bn, 21st Inf and A Co, 1st Bn, 27th Inf conducted a passage of lines through the block. At the same time artillery fire was called in to within 25 meters of the withdrawing elements. At 1700 hours the extraction was complete.

c. Phase III (5 Nov - 10 Nov was under the control of the 1st Infantry Division.

d. Phase IV (10 Nov - 26 Nov). For a detail account of units' actions, see the Brigade and Battalion reports at Appendix 2.

(1) On 7 November, following heavy contact by elements of the 1st Inf Div northeast of SOUI DA, this division was ordered to start operations in the western part of War Zone C. HQ, 2d Bde and the 2d Bn, 14th Inf were ordered to move to TAY NINH which they accomplished on 8 Nov 66. On 9 Nov, the Div Fwd CP along with Hq, Div Arty displaced to TAY NINH. The Div Fwd assumed operational control at 0930 10 Nov. The Div mission was to destroy elements of the 9th VC Div in War Zone C. At this time, it was believed the 271st Regt (VC) was located in the woods northeast of BAU CO via XT3370. An order was passed to the 2d Bde to conduct S&D operations to destroy the 271st Regt with priority to objective MONKEY via XT3370. Operations would not go further north than the 80 east west grid line. Guidance from COMUS MACV required that one B52 strike per day be planned for by each division. The operation began on 10 Nov. The 2d Bde on that day moved the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf and the 2d Bn, 14th Inf to BAU CO (XT2768) to establish a fire support base. The 1st Bn, 8th Arty then displaced to BAU CO. A decision was made to open the LOC from SOUI DA to BAU CO in order to save on helicopter support.

(2) On 11 Nov, the II FFORCEV commander attached 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf from the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div to the 25th Div (-). The Div was to use the battalion near GO DAU HA in order to protect against a threat from the BOI LOI - HOBO Woods complex (XT5333). The 1st Bn, 27th Inf was released from the 1st Inf Div on 11 Nov and arrived at BAU CO on 11 Nov. A series of operations were conducted by this base (see diagram 11&12). The 2d Bn, 14th Inf conducted operations from 11-13 Nov, east of BAU CO, sending patrols as far as the south edge of MONKEY. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf conducted an airmobile assault on the 12th and established a base to search out an area hit by a B52 strike. (See diagram 13 for B52 strike areas). The 2d Bn, 27th Inf moved to BAU CO on 12 Nov. Also on the same day elements of the 196th Inf Bde (LT)(SEP) were released from 1st Inf Div. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf conducted a S&D operation north of BAU CO and established on 12 Nov a base which was later called Fire Support Base #1 in the vicinity XT275790. The 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf established three company bases north of GO DAU HA and BAO DON with the mission of conducting operations south of the BOI LOI Woods. On the morning of 12 Nov, the battalion was given orders to secure the Rt 22 bypass in the vicinity of CAU KHOI Plantation in the vicinity XT3445. The Bn made this move on 13 Nov. On 14 Nov, the battalion mission again changed, this time because of a change of mission for the division. The division's mission changed from a search and destroy mission to reconnaissance in force astride Route #4 to KATUM and be prepared to move north and seize objectives in the vicinity of the Cambodian Border or to move southeast to seize BO DUC. The 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf was attached to the 2d Brigade on 14 Nov. The Brigade therefore had 2 mechanized battalions, 3 infantry battalions and 2 artillery battalions. The 2d Bn, 1st Inf took over the mission of guarding the Route #22 Bypass and the plantation. At that time the division was directed to construct a Special Forces camp in the vicinity of Fire Support Base #1 prior to the completion of the operation. Though this mission was later rescinded, it did make the division keep the Fire Support Base at BAU CO open longer than intended.

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Fire Support Base #2 in the vicinity of XT270865 was established by the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf and the 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf on 15 Nov. Two batteries of artillery were then moved to the area. Local operations were conducted in the vicinity of both Fire Support Bases for several days. The base at BAU CO was closed on 17 Nov 66 and the 2d Bn, 14th Inf moved back to TAY MINH. On 18 Nov, the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf drove north and prepared to recon east of KATUM. The 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf established a base north of KATUM in the vicinity of XT9627. The battalion conducted operations in the area until the 22d. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf moved from Fire Support Base #1 to Fire Support Base #2 on the 18th. A series of combat assaults were conducted from 20-23 Nov. The 2d Bn, 14th Inf conducted one the 20th in the vicinity of XT204803, where the 2d Bn (M), 22d Inf had a sharp fire fight the day before. They conducted another on the 21st to establish a temporary fire support base to support the Aero-Rifle Platoon, D Troop, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav which exploited a B52 strike next to the border. The 1st Bn, 27th Inf conducted a combat assault on 21 Nov and another on 23 Nov. The decision was made not to move the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf southeast to the BO TUC area. Rather, the 2d Bn 27th Inf conducted an air assault into the area on the 22d. On the 23d, the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf moved back to Fire Base #1 and then secured Fire Base #0 in the vicinity of XT1977 on 24 Nov with one company. The majority of units moved back to base camp on 24 Nov and the operation terminated on 25 Nov for all except the 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf which conducted a reconnaissance to TRAI BI (XT1170).

12. RESULTS:

Enemy Losses:

a. Personnel.

VC KIA (BC)	254
VC KIA (poss)	237
VCC	6
VCS	60
Detainees	19

b. Equipment:

(1) Captured:

Field Expedient Rocket Launcher	1
60 mm Mortar	1
100mm Grenade Launcher	2
Shotguns	2
CHICOM SMG	1
Thompson SMG	1
BAR	2
CHICOM Assault Rifles	3
CHICOM 7.62 Rifles	2
CHICOM Carbines	2
ML Rifle	3
Russian Rifles	2

French MAS-36 Rifle	1	
Rifle (type unknown)	3	
Homemade rifle	1	
US Carbines	3	
9mm Pistol	1	
Homemade Pistols	2	
Cross Bow	1	
Dart Gun	1	
RFG-2 Rocket Rounds	4	
60mm Mortar Rounds	6	
Small Arms Ammunition	588	
Claymore Mines	12	
AP Mines	2	
Rifle Grenades	54	
Hand Grenades	104	
AT Mines	4	
Rice	401	tons
Beans	15	tons
Canned Food	25	lbs
Milk, 8oz cans	820	
Salt	154	tons
Peanuts	2500	lbs
Bagle	1	
Military Radio, portable	1	
Motor, Sampan	1	
Tin	680	sheets
Bicycles	25	
Medicine	50	bottles
Cement, 100 lb bags	33	bags
1" x 12" lumber	20	
Sulfa drugs	15	lbs
Epsom Salt	150	lbs
Medical Supplies	4	lbs
Clothing	105	lbs
Detonating Cord	10	ft
Radio, transistor, commercial	3	
Cooking oil	600	gals
Batteries	98	
WD handle Shovels	300	
Medical Uniforms	6	
Pills (type unknown)	1000	
Gas Masks	3	
Chinese SMG Magazine	5	
Binoculars	1	
.50 Cal MG Barrel	1	
Radio Transmitter	1	
12.7mm Hvy MG Barrels	2	
Wheeled Mounts	2	
Fuses, Electrical	2	
Refrigerators	2	

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(2) Destroyed.		
105mm Rds	4	
80mm Rds	3	
SA Ammo	1026	
100 lb Bombs	2	
500 lb Bombs	2	
250 lb Bombs	1	
200 lb Bombs	1	
20 lb Bombs	5	
AT Mines	12	
AP Mines	15	
Claymore Mines	1	
Booby Traps	43	
Hand Grenades	91	
CBU	29	
Elasting Caps	2	
VC Structures	228	
Tunnels	92	
Bridge	1	
Caves	36	
Underground Fortifications	102	
Punji Pits	141	
Foxholes	169	
Trenches	12	
Weapons emplacements	28	
Sampans	18	
Oxcarts	16	
Boat Docks	2	
Rice	729.4	tons
Wheat	800	lbs
Fertilizer	1050	lbs
Fish	7955	lbs
Canned Food	240	lbs
Cement, 5 lb bags	8	
Clothing	460	lbs
TNF	10	lbs
Tar	440	gals
Gasoline	500	gals
Salt	10	tons
Tobacco	9000	lbs
Bears	1	ton
Picks	50	
"D" Handle Shovels	61	
Bicycles	2	
Motor, outboard	1	
Acid (type unknown)	176	gals
Rice mill	1	
Peas	100	lbs
Wire	350	ft

Friendly Losses (Phase I, II, III, IV)

a. Personnel

	<u>196th Bde</u>	<u>25th Inf Div (-)</u>
KPA	53	44
WHA	399	342
DOW		4

b. Equipment.

½ ton M151	4	
Wrecker 5T	1	
Tractor 5T	1	
M113 P0		4

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. Logistics. For a listing of logistic problems encountered see the After Action Report of the 25th Inf Div SUPCOM (App 2).

b. Signal. The circuits established to support this operation are described in the 125th Signal Bn After Action Report (App 2).

14. CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

a. Civic Action did not become a part of Operation ATTENBORO to a measurable degree. This was due to a lack of civilian populace in the AO, particularly in War Zone C. An element of the 196th Bde did conduct one MEDCAP at BEN RUNG (XT3240), a VC dominated hamlet in the CAU KHOI rubber plantation, treating 207 patients. This battalion was statically deployed in the area of this hamlet for a prolonged period on a route security mission. An incident occurred on 19 Nov when a 1st Div tank struck and seriously injured an elderly man. He subsequently passed away and was identified as the 3d ranking bishop of the CAO DAI Temple of TAY NINH. The CG, 196th Bde and his S5 accompanied by the TAY NINH Province Chief immediately paid their respects to the ranking CAO DAI Bishop expressing their regrets. Solatium was paid and the bishop was most impressed by their expression of concern and sympathy. There was little PSYOP exploit possible during the operation due to a lack of HOI CHINH, and few prisoners were taken. Leaflets and loudspeaker tapes were planned and utilized by the 196th Bde and by the division PSYOP section in support of the 2d Bde. In future operations, each Bde must plan daily application of PSYOP activities as a regular support adjunct to their tactical plans. Div PSYOP developed and locally reproduced an outline strip map which was distributed with CHIEU HOI leaflets and NSC passes prior to operations in the KATUM area (XT3093) in an effort to reach any possible returnees who might be located in this area. The total leaflets distributed and loudspeaker missions flown follow with general subject themes:

Total - 2,697,000 leaflets

14 loudspeaker missions

	<u>G5 & 246th PSYOP Co</u>	<u>196th Bde</u>
a. CHIEU HOI	780,000	1,377,000
Forward, Scare	435,000	52,000
Reward for weapons or info	105,000	50,000
Loudspeaker missions	*8	6

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*NOTE: Figure includes 3 days of "No Dose" missions.

b. B52 strikes were exploited by quantity leaflet drops by the 246th Co. No Civic Action/PSYOP evaluation of population and attitudes was possible because of the sparsely populated nature of the general AO.

15. Commanders Analysis. An after action critique by organic and attached infantry commanders was conducted on 29 Nov 66 (App 3).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1
Incls
~~1 Diagrams 1 thru 12~~ w/d
2 Combat Opns After Action Reports
~~3 Critique of Opn ATLEBOHO~~ w/d


G. L. JENNINGS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

HEADQUARTERS
25TH AVIATION BATTALION (INF DIV)
APO 96225

29 AVDCAVB-C

15 December 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (U)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96225

1. (U) IDENTITY OF OPERATION: Operation Attlaboro.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 11th through 25th November 1966.
3. (U) LOCATION: Tay Ninh Province.
4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Edward F. Davis, Commanding Officer,
25th Aviation Battalion.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 25th Aviation Battalion.
 - b. ASSIGNED OR OPERATIONAL CONTROL:
 - Co A, 25th Aviation Battalion
 - Co B, 25th Aviation Battalion
 - 170th Aviation Co, APO 96316 (OPCN)
 - 175th Aviation Co, APO 96357 (OPCA)
 - c. OTHER UNITS UNDER 25TH AVIATION BATTALION CONTROL FOR PORTIONS OF THE OPERATION:
 - Headquarters, 145th Aviation Battalion (-), APO 96227.
 - 56th Transportation Co (-), APO 96307.
 - 71st Aviation Co (-), APO 96227.
 - 116th Aviation Co (-), APO 96225
 - 118th Aviation Co (-), APO 96227

128th Aviation Co (-), A/C 96289
 162nd Aviation Co (-), A.C 96289
 147th Aviation Co (Hed), APO 96291
 178th Aviation Co (Hed), APC 96289

7. (U) SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS: N/A

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: N/A

9. (C) MISSIONS: The 25th Aviation Battalion (+) provided aviation support to the 25th Infantry Division during the conduct of Operation Attleboro to include aviation combat assaults, aerial supply, command and control aircraft, aerial reconnaissance, armed helicopter support, and artillery repositioning.

10. (C) OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION:

a. During the period 11-24 November 1966 the 25th Aviation Battalion established a forward command post, vicinity Tay Ninh East Airfield (XT1651). The 145th Aviation Battalion Headquarters (-), 170th Aviation Co, and 175th Aviation Co co-located their elements with the 25th Aviation Battalion forward command post. Other supporting aviation units commuted from home station on daily or mission basis, as required.

b. The overall controlling headquarters for aviation support during Operation Attleboro was the 25th Aviation Battalion. The 145th Aviation Battalion was utilized as the controlling headquarters for all troop lift missions.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. The 25th Aviation Battalion and supporting aviation units conducted the following troop movements during the period 11-24 November 1966:

<u>TROOP MOVEMENT</u>	<u>BATTALION</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>
Combat Assaults	10	None
Extractions	10	None
Repositions	5	1

b. A total of sixteen Artillery Battery repositionings were conducted by attached CH-47 helicopters.

c. A total of 5,658 flying hours were flown by units under the control of the 25th Aviation Battalion during the period 11-24 November 1966. A detailed analysis of these totals is included as TAB A.

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12. (C) RESULTS:

- a. No friendly aviation personnel were wounded in action.
- b. A total of 4 VC were KBAA (CG). A total of 3 VC were KBAA (FGSS).

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Supply: Adequate
- b. Maintenance: Adequate. Supporting aviation units rotated aircraft from home station or nearby fixed facilities to perform organizational and direct support maintenance.
- c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization: N/A.
- d. Transportation: N/A.
- e. Communications: Adequate.
- f. Medical Evacuation: N/A.

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: N/A

15. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. General.

(1) Artillery firing during the conduct of airmobile operations endangered troop carriers and embarked personnel.

(a) Discussion: Infantry Battalion Artillery Liaison Officers aboard C&C aircraft were not able to provide timely control of fires during airmobile lifts. This difficulty is attributed to employment of artillery units from several fire support bases in support of several maneuver units. The Artillery LNO in the C&C aircraft controlled only those fires in support of the battalion conducting the airmobile assault,

(b) Recommendation: Artillery Liaison Officers aboard C&C aircraft during the conduct of airmobile operations must be from an echelon that is capable of controlling all artillery fires which have an influence on the execution of the airmobile operation.

(2) Two Aviation Battalion Headquarters are neither required nor desirable for an operation of the scope encountered in Operation Attleboro.

(a) Discussion: The Division's organic aviation battalion is capable of controlling tactical and logistical support for tactical operations of the magnitude encountered in Operation Attleboro. Augmentation is required in FOL dispensing systems and pathfinders. The addition of another aviation battalion headquarters serves to increase the chain of communications and coordination required to execute a given mission. The addition of a second headquarters creates a structure which becomes unwieldy when tactical lift requirements and logistical lift requirements are intermeshed utilizing the same aviation assets.

(b) Recommendation: That the Division's organic Aviation Battalion be utilized to conduct and control all airborne activities in support of operations employing tactical forces of the size encountered in Operation Attleboro.

(3) Airfield operating personnel must be augmented when operating forward airfield facilities.

(a) Discussion: In addition to operating the forward airfield, forward refueling, and forward rearming areas, the aviation battalion was responsible for the normal operation of the Division Base Airfield at Cu Chi. Approximately seventy percent of the aviation battalion airfield operating personnel were required for the sustained operation of the forward facilities at Tay Ninh West Airfield. Only thirty percent of the personnel remained at the Base Airfield, thereby drastically reducing the operating capability of the airfield.

(b) Recommendation: That the requirement for the personnel and equipment to operate the division forward airfield control tower be placed on USARV on a mission basis. The 125th Air Traffic Control Company has the additional mission of operating forward airfields on a mission request basis. A solution arrived at by the 1st Infantry Division is to use a support battalion for the operation of the facilities in the forward area.

(4) Separate refueling areas and adequate POL dispensing equipment for CH-47 and UH-1 aircraft are essential to efficiently utilize all available daily operating hours of aircraft lift assets.

(a) Discussion: CH-47 aircraft refueling requires approximately thirty minutes per aircraft utilizing the standard 1200 gallon POL dispensing truck. A ratio of one 1200 gallon truck per two operating CH-47's is required to preclude refueling delays. UH-1 aircraft refueling areas and dispensing systems must be capable of refueling a minimum of ten troop carrier aircraft and two armed helicopters at one time. This is best accomplished through the use of six, 100 GPM portable dispensing pumps.

(b) Recommendation: That separate refueling areas be established for CH-47 and UH-1 aircraft on all future operations.

(5) Pathfinder requirements for the control of simultaneous activities involving troop lifts and resupply by airborne light companies and artillery or heavy equipment displacement by CH-47 aircraft exceeds the capability of the Division's organic pathfinder detachment.

(a) Discussion: The personnel and equipment of the Division's organic pathfinder detachment will permit simultaneous operation in three areas at one time. During Operation Attleboro, pathfinders were frequently required to operate simultaneously in six areas: Three locations working CH-47 loading or unloading, one UH-1D resupply area, one troop pickup zone and one staging area for reaction forces.

(b) Recommendation: The Division's pathfinder detachment be augmented with a detachment of pathfinders from the unit providing CH-47 support.

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(6) Aviation requirements for tactical operations and logistical support must be considered simultaneously.

(a) Discussion: Aviation requirements constantly exceeded aviation assets for a given day. It is a must that the unit commander be apprised of aviation assets and consider the requirements for tactical operations and logistical support simultaneously. The commander must consider the effect of each of these areas upon the other and how he can best accomplish the mission.

(b) Recommendation: That the unit logistical representative and the aviation liaison officer be brought into the tactical planning as early as possible. This will enable complete plans to be formulated and presented to the commander for a decision only after all aspects of the operation have been considered.

(7) Requirements for UH-1D command and control aircraft deplete the aviation airlift capability.

(a) Discussion: All requirements for C & C aircraft must be taken from available total lift assets. This reduces the capability of the aviation unit to perform its mission of troop lift or aerial resupply. During Operation Attleboro, four UH-1D aircraft were utilized for C&C by the Brigade. Under this concept, and assuming a two brigade operation, the assets of one lift company will be required to support C&C requirements.

(b) Recommendation:

1. That the OH-23 capability of the Brigade be used to provide C&C aircraft for ground commanders not engaged in airmobile operations.

2. Each brigade be furnished one UH-1D for C&C to augment assigned OH-23s.

(8) Planning of aviation support must consider the effects of adverse weather and darkness.

(a) Discussion: It is desirable to complete all aviation operations during daylight hours. Night operations near the border and over undefined terrain are hazardous. Adverse weather, i.e. early morning fog and late afternoon thundershowers, must always be considered as possibility. The effect of these limitations on the mission must be considered by the commander.

(b) Recommendation: That emphasis and consideration be placed on the possibility of adverse weather and darkness when planning an operation. Alternate courses of action should be established.

(9) The determination of overall aviation requirements to support a given operation must consider the rotation of units for maintenance down time.

(c) Discussion: Neither the Division nor supporting aviation companies possesses the capability to displace adequate G. and DS maintenance support to forward locations to sustain the high flying hour demands which were imposed during Operation Attleboro.

(b) Recommendation: Provisions must be made to station aviation units on a maintenance facility near the base of deployment for a portion of their G. and all of their DS maintenance or have sufficient latitude in aviation assets available versus demands so as to permit rotation of units, or portions thereof, to home station for maintenance.

b. Tactical Operations.

(1) No difficulties were encountered during airmobile operations. This is attributed to the extensive airmobile experience of the units of the 2nd Brigade to include the planning, coordination and execution of combat assaults.

(2) Time factors for the airmobile deployment of artillery units must consider the airmobile experience level of these units.

(a) Discussion: The ability of an artillery unit to meet average, expected airmobile deployment times is directly proportional to the airmobile training and experience of that unit. Attempts to move such units by airmobile means during the rapid pace of combat operations can have a serious impact on the entire ground tactical plan if this factor is not considered and appropriate allowances made.

(b) Recommendation: That artillery units without previous airmobile experience be employed where time factors are not critical, and where feasible, assistance be provided by personnel from experienced units.

(3) Three CH-47 aircraft are normally adequate for the rapid displacement of a 105mm Artillery Battery for one-way distances up to 30 Kilometers. An increase in aircraft above this number offers no increase in expediting the displacement.

(a) Discussion: The determining factor in short distance displacement of artillery units is the speed with which a unit can rig its equipment for movement. The allocation of lift aircraft above that level which the unit can handle, only results in inefficient use of aircraft.

(b) Recommendation: That extreme care be utilized in determining and scheduling aircraft for heavy lift requirements. The CH-47 Liaison officer is best able to assist a unit in determining the maximum number of aircraft which a unit can efficiently utilize for a rapid move.

c. Aerial Resupply.

(1) An adequate resupply staging area, properly organized and controlled, is essential.

(a) Discussion: UH-1D aerial resupply was hampered initially by lack of adequate resupply staging area. This was later remedied and positive control and coordination permitted efficient movement of supplies to the units in the field.

(b) Recommendation: Prior to an operation, detailed planning must be directed toward establishing the resupply staging areas.

(2) Aviation support of the magnitude required during Operation Attleboro is dependent on early anticipation of the ground unit's requirements and timely passage of information to supporting aviation battalion. Liaison Officers from the aviation battalion and OH-47 unit, located in the Brigade forward command post were found to be indispensable.

(a) Discussion: Upon receipt of the cumulative daily sortie requests, the Brigade S-3, Brigade Aviation Officer and the Aviation Liaison Officers considered the validity of the request, established priorities and computed the aircraft requirements for the following day.

(b) Recommendation: That liaison officers be utilized on all future operations of this magnitude.

(3) Unit equipment and supply displacement by airmobile means must be controlled by a representative of the highest headquarters being displaced.

(a) Discussion: A single representative vested with the authority to act in accordance with the ground commanders desires and supported with adequate communications must be present to direct pathfinder personnel during the displacement of a unit's equipment and supplies. In the absence of such a representative of the ground commander, with an adequate communications capability, pathfinder personnel are left without proper guidance should a situation arise which necessitates a change in priority or sequence of events.

(b) Recommendation: That a staff representative of the headquarters being displaced, with necessary communications equipment remain at the displacement site to lend guidance to pathfinder personnel during the conduct of the displacement.

(4) A central agency is necessary to establish resupply requirements and priority of movement.

(a) Discussion: The brigade designated an individual who received and consolidated the logistical requirements for all of the maneuver and fire support elements. He coordinated logistical requirements in view of tactical requirements and priorities established for aerial resupply. Each battalion further evaluated and established priorities within their assigned block of sorties.

(b) Recommendation: That the brigade designate a individual to function as a center agency for consolidating resupply requirements and establishing the priority of movement of supplies for all units of the Brigade Task Force.

(5) Accurate forecasting of logistical requirements by supported units is essential.

(a) Discussion: For routine operations, it is essential that daily logistical requirements forecast be accurate and expressed in terms of sorties. In general, the following sortie requirements were average for this operation:

DAILY RESUPPLY SORTIES

	<u>UH-1D SORTIES</u>	<u>CH-47 SORTIES</u>
Bde Hq	4-5	None
Inf Bn	15-18	None
Mech Bn	22-28	2 (FOL) (20 Barrels per sortie)
Arty Btry	None	5 (4 Ammo, 1 water trailer)

DAILY CARGO EXTRACTION SORTIES

	<u>UH-1D SORTIES</u>	<u>CH-47 SORTIES</u>
Bde Hq	1	None
Inf Bn	5-7	None
Mech Bn	10-12	1 (Empty FOL barrels)
Arty Btry	None	1

CARGO SORTIES REQUIRED TO REPOSITION UNITS

	<u>CH-47 SORTIES</u>
Bde Hq	8
Inf Bn	1
Mech Bn	
Arty Bn	13-19

(b) Recommendation: That standardized initial supply sorties be established for units based on unit tactical employment. That Unit S-4's establish typical daily aerial resupply requirements for each individual unit to eliminate the accumulation of supplies in the forward location.

(6) A daily meeting of aviation and logistical representatives to review all requirements is essential.

3/ (a) Discussion: Throughout the operation, the daily meeting (2100 hrs) of the aviation and logistical representatives was most beneficial. This meeting permitted a discussion of the day's activities, evaluation and establishment of the coming day's requirements, and the resolution of any problem or difficulties which may have arisen during the current day's operations.

(b) Recommendation: That this meeting be made a matter of regular practice.

(7) It is desirable that moving units establish a night base early enough to receive resupply during daylight hours. The area chosen should be large enough for multicraft resupply.

(a) Discussion: On several occasions units failed to establish a night base in sufficient time to receive resupply during daylight. Adverse weather combined with darkness could have prevented the unit's receiving critical supplies on several occasions.

(b) Recommendation: That moving units attempt to establish a resupply base in sufficient time to receive resupply during daylight hours. That this base be capable of accommodating five aircraft simultaneously whenever the tactical situation and terrain permits.

(8) Aerial resupply of artillery ammunition can be greatly expedited by prepacked loads.

(a) Discussion: The packing of artillery ammunition for aerial delivery is quite time consuming. The prepacking of loads during period of very light requirements will preclude an interruption in flow during periods of heavy requirements.

(b) Recommendation: That artillery ammunition be prepacked and rigged for aircraft sling loads to meet normal resupply and emergency resupply requirements.

1 Incl
as

Edward P. Davis
EDWARD P. DAVIS
LTC, ARMOR
Commanding

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

TAB A, Summary of Aircraft Flying Hours, Operation Attleboro

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1. The following is a summary of the aircraft flying hours for units in direct support of the 25th Infantry Division during Operation Attleboro from 11-24 November 1966.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
11th Combat Aviation Battalion	1,100
145th Combat Aviation Battalion	1,334
22nd Combat Support Aviation Bn.	407
170th Aviation Company	921
175th Aviation Company	1,020
A Co, 25th Aviation Battalion	724
B Co, 25th Aviation Battalion	328
TOTAL FLYING HOURS	5,658

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96225

33
AVDCMA-OP

12 December 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCMAO
APO 96225

1. NAME: Operation Attleboro.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 1 Nov thru 25 Nov 66.
3. LOCATION: Western Binh Duong Province and Northern Tay Ninh Province.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 25th Infantry Division.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Daniel B Williams
6. TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMANDER:

1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (LTC James M Cannon, Cmdg)

Btry A (1-3 Nov, 12 Nov-25 Nov)

Btry B

Btry C

Btry A, 2d Bn, 13th Arty (9-23 Nov)

Btry A (-), 2d Bn, 77th Arty (22-23 Nov)

Btry B, 3d Bn, 13th Arty (5 Nov)

3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (LTC Billy B Nicholas, Cmdg)

Btry A (-) (9 Nov-25 Nov)

Btry B (-) (9-17 Nov, 24-25 Nov)

Plat Btry D (9 Nov-25 Nov)

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

Btry C, 2d Bn, 32d Arty; GS; Reinf 1st Div Arty and 25th Div Arty.

Strategic Air Command provided extensive B-52 strikes.

7th Air Force provided direct air support.

25th Aviation Battalion provided UH-1D aircraft.

184th Aviation Company provided O1 aircraft.

147th Aviation Company provided CH-47 aircraft.

178th Aviation Company provided CH-47 aircraft.

8. INTELLIGENCE: Reports indicated that contact had been made with elements of the 9th VC Division during the week of 1 November. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade made contact with the 101st NVA Regiment and the 273d VC Regiment of the 9th VC Division. In the areas of Nui Ba Den the 1st & 2d Battalions, 70th Regiment were encountered. After 9 November there was no major contact with either VC or NVA. The area of operation was a VC stronghold with many caches. The total material captured or destroyed was the largest of the war.

9. MISSION: For the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, Operation ATTLEBORO is divided for convenience into three phases with elements of the command executing assigned missions as noted below:

Phase 1 (1-4 Nov) Reinforce fires of 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

Phase 2 (5-11 Nov) Reinforce 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

Phase 3 (12-25 Nov) Provide direct and general support for the committed organic and attached maneuver elements of the 25th Infantry Division.

10. EXECUTION:

a. 1 November: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery became the first element of the command to become engaged in Operation ATTLEBORO. Initially an alert was received to move one 105mm howitzer battery to Tay Ninh at 1045 hrs. At 1144 hrs the requirement was changed to move the battery to Dau Tieng by air movement. The movement to Dau Tieng was initiated at 1400 hrs and the battery closed vicinity XT 492 473 at 2200 hrs having utilized 17 CH-47 sorties. The battery was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery.

b. 2 November: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery continued its mission of reinforcing the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery at Dau Tieng. In order to provide medium artillery fire, Battery C (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from vicinity Go Dau Ha to vicinity Truong Mit (XT 398394) closing at 1130 hrs and was assigned the mission of GS; reinforce 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery.

c. 3 November: The build up of artillery support continued as a Platoon of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (attached to 3d

Battalion, 82d Artillery) was moved to vicinity Soui Da (XT 349579). Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and Battery C (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery remained in place and continued their missions. Enemy activity indicated substantial enemy strength and resulted in three friendly casualties (1 KIA and 2 WIA) in the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

d. 4 November: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was attached to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery effective 0001 hours. The battery fired in support of both the 1st and 2d Battalions, 27th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry became heavily engaged at 1200 hours and was pinned down by heavy automatic weapons fire. The enemy attacked Company A, 1st Battalion 27th Infantry using human wave assaults, but was repulsed with the aid of fires from Battery A. The enemy attacked again at 1800 hours and was again repulsed with the aid of Battery A's fires. On 5 November surveillance of the area by an infantry element credited Battery A for 25 VC KIA (body count) and 150 VC KIA (possible). The positioning of artillery to support the operation continued with a Platoon of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (attached to 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery) moving to Soui Da (XT 349579) joining the platoon already there. In addition, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Cu Chi Base Camp to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 2130 hours and was attached to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. Battery C (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from vicinity Truong Mit to vicinity Co Dau Ha (XT 414239) where it remained for the rest of the operation in support of convoys traversing Highway #1 and #22 contributing indirectly to the success of Operation ATTLEBORO.

e. 5 November: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery remained at Dau Tieng and along with other elements of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade were placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. A command group from the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery moved from Cu Chi to vicinity Soui Da (XT 349579) by CH-47 closing at 0855 hours and assumed control of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to Soui Da and was attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery closing at 1000 hours. The Platoon of Battery D, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery which was attached to the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and positioned at Tay Ninh with concurrence of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery was directed to move to Soui Da and to become attached to Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery. Maintenance difficulties precluded 1 howitzer from moving, however, the platoon less the 1 howitzer displaced to Soui Da closing at 1815 hours and was attached as stated. The second howitzer was repaired with a part airlifted from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh the night of 5-6 November and displaced to Soui Da closing at 061715 hours. At 2400 hours the command group relinquished control of the two batteries which were then placed under control of the 1st Infantry Division.

f. 6 November: At 0001 elements previously under the control of the command group, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery were attached to the 1st Infantry Division. The command group returned to Tay Ninh closing at 1235 hours. At this point all elements of the command that were supporting Operation ATTLEBORO were either attached to or under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division.

g. 7 November: The control group from the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to Cu Chi by ground convoy closing at 1828 hours.

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h. 8 November: At 1200 hours information was received that the tactical CP of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division would move to Tay Ninh immediately. 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (-) was attached to the 2d Brigade Task Force as of 1200 hours and was to move with the brigade. At 1515 hours the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery departed Cu Chi for Tay Ninh closing at 1835 hours. At about 1800 hours the Division Artillery was alerted to move a forward command post to Tay Ninh and the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-) to Soui Da on 9 November.

i. 9 November: The 25th Infantry Division Artillery forward CP displaced from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh Base Camp and established a forward tactical CP vicinity XT 165520 closing at 1200 hours. The 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-) displaced from Cu Chi to Soui Da (XT 343577) closing at 1400 hours and assumed control of its organic units already there. At that time the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-) was comprised of elements of Headquarters, Headquarters & Service Battery, Battery A (-), Battery B (-) and a Platoon of Battery D. The battalion was placed under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery was released from control of the 1st Infantry Division and displaced to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 1630 hours where it was attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and prepared for air movement.

j. 10 November: At 0600 hours the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery reverted to control of the 25th Infantry Division and was assigned the mission of GS; reinforce 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery. A battalion command group and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery moved by air to vicinity Bau Tam (XT 276685) using 29 CH-47 sorties closing at 1810 hours. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery was released from control of the 1st Division and returned to Tay Ninh Base Camp closing at 1840 hours.

k. 11 November: Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and Battery D, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery displaced from Tay Ninh to vicinity Bau Tam (XT 276685) utilizing 41 CH-47 sorties. The forward CP of the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery returned to Tay Ninh completing the active participation of that battalion in Operation ATTLEBORO. The enemy attacked the Tay Ninh Base Camp with rifle grenades at 2110 hours. As a result of the reaction to this attack, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 25th Infantry Division Artillery sustained 1 KIA when a defective US Air Force flare struck an enlisted man from the aviation section on the head.

l. 12 November: Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was released from attachment to the 1st Infantry Division and moved by air to vicinity Trai Bi (XT 119692) utilizing 11 CH-47 sorties. One sortie resulted in a howitzer being dropped some 5 kilometers from its destination. That howitzer was later located through the search efforts of CIDG forces

from Trai Bi and the villagers of Xoa Hoa Duc and destroyed to prevent its use by the enemy. At 0200 the enemy again struck the Tay Ninh Base Camp with mortars which continued until 0220 hours. Casualties sustained by Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 25th Division Artillery were 12 MIA with the majority of the personnel from the communications section. One warrant officer in the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was also wounded. In addition the Special Forces Compound at Trang Sup was mortared resulting in 1 KIA and 1 MIA in the Platoon of Battery B, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery positioned there.

m. 13 November: Battery A (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Soui Da to vicinity Bau Tam (XT 278680) closing at 1305 hours and was assigned a mission of GS; reinforce 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

n. 14 November: The command post of the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was split into two control groups. Battery A, Battery C and Battalion Control Group number one, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery were moved by air to vicinity XT 273785 using 34 CH-47 sorties.

o. 15 November: Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery under control of a battalion control group were airlifted from Bau Tam to a position vicinity XT 2686 utilizing 35 CH-47 sorties. A preparation, to include smoking the eastern slopes of Nui Ba Den while the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry (Mechanized) moved past Nui Ba Den, was fired under Division Artillery control. A Platoon of Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery displaced from Cu Chi to Soui Da joining the Battery (-) that had been previously positioned there.

p. 16 November: All artillery units remained in position. In addition to its normal direct support mission, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery supported a long range reconnaissance patrol action near grid XT 2795. The patrol adjusted fire against Viet Cong in the open and credited the artillery with 10 VC KIA (body count). With the aid of fires from Battery B, the patrol was extracted from the area without sustaining a casualty.

q. 17 November: Since elements of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division were out of range and road trafficability precluded movement forward, and to lend credence to the Division feint to the left, all elements of the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery were displaced to the vicinity of Tay Ninh with Battery B (-) returning to its Base at Trang Sup where it was attached to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade and the remaining elements closing into Tay Ninh Base Camp vicinity XT 154516. The 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery remained in position.

r. 18 November: All artillery units remained in position and continued their missions.

s. 19 November: All artillery units remained in position and continued their missions. The intensive H&I program that had been

instituted by the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was increased further as a result of intelligence indicating an increased effectiveness against the enemy. 35

t. 20 November: The Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery was alerted to replace Battery A (-), 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, which had been attached to his battalion, and prepare it for air movement and further attachment to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery displaced from Soui Da to Tay Ninh Base Camp. An intensified H&I program was continued.

u. 21 November: Battery C (-), 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery displaced to a firing position vicinity Phum Prey Sala (XT 265960) in support of Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry's exploitation of a B-52 strike near the Cambodian border. One howitzer was damaged when it was dropped from a height of 10 feet. After the exploitation, Battery C was airlifted to vicinity XT 335925 where it supported the 1st Battalion, 5th (Mechanized) Infantry. Two preparations were fired and the intense H&I program continued.

v. 22 November: Battery C, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery supported the airmobile operation of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, vicinity XT 3785 and then displaced by air to Tay Ninh. Battery A (-), 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery was attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and airlifted into fire support base number 1, vicinity Van Lich (XT 276785) in support of the 2d Battalion, 22d (Mechanized) Infantry. Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Battery, Battery A (-) and one Platoon of Battery D, 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced to positions vicinity Soui Da (XT 342579) where it closed at 1400 hours. At 2155 hours, the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery was attacked by mortars. Approximately 20 mortar rounds were received which inflicted 15 casualties including one enlisted man KIA and two officers and 12 enlisted men wounded.

w. 23 November: Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery supported an airmobile assault by the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and then was airlifted to Tay Ninh Base Camp where it closed at 1745 hours, was released from attachment to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and prepared for movement back to Phu Loi Base Camp.

x. 24 November: Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery was released from attachment and departed Tay Ninh for Phu Loi closing at 1645 hours. Battery A (-), 77th Artillery was released from attachment to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery and was airlifted to Soui Da where it joined the 2d Battalion, 22d (Mechanized) Infantry. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery supported the extraction of all elements from fire support base number 2 and the move of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery to vicinity Soc Ky (XT 185765) fire support base number 0, and then together with the battalion control group was airlifted to Tay Ninh Base Camp. Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery displaced from Trang Sup to vicinity Trai Bi (XT 117698) where it was given a mission of GS, reinforce Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

y. 25 November: The 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery (-) displaced from Tay Ninh Base Camp by road convoy and returned to Cu Chi Base Camp. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery supported the extraction of elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th (Mechanized) Infantry and was then airlifted to Tay Ninh Base Camp where it was attached to the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery. Elements of the Division Artillery Forward CP returned to Cu Chi Base Camp. The 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery (-) with Battery A (-) and a Platoon of Battery D returned to Cu Chi Base Camp and continued the mission of general support of the 25th Infantry Division. Battery B (-), 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery remained vicinity Trai Bi in support of elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th (Mechanized) Infantry. At 2400 hours, Operation ATTLEBORO terminated.

z. 26 November: Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 25th Infantry Division Artillery displaced to Cu Chi Base Camp.

11. RESULTS

a. Enemy losses.

- (1) Forty Viet Cong killed by artillery (body count).
- (2) One-hundred and seventy-nine Viet Cong killed by artillery (possible).
- (3) One Viet Cong structure destroyed.
- (4) Three Viet Cong structures damaged.
- (5) Three Viet Cong bunkers destroyed.

b. Friendly artillery losses.

- (1) Three US killed in action.
- (2) Thirty-four US wounded in action. (Note: This includes 4 US wounded when Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery was attached to the 1st Infantry Division)
- (3) Two OH-23 helicopters damaged. (Repaired)
- (4) Two AN/GRC 46 shelters damaged.
- (5) Two 105mm howitzers destroyed (not due to enemy action).

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. Maintenance: No abnormal mechanical failures were noted during the operation. Preventive maintenance was performed on all equipment during the operation.

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b. Transportation: During Operation ATTLEBORO extensive use of aircraft was utilized for both movement and resupply. Between 1 November and 25 November 1966 some 462 CH-47 sorties were utilized and the UH-1D flew an average of 5:30 hours each day re-supplying forward units and transporting unit and staff personnel. During the operation, support was both timely and well coordinated; often on short notice. The most efficient use of helicopter slings that are available deserves more study. On several occasions shortage of slings or components became critical to the operation. Prompt return of sling equipment to the resupply point must be emphasized. Battery personnel must be well trained in airmobile operations since Pathfinders often have little or no time to check loads.

c. Communications: The wide spread deployment of subordinate organizations made communications difficult. The use of retransmission facilities on Nui Ba Den, facilitated radio communications with subordinate and adjacent headquarters. VHF facilities afforded excellent communications and are considered mandatory for the accomplishment of the mission.

d. During the operation the Division Artillery continued its program of command inspections of subordinate organizations.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: A 200 meter height of burst with Shell WP fuze time was effective as the first round in adjustment for a ground observer in dense vegetation. It also proved to be effective in providing navigational marking rounds for maneuvering ground units as well as marking the limits of an axis of advance for a mechanized battalion.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: The major portion of Operation ATTLEBORO supported by the Division Artillery was a reconnaissance in force North into War Zone C by a reinforced brigade. Artillery support for the operation involved positioning batteries within fire bases secured by infantry battalions, and as the operation progressed, establishing new fire bases within artillery range of existing fire bases. Medium artillery was used in the mutually supporting fire bases as far into War Zone C as the roads permitted. However, most of the operation was supported by direct support 105mm howitzer batteries, which were employed in two-battery fire bases with an artillery control headquarters. During the operation, an extensive H&I program was developed. Intelligence derived from forward observer reports, visual reconnaissance flights, long range patrol reports, agent reports and other reconnaissance means was used as a basis for the program. Indications are that the H&I program was highly effective and as the operation progressed it was further intensified.

15. STATISTICAL DATA*

a. Artillery ammunition expenditures.

(1) HE		
(a) 105mm		28,354
(b) 155mm/8 in		<u>5,783</u>
TOTAL		34,137
(2) WP		
(a) 105mm		655
(b) 155mm		<u>143</u>
TOTAL		798
(3) ILL		
(a) 105mm		9
(b) 155mm		<u>85</u>
TOTAL		94

b. Missions by type:

(1) H&I's	5,533
(2) Support	798

* NOTES: All data includes the fires of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery during 1-5 November 1966, and the fires of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery for 5 November. It does not include the fires of the 3d Battalion, 82d Artillery or the fires of Battery A (-), 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery except for the period when it was attached to the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery.

c. OH-23G, Organic aircraft support by organization:


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>RECON</u>	<u>ARTY ADJ</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
1st Bn, 8th Arty	104:50	30:15	35:50	38:45
3d Bn, 13th Arty	61:30	15:10	11:00	35:20
Hq, Div Arty	<u>91:10</u>	<u>17:00</u>	<u>4:00</u>	<u>70:10</u>
TOTAL	257:30	72:25	50:50	144:15

d. O1 aircraft support (two O1s daily)

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<u>TOTAL HOURS</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
180:00	57	126

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ERNEST J STANDEVEN
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

