



*UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II*

Special Studies

CIVIL AFFAIRS:  
SOLDIERS BECOME GOVERNORS

*by*  
*Harry L. Coles*  
*and*  
*Albert K. Weinberg*



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. . . to Those Who Served



# Foreword

In the midst of the large-scale combat operations of World War II, the Army was called on to occupy, to govern, and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn countries and economies. Few of its tasks turned out to be as difficult and challenging as these civil affairs missions.

The present history, consisting for the most part of documentary material, deals primarily with civil administration in Italy, France, and northwest Europe. Its purpose is to illustrate certain basic and generic problems of civil affairs—their character, the approaches to their solution, and their impact upon the people who had to deal with them.

Because of the ideological aspect of the struggle and because the United States acted as a member of a coalition of Allies, U.S. military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of the statesman and the politician. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On another level—in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient civilization—they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian rather than military.

For its insight into how the Army met its civil affairs mission, for its focus on the vital and continuing problem of the relationship between soldier and civilian—in short, for its graphic analysis of soldiers as governors—this volume will be read with profit in a world where the problems of the soldier have become increasingly political.

Washington, D.C.  
25 May 1961

WILLIAM H. HARRIS  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Chief of Military History

# The Authors

Albert K. Weinberg received his Ph. D. from The Johns Hopkins University and has taught there, in addition to being for a time a member of The Institute for Advanced Study. His principal publication is *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History*. During World War II he served, successively, as an analyst in the Civil Affairs Section of the Office of Strategic Services, as Chief of the Reports Division in UNRRA, and as senior editor and later Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Harry L. Coles, Professor of History at Ohio State University, received the Ph. D. degree from Vanderbilt. He has been awarded both a Rosenwald Research Fellowship and a Mershon Post-Doctoral Fellowship. He served as an Army Air Forces historian in World War II and was later assigned to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. A contributor to the seven-volume *Army Air Forces in World War II*, he is also the editor of the recently published *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military*.

## Preface

The title of this volume may not convey the precise scope of its contents but the authors could think of no other that would be more suggestive without being overponderous. Broadly speaking the volume deals with U.S. Army and Anglo-American planning and operations in the sphere of relations with civilians in certain liberated and conquered countries in World War II. Although far more than mere difference in nomenclature was involved, the Army manuals generally referred to occupational operations in liberated countries as civil affairs and to those in conquered countries as military government.<sup>1</sup> In both types of occupation the range and complexity of the problems to be dealt with were as great as in the whole scope of modern government. In liberated countries the Army needs and Allied aims could be satisfied largely through existing governmental regulations and personnel, but in enemy countries drastic changes in laws, institutions, and administrators were necessary. Whether old or new governmental machinery was used, civil affairs doctrine emphasized the desirability of indirect control. In spite of this emphasis, in areas of military government Allied officers, whether from necessity or impatience, sometimes performed various governmental functions and in any case closely supervised them. In the liberated areas their intervention was far less direct, but, under the paramount authority residing in the theater commander by either the laws of warfare or by international agreement, they advised or assisted the indigenous authorities. Thus, in various senses and degrees, soldiers became governors.

The long and crowded history of Allied civil affairs activities, like the history of tactical activities, may be divided into the operations that took place before and those that took place after the military drive into the main enemy areas—Germany and Japan. The scope of this volume encompasses only the pre-Germany-Japan phase of the war, in which the Army prepared and organized for its tasks, conducted its first belligerent occupation (in Italy), and carried on the liberating occupations in France and northwest Europe preliminary to invasion of Germany. It was in this phase, in short, that the Army initiated and gained maturity in its civil affairs responsibilities. The omission of Germany and Japan may well disappoint some readers insofar as the operations in those countries were the largest and most consequential of the war. But the basic aims and methods took form in the earlier operations, and the occupation of Germany and Japan, however distinctive in some respects, cannot be adequately understood except in the light of what went on before. Moreover, when this project was first undertaken the records of military government in Germany and Japan were still located in those countries for the use of

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<sup>1</sup> In this volume, as also quite commonly in military usage, "civil affairs" has generally been employed for greater brevity to designate military occupation generically.

historical sections engaged in writing first narratives. In any case it would have been impossible to include all civil affairs operations in this volume without doing far less than justice to any one.

The historiography of civil affairs encounters, indeed, in World War II a documentation unique in broad scope and variety. Though the civil affairs problem was not new in World War II, as the wealth of novels and other popular literature about it might suggest, the Army did go beyond its traditional role in an unprecedented degree and manner. In the American experience military occupations had followed the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. World War II differed from these earlier conflicts in that the duration and size of civil affairs operations were much greater, there was a far larger degree of specialization, and soldiers from the very outset found themselves required to handle political problems to an extent never necessary before.

As for size, it has been estimated that Army operations overseas vitally affected the lives of more than 300 million people. At the same time, like all other phases of World War II, civil affairs required more specialization than ever before. In earlier wars a good soldier was generally a jack-of-all-trades. In the Civil War, for example, an artilleryman or the driver of a supply wagon might be temporarily detailed to clearing roads or dispensing relief and would then return to his regular duties. Civil affairs being of limited scope, no special training or indoctrination was considered necessary. In World War II, however, a Civil Affairs Division was created, on a high War Department level, to coordinate all planning as well as training. An extensive recruiting and specialized training program was organized for the first time, and G-5 (civil affairs and military government) staff sections were added at the theater army, corps, and even division levels.

Most important of all, in World War II soldiers became governors in a much broader sense than ever before—so much more than was foreseen that the Army's specialized training proved scant preparation for perhaps the most important phase of their role. They became not merely the administrators of civilian life for the Army's immediate needs but at the same time the executors and at times even, by force of circumstances, the proposers of national and international political policy. This broader role arose from the fact that in World War II the Allies strove to realize from the very beginning of occupation political aims that had usually not been implemented during war or, if during war at all, not until active hostilities had ended. Thus, in enemy countries civil affairs officials were immediately to extirpate totalitarian governmental and economic systems, in liberated countries they were as soon as possible to aid in restoring indigenous systems and authorities, and in both types of countries they were to make an all-out effort to effect gradual transition toward the envisaged postwar national and international order. This unprecedented mission was complicated, moreover, by the fact that occupation was joint rather than zonal as in World War I. Thus British and American military authorities found themselves compelled to take part in reconciling often quite conflicting views on both immediate and long-range goals. Believing that these essentially political tasks called for civilian rather than military aptitudes, the President and his advisers

planned initially to entrust the conduct of civil affairs to civilian rather than military agencies as soon as military conditions permitted. But the plan was not carried out, and as matters developed the Army had on its hands for the duration a twofold task which required the soldier to serve military expediency on the one hand and politico-social directives on the other.

The question of why, despite every initial prospect to the contrary, soldiers rather than civilians became and remained governors is indeed an interesting one. To the extent that they could do so without neglecting equally important though less dramatic problems, the authors have attempted to present and to emphasize the materials that suggest the explanation. There is no simple answer and certainly not, it seems to the authors, one so simple as the hypothesis that the Army wanted and strove to capture as broad a role in civil affairs as possible. Materials in Part I, concerned with the preparatory and organizational stage, suggest that the President's eventual decision to entrust the responsibility in the initial phase to the Army was due to civilian unreadiness rather than to any inveterate Army ambition. Portions of Part II make clear the difficulties of fitting civilian agencies, even in later phases of the Italian operation, into the context of battle and a military framework, and indicate reasons for the resultant decision to leave the military authorities in exclusive administrative control. As Part III reveals, despite this experience, Allied authorities, in planning for the liberated countries of northwest Europe, still proposed to delegate civil affairs as far as possible to indigenous civilian authorities, subject only to the Supreme Commander's right to determine how soon a complete delegation was militarily feasible. In Part IV, dealing with operations, it is disclosed that despite this purpose, and despite also the competence of indigenous authorities, conditions during and immediately following hostilities made it necessary for the Allied armies to render these authorities, in matters of civil affairs, substantial assistance.

The problem of the soldier's role in civil affairs was vigorously debated, particularly during the earlier part of these experiences. Some may feel that history should contribute to a solution, but to these authors it does not seem possible to suggest the answer to so complex a question on the basis of history alone, especially since history is subject to different interpretations. Perhaps, however, candor with the reader requires acknowledgment that any initial bias against entrusting largely political responsibilities to soldiers gradually became modified in the course of the authors' studies and thinking. Certainly this change came about partly from the growing suspicion that the soldier's degree of administrative involvement in CA/MG, as also the degree of connection between administration and political influence, are likely to be determined by forces stronger than any political theory. But it came about much more as evidence seemed to accumulate that at least Anglo-American soldiers, professional or lately civilians, were—or at any rate gradually became—capable of viewing and handling political problems not too differently from civilians. Another consideration was that not only organizational machinery but the attitudes of military and civilian authorities alike ensured civilian control of basic policy, although the capacity of the military leaders for properly interpreting and applying civilian policy would probably have developed more quickly and fully if their

broad role had not been allowed to devolve upon them so unexpectedly and with so little preparation for its more political phases.

To the foregoing need only be added that, in the final view of the authors, the issue of military versus civilian administration was far less important than the issue of military values versus civilian or—more correctly speaking—political values; that it was the latter issue which was at the root of most of the serious difficulties in civil affairs decisions; and that the issue would have presented the same dilemma and probably been decided in much the same fashion even if the President's initial plan for civilian control had been carried out. The dilemma was foreordained when national war aims and pursuant directives imposed ambivalent civil affairs objectives without indicating (as of course they could not have been expected to do) how the conflicts between military interests and political interests were to be resolved. Every politico-social objective undoubtedly coincided to a considerable extent with long-term military interests, but it also conflicted to a greater or lesser degree with immediate military expediency, in which case the civil affairs authority could only try, without sacrificing either competing interest too greatly, to bring the two into the best possible accommodation. The major difference which civilian control would have entailed is probably that civilians would have leaned over backwards lest their decisions seem to impair unduly military interests, whereas the military were always worried lest their decisions have the aspect of unduly impairing political values.

Since civil affairs problems are for the most part solved with pen rather than sword, the civil affairs effort gave rise to an enormous body of documentation, of which only a relatively small part is marked by the aridly formal style characteristic of military intercommunication. This book differs from others in the same series in that documents rather than text have been given the primary role in the presentation of historical developments. In fact, excerpts are generally used since the publication of complete documents would have too greatly shortened the range of presentation otherwise considered desirable. These excerpts have been so selected, arranged, and entitled that, in conjunction with the introductory text and footnotes, they might give the reader an insight into the principal historical developments and their interconnections.

The limitations inherent in the documentary method are obvious and the judgment of the authors that in this case the advantages outweighed the disadvantages was predicated on a consideration not applicable to any other phase of the war or volume of this series. Basically it was the fact that the function of civil affairs is unique among military missions in that in this instance the tale of "Arms and the Man" focuses upon the man. This is to say that almost every other phase of war experience is too technical and too difficult to understand without the military historian's art. Civil affairs operations, even though conditioned by war, concern chiefly generic social problems which involve human nature rather than technological factors. Because decisions of civil affairs are made and judged by the same genus of reasoning and moral evaluation that figures in ordinary individual and politico-social problems, the primary sources—in which the reasons of the authorities for acting as they did are often set forth fully and candidly—acquire greater importance for public, academic, and military understanding and evaluation than in almost any other phase of

war. This view appears to have been first stated not by a civilian but by a distinguished soldier. In April 1946, when the Allied occupation of Italy was drawing to a close, Gen. William D. Morgan, then Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

It is the considered opinion here, after detailed examination and long discussion, that the records of the Allied Commission should be treated differently from records of a purely military nature. . . . Rather than of strictly military interest they will be of permanent primary interest for historical research in Economic, Social, and Political fields as records of an initial effort in Allied Military Government.

The authors reached the decision, not without some misgiving, that it was justifiable to expose not only the formal directives and orders representing the end results of the decision-making process, but also the work papers illustrating the tentative and naturally often disputatious phases of that process. Their misgiving was materially lessened after they submitted their earliest selections of documents to several U.S. Army participants in the events. These men were of the opinion that not only they themselves but the vast majority of their American and British associates would not mind the publication of documents revealing their difficulties, uncertainties, or human limitations provided such publication tended on the whole to give an accurate impression of civil affairs experience. It is the authors' earnest hope that they have achieved this goal.

The decision to publish a history primarily documentary in approach was made the more fortunate perhaps by the appearance of two books in the "Civil Affairs and Military Government" series in the United Kingdom's *History of the Second World War*, edited by Sir J. R. M. Butler. These are *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-45*, by C. R. S. Harris, and *Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe, 1944-46*, by F. S. V. Donnison. Another textual account would have repeated to some extent the contribution that others have made in quite adequate fashion.

Most of the originals or official copies of the documents contained in this volume are presently located in the Federal Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia, a subordinate element of the National Archives and Records Service of the General Services Administration. Records of the War Department kept in this center and used in this volume include files of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff (cited as WDCSA), the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS), the G-1 Division of the General Staff, the Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD decimal and message files, and also the ABC files kept by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD), the Civil Affairs Division (CAD), Army Service Forces (ASF) files (including the files of the International [International Aid] Division), files of the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO), and the central War Department file, which was maintained very incompletely during World War II by the Adjutant General's Office (TAGO).

The Federal Records Center in Alexandria also contains many papers of a joint and combined nature that have been used and cited. The War Department collections listed above contain the papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) that have been used. Other record collections in the center that have been drawn upon extensively for the compilation

of this volume include files of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), and, from the Mediterranean and European theaters, files of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) in microfilm, files of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) and Advisory Council Italy, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) files, Seventh U.S. Army G-5 Staff Section Reports, and U.S. Forces European Theater (USFET) General Board Studies.

The concentration of World War II records concerning military government and civil affairs in one repository, the Alexandria Federal Records Center, offers students of these matters a unique opportunity for further research. Not all of the file collections and records used by the authors are as yet available to private scholars, but the bulk of them are, including most of the American records. Of course, students of the subject may need to consult some records elsewhere, as the authors have, including reference materials in the Office of the Chief of Military History. The authors were also fortunate in obtaining a number of interviews with participants, as cited in their work.

It should be noted that except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, asterisks are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

In preparing this volume the authors have incurred so many obligations that it is impossible to make proper acknowledgment to all who have helped. They wish nevertheless to say that they profited from the first narratives prepared by the Historical Section of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, which consisted of Richard M. Welling, Edgar L. Erickson, Edwin J. Hayward, and Henry N. Williams. Harold Epstein was with the project in OCMH in its early stages. Robert W. Komer made available certain papers from the G-5 AFHQ files, and his study, "Civil Affairs in the Mediterranean Theater," made as an Army historian, was of great help. Miss Inez V. Allen, in addition to doing a great deal of checking of footnotes and citations, compiled many of the documents relating to Fine Arts and Archives and other subjects relating to southern France. Col. Alfred C. Bowman, SCAO XIII Corps, Venezia Giulia, read all of the manuscript except that dealing with western Europe. Kent Roberts Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian, Department of the Army, put his extensive knowledge of Italian history and institutions at the disposal of the authors, who are also indebted for his encouragement to undertake the project despite its experimental aspects. Stetson Conn, current Chief Historian, contributed generously of his scholarly and critical abilities during revision of the first draft. David Jaffé, Acting Chief of the Editorial Branch, OCMH, assisted by Mrs. Helen V. Whittington, copy editor, saw the manuscript through its final stages of preparation for the press and exercised great skill and no less patience in an unusually difficult editorial task.

These acknowledgments of assistance are in no way delegation of responsibility for the contents of the volume. The presentation and the interpretation contained herein are the authors' own, and they alone are responsible for faults of commission or omission.

Washington, D.C.  
24 May 1962

HARRY L. COLES  
ALBERT K. WEINBERG





# Contents

## PART ONE

### The Army Must Take on an Uncongenial Task

Chapter	Page
I. SHOULD SOLDIERS BE GOVERNORS? . . . . .	3
1. <i>Shall the Nation Again Find Itself Unprepared?</i> . . . . .	6
2. <i>A School for Soldiers Is Established in a Civilian Institution</i> . . . . .	10
3. <i>Civilian-Military Jockeying for Control</i> . . . . .	14
4. <i>The President Says Occupation Is in Most Cases a Civilian Task</i> . . . . .	21
5. <i>A Debate Continues Which Will Never End</i> . . . . .	25
II. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA PUTS CIVILIAN CONTROL TO THE TEST . . . . .	30
1. <i>A Civil Affairs Plan To Minimize Military Responsibility</i> . . . . .	31
2. <i>Military Leaders Must Take Responsibility for a Thankless Political Decision</i> . . . . .	34
3. <i>Complex Design for Civilian Responsibility Developed</i> . . . . .	37
4. <i>Military-Civilian Integration Must Be Achieved</i> . . . . .	43
5. <i>Can Eisenhower Now Be Spared Political Problems?</i> . . . . .	45
6. <i>Can Military Commanders Be Spared Economic Problems?</i> . . . . .	50
7. <i>The Army Must Take Charge of Civilian Relief in the Tunisian Campaign</i> . . . . .	52
8. <i>Military Commanders Become Dissatisfied but Decide To Leave African Arrangement Alone</i> . . . . .	55
9. <i>North African Experience Points Up Need for Greater Co-ordination of Civilian Agencies</i> . . . . .	59
III. THE WAR DEPARTMENT PREPARES FOR A BROADER ROLE . . . . .	63
1. <i>The War Department Wants Initial Control in Future Operations</i> . . . . .	64
2. <i>Creation of a Civil Affairs Division To Set the War Department's House in Order</i> . . . . .	66
3. <i>CAD Takes On Broader Role Than Planned</i> . . . . .	69
4. <i>In April 1943 the War Department Takes Charge of Civilian Supply</i> . . . . .	73
5. <i>Expansion of Army Training Program Must Have Long Wait for Final Approval</i> . . . . .	78
6. <i>Europe's Cultural Heritage Must Be Protected</i> . . . . .	84

IV. THE ARMY IS ASSIGNED LEADERSHIP IN AN INDEFINITE INITIAL PHASE . . . . .	91
1. <i>In Enemy Areas the Army To Have the Initial Burden</i> . . . . .	95
2. <i>Acquiescence in CAD's Leadership in Co-ordination of Planning</i> . . . . .	96
3. <i>President Still Seeks a Way for Civilian Agencies To Control</i> . . . . .	98
4. <i>The Plan for Civilian Agency Operations Is Stalled</i> . . . . .	102
5. <i>Difficulties of Civilian Agency Procurement Lead to Extension of Period of Military Responsibility</i> . . . . .	105
6. <i>The Army Gets a Presidential Assignment by Default</i> . . . . .	108
7. <i>War Department Assumes Leadership in Foreign Economic Co-ordination for the Military Period</i> . . . . .	111
V. WASHINGTON OR LONDON? . . . . .	114
1. <i>Washington and London Compromise To Create a Combined Civil Affairs Committee</i> . . . . .	119
2. <i>London Supports a Rival of the Washington Civil Affairs Committee</i> . . . . .	125
3. <i>Americans Fear British Domination of Civilian Supply for European Theater</i> . . . . .	128
4. <i>Creation of a Combined Supply Committee and Reconciliation of British and American Supply Policies</i> . . . . .	131
5. <i>A Compromise on Locale of Planning—Washington and London.</i>	135
VI. THE ARMY TRIES TO LIMIT ITS COMMITMENTS . . . . .	139
1. <i>Turnover to Civilians as Soon as Possible</i> . . . . .	142
2. <i>Military Commanders Do Not Make Politico-Economic Policies</i> . . . . .	144
3. <i>Minimum Change of Local Institutions and Authorities</i> . . . . .	145
4. <i>Maximum Use of Indigenous Administration in Nonenemy Countries</i> . . . . .	147
5. <i>The Army Tries To Keep Out of the Balkans</i> . . . . .	148
6. <i>Civilian Supplies Only for the Prevention of Disease and Unrest</i> . . . . .	150
7. <i>The Army Is No Welfare Organization</i> . . . . .	153

## PART TWO

## Soldiers Learn Politics in Italy

VII. PLANNING JOINT MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROVES HIGHLY POLITICAL . . . . .	157
1. <i>AFHQ Begins Planning on the Assumption British and American Interests Can Be Pooled</i> . . . . .	160
2. <i>Each Country Wants To Be Senior Partner</i> . . . . .	165
3. <i>The Problem of the Chain of Command and Communication—Tactical or Dual?</i> . . . . .	168
4. <i>Direct or Indirect Rule?</i> . . . . .	170
5. <i>Political Advisers or an Exclusively Military Administration?</i> . . . . .	174
6. <i>The CGS Directs a Military Administration and as Much Benevolence as Practicable</i> . . . . .	176
7. <i>AFHQ Creates Joint Agencies and Issues Final Instructions</i> . . . . .	180

Chapter	Page
VIII. THE TEST IN SICILY . . . . .	188
1. <i>Mobile Military Government and the Struggle Against Chaos</i> . . . . .	190
2. <i>AMGOT Headquarters Takes Over and Revives Provincial Institutions</i> . . . . .	200
3. <i>When Fighting Ends More Complex Problems Begin</i> . . . . .	203
4. <i>Sicilians Become Somewhat Difficult</i> . . . . .	208
5. <i>CAO's Are Entangled by Their Excess of Zeal</i> . . . . .	211
6. <i>CCS Keeps the Military Governors on the Job</i> . . . . .	214
IX. ITALIAN SURRENDER AND A DESIGN FOR MAXIMUM RETURNS WITH MINIMUM RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . .	217
1. <i>The Theater Hopes for Armistice Control but Plans for Military Government</i> . . . . .	222
2. <i>The Fall of Mussolini and the Shift of Military Thinking to Armistice Control</i> . . . . .	224
3. <i>Italian Surrender and the Establishment of Two Types of Allied Control</i> . . . . .	226
4. <i>Eisenhower Recommends Strengthening the Badoglio Government With a View to Cobelligerency</i> . . . . .	230
5. <i>The Policy of "Payment by Results" and the Long-Term Armistice</i> . . . . .	233
6. <i>Prerequisites of Territorial Transfer and a Control Commission Do Not Materialize</i> . . . . .	237
7. <i>The Burdens of Control Become Greater Rather Than Less</i> . . . . .	240
8. <i>An Enemy Is Made a Cobelligerent</i> . . . . .	244
9. <i>Rise and Fall of Hopes for Early Returns</i> . . . . .	245
X. CONTROL AGENCIES ARE EASIER TO CREATE THAN TO CO-ORDINATE . . . . .	248
1. <i>Military Government Authority Is Bifurcated and Decentralized</i> . . . . .	252
2. <i>Despite Washington's Misgivings Decentralization Continues</i> . . . . .	253
3. <i>More Organizations Bring More Problems of Co-ordination</i> . . . . .	255
4. <i>Too Many Cooks for the Broth</i> . . . . .	261
5. <i>The Military Governor Brings ACC and AMG Together With ACC Co-ordinating</i> . . . . .	264
6. <i>ACC Is Streamlined for Greater Co-ordination</i> . . . . .	266
7. <i>Anglo-American Unity and Disunity</i> . . . . .	271
XI. THEY MUST BE MADE TO STAND ALONE . . . . .	275
1. <i>The CAO's Learn To Use Indirect Control</i> . . . . .	279
2. <i>AMG Revives Institutions Which Develop Local Government</i> . . . . .	284
3. <i>ACC Starts a Job Which Calls for Patience</i> . . . . .	288
4. <i>The First Restoration of Territory and Its Difficulties</i> . . . . .	294
5. <i>Advisory Help in Restored Areas Must Continue</i> . . . . .	300
6. <i>The Government Is Encouraged To Co-ordinate with AMG</i> . . . . .	303

Chapter	Page
XII. MILITARY NECESSITY DEMANDS RELIEF OF CIVILIAN DISTRESS . . . . .	306
1. <i>A Serious Food Shortage Despite the Assumption of Local Self-Sufficiency</i> . . . . .	308
2. <i>Expedients Which Are Tried but Found Wanting</i> . . . . .	311
3. <i>Food Imports To Prevent Starvation Become the Number One Priority</i> . . . . .	313
4. <i>The Food Shortage Is at Least Alleviated</i> . . . . .	316
5. <i>The Initial Food Experience Teaches Valuable Lessons</i> . . . . .	319
6. <i>Epidemic Knows No Nationality</i> . . . . .	322
7. <i>Refugees Are a Serious Military Problem</i> . . . . .	328
8. <i>The Poor and Sick Are Always With Them</i> . . . . .	333
XIII. SOLDIERS BATTLE WITH ECONOMICS . . . . .	340
1. <i>Only Limited Economic Assistance Is Planned</i> . . . . .	344
2. <i>Allies Find a Serious Degree of Inflation</i> . . . . .	346
3. <i>Matters Are Helped Neither by Allowing Nor Disallowing Wage Increases</i> . . . . .	348
4. <i>AMG/ACC Now Tries Selective Price Control</i> . . . . .	350
5. <i>Improvement Is Sought Through Supervision of the Government's Fiscal Policies</i> . . . . .	353
6. <i>The Theater Told To Reduce Import Burden by Increasing Italian Self-Sufficiency</i> . . . . .	358
7. <i>Rehabilitation Supply Program: Limited Imports Now To Reduce Imports Later</i> . . . . .	361
8. <i>Why the Theater Did Not Do Better in Promoting Economic Revival</i> . . . . .	364
XIV. MILITARY EXPEDIENCY IS NOT THE WHOLE STORY . . . . .	370
1. <i>Imperium ac Justitia</i> . . . . .	375
2. <i>To What Extent Can the Removal of Fascists Be Allowed To Imperil Administrative Effectiveness?</i> . . . . .	382
3. <i>Fascist Laws and Institutions Are Gradually Annulled</i> . . . . .	390
4. <i>Italian Labor Receives a New Charter of Rights</i> . . . . .	394
5. <i>A Primarily Negative but Important Mission in Education</i> . . . . .	400
6. <i>The Theater Becomes Increasingly Involved in Displaced Persons Problem</i> . . . . .	405
7. <i>Cultural Treasure Gives Pause to Military Expediency</i> . . . . .	413
XV. POLITICS WILL NOT WAIT . . . . .	425
1. <i>Patience and Impatience Over Issue of Political Change</i> . . . . .	428
2. <i>Strange Interlude of Political Courtship</i> . . . . .	431
3. <i>A Government of Technical Experts Until Rome Is Taken</i> . . . . .	433
4. <i>Under Military Government Politics Must Wait</i> . . . . .	435
5. <i>Allied Military Government Finds It More Troublesome To Prohibit Meetings Than To Permit Them</i> . . . . .	437
6. <i>It Becomes Increasingly Difficult for Allies To Be Politically Neutral</i> . . . . .	440

Chapter	Page
XV. POLITICS WILL NOT WAIT—Continued	
7. <i>Should One Change Horses in the Middle of a Battle?</i> . . . . .	442
8. <i>Soviet Power Politics Will Not Wait</i> . . . . .	445
9. <i>The King Agrees To Retire and Badoglio Government Is Broadened</i> . . . . .	450
10. <i>Some Matters Will Have To Wait</i> . . . . .	452
XVI. ROME IS A TURNING POINT . . . . .	
1. <i>Great Political Possibilities Foreseen in Occupation of Rome</i> . . . . .	457
2. <i>First European Capital Is Liberated</i> . . . . .	458
3. <i>The King Retires and a New Government Is Formed</i> . . . . .	464
4. <i>The Italian Government Comes to Rome and Takes on More Responsibility</i> . . . . .	467
5. <i>Italians Take Lead in Defascistization</i> . . . . .	471
6. <i>Patience With the Government Is Sometimes Difficult</i> . . . . .	477
7. <i>In the Advance Beyond Rome AMG Tries New Expedients</i> . . . . .	481
8. <i>Can This Be the Turning Point in Direction of Civilianization?</i> . . . . .	487
XVII. A NEW DEAL FOR ITALY . . . . .	
1. <i>It Is Hard for Italians To Remain in Tutelage</i> . . . . .	495
2. <i>It Is Hard To Stay Angry With Italians</i> . . . . .	496
3. <i>An Anglo-American New Policy and a Rooseveltian New Deal</i> . . . . .	499
4. <i>No Way To Ship Flour Without Ships</i> . . . . .	501
5. <i>No Way To Broaden Supply Policy Until Resources Are More Plentiful</i> . . . . .	505
6. <i>For the Time Being Disappearance of Control Is Only Nominal</i> . . . . .	506
7. <i>Harold Macmillan Argues Astutely for a New Directive</i> . . . . .	508
8. <i>Anglo-American Disagreements Are Compromised in a New Directive</i> . . . . .	513
9. <i>At Long Last Bread Ration Is Increased</i> . . . . .	518
10. <i>Controls Are Finally Relaxed</i> . . . . .	519
11. <i>Rehabilitation Program Must Wait for Peace and UNRRA</i> . . . . .	524
XVIII. SACMED AND THE PARTISANS — ALLIANCE OR MIS-ALLIANCE? . . . . .	
1. <i>Somewhat Puzzling Cobelligerents Behind Enemy's Lines</i> . . . . .	528
2. <i>Liberated Partisans Prefer Their Swords to Plowshares</i> . . . . .	532
3. <i>Partisan Units To Be Accepted in the Italian Army</i> . . . . .	535
4. <i>War Makes Strange Alliances</i> . . . . .	538
5. <i>The Government Tries To Protect Its Own Fences</i> . . . . .	542
6. <i>After Contract Is Signed—Misgivings and Curtailment of Aid</i> . . . . .	544
7. <i>Treat Partisans Right and They'll Behave—Perhaps</i> . . . . .	546
XIX. LIBERATION OF THE NORTH AND PROBLEMS NOT SETTLED BY VICTORY . . . . .	
1. <i>A Task of Unprecedented Magnitude Calling for Novel Methods</i> . . . . .	554
2. <i>Whirlwind Occupations and Great Expectations</i> . . . . .	560
3. <i>The CLN's Get Temporarily Out of Hand</i> . . . . .	564

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
XIX. LIBERATION OF THE NORTH AND PROBLEMS NOT SETTLED BY VICTORY—Continued	
4. <i>French Forces Remain Too Long in Aosta Valley</i> . . . . .	568
5. <i>The Nationality Problem in Bolzano</i> . . . . .	571
6. <i>Italy's Most Productive Region Is in Danger of Economic Stagnation</i> . . . . .	575
7. <i>An Overwhelming Influx of Repatriates Before Facilities Are All Ready</i> . . . . .	579
8. <i>AMG Must Stay Overtime</i> . . . . .	583
XX. POLITICAL PRINCIPLE VERSUS MILITARY PRAGMATISM IN THE ISSUE OF VENEZIA GIULIA . . . . .	587
1. <i>AMG Will Be Used To Uphold the Principle of Peaceful Settlement</i> . . . . .	590
2. <i>SACMED Tries To Temper Political Principle With Military Pragmatism</i> . . . . .	592
3. <i>SACMED Was Right in Predicting Trouble</i> . . . . .	595
4. <i>Military Pragmatism Prevails</i> . . . . .	600
5. <i>Yugoslav System Rejected on Good Pragmatic but Doubtful Legal Grounds</i> . . . . .	603
6. <i>AMG Gets Local Government Going by Indirection</i> . . . . .	607
7. <i>We Expect Release in Seven Months but Must Stay Seven Years</i> . . . . .	612
XXI. INTERDEPENDENCE PRECLUDES AN EASY WAY OUT . . . . .	614
1. <i>After the Foreign Enemy Is Defeated an Internal Enemy Emerges</i> . . . . .	619
2. <i>The Allies Take Steps To Meet Italy's Security Needs</i> . . . . .	624
3. <i>The United States Continues Aid as Vital to Postwar Aims</i> . . . . .	627
4. <i>With Allied Encouragement Democracy and Republicanism Are Given Their Chance</i> . . . . .	629
5. <i>The Prospect of an Early and Satisfactory Settlement Recedes</i> . . . . .	634
6. <i>Return of AMG Territory Continues Notwithstanding Obstacles</i> . . . . .	636
7. <i>Residual Controls Are Further Curtailed</i> . . . . .	639
8. <i>How Soon Can AC Be Closed Down or Civilianized?</i> . . . . .	642
9. <i>The Peace Treaty and Subsequent U.S.—Italian Agreements</i> . . . . .	645
10. <i>At Long Last Close-Out</i> . . . . .	647

### PART THREE

#### Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for the Liberated Countries of Western Europe

XXII. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS . . . . .	653
1. <i>A Draft Agreement Which Delegates CA to the Norwegian Government as far as Compatible With Military Needs</i> . . . . .	656
2. <i>Civil Affairs Agreements Are Consummated</i> . . . . .	658
3. <i>British and Americans Finds Themselves at Loggerheads over the De Gaulle Committee</i> . . . . .	661

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
XXII. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS— Continued	
4. <i>U.S. Nonrecognition of De Gaulle Hampers Civil Affairs         Planning for France</i> . . . . .	665
5. <i>Both U.S. and U.K. Try Still Other Lines in Effort To Get         Together on FCNL</i> . . . . .	667
XXIII. ORGANIZATION AND POLICY PROBLEMS IN PLANNING FOR WESTERN EUROPE . . . . .	671
1. <i>A Headquarters Organization for Civil Affairs Is Set Up</i> . . . . .	673
2. <i>In Final Plans CA Organization in the Field Will Be Under         Tactical Commander</i> . . . . .	677
3. <i>Basic Policies for Civil Affairs Operations</i> . . . . .	679
4. <i>Final Reorganization in SHAEF To Establish Direct SHAEF         Control of Country Units</i> . . . . .	680
5. <i>Civilian Supply: Military Program</i> . . . . .	681
6. <i>British and Americans Argue Over Kind of Currency To Be Used</i> . . . . .	687
7. <i>Allies Agree on Currency for France but De Gaulle's Support Is         Uncertain</i> . . . . .	693
XXIV. PLANNING FOR FRANCE EXTENDS BEYOND D-DAY . . . . .	697
1. <i>Organization and Planning for Southern France</i> . . . . .	700
2. <i>The Currency Issue Is Still Unsolved After D-Day</i> . . . . .	707
3. <i>The Currency Dispute Complicates Operations in the Northern         France Beachhead</i> . . . . .	709
4. <i>Allies and FCNL Come to Terms</i> . . . . .	711

## PART FOUR

### Soldiers Liberate Peoples and Restore Governments

XXV. FROM THE BEACHES TO PARIS IN NORTHERN FRANCE. . . . .	721
1. <i>Civil Affairs Troops Hit the Beaches in the Assault</i> . . . . .	722
2. <i>French Take Initiative in Restoring Civil Administration</i> . . . . .	726
3. <i>Cherbourg Is the First Large City To Be Liberated</i> . . . . .	730
4. <i>Prospective Supply Crisis in Paris Is Prepared For</i> . . . . .	738
5. <i>Paris Is Liberated</i> . . . . .	742
6. <i>Troop Spending Raises Question of Anti-Inflationary Measures</i> . . . . .	745
7. <i>FCNL Is Recognized as the Provisional Government and a Zone of         the Interior Is Created</i> . . . . .	749
XXVI. THE TIE-UP WITH DE GAULLE PAYS OFF IN SOUTHERN FRANCE . . . . .	751
1. <i>Status of CA Organization on D-Day and Ensuing Changes</i> . . . . .	753
2. <i>The First Ten Days</i> . . . . .	756
3. <i>The CA Setup Is Put to the Test in Troubled Areas</i> . . . . .	762
4. <i>The Liaison Offices Serve as Clearinghouses</i> . . . . .	767

XXVI. THE TIE-UP WITH DE GAULLE PAYS OFF IN SOUTHERN FRANCE—Continued	
5. <i>Undesirable Element in FFI Must Be Disarmed</i> . . . . .	770
6. <i>Illegal Trafficking in Army Goods Grows to Racket Proportions</i> . . . . .	772
7. <i>Transport, Labor, Food—The Most Serious Problems</i> . . . . .	773
8. <i>SHAEF Assumes Responsibility</i> . . . . .	787
9. <i>Retrospect and Conclusions</i> . . . . .	789
XXVII. IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG BOTH FIGHTING AND POLITICS RETARD STABILIZATION . . . . .	797
1. <i>Organizing and Planning for Belgium and Luxembourg</i> . . . . .	798
2. <i>Conditions in Belgium Right After Liberation</i> . . . . .	801
3. <i>SHAEF Mission Comes to Belgium</i> . . . . .	804
4. <i>Trouble in Disarming Resistance Forces Imperils the Government</i> . . . . .	805
5. <i>SHAEF Mission Finds Troubled Conditions in Luxembourg</i> . . . . .	809
6. <i>Ardennes Counteroffensive Puts Civil Affairs Personnel to the Test</i> . . . . .	813
7. <i>New Government Formed in Belgium</i> . . . . .	817
8. <i>Allies Straighten Out Their Representation in Luxembourg</i> . . . . .	819
XXVIII. PIECEMEAL LIBERATION OF THE NETHERLANDS AMID SERIOUS CIVILIAN DISTRESS . . . . .	821
1. <i>The Planners Assume Complete German Evacuation After Collapse</i> . . . . .	822
2. <i>The U.S. Army Liberates Portion of South Holland and Meets Real Problems</i> . . . . .	823
3. <i>The Greatest Problem Is Food</i> . . . . .	826
4. <i>Dramatic Arrangements To Bring Food Into German-Occupied Holland</i> . . . . .	830
5. <i>All Holland Is Now Liberated</i> . . . . .	832
XXIX. RETURN TO SELF-RULE IN DENMARK AND NORWAY. . . . .	835
1. <i>Allies Find Effective Danish Government in Operation</i> . . . . .	836
2. <i>Jurisdictional Niceties Cut Short Dispatch of Relief Supplies to Northern Norway</i> . . . . .	840
3. <i>The Underground Restores Indigenous Government in Norway</i> . . . . .	842
XXX. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE WAKE OF BATTLE . . . . .	847
1. <i>Civilians Become a Serious Problem in France During Rapid Army Advance</i> . . . . .	848
2. <i>Delegation of the Problem Does Not Work</i> . . . . .	851
3. <i>Allied Authorities Must Take More Responsibility Everywhere</i> . . . . .	854
4. <i>The Reception Plan Is Changed in the Last Phase of Hostilities</i> . . . . .	857
XXXI. THE PROTECTION OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS AND ART TREASURES . . . . .	860
1. <i>"Protect and Respect These Symbols Whenever Possible"</i> . . . . .	861

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Page</i>
XXXI. THE PROTECTION OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS AND ART TREASURES—Continued	
2. <i>Less Damage Than Expected In Northern France</i> . . . . .	867
3. <i>A Good Job in Southern France Too</i> . . . . .	871
4. <i>Art Officers to the Rescue in Belgium, the Netherlands, and         Norway</i> . . . . .	873
XXXII. CIVILIAN SUPPLY IS A MAJOR CA PROBLEM TO THE END.	877
1. <i>Delivery Falls Behind During the First Six Months</i> . . . . .	878
2. <i>Action Taken as Supply Problem Becomes Critical</i> . . . . .	884
3. <i>Pressures for National Import Programs</i> . . . . .	888
4. <i>Problem of Terminating the Military Supply Program.</i> . . . .	892



PART ONE

THE ARMY MUST TAKE ON  
AN UNCONGENIAL TASK



## CHAPTER I

# Should Soldiers Be Governors?

The story of civil affairs in World War II as it emerges from the documents reveals the effort to perform a mission unprecedented in complexity and size. The mission called for military, political, and economic activity on every level—from the job of rebuilding a village bakery to that of rooting out and replacing Fascist and Nazi ideology and institutions. The impact and interplay of these activities are highlighted in General Eisenhower's letter to General Marshall a few weeks after the opening of the North African campaign in 1942: "The sooner I can get rid of these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters." They are highlighted, on a lower plane, in an officer's problems on first entering a Sicilian town: "And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury."

The plight both of the theater commander and of the lower officer inevitably suggests the question of just why the U.S. Army in World War II had to take on civil affairs. That some agency, military or civilian, had to assume the heavy burden was dictated both by the laws of war and by common sense, but as a military mission civil affairs is unique among the Army's missions in that it seems to involve a radical disparity between its ends and the soldier's means. It is related to war only

insofar as it is the conduct of administration in foreign countries, enemy or friendly, which an army occupies either under the rules of war or by international agreement.

The civil affairs officer must so govern as to help the combat forces but his work is also judged by nonmilitary standards: ability to comply with the rules of international law; and, because military policy is but the instrument of national policy, by the ability to promote the nation's political interests. Civil affairs does not, like other phases of war, demand vast aggregations of men or (except for emergencies of civilian supply) of materials. But it does demand extraordinary intellectual and administrative skill in doing things, difficult enough in peacetime, under the conditions and special needs of wartime. The greatest difficulty is that most of the requisite skills of civil affairs are not those which the soldier acquires in his ordinary training and experience. They are political, economic, and technical skills—the skills of civilian more than of military life. Moreover, even though the civil affairs officer does not make basic policy, these skills are not, in practice, merely executory. Because policy directives are often not entirely clear or leave considerable discretion, because there are many unforeseen exigencies which they do not cover, and because officials issuing the directives generally feel dependent upon the recommendations and information of people on the spot, civil affairs requires more than mere ability to

follow orders. It demands, at least at higher levels, an understanding and sensitivity with regard to political and economic interests and the ability to sense what policy makers would wish done about such interests under particular circumstances. In sum, when the soldier becomes governor he must transcend the limits of his knowledge, experience, and even values as a soldier; he must become, as best he can, something of a statesman.

Because soldiers ordinarily are not trained to perform duties of this sort, and also because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the U.S. Army evoked bitter debate in every major war from the war with Mexico to World War I. The qualms felt by so-called anti-imperialists against military government after the Spanish-American War and World War I led to what the Army regarded as unfortunately premature substitution of government by civilians. That the Army's record in civil affairs has on the whole been very creditable, that its errors appear greatly outweighed by its humane aspiration and its efficient performance, has not overcome strong convictions that the use of civilians would have been far better. If only because of this historical background, it was natural that in World War II the great debate should have flared up again. But the debate was the more natural because in that war military and political aims were so largely complementary and interdependent. Civil affairs authorities not only had to extirpate and replace Fascist and Nazi institutions. They also had to take charge of civilian relief on an unprecedented scale, to pave the way for an ambitious postwar reconstruction, and to do all these and other things with the knowledge that by their performance foe and friend alike would judge the sincerity and worthiness of Allied

war aims. Never did the exercise of civil affairs authority call more strongly for wise statesmanship and never was it more important that such authority should be placed in the best hands.

The documents which follow, while concerned also with the early development of the Army's civil affairs training program, have been selected primarily to illustrate the causes, character, and consequences of the debate which raged over the Army's belief in its duty to assume initial leadership in the purely administrative preparations for civil affairs. Implications of the documents point up better than any abstractions the difficulties of a democracy's army in entering into such a sphere. It is true that, as soon as the War Department made its rather belated decision to place the responsibility for civil affairs in a specific agency—the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO)—the authorities immediately concerned quickly thought of measures calculated to make soldiers satisfactory civil administrators. This time, they resolved, they would not find themselves unprepared as in the past, and this time they would fashion personnel who while soldiers in garb would be civilians in knowledge and skill. They established a school for military government where, in the atmosphere of a university and under the tuition of civilians, this metamorphosis could take place. However, the documents also reveal the candid admission of these authorities that their initial measures were highly inadequate—not only in number of trainees but also in the failure to make sufficient use of civilian specialists and training institutions.

The Army quickly sought to repair these errors by an enlarged and revised training program. But as soon as these larger plans were announced, it found to its consternation that its training program, together with its entire role in civil affairs, was now

threatened by the conviction of many, including the President, that military control of civil affairs was both inexpedient in practice and wrong in theory.

The documents do not reveal as clearly as one would like the precise grounds of this belief. Aside from certain allegations about the Charlottesville School, the criticisms were marked by vague generality and cliché but probably rested upon ideas put forward to the same effect many times in the past: first, that the Army is not qualified to conduct civil affairs efficiently; second, that though it may do so quite efficiently it cannot do so with sufficient humanity, democracy, or politico-economic enlightenment; third, that though the Army may on occasion govern foreign territory both efficiently and with enlightenment, the taste of civil power may give some military leader ambitions for political power at home; fourth, that even though Army administration may have had no bad effects at home or abroad, nevertheless it is irretrievably wrong in principle for a democracy to make soldiers governors in any place and at any time. On the other hand, it does not appear that, at least in their second thoughts, the critics of the Army denied the need for a very limited degree of military control. First, they recognized that the military commander must have at least formal paramount authority over all matters in a theater of war. Second, they admitted that members of the armed forces must carry out certain functions of civil affairs as long as bullets fly too thick for civilians. The real ground of the apprehensions was the assumption, suggested by the scope of the Army's plans, that the military did not intend to relinquish control as soon as possible; rather, they were plotting to retain it for the duration and even in the crucial posthostilities period.

The records reveal that, in trying to allay such fears, Secretary of War Henry

L. Stimson and others displayed a patience and forensic skill (including even humor) which had been developed in the Army by more than a century and a half of such tribulations. They did not contest any of the traditional canons on the superiority of the civil power, or even the desirability of using it as soon as possible in wartime. They adopted as their main defense the position that, whatever might be desirable in theory, it was impossible in practice to entrust civil affairs to anyone but soldiers while certain military conditions prevailed. They also pointed out that the precise duration of these conditions could not be predicted, that while it might in some cases be very brief it might in others be rather long because of the tactical and logistical relationships between an area where fighting has stopped and adjacent or even remote areas where it is still going on. They added that, in any case, civil affairs would be conducted for the most part by persons who but lately had been civilians, having been commissioned because of their skills in civilian life and so far as possible on the recommendation of the civilian agencies. This last argument was supposed to clinch the Army's case, but it did not do so. The civilian critics evidently felt that a uniform and discipline can quickly change a man's soul and that, by wiles alone, the Army has often taken intellectually into camp supposedly free spirits like scientists, journalists, and even historians.

However, a number, including the President, appeared to be reassured in part—at least as to the honesty of Army intentions. Both those who were somewhat reassured, and those who were not, had to suffer the continuation of the Army's training program. In this as in so many later issues, the decisive fact was that though the civilian agencies might be strong in theory they were weak in organization. They had waited too long to make preparations for a training program

of their own, and it was now too late to start. Tacit acquiescence did not, indeed, signify any change in the plan of the President and civilian agencies for preponderant civilian control. The unfortunate stalemate in the training issue only strengthened their determination that those whom the Army had trained should

as soon as possible be taken out of uniform, purged of military indoctrination, and placed under the control of civilians who would know better than soldiers how to govern foreign peoples in accordance with American democracy and the blueprints for a brave new world.

## 1. SHALL THE NATION AGAIN FIND ITSELF UNPREPARED?

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: IN WORLD WAR I INADEQUATE ARMY PREPARATIONS AND EVENTUAL CIVILIAN CONTROL

[Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, Rpt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, 4 Mar 20, pp. 56-57 (hereafter referred to as Hunt Rpt), OCMH files]

\* \* \* All of the energy of the American army had been centered on an early decision in the field and there had been no opportunity to study the civil problems involved in an occupation of German territory. The American army therefore began its duties in occupied territory with only the scantiest information both of the particular situation confronting it and even of a broader nature, such as would permit it to intelligently frame an organization commensurate with its wide governmental powers. From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation.<sup>1</sup>

It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service-schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established.

<sup>1</sup> \* \* \* Except in the case of documents with numbered paragraphs, when it is obvious from the numbering that material has been omitted, asterisks are used to indicate the omission of one or more paragraphs.

The majority of the regular officers were, as a consequence, ill-equipped to perform tasks differing so widely from their accustomed duties. . . .

With the signing of the armistice, the prospective occupation became a real factor in the situation, and the problems to which it gave rise could no longer be evaded. On 11 November 1918, a month still ensued before our armies would reach German soil,—a period sufficient to at least lay a solid foundation for the future military government. The magnitude of the responsibilities assumed appear to have been greatly underestimated. There can be no doubt that the belief, felt in many quarters . . . that the armies could occupy enemy soil and yet divest themselves of the responsibilities of government, was both prevalent and powerful. . . . The military situation, serious enough when we consider that General Headquarters was at this time faced with the problem of moving 300,000 men to the Rhine, and the uncertainty in regard to the nature of the occupation, was no doubt responsible for the American failure to prepare for the task at hand. The failure, however, laid a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Third Army Commander and his subordinate officers charged with the security of their several commands. In all this force, with the exception of perhaps a half-dozen men, there was probably no one who had the faintest conception of the German governmental system, of its functions, limitations or channels of communication. The Second Section of the General Staff at G. H. Q. had, it is true, in November, prepared a pamphlet dealing with this subject, but its material was antiquated and its treatment inaccurate. . . .

The conclusion from these facts is incontestable; the American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom

the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

[Ltr, Pierrepoint B. Noyes, American Delegate, Inter-Allied Rhineland Comm., to President Woodrow Wilson, 27 May 19, Hunt Rpt, pp. 313-14]

After a month spent in the Rhineland as American commissioner, I feel there is danger that a disastrous mistake will be made. The "Convention" for the government of these territories, as drafted by the military representatives of the Supreme War Council on May eleventh, is more brutal, I believe, than even its authors desire upon second thought. It provides for unendurable oppression of six million people during a period of years.

This "Convention" is not likely to be adopted without great modification. What alarms me, however, is that none of the revisions of this document which I have seen, recognizes that its basic principle is bad—that the quartering of an enemy army in a country as its master in time of peace and the billeting of troops on the civil population will insure hatred and ultimate disaster.

I have discussed this matter at length with the American commanders of the Army of Occupation; men who have seen military occupation at close range for six months. These officers emphatically indorse the above statements. They say that an occupying army, even one with the best intentions, is guilty of outrages and that mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the contrary, grows apace. Force and more force must inevitably be the history of such occupation long continued.

Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the French and possibly overlooking political limitations, I have sketched below a plan which seems to me the maximum for military domination in the Rhineland after the signing of peace. Our Army Commanders and others who have studied the subject on the ground agree with this programme:

#### Skeleton Plan

I. As few troops as possible, concentrated in barracks or reserve areas, with no "billeting," excepting possibly for officers.

II. Complete self-government for the territory, with the exception below.

<sup>2</sup>The policies and procedures indicated in the Manual, Military Government (FM 27-5) prepared by the JAG in 1940 were promised almost entirely on the Rhineland experience, PMGO, History of Military Government Training, p. 4.

### III. A Civil Commission with powers:

a. To make regulations or change old ones whenever German law or actions

(1) threaten the carrying out of treaty terms, or

(2) threaten the comfort or security of troops.

b. To authorize the army to take control under martial law, either in danger spots or throughout the territory, whenever conditions seem to the Commission to make this necessary.<sup>3</sup>

#### UNTIL 1940 NO FIELD MANUAL FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Brig Gen William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-1 files, 9985-41]

1. Attached is an extract of a study, prepared by a student committee at the Army War College, pertaining to a proposed Basic Field Manual, entitled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory. It is recommended that a Basic Field Manual be prepared and published by the War Department, using the attached study as a guide.

2. Under date of October 11, 1939, in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, the Judge Advocate General expressed the opinion that there was no necessity for publishing a separate field manual on this subject. The Personnel Division, based upon considerations discussed below, does not concur in this viewpoint.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE FIELD MANUAL PLACES MG PLANNING AND TRAINING UNDER G-1

[WD Basic Fld Manual, Military Government (FM 27-5), 1940]

6. Planning—The Personnel Division (G-1) of the War Department General Staff is respon-

<sup>3</sup>Mr. Noyes' proposal for civilian government of occupied Germany was accepted by the President. He prevailed upon America's allies to enter into a convention which, on 28 June 1919, set up the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. But America's participation in the convention was contingent upon its acceptance of the peace treaty, and the failure of the Senate to ratify this treaty made it impossible for the United States, though sponsor of the arrangement for civilian government, to participate formally in the civilian high commission.

<sup>4</sup>JAG's opinion was based largely upon the fact that a field manual was already in existence for the laws of warfare (FM 27-10) which included the legal questions of military government. But this manual did not enter into questions of policy and organization, with which specialists in military government had to be familiar. Although the nonlegal phases of military government were touched upon in a number of Army field manuals, at the beginning of 1940 no manual existed which dealt with them systematically and exclusively.

sible for the preparation of plans for and the determination of policies with respect to military government. The personnel section (G-1) of the staff of the commanding general, theater of operations, will, in advance of the necessity for the establishment of military government, make such further and more detailed plans therefor as may be necessary. \* \* \*

8. Training—the Personnel Division (G-1) of the War Department General Staff plans and supervises the instruction and training of the personnel necessary for military government. In accordance with such plans and subject to such supervision, the personnel section (G-1) of the staff of the commanding general, theater of operations, makes such further and more detailed plans as may be necessary with respect to such instruction and training, so far as they may be carried on in that theater, and supervises them. . . . In advance of the need for its use, the Military Intelligence Division (G-2) of the War Department General Staff will furnish data on the subjects last mentioned which may be used for instructional purposes. . . .<sup>5</sup>

### THREE MONTHS BEFORE PEARL HARBOR JAG PROPOSES ADVANCE MG TRAINING

[Ltr, Col Harry A. Auer, JAGD, for Brig Gen Wade H. Haislip, ACofS, G-1, 5 Sep 41, G-1 files, 16308-125]

1. American forces are now serving in a number of bases in foreign countries, which service involves difficult and delicate questions arising from relations with the local government; and there is a possibility of future service involving the administration of military government by the United States Army. These facts indicate the need of competent personnel for such duties. Their detail from combatant units will deplete the officer strength of such units, and officers so detailed will in most cases be inexperienced and untrained in such duties. . . .

2. It is therefore recommended that commissioned personnel be selected and trained in a school or course of instruction for duty on the staff of the commander of any force which may

<sup>5</sup>The manual does not seem to envisage the actual conduct of training, as distinguished from its supervision, by G-1. This is left to the theater commander insofar as it is carried on in the theater. Thus, as will be seen, it became necessary to consider the question of the appropriate authority to conduct advance training in the Zone of Interior.

have a mission involving military government or liaison with an existing government. . . . It is further recommended that personnel be selected with a view to their future detail as Officers in Charge of Civil Affairs or Chief Liaison Officers, and for heads of the departments mentioned in paragraph 13, FM 27-5, to-wit: Public Works and Utilities, Fiscal, Public Health, Education, Public Safety, Legal, Communications, Public Welfare, and Economics.<sup>6</sup>

### G-1 BEGINS TO STUDY THE TRAINING QUESTION

[Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS (WPD), 10 Sep 41, G-1 files, 16308-125]

1. The Personnel Division has under study a plan to provide preliminary training for officers to fill key positions in Civil Affairs Sections on staffs of certain Task Force commanders. Such training will be confined to those staffs which may reasonably be expected to operate a military government.

2. In order to furnish a basis for the number of officers to receive such training it is requested that you submit a list of theaters based on present plans where such a contingency may arise.

### PMGO RECOMMENDED FOR CONTROL OF ADVANCE TRAINING

[Memo, ACofS, G-1, for CofS, 3 Dec. 41, AF files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), School of Military Government (SMG), Est]

#### I. Discussion.

1. Possible future requirement involving administration of military government by the Army suggests advance training of officers for military government and liaison. . . .

<sup>6</sup>This is the first formal War Department proposal for advance military government training but the nucleus of the idea appears to have arisen earlier. The PMGO History of Military Government Training points out: "A classified report from the United States Military Attaché in London, dated 2 May 1941, recommended that the United States take preliminary steps for the selection and training of Army officers and others for postwar activities abroad. (At this time, Great Britain had already constituted a politico-military course for training officers for reconstruction and other possible postwar missions in different sections of the world.) This report was referred by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, on 11 June 1941" (p. 4). The proposal of May 1941 had reference primarily to training for postwar liaison activities, such as was carried on in the British school.

2. Operation of necessary school is properly a Zone of the Interior function and should be charged to an existing War Department agency.

3. The Provost Marshal General has offered to include the necessary instruction in military government in the curricula of a school which he is organizing for other purposes.

## II. *Action recommended.*

1. That the Provost Marshal General be charged with the operating function of training officers for future detail in connection with military government and liaison.

2. That the Provost Marshal General be directed to confer with the Personnel Division relative to the preparation of detailed plans for initiating and operating the course of instruction under discussion. [Approved by Secretary of War, 7 January 1942.]

[Memo, Maj Gen Myron C. Cramer, JAG, for ACoS, G-1, 23 Dec 41, G-1 files, 16308-125, Tab C]

5. On September 5, 1941 . . . this office recommended that such [military government] training be given. All who have considered the question agree that such training should be given, but differ as to who should give it. It has been suggested at various times that the task should be imposed upon the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; the Civil Affairs Section, G.H.Q., The Judge Advocate General; and The Provost Marshal General. The objection to G-1 being charged with the task is that a division of the General Staff is not an operating body; to General Headquarters, that it should be mobile and have no other than combatant duties; to this office, that its function is solely to give legal advice and military government is not primarily a legal but an administrative task. By first indorsement, dated November 19, 1941 . . . , Major General Allen W. Gullion, who was then both The Judge Advocate General and The Provost Marshal General, but who now occupies the latter position only, expressed a willingness to include instruction in military government in a school for military police and provost marshals which he is setting up. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and War Plans Division, have concurred in that plan, but the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, declines to do so, saying:

. . . The scope of Military Government (FM

27-5) is so broad and so different from Military Police matters that it is difficult to see any material advantage in combining the two types of instruction. \* \* \*

6. The breadth of the instruction necessary will be seen from the following quotation from FM 27-5, paragraph 8:

. . . So far as time and available facilities permit, the instruction will cover the laws and practice of military government, the history of such governments in the past, and the language, geography, history, economics, government, and politics of the country to be occupied. \* \* \*

7. The above citations show that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is entirely right in saying that the scope of military government is much broader than and different from the work of military police. As a strict matter of logic, instruction in military government does not belong in a school whose primary object is the instruction of military police. But the question is a practical as well as a theoretical one. As has been shown, there are strong objections to the assignment of the task of instruction in military government to any one of the other agencies which have been suggested, but The Provost Marshal General is willing to undertake the task. The present Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, who presumably will serve as such for the duration of the existing war, has had a wide and varied experience, both civil and military. . . . While he was the Judge Advocate General, the Field Manual on Military Government (FM 27-5) and numerous opinions on that subject were prepared under his supervision. It would be difficult to find an officer better qualified to have charge of instruction in military government. . . . Moreover, this instruction can be given in addition to that normally given in the Military Police School without additional school facilities, whereas such facilities would have to be duplicated if the instruction were given elsewhere.

8. For the above reasons I am of opinion that, whatever theoretical objections may be raised to the assignment to The Provost Marshal General of the task of giving instruction in military government, as a practical matter that assignment will be a good working solution of the problem. I have therefore concurred in the memorandum for the Chief of Staff in reference as indicated by my initials thereon.

## 2. A SCHOOL FOR SOLDIERS IS ESTABLISHED IN A CIVILIAN INSTITUTION

### TEACHING CIVIL AFFAIRS WITHIN A MILITARY FRAMEWORK

[Memo, Jesse I. Miller,<sup>1</sup> PMGO, for PMG, 10 Jan 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

\* \* \* The Provost Marshal General has been charged with the responsibility of training officers for future details in connection with military government and liaison incident thereto [see above]. The execution of this assignment involves the establishment of a School of Military Government. The purpose of this preliminary memorandum is to outline the general nature, scope and personnel of such a school.

#### A. General:

The ideal type of military government is one which integrates the local laws, institutions, customs, psychology and economics of the occupied area and a superimposed military control with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter. \* \* \*

This involves fundamentally the selection of a group of officers possessing some special or promising talent and their instruction in two general and sharply defined areas:

1. The international conventions and the American regulations, procedure and experience relevant to the administration of military government, and

2. The historical, political, social and economic backgrounds of the occupied regions in which they may be called upon to function.

#### B. Scope of Instruction:

##### 1. Basic Instruction

\* \* \* The entire course above indicated should extend over a period of from six to eight weeks, preferably eight.

##### 2. Politico-Military Instruction

\* \* \* Under present conditions, this course should be limited to four weeks.

#### C. Personnel:

##### 1. Executive and Faculty.

The flavor of a Civil Affairs Section in

any occupied territory is military; its problems are primarily civil. Hence, there should be a Commandant of the school who should be a Regular Army officer, assisted by a Director who should be a civilian or an officer commissioned from civil life for that purpose. Thus, the special problems of the Army could be stressed and the two points of view integrated with the emphasis on the military.

The faculty would consist principally of lecturers drawn from the ranks of the best qualified persons in their respective fields. The permanent faculty would be small; at this stage it would be well to leave its composition to the Commandant and the Director.

#### 2. Students.

Here is, perhaps, the crux of the entire matter. For, no matter how well the course be designed and no matter how excellently it be presented, the entire project will become so much wasted effort if the student group is incapable of absorbing it. Hence, student-officers should be selected with great care and only those whose background and ability indicate some aptitude for the assignment should be selected. \* \* \*

#### D. Recommendations:

At the present time, recommendations are limited to the following:

1. That the school be designed to include both Courses 1 and 2, supra, and that its instruction cover a period of from 10 to 12 weeks.

2. That the school be in charge of a Commandant, who shall be an officer of the Regular Army, assisted by a Director, who shall be either a civilian or an officer commissioned from civil life for the purpose.

3. That the first student group consist of 30 officers of whom three shall be of sufficient age, rank and experience to qualify as the Chief of a Civil Affairs Section of an army of occupation and that the remaining 27 officers be selected from among younger officers of talent and ability and with backgrounds more or less equally distributed among the special fields above mentioned, i.e., engineers (electrical, civil and sanitation), accountants, lawyers, economists, sociologists and the like.

4. That the school be located at a place easily accessible to the War College where alone can be found the bulk of essential reading materials.

<sup>1</sup>Jesse I. Miller was a civilian consultant in the War Department, who had been in military service during World War I. After the Military Government Division was set up in the Provost Marshal's Office on 25 July 1942 (see below, p. 16), Mr. Miller was commissioned and made Associate Director, later Director.

## SECRETARY STIMSON SEES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRAINING PROJECT

[Telecon, Gullion and SW Henry L. Stimson, 5 Feb 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

Gullion: . . . Wickersham would be the head of the whole thing. He would be the Commandant of the College. It's a big man's job, there's no doubt about that.

Stimson: I should think that would be a very important position.

Gullion: No doubt about it. If we're going to win this war, we're going to have to occupy some countries.

## TWO MONTHS AFTER START OF WAR A SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS AUTHORIZED

[AG Ltr to PMG, 9 Feb 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

1. The Provost Marshal General is charged with the operating function of training officers for future detail in connection with military government and liaison at a school of military government to be established for that purpose.

2. The Provost Marshal General will confer with the Personnel Division, General Staff, relative to the preparation of detailed plans for initiating and operating the course of instructions.

## PROPOSAL TO LOCATE THE SCHOOL AT A NEARBY UNIVERSITY

[Memo, Brig Gen Cornelius W. Wickersham, PMGO, for PMG, 21 Feb 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

\* \* \* It is believed that advantage should be taken of the offer of the University of Virginia and that the School of Military Government should be located there. The facilities are sufficient for a school of about 60 students, 10 executive officers and members of the faculty, and a clerical and stenographic force of about 15. When the new Naval Building is finished and additional space is thereby made available, there will be room for some expansion.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>The offer was informally made by President John Lloyd Newcomb to General Wickersham at a conference of 19 February, was confirmed by a letter of 23 February, and was shortly accepted by the Provost Marshal General. While some military installations in and around Washington had also been considered, the practical difficulties were immediately apparent. It is noteworthy that from the outset the inclination of the Provost Marshal General's Office was to establish the school at a university, which would afford use of a library and other facilities not obtainable in equal degree on military premises.

## A DRY DIRECTIVE INITIATES A RATHER EXCITING EXPERIMENT

[Ltr, AG to PMG, 13 Mar 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

1. Supplementing directions contained in letter, this office . . . , February 9, 1942, subject, Training of Personnel for Military Government and Liaison, it is desired that the Provost Marshal General establish at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, a school to be known as The School of Military Government. This school will be under the direct supervision of The Provost Marshal General.

2. The course of instruction will not exceed sixteen weeks in duration, the first course to begin on or about May 1, 1942. Subsequent courses will follow, the second course to begin on or about September 1, 1942.

3. The School of Military Government is based upon instruction at one time of a student body consisting of not to exceed 100 officers. Permanent overhead for the school, exclusive of outside lecturers, will not exceed 12 officers and civilian instructors, 25 civilians, and one enlisted man, as arranged after consultation with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

4. The School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, is designated as an exempted station, under the control of The Provost Marshal General, but is authorized to communicate directly with The Adjutant General and with other persons and agencies with reference to other than policy matters.<sup>9</sup>

## THE CHARLOTTESVILLE CURRICULUM COMPRISES LARGELY CIVIL SUBJECTS

[Outline of Curriculum, First Course (May-Aug 42) submitted by Comdt, SMG to TAG [The Adjutant General], 13 May 42, AG files, 352 (12-3-41) (1), SMG, Est]

I. *Introduction and orientation: text material and bibliography.*

Distinguishing military law, martial law and military government; clarifying the nature, scope and general phases of the latter; outlining the general objectives of the course.

II. *The organization and operation of the War Department and the Army.*

A general outline of the organization of the War Department; military organization (tactical

<sup>9</sup>The school opened on 11 May 1942 with 49 student officers in attendance. The small enrollment was probably the result of the short interval between the announcement of the school and its opening.

and territorial); relation of the War Department to the Army; official correspondence, etc.

### III. *The international law of military government.*

The relevant conventions; the rules of land warfare; growth and general survey.

### IV. *The American regulations.*

A survey and study of War Department regulations (FM 27-5), presenting the basic policies and mechanics of military government.

### V. *American experiences in military government.*

Study of illustrative techniques in previous experiences. Application to objectives in: (1) liaison in friendly situations and (2) the Atlantic Charter.

### VI. *Other experiences.*

The experiences and practices of other countries in military government.

### VII. *Public administration.*

General principles of public administration, including local and state government; public finance; public health and sanitation; communications; utilities and public works; education; public safety; public welfare; economic problems.

### VIII. *Introduction to politico-military backgrounds.*

Discussing American Constitutional Government, the Atlantic Charter, Nazi ideology and other political philosophies.

### IX. *Politico-military backgrounds—general.*

Races and racial theories; general or comparative historical geography; geo-politics.

### X. *Politico-military backgrounds—special.*

(Three selected political or geographical areas)

Political histories; economic histories; systems of government; social psychology; geography; legal systems.

### XI. *Liaison.*

Liaison functions; correlation of problems of military government and friendly liaison. Study of selected areas and special features relating thereto.

## CHARLOTTESVILLE'S FIRST MAJOR FINDING: THE SCHOOL INADEQUATE UNLESS SUPPLEMENTED BY CO-OPERATION WITH CIVILIAN TRAINING AGENCIES

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

3. Certain factors should be noted as follows:

(a). The obligation implicit in the Army's mission of military government is, perhaps, of as great importance as any connected with the war. As has heretofore been pointed out by General Lee in his report on the British School, the termination of hostilities will probably leave the American army as the sole agency capable of initiating the reconstruction process in wide areas scattered over the entire world.

(b). It will not be disputed (at this time) that the prime direction and administration of any military government belong wholly to the military command. . . . There are, however, two overriding aspects of military government, when conducted extensively and in widely scattered areas, which the Army should not attempt to deal with alone, viz., general political policy and general economic policy. Joint efforts by the Army and other agencies of the government will be needed. Consequently, it would seem desirable to inaugurate a program in the beginning which would anticipate the inevitable liaison and which would forestall the premature loss of military direction and control.<sup>10</sup>

(c). The only form of military government contemplated by the international Conventions arises upon the occupation of *enemy* territory. American forces, may, however, find themselves in the occupation of the territories of neutrals, quasi-neutrals, puppets, or even allies. An entirely unexplored field of international law is in prospect, with little precedent save the Japanese.

(d). The American occupation of the Rhineland during the last war involved at no time an excess of 250,000 American troops. The number of military Civil Affairs personnel required there was 213, or approximately 1/10 of 1 percent of the armed forces. . . .

(e). In the 1918 German occupation, local German officials were extensively utilized in the

<sup>10</sup> General Wickersham could not foresee that primacy of the military establishment in the administration of occupied territory was very shortly to be denied by the President.

functioning of local institutions. Under present conditions in Germany, it would doubtless be unwise to continue Nazi officials in office or in key positions. The demands upon American personnel, at least during the initial stages of any occupation, would therefore be substantially increased. A similar situation would probably exist in any occupation of Japanese territory. Consequently, any estimate based upon the Rhineland experience of the last war is subject to the necessity of supplementing the trained Civil Affairs officers with large numbers of operatives and specialists.

4. The total task confronting the Army is to have available at the proper time (a) a trained personnel sufficient for the key administrative positions, (b) an adequate number of subordinates and (c) to find a sufficient number of operatives and specialists to meet the conditions that are likely to exist in both Germany and Japan. The combined total might run to several thousand men capable of functioning under military control and direction, but with consistent political and economic policies in widely separated areas all over the world, and in some instances, under circumstances where there will be little, if any, international precedent.

7. The following agencies may be considered sources of personnel within their respective capacities:

(a). *School of Military Government*. This can be increased to 150 student officers for the next course as already recommended, and this would make possible the training of 450 officers per year available for detail to military government and liaison. Those assigned to military government would occupy the key positions as military governors, Civil Affairs officers, and members of Civil Affairs Sections of staffs of commanders of higher units. Some further expansion would also be feasible for later courses.

(b). *Military Police Schools*. Additional instruction in military government might be given in these schools so as to constitute a training ground for subordinate positions.

(c). *Universities and Colleges*. A number of these institutions have indicated an interest in the inauguration of courses in training for specialist and technical personnel. Columbia Uni-

versity has already begun the setting up of such a course which will begin this summer. . . . Princeton and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy have already indicated a desire to embark on projects relating to postwar problems. It is sufficient to say that the programs contemplated by these institutions would provide the sort of background training which might fit older students for services in specialized fields in particular areas, and younger students for later work in this field.

(d). *Army Specialist Corps*. This organization is indicated as a procurement agency for expert and advisory personnel.

(e). *Board of Economic Warfare*. This agency is believed to be in close touch with technical talent in the United States, particularly in the field of economics and would probably be willing to co-operate both in the selection and in specialized training of expert personnel for special tasks in the economic and sociological fields.

(f). *Private or Semipublic Agencies*. One or two private agencies have indicated an interest in the subject, but it is not deemed advisable to rely upon them for direct assistance.

9. Recommendations. In view of the foregoing, the following recommendations are submitted:

(a). That the necessary steps be taken in accordance with paragraphs 7a and 7b above.

(b). That arrangements be made with the Army Specialist Corps and the Board of Economic Warfare for procurement of specialist and operative personnel with particular reference to Germany and Japan so that they can be obtained, when the time comes, on short notice.

(c). That approved universities and colleges should be encouraged to conduct courses in specialist and technical training and should not be discouraged from conducting the courses which increase the knowledge of students that may be useful to them in connection with later training for military government or postwar needs provided that it is made clear that the course will in no way constitute a short cut to a commission.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> General Wickersham envisaged, of course, the commissioning or enlistment of qualified civilians, in accordance with par. 7 of FM 27-5.

### 3. CIVILIAN-MILITARY JOCKEYING FOR CONTROL

#### A CIVILIAN AGENCY SEIZES THE INITIATIVE WITH THE PRESIDENT

[Copy of Memo, Arthur C. Ringland, War Relief Cont Bd, 20 Jun 42, forwarded to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, OUSW files, MG]

(1) The Administration has announced from time to time that this Government and the United Nations collectively must undertake the responsibility for multiple tasks of administration in occupied and liberated areas.

(2) In preparation for these tasks, several Federal agencies—notably the State, War, Navy and Agriculture Departments, the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Production Board, the National Research Council, the League of Nations and the International Labor Office, and many other institutions and organizations, are engaged in the study of procedures and plans to be made effective upon the cessation of hostilities. These plans would be immediately effective and extend through phases of relief and reconstruction from the time of the armistice until the establishment of a stable pattern of administration in the affected areas.

(3) It is obvious that trained personnel of varied capacities and of a speculative number will be needed for these tasks. It is certainly reasonable to anticipate that Army and Navy personnel will be needed for military governments of liberated and occupied areas at the end of this war as it was at the end of the last. After the Armistice in 1918, it was necessary to set up a military government in the Rhineland and to carry out an enormous task of food administration, relief and public health work throughout the countries of central Europe, the Balkans, and the Baltic States, the Near East and Russia. It is anticipated that this time there will be a similar but vastly greater task in Europe and in other parts of the world. This time and in view of the circumstances of the war, the exigencies of the situation may well require much more work of an economic and social character.

(4) At present the only formalized training for international administration is provided at the Army School of Military Government at Charlottesville and by the training program of the School of International Administration to be launched at Columbia University on August 17 with a nucleus of students detailed by the Navy, and it is understood, by certain civilian agencies.

(5) Neither the Army School nor the Columbia program will be in any way adequate to meet

the training program. It is understood that other educational agencies and certain of the Government departments are contemplating diverse aspects of the problem. There is to be considered too the use of the personnel and organizational resources of private agencies which have had experience in the foreign field.

(8) It is suggested that the President should request someone—or perhaps a small informal President's committee, to explore immediately the entire problem of the selection and training of personnel for international administration, including relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction; to evaluate what is now being done in these fields of training and education; and recommend what should be done in terms of an administrative setup. Co-ordinated action of this character will at once facilitate needed liaison, both within the several agencies of Government and between the Government and private institutions now interested in war and postwar tasks.<sup>12</sup>

#### IMMEDIATE ACTION NEEDED IF THE ARMY'S PLANS ARE NOT TO BE FORESTALLED

[Memo, Gullion for CG, SOS, 23 Jun 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

5. . . . There are serious doubts that 150 men of desired ability and qualifications can be obtained from the *Army* at this time, in view of the demonstrated reluctance of commanders to release good men. This is, I take it, one of the reasons that General Wickersham has recommended that extraordinarily qualified persons be commissioned directly from civil life for the purpose of instructing them at the Charlottesville School. These men are to be chosen because of their experience in government or in public utilities or in sanitary or civil engineering.

<sup>12</sup>Mr. Ringland's proposal would, of course, have reopened the whole question of the control of military government training, which the War Department, in accordance with tradition, had itself assumed. From this point of view the Ringland memorandum had, to the Provost Marshal General's Office, a different character from the numerous offers which other civilians and civilian agencies were making at the same time to establish cooperation in military government problems. Typical of many of these was the offer of Harold Weston, Secretary of the Reconstruction Services Committee, in a letter to the Provost Marshal General of 3 June 1942. Mr. Weston proposed that the committee should be authorized to consult confidentially with government agencies in its pursuit of studies regarding the rehabilitation of liberated areas. PMGO files, 014.13 Relations Between Civil and MG Authority.

6. While I foresee that we shall need men of the experience indicated by General Wickersham [Memo 17 June, Section 2 above], I am not at present prepared to recommend that they be commissioned in the Army of the United States, because, following their completion of the four-month course at Charlottesville, their services would be limited to standing and waiting. I should approve General Wickersham's request if it is possible to have these men commissioned in the Specialist Corps with the understanding that upon completion of their course at Charlottesville they be returned to civil life subject to call under their specialist commission when needed. . . .

7. The military government which the United States must, of necessity, establish, will dwarf all of our previous efforts in that line. . . . It is imperative that this responsibility be clearly recognized from the beginning and that the efforts of the military be not blocked or impeded by other agencies of our government.

\* \* \* Since the primary responsibility for the administration of any military government rests with the Army, it follows that *the Army should take the initiative* in the preparation of policies and plans, including the procurement and training of personnel, designed to assist the liberated areas and to govern conquered territory.

In my opinion, unless the Army acts immediately and decisively it will find any plan which it subsequently develops will become lost in the maze of plans which are now being formulated by civilian agencies, both governmental and private, notably the Board of Economic Warfare and Columbia University. \* \* \*

I am strongly in favor of the proposal to increase the faculty and student body of the School of Military Government.

8. I intend to set up a Military Government Division in this Office, with a view to the Army's assuming leadership in enlisting the services of the Board of Economic Warfare and other agencies in preparing for Military Government. I request authority to take the necessary preliminary steps toward the integration of such agencies under War Department leadership. . . .<sup>13</sup>

#### A DISTURBING MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT

[Ltr, USW Robert P. Patterson to Roosevelt, 20 Jul 42, OUSW files, MG]

The memorandum which you sent me on July

<sup>13</sup> There is no evidence that at the time of writing this memorandum General Gullion knew of the Ringland proposal, which was not brought formally to the attention of the War Department until a month later.

17th on the training of personnel for postwar administration relates to a subject of much interest to the War Department.<sup>14</sup> The memorandum points out that while some steps have been taken on postwar planning, very little attention has been paid to the training of personnel.

I am in full accord with the suggestions contained in it that steps be taken to explore the problem of selection and training of personnel, evaluate what is now being done, and recommend an administrative setup. However, I strongly feel that it is most important there should be no public announcement about this at the present time and that the work be done informally and without any publicity whatsoever.

Any time that you wish to discuss this with me I will be available.

[Memo, Miller, Dir, Military Government Division (MGD), for PMG, 28 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321, PMG & MGD]

\* \* \* Last July a memorandum by Mr. Arthur C. Ringland raised an issue at the White House that threatened the War Department's leadership in the field of military government. As a result, a comprehensive program for military government was inaugurated by The Provost Marshal General at the direction of the Under Secretary of War.<sup>15</sup> \* \* \*

#### UNWISDOM OF PREMATURE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

[Memo, Miller for Col Edward S. Greenbaum, OUSW, 23 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

1. The prime direction and administration of military government belong wholly to the military command. If there is one outstanding lesson to be gained from prior American experiences in military government, it is the un wisdom of permitting any premature interference by civilian agencies with the Army's basic task of civil administration in occupied areas.

3. . . . In those important American experiences in military government—three in number—where civilian influence was permitted to be

<sup>14</sup> This was the 20 June memorandum of Mr. Ringland (above) which the President sent to the Under Secretary of War, asking "Will you please speak to me about this at your convenience?" OUSW files, MG.

<sup>15</sup> This memorandum, though not written until October, is included here because it testifies not only to the concern entertained in July by the War Department but also to the influence of that concern in expediting action upon training plans.

exercised, the results were, respectively, demoralizing, costly and ludicrous. . . .

(a) *The Civil War*. The grand strategy of the Union forces in the early days of the war was to drive a wedge into the Confederacy, which was accomplished by the partial occupations of Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee. The military commanders in these three states thus acquired the right to impose military government. However, in the spring and early summer 1862, President Lincoln appointed George F. Shepley and Andrew Johnson as military governors of Louisiana and Tennessee respectively. Johnson was then a United States Senator; Shepley was a civilian. Both were given the rank of Brigadier General and assumed their duties as "military" governors of the respective states.

There was . . . violent conflict between these civilian "military" governors and the commanders in Louisiana and Tennessee. . . .

(b) *The Philippine Insurrection*. General Gullion's communication of June 23, 1942, to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, refers briefly to the Philippine episode. His remarks may be quoted as follows:

"The early history of the American occupation of the Philippines demonstrates the dangers to be encountered when the military and civil branches of the government exercise functions in the same occupied area. William Howard Taft admitted that under such circumstances there was bound to be 'inevitable friction!' The commanding officers in the Philippines, Generals Otis, [Arthur] MacArthur and [Adna Romanza] Chaffee, successively, were severely handicapped by the Schurman and Taft Commissions who were endeavoring to introduce civil government to the Islands prematurely. General Otis felt that the activities of the Schurman Commission cost the lives of many American soldiers and Generals MacArthur and Chaffee resented the injection of civilians into a situation which, in their judgment would be, and as events proved, was, of a purely military nature."<sup>16</sup> \* \* \*

#### MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION CREATED TO ASSERT WAR DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP

[Memo, Gullion for the USW, 25 Jul 42, PMGO files, 321, PMG & MGD]

I have been directed by the War Department

<sup>16</sup> The third issue discussed by Miller—the Rhineland occupation—is omitted in view of the reference to it in the second document of this chapter. It is noteworthy that the person citing this historical evidence against premature civilian interference in MG was no professional soldier. See also below, Miller's memorandum of 30 July 1942.

(through the Chief of Administrative Services) to take immediate steps to integrate, under War Department leadership, the civilian agencies now or hereafter to be interested in problems of military government.

Pursuant to that directive, I have established a Division of Military Government in the Office of The Provost Marshal General and have placed Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham in charge of that Division. General Wickersham will continue as Commandant of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville but will spend much of his time in Washington where he has fully equipped offices.

Subject to such instructions as he may receive from you, General Wickersham has been told to make contact first with the Board of Economic Warfare and later with other agencies, such as Columbia University.

#### NO CONSENSUS ON GENERAL GULLION'S AIM

[Memo, Harold H. Neff, Spec Asst to SW, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 29 Jul 42, OUSW Secret files, MG]

\* \* \* I doubt, however, whether the draft of memorandum by General Gullion is correct, because I don't see how, except by superior authority, the War Department can take steps to integrate under its leadership the several civilian agencies. Without direction from above, is not that an assumption of authority? Or is the idea it can be done *sub rosa*, as it were?

#### THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S OFFICE TRIES TO SELL ITS OWN PROGRAM

[Memo, Col Joseph V. deP. Dillon, DPMG, for Chief Admin Servs, SOS, 31 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

On the evening of July 29, 1942, at the invitation of Mr. Max Lowenthal [Board of Economic Warfare] and with the approval of the Provost Marshal General, Brigadier General C. W. Wickersham, Commandant, The School of Military Government, and his assistant, Mr. Jesse Miller, attended an informal conference to discuss the general program of military government. Five United States Senators and four or five members of the Board of Economic Warfare also attended.

General Wickersham outlined a program which included the integration of all interested agencies (Government and private) in matters of military government, under the leadership of the War Department. All present were highly

pleased with what had been accomplished thus far and appeared to be extremely co-operative.

Colonel Greenbaum, of the Office of the Under Secretary of War, was informed of the developments of that informal meeting. On the morning of July 30th, Colonel Greenbaum called General Wickersham and informed him that Mr. Wayne Coy, of the Office of the President, had called Secretary Patterson and requested the return of the President's memorandum, with the enclosure written by Mr. Ringdale [Ringland] to the President. It was inferentially indicated that the President was satisfied that the War Department had taken the proper steps to develop the program. With the return of that memorandum, Colonel Greenbaum attached the following memorandum:

Subject: Military Government.

The outstanding lessons gained from American experiences in military government, including the Civil War and the Philippine Insurrection, and from the experiences of other countries, is that the prime direction and administration of military government belongs wholly to the military command. In recognition of its important obligation to fulfill the mission of military government, the War Department has established, under the Provost Marshal General, a School of Military Government, at Charlottesville, Virginia; Military Police Schools at Chickamauga, Tennessee, and the Division of Military Government in the Office of The Provost Marshal General.

The School of Military Government is for training the personnel to fill the key positions in military government and the Military Police Schools will train personnel to perform subordinate and preliminary functions. The Division of Military Government is taking steps to integrate, under War Department leadership, civilian agencies, both public and private, now or hereafter to be interested in the problem of military government. Its duties include the activation of the program, to recruit, train and make available such reservoirs of additional personnel as may be deemed requisite for missions of military government, including technical experts and advisory personnel, both of whom will have to be recruited from persons presently in civil life.

Judge Patterson added to this memorandum to the President, this statement:

"Whenever you care to do so, I will be glad to arrange a meeting to give you further information about the matter."

#### THE ARMY POINTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ORDER TO FORESTALL CIVILIAN CONTROL

[Memo, Miller, Associate Dir, MGD, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 30 Jul 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

I think you may find the inclosures [not attached] useful at this time in connection with any White House discussions. The program outlined in the accompanying papers now has the approval (with minor and immaterial variations) of both General Gullion and General Wickersham and has therefore been put into operation.

Specifically . . . the following affirmative action has already been taken in respect of the six recommendations there set out:

1. A Military Government Division has been set up in the Office of The Provost Marshal General with the personnel recommended in memorandum of July 25, 1942.

2. The School of Military Government has been directed to prepare appropriate recommendations relative to revised Tables of Organization covering Civil Affairs personnel and the School is already engaged in that task.

3. Arrangements have been formulated for post-graduate work to begin concurrently with the opening of the second session of the School of Military Government on or about September 9, 1942. It is hoped that portions of this post-graduate work can be conducted in co-operation with certain universities, principally (at the moment) Yale, Columbia and Johns Hopkins. Yale has already submitted definite and, I think, highly satisfactory proposals.

4. The Military Police Schools have indicated their willingness and capacity to train per year 400 to 500 subordinate officers and 1,200 enlisted military police for special duties in military government. The only obstacle to immediate action is a housing one to cost approximately \$20,000.

5. The Army Specialist Corps has indicated its complete willingness to serve as a vehicle for the recruitment of technical and advisory personnel, and its staff is now studying the feasibility of creating an Army Specialist Corps Reserve in connection with this project.

6. Liaison has been established with the Board of Economic Warfare and the areas of presently acceptable co-operation with the War Department already delimited. . . .

As you will observe from the program outlined in the inclosures, the immediate over-all objective is to silence any claims by civilian agencies to leadership in the military government program by giving to all of them an active part in the program but in such a relation to it

as to forestall their seizing its direction or control. In this connection, I inclose a copy of a letter dispatched today to the Board of Economic Warfare.

#### THE WAR DEPARTMENT GIVES QUALIFIED APPROVAL TO GENERAL GULLION'S PROPOSALS

[Memo, Asst Secy, GS, for PMG Through CG, SOS, 14 Aug 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The expansion of The School of Military Government, as proposed by The Provost Marshal General, is approved, with the following restrictions:

(1) That the increase in the number of students and the increase in the faculty of the School be provided from personnel of the Army Specialist Corps.

(2) That the Army Specialist Corps personnel detailed as students will be returned, at the completion of the course, to an inactive status without pay, if there are no vacancies for their services.

The Provost Marshal General is authorized to establish a Military Government Division in the Office of The Provost Marshal General, provided this can be done without any increase in the allotment of officers assigned to The Provost Marshal General. The Military Government Division in the Office of The Provost Marshal General will engage in broad planning activities, with detailed estimates to be undertaken by The School of Military Government.

#### HIGH-LEVEL DECISION: IT IS TIME TO ANNOUNCE A WAR DEPARTMENT PROGRAM

[Telecon, Gullion and Patterson, 4 Sep 42,<sup>27</sup> PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

\* \* \* Judge P. General, I had a talk this morning at a meeting with [Henry] Morgenthau, Jr. I thought it was just on the currency proposition but it developed that he had . . . an agenda there that included a good many other things and it developed into a discussion of military government in general. He showed a good deal of awareness of what had been going on. I told him that we had the subject in hand and after some more discussion he said well if you have got the subject in hand I'll lay off with only a respond when you want our assistance.

<sup>27</sup> Transcript of conversation, with inaccuracies and omissions, is included to show the trend of thought which led to the preparation of the War Department Program of Military Government.

I said that's all right. The State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare were also there. [Frank] Knox was also there from the Navy and Knox showed that he didn't know anything at all about any developments being on. He said that he had discussed it recently with the President. The President thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ought to do it. Well, I told him that the work was in hand in the War Department and we [if] thought best by all concerned to transfer it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that could be done too, although I didn't think it was necessary or feasible. That prompts me though to the thought that I think the time has probably arrived when we ought to put down on paper the outline of the policy in the War Department for planning and preparation so that it could be given to Treasury and Navy, etc. Don't you think so?

Gen. G. Yes, it wouldn't require much of an elaboration of what we already have on paper, as to the purposes of this School.

Judge P. Well, I thought the School, yes, but you've also set up your division. It seemed to me that if we could state on a couple of sheets of paper a brief outline of present War Department policies on the preparation of Military Government. Well, such a thing as this. I suppose the policy is eventually on any passport to have someone on Military Government on the staff of the commanding officer.

Gen. G. That's true.

Judge P. . . . and he would assemble the necessary people, military and civilian, with a view to the performance of the jobs that he would have right in the particular area in mind. The area itself having been studied and its problems having been given consideration. The assembly of the people having being planned with that in mind, and then I suppose we ought to give our concept quite briefly of the operation of Military Government, that I suppose that staff officer in the name of the commanding officer orders this not to be done. Knox was talking in a very vague about civil governor and working in collaboration and . . .

Gen. G. That's all wet. That's the very thing we don't want.

Judge P. Of course not. I said that. But I think that we have got to make kind of an affirmative statement. I think the time has come and I think ought probably be passed around to the other Government agencies so that a meeting such as Morgenthau called this morning might not be held at all. He called the meeting off and I told him, I thought it was a . . . he said well that's all right; he said, putting it very bluntly, he'd rather

that we didn't discuss these things and that they're in hand in the War Department, that you'll let us know when you'll need us. I said that is true. With that, we broke up. But there had been a good deal of rather feudal [futile] discussions before that. I think the memorandum might also cover in a rather concise way the progress that has been made and the planning that is being done, of course, this I take it that the School equips officers for general overall use in this job and that it is contemplated that the necessary civilian skills will be assembled, at least in a tentative way, the necessary governmental agencies gotten in touch with on any operation that comes up and see the currency man from the Treasury Department and someone from the Board of Economic Warfare and so forth.

Gen. G. That's exactly how I have planned.

\* \* \*

Judge P. Is this set down on paper anywhere in a brief way?

Gen. G. No, it has not been.

Judge P. Don't you think that you and Wickersham ought to?

Gen. G. Yes, I'll call Miller today and tell him to come up here.<sup>18</sup>

Judge P. It'll head off a lot of trouble, I'm sure, and that maybe we ought to send them to the White House as well, because. . . .

Gen. G. Oh, yes, he's [the President] very much interested in it, you know.

Judge P. He might then confine the discussion of it to people who know something about it rather than to talk to people who haven't thought of it at all and think there's nothing been going on. \* \* \*

#### THE ARMY ANNOUNCES ITS PREPARATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY IN THE INITIAL PHASE

[Synopsis of WD Program for MG, 4 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

Any occupation of hostile or Axis-held territory may be divided into two phases: (a) a period of military necessity and (b) an ensuing period when military necessity will no longer exist. During the first phase, it is the obligation of the armed forces to establish and maintain military government; during the second phase, civilian authority of some type will probably assume the mission then to be surrendered by the Army. Until the second phase has begun, however, it

<sup>18</sup> Jesse I. Miller was in Charlottesville where he also assisted General Wickersham.

develops upon the Army to administer the government of any occupied area.

In recognition of these basic principles, the War Department is now pursuing a program designed to accomplish two objectives: (1) the procurement and training of an adequate personnel to fulfill its mission of military government and (2) the development of a technique which will effect the transition from military to civilian control with a minimum impairment of efficiency.

The procurement and training program is designed to produce, with the necessary rapidity, the following categories of personnel for military government: (a) top administrative commissioned personnel, (b) junior commissioned personnel, (c) occupational (or military government) military police, and (d) technical and advisory personnel. Category (a) is now being produced at the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, which graduated its first class on August 29, 1942, and which began its second four-month course on September 9. Categories (b) and (c) will be produced at two new schools to be opened at the Provost Marshal General's School Center at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, about November 1, 1942. Category (d) will be developed in the manner presently to be indicated.

This last-mentioned group of technical and advisory personnel is to be selected from highly trained civilians. Since there will be no immediate need for their services, it would be inadvisable to withdraw them from their present nonmilitary pursuits at this time. However, it is necessary to compile a roster of these specialists, select those best-qualified, and make arrangements to have them available at call. Only a minimum amount of training in the special field of military government will be necessary for them as they will be already highly trained in their respective fields for the specialized functions which they will later perform. On them will fall the burden of performing the important duties hereafter referred to.

Many complicated technical problems will inevitably arise in any occupation. Among these will undoubtedly be fiscal matters of far-reaching economic importance. Control of local banking establishments must be undertaken. Disentanglement of monetary systems from Axis-imposed regulations must be accomplished and American occupational currency and rates of exchange established.

The economic problems that will arise will be of doubly difficult solution because of the prior Axis occupation and total disarrangement inci-

dent thereto. Industries must be surveyed to determine those to be continued in operation or re-established. Raw materials, operating personnel, and funds must be allocated to obtain maximum efficiency of production.

Administrative problems arising from the care and feeding of liberated peoples will require special technique, tact, and skilled administration. Public health and sanitation will present other problems requiring specialized knowledge. The broad field of public utilities will demand trained technical administrators.

These problems, but a few of those that may be anticipated, prove the immediate need, at the beginning of an occupation, for skilled technicians and advisors in all fields of public endeavor.

The Army's mission of military government is primarily an administrative one. Many underlying policies will be determined by agencies other than the War Department or the Army. Thus, the political policy of an occupation will be determined by the State Department; the economic policy by the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare, or both; the fiscal policy by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, and so forth. These general policies will be administered in great part by the technicians referred to above who will, however, during the period of military government, be under military control and direction. But since the functions to be performed by them will be largely the administration of those policies formulated by agencies other than the War Department, it is planned to recruit them from nominations supplied by the various agencies concerned, since such agencies are in a position to discover the best-qualified individuals for the tasks in which they have a peculiar interest.

In the light of the foregoing, the following immediate co-operative activities between the War Department and other agencies of the government are indicated:

a. The furnishing to the War Department of lists of persons qualified for missions in military government in the special field with which any agency is concerned. From such lists, the technical and advisory group referred to above will be principally recruited. The War Department has already requested such lists from certain agencies; a general request will be made shortly.

b. The study, by certain agencies, at the request of the War Department, of various special and technical problems arising in military government. The War Department has heretofore suggested to the State Department

and the Board of Economic Warfare certain studies in the fields of international law and economics. A need for research in other fields exists, and studies concerning them are to be requested.

c. For the past five months, several departments and agencies have been co-operating with the School of Military Government in furnishing it with materials and lecturers in connection with its instructional work. These activities are continuing.

[Ltr, SW Stimson to Heads of Govt Depts, 26 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

From the enclosed copy of a "Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government" you will observe that, among other objectives, it is planned to create groups of technical and advisory personnel for eventual duties in military government. It is hoped to recruit these groups principally from the agencies of the government having an interest in certain special fields that may be involved in future military occupation.

Since your Department may have now or may later develop a peculiar interest in certain aspects of military occupations, it is believed that you will desire to co-operate with the War Department in their indicated activity.

Accordingly, if you have not already done so, will you be good enough to designate some person in your Department to establish and maintain liaison for that purpose with Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, who is directly in charge of the military government program?

#### THE WHITE HOUSE SEEMS TO BE SATISFIED

[Memo, Gullion for ASW John J. McCloy, 12 Sep 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

Sorry to impose additional information on you, especially since Mr. Harry Hopkins says he is satisfied. However, herewith is General Wickersham's list of students in the first class with explanations as to their sponsors or other reasons for selection. \* \* \*

#### CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND THE COLLEGES SEEM SATISFIED

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Gullion, 28 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

The most important phase of the program (from

the point of view of establishing War Department leadership) related to the recruitment from among . . . governmental agencies of a large reservoir of technicians and professional personnel. By personnel contacts with all these agencies (except the State Department) they were advised that the War Department intended to commission 2500 persons, principally from nominations by government agencies, in the Army Specialist Corps under an arrangement which would continue such persons in their present civilian pursuits until they were required for military government missions. This phase of the War Department program met with immediate and enthusiastic response from practically every agency of the Government, including the President's War Relief Control Board, to which Mr. Ringland is attached, and from Mr. Ringland himself. All these agencies are now at work compiling lists of highly qualified persons for various functions in occupied areas. Included among the liaison agents now engaged in this work is Mr. Charles [S.] Hyneman, for the Bureau of the Budget, who is now making an investigation and preparing a report for the President on the

Ringland memorandum.

While these matters were proceeding, an effort was being concurrently made to conciliate the American colleges and universities, which were, not without cause, complaining that the War Department was unwilling or unable to suggest to them some more useful participation in the war effort than had theretofore been made available. It was stated to the representatives of a number of universities—and thereby circulated rather generally throughout the university field—that this office hoped to be able ultimately to establish a program somewhat as follows:

That when the reservoir of technicians already mentioned had been recruited to some substantial extent and commissioned in the Army Specialist Corps, these specialists would be earmarked for specific areas and then farmed out in groups of 50 to 100 among a number of colleges and universities for brief training periods in the background of the areas in which they would ultimately be utilized. This suggestion met with instant approval in university circles and has drawn their almost unanimous support to the War Department program. \* \* \*

#### 4. THE PRESIDENT SAYS OCCUPATION IS IN MOST CASES A CIVILIAN TASK

##### THE CHARLOTTESVILLE SCHOOL IS GIVEN A FAVORABLE IG REPORT<sup>19</sup>

[Memo, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, IG, for the DCofS (Summary of Report of Special Inspection of SMG), 12 Aug 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

##### f. Conclusions:

(1) Is the School developing officers who can be used efficiently as administrators in conquered areas?

Yes. The School superimposes upon the students' previous experience a familiarity with the problems of a theater commander, and these of the higher executives of military government. A habit of thinking is established which develops administrators by the solution of practical individual and group problems of research, judgment and decision.

<sup>19</sup> This report was later brought to Mr. Stimson's attention to assist him in meeting the President's criticism of the School of Military Government. It is pertinent chiefly to the debate soon to arise over whether the school was selecting the wrong type of students or wasting the time of students in impractical studies.

(2) Does the curriculum seek to develop statesmen instead of administrators?

No. There is a tendency so to do; the method of statement of some of the problems which require the student to make many assumptions of the decisions of higher authority upon organization and administration tends to encourage protracted discussion of statesmanship beyond the scope of executives of military government.

(3) Is adequate emphasis placed on developing skilled administrators such as city engineers, sanitation officials, etc.?

The emphasis is adequate for the capability and purpose of the School. Emphasis is not placed upon developing skilled administrators of the kind mentioned; but rather upon developing executives who can direct such administrators. Emphasis is placed upon the necessity for the administrators of large areas (country, region, city) to consider every department of government and to have some familiarity with the problems of each. In the selection of students effort is made to secure a cross-section of all administrative

skills. In the short course, there is not sufficient time to specialize in any one of the subdivisions of governmental administration (city engineer, sanitary engineer, finance, etc.).

(4) Is there any overemphasis on legal phases, such as international law and political philosophy which, while useful, may not be essential for subordinate officials?

Yes, to some extent. It is considered that too many hours were devoted to legal subjects in the first class; they are being reduced in the second class. . . .

(5) Is the course practical?

(a) Yes. The applicatory method is stressed; students deal with real statistics, and with the actual value of all other factors in occupied countries as far as very extensive resources in data can disclose them.

(b) Considerable time is used in lectures in orientation upon the major enemy countries. This orientation is valuable and essential.

(c) Part of the course must be used to indoctrinate the students and to instruct them in fundamental military organization, policies and procedures; the demands of this period will increase as more students with limited or no military service are selected. \* \* \*

(8) Are the officers selected for students suitable?

Yes. The first class consists of a very reasonable spread of skills and success in civilian pursuits.

(9) Are officers whose backgrounds include experience in the administrative phases of municipal government being selected to attend the course?

Yes. In the selection of students an effort is made to secure officers of this type. The present class includes a city manager, police chief, physician, two city attorneys, several utility specialists, public health officer, judges, and the Fiscal Director of the Port of Oregon.

(10) Are individuals who have spent many years in areas in which military government is contemplated being selected?

No. This is not a factor of any appreciable weight in the selection. Although several members of the class have had periods of residence in foreign countries.

(11) Are there too many officers whose background includes political experience only?

No. Although there are 17 lawyers in the class of 51 there are only 8 of the 51 who have "Political experience" only. \* \* \*

#### A RATHER CRITICAL LETTER FROM A CIVILIAN SOURCE

[Ltr, Gardner Jackson, Spec Asst to Under Secy of Agriculture, to Miller, 13 Oct 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

You may remember the question I asked General Wickersham the other evening during the discussion on government of occupied areas. You will recall that my question was whether General Wickersham's School of Military Government used any criteria in the selection of its candidates to test the social attitudes of those candidates, the degree of their devotion to democracy, their racial attitudes, etc.

You will recall that he replied by saying that the question had never arisen and that he saw no reason why it should arise, that since the candidates were picked by the Army they naturally had as deep a devotion to democracy as he or I.

The . . . address by Wayne Coy [Spec Asst to the President] on the problem of Government and democracies more fully explains why I asked the question I did. . . .

#### THE PRESIDENT REPROVES THE SECRETARY OF WAR

[Memo, Roosevelt for the SW, 29 Oct 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

I understand that the Provost Marshal General is training a substantial number of men from civil life to assume the duties of Military Governor or civilian advisors to Military Governors of occupied territories. I should like to have from him a complete explanation of the project—a list of the personnel, officer and civilian, under such training, and a statement of their previous experience.

This whole matter is something which should have been taken up with me in the first instance. The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See Under Secretary Patterson's letter to the President dated 20 July 1942 in Section 3, above, in which he states that he is available at any time to discuss the selection and training of personnel in connection with governing occupied territories. The President was no doubt referring to a later phase of occupation than the assault period. From observations which appear in subsequent chapters of this volume, it is clear that President Roosevelt not only objected to military administration in a postwar period but was anxious that the Army relinquish its con-

## CHARLOTTESVILLE IS CRITICIZED AT A CABINET MEETING

[Memo, Col Robert N. Young, SGS, for CG, SOS, 30 Oct 43, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The following are notes which the Secretary of War dictated following the Cabinet Meeting, October 29, 1942. It is requested that a memorandum be submitted to this office on the questions which were raised and on which the Secretary should be furnished additional information.

"1. *Charlottesville school for Army instruction as to occupied places*: This was discussed at Cabinet with evident suspicion on the part of Departments which may have liked to have had a hand in the matter. The President, however, said that he thought the idea was good within its proper scope but he had been a little impressed with the fact that the instructors did not seem to be the best that could have been collected. He thought they were rather second-rate. The matter was held to be important enough for me to think that I should like to get a pretty careful synopsis of what has been done, the staff of instructors, courses, and the men being trained."<sup>21</sup>

"Secretary Ickes had received a message from Gullion to the effect that he proposed to educate a thousand Specialist Corps men for use in occupied countries in which proposition he saw the germ of imperialism and was much alarmed."  
\* \* \*

## THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL ANSWERS THE ATTACKS

[Memo, Gullion for SW, 9 Nov 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

1. The attacks upon the School fall into two general classes: (1) that the faculty is second-rate, not containing names famous in scholastic and especially in international law circles; and (2) that

control to civilian agencies as soon as possible in the middle phase when active hostilities were over in large areas though the war still continued elsewhere. The President's reference to "second string" men is difficult to understand. It seems probable that his distrust of the Charlottesville group rested on the strictures of Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes and other New Dealers. See below, Section 5.

<sup>21</sup> With regard to the question of proper scope, a later observation (at the meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee on Training, 16 March 1943, sec. 5, this chapter) seems to indicate that the President was concerned lest a large Army training program would lead to continuing and even postwar monopolization of foreign administration by the military.

ideology and pure theories consume time that should be devoted to practical studies."<sup>22</sup>

2. Enclosure A contains a list of the names and qualifications of those responsible for the conduct of the School. Enclosure B contains the names and qualifications of outside lecturers. The men listed on Enclosure A (faculty) were chosen by General Wickersham and me from our personal knowledge or as a result of information received from authorities in whom we had great confidence. In choosing the faculty we wanted a working lot of practical men. The matters studied fall in the dirt farming category, as it were, not in the cultural realm. To an extent, men with big names are not the kind of workers we desire. We did not want men who think that the writing of a book is *summum bonum*, nor did we want *professional* delegates to international conferences. . . . The faculty works hard and makes the students work hard and the studies submitted herewith will show that the work is practical. Enclosure B (outside lecturers) indicates a combination of men with big names and men with practical knowledge of administration and of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation.

The faculty consists of a judicious combination of lawyer-soldiers, soldier-administrators and civilian specialists. They have had the advantage of records many of which are confidential and to be found only in the War College, War Department, Strategic Services and B.E.W. files. No constellation of big names in a Cambridge orbit would have done as well.

3. Accompanying this memorandum are problem solutions which will show you how the school works. General Eisenhower was furnished a number of these and cabled a request that he be supplied with others.

4. In addition to scheduled formal lectures and conferences, study and reading, the students engage in the highly practical work of solving concrete problems. For this purpose the class is divided into committees to make surveys of foreign countries or areas, formulate recommendations for the establishment of military gov-

<sup>22</sup> General Gullion here overlooks a third type of attack which clearly, in certain circles, was predominant. This was that the school was not giving its students enough of the kind of philosophy which would have made them sympathetic to progressive and liberal ideas. In a memorandum of 27 November 1942 (see below, this section), General Gullion does note this type of criticism. It was the most difficult type for him to meet because the school operated on the premise that matters of social philosophy were outside its purview.

ernment, or for liaison work in an area and to submit a definite plan for the administration in that area of such matters as public safety, public sanitation, education and public welfare. \* \* \*

#### SECRETARY STIMSON DEFENDS CHARLOTTESVILLE

[Memo, Miss E. C. Neary, Personal Secy to the SW, 1 Dec 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The following notes on the subject of the School of Military Government were dictated by the Secretary of War on his return from Cabinet meeting on Friday, November 6, 1942.

When Cabinet meeting came at 2 o'clock and I was called on, I brought the matter of the Military School at Charlottesville up myself and explained the objectives of the school and the manner in which it had been created, and showed how ridiculous was the proposition that we were trying to train Army officers for proconsular duties after the war was over.

I kept the discussion on a light basis, not getting too serious but showing earnestly how important it was.

When Mr. Stimson was leaving for Cabinet meeting the following week and this subject was mentioned, I believe he stated that the President's questions about the School had been settled the previous week at Cabinet.<sup>23</sup>

#### IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN REASSURED

[Memo, Col George F Schulgen, Asst SGS, for CG, SOS, 1 Dec 42, PMGO files, 321.19, MG]

The attached note signed by Miss Neary, personal secretary to the Secretary of War, indicates that the questions raised on the subject matter were answered by the Secretary of War in a Cabinet meeting to the satisfaction of the President; and therefore eliminates the need of the Secretary of War's memorandum to the President in answer to the Presidential memorandum of October 29, 1942.

Mr. McCloy is of the opinion that these papers should be filed without any further action.

<sup>23</sup> It seems clear from Miss Neary's memorandum that Mr. Stimson decided not to use the elaborate brief in defense of military government which Colonel Miller prepared for him. Copy of the brief will be found in PMGO files, 321.19, MG.

On 23 November the program for commissioning and training 2500 civilian specialists was formally approved by the War Department (see below, Chapter III, Note 16).

#### THE ATTACKS CONTINUE AND FIND ONE VULNERABLE TARGET

[Memo, Gullion for CofS Through CG, SOS, 27 Nov 42, G-1 files, Personnel, SMG, Misc Info]

1. Attacks upon the Charlottesville School of Military Government and upon Army's plans for military government continue. Several (Cabinet) departments of the government and independent agencies appear to be jealous of each other, though somewhat united in their attack upon us.

2. Chronologically, these attacks may be summarized:

(a) On The Provost Marshal General's personal ambition.

(b) On the political composition of the faculty and student body, it is being alleged that The Provost Marshal General packed the school with Republicans and anti-New Dealers who are not "socially minded."

(c) On the alleged second rate quality of the students and the consequent inadvisability of the Army's having anything to do with the government of occupied territory.

3. We believe that attack (a) has been defeated and that attack (b) has been stalled. The attack on the quality of the students and upon the Army's suitability to govern occupied territories continues. Within the last week Mr. William Bullitt, ex-Ambassador to France and Mr. Jonathan Daniels, son of Josephus Daniels, in separate personal interviews with me, stated that the President had told them individually to investigate and report to him upon the quality of the students, the work being done by them and on our plans for military government in general.

4. We are *vulnerable* in one particular, i.e. *we are not getting enough high class students*. Unless the quality of the student body improves materially and rapidly, there is real danger that the Commanding General in each theater will have a commissar by his side, or a civil governor with power deriving directly from the President, acting independently of the commanding general.

5. The next class reports January 8, 1943. Most of the officers recommended for it are distinctly below the average of students in former classes. One commanding general included six (6) colored captains in his list of seventeen (17) recommendations.

6. Herewith is a directive designed to improve the quality of the student body.

## MORE FORCEFUL ACTION TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY MG PERSONNEL

[Memo, ACoFS, G-1, for the CG, SOS, 4 Dec 42, G-1 files, 352, SMG]

1. Action recommended in your Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, above subject [Charlottesville School of Military Government], is approved in principle, except that Tab B is not believed sufficiently forceful to accomplish the necessary results.<sup>24</sup>

2. In this connection, the Secretary of War directs that letters allotting quotas for the January 8th and subsequent classes at the School of Military Government include statements substantially as follows:

Selection of officers to fill the quotas allotted will be given the personal attention of the commanders to whom the quotas are allotted. Those commanders will be held responsible that the individuals selected under their quotas are the highest type, are genuinely possessed of the essential qualities listed in Memorandum No. W350-107-42, dated October 27, 1942, and have outstanding leadership qualities and unimpeachable character.

Students accepted for enrollment but who subsequently fail will be either reclassified or reported to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces or Services of Supply, whichever is appropriate, for reassignment.

Officers desiring to attend the School of Military Government are authorized to forward applications through channels to The Provost Marshal General for consideration. Direct correspondence is authorized between The Provost

<sup>24</sup> Tab B is the directive referred to in par. 6 of above document. The Commanding General, SOS, recommended that it be published as a directive of the Secretary of War.

## 5. A DEBATE CONTINUES WHICH WILL NEVER END <sup>25</sup>

### MR. ICKES SEEKS A ROLE IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR HIS OWN DEPARTMENT

[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 28 Dec 42, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

Various members of my staff and I have had numerous conversations with Mr. Bullitt concern-

<sup>25</sup> The further development of the training program is considered here only insofar as it raises the issue of military versus civilian control. For some of the administrative developments see below, Chapter III, Section 5.

ing the problem of civilian participation in the government of occupied and reoccupied territories. I believe that Mr. Bullitt shares my feeling that, because of this Department's unique experience with primitive people, we should participate actively in the administration of any island in the Pacific which may be occupied and governed by the United States.

### THE PRESIDENT'S INVESTIGATOR FINDS THAT CHARLOTTESVILLE SHOULD EXPAND

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 10 Dec 42, PMGO files, 352.01, SMG, Est]

1. When he was here on December 3d, Honorable William C. Bullitt, who, as you know, was representing the President, made the point that in our training program we shall concentrate on the study of those areas of the world where civil affairs officers are most apt to be needed in an order of priority, and that so far as possible we should train the individuals for the particular country to which they would ultimately be assigned. He made a further point that in doing so every effort should be made both in selection of students and in instruction so that they would be able to speak the language fluently. He regards this as a matter of major consequence. He made the further point that our efforts should be expanded and that more students should be trained here than under the present program. \* \* \*

[Ltr, William C. Bullitt, Spec Asst to the SN, to USW Patterson, 30 Dec 42, OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG]

\* \* \* I have already reported to the President assuring him that the accusations against the School were without foundation. I told the President about different changes that General Wickersham was making and recommended that he should cease to worry about the School, but might, if he wanted, send down someone to look at it again during the latter part of February. \* \* \*

Mr. Bullitt suggested that during the period of military government of these islands, it might be helpful if the Navy Department were to call upon

the Secretary of the Interior to designate advisors on Native Affairs who would work with the Naval Commandant assigned to each group of islands. This would have the dual purpose of providing qualified assistance to the Naval Commandant in connection with civilian problems and of training civilians for eventual establishment of civilian government.

If you are in favor of a program of this sort, I should like to consult with Secretary Knox as to the details. It would be necessary for us to compile a roster of qualified people, and to spend a small amount of money which might have to be supplied from the President's Emergency Fund, training them and in compiling information which should be available for this sort of work. We would, of course, co-ordinate our studies with the work which is being done at the Navy school at Columbia University.

#### THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO FAVOR MR. ICKES' PARTICIPATION

[Memo, Roosevelt for Ickes, 30 Dec 42, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I wish you would talk with Frank Knox in regard to caring for Native Affairs in the Islands of the Southwest Pacific.

#### THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD IMPERIALISM IS STATED AT CHARLOTTESVILLE

[Address by USW Patterson, at Graduation Exercises of SMG, 29 Dec 42, ASF, International Division (ID) files, Basic Policy—Gen (1942-43)]

It is as good a time as any to clear away misconceptions that have grown up about military government and about "the Army moving in," as some people express it. I have recently heard people who ought to know better give expression to fears along this line. Whenever this nation has been engaged in a war of a critical character and has undertaken to protect itself by raising a strong Army, the timid would have raised the ghost of "rule by the sword." Washington's letters in the dark days of the Revolution are full of discussions of this groundless fear and of how damaging to the success of our arms were certain policies based in large part upon such fear. \* \* \*

We have no use for imperialism. That is no part of the Army's policy. But the Army is confronted with an essential administrative task. It will be called on to preserve order among a disaffected or confused people. It will be called on to operate a water supply system or an electric

power system. It will be called on to attend to the distribution of the necessities of life. For all of this we need to have officers trained to manage such matters, and we also need civilians with the appropriate technical experience. Many of the policies will be the concern of other agencies of the Government. But the execution of the policies will be the responsibility of the military commander, until the conflict will have moved far enough away or will have ceased altogether. \* \* \*

#### A CIVILIAN STUDIES CENTER IS PROPOSED TO PREVENT ARMY CONTROL OF POSTWAR WORLD

[Memo, Saul K. Padover, Dept of the Interior, for Ickes, 8 Jan 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

The civilians are in danger of losing the postwar world by default. They are in danger of losing out because they seem to lack a comprehensive plan and a unified purpose. The Army, on the other hand, has a plan and a purpose. The Army's plan is to train administrators for the postwar world and thereby to control it. Furthermore, this plan will monopolize all of the training and research facilities of the country by a process of total absorption. In other words, the present plan is to put the men skilled in social science, public law, administration, scientific management, etc., into uniform.

So far, the Army's plan and goals have not been successfully challenged by any civilian groups or agencies.

The truth is that civilian groups and agencies have offered no comprehensive plan or blueprint for the postwar world. The Army did. And so the Army is moving in by default.

From a democratic point of view—from the point of view of what the United Nations are fighting for—this situation is disturbing. We are fighting for a civilian, democratic, free world—not for a world ruled by armed forces—even the best-intentioned armed forces. Moreover, by tradition, training, background, and outlook, the Army is not equipped for long-term administration of foreign areas, especially if those areas are to be given the essentials of a democratic, social-economic structure.

What, then, are the civilians in the Government doing about it?

What plans, if any, are they proposing to the President?

This is a proposal for the establishment of a civilian Center of Administrative Studies.

Such a center should be set up inter-Departmentally by those agencies of the Government

that are concerned with the problems at issue. The most important of these agencies are the Department of the Interior, the State Department, and the Board of Economic Warfare.

Interior, State, and B.E.W. have the kind of specialized experience and skill needed for post-war world reconstruction. \* \* \*

#### THE "AMBITIOUS" GENERAL GULLION STILL DISTURBS SECRETARY ICKES

[Ltr, Ickes to Roosevelt, 9 Jan 43, enclosing Padover's 8 Jan Memo, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

\* \* \* The present plans of the ambitious General Gullion as they are reported to me, fill me with grave misgivings. If a stop is not put to them, I think we are headed into the worst kind of trouble, notwithstanding who may win the war. \* \* \*

#### THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL TRIES TO CONCILIATE THE NEW DEALERS

[Memo, Gullion for Col Reuben Jenkins, Chief, Officers Branch, SOS, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

\* \* \* I took up directly with the Secretary of War the matter of having an advisory board composed partly of civilians which would screen the thousands of applicants for commission for military government duty, and suggested to the Secretary that Oscar Chapman, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, and John J. Corson, who had been with the Social Security Board almost from the beginning, be the civilians on the advisory board. Mr. Stimson wanted to be sure that the civilians named would not be "appointing Army officers." When he understood that the advisory board was merely the first screen and that thereafter the usual appointive and selective processes of the War Department were to be applied, he signed letters to Secretary of Interior Ickes and to Chairman [Arthur J.] Altmeyer of the Social Security Board, asking respectively for the services of Messrs. Chapman and Corson. . . .

The basis for an advisory board composed partly of civilians was: At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary Ickes had denounced our military government plans as "imperialistic" and the President told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a military matter. Mr. Harry Hopkins called upon Mr. McCloy to obtain a breakdown of the faculty and students showing former occupations and

reasons for their selection and said to Mr. McCloy, "Gullion is packing the school with Republicans and men who are anti-socially minded." (Gullion happens to be a Democrat and a former Administrator of the NRA in Honolulu.)

Mr. Isadore Lubin, a close advisor of the President with offices in the White House and an intimate friend of Colonel Miller (head of the Military Government Division, PMGO, and for nine months Executive Secretary of the National Labor Board) suggested to me through Colonel Miller that the White House suspicions and misunderstandings would be largely dispelled if two well-known liberal civilian members of the administration of character and ability be utilized as advisors in the screening of candidates. \* \* \*

#### THE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARD FAILS TO CONCILIATE

[Memo, Jonathan Daniels for Roosevelt, 8 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I was very much interested in the note from Secretary Ickes and its attached memorandum which you asked me to read. However, since the Secretary sent you this memorandum early in January, the Department of the Interior, through Assistant Secretary Oscar Chapman, has been leading in some interdepartmental planning in this field.

Some time ago Mr. Chapman became chairman of a committee which is engaged in creating the roster from which all civilians accepted by the army for training at the School of Military Government in Charlottesville will be drawn. . . .

While Mr. Chapman took the chairmanship of this committee with the agreement of Mr. Ickes, I do not take that to mean that the Secretary has changed his mind about the Charlottesville school. Indeed, both he and Mr. Chapman, I think, are acting to improve a situation which fills them both with the grave misgivings the Secretary spoke of in his note to you. As you know, I have shared those misgivings. I doubt that this committee can, by improving the quality of its student personnel, cure the serious defect in the Charlottesville School of Military Government or eliminate the dangers which Secretary Ickes and others have seen in that School. None of its nominees will enter the School before May.

In addition to his work in assisting in the selection of civilians, Mr. Chapman has interested himself in the creation of an interdepartmental board which, I understand, would supervise the

training of personnel to be used in the occupation of all enemy or Axis-held territory. Some of the advocates of this plan think that from it might grow a nonmilitary Occupational Authority which would supervise any American occupation and co-ordinate the responsibilities of various Federal Departments and agencies in such an occupation. This plan, of course, would not preclude such a Center of Administrative Studies as the Secretary of the Interior's memorandum proposed. It might insure the proper democratic attitude in the selection, training and use of men who, as our representatives, will be responsible for the American impression of important parts of the postwar world. \* \* \*

#### GENERAL GULLION ON THE DEFENSIVE STILL

[Memo, Gullion for Brig Gen Edwin M. Watson, Secy to the President, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

Our military government plans have been attacked as unprecedented, un-American, imperialistic, grandiose and personally ambitious. What follows may be illuminating.

1. Every victorious army invading hostile territory has had to set up a military government. Belisarius, under Justinian, erected one in North Africa fourteen hundred years ago. . . . General [Winfield] Scott's splendid military government in Mexico in 1847-48 was bitterly attacked but historians of his period praised it.

2. So long as there is danger of the enemy continuing or resuming the fight, the person in control of the occupied territory must be immediately responsible to the will of the commanding general who is the military governor. . . .

3. When the President decides that military government is no longer necessary, it may be replaced by civil government or returned to control of the former enemy. . . .

4. For years the Germans and the Japanese have been training for military government. The Germans have seven thousand occupational personnel—as distinguished from combat personnel—in Poland alone. After two years of training, including those junior officers at the Fort Custer schools, we shall have only six thousand to spread over possibly a dozen occupied countries.

#### THE PRESIDENT THINKS THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL NEEDS "ELASTICITY"

[Memo, Roosevelt for Watson, 16 Feb 43, in re Gen Gullion's Memo to Watson, 6 Feb 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I want to see Gullion sometime and talk to him

about this. He evidently has no elasticity of mind and he needs some!

#### A COMMITTEE IS CREATED TO STUDY TRAINING OF CIVILIANS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Ltr, Actg Secy of State Sumner Welles to the SW, 8 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 1]

The President has directed the Secretary of State to establish and assume the Chairmanship of an Interdepartmental Committee to study the need for civilian personnel for nonmilitary overseas service. The Committee is to be composed of a representative and alternate of each of the several Departments and Agencies of the Government herein specified: Treasury Department, War Department, Navy Department, Department of Justice, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Civil Service Commission, Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Lend Lease Administration, War Manpower Commission, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and War Shipping Administration.<sup>26</sup> \* \* \*

The Secretary of State has designated Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, to serve as his alternate . . . and it is proposed that the first meeting be held on Tuesday, March 16, at 10:30 a.m., in Mr. Shaw's office.

[Memo, Col John H. F. Haskell, Actg Dir, Civil Affairs Division (CAD), for the ASW, 17 Mar 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 1]

2. . . . Mr. Ickes said that the matter has been discussed in the Cabinet and that his understanding of the President's position is that the military will be in complete control in recovered territories until civil government can be restored, at which latter time civilian personnel would be used.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> For additional coverage of this subject, see Chapter II.

<sup>27</sup> This memorandum reported the discussions of the first meeting of the new Interdepartmental Committee which was held on 16 March 1943. Although Secretary Ickes apparently envisaged the use of civilian personnel as soon as civil government could be restored, Assistant Secretary of State Shaw had a more limited expectation. He told Colonel Haskell it was his feeling that it was not the intention of the committee to set up any intervening civilian government between the time military government ceased and local civil authority was restored. Rather, he felt that the civilian personnel in question would be used largely to assist and advise local governmental agencies in occupied territories after military government had ended.

#### THE WAR DEPARTMENT PROPOSES TO DEFEND ITS JURISDICTION OVER MG TRAINING

[Min of Remarks of Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, 1 Apr 43, at Mtg Called in WD to Consider Its Attitude Toward the Interdepartmental Comm., OPD files, 230 Civ Employment, sec. 1]

4. Colonel Haskell summarized the views expressed at this meeting with the concurrence of all present as follows:

*a.* That the War Department should maintain the concept of military control of the administration of areas occupied as a result of military operations for as long a period as military necessity makes it essential.

*b.* That it is considered best that training of specialists in the Army, be they government, finance, engineer, medical, etc., be conducted by the Provost Marshal General under staff supervision of G-1 and interested War Department agencies.

*c.* That it is not the present understanding of the War Department that there will be a U.S. colonial or other type of civilian administration of occupied foreign countries prior to the time of the restoration of control in the local population; therefore, the need of training governmental administrators, mayors, governors, etc., on the part of civilian agencies is not apparent.

*d.* That from the beginning, and in fact in advance of operations, the War Department will require the assistance, advice, guidance and instructions of certain specific governmental agencies such as the State, Treasury, etc., Departments for policy and direction of the theater commander and military governor. It is recognized that at the earliest practicable date certain governmental agencies such as Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, Lend Lease, Board of Economic Warfare, etc., will require a limited amount of trained personnel on the call of the theater commander to supervise certain activities in occupied areas.

5. It was agreed that the above-stated views would be used as the basis for discussion with the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of War with a view to formulating War Department policy.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> The civilian training project of the Interdepartmental Committee proved to be abortive.

#### DOES THE CHARLOTTESVILLE FACULTY INCLUDE IMPERIALISTS?

[Ltr, Hyneman, Chief, Tng Sec, MGD, to S. Harrison Thomson, Univ of Colorado, 6 Jul 43, PMGO files, 330.14, Criticisms]

Your letter of June 28 to the Provost Marshal General came to my attention and I asked to be permitted to write you a personal letter about the matters you discussed. I did this because all of my own adult life (until after the declaration of war) has been spent in university teaching and I believe that I have some appreciation of the considerations which cause you to write frankly about the things which disturb you. \* \* \*

Your characterization of the faculty as containing "American imperialists" . . . presents a question on which I can write you with some confidence.

Whether some members of the faculty are imperialists, I do not know. I believe it is irrelevant. My inquiries (and I have checked on this since reading your letter) indicate that only one of the resident faculty touches more than casually upon a subject matter that lends itself to attitude-building for or against imperialism, and I find no evidence that he prejudices or attempts to prejudice minds on this matter in either direction. I am told that very few of the lectures by visiting lecturers (probably not more than a dozen of approximately 80 delivered to the third class) discussed questions of policy in which a question of imperialism is involved. I would say that if a preponderance of predilection was revealed in these lectures, it was in favor of a Good Samaritan internationalism. The offense, if there was any, I dare say was one of failure to present adequately the alternatives—policies of American imperialism or American isolation. I presume these are legitimate possible policies, even though reprehensible to you or me.

But the point I must press is not one of whether internationalism, imperialism and isolation are entitled to equal consideration as possible future policies for America; the point is that our military government training now proceeds on the assumption that these issues are none of the military government officer's business.

## CHAPTER II

# French North Africa Puts Civilian Control to the Test

At the time of operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, the most important civil affairs issue seemed to be the politically dramatic problem of the Darlan Deal and the apparent compromise of political principle which it involved. Many were unfavorably impressed by the military role in this issue, which seemed to place the Army on the side of political opportunism if not of worse. The public was not in a position to know the imperative reasons which led to the temporary acceptance of a Vichy statesman as collaborator. The public also could not know that the decision to use Darlan grew out of what was originally a civilian decision—that of the President—to accept whatever administration U.S. forces found in French North Africa, and that General Eisenhower's recommendation regarding Darlan was approved by the State Department's representative on the spot, and later by both the President and Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

In any case, when the TORCH operation is considered from the point of view of its place in the general development of American civil affairs policy, the Darlan issue, which effected no lasting change in the political principles underlying this policy, does not seem the most important matter at all. What is most important is the fact, little noticed at the outset, that TORCH put the theory of civilian control to its first test and resulted in certain con-

clusions which affected all later civil affairs planning. To be sure, in French North Africa there was neither military government nor, in the narrower sense, even civil affairs; the ordinary administration of civil affairs was left to Admiral Darlan's government except for certain rights which could be exercised in emergencies. But there was a many-sided Allied economic program, to say nothing of political issues, for which the Allies could not escape responsibility, and thus the Allied program involved difficult problems which it seems impossible to characterize by any other name than civil affairs. It entailed the setting up of control machinery, and as the documents of this chapter reveal, this machinery was established on the principle of primary civilian responsibility. They indicate further the great difficulties encountered not only in linking together the many civilian agencies concerned but also in so integrating the civilian setup with the military that the principle of the theater commander's paramount authority was not violated.

More important still are the implications of the documents as regards the operational consequences of adopting the principle of civilian responsibility. It appears that instead of relieving General Eisenhower of responsibility and concern over the economic and political problems which arose, the civilian setup actually interfered with his freedom of action. To be sure,

only the most serious of these problems could receive his special attention, and it remains to consider whether the more routine matters of civilian supply and economic assistance or exploitation, which in their aggregate were also important, were handled with satisfaction. One should not, indeed, consider that the limited evidence presented here permits a definitive judgment on the performance of the civilian agencies. The documents have not been selected for that purpose but merely to show the contemporary opinions both of military and civilian authorities, which, whether just or unjust, exercised an influence on civil affairs preparations for future areas of operations. With regard to the question of objective evaluation, it need only be stated that while a number of spectators and participants spoke as though the performance was an utter fiasco, the bulk of the evidence indicates that this was a great exaggeration; the errors lay more in Washington than with the civilian agencies in the theater; and, whatever the errors, they were not of such a character that they could not be remedied in time to prevent serious injury to military operations. The documents do show plainly that not only the military authorities concerned, but also some of the civilian authorities, considered that civilian control had not been satisfactory. This conclusion was the more impressive be-

cause civilian control had been tested under the most favorable conditions—in a friendly country, with local authorities assuming the burden of actual civil administration. Moreover, the troubles were not attributed to civilians as individuals, most of whom had put forth admirable efforts, but rather to a system. While the absence of sufficient organizational preparation seems also to have been a contributing factor, yet military men considered the essential error to have been the attempt to divorce the control of civil affairs from military organization even though every civil affairs problem is bound up with military operations. Some leading War Department authorities decided as the result of the TORCH experience that they could not safely acquiesce in its pattern of control in future operations, least of all those in enemy areas. Executives of the civilian agencies were also disturbed but they felt that the difficulties of French North Africa could be obviated by effecting a much better co-ordination of civilian agencies than had thus far obtained. They overlooked the fact that they were recognizing the principle of undivided authority only in a limited degree, and that if this principle was carried to its logical conclusion it would mean the acceptance of the theater commander's control through an administration of purely military character.

## I. A CIVIL AFFAIRS PLAN TO MINIMIZE MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

### CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION DESIGNED TO REST UPON STATE DEPARTMENT AID

[Memo, Gen George C. Marshall for President Roosevelt, 3 Sep 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

The success of the TORCH operation is critically dependent upon the reactions of the authorities, inhabitants and troops of North Africa. With this in mind, General Eisenhower has on his staff a Civil Administrative Section to co-ordinate the

civil and political matters in immediate relation to the operation. He urgently requests that men from the State Department be released to serve on this body. . . .<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ in London was not formally activated until 15 September 1942. But as early as 21 August, Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower cabled the War Department that it was necessary to organize on his staff a Civil Administrative Section in addition to his already existent Political Section, and asked for a civil

In all these matters it is understood that you will take personal direction of this phase of the TORCH operation, but it will be necessary for General Eisenhower to be in immediate control and fully aware of the details. The men referred to in their relation to General Eisenhower will be in a position somewhat analogous to that of a Military Attaché to an Ambassador. They would exercise their functions under General Eisenhower, but as State Department officials they would be in a position to act when desirable through our diplomatic agencies and representatives in the area.

I believe it is your desire that the War Department should undertake to carry out this operation in all respects, but the political and civil phase of the plan could be facilitated by the aid of the State Department. The Civil Administrative Section was created to insure the complete co-ordination of military and civil preparations in connection with the operation and to effect the civil administration of that area. \* \* \*

#### EISENHOWER CONCERNED OVER HIS CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR'S DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8213]

I have gone over Murphy's directive very carefully.<sup>2</sup> I hesitate to raise an issue which may cause you any embarrassment, particularly after our intimate and successful conversations here with Murphy as I have the utmost confidence in his judgment and discretion and I know that I will be able to work with him in perfect harmony. However, as I am responsible for the success of the operations I feel that it is essential that final authority in all matters in that theater rest in me, subject only to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President, with Murphy as my

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administrator and key "military and civilian" assistants. Robert D. Murphy, former Counselor of the American Embassy at Vichy, was selected to head the Civil Affairs Section and a number of officers who had just graduated from Charlottesville were sent as military assistants. Civilian assistants were provided later by the State Department (see below, Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, sec. 3). Mr. Murphy's selection was due in great measure to his firsthand acquaintance with conditions in French North Africa. There, in the summer, he had gathered information showing the disposition of certain French groups, notably that of Brig. Gen. Charles E. Mast, to co-operate with the Americans in case they invaded this territory.

<sup>2</sup>The civil affairs plan which appears in President Roosevelt's directive to Mr. Murphy (following document) was no doubt one which the latter had largely suggested (see George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: 1957) (hereafter cited as Howe, *Northwest Africa*), Chapter IV).

operating executive and advisor for civil affairs. This is in accordance with my understanding of the President's intentions through oral messages delivered to me by Harriman, and I believe the directive should clearly set forth this relationship. Prior to the commencement of the special operation it is essential that Murphy have status as the President's personal representative in that area. There is a possibility that unless the directive is revised as indicated, there may develop in the minds of the French officials, after my arrival, the idea that there is division of authority between the American civil and military officials. I am sure that Murphy will agree with the foregoing and with the necessity of presenting the French with a clean-cut and single authority.<sup>3</sup>

#### PRESIDENT'S ENTIRE PLAN RESTS UPON MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH

[Directive (rev), Roosevelt to Murphy, Chief Civil Administrator, AFHQ, 22 Sep 42, in William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947), White House Papers, pp. 315-16]

1. Upon the occupation of French North Africa by American military force, you will act as the Operating Executive head of the Civil Affairs Section and Advisor for Civil Affairs under General Eisenhower. . . .<sup>4</sup>

2. You will work in close co-operation with General Eisenhower . . . in the preparation and execution of plans of a civil and political nature for the occupation of French North Africa by American Military Forces.

3. You will at an early date contact personally and through your Psychological Warfare and other assistants those French nationals whom you consider reliable, and give them the following information:

Information having been received from a reliable source that the Germans and Italians are planning an intervention in French North Africa, the United States contemplates sending an

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<sup>3</sup>Although revised to make it more in accord with General Eisenhower's views on military authority, the directive, even in its revised form (see the following document) reflected the conception that, so far as concerned purely political civil affairs planning, Murphy was to have a great deal of latitude.

<sup>4</sup>Murphy was thus not to assume charge of the Civil Affairs Section until after the occupation began. This was due to the secret mission to French North Africa on which he departed immediately after his appointment. H. Freeman Matthews, of the State Department, served as acting chief of the section throughout the planning period. Howe, *Northwest Africa*, ch. III.

early date a sufficient number of American troops to land in that area with the purpose of preventing occupation by the Axis and of preserving French Sovereignty in Algeria, and the French administrations in Morocco and Tunisia.

No change in the existing French Civil Administration is contemplated by the United States.

Any resistance to an American landing will, of course, have to be put down by force of arms.

The American forces will provide equipment as rapidly as possible for those French troops who join in denying access to French North Africa to our common enemies.

Money, in addition to that provided by French sources, will be made available for additional expense incurred through co-operation with American forces.

The American Government will guarantee salaries and allowances, death benefits and pensions of those French and other military, naval and civilian officials who join with the American expeditionary forces.

The proposed expedition will be American, under American command, and it will not include any of the forces of General [Charles] de Gaulle. \* \* \*

#### REGARDLESS OF RESISTANCE THE FRENCH ARE TO BE TREATED AS FRIENDLY

[AFHQ GO 4, 11 Oct 42,<sup>5</sup> OPD files, 381 TORCH, sec. 1]

1b. It is expected that all governmental officials, officers and employees of the local government in all of its branches, and who are trustworthy, will remain in office, and that all officials and employees of the civil administration, civilian public services and facilities, will carry on their normal duties.

3a. The principle upon which all relations with the civilian authorities is to be based, is that regardless of resistance, the French are friendly and are to be maintained in their government. \* \* \*

#### EVEN IF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY FRENCH PERSONNEL SHOULD ADMINISTER

[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

1. The purpose of a civil affairs section is to assist the Commander to which it is assigned to carry out the policy of the Commanding General, namely: To maintain and control for the Commanding General the civil governments of the

<sup>5</sup> AFHQ General Orders form the main part of the plan prepared by the Civil Affairs Section.

territories of French North Africa as soon as military control of those territories is secured; to retain the existing form or forms of government in the territories under control, and to retain the civil governments and their officials and employees in their present positions, insofar as they are willing to continue in office, and as is consistent with the military mission and the policy of the Commanding General; to supplant those persons not in accord with the war aims of the United States, and its supporting ally [Great Britain], with other capable and efficient local personnel; or with military personnel in the event there is hostile action on the part of the armed forces of the territories to be occupied or by the inhabitants after the control is secured.<sup>6</sup> \* \* \*

3a. The Commanding General will be the Military Governor of all territory in French North Africa controlled by the United States and its supporting ally.<sup>7</sup> \* \* \*

19b. The salaries, wages and pensions, pension rights and all other benefits and emoluments of all French and native governmental, territorial, municipal and other subdivisional districts, and regional officials and employees, and all Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, will be guaranteed by the United States of America, as long as they remain in their present positions carrying on their normal duties in a manner satisfactory to the military governor of the territory or the area occupied, and do nothing by word or deed that can in any way be construed as disrespectful to the United States or its supporting ally, or to their personnel and property.

#### A PRINCIPLE OF THE MANUAL IS FOLLOWED

[FM 27-5, 1940]

\* \* \* *Economy of effort.* Every man engaged in military government is withdrawn either from the combatant forces or from productive labor at home. All plans and practices should be adopted with a view of reducing to the minimum consistent with the proper functioning of military government the number of the personnel of our Army employed in that government and the amount of work required of them. \* \* \*

<sup>6</sup> It had been decided that, because of the bitter feeling against Great Britain which the attack on Dakar had aroused among the French, the administration should be entirely in the hands of Americans.

<sup>7</sup> The planners did not consider the declaration of military government desirable but were obliged to plan for it as a possibility.

[AFHQ GO 5, 12 Oct 42, OPD files, 381, TORCH, sec. 1]

6d. Plans and practices will be adopted with a view of reducing to the minimum consistent with the proper functioning of military administration, the number of the personnel from the armed forces employed in that administration. \* \* \*

#### IT NOW SEEMS GIRAUD WILL BE GOVERNOR

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Oct 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 7296]

\* \* \* Giraud to be recognized as our principal collaborator on the French side, with the proposal that he accept the position immediately of French governor of all French North Africa, responsible for all French civil and military affairs, and whose position will be supported and protected by the Allied forces. Giraud to be requested to make proper contacts with Darlan and to accept him as Commander in Chief of French military and/or Naval Forces in North Africa or in some similar position that will be attractive to Darlan. In this way the French Forces could cooperate immediately, under the general direction of the Allied Commander in Chief.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>With the emergence of the possibility of using General Giraud's help the thought of declaring military government, never a preferred plan, receded still more. It had recently become known to Washington and AFHQ that Darlan would not be disinterested in co-operating if a sufficiently promising American invasion was launched. However, despite General Eisenhower's consideration of this alternative, it was not approved in Washington. The narrative of the complicated negotiations with Giraud and other French leaders is to be found in Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble*, and in Howe, *Northwest Africa*, Chapters II and III.

## 2. MILITARY LEADERS MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A THANKLESS POLITICAL DECISION

#### WHY A DEAL WAS MADE WITH DARLAN

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 14 Nov 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6267]<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \* Can well understand some bewilder-

<sup>9</sup>The Allies landed in French North Africa on 8 November. They soon learned that Admiral Jean François Darlan, Commander in Chief of the French Forces, happened to be in Algiers visiting his ill son. Conferences with him began after the Americans took Algiers and discovered that the local French leaders would follow only Darlan, not Gen. Henri Giraud. This message was sent after Darlan had been won over to co-operation with the United States. On 13 November the French leaders in North Africa agreed to form a new government with Darlan as civil head and Giraud as head of the armed forces.

#### ONLY 500 TONS OF CIVILIAN SUPPLIES REQUESTED

[Memo, Matthews, Asst Chief, Civil Affairs (CA) Administration, AFHQ, for DCoS, AFHQ, 22 Oct 44; Civilian Supply: A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, International Division, ASF (2 vols. text and 3 vols. documentary supplement), prepared by International Division, ASF, documentary supplement 1. Hereafter cited as ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS, MS in OCMH.]

The measure of support to our [North Africa] Operation and the United Nations cause on the part of the population, both French and native, of North Africa, will depend in no small part on the amount of badly needed consumer goods we can put into the area in the early days. While the first convoys must necessarily be filled with military equipment and supplies, it has been suggested that approximately 500 tons of such items could be stowed in odd corners of early ships.<sup>9</sup> \* \* \*

#### EISENHOWER'S ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES DELIMITED

[Ltr, Brig Gen John R. Deane, Secy, CCS, to the Secy of State, 12 Nov 42, WDCSA [War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] files, 386, Africa 1942]

\* \* \* At a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 30 October it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be informed that he would concern himself with economic policies only to the extent that they affect his operations and that further action in this regard would be handled by the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom. \* \* \*

<sup>9</sup>After the landings, 30,000 tons a month were requested as a bare minimum. See Section 6, below.

ment in London and Washington with the turn that negotiations with French North Africans have taken. The actual state of existing sentiment here does not agree even remotely with some of prior calculations. The following salient facts are pertinent and it is extremely important that no precipitate action at home upset such equilibrium as we have been able to establish.

Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal [Henri] Pétain is something to conjure with here. Everyone from highest to lowest attempts to create the impression that he lives and acts under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The

Civil Governors, Military leaders and Naval Commanders will agree on only one man as having an obvious right to assume the Marshal's mantle in North Africa. That man is Darlan. Even the Kingpin [Giraud], who had been our most trusted adviser and staunchest friend since early conferences succeeded in bringing him down to earth, clearly recognizes this overpowering consideration and has drastically modified his own ambitions and intentions accordingly. The resistance we met initially was offered because all ranks believed this to be the Marshal's wish and for this reason the Kingpin is deemed to have been guilty of at least a touch of treachery in urging nonresistance to our landing. The Kingpin himself understands and appears to have some sympathy for this universal attitude. All concerned profess themselves to be ready to go along with us provided Darlan tells them to do so, but they are absolutely not willing to follow anyone else. For example, [Vice] Admiral [Jean-Pierre] Estéva in Tunis says he will obey Darlan, while Noguès stopped fighting in Morocco by Darlan's order. Recognition of Darlan's position in this respect cannot be escaped.

The gist of the current agreement is that the French group will do what it can immediately to assist us in taking Tunisia. The group will organize French North Africa for effective co-operation and will begin reorganization, under Kingpin, of selected military forces for active participation in the war. . . .

Our hope of early conquest of Tunisia and of gaining here a supporting and organized population can not possibly be realized unless there is accepted a general agreement along the lines which we have just concluded with Darlan and his Admirals, with the Kingpin, with [Gen. Auguste Paul] Noguès, who controls the tribes in Morocco, with [Gen. Alphonse] Juin and others. The Kingpin is now so fully aware of his inability to do anything by himself, even with Allied moral and military support, that he has cheerfully accepted the post of Military Chief in the Darlan group. He fully agrees also that his own name should not be mentioned in connection with this movement for a period of several days. Without a strong French government of some kind here we would be forced to undertake complete military occupation. The cost in time and resources would be tremendous. In Morocco alone [Major] General [George S.] Patton [Jr.] calculates that it would require sixty thousand Allied troops to hold the tribes quiet, and in view of the effect that any tribal disturbance would have on Spain, you can see what a prob-

lem we are up against.

The Kingpin is honest and will watch Darlan. Moreover, Murphy, who has done a grand job, will, as head of my Civil Affairs Section, practically live in Darlan's pocket. [W. H. B.] Mack [British head of the Political Section, AFHQ] and other capable men will co-operate with him. I realized that there may be a feeling at home that we have been sold a bill of goods, but I assure you that these agreements have been arrived at only after incessant examination of the important factors and with the determination to get on with military objectives against the Axis and to advance the interest of the Allies in winning this war. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY CHIEFS AT HOME FEEL THE SOLDIER ON THE SPOT MUST HAVE FREEDOM OF ACTION

[Memo, Admiral William D. Leahy, CofS to CinC, to Roosevelt, 15 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

General Eisenhower's message relating to arrangements made with Darlan, Noguès, Giraud, and [Gen. Yves] Châtel in North Africa has been forwarded to you. I do not believe that we have sufficient information here to issue detailed instructions to him. The arrangements he has made represent probably the only practical course at the moment when his interest is necessarily focused on the vast importance of a hurried conquest of Tunisia, the possible acquisition of the French fleet at Toulon, and the avoidance of a necessity for large reinforcements in order to hold his present position. \* \* \*

. . . I consider it necessary that General Eisenhower and his advisers in Africa should be given a free hand in this matter.

General Marshall is in full agreement.

#### PROPOSED AGREEMENT IS A PURELY MILITARY ONE

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 7505]

Attention is invited . . . to the fact that this agreement is merely one between a Commander in the field and a Commission which is exercising ordinary civil and military functions in the theater in which he is operating.<sup>11</sup> Its terms are intended only to facilitate the operations of the Allied Forces brought here, although, naturally,

<sup>11</sup> On the same day General Eisenhower had dispatched to Washington a copy of the proposed agreement with Admiral Darlan. Although consummation of the agreement called for the greatest haste, General Eisenhower felt that, in view of the deviation of the agreement from both of the alternative armistice drafts given him before the landings, CCS approval was required.

accomplishment of this purpose involves certain economic and transportation features. \* \* \*

#### UPSETTING PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE DISASTROUS

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 20 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 8525]

We entered this theater with a knowledge that we would have to deal with North African civil affairs through the existing civil organization covering all North Africa. We did not set up any official. We merely required the existing officials to agree upon a form of central commission through which we could deal. I attempted to force Giraud upon them as head but he collapsed under me. He himself finally admitted that he could not do it because he could not control the situation except on the basis of a huge military support which I could not possibly afford. As a result of the agreements we have made we have secured an opportunity to press our concentration toward the east for battle in Tunisia without worrying about the rear. At every principal port we would be badly handicapped without the assistance cheerfully rendered us now by French military, naval and civil groups. What I am trying to point out is that even if we should only have passive resistance, our operations would be sadly slowed up and our position badly weakened. We have these advantages through the influence of the entire group through which we have worked. I have conferred incessantly with many individuals at various points in the theater, and every British and American officer that I have seen is convinced that any early attempt to upset the present arrangement will result disastrously for us. I hope it can be generally understood that the arrangement we have is one made for practical military purposes and should not be attacked as long as it works at its present efficiency and until the objects for which this army was directed to invade Africa have been attained. If the arrangement we have made is broken up now both governments must be prepared for extensive occupation of this country. \* \* \*

#### PROVISIONS OF DARLAN AGREEMENT LEAVE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE FRENCH BUT RESERVE CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RIGHTS

[Agreement signed between Lt Gen Mark W. Clark, representing the CinC, AEF, and Admiral François Darlan, High Cmsr in French North Africa, 22 Nov 42, CAD files, 371, N. Africa (8-27-42) (1)]<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> As finally consummated the agreement recognized the role of Great Britain in the area by adding to its references to the CG, U.S. Army, the phrase "and its supporting Allies."

#### Preamble

The forces of the United States and their supporting Allies have landed in French North Africa for the purpose of preventing the domination of this territory by German and Italian forces and their Allies and for carrying on the war for the defeat of the Axis powers.

By a common agreement among leading French officials in French North Africa, a High Commissioner in French Africa has been established in the person of Admiral of the Fleet François Darlan.

It has been agreed by all French elements concerned and United States military authorities that French forces will aid and support the forces of the United States and their Allies to expel from the soil of Africa the common enemy, to liberate France and to restore integrally the French Empire. In order that this high purpose may be accomplished, and to make appropriate arrangements for the presence in North Africa of large forces of the United States and its Allies, the following agreement is entered into at Algiers this twenty-second day of November 1942.

#### I

There shall be the closest co-operation between the Commander in Chief of the French Land, Sea and Air Forces and the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces to accomplish the purpose set forth above.

#### III

French governmental personnel will continue in the performance of their functions with loyalty to the purpose of the forces under the command of the Commanding General, United States Army and supporting forces. Such government personnel will take such measures as are necessary for the maintenance of order and public administrative services throughout the territory in consultation with the Commanding General of the United States Army.

#### XVI

In North Africa areas deemed by the Commanding General, United States Army, to be of importance or useful to the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof, from time to time, may be declared by him to be military areas under his control whereupon the maintenance of order and administrative and public services in such areas shall come under the direct control of such Commanding General. The French authorities will be promptly notified in the event that such a step becomes necessary.

## XVII

If the internal situation at any time be such as in his opinion to endanger his lines of communication or threaten disorder the Commanding General, United States Army will inform the French authorities of such danger and the French authorities will undertake, in concert with him, such administrative and other measures as may be necessary for the protection of the military interests of the forces under his command and supporting forces.

## XVIII

The Commanding General, United States Army, will appoint such military, naval, air and economic and branch Missions as he may deem requisite to regulate, in liaison with such agency or agencies as the local authorities will institute for this purpose, the application of the present accord.

## XIX

There shall be immediately appointed a Joint Economic Commission which will be charged with the study of the economic needs of French North Africa. The Commission will suggest such measures as may seem appropriate to it regarding exportation and importation, as well as for the increase of agricultural and industrial production, as well as for the establishment of economic stability, and the creation of prosperity in French North African territories.

## XX

A joint censorship commission shall be established. It will extend its action to the press, radio broadcasts, telecommunications, postal services and all public means for the dissemination of information and shall operate in full conformity with the common purpose set forth in the preamble thereof. The French members of the Commission will be appointed by the High Commissioner. \* \* \*

### FORTUNATE WE DO NOT HAVE TO DO THE JOB OURSELVES

[Memo, Lt Col Bernard Bernstein, former Financial Adviser, North African Econ Bd, for Brig Gen Arthur H. Carter, Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, A49-94, Misc and Sub, MG]

A.7. One of the reasons given for permitting the French authorities to run their own governmental affairs was that we did not have the organization to do it ourselves, and therefore we had to let the French do it in order not to interfere with our military effort. In a sense we were fortunate that we did not have to undertake a full military government in North Africa. With the inadequate organization that existed in the field and in Washington, such an undertaking probably could not have been successfully discharged. All phases of military government and civil affairs are likely to be far more complicated and require more immediate and comprehensive action when we go into Europe than was or might have been the case in North Africa. \* \* \*

## 3. COMPLEX DESIGN FOR CIVILIAN RESPONSIBILITY DEVELOPED

### COMBINED CHIEFS DECIDE THAT CIVILIAN AGENCIES WILL HANDLE ECONOMIC MATTERS

[Ltr, CCS to Secy of State Cordell Hull, 12 Nov 42, WDCA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

About two weeks ago the Combined Chiefs of Staff received a proposal from the British Chiefs of Staff regarding certain economic measures to be taken in North Africa upon our occupation of that country. \* \* \*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . agreed to recommend to the appropriate civil departments of the United States and the United Kingdom that they maintain close collaboration in respect to the economic policies to be adopted in North Africa. This letter is to inform you accordingly.

In order that any policies adopted may be considered on a combined basis it is suggested that you initiate conversations with Washington representatives of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare in the near future.<sup>13</sup>

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE GIVEN THE LEADING ROLE

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Hull, 18 Nov 42, ASF, ID, Hist of Civilian Supply (Civ Sup), Documentary Supplement (DS 7)]

I am reverting to our conversation the other day

<sup>13</sup> The CCS, who had jurisdiction over civil affairs as over all other phases of combined military operations, were in effect delegating CA responsibility to civilian agencies, with the reservation that they should be kept informed on policy matters. See CCS Secretariat Memorandum of 27 November 1942, below.

concerning the economic, political and fiscal questions which were developing in the wake of the advancing American armies in North Africa. While our conversation related especially to developments in that particular area, it is very apparent the same or similar problems will develop throughout the world as the scene changes. While it is a Mediterranean question today, it will later be extended to Pacific and to other areas.

Consequently, the policies of our Government will develop towards dependent and independent peoples under the relevant parts of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

All this concerns foreign relations and international co-operation in the immediate present and after the war, and involves both political and economic elements.

As the conduct of these affairs lies in your hands, you have my full authority to designate to serve under you a person to whom you will look to carry out our policies.

You, yourself, have full authority to secure the co-operation of persons in your Department and can make such transfers as you deem necessary.<sup>14</sup>

You are hereby authorized to draw upon any of the other departments or agencies of the Government for any assistance that may be needed.

I consider that full co-operation and co-ordination is not only important but is necessary to the proper fulfillment of our objectives in the field of foreign relations.

#### WAR DEPARTMENT ACQUIESCES IN CIVILIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PURELY CIVIL MATTERS

[Paraphrase of Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 24 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

Under the general supervision of the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration has been charged by the President with providing food and other essentials for all occupied territories.<sup>15</sup> Civil activities in occupied areas have been made the responsibility of the State Depart-

<sup>14</sup>In accordance with this letter the Secretary of State, on 21 November, established in the State Department the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), with Governor Herbert H. Lehman as its director, and on 24 November the Office of Foreign Territories, which immediately assumed "the responsibility for implementing the economic and social program" for North Africa in Washington.

<sup>15</sup>The President's earliest step in assigning responsibility to civilian agencies was his letter of 13 November to the Lend-Lease Administrator authorizing him to render lend-lease aid to French North Africa as vital to the defense

ment. That department's designated representative will act as the Commanding General's civil adviser, but when civil activities affect or are affected by military operations he will be subject to your decisions. As per its cables to Murphy of 13 November, the State Department, pursuant to the Presidential directive, is now sending an administrative expert and highly qualified representatives of Department of Agriculture, War Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, Treasury Department, and Board of Economic Warfare, who will work under Murphy. It will be requested of the State Department that a USCC [United States Commercial Company] representative be sent. A survey should be made after these experts arrive to develop definite program and procedures including channels of communication which you approve and to determine additional staffs. The responsibility for decisions that must be made in the field to co-ordinate efforts of British and our representatives must rest with you.

To co-ordinate War Department interest in these activities and to represent you in these matters a separate section is being established under [Lt. Gen. Brehon B.] Somervell, which will maintain constant liaison with the Department of State, and through it with other interested agencies of the Government. Is this arrangement, finally established here with interested agencies, satisfactory to you? <sup>16</sup>

#### COMBINED CHIEFS WILLING TO BE BYPASSED ON DETAILS

[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

It is recommended that the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff be authorized to refer questions of detail relating to civil, economic, and financial matters, which are referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by General Eisenhower, directly to the Committee of Combined Boards.<sup>17</sup>

of the United States. The letter implied that the Lend-Lease Administration was not merely to finance such aid but to procure supplies as an operating agency. About the same time the President declared that "No one will go hungry . . . in any territory occupied by the United Nations." Dept of State Bull, Nov 42.

<sup>16</sup>It is doubtful that, in acquiescing so readily in the degree of control given to civilian agencies, War Department authorities were appreciative of the great civilian supply problem which French North Africa was to present. Interv, Harold Epstein, OCMH, with Donald H. McLean, former ASF working member of CAD, 17 Apr 50.

<sup>17</sup>The Committee of Combined Boards was being set up pursuant to the CCS recommendation of 12 November (above).

Further, that in order to expedite action, the secretariat be authorized to communicate the decisions of civil agencies concerned directly to General Eisenhower without reference to the combined Chiefs of Staff if in their opinion the action taken will have no adverse effect on General Eisenhower's military operations. It would, of course, be understood that political questions involving important matters of government policy would not be included within the scope of these arrangements.

#### CIVILIAN AGENCIES FEAR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Memo for Rcd, 4 Dec 42, Capt Arthur E. Palmer, ASF, ID, on Discussions of 3 December with Representatives of Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA), ASF, OUSW files, Civ Sup, DS-11]

3d. It was feared that the Army would deliberately and unnecessarily omit Lend-Lease cargo from shipment and would replace it by similar cargo procured by the Army or would not replace it at all.<sup>18</sup> *In this connection OLLA and State are frankly worried that if the Army provides the civilian supplies it will obtain first possession of them in North Africa and will thus have a dominant position.* \* \* \*

#### PROLIFERATION OF WASHINGTON CIVILIAN AGENCIES FOR NORTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC MATTERS

[Memo, Col John B. Franks, Dir, International Aid Div, ASF,<sup>19</sup> for CofS, SOS, 17 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

1. As instructed, this office has followed closely the course of the procedures now under development in Washington for handling problems relating to civilian supply in conquered countries, with particular reference at this time to North Africa. The procedure is now becoming sufficiently well defined to be the subject of an interim report. It is still, however, in a state of changing development.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The subject under discussion was the Army's purchase and shipment in November of barter goods and other civilian supplies requested by Eisenhower for French North Africa. The War Department had assumed responsibility pending the crystallization of civilian agency plans and procedures.

<sup>19</sup> International Division and International Aid Division were used interchangeably.

<sup>20</sup> A concise account of all agencies set up by the State Department for handling civilian supply will be found in Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-45*, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (hereafter cited as Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics, 1943-45*).

2. *Committees:* The following committees have been organized in Washington for dealing with these problems.

#### 1. *Committee of Combined Boards called C.O.B.*

This Committee has been established at the instance of the State Department to handle *Combined* (i.e., matters of interest to the British as well as to the United States) civilian economic matters regarding North Africa. This Committee is intended to be the focal point for all non-military requirements for North Africa, whether prepared in North Africa, Washington or London, and is to recommend action to be taken thereon. Representation is drawn from the State Department, the British Embassy, and the executive secretaries of CPRB [Combined Production and Resources Board], CRMB [Combined Raw Materials Board], CSAB [Combined Shipping Adjustment Board], and CFB [Combined Food Board]. Part of the secretariat of this committee is furnished by the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, consisting of a representative from the office of General Deane (Colonel Hammond) and a representative from the office of Brigadier Dykes.

It is the stated intention of this Board to have communications from North Africa on civilian matters sent directly from General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. \* \* \*

#### 2. *Combined Requirements Group*

This Committee has both U.S. and British membership and acts in effect as a subcommittee of the C.O.B., which is outlined above. It was organized at the instance of Mr. Tom [K.] Finletter of the State Department, with the concurrence of the C.O.B., and is to act under direction of the State Department. It has been charged with the limited duty of passing on and approving civilian requirements for North Africa, and reporting them to the C.O.B. for its action. This Committee has been merged with a similar committee which was appointed for the same purpose by Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of Foreign Territories of the State Department, and Mr. Appleby now serves as its Chairman.

It is not clear that a committee of this prominence will concern itself only with screening of requirements, and the demarcation of jurisdiction between this Committee and the C.O.B., mentioned above, and the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee, mentioned below, can not be considered as finally determined. \* \* \*

#### 3. *Interdepartmental Advisory Committee*

This Committee has only U.S. representation on the main committee, but may have also British representation on some or all of its sub-

committees. It has been established as an *advisory* committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Appleby, Director of the Office of Foreign Territories of the State Department.

The stated purpose of this Committee is "Implementation of the Economic and Social aspects of the North African Program."<sup>21</sup> Consequently, its jurisdiction appears to be broader than the jurisdiction of the Combined Requirements Group referred to next above.

The relationship between this Committee and the other Committees is not yet definitive, but it now appears that all U.S. interests will meet in this group to handle problems relating to all civilian matters in North Africa. \* \* \*

#### 4. Public Health

This is presently being handled by Governor Lehman's office, acting in concert with Lend-Lease and the Red Cross. \* \* \*

#### MURPHY BECOMES PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE THEATER

[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 18 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 6349]

Following message under date of December 15 furnished you from the President: "I am today appointing Mr. Murphy to be my personal representative in North Africa with the rank of Minister. He will continue on General Eisenhower's staff in his present capacity as Civil Affairs Officer until such a time as consultation with the War Department suggests a change."<sup>22</sup>

#### NORTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC BOARD CREATED TO CARRY OUT STATE DEPARTMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM

[AG AFHQ Ltr, 1 Dec 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

1. The Department of State has been charged by the President of the United States with the responsibility for the development and execution of a plan for the economic support of North Africa, subject to military exigencies.

2. *a.* The North African Economic Board (NAEB) is hereby set up to carry this plan into effect. Initially, since the requirements of military operations are dominant, the Board shall consist of both military and civil representatives as follows:<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> The function of this committee was to advise the Office of Foreign Territories on matters of policy.

<sup>22</sup> This appointment gave Murphy direct access to the President and the State Department on matters of policy.

<sup>23</sup> The charter of the North African Economic Board was revised on 8 January. Among the changes made was

The Joint Chairman:

Civil: Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Administrator.

Military: Maj. Gen. H. M. Gale, Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force Headquarters.

Executive Vice-Chairman (to be designated by the Joint Chairman).

Heads of Sections of the Boards Executive.

Representatives of:

G-1, AFHQ

G-4, AFHQ

Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ

together with such other persons as the Chairman of the Board may from time to time designate.

9. *a.* The functions of NAEB shall be:

(1) The supply of essential materials to the civil population and to vital utilities and industries. This function will involve a continuing examination of needs and such participation in distribution as may prove desirable.

(2) The purchase both of strategic materials which are immediately required in the United Nations war effort and, in reasonable quantities, of other products, the production and normal markets for which have been disturbed. This function will involve not only purchase and export but storage of the latter type of produce for future sale or use in eventual United Nations operations.

(3) The handling of currency and financial problems. This function will involve a survey of the whole financial situation and the establishment of whatever controls may prove necessary, as well as the examination of the files of Axis firms and of government documents, with a view towards obtaining information concerning persons engaging in undesirable commercial and financial transactions and enemy plans and activities.

(4) Initially in accordance with military requirements the maintenance, repair and expansion of vital transportation facilities, including railroads, port facilities and automotive transport.

the division of the board into a Civil Department and a Military Department, the latter dealing solely with military economic matters. On 23 January 1943 AFHQ, in informing the War Department of organizational and personnel developments of the Board, stated that "responsibility has been placed in the civilian side but pending arrival of adequate civilian personnel military men will be detailed temporarily to civil department." OPD Msg files, CM-IN 10177. Civilian agencies soon filled the leading positions of the board's various divisions. To be sure, NAEB did provide for representation of the military component, both in its chairmanship and in its Military Department, and its general functions embraced the co-ordination of military and civilian interests.

This function will involve a careful survey of needs and advice and assistance in operation.

(5) The maintenance of public health. This function will involve an estimate of needed supplies and advice as to their utilization. The function will involve co-ordination with the Red Cross and other relief agencies.

(6) Expansion of the production of finished articles, foodstuffs, and other materials needed by the civil population, by our armed forces, or elsewhere in the United Nations. This function will involve a survey of the pertinent industries, the supply of needed equipment and advice and assistance in its installation and use. \* \* \*

#### STATE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

[Memo, Implementation of the Econ and Social Aspect of the North African Program, attached to Min of the Mtg of the Interdepartmental Comm. of the OFT, 22 Dec 42, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-8]

The responsibility for implementing the economic and social program shall be centralized in the Office of Foreign Territories [OFT] which shall operate as follows:

1. Recommendations concerning the policies and methods to be followed in dealing with the supply, purchase and distribution of materials will be submitted by the Civil Affairs Officer to the Office of Foreign Territories.

2. The Combined boards in Washington shall be asked by the Office of Foreign Territories (a) to consider the recommendations of the Civil Affairs Staff as to the materials required in North Africa and to determine the amounts of such materials to be sent to that area as well as the sources from which they are to be obtained; (b) to designate materials required from North Africa and to decide as to their disposition; (c) to designate materials the production of which in North Africa should be expanded and appropriate sources of equipment required for this production; (d) to assign shipping for the movement of these materials.

3. There shall be established by the Office of Foreign Territories an operating committee or committees to examine the recommendations of the Civil Affairs Officer in regard to questions of supply, purchase and distribution; to request the appropriate instructions from the Combined Boards and other authorities; and to carry out through the appropriate United States and other agencies the decisions agreed upon. This committee or committees shall include representatives of State, Lend-Lease, B.E.W. [Board of Economic Warfare], and the appropriate foreign represen-

tatives. Representatives of the Combined Boards shall be members of the operating committee or committees concerned with (a) the purchase of materials in North Africa, and (b) supply of goods to be sent to North Africa. The operating committee of the Combined Boards may be utilized to arrange for the allocation of strategic materials in accordance with the decisions of the Combined Board. The various United States and other agencies represented on the committee shall be asked to perform the operational functions necessary to implement other agreed-upon decisions.

4. There shall be established by the Office of Foreign Territories a procedure for examining recommendations submitted by the Civil Affairs Officer and for establishing programs with respect to financial and commercial control matters including currency, exchange control, trading with the enemy control, enemy property control, and such control of local commercial and financial transactions as is necessary to prevent Axis firms in North Africa from being able to engage in such transactions. This procedure will involve regular consultation, perhaps through the creation of a committee, perhaps through simple liaison arrangements with War and Treasury Departments of this Government and with any interested foreign representatives. Censorship and communications are regarded at this stage as military in character and must be handled by the military.

5. Questions involving relief, public health and rehabilitation will be the responsibility of the Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. Appropriate liaison and exchange of information will be maintained between the Director and the Office of Foreign Territories in order that matters of common interest, including the co-ordination of relief and rehabilitation supply requests with other supply programs, may receive the required attention in both offices. \* \* \*

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL TO FORMALIZE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CO-OPERATION

[AFHQ GO 4, 7 Jan 43, ACC (Allied Control Commission) files, 10000/134/11]

1. Announcement is made of the establishment of a Political and Economic Council for the purpose of advising the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, on political and economic matters and additionally for the purpose of co-ordinating and guiding the work of the various experts, American and British, in North Africa.

2. The Council will consist of a representative of the Commander in Chief, a representative of the Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, and Mr. Harold [M.] Macmillan, as full members.<sup>24</sup> Such other members as are designated will attend council meetings as required. \* \* \*

6. The Council will deal with the wide aspect and range of political and economic problems which arise from time to time and such other matters as the Commander in Chief may refer to it for consideration.

#### A PLAN FOR GRADUAL CHANGE TO COMPLETE CIVILIAN CONTROL

[AFHQ Staff Memo 13, 10 Feb 43, G-5, AFHQ, MTO, HS files, Civil Affairs Office (CAO-44)]

As soon as the military situation permits, the conduct of political and economic relations with the French Authorities in North Africa will pass into normal civilian channels. In order that this may be accomplished gradually, the following transition arrangements will be put into effect:

a. The American Minister [Murphy], as Chief Civil Administrator, Allied Force, is charged with the direction of political and economic affairs as a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief. In order that there may be complete Anglo-American unity of purpose and policy in regard to these matters, the British Minister [Macmillan] has been invited to associate himself closely with Mr. Murphy in the exercise of this function. Mr. Macmillan has accepted this invitation.

b. For the purposes of insuring that civil administration is in accord with military requirements, the Political and Economic Council set up by General Order No 4 of 7 January 1943, will remain in being. (The Council will meet as required.)

c. The Ministers will be assisted by a Secretariat which shall act as a Joint Secretariat to co-ordinate the work of the Ministers and the Boards or sections concerned.

d. The particular functions in question are:

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<sup>24</sup> Macmillan, a member of the British Cabinet, was at the end of December 1942 appointed British Resident Minister at AFHQ to keep His Majesty's Government informed on political matters and to supervise the British civilians who were coming to assume positions in NAEB. The Political and Economic Council was formed in order to provide a formal means for co-operation with Macmillan, who, not being a member of General Eisenhower's staff, required some medium for official collaboration.

(1) Conduct of relations with the French authorities on political and economic questions as distinguished from military questions.

(2) Direction of all activities of NAEB subject to dominant military requirements. Any necessary readjustment of the existing machinery will be carried out in consultation with the CAO [Civil Affairs Officer].

(3) Direction of all activities of North African Shipping Board subject to dominant military requirements. Any necessary readjustment of the existing machinery will be carried out in consultation with naval and military authorities concerned. \* \* \*

#### STILL MORE WASHINGTON COMMITTEES ARISE

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, International Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

15. b. *CCNA (Combined Committee for North and West Africa)*.<sup>25</sup> This committee consists of representatives of Lend-Lease, State, B.E.W., Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Army, Agriculture, Combined Shipping Adjustments Board and the British Embassy. It goes over and answers all cables from NAEB, assigning action to the appropriate agency and discussing the action taken or proposed, and the consequent cable answers. It handles about two hundred cables a month. . . . The Secretariat of the committee is furnished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . .

c. *CCNA (U.S. Members only)*. This committee meets upon call . . . in Mr. Finletter's office to discuss problems of interest only to American agencies. Only one representative from each agency is permitted to attend, and he is supposed to be prepared to speak on behalf of this agency. . . .

d. *Tunisia Committee*. The name of this committee is perhaps misleading since it is intended by the State Department that this committee shall be a focal point for discussion of plans for all areas that are apt to be occupied by military action. . . .

e. *CCNA (Section II—Fiscal and Economic matters)*. These meetings are devoted to fiscal or economic matters which are attended by the Fiscal Division, ASF, and by the Civil Affairs Division. The committee picture is in a constant state of change at the present and is supplemented by various working subcommittees.

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<sup>25</sup> Established in February 1943, it was an operating committee of the Committee of Combined Boards, and did its more routine work.

#### 4. MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTEGRATION MUST BE ACHIEVED

##### DURING INITIAL STAGES THE CCS SHOULD BE KEPT INFORMED ON POLICY MATTERS

[Memo, Secy's, CCS, approved by CCS, 27 Nov 42, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

Under the leadership of the State Department, the Committee of the Combined Boards has been set up in Washington to handle combined civilian economic matters regarding North Africa . . . [above, Sec. 3]

Until the situation stabilizes in North Africa, civil and military matters will, of necessity, be closely interwoven and to some extent cut across each other. Civil matters in North Africa will be handled by the Civil Affairs Section of General Eisenhower's staff, and the channel of communications will be from General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As the situation settles down, it is probable that the U.S. and U.K. Governments will establish some agency in North Africa which will take over many of the duties of the Civil Affairs Section of General Eisenhower's staff, and, similarly, the civil agencies in Washington will be able to act progressively more and more independently from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

During the initial stages, however, and until the situation settles down, it is believed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be kept informed constantly of the actions taken by the Committee of Combined Boards which is being set up. In order to accomplish this, arrangements have been made whereby the secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will provide part of the secretariat necessary for the Committee of Combined Boards. \* \* \*

##### EISENHOWER AGAIN PROTESTS AGAINST THE SEMBLANCE OF DIVIDED AUTHORITY

[Msg 609, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1492]

Mr. Murphy has received, through this office, two messages from the State Department which outline State Department plans for sending to North Africa a mission of economic and other experts to assist Murphy in his difficult tasks. . . . There is an acute need for such a body because the success of future operations from this base will depend very largely upon the speed with which the economy of this country is rehabilitated, at least to the point of sustaining a majority of the population above the starvation level. However, there is an implication in these messages that while Murphy is expected to remain a Staff

Officer of mine, he would in another capacity be independently responsible to the State Department. This intent may not exist but the matter is so important that I must invite your immediate attention to it.

No one could be more anxious than General Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of all problems other than purely military, but the fact remains that, at this moment and until North Africa is made thoroughly secure, in which process the capture of Tunisia will be an important incident, everything done here directly affects the military situation. Therefore, the body of experts mentioned should be sent at the earliest possible date to report to Murphy who should, for the time being, have the single status of head of my civil affairs section. \* \* \*

The purpose of this message is to request your aid in assuring, for the moment, that single-handed responsibility is maintained here, while the State Department may be assured that its staff of experts, through my civil affairs section, will receive every possible assistance and support in carrying on the work which is so vital to the future of successful military operations in and from this region.

Mr. Murphy and his assistants are in complete accord with the conclusions above presented.

##### EISENHOWER'S AUTHORITY IN CIVIL AFFAIRS WILL BE PARAMOUNT AS LONG AS MILITARY SITUATION REQUIRES

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Nov 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 9420]

I want to assure you that the State Department is working in closest co-operation with the War Department in supporting your operations in North Africa. . . . Your number 609, November 26 [above] and this reply have been read by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hull is in complete agreement with the contents of this message. \* \* \*

As long as military operations in North Africa require it, Murphy will remain a member of your staff and be directly subordinate to you in all respects. The State Department had this in mind in sending its instructions to Murphy.<sup>26</sup> When

<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, on 18 December 1942, Eisenhower was notified that Murphy had been appointed the personal representative of the President with the rank of Minister (see above). It has been observed, however, that one of Murphy's great contributions was that he represented the political point of view while attempting to fit completely into the military framework, Interv, Epstein, OCMH, with Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, one-time member of the Jt Exec Vice Chairmanship, NAEB, 17 Apr 50.

the military situation permits, and the time of arrival of this condition cannot be forecast now, the State Department desires to relieve you of the responsibility for civil matters. When that time arrives Murphy will begin operating directly under the State Department, but in closest co-operation with the military commander in North Africa. The War Department is in complete agreement with this plan, but as stated above it cannot be executed until the military situation is stabilized to a point permitting it. The final divorcement of civil matters from your control will be based on a recommendation from you at the time that the military situation permits such action. There may also be a transition period during which you might wish to divest yourself of certain responsibilities and the civilian group under Murphy's direction will be able to undertake them as you see fit and in accordance with your judgment. (This last sentence was drafted by Mr. Hull personally.) \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT SEEKS AND OBTAINS REPRESENTATION IN THE WASHINGTON COMMITTEE

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the Dir, ID, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

13. In the initial phases of the organization in Washington on the North African problem no provision was made for direct War Department representation on any of the organizations concerned. The only military representation provided was that which resulted from having half of the secretariat of the Washington committee composed of Army representatives (one U.S., one U.K.) of the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Consequently, there was no direct relationship between the Washington committee and the War Department. As a necessary result there was no co-ordination of War Department communications and those through other channels. War Department communications on the subject were received from Allied Force Headquarters; Combined Chiefs of Staff cables on the same subject were received by the Civilian Committee, and some State Department cables on the subject were also turned over to the Civilian Committee. Consequently neither group knew whether action proposed by it duplicated or merely supplemented action of the other group. It soon became evident that the Washington State Department committee for civil affairs could not properly handle the problem without the help of proper representation from the War Department. It was accordingly arranged in January that the Assistant Secretary of War, the Commanding

General, Services of Supply, and the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, should be represented on the Washington committee. By informal delegation the responsibilities of these three offices were discharged by the International Division until the creation of the Civil Affairs Division. . . .<sup>27</sup>

#### CIVILIAN SUPPLIES MUST BE CONSIGNED TO THE ARMY

[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. I]

15. The question of consignment of civilian goods has arisen. The civilian agencies wished to have them consigned to Murphy; the War Department wished to have them consigned to General Eisenhower. The matter was referred to General Eisenhower by cable, with State and Lend-Lease agreeing to abide by his answer. The answer, received yesterday, requested all goods to be consigned to General Eisenhower. A supplemental cable indicates that this is to be accomplished as to "non-common" stores, by consignment to the North African Economic Council, as a subdivision of General Eisenhower's staff.

#### THEATER COMMANDER MUST HAVE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[ID Agenda, Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 12 Dec 42]

1. Responsibility for civilian supply for conquered territories, including places such as North Africa, has been delegated by the President to Lend-Lease, acting through the State Department. Such responsibility does not, however, encroach upon the responsibilities of the commanding

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<sup>27</sup> In December 1942 McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, had become the War Department representative on the Committee of the Combined Boards and also on the State Department's Interdepartmental Advisory Committee. Subsequently, the War Department obtained representation on the Combined Committee for North and West Africa (CCNA) and substantially all the other interdepartmental committees. AFS, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 22, 26.

Also in December there was established in the War Department an informal committee for North African Civilian Supply, consisting of representatives of the International Division, SOS; Operations Division, GS; Operations Division, SOS; Transportation Corps, SOS; and the Army-Navy Petroleum Board. The committee acted under the chairmanship of the Director, International Division, which provided the secretariat. Matters relating to civilian supply for North Africa were referred to the International Division for action so that proper distribution of the problems might be made within the War Department, and correlation maintained between the action of the War Department and the action of the other agencies in Washington.

generals of the theaters in question, and shall be at all times subordinate to him while the situation in the theater is purely under the commanding general on matters which affect or are affected by military operations.

7. Since all ships that can be placed on the North African run are, and for some time will be, needed for military equipment, civilian supplies can be sent only as filler cargo unless displacement of military cargo is ordered by General Eisenhower. This fact is not yet fully appreciated by the civilian agencies in Washington.

9. Under present conditions, priority of military *versus* civilian cargo, and priority within civilian cargo, is in effect a command decision to be made by General Eisenhower and OPD. The other agencies of the War Department have the functions of:

(a) Implementing such decisions.

(b) Referring requests for civilian cargo, together with analysis of possible treatment, for decision.

(c) Relating conduct of civilian agencies to the main problem. \* \* \*

#### BUT THERE ARE HIGHLY TRAINED CA OFFICERS WITHOUT APPROPRIATE FUNCTIONS

[Memo, Col Charles W. Rooth, Asst Civ Admr, AFHQ, for Murphy, Chief CA Admr, AFHQ, 29 Nov 42, CAD files, Husky Plan]

Should the decision be made that the Civil Administration in French Africa be a function of the State Department 100 percent, then it is suggested that all trained Civil Affairs officers be segregated and organized into a planning group for the next tactical operation and the subsequent administration of Military Government. It is extremely important that these trained officers be accessible for such planning with a minimum disruption to any local civil administration.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Colonel Rooth headed the group of CA officers who had been trained at Charlottesville. His proposal was not acted upon.

## 5. CAN EISENHOWER NOW BE SPARED POLITICAL PROBLEMS?

### EISENHOWER WELCOMES PROSPECTIVE RELIEF FROM NONMILITARY QUESTIONS

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

. . . The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.

### CA OFFICERS USED MERELY TO CHECK UNLOADING

[Memo, Rooth for the Exec Vice Chairman, NAEB, 6 Jan 43, CAD files, Husky Plan, ExecOff file]

2. a. Are Civil Affairs officers to continue checking the unloading of ships? \* \* \*

[Memo, Bernstein, Financial Adviser, NAEB, for Carter, Chief of Finance, SOS, 10 Feb 43, OUSW files, A49-94, Misc and Sub, MG]

A. 8. . . . Many of the Civil Affairs officers have had little opportunity to do useful work since their arrival in North Africa and they have had a sense of uselessness. Furthermore, at Oran and Casablanca, especially after the creation of the Mediterranean Base Section and the Atlantic Base Section, the commanding army officers were increasingly disregarding the Civil Affairs officers and using other military units to handle such matters as the civilian supply and exports. \* \* \*

### THE ARMY MUST HANDLE DELIVERIES

[Memo, unsigned for ASW McCloy, Based on Conversations With Persons Interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 19 Mar 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

The problem of getting the goods away from the ships and the docks to the warehouses (where the French take delivery and issue receipts) has been largely handled by the Army up to the present time and it has been decided that this job will be handled by the Army, so as to insure that the docks will be cleared promptly. NAEB is not equipped or staffed to handle this job, and if it had to assume responsibility for it, could only accomplish the task by borrowing men and equipment from the Army or by pushing the French to do the physical work.

### HE MUST FIRST SETTLE POLITICAL ISSUE OF FRENCH FEDERATION

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 986]

The President desires that when the "agreement" you refer to is completed, it be issued by you and French parties concerned as a "Joint announcement" rather than as an "agreement," ref-

erence your number 1010 2 December.<sup>29</sup>

The President does not wish the words "French Imperial Federation" included in such "Joint announcement."

The foregoing is based on the premise that no act of ours can recognize any particular government setup, except such provisional one as is locally necessary for the prosecution of military operations. . . .

#### EISENHOWER MEETS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING HELP OF FRENCH WEST AFRICA

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1629]

Repeatedly Boisson [Governor General of French West Africa] said to me, "I want to put everything I have at the disposal of the United Nations under the leadership of the United States. But it is impossible for me to return to French West Africa, announcing such an intention and secure an enthusiastic reaction unless I can show that the United Nations and particularly England are taking obvious steps immediately to treat us as friends. Raids, propaganda and unauthorized flights must stop at once and I must be able to say that any of our people held prisoner by any part of the United Nations are to be freed at once."<sup>30</sup>

My point in all this is that it is necessary for us here to preserve the attitude that we are treating with a friend rather than an enemy. With us this whole problem is cold-blooded military necessity; we do not show weakness as you can see from the nature of the rights and privileges accorded us by the French in original agreement. But I feel it is a mistake to demand co-operation and a friendly attitude on the one hand and on the other to act like we have here a conquering army which enforces its will by threat and views with intense suspicion every proposal of these people. . . . Frequently some detail can be exchanged for a big advantage and that is what we are trying to get when we ask for the full use of French West Africa. . . .<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> The agreement whereby French West Africa proposed to join Admiral Darlan's commissariat in forming a French Imperial Federation.

<sup>30</sup> On 3 December AFHQ had sent to Washington the text of an agreement with Governor General [François Pierre] Boisson giving the United States all the military advantages which it sought in French West Africa. There were no civil affairs provisions in the agreement. See Howe, *Northwest Africa*, pp. 270-71.

<sup>31</sup> On 5 December the British Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the British Joint Staff Mission giving the assurance that the Government of the United Kingdom would not permit action or propaganda from British

#### PROBLEM OF VICHY LEGISLATION IS PUT UP TO EISENHOWER

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 2210]

The following memorandum from the President is quoted for your information:

There is a real desire here and in England that a statement be issued by the appropriate authority indicating that civil restrictions imposed on the population in North Africa by the Vichy Government have been withdrawn, including the freeing of political prisoners, the abolition of the ban against labor unions and the lifting of restrictions against the Jews.

I think that such a statement, if it could be made, would be very helpful, but I hesitate to do this without Eisenhower knowing about it and getting his views. Would you be good enough to get an expression from Eisenhower on this point and indication from him as to the effect of a statement such as I have indicated on the Moslems and the Arabs?<sup>32</sup>

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Dec 42, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3437]

I am strongly in favor of President's plan. Three weeks ago I began working on the suggested lines and progress has been made in securing liberalization in many directions. . . .

Upon receipt of your message, the subject was again discussed with Darlan, with the view of giving publicity not only to accomplishments but to announced aims. He is particularly grateful to the President for realizing and mentioning the fact there is a local Jew-Moslem problem that is full of explosive possibilities unless carefully handled. He is in favor of a public announcement that aligns him definitely on the side of liberal government and opposed to the Axis and what it stands for. I believe that the place and methods of issue of the statement can probably be decided better by appropriate authority at home than we can here. . . .<sup>33</sup>

West African territories directed against the authority of Boisson. Eisenhower was asked to inform Boisson to that effect. OPD files, Exec 5, Item 4.

<sup>32</sup> It is noteworthy that even in a purely political matter—and one in which the President felt the deepest concern—it seemed impossible to proceed without first obtaining the theater commander's views. The paramountcy of military necessity appears to have been recognized no less in Washington than in the theater. This was to be the case with most subsequent political issues as well.

<sup>33</sup> A statement was drafted for Admiral Darlan but it was made public in entirety only outside of French North Africa. It was feared that the liberal tenets advanced would not have happy repercussions locally.

## THE ALLIED CINC HEARS CRITICISMS OF POLITICAL SITUATION UNDER DARLAN

[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3524]

We have been disturbed by reports received during the last few days from North Africa via Europe about conditions in French Morocco and Algeria. These reports, which come from independent and reliable sources, all paint the same picture of the results which follow from our inability in existing circumstances to exercise control over the local French authorities in internal administrative matters.

These reports state "That the S.O.L. and kindred Fascist organizations continue their activities and victimize our former French sympathizers some of whom have not yet been released from prison. The first reaction of these organizations to the Allied landing was rightly one of fear but it seems that they have now taken courage to regroup themselves and continue their activities. Well-known German sympathizers who had been ousted have been reinstated. Not only have our enemies been thus encouraged but our friends have been correspondingly confused and cast down. There have been cases of French soldiers being punished for desertion because they tried to support the Allied Forces during the landing. \* \* \*

It is desired that you talk these reports over with Murphy and submit your comments and advice on all phases of this message at the earliest practicable date. It is suggested that you take such corrective steps as are practicable.<sup>34</sup>

## EISENHOWER HOPES THAT CIVIL AFFAIRS PROBLEMS WILL SOON END

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 22 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9542]

It is true as ever that complete military occupation of this territory by the Allied forces should be undertaken only as a final and inescapable measure. We are trying to make a system work here which is admittedly full of defects from every standpoint, both at home and here. We know that many petty and even some prominent officials all over North Africa are either strad-

<sup>34</sup> On 13 December Eisenhower replied at length to this message. While admitting that the political situation was "most confused and very difficult," he did not feel that the reports in general were accurate and stated that on the whole he was "gratified with the progress being made toward a sound civil administration." OPD Msg Files, CM-IN 6093.

dling the fence or are actually antagonistic. In this diverse population there is no general enthusiasm in support of the war and there is no question that various reverses to us would be intensified in effect because of trouble in the rear and in the interior, which the civil administration might not be strong enough to control completely. This factor merely increases the tasks normally involved in a military operation, so you can understand how earnestly we are seeking to prevent internal friction, at least until the difficult problem in Tunisia can be solved. \* \* \*

I have carefully kept my relationships with Darlan on a military basis, and he clearly understands this. But our military situation has continued to be such as to make all of these civil matters an essential part of active operations. They have been a great burden but I understand that measures are under way whereby as quickly as possible civil and military matters may be even reasonably well separated and I can be relieved of direct responsibility for most of these things. I will be delighted. \* \* \*

## WAR DEPARTMENT ALSO WISHES EISENHOWER FREED FROM NONMILITARY DISTRACTIONS

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 42, OPD files, Item 36a, Exec 12]

I think you should delegate your international diplomatic problems to your subordinates and give your complete attention to the battle in Tunisia and the protection of the Straits of Gibraltar. \* \* \*

## NEW POLITICAL PROBLEM CREATED BY DARLAN'S ASSASSINATION

[Hq Fifth Army, Rcd of Events and Documents, 9 Nov-25 Dec 42, Fifth Army Opn Rpts, OPD 105-11.5 (19140)]

Algiers, December 24, 1942—Admiral Jean François Darlan, High French Commissioner in French North Africa, is assassinated today!

The enigmatic French politician-sailor is shot through the face and chest as he is entering his office at the Summer Palace following a late lunch. The assassin is a 22-year-old University student who is arrested immediately. By midnight it still has not been learned if the murder was instigated by the Axis or some political clique or what, exactly, was the assassin's motive. His true name has not been learned. \* \* \*

General Clark personally is shocked by Admiral Darlan's death. Darlan had fulfilled his many obligations and promises to Allied officers. There had been no indication that Darlan was not

sincere. Repercussions of the Admiral's death can lead almost anywhere. What will the DeGaullists do? What perverted tangent will Axis propaganda take? Who can fill the void caused through Darlan's death? General Clark doesn't look for any serious unrest, but he thinks a few groups "may take advantage of the opportunity to cause disorder." As he looks at the dead French leader, the General thinks of two statements Darlan made to him at the luncheon yesterday: "Tomorrow the Axis press will say I gave this luncheon for you because you had a gun pointed at me." "I'd like to turn this thing over to General Giraud. He likes it here and I don't." \* \* \*

Late in the evening, General Clark gets in touch with General Eisenhower by telephone. The Commander in Chief will return to Algiers tomorrow. General Giraud is going to fly back from the front. General Eisenhower later radios General Clark: "You were quite right in absolutely rejecting Noguès. Consider Kingpin (Giraud) only possibility." Later, a radio comes from Washington saying that President Roosevelt "desires that no announcement be made reference Darlan's successor."

#### QUESTION OF DARLAN'S SUCCESSOR AND PROPOSAL TO BREAK WITH VICHY PATTERN OF LEGALITY

[Jt Msg, Eisenhower to CCS and Murphy to Secy of State, 26 Dec 42, Exec 5, Item 4, CM-IN 11073]

Immediately after Darlan's death last evening General [Jean Marie] Bergeret, Deputy High Commissioner asked me to call for a discussion of the situation resulting from Darlan's passing. . . . Bergeret was in a state of indecision as to the procedure to be followed but he thought that it would be necessary to follow that established in a secret ordinance . . . said to have been signed by Darlan on 2 December 1942. . . . This document in essence provides that in case of inability or absence of the High Commissioner his functions would be assumed by General Noguès, Resident General in French Morocco, but if the inability was of long duration within a period of one month the Imperial Council would definitely exercise the functions of High Commissioner. . . . He asked my personal opinion and I told him unequivocally that I felt that General Giraud is the only possible choice, that I felt that General Noguès would be unacceptable, and that furthermore I felt that now is the time of breaking with the notion that legality as provided by Vichy legislation is necessary to assure the functioning of a regime established

in North Africa for the prosecution of the common war effort.<sup>35</sup>

#### THE UNITED STATES IS STILL NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE FRENCH

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jan 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 2173]

We have learned that in some quarters at home there . . . is an apparent conviction that we are in North Africa as an occupying powerful, conquering army fully capable of carrying out our military missions and, if need be, of controlling the population by force. . . . As a result of this conviction it appears to be assumed that we are in position to deal with the French on the basis of giving orders and compelling compliance. I am writing this message for your exclusive and confidential information with the request that when opportunity arises you do what you can to correct or soften this view at least to the extent that during the ensuing critical weeks we do not receive any arbitrary instructions which might precipitate a military crisis. I know that you fully understand the essentials of our military situation and, therefore, are aware of the extent to which we are dependent upon active co-operation of the French. From the very beginning, this whole task would have been an easy one for us here, both militarily and politically, if we had been content merely to seize ports and solidify our own bases and pacify the country. We did not take the easy, safe course, and I know you have always agreed that the decision to rush ahead although risky was fully justified. Even yet I think we gained tremendously by that decision, in spite of political difficulties that all have had their roots in the extent to which we have exposed our rear to sabotage and disruption. We must always face the fact that it will be many weeks yet before we can perform the military tasks in front of us and still be strong enough to impose our will arbitrarily upon the local French.

Ever since 9 November we have, in full conformity with the spirit and letter of our original instructions, attempted to secure active French co-operation on the basis of friendship and have made our military dispositions on a continuation of such a relationship. I will be prompt in report-

<sup>35</sup> Giraud was, shortly afterward, chosen by the Imperial Council as High Commissioner. He remained in that office until, on 3 June 1943, De Gaulle and Giraud became co-presidents of a French Committee of National Liberation. In August 1943 the United States and Great Britain recognized this body as *de facto* governing body in North Africa and other areas where its authority was accepted.

ing to you personally when the time arrives that we are strong enough in front and rear to disregard, if so ordered, French and other viewpoints. The immediate effect of nonco-operation now would be catastrophic and, if anything we should be instructed to do might result in nonco-operation, we must have ample time in which to re-adjust dispositions much more conservatively than at present. \* \* \*

#### EISENHOWER EXPLAINS WHY THE PEYROUTON APPOINTMENT WAS SANCTIONED

[Msg, Eisenhower to Elmer Davis, Dir, OWI, 24 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11349]

. . . But what no American critic seems to understand is that there is a great paucity of qualified men to fill the highly specialized posts in the civilian administration of Morocco and Algiers. America further fails to consider the importance of a continuing orderly civil administration to our military operations. Abrupt, sweeping or radical changes, bringing into office little known or unqualified administrators, could create serious difficulties for us. This is particularly true where the administration is connected with Arab affairs. Thus after two years of German pressure and propaganda, it is obvious that we could not find Frenchmen in positions of influence or power in this area, who would satisfy the democratic feelings of America. But what America fails to understand is that amongst Vichy appointed or Vichy approved officials here there still exist some Frenchmen who are bitterly Anti-Axis. It is not possible quickly and easily to determine beyond question which are the French officials who merely change their coats with the shift of the wind and which are those who can be counted upon to co-operate fully against the Germans. We have tried to work with the existing administrative machinery, judging not on the basis of prejudice or past political affiliations in France, but upon a practical basis of how each French official proves himself in action over a reasonable period of time. Admiral Darlan offered to discharge any official for whom we could offer a substitute acceptable to the Allies and to the American and British press, provided only that he be qualified and also acceptable to the local population. No useful suggestions were forthcoming. Any Gaullist was considered as impos-

sible, being regarded as too extreme by the leaders of the French armed forces.

The present criticism on the part of the American press centers around Peyrouton's appointment. This case provides a typical example of the limited alternative which had been open to us. We could have retained Châtel with his heritage of weakness and political harlotry. Or we could have insisted upon a Gaullist candidate to which the French military leaders would have been completely opposed. Or we could accept the appointment of Peyrouton, a man of known administrative ability with experience in dealing with such intricate North African problems as that of the Arabs.

Contrary to the reaction in America, [Marcel] Peyrouton's appointment has caused no outcry here. It has been well received to all appearances. He is generally regarded as strongly anti-German and his antagonism to Laval is well-known. The State Department consented to Peyrouton coming here and knew of his intended appointment. The only active dissatisfaction may be presumed to be among the Gaullists and left wing groups which in North Africa however plentiful do not constitute an organized body capable of running a government. . . .

#### NINE MONTHS AFTER INVASION EISENHOWER STILL HAS POLITICAL PROBLEMS

[Msg, Gen Smith, CoS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 6 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3980]

Murphy has just shown me a draft of a message to the Secretary of State suggesting for the President's consideration that Giraud's visit to the United States affords an appropriate occasion to announce the recognition by the United States of the French Committee of National Liberation [FCNL] as the body which is collectively responsible for the representation of French interests until such time as a national government is established.<sup>36</sup> General Eisenhower concurs in this recommendation and our particular interest lies in the fact that once this recognition is afforded and representation of the British and American Governments is established here, we will be able to shift many of the political problems which now embarrass an encumber us to the shoulders of the customary representation. . . .

<sup>36</sup> For recognition of FCNL, see Chapter XXIV.

## 6. CAN MILITARY COMMANDERS BE SPARED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS?

### IN THEORY THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS TO HAVE ALL THE ECONOMIC WORRIES

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Nov 42, WDCSA files, 396, Africa, 1942]

This morning I received your telegram [28 Nov 42, in Section 4] concerning the functions of the State Department in developing the economy of this particular theater. I agree with every word of it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever will occur in the execution of the plan. \* \* \*

### EISENHOWER CONCERNED OVER EFFECTS OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY SHORTAGES ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 9 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4195]

. . . I am concerned at the present economic situation in North Africa and its possible influence on military operations and urge that steps to alleviate it shall be initiated immediately. . . . I cannot over emphasize adverse political effect of not meeting minimum needs of civilian population where it is possible to do so in view of public assurances in United States which have been given prominence in the press here. . . .

### UNLESS TONNAGE IS PROVIDED FOR CIVILIAN NEEDS MILITARY SHIPPING MAY HAVE TO BE REDUCED

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 10 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4698]

. . . These tonnages are entirely inadequate to meet civil and French military needs. The civil needs are so closely tied up with success of the military campaign, that unless there is a general readjustment of shipping to increase the tonnages received here I shall be compelled to decide between reducing the size of the total forces or causing disaffection with the French by failing to supply essentials which they are expecting to receive.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Shortly after this message, Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., of the Office of ACofS for Materiel, reported a recent conversation with General Eisenhower as follows: "General Eisenhower places great stress on the necessity of doing everything possible to import the maximum of supplies for civilian economy. The underlying reason for this is the long unprotected communication line—approximately 1,500 miles, Casablanca to Tunisia—the security of which in large measure is dependent on local military forces and civilian population." ASF, JD, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 30-31.

### THIRTY THOUSAND TONS OF CIVILIAN SUPPLIES MONTHLY NEEDED

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 26 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11940]

. . . I agree with civil experts that urgent local needs at present require approximate monthly civilian supply shipments of 30,000 tons and am convinced that any reduction in this figure would be dangerous from political and military standpoints. \* \* \*

### ONLY WHEAT IMPORTS WILL EFFECT DEHOARDING

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 12697]

We agree that on crop figures there should be heavy quantities of wheat hoarded by Arabs especially in Morocco. As explained . . . there are two policies advised here to effect dehoarding: A: Substantial and early shipment of grain and B: importation of consumer goods. French estimate grain requirement civilian needs only was two eight zero thousand tons up to end of May. Our view however was that forty thousand tons quickly shipped and widely publicized and accompanied by consumer goods would effect dehoarding. In view of shipping and port clearance difficulties we have necessarily had to reduce our wheat figure. This accounts for reduction monthly demand . . . to ten thousand tons only. We have gravest doubt however whether this quantity plus consumers goods will in fact effect our policy but proposed division of requirements in our opinion best compromise possible.

### CIVILIAN SUPPLIES SHOULD BE SENT EITHER AS BROKEN STOWAGE OR IN ADDITIONAL SHIPS

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 5 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2397]

. . . I sincerely hope that experience in shipping to North Africa will parallel that in other theaters and that it will be possible to meet the civil needs without infringing on my military requirements. The following policy must be adhered to at least until the urgent military needs are met: No tonnage should be used for other than military supplies except that which can be made available by reduction of ballast and use of

broken stowage not utilized for military supplies. The tonnage of any ships which are added to the present convoy limitations may be used exclusively for civil and French rearmament shipments.<sup>38</sup>

#### STOP SENDING STOCKINGS AND NAIL POLISH

[Msg, AFHQ to OLLA, 7 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, 4638]

As set forth in our summaries of civilian requirements stockings, nail polish and other items not on our requirements list, should be cut off in view of the more urgent items.<sup>39</sup> \* \* \*

#### WHAT THE THEATER URGENTLY REQUIRES THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES CANNOT PROVIDE

[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 27 Feb 43, CAD files, 200, N. Africa (2-27-43)(1)]

Personnel problem outlined McCloy's 2663, February 24,<sup>40</sup> recognized here as urgent. Civil agencies cannot find male stenographic help. All clerical help difficult to obtain. Executive personnel being obtained by each agency. After consultation with State Department and other agencies appropriate solution for immediate problems appears to be to make available from here a limited number of enlisted men capable of stenographic or clerical work and junior officers trained for administrative work. . . . These men would report to you and could be detailed by you to the State Department to be used to complete NAEB field organization. In due course they would probably be replaced by civilian personnel when available. \* \* \*

#### ARMY SUPPLIES MUST BE USED WHEN LEND-LEASE PROCUREMENT BREAKS DOWN

[Memo, Franks, Dir, ID, for Dir, Distribution Div, SOS, 15 Mar 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-21]

5. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration had considerable difficulty in meeting . . . requirements on the initial convoys to North Africa due in large part to the short notice upon which they were asked to make these goods available.<sup>41</sup> The

<sup>38</sup> The shortage of shipping was always to be far more serious than the shortage of supplies.

<sup>39</sup> These items could, of course, be justified on the ground that the farmers' wives would sell wheat to obtain them.

<sup>40</sup> Assistant Secretary of War McCloy had made a trip to French North Africa and had sent an urgent cable on the personnel shortages.

<sup>41</sup> For criticisms of OLLA supply operations, see below. Also see Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics*, 1943-45.

Office of Lend-Lease Administration at once purchased existing stocks of French materials in this country and undertook steps to make available as quickly as possible the additional items needed. However, one of the early convoys upon which appropriate shipping space for the 30,000 ton program was made available, was due to sail before Lend-Lease could make available sufficient cargo to meet General Eisenhower's request. Accordingly, at a general discussion on this subject in New York City on 5 January 1943, called for the purpose of discussing an appropriate stockpile program to meet shipping needs, it was recommended that supplementary "insurance" stockpiles for this purpose be created by the Army, and it was decided that the New York Port should draw on port reserves to make up the necessary shipments for the convoy then in question. . . .

Since the loading of the ships was then proceeding, this decision was put into effect forthwith and a statement with respect thereto was submitted to the Office of the Quartermaster General on 6 January 1943.

6. On 23 January 1943 a meeting was held at which . . . it was concluded that in lieu of established Army stockpile as an insurance measure for the above purpose, it would be better to follow the procedure where necessary of drawing on port stocks. \* \* \*

#### EVEN MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS MAY BE BEYOND OUR RESOURCES

[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jan 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5732]

2. . . . the Combined Boards here are somewhat concerned lest the import requirements of North Africa be stated to Washington more in terms of normal pre-war needs than in terms of the situation as it exists today. The impression we get . . . is that you intend to work out the import requirements on the basis of certificates of necessity, and we welcome this. Nevertheless, we think it is important to emphasize that it would only cause disappointment and difficulty if, in compiling the first estimates to be screened in North Africa, the impression should be gained by the French that anything like pre-war normal imports would be possible. . . . There will be other areas requiring support which have been much more severely affected by the war than North Africa. Therefore to set too high a standard there would not only cause disappointment

in that area but resentment elsewhere at a later stage.<sup>42</sup>

#### WAR DEPARTMENT SUPPLY AUTHORITIES MUST CO-OPERATE EVEN THOUGH WITHOUT FORMAL RESPONSIBILITY

[Memo, Maj. Arthur E. Palmer, Jr., Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, International Aid Div, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

22. The supply functions of ASF with respect to areas such as North Africa would be divided roughly into two aspects. First as to North and West Africa itself, since the prime responsibility for availability of supply is that of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, it is the duty of the International Division to be informed as to the needs for civilian supplies in these areas insofar as such needs are of interest to the military, and the manner and extent to which such needs are being met by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. Since this type of problem is a new one to the Office of Lend-Lease Administration the matter is an organizational phase in that office and the work of keeping currently posted on progress is considerably greater than should be the case in the future. Nevertheless, there are instances in which assistance can be rendered to

<sup>42</sup>On the whole, the 30,000-ton-a-month program set by General Eisenhower was successfully met. The difficulty lay in the fact that both the French and some of the Washington civilian agencies believed a larger program desirable.

## 7. THE ARMY MUST TAKE CHARGE OF CIVILIAN RELIEF IN THE TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN

#### INITIAL UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO IS TO DISTRIBUTE SUPPLIES

[Memo, M. S. McDougal, OLLA, for Oscar Cox, OLLA, 19 Nov 42, PMGO files, 014.13, MG]

This is to report a conference with Col. Jesse I. Miller . . . of the Provost Marshal General's Office. . . .

Col. Miller is very much concerned about two problems: (1) The absence of any high policy or integrated planning for how the peoples of occupied countries are to be fed, etc.; (2) the failure of his office in efforts to establish effective liaison with Lend-Lease.

1. The Provost Marshal General's Office is charged with the responsibilities of training per-

Lend-Lease with its procuring problems and should be in order to make sure that the military requirements are met. . . .

23. In addition to this general duty with respect to the present arrangement, the International Division also acts as a focal point in instances where the War Department is asked by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration to act as a procuring agency for items needed for civilian supply for North or West Africa. This occurs only in instances where the War Department is the sole procuring agency except in cases of emergency. \* \* \*

#### NINE MONTHS AFTER THE LANDINGS MILITARY CHIEFS STILL HAVE ECONOMIC WORRIES

[Memo, Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie, Asst Chief of Transportation, for Dir, International Aid Div, 22 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. III]

1. . . . As the situation stands at present, our docks are practically clear of Lend-Lease cargo and none has been made available to us for Convoys 14 and 15 . . .

2. Cables from Eisenhower indicate that he holds the Army responsible for any movement of these supplies, but obviously we are at the mercy of the supplier in this instance. Frankly, we feel that we are being given the run around in this matter and feel that Mr. [Edward R.] Stettinius, Jr. [Director, Lend-Lease Administration] should be made cognizant of the situation. \* \* \*

sonnel for military government and of making long-range plans (surveys, tentative programs, etc.) for the government of occupied areas. Yet that office does not now know who is to be charged with the task of feeding people in occupied territories. Is it to be the Army, or the Red Cross, or Lend-Lease, or some new organization which is to be tagged? Decision should not be postponed for improvisation each time some new territory is taken. Some agency should be charged in advance for all areas, with the duty of training personnel, making detailed preparations of all kinds, etc. Presumably (according to Col. Miller) the commanding officer will direct the *policy* of distribution; but he will not be able to do the detailed administration. ("Something's got to be done, and be done right away.")

## AFHQ FORTUNATELY ABLE TO USE NORMAL CIVILIAN CHANNELS FOR MOST DISTRIBUTION

[Pers Views of CA Sec. AFHQ, Recent Information From North Africa, 28 Dec 42, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

*Distribution.* . . . Taking the pool as a whole (Army barter goods, lend-lease goods, and British goods mixed together), it has been unanimously agreed in NAEB to divide the goods into four parts, the first of which will comprise the great majority:

1. Goods to be distributed through normal civilian channels.

2. Selected goods to be given as a gift to hospitals, charitable institutions and extremely needy groups.

3. Goods to be sold through U.S. Army-operated "company stores," to dock workers, airport workers and other special groups working for the Allied armies. . . .

4. Goods to be accumulated as an emergency stockpile for use in Tunisia.

All of these distributions will be under NAEB supervision.

## OFRRO TO GET READY FOR FIELD OPERATIONS

[Msg, Hull to Eisenhower and Murphy, AFHQ, 1 Jan 43, ASF, ID files, 014, N. Africa, vol. 11]

In compliance with the responsibility placed by the President upon Governor Lehman as Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, relief and rehabilitation operations are to be conducted under his direction.<sup>43</sup> \* \* \*

[Statement of Lehman before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 9 Feb 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)]

Mr. Lehman: . . . So far as concerns the goods used by the Army in its operations, that, of course, will be under Army direction and the direction will be American.

Senator [Harold] Burton: And this American personnel that distributes the relief directly, do they wear Army uniforms, Navy uniforms, or civilian clothing? . . .

Mr. Lehman: Of course those who distribute relief can't personally give it out; so they are using, to a great extent, local personnel.

Senator Burton: Local civilian personnel?

Mr. Lehman: Local civilian personnel. The Red Cross is co-operating, and their representatives are in the Red Cross uniform. Our men

<sup>43</sup>The first OFRRO field mission left for North Africa the middle of January 1943.

who will go over there will be in civilian clothes. \* \* \*

## IT APPEARS UNSAFE TO RELY UPON FRENCH ADMINISTRATION FOR RELIEF IN TUNISIA

[Ltr, American Consul at Constantine, Algeria, to Secy of State, 30 Dec 42, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30-42) (1)]

It is apparent that the economic situation facing the Allied troops upon their entry into Tunisia, which unfortunately seems to be delayed in spite of the favorable conditions which existed there at the beginning, will be disastrous and will require immediate action. Such action should be undertaken directly by the Allied forces themselves, as it is probable that the French Administration will be so shattered by the present occupation that some time will be necessary to re-establish it. \* \* \*

## OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS SEEM TO REQUIRE MILITARY CONTROL OF RELIEF IN TUNISIA

[Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CG, SOS, 8 Jan 43, CAD files, 400, N. Africa (12-30-42) (1)]

2. Recent reports from General Eisenhower indicate that operational logistical problems of increasing seriousness now exist. My view is that it is essential that all military and civilian activities operate under the unified and supreme control of the theater commander, to insure that such activities will not complicate, but actively assist the accomplishment of the military mission. General Eisenhower should have final decision on all these matters including the amount and character of civilian aid, and control of the priorities and methods of its shipment, unloading, local transportation, distribution, payment diversion. \* \* \*

## CIVILIAN AGENCIES WANT ARMY TO HAVE INITIAL BURDEN IN TUNISIA

[Notes on Mtg in Dept of State between Representatives of Civ Agencies and WD, 19 Feb 43, CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1)]

Mr. [Luther] Gulick [OFRRO]: The OFRRO has been studying the problems of relief and rehabilitation which would be necessary in Tunisia. (He outlined some of the problems.) I assume that the initial operation of the program would be that of the Army, and in the next phase that of the French and the North African Economic Board.

Mr. [Thomas K.] Finletter [Director of the OFT]: Has the Army plans for handling these civil affairs and the initial period in Tunisia?

Colonel Haskell: There is no information of that here. It is a job to be done on the ground and the War Department is not keen on planning from this side. However, Eisenhower will be sent a cable asking his plans, stating that the belief here is that he should be planning for conduct of civil affairs in the initial stages, and asking if he agrees.

Mr. Finletter: I then understand that the initial chaotic phase will be an Army problem. (Everybody present agrees.)<sup>44</sup> But we here want to know Eisenhower's plans; not the details but the broad outlines. \* \* \*

#### EISENHOWER IS ASKED WHETHER HE WILL DO THE JOB

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 23 Feb 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 8356]

State Department, Governor Lehman, Lend-Lease, and Board of Economic Warfare desire War Department views as to the United States agency to be responsible for planning operation civilian relief repair and restoration economy in Tunisia when occupied.

Our view is that these activities during the initial stages of occupation will be so intimately linked to military operations transport and supply in this area that

1. They should be definitely the sole responsibility of the military

2. Administered by military personnel and services

3. Advance planned by you on the ground.

State Department and above-cited civilian agencies are now of same opinion and would plan to relieve the military of such of these affairs as soon and in such degree as in your judgment is prudent. In the meantime they offer to place all information and such detailed plans which they have assembled here at your disposal. \* \* \*

#### INITIAL PHASE OF CIVILIAN RELIEF WILL BE A MILITARY JOB

[CAD Memo for Red 13 Mar 43,<sup>45</sup> CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1)]

1. By exchange of cables between the War Department and General Eisenhower, it has been established that civil supply and civil affairs in

<sup>44</sup>It is clear that the civilian agencies did not consider themselves able to cope with this phase for the present. Whether or not they felt that the Army should always handle relief initially is less clear. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 9 February [above], Governor Lehman had stated that OFRRO

Tunisia upon its recovery will be, for an initial period, a direct and sole military responsibility.

3. Consequently it is a military function to supply the necessary materials and personnel for discharging this responsibility, and in addition the materiel and personnel for continuing these operations until such time as military and other relevant circumstances permit the Theater Commander to delegate this responsibility to agencies of this government or the French or both. No other way can be relied upon for assuring the availability of appropriate supplies (shipped and procured on military priority), properly constructed and packaged and marked for use under combat conditions. It is doubtful that other governmental agencies should be required to assume this responsibility. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY AGENCIES WILL HANDLE EVEN PROCUREMENT IN TUNISIA

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 18 Mar 43, OPD files, 014.1 Civil Govt, sec. 1]

Final determination by War Department and United States governmental agencies is that planning and initial stages of operation of civilian relief in Tunisia will be strictly military responsibility. . . .

Procurement and other support this phase of operation will be handled here by War Department and not through Committee of Combined Boards. . . .<sup>46</sup>

#### AFHQ HAS PLACED CIVILIAN RELIEF UNDER A SPECIAL DETACHMENT AS A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 27 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 14509]

Initial stages and planning of operation of civilian relief in Tunisia by Tunisian detachments a military responsibility. It is being directed by the Civil Affairs Section of this headquarters. The North African Economic Board is included in that section as is the representative of OFRRO. These agencies act jointly in the Tunisian operation.<sup>47</sup>

men could have gone in with the Army over the North African beaches if his office had been in existence then.

<sup>45</sup>For organization of Civil Affairs Division see Chapter III.

<sup>46</sup>The War Department had, previously, handled procurement of civilian supply only in emergencies, and generally by borrowing from existent Army supplies.

<sup>47</sup>In other words, although the direction was to be military, the actual operation in Tunisia was to be joint military-civilian. In this respect it was only the nucleus of the full military control which was to come in later operations.

## MILITARY-CIVILIAN TEAM OPERATES IN TUNISIA UNDER MILITARY DIRECTION

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, to Dept of State, 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 014, Tunisia (2-2-43) (1)]

The War Department is in charge of relief work in reoccupied Tunisia and a detachment of Army officers and civilians with headquarters at Lekef [Le Kef] and representatives with the 8th [Eighth] Army are at the present time operating under my direction, in liaison with French civilian administration and co-operating with the latter on civilian relief. This detachment includes representatives of the Lend-Lease Administration, State Department and OFRRO. \* \* \*

## HOW TUNISIAN DETACHMENT FILLED THE BREACH WHEN FRENCH DISTRIBUTION BROKE DOWN

[Lt Col Harvey S. Gerry, CO, Tunisian Det, Rpt to Murphy, Chief, Civ Admin, AFHQ, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

### V. Food and Civilian Supplies

Food and other civilian supplies that were

shipped into Tunisia were divided between Lend-Lease goods and Tunisian stockpile supplies. We, at first, maintained control of the stockpile goods but at a very early date most of these supplies were also turned over to the French, for distribution subject to our control. Supplies were located at various strategic points around Le Kef, Souk-El-Arba, Tebessa and other towns with the idea that needed food and clothing would be rushed in as soon as an area was liberated. Certain supplies were immediately brought in on our trucks but the bulk of the supplies were to be brought in by the French. The French distribution system did not work and as late as 1 June only a few carloads of supplies had arrived for the Médenine, Gabès, Sfax, Kairouan and Sousse areas. Supplies for the Tunis area, however, did arrive close to schedule.

When it became apparent that the distribution system by train planned by the French was not working, steps were immediately taken to obtain trucks which the French could use to bring supplies into the various areas and to distribute such supplies locally within these areas. . . .

## 8. MILITARY COMMANDERS BECOME DISSATISFIED BUT DECIDE TO LEAVE AFRICAN ARRANGEMENT ALONE

### SHOULD SOME OF THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES BE TIED UP UNDER THE MILITARY STAFF?

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Dec 42, OPD files, Exec 10, Item 36a, CM-OUT 968]

. . . Mayor [Fiorello H.] LaGuardia has had some conversation with the President in regard to organization and control of propaganda activities in your area in view of possible developments upon termination of present activity. The idea is that he with a small staff with proper language qualifications should be assigned to you as part of your staff primarily for the co-ordination of various activities now engaged in some phases of propaganda and psychological warfare. This scheme if approved, developed and executed would place the co-ordination of these activities in the hands of a man with the necessary background and knowledge of local conditions. It might be a decided asset to you and at the same time relieve other members of your staff of the annoyance, confusion and loss of time attendant upon the activities of a number of semi-independent civilian agencies now in your area or

about to descend upon you such as FCC, OWI, BEW, Red Cross, etc. It might also result in a decrease in the tendency to inject at this time a growing number of civilian agencies who want to have a finger in the pie.

Prior to taking any action in the premises your reaction first to the acceptability of Mayor LaGuardia as a member of your staff, and second, reaction to the principle of placing all American civilian agencies in the area under one man on your staff is desired.

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD Msg files, Item 36a, Exec 10, CM-IN 1675]

Do not consider it advisable at this time further to complicate my staff problems and procedure by drafting of Mayor LaGuardia. No individual regardless of personal qualifications could serve at this time as head of my civil affairs section except a man that has lived through the hectic experiences of the past few weeks. Murphy's broad experience precludes any thought of placing him in a subordinate position. \* \* \*

## WHAT SENSE IN NONOPERATIONAL AGENCIES DOING THE JOB THE ARMY IS QUALIFIED FOR?

[Memo, Lt Col Frederick B. Wiener, DJAG, for the JAG, 7 Dec 42, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

1. Late Saturday afternoon Major J. [Joseph] M. Scammel, C.M.P., came from The Provost Marshal General's Office to see whether I knew of any precedents which might be of assistance in the following situation:

It appears that the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare are toying with the idea of taking control of civil affairs in North Africa out of General Eisenhower's hands [see AFHQ Memo 13, 10 Feb 43, section 3 above.] The Provost Marshal General was interested in finding instances in our history where civilians had been given such control, with a view to demonstrating from actual instances that it was a mistake to make any such transfer.

3. I said that I did not know of any such instances because it had been the almost unvarying American practice to leave control of civil affairs in the hands of the military for a very long time.

6. While therefore there were very few precedents of divided control, it would seem to me that on principle there was every reason not to remove civil affairs from the jurisdiction of the military commanders while hostilities were still in progress. I could see no compelling reason indicating why the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare were better fitted for the task than was the Army. The State Department was not an operating agency and dealt only with the relations between sovereign states. The Board of Economic Warfare was not an operating agency and its functions were limited to a relatively narrow field. On the other hand, the Army had had experience in doing the thousand and one things that a government must do; it fed men, it housed them, it guarded their health, it operated camps larger than many cities, and it maintained courts and dispensed justice. By any functional standard the Army was infinitely better qualified to administer a local government by reason of experience and practice than either of the other two agencies, and experience indicated that, in any event, such control must be left to the military authorities as long as hostilities continued.

## OBJECTION TO CIVILIAN AGENCY OPERATIONS WITHIN THE THEATER

[Memo, Miller, for Greenbaum, OUSW, 21 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. 1]

(a) Civilian agencies have the entirely proper and useful function of assembling, outside the theater, and laying down in it the necessary supplies and material for civilian use. Distribution or other handling, after arrival in the theater, should be under the absolute control and direction of the theater commander during any period of military necessity. Military necessity is a matter of fact, not a matter of law or international politics. From this point of view, the activities of COB seem to be sound, provided General Eisenhower is left in supreme command in the theater.

(b) The formulation of long-view political, social and economic policies is properly the function of civilian agencies of the government; their "implementation," during any period of military necessity, is the function of the military command. The implications of the asserted purposes of the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee are, therefore, fraught with great danger.

## AN ILL-FATED PROPOSAL FOR MILITARY CONTROL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM MAYOR LA GUARDIA

[Memo, Maj Gen George V. Strong, ACofS, G-2, for the CofS, 23 Dec 42, WDCA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

1. Enclosed herewith is a letter from Mayor LaGuardia outlining a plan for propaganda and civil affairs in connection with the next phase of operations in the Mediterranean.

3. Basically this plan is a matter of control, coordination and execution of propaganda, subversive activity, espionage and counterespionage, and other nonmilitary activities including civil affairs, in the theater, except those of the State Department, under a Staff Officer of the Commanding General. It has the advantage of being a single military setup rather than having these affairs handled by a number of separate civilian agencies. Its disadvantage is that it runs counter to some of the activities assigned to OWI and OSS.

4. It is recommended that this be forwarded to Admiral Leahy in order that the desires of the President in the premises might be made known.

[Memo, Leahy for Deane, Secy, JCS, 24 Dec 42, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

The President says he will delay any action on this for a *long time*.

#### WAR DEPARTMENT OBSERVER REPORTS NEED OF TIGHTENING CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION IN NAEB

[Memo (unsigned), for McCloy based on conversations with persons interested in Civil Affairs in Algiers, 19 Mar 43, p. 10, CAD files, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

. . . NAEB needs an experienced businessman to administer it and a good executive secretariat to pull it together. If possible, the "separate agency" idea should be minimized, and all civilian employees (whether Relief, BEW, Lend-Lease or what have you, and their British counterparts, if any), should be employees of NAEB. NAEB should be able to use any of its staff on any job for which need arises. There is some overlapping between the functions of several of the divisions of NAEB.<sup>48</sup>

#### HEAD OF SERVICE FORCES WANTS MILITARY CONTROL OF ECONOMIC MATTERS

[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

1. Reference is made to your note to me of March 29, and its inclosure consisting of . . . notes dated March 19 giving a résumé of certain organizations for handling civil affairs in the North African Theater.

2. I have had these notes studied in my office, and submit the following comments and recommendations:

##### a. *Joint Economic and Political Council*

While the JEAPC [Joint Economic and Political Council] is divided into two sections, one political and one economic, Mr. Murphy is the American representative on both. It will be noted that the British representative on the political side is from their Foreign Office, while their representative on the economic side is from their Military Supply Group. Obviously, this is an advantageous arrangement, for the British. During military operations, economic matters must

<sup>48</sup> This is an excerpt from a lengthy report, evidently written by an individual close to McCloy, who had just returned from a visit to North Africa. It was circulated among leading War Department authorities concerned with civil affairs and received much attention because of its realistic description and analysis of the entire setup for civil affairs in the theater. The writer, though concerned over the lack of co-ordination, did not himself criticize the principle of civilian control.

be decided by their military rather than by their political import. Mr. Murphy as a representative of the State Department must necessarily be largely guided in his actions by his political views, which may be at variance with military necessity. I am very definitely of the view that the economic side of the picture should be completely dissociated from the political. Mr. Murphy should act as a political adviser to the Theater Commander in conjunction with his British opposite. Certainly, the Theater Commander will take this advice into consideration in making decisions with respect to the economy in North Africa. However, the reports reaching him, and the policies with respect to the economy in North Africa should not be drawn up with the political question dominant. It is believed that the Economic and Political Councils should be separated entirely, and that a Staff Officer experienced in supply should replace Mr. Murphy on the North African Economic Board if this Board is continued.

##### b. *North Africa Economic Board*

I believe that the North Africa Economic Board should be abolished and its functions taken over by appropriate Staff Divisions on the Theater Command Staff. . . . Basically, there might be three such divisions: (1) A General Purchasing Agency to replace the military section with both British and American purchasing agents; (2) A Civilian Supply Section which would control both imports and exports; (3) A Fiscal Section, and (4) if necessary, a Relief Section. These sections should all be handled by Staff Officers, and the representatives of the civilian agencies should be assigned as advisors during the initial occupation and while military operations are still under way. As the military move out, these officers should be prepared to take over and carry on. The initial staff should be provided from military personnel to be replaced later by appropriate civilian administrative and clerical assistants as these assistants can be brought into the area. \* \* \*

*General Comments on NAEB*—The general comments on NAEB spring definitely from lack of advance planning, failure to establish firm policies, and the many divisions of responsibility which result from so many of its representatives reporting indirectly to so many different agencies in Washington or London before being willing to expound their positions. \* \* \*

##### 3. *Recommendations*

I would strongly recommend that the Acting Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, together with representatives of the Operations Division, WDGS, and of the Army

Service Forces, specially selected for the purpose, be formed into an *ad hoc* committee to prepare a sound joint organization, and a guide manual to be presented for United Kingdom agreement so that this may be promulgated and issued as a directive to all Theater Commanders. The time for preparation of such a guide is limited now, and early action is needed.

#### CIVILIAN CONTROL SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED UNTIL WE OCCUPY ENEMY AREAS

[Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes, Chief, MGS [Military Government Section], AFHQ, for Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

(2-b) The recommendation that the North African Economic Board be abolished is not, I believe, in conformity with General Eisenhower's policy.<sup>49</sup> He has indicated that as rapidly as the military situation permits, he wants to have civil activities, both political and economic, separated from the military. Under his instructions, some progress has been made in that direction already. I believe that one reason which prompts this attitude on General Eisenhower's part is that North Africa is not enemy-occupied territory and is rapidly assuming the status of an ally, if not as yet an admitted member of the United Nations.

General Somervell's memorandum seems to cover two general subjects, that is, the existing situation in North Africa, and plans which should be made for future operations. It is of course recognized that a different policy must be pursued and different machinery set up to take care of the situation in enemy territory. I think that General Eisenhower would agree that the administration of enemy-occupied territory should be handled entirely by the military, and this is in conformity with plans with which you are familiar.

[Memo (unsigned), for Dir of CAD, 13 Apr 43,<sup>50</sup> CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

2. . . . It seems clear that the organization of the NAEB was a mistake and that all matters handled by it should have been handled by appropriate sections of the staff. If experts from other branches of the government were needed they should have been commissioned for the pur-

<sup>49</sup> Colonel Holmes happened to be in Washington at the time, having brought over the AFHQ plan for military government in Sicily.

<sup>50</sup> This is an extract from a *very* rough draft, commenting on General Somervell's memorandum for McCloy of 3 April, above.

pose. However, it may be doubted whether it would be wise to disturb this situation at the present time. Any attempt to do so would almost certainly bring on protracted arguments with other branches of the government. And the attempt might be ultimately unsuccessful. It would seem wiser to stand pat on the present situation in North Africa and to make certain, in the case of the next occupied territory, that the whole matter be handled by the military. It will be psychologically and politically easier to prevent the establishing of another NAEB in the next occupied territory than it would be to abolish the present board. "Possession is nine points of the law." There are many vested interests that would almost certainly resist the abolition of the present board. And if these should succeed in saving the NAEB they would then be in position to argue that the principle had been settled and might thereby be able to bring about the establishment of such boards for other areas.<sup>51</sup> \* \* \*

#### LEND-LEASE DOES NOT SEEM A PROPER OPERATING AGENCY

[Memo, Capt Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for the Dir, ID, ASF, 16 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-22]

7. The best information available to date indicates that the only important civilian supply problem for North Africa is the problem of fulfilling a stated requirement of approximately 10,000 tons a month of industrial materials. This material is in short supply in this country and presents a real procurement problem. It is stated by civilian authorities in North Africa to be essential to the economy of the country. The problem of providing food is a very simple problem and, to some extent, the same may be said of clothing and other miscellaneous materials.

8. On the basis of all available evidence it is not possible to come to the conclusion that Lend-Lease may be able to discharge with any degree

<sup>51</sup> Although NAEB was left in the control of civilian agencies, it retained its status within the military framework much longer than was originally intended. In accordance with the plan of eventual "civilianization" of Allied economic activities in French North Africa, the decision was made, after the completion of the Tunisia campaign, that NAEB should be superseded by a wholly civilian organization in November 1943. But it proved very difficult to find civilian replacements for certain key military personnel, and the conversion of NAEB was, consequently, long delayed. Finally, on 1 June 1944, it was replaced by the North African Joint Economic Mission, a civilian agency, which was placed directly under the two Allied governments. Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, MS, OCMH files, pp. 59ff.

of success its supply responsibilities as to industrial materials. Lend-Lease states that the matter is well in hand and that substantial deliveries will be expected in the near future and may be expected to continue at a satisfactory rate.

9. Although this may well be the case, all available evidence points to a contrary conclusion.

10. Analysis shows that the North African Economic Board has requested 50,400 tons of critical industrial material for delivery by 30 June 1943. Lend-Lease has filed requisitions for approximately 29,700 tons of such material, has obtained deliveries of 1,250 tons, has shipped 9,300 tons to North Africa, and expects to have 2,700 tons at ports of export by 30 April 1943.

11. In response to repeated attempts to obtain detailed information as to forecasts of delivery schedules, no information has been provided other than oral assurance that "everything is under control."

12. The basic difficulty to be faced is that Lend-Lease has never been organized as a procuring agency and is not now staffed to perform such a duty. It was created after the main foreign countries had already established large and capable purchasing missions in this country. Consequently, it has operated in only a general staff capacity. Similarly, Treasury Procurement, the operating agency for most of the purchasing in question, has at all times had available the assistance of the foreign purchasing missions and there is no evidence that it is a properly qualified operating agency to undertake the difficult procurement problem.

13. In view of the foregoing the conclusion seems inevitable that only a small percentage of the critical industrial materials stated to be needed in North Africa will be furnished in the absence of a drastic change in the present operation. There are several possible solutions. One is to

strengthen Lend-Lease and Treasury Procurement in such a way that they are capable of truly discharging their responsibility. Another is to establish a strong French Purchasing Mission to provide the assistance which is normally provided in the case of most foreign governments. A third possible solution is to have General Eisenhower requisition through G-4 of the War Department all materials, the supply of which is truly important in North Africa.<sup>52</sup>

#### MORE CRITICISM OF CIVILIAN AGENCY SUPPLY PROGRAMS

[Memo, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, ID, ASF, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

... matters of civil supply were not properly organized and to date are still in an unsatisfactory state of initial organization. As a direct result, the exports from the United States to North Africa for the purpose of supporting the civilian economy have not included appropriate materials. Exports to date have consisted of large quantities of wheat, flour, sugar, tea and soap, with some cotton cloth and varied industrial materials included. The requirements for the area, it now appears, would have been much more satisfactorily met had the exports consisted of industrial items in large quantities and cotton cloth and spare parts of automotive equipment to re-establish the internal transportation which is the most vital problem now facing the population. Consequently a rich food producing area is importing food for its cities, and to some extent food is piling up at the ports rather than being distributed. \* \* \*

<sup>52</sup> For an account of the continuing problem of industrial rehabilitation supplies for devastated areas, see Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics*, 1943-45.

## 9. NORTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE POINTS UP NEED FOR GREATER CO-ORDINATION OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES

### EISENHOWER FORESEES THAT THE "LOCUSTS" WILL NEED CO-ORDINATION

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Dec 42, OPD files, Item 36A, Exec 10, CM-IN 1672]

I hope you will keep track of the various agencies which you say will soon be sending representatives like locusts to descend upon me and convince them that the whole should be organized

in the states into a single unit under a man like LaGuardia.<sup>53</sup> The idea of a single staff authority over the whole gang is eminently sound and I want them all to understand it before coming here.

<sup>53</sup> See above, page 55, for the abortive plan of co-ordinating propaganda and civil affairs under Mayor LaGuardia as a member of General Eisenhower's staff.

## NORTH AFRICA—A WARNING SIGNAL OF IMPENDING BREAKDOWN

[Memo, James E. Webb, Dir of Bur of the Budget, for Roosevelt, 6 Feb 43, WDCSA files, 386, Africa, 1942]

North Africa, the first sizable relief problem encountered, provides a warning signal of impending breakdown in our international operations.

Under its original Executive Order, the Board of Economic Warfare was given broad powers for post-war international economic planning. . . . It is still responsible presumably for procurement and development of North African raw materials, and for stockpiling goods in foreign areas for relief purposes. At present it has a mission in North Africa.

When North Africa was invaded, the Lend-Lease Administration was directed to procure, finance, and distribute relief goods, and to meet all other civilian requirements, OLLA has accordingly begun to staff itself for the relief job.

The State Department then received a directive to co-ordinate the activities of all civilian agencies operating in North Africa.

Meanwhile, the War Department is maintaining a school to train officers to administer reoccupied territories in the wake of our armed forces. In North Africa military expediency had dictated, as it must, the direction of our economic operations.

To sum up: BEW plans, hopes to rehabilitate, and may develop; Lend-Lease plans, procures, finances, and distributes; the Department of State plans and attempts to direct; the Army plans, administers, and directs;—all with respect to the same geographical area.

Much more is needed here than the mere addition of another authority with broad vague powers of "co-ordination and integration."<sup>54</sup> It is the confusion in the basic war jobs—the multiplicity of operating agencies—which complicates the task. \* \* \*

[Memo, Dir of Bur of the Budget for Roosevelt, 3 Mar 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

3. In reviewing 1944 budget estimates and current proposals for allocations of funds for mis-

<sup>54</sup> This memorandum was largely prompted by the issue whether the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as its director desired, should be given an executive order vesting it with power of co-ordinating civilian agencies in the sphere of civilian relief and rehabilitation abroad. Although OFRRO had been in existence for several months, its powers had not as yet been authoritatively defined.

sions to be sent to North Africa by Lend-Lease, BEW and OFRRO, I find even more striking cases of duplications in the proposed programs of these agencies than I had heretofore suspected. Each agency is mobilizing an almost identical corps of industrial, agricultural, transportation, construction, economic, and foreign trade experts to be sent to North Africa; and programs for other areas are in the making.

4. The Army is gravely concerned over the task of dealing with a large array of civilian agencies here, in North Africa, and on new fronts. . . . Issuance of the OFRRO order as now written would further difficulty.

5. The State Department has taken some positive measures to correlate economic operations and policy in occupied areas, as for example the establishment of an interdepartmental committee in Washington and the North African Economic Board. But . . . current methods leave large gaps in harmonizing these operations and they fail to tie economic programs together closely enough with the propaganda and political-diplomatic programs. Deficiencies in the internal organization of the State Department and the number of separate agencies to be co-ordinated offered serious obstacles.

6. Current disunity and competition among American agencies play into the hands of the enemy and confuse our allies. A unified front in dealing with the British, the French in North Africa, and others is lacking. The Axis propaganda machine is making the most of the conflict of American agencies.

When the several agencies with foreign economic programs all go up to Congress in support of their 1944 budget and describe virtually identical programs and types of operations to be carried on both in Washington and overseas, the Administration will be subject to heavy criticisms. Moreover, Congressional reaction might be such as to endanger the whole foreign economic program by refusing to appropriate for important segments and by airing the whole situation in public, to the detriment of the program both at home and abroad.

### *Recommended Steps:*

1. Assign to the State Department (not to OFRRO) [See Chapter IV, Section 3] the responsibility for co-ordinating the war programs of American civilian agencies abroad. . . .

2. Establish adequate and properly organized facilities within the State Department for co-ordinating foreign economic, propaganda, and political policies and for guiding the policies and

programs of civilian agencies abroad (e.g., North African Economic Board).

3. Organize OFRRO, Lend-Lease, BEW, and perhaps certain RFC agencies and parts of CIAA [Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs] as consistent parts of a single agency, somewhat in the form of the National Housing Agency. This would immediately clear up any of the difficulties cited above and would bring into manageable dimensions the job of the State Department in harmonizing American civilian, military, other national and United Nations organizations without its having to sit on a fox's lair of competing American agencies. With a consolidated economic agency, the separate and competing missions of American agencies could be replaced by an integrated staff headed by an operating official working under the direction of the State Department. \* \* \*

#### AN INTEGRATED POLICY NEEDED IF BAD PERFORMANCES ARE NOT TO BE REPEATED

[Memo, Capt Donald McLean, CAD, for Actg Dir, CAD, on a meeting with Thomas K. Finletter, Spec Asst to the Secy of State, 3 Apr 43, CAD files, 334, CCNA (3-2-43) (1)]

3. Mr. Finletter then stated that he was becoming increasingly concerned over the possibility that problems involving the civilian economy of occupied areas might be as badly handled in new areas as they had been in North Africa.<sup>55</sup> He said they thought the question should be investigated by all the agencies with a view toward developing an integrated program. . . .

4. For the purpose of stimulating thought on the subject, Mr. Finletter suggested that skeleton staffs be set up in Washington to consider proposed areas, with the end in view that the group which had been working on a given area in Washington would assume responsibility of the same nature in those areas as soon as the Commanding General authorized their assumption of responsibilities. Although the specific question did not arise, Mr. Finletter was assuming the possibility that the NAEB pattern would be followed in all areas. \* \* \*

<sup>55</sup> Some of the most critical remarks about the working of the civilian agency setup came from civilian agencies themselves, particularly the State Department and OFRRO. It should be noted that much stronger criticism was directed against the Washington agencies than against NAEB in the theater, which, despite the transiency of its personnel, appears to many to have done a rather good job. Interv, Epstein, 18 Apr 50, with Spofford who was connected with the North African operation in a military status.

#### THE CIVILIAN SUPPLY BRANCH DEPLORES CONFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY

[Memo, Maj Palmer, Chief, Civ Sup Branch, for Dir, ID, 24 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-36]

12. . . . The delegation of . . . duties in Washington has not been focalized in a satisfactory manner. The State Department in Washington purports to act on such affairs under a letter from the President rather than under the request from the War Department. In addition, the State Department acts as chairman of an informal committee which in turn was charged with certain duties with respect to civilian affairs in North Africa in CCS 126 [COB]. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, which has assumed the responsibility for providing necessary civilian supplies to the area, purports to act under a directive received from the President rather than under a directive from the State Department or from the War Department, either of which could have been proper procedure. . . . The result of the foregoing is that none of the agencies in Washington are responsible to any of the direct participants in the operation and their only common meeting ground is the informal State Department committee in which they participate and from which they can withdraw without weakening their responsibility with respect to North African affairs.

#### SHOULD WAR DEPARTMENT PROVIDE LEADERSHIP?

[Memo, Lt Comdr Perry R. Taylor, USNR, for Deane, CCS Secretariat, 7 May 43, CAD files, 014, N. Africa (11-24-42) (1)]

Several indications are now appearing that the CCNA activities might develop into mere formalities. Matters requiring decision by COB cannot be determined by CCNA and there is an increasing trend on the part of the individual U.S. agencies to return to the pre-COB system, where each agency carries on what it considers its business without any reference to other agencies. Duplication and lack of co-ordination are the obvious results. It is believed that the principal cause for this trend has been the inability or unwillingness of the State Department to give adequate leadership to the necessary co-ordination among the U.S. agencies.

. . . There appear to be two courses; one, that the military urge the State Department to take the leadership insofar as French Africa is concerned, and two, that the military provide this leadership itself. \* \* \*

GENERAL HILLDRING PREFERS DIPLOMACY TO WAR  
DEPARTMENT LEADERSHIP

[Memo, Maj Gen John H. Hilldring, *circa* Jun 43, CAD files, 321, (1-1-43) (1)]

\* \* \* In consultation with State Department yesterday afternoon, I agreed that a subcommittee appointed by Secretary Hull would have greater legal standing than one appointed by the Secretary of War. My consent to this arrangement was not without consideration for the fact that present excellent relationship between War Department and State Department would be enhanced by this arrangement, and would be severely strained if not damaged, if I barged ahead with my original plan.

Please prepare a letter for the Secretary of War's signature requesting that he appoint under the authority cited a subcommittee on military government. . . .

MACHINERY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF CIVILIAN  
AGENCIES WILL BE SET UP

[Min, Mtg of WD Gen Council, 14 Jun 43, OPD files, 334.8, Gen Council]

General Eisenhower has experienced much difficulty with various civilian agencies operating within his theater because of absence of definite understanding concerning the jurisdiction of these agencies. Settlement of such jurisdictions should be made before these units go overseas. Bureau of the Budget is now attempting to set up machinery to accomplish this, and last week the President directed the Secretary of State to designate one of his assistant secretaries to co-ordinate with all such agencies. . . .<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>The reference here is to the President's establishment of the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination. See below, Chapter IV, Section 3.

## CHAPTER III

# The War Department Prepares for a Broader Role

Before operations in French North Africa the only War Department agency to engage in intensive preparation for a role in civil affairs was the Provost Marshal General's Office—more particularly the small Military Government Division established in that office in July 1942. This division, although vested with a charter authorizing it to engage in broad planning, was in fact scarcely in a position to extend its activities and influence beyond the sphere of training. The division, if not the Provost Marshal General's Office itself, was on too low a level to speak for the War Department as a whole and, aside from the backing given General Gullion by the Secretary of War in the issue over the Army's control of training, it did not command much active support. The attitude of other agencies of the War Department appears, indeed, to have been less one of opposition to or support of military control of civil affairs than lack of awareness of the issue. The multitude of major problems which pressed upon the Army during the first year of the war left little time for concern over the onset of civil affairs responsibilities in French North Africa. Because this area was friendly territory, and arrangements for civil affairs administration could be placed in the hands of the French, it seemed possible to allow civilian agencies to take over the handling of the economic problems which would

normally have been the responsibility of military authorities in Washington.

The close relationships between supply problems and military operations disclosed by the French North Africa experience, together with the failure of civilian agencies to handle such problems with complete satisfaction, jolted a number of War Department authorities out of their complacency. Although the decision was made for practical reasons to leave the arrangements in French North Africa unchanged, the matter was quite different as regards occupation of enemy territory. This became a pressing question when it was decided in January 1943 to launch an invasion of Sicily. In the early months of 1943 assertions in the War Department as to the importance of placing civil affairs under military control became more frequent and emphatic, particularly among supply authorities.

But it would be impossible to assume such control, or to defend it against the conflicting aspirations of civilian agencies, without correcting the confused and inadequate organization for civil affairs which then characterized the War and Navy Departments. This placing of the military house in order entailed particularly the establishment of a high-level agency in the War Department to assume for that department, if not for both of the armed services, the central co-ordination

of military civil affairs activities and a unified liaison in this sphere with civilian agencies. Other questions involved were the settlement of the responsibility for planning military policies for future civil affairs operations, the establishment of a military program and organization for civilian supply, and the further enlargement of a training program. The problem of preparing control machinery for combined operations was also involved, and the disposition of the British to favor the delegation of future operations to a combined civilian agency proved a potent stimulus to the crystallization of a War Department decision to assume the leading role in initial civil affairs operations. The creation of combined organization for civil affairs came later than the establishment of an improved civil affairs organization and involved different types of problems; it is therefore treated separately

(see Chapter V). The effective organization of the American military establishment for civil affairs involved many administrative issues, including such difficult ones as the compromise of conflicting departmental claims. Still more important, it involved the question of how long the military authorities should assume civil affairs duties in a situation where tactical efforts demanded so imperatively the greatest concentration of military resources. Far from indicating a military plot to wrest complete control of civil affairs from the nonmilitary agencies of the government, the record of the War Department's early organizational activities in this sphere suggests rather an attempt to limit the military role in time as much as possible.

Because of this attempt the organizational structure first designed later proved inadequate.

## 1. THE WAR DEPARTMENT WANTS INITIAL CONTROL IN FUTURE OPERATIONS

### LAY PLANS WELL OR SEE CIVILIAN AGENCIES TAKE OVER EVERYTHING

[Undated Memo, signed "Easton" for Brig Gen Miller G. White, ACoFS, G-1, on 16 Dec 42 conf, G-1 files, Personnel SMG, Misc Info]

#### 2. Agenda

a. . . . Apparently there is a loose understanding that the Army will provide personnel for military government of occupied countries (i.e., Civil Affairs sections). At any rate, if the Army does not have well laid plans, the State Department will take over everything, just as it apparently did in North Africa. \* \* \*

### THE WAR DEPARTMENT ASSERTS A CLAIM TO INITIAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL AFFAIRS

[WD Statement of Policy, 1 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

1. Experience with North Africa has indicated that in any military operation which results in occupation of substantial areas of inhabited terri-

tory, provision must be made as part of the military plan of attack for the welfare of the civil population over which jurisdiction is thus obtained.

2. The Military Plan must make adequate preparation for the following:

- a. Feeding the civilian population.
- b. Health of the civilian population.
- c. Housing for the civilian population.
- d. Maintenance of order and security.
- e. Acquisition of raw materials available.
- f. Restoration of civil control over the area in question.

3. Restoration of civil control over the area in question may be effected in several ways. It may be by restoring sovereignty to the native population; it may be by delegating sovereignty to *civil agencies of the occupying forces*. For the present it is assumed that there will be a considerable period of time following the invasion and preceding the time when sovereignty should be delegated to civil instrumentalities of the governments of the occupying forces.

4. For an initial period following the invasion, the matter must however be handled as part of the military operation. The military stores assembled for the operation should consequently include food, medical supplies and housing facilities, based on previous estimates of the condition to be faced. The Military Commander has a special staff section—Civil Affairs—for distribution of supplies, maintenance of order, establishment of municipal and public utility services, and supervision of civil government personnel.

5. Upon the event of an armistice terminating hostilities, or in the event that sufficient territory is acquired to make possible the resumption of normal life in substantial areas behind the fighting lines, it will then be possible to relinquish to civilian agencies the following duties in the order named:

- a. Feeding civilian population.
- b. Health of civilian population.
- c. Housing of civilian population.
- d. Resumption of trade relations (i.e., to obtain raw materials, etc.).

6. At such time civilian personnel for the purpose should be admitted to the area as required for the tasks to be taken up by the civilian representatives. Initially, they should be attached to the Staff of the Commanding General.

7. The period of time between the invasion and the assumption by civilian agencies of the occupying forces of initial responsibility of feeding the civilian population may not, under fortunate circumstances, be more than a few days. An example of this is found in certain areas of North Africa. Under less fortunate circumstances the shift in responsibility may be much longer delayed.<sup>1</sup>

#### WE MUST BREAK THE PRESIDENT OUT OF HIS IDEA

[Telecon between Maj Gen Lucius D. Clay, ACoS for Materiel, SOS, and Gullion, 5 Feb 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy—Gen (1942-43)]

Clay: We are interested in Civilian Supply, particularly relationships with Governor Leh-

<sup>1</sup> The statement was initiated by the International Division, SOS, during the course of conversations in January 1943 with a representative of the Commanding General, ETO, suggesting that civilian supply be planned and handled by the Army as an integral part of military operations. It had the concurrence of Headquarters, SOS, of the Operations Division, WDGS, and of McCloy, ASW,

man's organization. Our International Aid [Division] is interested from point of supplying shipping, items to be selected and stockpile prior to moving into area, and establishment of what we should NOT do. We feel question of civilian supply in the Theater of Operations should be handled as military operation. . . .

Gullion: I have had several conferences with Governor Lehman and others and we have another conference on Monday. It would be unfortunate if we got wires crossed. Occupation is bound to be military. The President thinks it should be civilian and we have to see if we cannot break him out of the idea. Governor Lehman is preparing to duplicate what we are doing. They are working on economics, public health and schools. We are to go in first and they would take it up later. I do not want to take on any responsibility of supply if it means transportation or acquisition of supplies but civilian supply section of the Military Staff would advise him where supplies would go.

Clay: There is a dividing line as to where it is G-4 and where civilian. \* \* \*

#### A REAL LESSON HAS BEEN LEARNED FROM NORTH AFRICA

[Memo, Somervell, for McCloy, 3 Apr 43, OPD files, 014, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

We have had the opportunity to learn a real lesson from North Africa which lesson to me is that you cannot separate the handling of civil affairs from military operations in areas in which military operations are under way, and that an attempt to do so in a hostile country would be disastrous. Each Theater Commander contemplating active operations should have a Civil Affairs Division under an experienced officer selected for his administrative qualities to act for the Theater Commander in all civil affairs. This division would plan in advance the administrative procedure to be established in an occupied country, the supplies which must be brought into the country at an early date, and the staff which must be assembled to handle these affairs after occupation. . . .

but it had no immediate practical repercussions outside the War Department. ASF, ID, History of Civ Sup, I, 40-41.

## 2. CREATION OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION TO SET THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S HOUSE IN ORDER

### THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE PROMPTS INVESTIGATION OF WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for USW Patterson, 16 Jan 43, OUSW files, Misc and Sub, MG]

Colonel Greenbaum asked me to look briefly into the question of the War Department organization concerning military government as illustrated by the experience with North Africa.

Your responsibility in regard to the matter would seem to be twofold, first, as regards the military school at Charlottesville, and second, as regards to procurement of civilian supplies for North Africa. As far as I have been able to ascertain neither one of these matters had been fully co-ordinated with the whole of the civilian affairs action concerning North Africa. The matter is of importance not only as concerns North Africa but also more generally, because the pattern being set there may well be followed in other areas. In fact, that view has been expressed by other agencies.

In consequence, it seems to me that this matter should be fully explored, particularly with Mr. McCloy, to see if the situation cannot be clarified.

### CA FUNCTIONS ARE SCATTERED HELTER SKELTER ALL OVER THE PENTAGON

[Memo, Neff, OUSW, for Patterson, 26 Jan 43, CAD files, 092.3, N. Africa (11-10-42) (1)]

As shown below, at the present time the powers concerning Military Government are scattered within the War Department, and delimitations of authority are not clear. This situation, it would seem, needs correction.<sup>2</sup> The present memorandum is merely exploratory, to raise the question whether there should not be a full examination of the matter.

Whatever be the form of government in foreign territory occupied by American troops, there are bound to be a great number of questions affecting Civil Affairs which will have to be referred to the War Department for advice or decision. Their number and importance may vary, depending upon whether you have a purely military government or some variation thereof. They

<sup>2</sup> On 6 February, Colonel Miller, Director MGD, made the same recommendation, though considerably stronger, to the Provost Marshal General.

arise both in the planning and the operations phase. \* \* \*

The agencies of the War Department most concerned with these matters are: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War; Operations Division of the General Staff; Headquarters, SOS; G-1 of the General Staff the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office; and the International Division of SOS.

The actual functions of these several agencies seem to have evolved in practice out of the North African experience and to have departed from the organization as contemplated in the Manual of Military Government.

G-1 of the General Staff, according to the Basic Field Manual for Military Government, is "responsible for the preparation of *plans* for and the determination of *policies* with respect to military government." The exact limit of these powers does not seem clear. . . .

When set beside the above powers, those conferred upon the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office are even less clear. They are derived from a letter from the General Staff dated August 14, 1942, by which The Provost Marshal General, in regard to military government, is to be given the power to "engage in *broad* planning activities, with detailed estimates to be undertaken by the School of Military Government." The relationship between "broad planning activities" and the "preparation of plans" charged to G-1 of the General Staff is not defined. \* \* \*

In actual operation, however, neither G-1 of the General Staff nor the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office have been actively engaged either in the planning or in the day to day questions arising in the only present instance of occupation by our troops, namely, the operation in North Africa.

The matters of large policy have been acted upon directly by the Under Secretary of War, and Assistant Secretary of War, and the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. The run-of-the-mine questions have come to the War Department through a committee of which the State Department furnishes the chairman and the War Department part of the secretariat. . . . Those questions which are not acted upon directly by the War Department representation on this committee are cleared by the International Division with such parts of the War Department as seem to have an interest. They have not gone to G-1,

which, as stated above, is charged with the making of plans and the formulation of policies for military government. They have gone, however, for comment to the Military Government Division of the Provost Marshal General's Office, to Operations of the General Staff, the Fiscal Division of SOS, and other agencies of the War Department.

G-1, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has not performed any of the functions assigned to it by the Manual for Military Government, except that it has given directives to the Provost Marshal General's Office concerning the procurement of personnel. The training of the personnel has been directed by the Provost Marshal General under directives from G-3 of the General Staff and Training, SOS. \* \* \*

It is . . . suggested that consideration should be given to the charging of some single unit in the War Department with all of the powers and duties concerning military government, with provision for such routines for concurrences as should be required.

Otherwise, it is not seen how the War Department can accomplish its task. This is particularly so because other agencies may be inclined, unless corrective steps are taken, to assume authority properly belonging to the War Department. In fact, if steps are not taken to forestall it, the pattern as to North Africa may be taken as the model one, and thus impede the proper establishment of full military government in areas where it may be imperatively required.

#### A CONFERENCE CONCLUDES WAR DEPARTMENT INTERESTS CAN BE PROTECTED ONLY BY A SINGLE CLEARINGHOUSE

[Memo, Capt J. O. Hall, PMGO, for Miller, Dir, MGD, PMGO, 2 Feb 43, PMGO files, 321, PMGO & MGD]

The problems presented for discussion were (1) that of protecting the interests of the War Department in North Africa civil affairs organizational setup in Washington, and (2) co-ordination and operation generally, within the War Department, of civil affairs matters referred by commanders in the field.<sup>3</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff informally proposed releasing to the State Department the function of handling communications regarding civil

affairs in North Africa (and elsewhere as the problems arise) for action and information of interested agencies. The proposal was made because of the great volume of work involved. After considerable discussion it appeared to be the sense of the meeting that the War Department could not adequately have its interests protected by the proposed change, and that the CCS should continue to perform the job. Colonel Haskell and Captain Palmer were to inform the CCS informally of these views.

On the second problem the opinion seemed to be that a staff would have to be set up in the War Department to act as a central clearing house on civil affairs. G-1, G-4, and GS-OPD were mentioned as possible organizations in which a civil affairs section might be created.

There was cognizance of possible greater War Department interest in civil affairs in future theaters, and in a theater in which the War Department was directly interested rather than the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### A SINGLE LIAISON AGENCY NEEDED FOR CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Memo, Gullion for Secy, GS, 16 Feb 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 14]

2. At the conference on February 15, 1943 [officials of WD and OFRRO] . . . memorandum was submitted by Mr. Sayre and Mr. [Kenneth] Dayton, indicating the necessity for careful advance planning and co-ordination of activity between the Army and the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. Mr. Dayton said that Governor Lehman had personally delivered the original of the memorandum to the Secretary of War. . . .

3. Governor Lehman's organization has been impressed by the fact that no agency of the War Department has been erected to deal authoritatively will all phases of civil affairs activities and, in such capacity, to make valid commitments for the War Department in working out co-operative arrangements with civilian agencies.

4. . . . On this point the . . . memorandum states:

"Where the Army group fits into Army organization is a matter for its determination, but the problems suggested above indicate the importance of the task from the Army's own point of view

<sup>3</sup> Captain Hall refers to a conference which he attended in the Office of the Under Secretary of War on 31 January 1943. In another memorandum he adds the information that Col. A. H. Wade, handling civil affairs for ETOUSA, presented to the conference an appeal for a strong, parent civil affairs organization in the War Department to prevent such difficulties as he was facing in London. Colonel

Wade stated that only such an organization could enable him to secure decisions on policy and obtain information or carry on for him the necessary liaison with U.S. civilian agencies. He declared that the Military Government Division as currently constituted was inadequate to serve his needs. Memo, Hall for Wickersham, 31 Jan 43, PMGO files, 321, PMGO and MGD.

so that it seems apparent that this Civil Affairs Section should be headed by somebody of high rank and authority. It seems to us that it should be attached directly to the General Staff, but should make proper use of the group who are training for military government and of the Services of Supply."

5. At the moment, operating Civil Affairs functions within the War Department are spread among a number of agencies. . . .

6. General Spalding and I make the following recommendation:

That some agency of appropriate level be constituted, the function of which shall be to co-ordinate and direct all civil affairs activities for the War Department. This should be done immediately.<sup>4</sup>

#### SHOULD CA BE UNDER CHIEF OF STAFF OR SECRETARY OF WAR?

[Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer, CofS, ASF, for the CG, SOS, 14 Feb 43, ASF, Somervell files, Dec 42-Feb 43]

c. *Organization to handle civil matters in occupied countries.* General Handy informs me that the Secretary of War has been discussing this matter with the Chief of Staff, and that the Secretary of War had proposed setting up an organization to report to him to handle these matters.

On February 9, General Clay and I discussed this matter with General Handy, and later with General Marshall. Clay's and my opinion was that any organization established must be closely co-related with the theater commanders and operations in the theaters, and should, therefore, be under the Chief of Staff rather than directly under the Secretary of War. It should be a staff agency rather than an operating agency. For operation, it should utilize the existing machinery of the SOS and other agencies of the government.<sup>5</sup>

General Marshall had discussed the matter again with the Secretary of War, and while he agreed that these matters should be very closely correlated with the theater commanders and

operations of the theater, he believed that it would develop into such a large matter that a separate organization should be set up to handle it. The Secretary of War appeared to be of the opinion that it should report to him. \* \* \*

#### A CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION IS ESTABLISHED

[Ltr, AG to Haskell, OPD, 1 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43) (1), sec. 1]

1. By direction of the Secretary of War, a Civil Affairs Division of the War Department is hereby established. You are designated Acting Director of this Division.<sup>6</sup>

2. The primary function of the Civil Affairs Division is to inform and advise the Secretary of War in regard to all matters within the purview of the War Department, other than those of a strictly military nature, in areas occupied as a result of military operations. The Civil Affairs Division will perform such additional advisory and administrative functions in connection with civil matters as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.

3. Close co-ordination will be maintained between the Civil Affairs Division and the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and other military agencies of the War Department. To this end, all communications from the Civil Affairs Division to a commander in the field will be cleared through and transmitted by the Operations Division. The Civil Affairs Division will maintain liaison with civilian agencies exercising functions in any theater in which the Civil Affairs Division may be engaged.

4. The initial organization of the Civil Affairs Division will include a Chief of Division, an Executive, a secretary and such additional officers as the Secretary of War may direct. One working member of the Civil Affairs Division will be detailed thereto by the Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, and one working member will be detailed thereto by the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

5. The Civil Affairs Division will maintain an office of record on civil affairs matters and action

this branch for such matters. After the Secretary's Office had initiated discussions, General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, requested General Tansey to prepare an outline and chart. Colonel Haskell, later the first head of CAD, drafted these for General Tansey in accordance with his idea of locating the new division within OPD. Interv, Albert Weinberg with General Tansey, 5 Apr 50.

<sup>6</sup> Hilldring was designated Chief of the Civil Affairs Division on 7 April 1943. The division was placed on the General Staff and, therefore, under the Chief of Staff as well as the Secretary of War. About a month after its creation, CAD was shifted to the Special Staff, where it remained.

<sup>4</sup> According to Colonel Miller, Director, MGD, General Gullion realized that "because of the Provost Marshal General's inferior position in the Army Service Forces, he lacked authority to implement those basic policies requiring co-ordination of military and civilian agencies." Memo, Miller for Contl Div, PMGO, 17 Sep 45, sub: Commentary of Military Government (MG), PMGO files, 319.1 Rpts—MG Inter-Office.

<sup>5</sup> OPD also had definite views about the location of the proposed civil affairs division. The Logistics Group had been handling most of the theater communications on civil affairs, and Brig. Gen. Patrick H. Tansey, its head, felt that a separate division should be established within

taken by it in the performance of its assigned mission.

### CAD WILL NOT GIVE THE THEATER COMMANDER ORDERS

[Discussion between Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, and Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 5 Mar 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy--Gen (1942-43)]

Colonel Haskell described the War Department's policy in dealing with theater commanders, explaining that the War Department assigned the *mission* and provided the necessary means in the way of troops and equipment. The *job* was then up to the theater commander. If he proved to be unsatisfactory, the cure was to relieve him, *not* to tell him in detail what to do. If the mission was diminished or increased, the means provided or made available would vary commensurately.

### THEATER COMMANDERS ARE NOTIFIED OF THE POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION

[Msg, WD to Theater Comdrs, 6 Mar 43, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43) (1), sec. 1]

The following radio is being dispatched to the Commander of the North African Theater and to all theater commanders likely to participate in capture and occupation of enemy territory or enemy controlled territory: In response to a need in the War Department for a centralized organization for co-ordinating matters pertaining to civil affairs which arise in the North African

theater and which will also be present in any territory captured from the enemy there is being established in the War Department reporting directly to the Secretary of War a Division of Civil Affairs. This Division will provide a central point for funneling such matters to the various operating agencies of the War Department for action and will provide a means for following up and co-ordinating action taken. It will also provide a means for liaison and co-operative action with other agencies of the Government and insure that such action is co-ordinated with the military effort. To this Division will be routed communications on strictly civil affairs matters as differentiated from those where the interest is solely military and arrangements will be made for it to receive copies of pertinent communications received or dispatched through State Department or other channels. All communications on purely civil affairs matters sent by the War Department to theater commanders will be processed by the Division of Civil Affairs through the Operations Division War Department General Staff to insure co-ordination with military operations. It is considered essential that you establish at the appropriate time an agency on your staff headed by a suitably qualified individual and staffed with specialists competent to advise and handle matters pertaining to functions listed below. The War Department stands ready to assist in procuring necessary specialists on request...

## 3. CAD TAKES ON BROADER ROLE THAN PLANNED

### BRITISH PROPOSE THAT COMBINED CIVILIAN AGENCIES PLAN AHEAD FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Incl A, Memo, CCS Secy's (CCS-190), 22 Mar 43, CAD files, 092 (3-27-43), sec. 1]

Comprehensive and detailed plans for the handling of civil affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated should be given immediate and continued attention by the appropriate agencies of Government so that military operations will be supported by the population of areas occupied rather than be hindered thereby. Such planning can be made without undue risk

<sup>7</sup>Only so much of the JCS and CCS discussions of the issue is included in this chapter as pertains to the decision to entrust to CAD the civil affairs planning responsibility for JCS. For other portions of the discussions concerning the creation of combined civil affairs agencies, see Chapter V.

to the security of information regarding military strategic plans. \* \* \*

By handling this planning in a very general way at the outset, it is hoped to maintain the security of the information. Instead of asking specifically for plans for any one area that will be invaded it is proposed that the civilian agencies charged with this responsibility be asked to develop plans on a number of areas, any one or two or three of which might be a real scene of military operations within, say, the next year.

It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff request the Committee of Combined Boards to have outline plans prepared covering the following areas: Norway, Northern France, and the Low Countries, Southern France, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Burma, and Indo-China; the plans to be in the hands of CCS by May 10. . . .

## THE U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OPPOSE ASSIGNMENT OF FUTURE PLANNING TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Memo, U.S. JCS (JCS 250), 31 Mar 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

### II Discussion

1. The Committee of Combined Boards was created November 27, 1942, as a procedural convenience in dealing with civil affairs in North Africa (see CCS 126). In connection with matters referred to the various agencies by the North African Economic Board, which is attached to General Eisenhower's staff, the Committee exists with the acquiescence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It does not exist as a delegated authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It has no charter. It has no staff. The secretariat is furnished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, this agency as such is not in a position to make or to direct the studies which are in effect proposed in CCS 190.

2. To extend the field of COB to the problems of civil administration in areas still enemy-held but expected to be occupied in the future would involve enlargement of the field of COB in two main respects: (1) geographically to areas other than North Africa; and (2) functionally to future military operations rather than, as now, to civil affairs problems consequent upon *past* military operations. While COB is a co-ordinating agency of great usefulness, and while there would be no objection to geographical extension of its field to other territory *after* military occupation, there are objections to the proposal to use COB for *advance* planning for *future* operations.

3. In any consideration of *future* military operations the question of security is seriously and necessarily involved. The Committee of Combined Boards is not now so organized as to assure proper safeguards in this respect. While these agencies should participate in comprehensive, over-all planning as far as their own functions are concerned for the handling of civil affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated, this planning should not include any specific operations by these agencies until stabilized conditions have been attained in the areas involved.

### III. Recommendations

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that CCS 190 be dropped from the agenda.

2. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign to the War and/or the Navy Department responsibility for the preparation of plans for civil affairs as an integral part of planning for any specific opera-

tion, and that such planning be conducted by the Army and/or the Navy directly with the civilian agencies concerned.

3. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that representatives of the War and/or the Navy Departments consult appropriate British agencies with respect to plans and policies to be followed in handling civil affairs in specific combined operations.

### CAD TO BE PLANNING AGENCY FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS

[Ltr, JCS to SW and SN (JCS 250/2), 10 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

As long as military occupation exists, civil affairs are a responsibility of the commander concerned. In meeting local problems within his theater the commander is assisted by the Civil Affairs Division of his staff. However, there is much planning to be done in advance of the operation and considerable operating to be done in the United States regarding civil affairs in occupied territories. This must be accomplished or at least co-ordinated by some agency in Washington.

While many of the matters pertaining to civil affairs can be handled by civilian agencies, the requirements of secrecy and security prevent giving civilian agencies the information in advance of the operation which would be necessary for them to have in order to make advanced plans. It is therefore necessary to charge some military agency with this duty.

The War Department has recently established a Civil Affairs Division which is closely related to the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff. This appears to be the logical agency to plan and co-ordinate the handling of Civil Affairs in nearly all of the occupied territories. Inasmuch, however, as the military occupation is by joint forces and certain aspects of civil administration are of interest to the Navy, the Navy should be represented on the War Department's Civil Affairs Division and be fully consulted.

This Civil Affairs Division in the War Department can well be given jurisdiction in certain theaters in which the commander is a naval officer but in which the actual occupying troops are Army.

There will be cases, of course, of occupation by naval or Marine personnel of areas of small extent in which civil affairs matters would be of minor importance. In such cases the civil affairs can be handled by existing agencies in the Navy Department.

In instances where the invasion of enemy territory is a combined operation with one or more allies, the Civil Affairs Division will, of course, have to be co-ordinated closely with the appropriate authorities of the allies concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to have civil affairs handled by civil authorities just as soon as the military situation permits subject, of course, to the control of the theater commander. As far as the United States is concerned, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, State Department, and the Committee of the Combined Boards are now set up to take over civil matters at the earliest time, which in the opinion of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff, as may be appropriate, it can be accomplished without interfering with the military purpose of the occupation.

In view of the foregoing the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the War Department be designated as the agency to plan the handling of civil affairs in territory about to be occupied and to co-ordinate the activities of civilian agencies in the United States in administering civil affairs in hostile or liberated territory during the period of military occupation. They request the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to this recommendation [approved 17 April 1943 (JCS 250/2)].

#### GENERAL HILLDRING'S PLANS SEEM BROADER THAN THE SCOPE OF CAD'S CHARTER

[Memo, Dayton, 2d Deputy Dir, OFRRO, to Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 1 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43), sec. 1]

On April 28th, Mr. Sayre and I had a conference with General Hilldring who has been newly appointed the head of the Civil Affairs Division of the Army.

General Hilldring stated that he was charged with staff responsibilities for all affairs concerning military government. . . .

. . . General Hilldring's jurisdiction is considerably broader than that suggested to us by the copy of the original letter establishing the Civil Affairs Division, which seems to make it primarily a liaison and information channel with civilian agencies. \* \* \*

#### CAD TAKES OVER GENERAL STAFF FUNCTIONS ONLY

[Ltr, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, to Dayton, 6 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* I apparently didn't make the position of CAD clear to you. It is the business of this

division to handle the general staff functions (planning, policy making, the issuance of basic directives, co-ordination and supervision) of all army responsibilities with respect to military government. However, this is not an operating agency. . . . It will be the responsibility of this office to co-ordinate his [General Clay's ASF] program with those of all other operating agencies in the War Department . . . *so far as they pertain to military government*. . . . General Clay's responsibility to procure and make available the physical needs of military government is not changed in any way by the establishment of this division.<sup>8</sup> \* \* \*

#### CAD'S PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE DEFENDED AGAINST ASF ENCROACHMENT

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 10 May 43, AG files, 014.1 (5-17-43), (1)]

1. General Somervell has submitted, with his concurrence, a memorandum from the Fiscal Division, ASF, which recommends:

a. That the Fiscal Division, ASF, be charged with the direct responsibility for all War Department planning of overseas fiscal policy.

b. That General Eisenhower be advised that the initiative for all fiscal planning in reoccupied areas is a War Department responsibility rather than a Treasury or State Department responsibility. \* \* \*

2. In view of the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division on March 1, 1943, with a direct responsibility for all War Department matters in reoccupied areas, other than those of a strictly military nature, it is believed inadvisable to delegate a large part of this responsibility to the Fiscal Division, ASF, as recommended in paragraph 1a. above. Overseas fiscal policy includes not only the financing of Army operations but also the very broad civil problems of foreign exchange, internal finance, budgets, taxes, currency, financial controls, etc., all of which make up an inte-

<sup>8</sup> As Hilldring indicated, and the following documents show, he assumed the authority to co-ordinate. He was aware that the charter of CAD did not explicitly confer it. But he felt justified by the known intentions of the Secretary and the requirements of the situation. The question of broadening the directive to make his authority explicit was considered but it was deemed best not make a legalistic issue of the matter which, after some initial difficulties, seemed to be working out well on a basis of general concurrence. (Interv. Weinberg with Maj Gen Hilldring, 15 Sep 50.) Hilldring came to his new office from a long experience in the War Department, including the position of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, which had familiarized him with the processes of interoffice negotiation. He was, besides, a resourceful and forceful person.

gral part of the administration of civil affairs in reoccupied areas.<sup>9</sup>

#### THE DIRECTOR DEFINES CAD'S FUNCTION QUITE BROADLY

[Min, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 (4-14-43) (1)]

General Hilldring explained that the over-all function of the Civil Affairs Division is to obtain complete synchronization throughout the Army on military government problems. Such synchronization occurs only where a deliberate effort is made for its achievement. It was with that purpose in mind that the Civil Affairs Division was established in the War Department, thus setting up a single office devoted entirely to military government. It is the function of the Division to conduct the planning, policy making, supervision and co-ordination of all matters concerning military government. A further function is to regulate, in the Army, all operating agencies concerned with military government. \* \* \*

#### NO TROUBLE IN CO-ORDINATING ARMY-NAVY MATTERS

[Min, Mtg in Hilldring's office, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337 (4-14-43), (1)]

General Hilldring took advantage of the occasion to explain the most excellent co-operation existing between the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Office for Occupied Areas in the Navy Department. He explained that this co-operation has existed since his arrival in Washington, that it is wholehearted, and has welded the Army and Navy into a united understanding of the problems which are being faced. In no instance has a problem arisen between the two Services which has not been solved between General Hilldring and Captain Pence, thus obviating the necessity for reference to higher authority.

Captain [Harry L.] Pence, representing the Navy at the Meeting, stated that co-operation between himself and General Hilldring had been an easy task in view of the sound and practical ideas which had been presented. He further commented on the very excellent and close relationship existing in the War Department between the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division and the Secretary of War, through Mr. McCloy. \* \* \*

<sup>9</sup>This jurisdictional dispute was resolved in CAD's favor by order of the Secretary of War on 21 May 1943. WD Memo for the Chief, CAD, AG files, 014.1 (5-17-43).

The subject then turned to the selection of civil affairs personnel for theater commanders. General Hilldring stated that he was making a deliberate effort to have Navy personnel selected for some of the positions in the civil affairs sections of the staffs of theater commanders. He stated that it was particularly desirable in ports, and had added advantage as evidence of a united Army-Navy front. \* \* \*

#### ARRANGEMENTS EFFECTED FOR ARMY-NAVY CO-ORDINATION

[Memo, Hilldring for Exec to the ASW, 9 Feb 44, CAD files, 321 (1-1-43), sec. 1]

2. CAD and OAS [Occupied Areas Section] have responsibility for the administration of civil affairs in areas assigned to the Army and Navy, respectively. The Navy sphere of responsibility includes certain islands in the Pacific. The Army sphere of responsibility includes other enemy-occupied areas. In the preparation of directives, manuals, and communications for the administration of civil affairs in all such areas, CAD and OAS collaborate in much the same manner as partners in a joint enterprise.

3. Preliminary to combined U.S.-U.K. discussions at Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC) meetings (or at meetings of the U.S. side of CCAC), CAD co-ordinates with OAS in formulating the views of the U.S. armed forces. . . .

4. In addition, CAD maintains close liaison with OAS in day-to-day operations. Through an OAS liaison officer, the CAD secretariat furnishes OAS with complete information on civil affairs problems currently under consideration. The Executive Officer, CAD, also furnishes copies of cables, letters, and other communications (incoming and outgoing) simultaneously with the distribution of such papers to CAD branches. \* \* \*

#### GENERAL HILLDRING ASSENTS TO THE CREATION OF A JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

[Memo, Hilldring for Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, DCofS, 23 Aug 44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1), sec. 6]

1. . . . a. With or without a Joint Civil Affairs Committee, the real work of planning for civil affairs and the real operation of civil affairs will have to continue to be done in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department or the Military Government Section of the Central Division of the Navy Department.

b. If Admiral [Frederick J.] Horne's memo-

random [19 August 1944] implies, as it appears to, that the Army operates civil affairs in any area as a purely Army matter, the memorandum is in error. In those areas which the Joint Chiefs have assigned as a primary responsibility to the Army, civil affairs are co-ordinated in every detail with the Navy Department through the Military Government Section. Vice versa, in areas assigned as areas of primary responsibility of the Navy, the Navy carefully co-ordinates its civil affairs plans and operations with the War Department through the Civil Affairs Division. In effect, what Admiral Horne proposes is that instead of co-ordination between these two agencies of the Army and Navy, a Joint Committee be formed to effect this co-ordination. The point I want to make is that this will not bring about any better co-ordination than already exists. It will simply substitute a committee for the co-ordination now being accomplished. . . .

3. Admiral Horne presents one argument, however, for a Joint Civil Affairs Committee for which I have no answer, and which, in my opinion, constitutes sufficient reason for the formation of such a committee. He says, "Since all other phases of joint operations are dealt with in the Joint Chiefs of Staff channel by joint committees, no reason can be seen why military government should be an exception." My only reason for objecting to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee is that it will increase administratively the difficulties of operation because it is difficult to work for a committee. However, if the Navy insists on having a Joint Committee, I can think of no valid grounds on which the Army can object, if the Navy chooses to disregard the obvious fact that the Committee is unnecessary.

#### 4. IN APRIL 1943 THE WAR DEPARTMENT TAKES CHARGE OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY

##### GENERAL CLAY THINKS WAR DEPARTMENT SHOULD MAP OUT ITS ROLE IN CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Memo, Clay, ACoFS for Materiel, SOS, for ACoFS, OPD, 11 Feb 43, OPD files, 014.1, Civil Govt, sec. 1]

2. The meeting [with Governor Lehman, 10 February] as a whole demonstrated that the several civilian agencies concerned are approaching the problem for the "idealistic" viewpoint of improving conditions throughout the world rather than from a realistic viewpoint. Governor Lehman was realistic in his approach. He pounded as his thesis that we could not

4. However, the formula proposed by the Navy for a purely military Joint Civil Affairs Committee should not under any circumstances be concurred in by the Army, for the following reasons:

a. There is no merit whatever to the statement made in paragraph 6, which would authorize "representative of the State Department to be appointed as associate member of the JCAC who would be available for discussions on the political aspects of joint military government operations, but would be excluded from discussions of purely military problems." Civil Affairs is 70% on the civilian side. We never have a problem in civil affairs which is purely military.

b. I am sure that the State Department, Mr. Stimson, Mr. McCloy, and, from what I have recently heard, Mr. [James V.] Forrestal himself, would violently oppose a civil affairs committee that did not accord full membership to the civilian authorities. Within recent weeks Mr. Stimson and Mr. Forrestal have complained to the Secretary of State because of the political questions which Mr. Hull is submitting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the War Department I have kept this condition under control by repeatedly pointing out to Mr. Stimson and Mr. McCloy that these projects, through present procedures, either come to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee where Mr. McCloy and Mr. [James C.] Dunn are present, or are presented by General Hull or by me to Mr. McCloy. . . .<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> A Joint Civil Affairs Committee was created on 3 April 1944. Its charter incorporated the provision for a purely military membership as desired by the Navy. Hilldring's contention that such a committee was not needed seems to receive confirmation in the relative inactivity of the Committee, which held very few meetings.

maintain our own war economy and help occupied countries except for these relief measures essential to prevent starvation and extreme suffering from exposure. He was particularly upset over the extent of civilian supply shipments to North Africa which he believed in excess of absolute needs. He was further concerned by the apparent lack of single economic direction in North Africa with Lend-Lease, BEW, and other agencies possibly working at cross-purposes. He believed it essential that a top committee be formed in Washington composed of representatives of the various agencies to establish definite

policies for the future and to direct advance planning. He did not believe that existing combined committees were at a high enough level to be effective, referring particularly to the Committee of Combined Boards headed by Mr. Finletter of the State Department. \* \* \*

4. It was suggested that a committee be formed with representatives of the several agencies present under the chairmanship of Governor Lehman to formulate and recommend policies presumably to the President. It was apparent that those agencies having a more "idealistic" approach were not in full sympathy with this committee, and they countered with the suggestion that the committee should be at a sufficiently high level to justify the Vice President being its chairman.

5. Throughout the discussion it was apparent that very little thought was being given by any of the representatives present to the responsibilities of the Army in an occupied area, particularly in the initial phases of operations, and the possible necessity for military government in such areas was not introduced or discussed. It did not appear an appropriate time for this thought to be introduced by the War Department representative, particularly as the main theme of discussion was in the field of supply. . . .

6. The meeting will undoubtedly stimulate the several agencies concerned to obtain high approval for their positions in the picture, with a strong probability that the State Department, prior to the next meeting, may formulate and obtain approval for the policy which it believes desirable. Therefore, it would appear essential for the War Department to formulate a definite War Department policy as to its own relationship to civil affairs in occupied countries at the earliest possible date so that its views may be presented before a policy which may be contrary thereto has been established.

#### PROPOSAL FOR A CIVILIAN PLANNING AGENCY STIMULATES ASF TO ASSERT MILITARY CONTROL OF SUPPLY

[Memo, Somervell CG, ASF, for CofS, 25 Mar 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

1. Reference is made to CCS 190 [sec. 3 above], which recommends that the Combined Chiefs of Staff request the Committee of Combined Boards to have outlined plans prepared covering certain areas which may become occupied areas as a result of military operations. This pa-

per is an invitation to other government agencies for the handling of Civil Affairs in areas proposed to be occupied through military operations. While these agencies should participate in comprehensive over-all planning in as far as their own functions are concerned for the handling of Civil Affairs in areas where military operations are contemplated, this planning should not include any proposed operations by these agencies until stabilized conditions have been attained in the areas involved.

2. The planning for the handling of Civil Affairs during the initial phases of occupation should be a direct responsibility of the War Department, operating through the Theater Commander, and planning for this purpose should be undertaken with the utmost secrecy and full security measures. Moreover, the functions of the other Government agencies are largely concerned with supply, and difficulties of transportation necessitate that all supply measures be under direct military control until conditions have stabilized. . . .

#### THE WAR DEPARTMENT AGREES TO ASSUME FULL INITIAL SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY

[Msg, WD to CG, NATOUSA, 5 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 2451]

. . . President's directive makes Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation an organization to facilitate progress of war and relieve suffering and provides OFRRO operations in any specific areas abroad will be subject approval of United States military so long as military occupation exists. Prior to Governor Lehman's departure, War Department agreed with him to assume full procurement, operating and administrative responsibility all phases civilian relief, reconstruction, sanitation, agricultural development, etc., as function of theater commander during initial period of operations for sufficient time to permit orderly turnover with adequate advance notice. For purposes of permitting Governor Lehman to plan this period has been estimated minimum 90 days but will of course vary considerably with each operation.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The agreement with Governor Lehman was in one aspect an outgrowth of OFRRO's concurrence in Army control of civilian relief in Tunisia. (See above, Ch. II, sec. 7.) The motives which led Lehman to welcome the War Department's co-operation are indicated in Chapter IV, below, and, as will be seen, have to do with the difficulties of OFRRO in coming into operations at an early stage.

## THEATER COMMANDERS ARE MADE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING CIVILIAN SUPPLIES

[Summary of WD Cable of Gen Application to Theater Comdrs, 12 Apr 43, CM-OUT 4944, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

The Theater Commander is responsible for the provision of any essential civilian supplies in the occupied area from the military stocks which have been made available to him for a minimum period of time after occupation has been effected. For planning purposes this period should be assumed to be approximately 90 days, but it will of course vary with circumstances of each operation. The objective should be to discharge this responsibility from Army stocks or other supplies available to the Theater Commander until on adequate notice the civilian agencies are prepared to assist the Theater Commander in the discharge of this responsibility. All civilian agencies, including the agency responsible for relief and rehabilitation, have been advised accordingly.

The War Department will assume that your requisitions include provision for such essential civilian supplies as you propose to allocate shipping and no special provision will be made for such supplies except on receipt of special requisitions from the Theater Commander. Any special requisitions for subsistence, medical supplies, or other special items deemed necessary to meet essential civilian needs should be submitted to the War Department at the earliest possible date to permit advance procurement without sudden demands on the market which would indicate operations to be contemplated.

It is further assumed that the Theater Commander will include in his requisitions for engineering materials those items deemed essential for the rehabilitation of utilities in the occupied area if any appear necessary to meet military requirements and that such work will be undertaken by the Theater Commander in supervision of troops at his disposal.

The utilization of military supplies or such special supplies as may be obtained to meet essential civilian needs through commercial channels or as barter goods in payment for labor should be incorporated to the fullest possible extent.

### CIVILIAN SUPPLY PROBLEM IS OF HUGE SCOPE

[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

3. Captain Palmer opened the discussion with a summary of the civilian supply problem in occu-

ped areas and the Army's relationship to it. He pointed out that:

(a) This problem had not until recently been of concern to the War Department; North Africa both opened and enormously expanded it;

(b) The British had all along been more aware of it because of their closeness to and political interest in the continent of Europe. British planning on the subject reaches back over a period of more than one and a half years. They are proposing to make civilian welfare in occupied countries a matter of Army concern for a period of six months and to sustain civilians for this period from Army supplies—thereby making purchases to meet this supply program a matter of military priority. Indeed, there is evidence that the British are prepared *now* to purchase such stores;

(c) Some concept of the scope of the civilian supply program may be gleaned from the fact that some U.S. estimates contemplate need of at least six million tons of material during the first year of occupation of Europe. British figures run, it is believed, much higher, their estimates being based in part upon discussions with the governments in exile and may for that reason be on too generous a scale. It is in any event probable that the volume in which supplies must be furnished, even when cut to a minimum, can exert a serious effect on both the timing and undertaking of military operations;

(d) The Army's problem of meeting civilian requirements must be geared (in the light of purely military necessity) to accomplish the following:

Prevent unrest and disease <sup>12</sup>

Restore war production

Live off the country

Obtain assistance from the population \* \* \*

(e) The job over and beyond this was one for civilian agencies. \* \* \*

### AT FIRST THE JOB IS VIEWED AS PRIMARILY ONE OF SUPPLEMENTING THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Summary of Discussion at Mtg of WD Sup Officers, 15 May 43]

7. Captain Palmer pointed out that it was now accepted Army policy that responsibility for the initial period of occupation would be solely that of the military. For planning purposes it is now assumed that this period will last for a minimum of 90 days, for which time the Army must be

<sup>12</sup> This phrase came to be generally used in characterizing the extent of the Army's mission in civilian supply.

prepared to meet civilian needs from the ASP and not necessarily from Lend-Lease or OFRRO stockpiles.

(a) Further that it was not a matter of duplicating the work of the above agencies, but rather of knowing what they were doing and preparing to do in order that the Army could be intelligently prepared to draw from and/or supplement such stockpiles.

(b) That the British preparations for a six-month period in contrast to ours for a 90-day period contained the possibility of conflict in the determination of items of military priority.

8. Captain [Donald H.] McLean added that the Army's problem was one essentially of procuring a "hedge" against items difficult to acquire and not available in occupied territories; that this involved a full knowledge of local peculiarities and eating habits. \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT BEGINS TO PLAN FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for DCofS, 19 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

##### I. Discussion

1. The War Department has placed the responsibility for civilian relief and rehabilitation, and for the requisitioning and distribution of essential civilian supplies, upon the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ, North Africa. No requisitions or statements of requirements have as yet been submitted by AFHQ.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 10 cabled AFHQ to submit promptly to CCS for the War Department its estimates, even if tentative, of total civilian needs by item, quantity, priority, desired destination and markings from D Day to D Day plus 90.

3. In order that the War Department may be in a position to screen these estimates, when they arrive, and to anticipate subsequent requisitions by procurement, if necessary, it is desirable that independent estimates, based on information available in Washington, should be established.

##### II. Action Recommended

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That the Commanding General, ASF, prepare an estimate of total civilian requirements for HUSKY; the estimate to provide for food, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies, shelter, barter goods, engineering equipment and such other items as may be required to meet essential civilian needs; the estimate, by item, priority and destination from D Day to D Day plus 90.

2. That in the preparation of these estimates consideration be given to the importance of providing a minimum food ration which, combined with supplies locally available, will facilitate the maintenance of order, preservation of public health and utilization of local labor.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE COUNTRY HAS SURPLUSES ONLY IN A FEW ITEMS

[Memo, Maj Gen Edmund B. Gregory, QMG, for Dir, Opns, ASF, 24 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (1942-43)]

a. It is anticipated that there will be a great demand for food for the civilian population of occupied countries. It is believed that the food supply now available in the United States, or to be produced, will be insufficient to supply all requirements unless national policies and allocations are revised to reduce current consumption.

b. At the present time, the only items of food in which surpluses are believed to exist are:

Wheat and wheat flour

Durum wheat and alimentary pastes

Cereal products made from wheat

Soybean products, principally flour

This list represents the only unrationed foods in the United States, and, indicates the basis of those items which we can readily spare after providing for the needs of the Armed Forces and the civilian population of this country.

e. Should the Army be required to provide supplies for relief or for barter purposes, all luxury items should be excluded. In the case of North Africa, certain items supplied for barter purposes were in the nature of luxury items which were difficult to obtain and were subject to a high percentage of pilferage.

f. Quartermaster stocks of food are not sufficient to undertake the supply of civilians in occupied territories. If such supplies are taken from our stocks, it will be impossible in many instances to replenish them even at the expense of our civilian population.

#### WHY ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM SHOULD BE NARROW

[Notes on Mtg of Sup Officers, 4 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun-Jul 43)]

. . . Major [Thomas R.] Taylor questioned the limitations placed on types of supply to be in-

<sup>13</sup>The Secretary of War approved the recommendation of the Chief of CAD on 20 May. Planning was coordinated by the Civilian Supply Branch of the international Division.

cluded by the Army in meeting civilian needs, pointing out the frequent requests for agricultural implements, fire-fighting equipment, and tools, etc. that came in from theaters. Major Palmer said that the purpose of such limitations was to place the burden of proof on those who wish to expand the already great Army supply problem. . . .

#### PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE A SECTION FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLIES IN ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM

[Memo, Brig Gen Boykin C. Wright, Dir, ID, for Dir of Materiel, ASF, 7 Jun 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS 63]

1. To cover the problem of civil supply for the first 90 days of an occupation it is proposed to include a section in the Army Supply Program, based upon Staff plans and Service recommendations.<sup>14</sup> To this end it is proposed to consult with the several Services as to the character and amount of supplies to be provided. . . .

3. With respect to the U.S. civil agencies, it is proposed to take the position that:

a. The War Department will program and procure the supplies needed for military use during the first 90 days, whether U.S. or U.K.;

b. During the period of military government the War Department may requisition against the Lend-Lease Administration or any others who may have stockpiles, thus, in effect, acting on behalf of the foreign territory in question to cover needs after the first 90 days;

c. The War Department, while unwilling to endorse relief programs, will be glad to have them submitted for such comment as the War Department shall deem appropriate. . . .

#### BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM

[Memo, Wright, Dir, ID, for QMG and SG, 2 Jul 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-63]

1. As a matter of policy it has been determined that the War Department shall be responsible for the supply of essential minimum needs of civilian populations in occupied areas during the initial phases of a military operation and the period of Military Government. Such supplies will be provided on requisition of the theater commander.

2. The War Department will itself provide

<sup>14</sup> The proposal for a civilian supply section in the Army Supply Program was first made at an ASF staff conference on 4 June. Acceptance of the proposal was influenced largely by recent experience appearing to show that the procurement efforts of civilian agencies could not be counted upon.

from military stores the minimum essential supplies necessary for an initial period, until other agencies concerned with civilian relief become a source of supply. For planning purposes, it has been determined that this initial period shall be a minimum of at least 90 days and that all Axis-occupied areas together with Italy and her Mediterranean possessions will be involved. The extent of provision for civilian supply from military stores must be limited to requirements necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations. The basic objectives to be attained are:

a. to prevent civil unrest which would endanger lines of communication and channels of supply;

b. to prevent disease which would endanger troops.

3. To make provision for supply of civilian populations in occupied areas, requirements for this purpose will be included in the Army Supply Program and appropriate budget and financial arrangements will be made.

4. In determining the kind of materials to be provided consideration should be given, on the one hand, to the advisability of having such material be similar or identical to the customary commercial supplies of the area in question to facilitate distribution and, on the other hand, to the advisability of having such material conform to Army standards to make it interchangeable with Army supplies. Consideration must be also given to the problem of mass feeding and supplies appropriate therefor.

#### PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING SUPPLY PROCUREMENT ADOPTED

[Memo, Clay for Dir, ID, ASF, 22 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen (Jun-Jul 43)]

1. The following procedure for the establishment and procurement by the War Department of certain requirements for civilian populations in areas occupied by U.S., or combined U.S. and other forces is hereby adopted:

a. Requirements for civilian supply in the several areas will be determined by International Aid Division, Army Service Forces, upon the basis of operational plans received from Planning Division, Army Service Forces. In the case of combined operations, International Aid Division will also determine the proportion of combined Allied responsibility for furnishing civilian supplies in such areas which will be furnished from U.S. resources. In the determination of such requirements and the determination of such proportionate responsibility, International Aid Division will obtain recommendations from the

appropriate Technical Services and such additional information and assistance as may be appropriate. Also concurrences will be obtained by International Aid Division from Civil Affairs Division, OCS; Operations Division, WDGS; Director of Operations, ASF; and Requirement and Production Division, ASF.

b. The requirements so determined will be included in the Army Supply Program as U.S. military requirements in a new Section to be known as Section VI. The International Aid Division will transmit the proposed Section VI to the Director of the Requirements Division for publication by Requirements Division.

c. Supplies for the civilian population of occupied areas which are procured by the War Department will be delivered against requisition of the U.S. Theater Commander of the area in question.

#### HANDLING OF REQUESTS FOR SUPPLIES NOT IN ARMY SUPPLY PROGRAM

[Memo, Maj Edward M. Conklin, Jr., ASF, on Remarks of Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Mtg of 4 Sep 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-125]

2. General Clay outlined the policy of the War Department in respect to providing relief and supplies for occupied and liberated territories as follows:

a. The War Department will procure and stockpile the following items as military requirements for relief of civil population in occupied territories:

Basic ration  
Fuel

Medical and Sanitary Supplies  
Soap

(This is in consonance with CCS 324/1 which was approved by the CCS at their 115 meeting, 23 August 1943.)<sup>15</sup>

3. General Clay stated further that any supplies beyond those which come within the categories indicated in paragraph 2 a above would not as a rule be procured as military items. However, in the event supplies beyond the scope of the categories indicated above were requested and such request bore the endorsement of approval of the U.S. Theater Commander, the War Department will submit such requests to the appropriate civil agency . . . and the War Department will obtain therefrom the necessary supplies. Such supplies, however, will not be programmed nor procured by the War Department unless not otherwise obtainable. General Clay stated further that if supplies beyond the scope indicated in the categories of paragraph 2 a above, were submitted for fulfillment but did not bear the endorsement of the Theater Commander, the War Department will submit such requests to the appropriate civil agencies for procurement. At the same time the ASF, through Production Division, will make a study as to the effect the procurement of such supplies would have on articles to be procured for the Army from the standpoint of materials, facilities and manpower and advise the WPB of the effect that filling such civilian requirements would have on the articles of supply programmed by and to be procured for the Armed Forces.

<sup>15</sup> CCS 324/1 laid down the principles of the combined British and American supply program. See below, Chapter V, Section 4.

## 5. EXPANSION OF ARMY TRAINING PROGRAM MUST HAVE LONG WAIT FOR FINAL APPROVAL

#### OPPOSITION TO LARGE MILITARY GOVERNMENT STAFFS

[Memo, Col Thomas North, Chief, Current Sec, OPD, for the Theater Gp, OPD, 10 Aug 42, OPD files, 352 (3-24-42), sec. 1]

1. Your comments and recommendations are requested on the enclosed paper from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. This matter pertains to the establishment of a general policy to guide the assignment of officers, trained in the administration of civil affairs by graduation from the School of Military Government, to appropriate units in the theaters and the continental United States.

3. a. It is the opinion of this section that:

(1) The immediate need for large special staffs for administering military governments overseas is not indicated.

(2) The requirements for each theater for a civil affairs staff section will vary to such an extent that a general policy concerning the detailing of officers to theaters and task forces for this purpose will prove impractical.

(3) Premature assignment of officers to such a detail might result in insufficient employment of trained manpower.

b. Pending the receipt of recommendations from the various theater commanders at the time

military governments in occupied territories are contemplated, it is believed that graduates of the School of Military Government can be given other assignments appropriate to their military qualifications.<sup>16</sup>

[Memo, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, for the Dir of Personnel, ASF, 31 May 43, PMGO files, 200, MG]

1. The primary concern of this office in civil affairs lies in the supply field. In this field the personnel required in any specific area will be comparatively small. It is our view that key personnel in this field can be trained most advantageously through actual staff work in the Headquarters, Army Service Forces. We believe that a small group of officers should be maintained to provide the nucleus of supply personnel for each occupied area, and that still further training can be obtained through actual experience in these occupied areas to form units for other occupied areas.

2. In general we are somewhat of the same opinion with respect to the over-all training of officers for duty in the occupied countries. It would be a mistake to train a large number of officers for this purpose if these officers were to be returned to civil life pending their assignment to active duty or if they were to be kept in active service without a specific assignment of duties. It would appear almost impossible to train enough men in units in the United States to provide for the administration of the occupied countries and much dependence must be placed on officers and men to be made available from the occupying forces. It would seem, therefore, that the training objectives in this country should be devoted to developing the very high-grade administrators to occupy key positions. We are not likely to occupy very large areas concurrently, hence each area in which we establish a military government will become a training ground in itself where able and experienced administrators can be developed for use in other areas. Such a system taken into conjunction with the training which we now have under way would appear to be logical and would require a minimum of personnel in training.

<sup>16</sup> G-1, on 23 November 1942, approved the Provost Marshal General's request for the appointment of "2,500 individuals in the Specialist Reserve Section of the Officers Reserve Corps." The officers appointed were to be "assigned to a course in Military Government, upon the completion of which they shall revert to an inactive status." Memo, ACofS, G-1, to PMG, 23 Nov 42, in PMGO files, Hist of MGT.

#### RECOMMENDATION THAT SPECIALISTS BE TRAINED AT COLLEGES

[Memo, Gullion for the ACofS, G-3, 11 Jan 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 18]

1. The procurement authority of November 23, 1942 . . . as amended by authority of November 27, 1942 . . . authorizes the Provost Marshal General to recommend for commissions 20 lieutenant colonels, 30 majors and 2450 captains and lieutenants (a total of 2500) in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps, at a rate of not to exceed 300 per month.<sup>17</sup>

3. As above indicated, not in excess of 375 of the 2500 authorized officers will attend the Charlottesville School. As to the remaining officers, it is intended to earmark each for probable eventual duty in some general overseas area and then to call each temporarily to active duty for some brief instruction in military government and the background of the general area for which he will have been earmarked. Such instruction would in each instance be for a period not to exceed six weeks. Not only is such instruction indicated by the procurement authority, but without it these officers would enter upon important active service overseas without any special training whatsoever.

4. As already pointed out, it will not be possible to provide training at the Charlottesville School for more than 375 of these officers during the year 1943. It will be feasible, however, to arrange with a group of colleges and universities to furnish such training by farming out these officers in small groups from time to time for instruction in military government and backgrounds of the general areas involved.

#### Recommendations:

(a) That the principle of "farming out" these reserve officers to a group of colleges and universities for periods not to exceed six weeks be approved and

(b) That the Provost Marshal General be authorized to engage in the necessary preliminary discussions to accomplish this objective, all final arrangements and agreements to be consummated by the duly authorized agencies of the War Department.

<sup>17</sup> Authority for commissioning from civil life was first given on 12 October 1942. But this authorization applied to the Army Specialist Corps, which was dissolved on 1 November 1942. Thus it became necessary to approve commissioning the Specialists in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps.

## CURRICULUM FOR SPECIALISTS

[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for the ACofS, G-1, 6 Feb 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 19]

. . . Two curricula must be provided, viz. for (a) Fort Custer and (b) civilian colleges.<sup>18</sup> Inasmuch as the training program is a novel venture, sufficient flexibility should be retained at this time to make possible such minor adjustments as experience may prove to be desirable.

The Charlottesville School has developed a general pattern of instruction that, it is believed, should be followed as nearly as possible in the new training program. This should be done not only because the Charlottesville method is believed to be sound, but because the adaptation of its essentials to the present program will create a desirable uniformity in all instruction given to military government personnel.

The Charlottesville instruction is divided generally into two parts—(I) that relating to the general principles of military government which are applicable and important regardless of the particular area of occupation and (II) the study of the backgrounds of areas of potential occupation. Under (I) are included such topics as Army organization and staff functions, the international law and American regulations relating to military government, the experiences and practices of the United States and other nations in the actual operation of military governments and the general principles of public administration. Included under (II) are matters concerning the institutions, customs and practices of particular areas and the language thereof [see above, Chapter I, Section 2.].

It is proposed to allocate to the Fort Custer training those portions of the instruction embraced in (I) above and to the civilian colleges and universities those portions embraced in (II).

A brief explanation for the desirability of such an allocation should be made. In the first place, it will be very difficult to establish in six separate colleges a satisfactory course of instruction embracing the general principles making up Part I of the Charlottesville curriculum inasmuch as persons trained in certain of the topics are not usually found on college faculties. On the other hand, there is already in operation at Fort Custer a Department of Military Government, which is furnishing the instruction in its two schools for occupational police (officers and enlisted) upon the same topics which should be included in the present curriculum. It will be an easy matter

<sup>18</sup> The specialists commissioned in the ORC were sent for four weeks to Fort Custer before being farmed out to the colleges.

to augment the existing faculty at Fort Custer and to furnish the instruction in that way. Furthermore, this procedure should result in a betterment of the existing Military Government faculty at Fort Custer. Finally, since only one hour per day, or a total of 48 hours for each course, will be devoted to this instruction, it will not materially reduce the time allotted to basic military training. \* \* \*

## TRAINING PROGRAM IN CURRENT FORM IS SUMMARIZED

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, for Actg Dir, CAD, 2 Apr 43, PMGO files, 337, Confs (MG and CAD Staff Officers)]

2. *General.* The objective of the total program is to recruit and train, during the period ending December 31, 1944, between 5500 and 6000 officers for military government duties in occupied areas. . . .

The training program, insofar as instrumentalities are concerned, may be divided into three parts, namely (1) The School of Military Government, (2) The Fort Custer-college setup and (3) The Occupational Police Schools. The trainees at the School of Military Government are prepared for the planning and top general administrative levels in military governments. The Fort Custer-college program is for officers of the Specialists pool who will constitute the technical and advisory personnel in military government organizations, below the organizational level of the SMG graduates. Both groups must be viewed as staff officers whose activities are to be supplemented to a very large extent by drafts upon tactical and special service troops and also by the utilization of civilian population to the greatest extent possible. The occupational police personnel is designed to furnish officers and enlisted cadres for a considerable force of occupational police and, at the same time, to produce a surplus of occupational police officers for duty as junior administrative officers in military government.<sup>19</sup>

With these general observations in view, the three activities indicated above may be separately considered.

3. *The School of Military Government.* The School of Military Government was opened at Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 9, 1942, for the purpose of giving a series of 16 weeks' courses to selected groups of highly qualified student-

<sup>19</sup> The program for training occupational police is omitted since it was not long afterward abandoned. It was believed that the program imposed an excessive personnel commitment and that combat troops could be used as occupational police.

officers. The first course was attended by 50 officers, the second course by 115 officers and the third (present) course by 133 officers. It is contemplated that succeeding courses (the fourth course begins on or about May 15, 1943) will contain approximately 150 officers, which is the authorized strength of the School.

The student-officers are divided into two categories, (a) officers already commissioned in the military service and (b) officers commissioned directly from civil life for the purpose of attending the School. Officers in group (a) have heretofore been secured from nominations submitted by the several Service Commands and Armies and by the staff branches; for the fourth and subsequent courses these sources of supply have been enlarged to include all Army Group Forces and the Army Air Forces, as well as officers from the various staff branches. Group (b) in the present course consists of 44 officers; all subsequent courses will contain from 50 to 75 each, depending upon the number required to bring the course to full authorized strength. This group will be drawn from reserve officers commissioned in the specialists pool presently to be discussed.

The student groups at the Charlottesville School are selected to represent, in the aggregate, all the general and special skills requisite to a complete Civil Affairs organization, namely, public works and utilities, public safety, fiscal, economics, public health and sanitation, public welfare, education, public relations, communications, legal and government administration. The training being directed at producing officers on a top planning and general administrative level, the curriculum of the School is designed to produce this result.

4. *Specialists Pool.* The Provost Marshal General has been authorized to select and recommend for commissions a pool of 150 Lieutenant Colonels, 600 Majors and 1750 Captains and Lieutenants, a total of 2500, from civil life in the Specialists Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps. Each officer must possess one or more of the functional skills indicated in the next preceding paragraph. From this pool, certain officers will be selected to attend the School of Military Government, as already pointed out. The remaining officers in the pool will be given, in comparatively small groups, beginning on or about June 1, 1943, a period of training at Fort Custer, Michigan, to be followed by training in seven to ten civilian colleges and universities. . . .

6. The Provost Marshal General's procurement authority provides that all persons com-

missioned in the Specialists pool will revert to an inactive status upon the completion of the training period, whether at the SMG or in the Fort Custer-college program. This provision is entirely satisfactory to certain persons eligible for appointment; in the majority of cases, however, it is quite unsatisfactory and seriously impedes the recruitment of the most desirable personnel. The procurement authority should, it is believed, be amended to provide for a return to an inactive status only for those persons desiring such procedure, and to provide for the continuance on active duty of those officers who desire retention in the service. Since the training program will extend over a period of more than 18 months and the monthly increments will be comparatively small, it is believed that they can be absorbed into useful and relevant military duties without any serious difficulty. This will be particularly true if occupations on any considerable scale can be expected within the next twelve months. \* \* \*

#### WHY COLLEGES ARE PREFERABLE TO ARMY POSTS FOR CA TRAINING

[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for the Dir, CAD, 17 Apr 44, PMGO files, 008, Policy]<sup>20</sup>

2. . . .

a. . . . The use of colleges makes available the most modern, up-to-date plant and equipment and the most competent civilian instructional personnel in the United States. The excellent results that can be accomplished by employing such facilities have been fully demonstrated in the prior training programs; a different course should not be pursued unless a clear advantage is apparent.

The principal difficulty in any army post setup will be in creating a proper faculty. In the Civil Affairs Training Schools previously in operation, staff, faculty and occasional lecturers ranged from 30 to 50 at each School; a minimum staff and faculty at an army school, with a maximum load of 1500 student officers, would have to be well over 100 plus a considerable number of outside lecturers.

It is not believed that an adequate number of qualified faculty members can be found in the Army; if available, their assignment to such duty is exceedingly doubtful. It is understood that the whole Far Eastern Program was once jeopardized

<sup>20</sup> This memorandum was written in response to General Hildring's request for a statement of the reasons why it was proposed to conduct the specialist training program in colleges rather than in Army posts. By this time PMGO military government training had come under the jurisdiction of the newly established Civil Affairs Division.

because it was thought in certain quarters that a small increase in the faculty of the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, might be involved; any request for a large military overhead at a Far Eastern School would probably be suicidal.

Consequently, the faculty would have to be recruited principally from civilian sources. There is little hope of attracting to any army post the numbers and quality of experts who are readily available on university campuses or their vicinity. As a result, any faculty recruited for an army school would be inadequate in numbers or mediocre in ability.

Furthermore, an army post is ill-fitted for the peculiar type of instruction required in Civil Affairs training. Instruction is very largely academic, with a minimum of the military training for which the ordinary army post is primarily designed. One pivotal item—an extensive library—is always entirely lacking. Lecture halls, class, conference and study rooms, if constructed originally for such purposes, are usually bleak, badly lit and ill-heated and ventilated; if (as is more usual) they are converted from mess halls or barracks, they soon become depressing and a definite morale-destroying factor. The Provost Marshall General's School at Fort Custer is one of the better equipped army post schools; anyone who has observed the reaction of a student officer coming, after a four weeks' stay at Fort Custer, to the campus of a modern university will readily understand the comparison.

Without protracting the comparisons further, it is perfectly obvious that the efficiency and quality of Civil Affairs instruction at an army post would be far below that easily possible in any high grade university. \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT IS CRITICIZED FOR TOO MUCH TRUST IN UNIVERSITIES

[Ltr, Thomson, Univ of Colorado, to Hyneman, Dir of Tng, MGD, 10 Jul 43, PMGO files, 330.14, Criticisms]

I do not feel that you have gone about the contracting with the six universities for training Civil Affairs Specialists in a satisfactory manner. You do not know who is going to teach what. The content of the courses that are to be given has not been gone over in any detailed fashion. You have left up to the universities both personnel and content. You have taken their word for it that they could find some one to do the job. That means hurried improvisation and competition between these schools for outside help, and you will find, in the event, that they have not been able to get the "experts" they have so glibly promised.

If you rely on the resident faculties of these institutions it seems to me you are being more trusting and unbusinesslike than you have any right to be. The men are simply not to be found on these faculties in adequate quality or quantity. I know the men in these fields. That is my business. But with adequate foresight and a little imagination, a constructive and satisfactory program could have been worked out. A job like this cannot be done by correspondence from Washington.

#### THE FIELD CONSIDERS QUALITY OF PERSONNEL ITS MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 13 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 9087]

Most important problem Military Government subsequent operations is quality of personnel. All here emphasize need for experienced general administrators, organizer and operator type, for direct contact local officials and people. Higher standards and more detailed individual attention in selection of even lower echelons essential. . . .

#### PRIDE AND MISGIVINGS OVER PROGRESS OF TRAINING

[Memo, Gullion, PMG, for CofS, CG, ASF, and the Chief, CAD, 24 Aug 43, CAD files, 353 (3-8-43), sec. 2]

6. Presidential resistance found some counterpart within the War Department itself where there appeared to be some feeling that any extensive military government training program should be discouraged because of (a) the uncertainties of time and place of future occupation and (b) the undesirability of creating any considerable pool of officers for whom no fairly immediate civil affairs duties were apparent.

7. In the face of remarks made by the President, and the criticisms by civilian agencies and the War Department itself this office proceeded with a twofold design—*a.* to recruit and train the greatest number of officers possible under the circumstances in order that at least a sufficient supply will be on hand as soon as the inevitable emergency demand for it should arrive and *b.* at the same time, to erect a recruiting and training mechanism capable of immediate and unlimited expansion when the need for civil affairs officer personnel has become more apparent to those concerned.

9. In the light of the foregoing, I felt that we have accomplished our self-imposed mission with a considerable degree of success and under somewhat severe handicaps. Requisitions (completely filled, pending and for which we have been

alerted to 30 September 43) from CAD for civil affairs personnel for overseas duty total approximately 600. Against these demands, there are approximately 1200 officers trained or in training. By 30 September, this total will have increased to 1800. At the same time, we have erected a series of co-ordinated training programs that are, as above pointed out, capable of immediate and unlimited expansion, *circumscribed only by the ability of qualified officers for student groups.*

Nevertheless, in view of increasing demands, the lack of success in obtaining the approval for occupational police organizations, and the actual threat of deactivation of existing military police organizations, I am quite disturbed over the future.

11. In summary, I am of the opinion that the importance of trained personnel in handling the difficult military government problem is not generally recognized.

#### TRAINING PROGRAM IS ACCELERATED AFTER OPERATIONS BEGIN

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for the PMG, 27 Aug 43, PMO files, 200, MG]

##### 1. Secretary of War directs:

a. That inasmuch as not to exceed 40 graduates of SMG and the Custer-CATS<sup>21</sup> program will be available for civil affairs assignment after the current NATOUSAs requisition is filled:

(1) Plans be made immediately to bring 2500 additional officers into civil affairs training programs by the end of the calendar year 1943. . . .

#### THE LESSONS OF TWO YEARS ARE BORNE IN MIND IN PLANNING FAR EAST PROGRAM

[Memo, Gullion for Chief, CAD, 31 Dec 43, PMGO files, Hist of MG Tng, Tab 22]

1. By directive of 10 December 1943 the Provost Marshal General was ordered to prepare and submit to the Civil Affairs Division a detailed training program for Civil Affairs officers for duty in the Asiatic theater. The directive prescribes these bases for the program: (a) that 1500 officers (25 percent Navy, the remainder Army) be trained; (b) that approximately 10 percent of the total become available for occupational duties in October 1945 and the total number by March 1946; (c) that the training program follow the pattern of the Fort Custer-college (CATS [Civil Affairs Training School]) courses employed in training for the North African and European theaters

<sup>21</sup> Civil Affairs Training Schools in the colleges.

and (d) that not less than six months of training be spent in area and Japanese language studies, (e) to be preceded by an indoctrination course in military government.

The following plan has been formulated within the foregoing prescription and in the light of the general situations and overriding objectives discussed below.

2. *General.* It is hoped that the lessons of American experience in the past two years will not be forgotten in the present venture. Two years ago and until recently it was urged that the control of occupied areas was a civilian, not a military, responsibility; that American forces might never be in occupation of any considerable areas; that, in any event, preparation for such possible tasks might be deferred until their emergence had become more apparent. These identical views may be aired again; if so, they must be beaten down as they have been in the past.

For it is infinitely more important in a program for the Far East than for the Mediterranean-European theaters that recruitment and training for occupation be initiated well in advance of the event. Familiarity in America with European languages and backgrounds, while not widespread, is nonetheless considerable; acquaintance with Far Eastern languages, institutions and points of view is practically nonexistent.

Furthermore, the difficulties of imparting useful language and other relevant knowledge of the Far East are many times those of similar preparation for European areas. Whereas a useful basic conversational knowledge of Italian and German can be imparted to a student officer in three months, a corresponding proficiency in Japanese cannot be achieved in six to eight months. Six months of intensive work in conversational Japanese is a bare minimum of useful instruction—a fact fully recognized in the directive itself.

Finally, it is feared that a certain amount of inevitable war-weariness may, in the end, adversely affect the Far Eastern program. With the conclusion of European hostilities, it is easy enough to visualize a diminishing interest in Far Eastern occupations, a fact that may seriously increase the difficulties of recruiting desirable student officers and of maintaining a necessary degree of zeal in their studies.

These situations combine to point out the first of two overriding objectives in the following plan, i.e., to begin training at the earliest possible moment consistent with the provisions of the directive. The second major objective relates to

the disposition of the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia. These two matters will now be discussed. \* \* \*

Recommendations:

a. That the plan be generally approved.

b. That the training of the first group of student officers for the Far East begin at the School of Military Government, Charlottesville, Virginia, on 1 July 1944; that a directive, calling upon all Forces to furnish nominations for this and five succeeding courses, be published not later than 1 April 1944.

c. That the School of Military Government be authorized to conduct two courses in military government of six (6) to seven (7) weeks each during the period 1 March 1944 to 15 June 1944; that each of these two student groups consist of not to exceed one hundred (100) officers of field grade to be secured by allotments to the several Forces; that a directive establishing quotas for these two courses be published not later than 1 February 1944.

d. That contracts with not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) universities, to be se-

lected by the Provost Marshal General, be authorized for the purpose of furnishing instruction for periods of not less than six (6) months nor more than eight (8) months in Japanese language, backgrounds and related subjects, to groups of Army and Navy officers not to exceed two hundred and fifty (250) in each group.

e. That the Provost Marshal General be authorized to employ not to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) persons speaking the Japanese language for periods not to exceed three (3) months for any one person, during which time they will be instructed in modern methods of language instruction.

f. That a contract with the University of Chicago be authorized for the purpose of securing the services of said University in instructing not to exceed one hundred and fifty (150) Japanese language informants and not to exceed five (5) supervisors in modern methods of language instruction.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> The program recommended was authorized by WD directive of 31 March 1944.

## 6. EUROPE'S CULTURAL HERITAGE MUST BE PROTECTED

### AMERICAN LEARNED SOCIETIES URGE PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF WORKS OF ART AND HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

[Ltr, William Bell Dinsmoor, President Archaeological Institute of America, Columbia Univ, to SW, 15 Mar 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43 (1))]

As the writer of one of the preliminary memoranda on the matter of a proposal for the protection of cultural monuments in the war zones and as one who has had this problem under consideration for the past several months, I wish most strongly to endorse the enclosed memorandum which Mr. Francis H. Taylor of the Metropolitan Museum, with whom I am collaborating, has drawn up on this subject.<sup>23</sup>

. . . I am representing a group which at present constitutes an informal committee, of which I

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<sup>23</sup> From the outbreak of war, George L. Stout of the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts had been studying the problem of safeguarding works of art under war conditions and in March 1942, largely on his initiative, a conference to discuss these matters was held at Harvard University by the Department of Conservation of the Fogg Art Museum. In November of the same year concerted efforts were made by Taylor and Dinsmoor to interest the Government in salvage and restitution of works of art in Europe. The draft of a petition to the Government to

am chairman, and includes the heads of the departments of art and archaeology at Princeton and Harvard, who are most emphatically in favor of urging that steps be taken at the earliest possible moment. The matter was also brought before the American Council of Learned Societies, which approved of such action and asked me to assume the chairmanship of such a committee. I had previously, as President of the Archeological Institute of America, discussed the matter with the Board of Trustees and the Executive Committee of the body; and recently, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the American Academy in Rome, of which I am Secretary, I brought up the same matter. On all of these occasions, always with men who thoroughly know Europe and its cultural heritage, I was impressed by their earnest feeling

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create a commission for this purpose, drawn up in January 1943 under the direction of Mr. Stout, met with the approval of Taylor, Dinsmoor, the Director of the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Director of the American Association of Museums and American Defense-Harvard Group, with the result as indicated by documents herein. Further details will be found in G-5 (Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF) SHAEF files, 130, Jkt 1.

that something must be done to protect and salvage it. . . .

In view of the fact that the proposal is now being presented to you for your consideration and, . . . venture to hope, approval, I wish . . . to offer my own services in any capacity in which they may be useful . . . particularly in connection with the organization and execution of the project. . . .

[Memo, Taylor, Dir, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 15 Mar 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

(1) The United States Government has been party to a series of conventions for the protection of monuments, missions, works of art, and cultural property generally in time of war, as follows: *a.* Convention (II) with respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899.

*b.* Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907.

*c.* Convention (II) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907.

*d.* Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact), opened for signature at Washington, April 15, 1935.

(2) The War Department has implemented the diplomatic conventions in the Rules of Land Warfare, published in the Basic Field Manual (FM 27-10) prepared under the direction of the Judge Advocate General's Office, October 1, 1940, under the articles dealing with instructions for officials in occupied territory for the care of public . . . and . . . private property. . . .

(3) In view of the above, there is a body of precedent clearly established according to the rules of international law and of military procedure for dealing with these matters, but the great scale of destruction in the present war has exceeded anything imagined or provided for by previous declarations, and it is therefore imperative that certain additional measures be undertaken by the War Department which will not be in conflict with any military strategy or objective, but which will give added consideration to salvaging whatever may be possible of the civilization now being wrecked upon the continent of Europe.

Information which has been received through our channels indicates that through looting, forced sale and other forms of sequestration, the Nazis have stolen more than a billion and a half dollars worth of movable works of art.

Many of the great monuments of Europe have been pillaged or destroyed. . . .

More recently, the air offensive upon the countries occupied by the enemy has created a new problem in regard to the bombing of cultural monuments by forces of the United Nations. In Nuremberg, Berlin, and Munich some of the greatest museums of the world have, we understand, been totally destroyed. While we realize that part of the tragedy of the war lies in the necessary bombing of cultural centers if they lie within the orbit of military objectives, we nevertheless feel that there should be attached to the general staffs in each area qualified officers who not only are competent to indicate what monuments should preferably be avoided, but also to direct operations of salvage and protection of partially damaged monuments and the care of movable objects in damaged buildings at the very moment that such devastated areas are occupied by our troops.

(4) There are today more than fifty museum directors, curators, archaeologists and historians of distinction and competence who hold commissions in the armed forces. The great majority are doing routine desk jobs as intelligence officers. . . .

It is suggested that a special detail be formed where, by executive order, these officers could be brought together. Similarly by application to the Secretary of the Navy, such Naval and Marine Corps officers could be transferred to this detail. After a brief period of a few weeks' discussion of policy and procedure, they could be assigned to staff headquarters in various theaters of operation . . . to work in conjunction with personnel now being trained for military government. . . .

The function of these officers would be to advise Commanding Officers in regard to the principal monuments under their care, so that the actual operation of salvage and protection might be carried out under the direction of junior officers assigned to the troops.

#### PROTECTING EUROPE'S CULTURAL HERITAGE SHOULD BE A FUNCTION OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION

[Memo, Comdt, SMG, to Actg Dir, CAD, Through PMG, 1 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43)(1)]

1. The attached papers<sup>24</sup> and our own studies indicate that special measures will be required in

<sup>24</sup> Correspondence of the SW with Dr. Francis Taylor and Dinsmoor which had been referred to Wickersham on 30 March.

occupied territory for the protection and preservation of historical monuments and art treasures, and also to prevent black markets in historical paintings, objects of art, and similar articles stolen by the enemy.

3. . . . special measures should be taken for the protection of the cultural heritage of Europe and other appropriate areas. Clearly the matter is of great importance, and it is believed that the Army will gain in good will if adequate steps are taken.

4. For this reason, the protection and preservation of historical monuments and art treasures in occupied territory should be specifically included in the functions of the civil affairs section. Experienced personnel should be trained in order to assist the commanding general and the officer in charge of civil affairs in adequate advance planning and to act as advisers on technical aspects.

5. The objectives would include museums, libraries, archives, monuments, collections, universities, colleges, churches, convents and similar installations.

7. The following recommendations are submitted:

a. That four of five carefully selected experts having maximum knowledge and experience in the field of fine arts and archaeology be commissioned for the purpose of taking the course at the School of Military Government. . . .

b. That the civil affairs section of each theater commander include one or two such experts. . . .

c. That an appropriate number of experts be included in the pool of technicians and specialists now being formed by the Provost Marshal General to be available when needed for operating functions in the field. . . .

d. That FM 27-5 be amended or supplemented by appropriate reference to the subject. . . .

#### NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING CREATION OF AN ORGANIZATION TO PROTECT CULTURAL OBJECTS

[Ltr, Dir, National Gallery of Art, to the President, 20 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

I refer to a letter addressed to you by the Honorable Harlan F. Stone, the Chief Justice of the United States, dated December 8, 1942, concerning the creation of an organization to function under the auspices of the Government for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects as have been

appropriated by the Axis powers or by individuals acting under their authority. . . .

In your reply to the Chief Justice, dated December 28, 1942, you advised him of your interest . . . and stated that his letter had been referred to the appropriate agencies of the Government. . . .

I now have to inform you that this matter has been given careful consideration by the Department of State and that the governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been approached with the suggestion that a similar organization might be set up in each of these countries.

In the meanwhile, under the auspices of the War Department, a special section has been formed in the School of Military Government . . . with the idea of training certain officers in the Specialist Branch . . . so that they could be attached to the staffs of our armies which . . . will occupy European countries and thus be able to advise the commanding officers as to the location of and the care to be given to the various artistic and historic objects in these occupied territories. . . .

It would seem therefore that it would now be appropriate to appoint a commission to be known as the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, such Commission to advise and to work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territories when it is possible to relinquish military control. \* \* \*

The Commission should be authorized to secure, on a volunteer basis, the services of a committee of experts composed of museum directors and other qualified persons to advise on the above project and to furnish information required for carrying it out. \* \* \*

I have consulted with Secretary Stimson concerning this matter and he is in accord with these suggestions.<sup>25</sup>

#### WAR DEPARTMENT IS IN AGREEMENT

[Memo, Hilldring to SW, 27 Apr 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. Colonels Haskell and C. H. S. Townsend of this Division conferred April 19th with Colonel H. [Harry] A. McBride, Mr. David Finley, Director and Messrs. Walker, Shepard, and James, all of the National Gallery of Art, for the pur-

<sup>25</sup> That part of the letter containing suggestions concerning membership of the Commission, its location and functions is omitted.

pose of considering measures to be taken for the protection of cultural monuments and works of art in enemy-held territory now or hereafter subject to military operations.

2. It was agreed that this Division would be furnished a comprehensive list of officers now on other duty but especially qualified by training and experience for duties in connection with the protection of works of art and historic monuments, and a further list of men so qualified but not now in the military service. It was tentatively agreed that certain officers should be assigned for both staff and field duty in this connection. The suggestion that some instruction on this subject be given at the school of Military Government was accepted by the War Department.

3. With regard to the committee mentioned in Mr. Dinsmoor's letter of April 7th,<sup>26</sup> it has been agreed that a committee be formed with such a membership as to make it national in scope, and further that the proposed membership of the committee should be submitted to the President for his approval.

#### SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER SUGGESTIONS FROM CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

[Ltr, SW to Dinsmoor, 24 May 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

With your letter you inclose, in draft form, a statement and questionnaire which, I observe from your letter, are "now being considered by the American Council of Learned Societies' Committee on Preservation of European Cultural Material for printing and distribution among those particularly concerned with the salvage and preservation of such material."

As you know, I am deeply interested in the preservation of the cultural heritage of Europe and desire to promote all practicable steps looking toward the accomplishment of this purpose.

The School of Military Government . . . is giving special attention to this problem and for that reason I am sending the proposed statement and questionnaire to the Commandant, Brig. Gen. Wickersham, for his information. As the statement might be interpreted to contain certain implications of a tactical nature, it would be inappropriate for me to comment upon it.

<sup>26</sup> With this letter to Wickersham on the subject which had been brought to the attention of the Secretary of War on 15 March (above), Dinsmoor submitted an Outline of Preliminary Processes for initial utilization of resources available at Princeton, Harvard, Columbia, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Dumbarton Oaks, the Library of Congress and the Frick Art Reference Library. For further details, see CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1).

#### THE BRITISH ALSO CALL ATTENTION TO DESIRABILITY OF PROTECTING EUROPEAN ART

[Ltr, First Secy, Br Embassy, to Secy of State, 25 Jun 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

. . . the Embassy has been approached by certain interested British officials on the subject of the protection of works of art and ancient monuments in any projected invasion of the European Continent. . . .

The real objective is twofold:

(a) To see that precautions are taken to prevent unnecessary damage to works of art after the actual fighting is over.

(b) To see that measures are taken at the first possible moment to save partly destroyed buildings from further damage. . . .

This matter has already been brought to the attention of Lt. Col. David Bruce, Chief of the Office of Strategic Services in London. . . .

Inasmuch as the British authorities are already taking measures looking to the protection of artistic works and ancient monuments during operations on the Continent, it is believed that the Department may wish to study this matter and take appropriate action with the American Military authorities in Washington.

#### SPECIALISTS ON HISTORIC MONUMENTS AND OBJECTS OF ART ASSIGNED

[Memo, Hildring for ASW, 21 Jul 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. There follows . . . action taken by the Civil Affairs Division to make available to General Eisenhower trained personnel . . . concerning historic monuments in Italy:

a. The Directive for Husky made reference to the preservation of historic monuments.

b. Captain Mason Hammond, AC [Allied Commission], a specialist in planning for protection of historic monuments, was sent to General Eisenhower's headquarters under orders dated 26 May 1943. In addition, it is understood that an officer of qualifications similar to those of Captain Hammond was furnished by the British.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> British experiences in North Africa had pinpointed the necessity of appointing in advance specialist officers for conservation and protection of monuments and fine arts in Sicily and Italy. Therefore, in May 1943 the Office of the Adviser on Fine Arts and Monuments to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government was set up by the War Department with a lieutenant colonel and a major. Hammond was ordered from Air Force Headquarters in Washington to fill the major's slot. The British agreed to assign an adviser and, on 6 September 1943, Capt. F. H. J. Maxse reported

## PRESIDENT APPROVES AN AMERICAN COMMISSION

[State Dept Press Release No. 348, 20 Aug 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

The President has approved the establishment of an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe,<sup>28</sup> with the Honorable Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as Chairman. Mr. David E. Finley, Director of the National Gallery and a member of the Commission of Fine Arts, has been appointed Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Huntington Cairns, Secretary-Treasurer of the Gallery, will serve as Secretary-Treasurer of the Commission. The other members of the Commission are: The Honorable Herbert Lehman, Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations; the Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress; Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the Archaeological Institute of America; Dr. Francis Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan Museum in New York, and President of the Association of Art Museum Directors, and Dr. Paul J. Sachs, Associate Director of the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts of Harvard University. The members will serve for three years.

The headquarters of the Commission will be in the National Gallery of Art. The Commission will cooperate with the appropriate branches of the Army and of the Department of State, including the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as well as with appropriate civilian agencies. The Commission will also advise and work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territory when it is possible to relinquish military control.

The Commission may be called upon to furnish museum officials and art historians to the General Staff of the Army, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by the armies of the United Nations. One of the principal functions of the Commission will be to act as a channel of communications between the Army and the various universities, museums and other scholarly institutions, organizations and

individuals from whom information and services are desired. . . .

The Commission will function under the auspices of the United States Government and in conjunction with similar groups in other countries for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic and historic records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and restoring to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis Powers or individuals acting under their authority or consent. \* \* \*

## ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENTS ACT TO SHIELD ART OBJECTS

[WD Press Release, 25 Aug 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

Every effort consistent with military expediency is being made to preserve such art objects as come within the scope of Allied military operations. . . .

Military personnel whose backgrounds include a knowledge of art are being assigned to the Allied Military Governments to counsel and guide commanding officers of various units on the value of the art objects. \* \* \*

Maps showing the locations of widely known art objects, including statues, museums and other structures containing both public and private collections, are being furnished combat commanders, including those officers directing aerial attacks. Commanders are doing everything practicable to keep these objects out of direct range. \* \* \*

In addition to preserving these art objects intact whenever possible, the duties of the AMG museums and monuments officers include advising on minor repair projects, and preservation of such fragments as are found after an occupation so that it may be possible for the objects to be completely restored after the war.

## ARCHIVES SPECIALISTS NEEDED

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Oct 43, CM-IN 18164 (MAT-70), CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1]

Already this headquarters is receiving requests for procurement of Italian documents and other material of war. Note Hilldring's letter of 8 September inclosing request of Librarian of Congress. Systematic collection of archives and documents . . . requires organized and directed effort by competent archivist. Suggest if two governments desire such collection to be carried out that they make initial designation of one archivist with small staff each from United States and United Kingdom. They would be attached to

as Deputy to Captain Hammond. Activities of this office were centered in the Subcommittee on Education until the Subcommittee on Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (MFA&A) was established. See CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1) and CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43) (1).

<sup>28</sup> Frequently referred to as the Presidential Commission and the Roberts Commission.

Subcommission in Education, Fine Arts and Archives of the Allied Control Commission. Not necessary that they be in uniform. . . .

[Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 5 Nov 43, CM-OUT 2457 [TAM-74], CCAC files, 314.8 (10-30-43), sec. 1]

. . . We agree with your statement of problem . . . and suggestion made in your MAT 70. . . . Action to accomplish above being initiated immediately. . . .<sup>20</sup>

#### WAR DEPARTMENT POLICY AND PLANS FOR PRESERVING ARTISTIC TREASURES

[Memo, Lt Col Charles P. Burnett, Jr., Chief, Govt Branch, CAD, to Chief, CAD, 26 Oct 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. *Determination of Policy.* The War Department has adopted the policy of protecting artistic treasures to the fullest extent consistent with military operations.<sup>20</sup> This policy is emphasized in the forthcoming Revised Civil Affairs Manual (FM 27-5), which states: "It is the policy of the United States, except where military necessity makes it impossible, to preserve all historical and cultural monuments and works of art, religious shrines and objects of art." In carrying out this policy, the War Department, through the Civil Affairs Division, works in close collaboration with the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. . . .

2. *Formulation of Plans.* Directives for military operations issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff have provided that, so far as consistent with military necessity, all efforts should be made to preserve local archives, historic and classical monuments and objects of art. . . . In the same connection, General Marshall cabled to the Commanding Generals of U.S. Army Forces throughout the world that by direction of the President

<sup>20</sup> With the approval of Eisenhower, on 10 December 1943 the Librarian of Congress directed Manuel Sanchez of his staff, who was then in Algiers, to report to the Military Government Section, AFHQ, as the head of the United States Staff for the collection of archives and library material. On 27 December, the Archivist of the United States recommended that Fred Shipman, Director of the Hyde Park Library, be attached to the Military Government Section for three months to collaborate with Sanchez. However, Shipman did not arrive at AFHQ Headquarters until 30 March 1944. For his reports on the activities of archives specialists in Mediterranean and European Theaters see ACC files, 10000/145/321 and CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Chapters XIV, Section 7, and XXXI cover briefly the procedure in Sicily, Italy, Northwest Europe and Southern France.

all possible steps should be taken to preserve archives. . . .

In the theater of operations, AMG General Administrative Instructions [GAI] No. 8 [Ch. XIV, sec. 7] contained detailed instructions to Civil Affairs officers concerning the steps necessary to implement these directives. AMG Planning Instructions No. 12 also emphasized the policy of protection for ancient monuments and prohibited the purchase or export of souvenirs of artistic value.

Notices have also been posted at historic ruins to safeguard them from damage by troops.

3. *Procurement of Personnel.* Provision was made in tables of organization of AMG for museums and monuments officers. Those officers are now serving overseas in the Education and Fine Arts Division of AMG. Their function is to make plans for precautions to prevent unnecessary damage to artistic treasures and to furnish advice and assistance regarding partially damaged monuments, museums, and other artistic treasures. \* \* \*

4. *Distribution of Maps.* . . . there has been prepared under the general supervision of the American Commission and the Committee of the American Council a series of maps of European cities and towns. These maps contain a brief history and description of the chief museums and monuments in each locality and other information concerning artistic and historic monuments therein.

The maps are furnished to the War Department for use by museums and monuments officers in performing their functions and by the U.S. Army Air Forces in planning their own aerial operations. \* \* \*

5. *Coordination with Operations.* General Eisenhower had been requested by OPD to comment on (a) the practicability of declaring specific cities and towns throughout Italy to be open by agreement and consequently safe storage for movable works of art . . . and (b) the possibility of using radio broadcasts and pamphlets to advise Italians to remove such works from cities and towns which may be subjected to future military operations. . . . [See below, Chapter XIV, Section 7.]

General Marshall also submitted for General Eisenhower's consideration the policy of avoiding destruction of immovable works of art insofar as possible without handicapping military operations and General Eisenhower replied this policy was already in effect. \* \* \*

[FM 27-5, 22 Dec 43, sec. 1]

*Archives and Records.* Archives and records, both current and historical, of all branches of the government of the occupied territory are of immediate and continuing use to military government. It is therefore essential to seize and

protect such archives and records. \* \* \*

*Shrines and Art.* It is the policy of the United States, except where military necessity makes it impossible, to preserve all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER IV

# The Army Is Assigned Leadership in an Indefinite Initial Phase

What of the civilian agencies in the months when the War Department was preparing for a broader role in civil affairs? The question is very pertinent for, while preparation for civil affairs was an Army duty by tradition, this was a war in which many traditions were being upset, and the President could be expected to support the civilian agencies if they were still of a mind to contest the tradition of military control. In February 1943 the Provost Marshal General complained to General Clay that the civilian agencies were "preparing to duplicate what we are doing." These agencies did not, to be sure, protest when, in ensuing months, the War Department not only planned for a purely military administration in the initial phase of the occupation of Sicily but also, in negotiations with the British over combined control machinery, enunciated a general principle of initial military control both of planning and of administration. But such acquiescence meant nothing as the necessity of military control at the outset had never been disputed. The real issues were whether such control should be brief or long, and whether it should be coextensive only with the duration of active hostilities in a restricted locale or with the continued predominance of tactical and logistical needs in a broad area. In the months when civilian control in French North Africa was being evaluated, the civilian agencies gave no indication that they had

changed their dogmas on this issue except in one respect—the recognition that if early civilian control was to be instituted in enemy territory the departments of government would have to act less as contestants with each other. In March 1943 the President defined the powers of Governor Lehman in civilian relief broadly enough to imply a co-ordinating authority in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO), but three months later it seemed necessary to create in the Department of State a new organizational framework of interagency co-operation—the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC). In announcing the OFEC plan in early June the President made it clear that if anyone was guilty of duplication of effort it was the War Department, for his letters to the Secretaries of State and War constituted the fullest and strongest defense of early civilian control of military government that he or anyone had as yet made.

The plan, set forth in one of the documents to follow, was in respect to details rather complicated but its underlying principle was simple—the same, the President wrote to Mr. Hull, as he had had in mind with regard to French North Africa. At a presumably early date, as soon as conditions in the field allowed, civilian agencies would send to the theaters teams of experts whose functions, while characterized as economic, would in fact be coextensive

with all the nonmilitary responsibilities of civil affairs. The one notable deviation from the pattern in French North Africa was that the civilian agencies would be more closely co-ordinated than in that area; OFEC, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, would be a kind of federal union into which they would be brought for purposes of co-operation in civil affairs. By the Area Director Plan, as the plan for operations was known, the civilian agencies would be integrated in the theaters under mission chiefs who reported to corresponding Area Directors of OFEC in Washington. Though the mission chiefs were ultimately to be given complete civilian authority, the plan included a recognition, just as in French North Africa, that during the military period the theater commander's authority must be paramount; when Assistant Secretary McCloy pressed the issue, OFEC acknowledged that this authority would include the right of the theater commander not only to decide the time when civilian agencies would begin operations but also to keep the chain of command and communications within the military framework. All this sounded very well but under any realistic calculation of probabilities no theater commander would be in a position, without the strongest cause, either to defer for very long the beginning of OFEC's operations or, once it had started, to exercise very much influence on its policies. His attempt to do so would be contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the President's pronouncement—in effect that the sooner and the more fully the Army got out of the civil affairs business the better it would be for all concerned. General Eisenhower was apprised of this attitude by General Marshall when the Allied Commander in Chief in August discouraged the belief that civilian agencies would soon be able to begin effective operations in Sicily. [See Chapter VIII.] Once having

begun, their activities, according to probabilities, would tend to bring about not only early demilitarization of the soldier Civil Affairs Officers (CAO's) in the field but also a relatively speedy ending of military control of civilian supply procurement and of civil affairs planning in Washington.

As of the beginning of September 1943 the prospect, then, was one of early transition to civilian control both in Sicily and in other areas as they should be successively occupied. But three months after the trend toward civilian control was at its apex the entire situation changed to an almost incredible degree. In November the Army and not the civilian agencies was assigned the primary role in civil affairs—one much greater than the War Department had either expected or wished. And this time the Army was in the saddle to stay.

To take the liberty of presenting a denouement before its background, on 10 November 1943 President Roosevelt, despite his previous dictum that occupation was in most aspects a civilian task, directed the Secretary of War to assume the major burden of civilian supply. The War Department was to undertake the planning and implementation of the civilian supply program not only in areas of military operations but also in the areas which might be occupied without fighting as the result of a German surrender or collapse which was then seen as relatively imminent. The Army was to have the mission of civilian supply until civilian agencies completed their preparations—in other words, for an indefinite time. While the President said nothing explicitly about the Area Director plan for general civilian control, his reference to the unreadiness of civilian agencies for the supply task was a reminder of what was too well known to need saying—that the civilian agencies had failed not only to take

over civilian supply but also to put into effect the plan first enunciated in June for assumption of responsibility in civil affairs in general.

Something had gone wrong with the entire plan for civilian control, and the cause of the miscarriage, not being revealed in the President's brief pronouncement of 10 November, must be searched for in the three preceding months. The reader of this chapter will not find in the documents an entirely clarifying answer. This is due in part to the fact that the files of the War Department only partially reflect the developments among the civilian agencies. However, both in the War Department and in the civilian agencies informal high-level developments were not, of course, always recorded. Although a most important episode of organizational history must in part remain a mystery, the basic causes of the shift may be discerned from War Department records. At least these records permit one to dispose of the first hypothesis which may suggest itself—namely that the War Department, adopting tactics of a jurisdictional battle, had deliberately made an aggressive comeback.

With regard first to the miscarriage of the plan for civilian agencies to enter the theaters, the documentary record does not show that the War Department did anything to bring this about beyond complaining to the civilian agencies themselves that they were not effecting the co-ordination with each other and with the military that was necessary in order to put the plan satisfactorily into operation. It was the British who dealt the first blow to OFEC's Area Director plan; though their own practice favored early assumption of responsibility by civilian agencies, they saw the matter in an entirely different light when the question was one of introducing American civilians who might be expected to be more sensitive than the U.S. Army to questionable tendencies in British polit-

ical and economic policies. Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring, far from favoring abandonment of the OFEC plan when the British expressed opposition, proposed that high-level efforts be made to overcome the opposition. These efforts might possibly have succeeded had not a second blow been dealt to the plan by the civilian agencies themselves. While OFEC had been counted on to improve co-ordination among component agencies, several of these agencies felt that the required co-ordination with each other and with the military organization would mean an undue sacrifice of their freedom of action. As a result OFEC had to be replaced by the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), wherein several civilian organizations lost their legal individuality and were thus compelled to act as one. But, if the observations of the Civil Affairs Division were correct, FEA failed to achieve—partly because of uncertainties over the boundary line between its jurisdiction and that of the State Department—the co-ordination and stability which it was created to achieve. Moreover, by this time the civilian agencies had received reports from the representatives whom they had sent to the field to reconnoiter, and the reports were most discouraging. Innumerable conferences had been held in Washington on such abstruse issues as the relative merits of centralization and decentralization in foreign economic reconstruction; now the reports revealed that for all practical purposes it would have been better to consider such simple questions as how, under conditions of war devastation, it would be possible to obtain for civilians offices, jeeps, and lodging. At a certain point the civilian agencies themselves seem to have decided that the Area Director plan should be deferred; though never formally abandoned, it soon perished from inanition.

Meanwhile, in the more limited sphere

of civilian relief, OFRRO had been experiencing great difficulties in procuring supplies and had appealed to the War Department for a partnership which would have involved the Army in an expensive and precarious entanglement. When OFRRO personnel became the American component of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) the prospect for an early civilian relief program was scarcely improved; UNRRA would have to wait not only for funds but also for the creation of elaborate machinery for international collaboration. The Army thus did not need to press for the supply responsibility which the President assigned; it received the assignment, and indeed a much larger mission in other civil affairs matters, simply by default.

The default of the civilian agencies resulted in more than a deferment of their control. There is a tide in the affairs of organizations which if taken at the flood leads on to fortune, and the civilian agencies missed this tide in the fall of 1943, with the result that opportunity never beckoned again with the same degree of appeal. Operational conditions in Italy and other areas continued to be difficult much longer than had been expected, and, though the Army again and again invited the civilian agencies to assume varying degrees of responsibility, they appear to have lost full belief in their own destiny in civil affairs—at least as far as concerned field operations.

It would be wrong to conclude—the later achievements of the UNRRA alone made this clear—that the civilian agencies could not have prepared themselves adequately to handle civil affairs in Italy and elsewhere if they had had the time and the resources. American organizational and administrative genius is known best in the

accomplishments of civilians, and some of these accomplishments have been those of governmental civilian agencies in war as well as in peace. From the point of view of the nation, and even more that of the Army itself, it was not a matter for gratification that the plan for early transfer of civil affairs responsibilities to civilians did not materialize. The case for maximum civilian control of civil affairs is much stronger than many of the arguments advanced for it indicate. This case does not rest upon possible Army imperialism or other ambitions, and it is a pity that a number of underlings in civilian agencies, and even a few persons high enough in position to have known better, tended to discredit a sensible thesis by somewhat nonsensical arguments. The case for civilian control rests upon the advisability of a proper division of labor in wartime, as President Roosevelt pointed out in presenting the OFEC plan. His letter of 3 June 1943 to Secretary Stimson emphasized that modern war requires maximum utilization of the nation's civilian as well as military resources, that the assignment of the essentially political and economic functions of civil affairs to civilian agencies places the functions where there is presumably most aptitude for them, and that this division of labor leaves the Army free to concentrate upon its primary mission. The Army itself accepted these concepts subject only to the understanding that during the period of military operations the authority of the theater commander would remain paramount and civilian agencies would be integrated with military organization in such a manner as to ensure harmony of their activities. These provisos the responsible leaders of the civilian agencies came also to accept, and the plan for control in its final form was thus one which

gave appropriate recognition both to military and to civilian interests.

Had the plan been carried out, the history of American participation in civil affairs would have provided a most interesting test of a novel scheme of control peculiarly appropriate for a democracy. The failure to carry it out meant placing undue tax upon the Army's administrative

energies. And, since the control of administration necessarily entails an involvement in problems of policy, the failure also placed upon soldiers the responsibility of political and economic judgments which often were outside their normal sphere and, though not necessarily beyond their competence, certainly beyond their inclination.

## I. IN ENEMY AREAS THE ARMY TO HAVE THE INITIAL BURDEN

### STATE DEPARTMENT FAVORS A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN ENEMY TERRITORY

[Memo, State Dept, on a plan for MG in Sicily, Mar 43, CAD files, HUSKY, prior to 1 Jun 43]

1. There should be a joint United States-British military administration under the orders of General Eisenhower as the United Nations Commander in Chief in the area involved. Since these operations will involve military occupation of *enemy territory*, in contrast to the operations in North Africa and will be conducted under the unconditional surrender principle, the administration should be definitely military in character as a part of the progressive military operations.

2. b. Any appointments of specially qualified persons from agencies other than the military establishments of the two Governments should become part of, and under the direct orders of the military administration, and should not function as representatives of their respective agencies. \* \* \*

### WAR DEPARTMENT VIEWS ON INITIAL MILITARY CONTROL SEEM TO BE GAINING GROUND

[Memo, Haskell, Actg Dir, CAD, for the ACofS for Opns, 1 Apr 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1)]

3. . . . War Department views as to the necessity of administering occupied areas under firm military command, and assuming full responsibility for all matters of civilian supply, public health, repair of utilities and economic measures, especially during the early stages of an operation, are gaining ground as a result of experience of these [civilian] agencies with practical operating difficulties even in North Africa. \* \* \*

### PRESIDENT APPROVES PLAN FOR MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN SICILY

[Memo, Haskell, for McCloy, 16 Apr 43, CAD files, 300.01 (2-26-43)]

I am returning your note of April 13 with . . . memorandum for Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy regarding State Department's position in military occupation.

I know of no Executive Order or Presidential Directive setting forth the present position of the President which, as you know, represents a change from his views of last fall.

This altered viewpoint, at least for one area, has been expressed in security control cable to General Eisenhower, approving a military government for that area and in the President's recent memorandum outlining policy for military government and his approval for Colonel Holmes' plan. . . .<sup>1</sup> The State Department would guide the War Department in determining policy in political matters for the military governor but will have no administrative responsibility in the occupied area as long as military occupation continues. \* \* \*

### STATE DEPARTMENT WANTS A MILITARY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS IN SICILY

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 7 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3020]

. . . State Department in complete accord with our views that British proposal should not be accepted since it is directly opposed to United States Government's considered decision that Combined Chiefs of Staff be sole channel of com-

<sup>1</sup> The alteration in the President's views had not become far-reaching by this time. See Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 3 Jun 43, in sec. 3, below.

municating directives to Commander in Chief and that the views of British and American Governments should be reconciled here and not in Allied Headquarters. . . .<sup>2</sup>

#### PRESIDENT APPROVES A MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN THEATER

[Msg, JCS to CG, ETOUSA [European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army], 31 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 12905]

The President has approved the following message . . . : "The appointment of Political Advisers to COSSAC [Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command] Staff is believed to be inadvisable. The United States prefers pattern being followed in Italian campaign, where Allied Commander receives co-ordinated and agreed political decisions of the two governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Diplomatic representatives are present only as observers for respective governments."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The British had proposed that their Resident Minister, Harold Macmillan, be attached to Eisenhower's headquarters to be in a position to advise him on the

#### PRESIDENT IS INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE

[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Hull, 26 Nov 43, CAD 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2]

I am convinced that no final decisions or plans concerning Civil Affairs for France should be made at this time. Entire North African situation is complicated but the Lebanon affair illustrates the general attitude of the Committee and especially De Gaulle. The latter now claims the right to speak for all France and talks openly of plans to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in.

The thought that the occupation when it occurs should be wholly military is one to which I am increasingly inclined. [See Part Three Soldiers and Statesmen Plan for Liberated Countries of Western Europe.] \* \* \*

political issues which would arise during operations in Sicily. Detailed plans for Military Government control during initial phase in Sicily will be found in Chapter VII.

<sup>3</sup>See Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II* (Washington, 1954), Chapter II.

## 2. ACQUIESCENCE IN CAD'S LEADERSHIP IN CO-ORDINATION OF PLANNING

#### FRENCH NORTH AFRICA SHOWS NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION OF POLITICAL PLANNING

[Memo, Eugene V. Rostow, OFT, Dept of State, for Paul Appleby, Dir, OFT, 22 Dec 42, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. I]

1. . . . The great issue there [in French North Africa] is political, and its primary importance emphasizes, in my view, the greatest lack in our present organization, a mechanism for constant and advance planning with the War Department on the conduct of political affairs in the field. I do not regard an overall interdepartmental advisory committee as an appropriate mechanism for considering these issues. In my judgment a working group should exist—the North African Committee—consisting of you, Mr. McCloy, and, from time to time, one or two British delegates, with suitable assistants and advisers, to create recommendations for Messrs. Hull and Stimson, and the President, both on immediate and long range problems. . . . There are issues of political organization, personnel, security, education, information, the liberation of prisoners and refu-

gees, communications, etc., which are of immense consequence to us, and to the conduct of the war. . . .

2. . . . This proposal for a North African Committee to guide the conduct of political events during the period of warfare and occupation I regard as the first order of business for the broader job of the Office of Foreign Territories. These should be like working groups, with you and Mr. McCloy aided by different advisers, for Italy, Norway, France proper, Germany, and perhaps Burma. Such groups would not only lay down broad lines of policy, which might be followed or not during the battles; they would prepare instructions for the men in the field, recruit the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and his staff for the Commanding General in each case, and see to it that those men became a single combat team, adequately organized for the particular job in hand. In short, they would do what would compare in this field to the work of a general staff for a purely military operation. The job here is para-military, with strong political and military aspects. To make it an effective

combined operation there must be an effective and closely knit combined military and political staff.<sup>4</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT EXCLUDES MOST CIVILIAN AGENCIES FROM ADVANCE PLANNING FOR SICILY  
[Msg, CAD to AFHQ, 24 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 10097]

The War Department for security and other reasons has determined upon policy including only high State and Treasury Department officials in present advance planning stage for HUSKY [Sicily].

Assume you are following some procedure of excluding NAEB and local representatives of Lend-Lease, BEW, OFRRO, OWI, etc. from all planning and administrative responsibility outside N.A. [North Africa].<sup>5</sup>

OFRRO FAVORS JOINT PLANNING OF SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS

[Note by Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 5 May 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

. . . In the discussions which I held with Lieutenant General [Frank M.] Andrews and other representatives of our military forces in London, as well as in discussion with representatives of the War Department here, we have considered the advisability of joint planning of requirements by military authorities and this office, even for the initial military period, on the ground that no one can perceive the precise period of direct military administration or the precise areas which may fall immediately under civilian responsibility by virtue of the withdrawal of the enemy after a military operation is begun. . . .

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE CONCEDES ARMY'S PRIMACY IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLANNING

[Memo, Miller for PMG, re Conf With Representatives of BEW, 21 May 43, PMGO files, 014.13, Relations Between Civ and Mil Auths]

The conferees explored and discussed the following general principles:

<sup>4</sup> As regards French North Africa, the War Department's planning role was secondary to that of civilian agencies. The proposal of Mr. Rostow is striking because of its suggestion that the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee, in which the War Department was but one of a number of interested agencies, was less appropriate than a tightly knit planning relationship between the State and War Departments. When planning began for new areas something like this was, in fact, to eventuate.

<sup>5</sup> The proposal of the civilian agencies for systematic joint planning was thus not adopted by the War Department, except for the two agencies noted above.

1. That the War Department has complete control and direction of all planning and administration in the field of military government and in all training in connection therewith. This was conceded by all.

2. That, upon certain economic matters and the techniques incident thereto, the Board may be in a position to make useful contributions to the activities of the School. \* \* \*

STATE DEPARTMENT AGREES THAT CAD NOW HAS A RIGHT TO THE FINAL WORD

[Min, WD Gen Council, 31 May 43, OCMH files, WD 2-32]

General Hilldring stated that in the first weeks of the organization of the Civil Affairs Division the primary purpose had been to bring the State Department to a realization that they would have to take second place to the War Department in questions of military government. [See CAD notes below.] They have been brought in line on this view, and it has been agreed that the War Department will have the final word in such matters. Then it was necessary to bring other government agencies into agreement on this matter. Progress is being made on a general acceptance of this theory. \* \* \*

HOW CAD PREPARED PLANS

[Ltr, AG to Theater Comdrs, 29 Jul 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42) (1)]

a. In carrying out its mission for the broad civil affairs planning and the direction in Washington of civil affairs problems presented to it by theater commanders, the Civil Affairs Division will prepare broad plans for each enemy or enemy-held area occupied or to-be-occupied, and will co-ordinate these plans with the appropriate civilian agencies and where possible with our allies. Following agreement by all concerned in Washington, the Civil Affairs Division will transmit the plan in the form of a tentative directive to the theater commander concerned for his views and recommendations.

b. The Civil Affairs Division will reconsider the tentative directive in the light of the expressed views of the theater commander and will issue a directive as a basis upon which the theater commander will prepare a detailed plan for military government in enemy or enemy-held areas within his theater.

c. This detailed plan will then be forwarded to the War Department for submission to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval. \* \* \*

## DIFFICULTIES OF PLANNING WITHOUT KNOWING STATE DEPARTMENT'S POLITICAL PREMISES

[Rpt, Maj Sidney C. Sufirin, ASF Hq, on Mtg with Representatives of State Dept, 26 Jul 43, CAD files, 091.1, MG (10-6-42) (1)]

3. The question of the relation between the civilian (teams) and military government was discussed very briefly—no one knowing exactly the administrative plan which would be followed.

4. Mr. Stinebower [State] expressed the view that it would be wise if arrangements were made for the transfer of information and pooling of ideas by persons in the War Department and in the State Department who were doing the basic work. It was also suggested by Mr. Stinebower that it might be wise if War Department representatives in OFEC raised the question of the political preconceptions which would be demanded of military government. Were such a question raised, it would do much to force the State Department to answer questions which it finds difficult to answer.<sup>6</sup>

## STATE DEPARTMENT IS WILLING FOR CAD TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN DRAFTING DIRECTIVES

[Undated CAD Notes Relating to a Conf Attended by Hull, James Dunn, Maj Gen Ray W. Barker, and Hilldring, Transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, CofS files, 337, Staff Conf]

6. *a.* General Hilldring pointed out to Mr. Hull that time was pressing with respect to civil affairs

<sup>6</sup> One difficulty in the State Department planning was apparently the multiplicity of levels and desks concerned. Not until the creation of the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) in late 1944 was a mechanism

planning for Europe. He suggested, in view of the fact that the pressure was largely upon the War Department, that the War Department initiate civil affairs directives for Axis-occupied areas of Europe, including political, economic, and financial sections, and that the War Department then submit them to the State Department for comment, and with respect to the political and economic sections, for approval. General Hilldring's suggestion followed a statement by Mr. Hull that for the time being the State Department would not reduce its political policy for Axis-occupied countries to specific terms for any single country.

*b.* Mr. Hull approved General Hilldring's suggestions. \* \* \*

## AN EXAMPLE OF DELAY IN POLITICAL DIRECTIVES

[Msg, McCloy to Hilldring, 22 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 13754]

On way over suggestion was made that RANKIN C plan be completely reversed.<sup>7</sup> That is, that we take northwest area supplying through northern ports and our partners take southern area supplying through the ports that were allocated to U.S. in CCS 320/2. Thus far we have had no guidance from State Department on any of RANKIN subdivisions. As guide to planning here will you consult Dunn and wire summary of State Department views on all RANKIN proposals. . . .

found which would bring about quick interdepartmental decisions. This committee was composed only of representatives on the higher levels.

<sup>7</sup> One of the three plans, generally known as RANKIN I, II, III, for return to the Continent in event of deterioration of the German position. See Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, Chapter V.

## 3. PRESIDENT STILL SEEKS A WAY FOR CIVILIAN AGENCIES TO CONTROL

### PRESIDENT GIVES OFRRO A CHARTER FOR CIVILIAN RELIEF

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, 19 Mar 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43)(1)]

Pending the working out of final plans with our allies, I should like to define the scope and duties of your work as director of Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

You are authorized to plan, co-ordinate, and arrange for the administration of this government's activities for the relief of victims of the war in areas liberated from Nazi control through the provision of food, clothing, and other basic

necessities, housing facilities, medical and essential services; and to facilitate in areas receiving relief the production and transportation of these articles and the furnishing of these services. \* \* \*

Your operations in any specific area abroad will, of course, be subject to the approval of U.S. Military Commander in that area so long as military operations continue, and in matters of general foreign policies you will be guided by directives of the Secretary of State.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> These directives were in response to Governor Lehman's request for more definitive instruction.

## CIVILIAN AGENCIES DO NOT AGREE WITH WAR DEPARTMENT ON LIMITATIONS OF THEIR ROLE

[Memo for Info No. 56, app. to Memo from Brig Gen William J. Donovan, Dir, OSS, for Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

In defining its mission in military government, the War Department holds it to be mainly administrative and expects that underlying policy in matters political, economic, fiscal, etc. will be determined by other agencies of the government. (Synopsis, September 1, 1942) It invites these agencies to supply lists of personnel qualified to deal with such matters, but it reserves to itself the right of appointment and insists that in all departments military government will be under military direction and control.

It is not at all clear that other departments of the government have accepted the War Department's definition of their relation to military government. The State Department is taking an active interest not only in matters of policy but also in matters of administrative control. The Office of Relief and Rehabilitation (Governor Lehman) appears to be making its own plans quite outside the War Department's frame of reference. Both Lend-Lease and BEW are plan-making in the economic field. The Department of Interior is staking out a claim for participation in the occupation of the Philippines. And there are doubtless others. \* \* \*

## GOVERNOR LEHMAN PROPOSES A STATEMENT OF POLICY FOR OFRRO

[Incl<sup>9</sup> to Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to SW, 8 May 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)]

11. With respect to operations in the field, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations must and does assume responsibility for the selection and direction of the Chief and members of the relief and rehabilitation mission in each liberated area. The mission chief will be answerable to me, as Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, and his charter of operations will come from me.

In matters of general foreign policy the mission chief will be guided by the directives of the Secretary of State and the chief political officer of this government assigned to the liberated area.

When relief and rehabilitation operations are being administered by the military authorities, he

<sup>9</sup> Statement of Policy for Relief and Rehabilitation in Future Liberated Areas. Copies were also sent to State, Treasury, Navy, Agriculture, War Food Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, War Production Board, and the Bureau of the Budget.

will function under the immediate direction and supervision of the commanding military officer in the field; and thereafter, so long as military occupation continues, his operation shall be subject to the approval of the military commander in that area.

Throughout the period of civilian administration of relief and rehabilitation, the mission chief will be directly responsible to this office for the preparation of requirements, the formulation of plans, and the control of the reception, transportation and distribution of goods imported under United States auspices for civilian use, and for all rehabilitation operations.<sup>10</sup>

## WAR DEPARTMENT EXPECTS OFRRO TO RECOGNIZE THE PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY CONTROL DURING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Ltr, Stimson to Lehman, 2 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, OFRRO (2-5-43) (1)]

. . . there were several statements in your memorandum in respect of matters in which the War Department has a primary interest that might be misinterpreted. Informal conversations between members of the War Department and your organization resulted in the conclusion that there were no differences of opinion in fact and seemingly obviated the possibility of future misunderstandings. The following two specific observations, however, would seem to be pertinent.

It is recognized that during the period of military government complete responsibility for all matters within the theater of operation is necessarily vested in the Commanding General of the theater. This does not, however, preclude delegation by the Commanding General, at any time in his discretion, of administrative authority to civilian agencies; it being understood that the civilian agencies would not be called upon to exercise that authority unless and until they are fully prepared to do so.

In regard to supply, transportation and distribution arrangements, there is full appreciation of the fact that these must come under the control of the military, and that all communications during the period of military government must pass through military channels.<sup>11</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>10</sup> Governor Lehman, it will be remembered, had early in April agreed that the War Department would assume responsibility for the first ninety days (see above, Chapter III, Section 4). This paragraph, in particular, was responsible for the concern in the War Department which led to Secretary Stimson's letter to Governor Lehman on 2 June.

<sup>11</sup> Governor Lehman promptly expressed agreement with Secretary Stimson's observations.

PRESIDENT HAS A NEW PLAN FOR ENSURING EARLY CONTROL BY CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 3 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

I am enclosing a "Plan for Co-ordinating the Economic Activities of U.S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas" drawn up by the Bureau of the Budget after extensive discussion with various interested agencies. It has my approval as a positive approach to the establishment of adequate interdepartmental machinery, and I am sure I can count on your wholehearted assistance in its prompt and effective operation.<sup>12</sup>

In order to facilitate the functioning of the plan, I have written the Secretary of State asking him to undertake full leadership in the co-ordination here and abroad of the relevant civilian agency activities, and amplifying certain of the functions assigned to the agencies. A copy of that letter is enclosed for your guidance.<sup>13</sup>

I am making these arrangements so that we can plan for greater participation of the civilian agencies in the economic affairs of liberated areas than has heretofore been feasible. I am convinced that they should be brought into operations at the earliest stage of occupation consistent with military considerations and that maximum reliance should be placed in their work.

Total war, as our enemy has demonstrated, involves full use of military and civilian resources. The civilian agencies have considerable experience and talent that it would be difficult and undesirable for the Army to duplicate. The military operations of our Army should not be unnecessarily diluted or diverted by the questions affecting relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, restoration of trade, strategic procurement and development, repatriation, property rights, legal systems, political warfare, political organ-

ization, and other essentially civilian problems.

Accordingly, I want your Civil Affairs Division and other parts of the Service, to work with these agencies in closest co-operation and to use them to the maximum extent possible. This will leave you free to carry on the primary task which you are facing—the execution of military operations against the enemy.

Plan for Co-ordinating the Economic Activities of U.S. Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas

The plan herein outlined for co-ordinating in this country and abroad, the activities of U.S. civilian agencies relative to economic affairs in liberated areas is based on the following premises:

1. *Premises*

a. There must be one central point in Washington for the co-ordination of interrelated activities of the several U.S. agencies operating abroad. Leadership in providing this co-ordination rests with the Department of State.

b. There must likewise be in each liberated area a central point of leadership and co-ordination similar to that in Washington.

c. The attainment of unity in policy and operations requires the participation of all agencies concerned through interdepartmental machinery which provides a setting for close and continuous working relationships.

d. Such provision for co-ordination shall not remove the responsibility or authority of each agency for carrying out its own functions.

e. A major objective of the interdepartmental machinery should be that of relating the economic plans and operations of U.S. civilian agencies for liberated areas to those of officials responsible for foreign policies, and to those of the armed services and members of the United Nations.

f. Exempted from the scope of this memorandum are the territories and possessions of the United States now occupied by enemy forces, such as Guam and the Philippine Islands.

g. At all levels of interagency operations in Washington, the military and the political policy representatives of our government should work with the civilian operating agencies to afford proper guidance, to obviate excessive clearance, and to provide the information essential to effective planning and operations.

2. *Interdepartmental Policy Committee*

In order to develop a unified policy and to facilitate the co-ordination of agency activities, there is hereby established an Interdepartmental Committee for Economic Policy in Liberated Areas (Policy Committee). The Chairman of this

<sup>12</sup> The Director of the Bureau of the Budget had been working on such a plan ever since, in the French North African operation, it became evident that civilian agency operations were sadly in need of co-ordination. For memoranda of the Bureau of the Budget and others giving the background of the plan, see above, Chapter II.

<sup>13</sup> In his letter to Secretary Hull of 3 June, the President described the plan as ". . . similar to what I had in mind when we discussed the problems arising from the invasion of North Africa. . . . The job in Washington will demand a large part of the time and energy of the Assistant Secretary you name to co-ordinate these activities . . ." CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1). To carry out the plan, the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination (OFEC) was created. Though the State Department also had had leadership in North Africa, no machinery had been provided for co-ordinating the different civilian agencies in Washington or, except for the North African Economic Board, in the theater.

Committee shall be an Assistant Secretary of State whose designation is provided for in Section 3 of this plan. In addition to the Chairman, the Committee shall consist of the heads, or their deputies, of the following:

State Department (Political Policy)

Treasury Department

War Department

Navy Department

Board of Economic Warfare

Office of Lend-Lease Administration

Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations

This Committee will provide a means for bringing together responsible officials of the agencies to consider policies, programs, and other matters of concern to such a group. The Committee will give final resolution, subject to the decisions of the President, to over-all policies and programs of interagency concern which have not been resolved in the Co-ordinating Committee (to be established). \* \* \*

### *3. Assistant Secretary for Foreign Economic Co-ordination*

The Secretary of State shall designate an Assistant Secretary of State who shall co-ordinate our economic activities related to liberated areas and facilitate military-civilian co-operation.

In connection with these duties, he shall act as Chairman of the Policy Committee and of the Co-ordinating Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the interested agencies. To this end he shall provide a secretariat and necessary staff to serve the Policy Committee, the Co-ordinating Committee, and any subcommittees.

### *4. Co-ordinating and other Subordinate Committees*

The Policy Committee shall establish as a working committee a Co-ordinating Committee composed of representatives of the same agencies as those in the former group.

Subject to appeal to the Policy Committee, the Co-ordinating Committee shall review and co-ordinate area plans, and take such steps as may be necessary to adjust policy and area operations to meet the changing needs of the military services and to comply with working arrangements set up with our allies.

Area subcommittees, covering territories to be liberated as well as territories already liberated, may be set up, based on administrative areas determined in consultation with military officials. \* \* \*

### *5. Area Directors*

For each of the areas liberated, the Secretary of State shall appoint with approval of the Policy

Committee, an Area Director. These Directors will provide over-all direction and co-ordination to the economic activities of U.S. civilian agencies in their respective areas.

It is recognized that the emergency problems faced and delay of detailed Washington clearances make it necessary to give Area Directors wide latitude in operations and ample authority to act "on the spot." It is likewise evident that the pattern for each area must be modified according to the military theatre arrangements and agreements with our allies.

In general, however, the following pattern shall obtain where a major part of economic operations are under U.S. agencies:

The Area Director will be subject to orders of the Military commander of the area, and of the Assistant Secretary in accordance with policies established by the Policy or Co-ordinating Committees. In the field the Area Director will keep the political representative of the State Department advised of his activities and will be guided by him on matters of general political policy. That representative, however, shall intervene only when definite political policies are involved. Clearance "bottlenecks" in this respect shall be avoided throughout.

Within these limits, the Area Director shall have all the powers necessary to co-ordinate the field activities of the various U.S. civilian agencies concerned with the economic affairs of the area. In case of emergency, threatened breakdown of activities, or serious difficulties, these powers shall extend to directing specific operations and shifting functions and personnel, pending other arrangements in Washington to meet the situation.

The Area Director will act as the major channel of contact for the civilian economic agencies with the military and our allies in the field. He will likewise channel all communications of these agencies from the field to the Assistant Secretary in Washington for proper handling. \* \* \*

### **THE WAR DEPARTMENT SEEMS TO HAVE SOME MISGIVINGS BUT WILL CO-OPERATE**

[Memo, ID for Rcd, 5 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun 43-Jul 43]

1. The proposed plan is of vital interest to the Army as well as to the State Department and other civilian agencies.

2. It is not believed that the State Department and the various civil agencies are in a proper position to evaluate or estimate the importance of this matter to the Army.

3. The plan has not been discussed with the Army.

4. In essence the plan appears to contemplate, although it is not clear, that during a period of military government there will be no final authority in any one department or agency in the military theater. Instead, there will be a theater commander whose responsibility will be "military," and who will report to the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff as the case might be. There will be a State Department representative who will have authority as to "political" matters. He will report both to the Department of State and presumably to the President. There will also be an area director whose duties will be "economic matters." He will act under the direction of the State Department from Washington and will report to the theater commander, the State Department representative in the theater, and to the State Department in Washington.

5. It is clear that such a system can produce only confusion and cannot be productive of good results. It is fundamental that at any given time there is one source of authority in the area. Initially it must be the military commander. . . .

8. The danger is, of course, that the military

will devote too much attention to military problems and too little attention to civil problems. Yet it is recognized that the primary task is that of military victory. It seemed safer to subordinate civil matters to military operations than to confuse both the civil matter and the military operations by a scheme which is neither fish, flesh, nor fowl.

[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 11 Jun 43, CAD files, 334 OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

. . . You can be sure that it will be the purpose of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department to do all that it can to make the plan effective and in this connection, of course, will seek closest assistance and co-operation of the civilian agencies.

I feel that the government of an occupied area should initially be entirely military and that there is real unwisdom, if not danger, in moving too promptly from military to civilian authority in a sensitive area. However, I can assure you that there will be the greatest disposition to call on the civilian agencies for all the help they can render as promptly as possible. \* \* \*

#### 4. THE PLAN FOR CIVILIAN AGENCY OPERATIONS IS STALLED

##### TREASURY DEMURS AT LOSS OF SEPARATE COMMUNICATION WITH ITS FIELD EMPLOYEES

[Min, 13th Mtg of OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 10 Aug 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

##### II. Organization of Anglo-American Team in Sicily and other Liberated Areas.

1. The Chairman laid before the Committee for discussion and action the following resolution:

"The economic representatives of the United States and Great Britain in Sicily and other territory hereafter liberated shall be combined into a single integrated organization following the pattern of integration established by AMGOT [Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory], i.e.,—There shall be a single Area Director chosen by the U.S. and U.K. governments who shall have as his deputy a person of the opposite nationality; all other economic representatives in the area shall be responsible to the Area Director regardless of nationality and any sections of such divisions shall be organized in like manner from top to bottom so that each person reports to his superior in the organization

regardless of nationality and not to the chief of mission; every effort shall be made to preserve an even balance between the U.S. and U.K. representatives.

"Inasmuch as differences of opinion may arise between U.S. and U.K. representatives it is understood that such differences shall in the discretion of the Area Director and his deputy be referred for instructions to the Co-ordinating Committee in Washington. . . ."

2. Mr. Taylor of the Treasury requested that the means of communication of the agency representatives in the field should be clarified. He said that it was the desire of the Treasury that it be made clear that Treasury representatives in the field could communicate to the Treasury in Washington. . . .

3. General Hilldring agreed that the Army is strongly opposed to a repetition of the communications pattern as adopted by NAEB. He stated that for the sake of clarity and efficiency it was essential that all cables should come to a combined OFEC.<sup>14</sup> This agency would then resolve

<sup>14</sup> A proposed committee for combining the civilian economic agencies of the United States and Great Britain.

such differences of opinion as might exist. By so doing, opposing views would be settled in Washington and conflicts of policy would not exist to trouble the Area Commander. He pointed out that conflicting communications to London and Washington are exactly what the Army wishes to avoid.

5. Mr. Taylor said that the Treasury insisted on the right to ask Treasury representatives in the field for reports from the field. Governor Lehman agreed on this point. The Treasury also suggested that agency representatives report not to the Area Director but to the highest officer of his own nationality. General Hilldring pointed out that in the organization of AMGOT each man reported to his immediate superior regardless of nationality and that in fact the chain of command alternated between British and American.

6. The Chairman requested that the Committee come to a decision on the Resolution and OLLA, OFRRO, OEW [Office of Economic Warfare], and the Army agreed that it should be adopted as an expression of policy by the Committee. Mr. Taylor . . . said he would have to clear the Resolution with other members of his agency and agreed to notify the Chairman of the Treasury decision.

#### OFRRO OPPOSED TO LOSS OF FULL POWER OVER ITS FIELD EMPLOYEES

[Min, 16th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 20 Aug 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

Governor Lehman explained, as the basis for OFRRO's unwillingness to accept the proposed pattern for the Sicilian Team, that in his judgment, the agencies have certain responsibilities placed on them by statute or Presidential order and that under the pattern of the Revised Resolution the agencies' authority is taken from them but the responsibility remains. The Chairman said that it was not the desire of the Co-ordinating Committee to shear the civilian agencies of authority but that an integrated team was necessary to fit into the existing pattern of AMG in Sicily, and, since the Army would not for military reasons change its pattern to fit plans of the civilian agencies, that it was necessary for the civilians to adapt themselves to the Army pattern. \* \* \*

Governor Lehman said that as he visualized the pattern of the civilian agency teams for Sicily, the Area Director would act merely as co-ordinator, but that he feared that under the plan expressed in the Revised Resolution the Area

Director will not only be a co-ordinator but also the man giving orders to the civilian agencies on what they are to do and how it is to be done.

The Chairman said that the issue was clear. It was whether the Area Director had general powers or whether he had powers only in an emergency. The Chairman expressed his opinion that mere emergency powers were not sufficient for proper supervision of civilian work and that he felt that it was essential that the Area Director must be in general charge of the field team. Of course, he explained, it is clear that the Area Director cannot on his own authority order a civilian agency to adopt a certain course without being subject to the agency's right to have the entire matter brought up to the Co-ordinating Committee.

#### BRITISH DO NOT SEEM TO BE PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR THE NEW PLAN

[Memo, Col Samuel F. Clabaugh, Chief, Econ Branch, CAD, for Col David Marcus, ExecO, CAD, 25 Aug 43, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1)]

2. The plan . . . is still not sufficiently definite, complete and articulate in its fundamentals to work out the details to any degree of exactness. For instance it is our understanding that the British do not have any comparable organization to the Office of Foreign Economic Co-ordination or the area teams. We are attempting to integrate two components when one component is not organized, or so far as we know, not proposed. \* \* \*

#### U.S. CIVILIAN AGENCIES DO NOT SEEM TO BE CO-ORDINATING OR PREPARING ADEQUATELY

[CAD Notes Relating to a Conf Attended by Hull, Dunn, Barker, and Hilldring, transmitted to CofS, 3 Sep 43, CofS, 337, Staff Conf, 1943]

1. a. Mr. Hull opened the conference by stating that Mr. James [F.] Byrnes in a recent conference had expressed the fear that the Services and the United States civilian agencies had not reached a clear understanding as to what part each was to play in liberated and occupied areas, and that there was no firm understanding as to how the military and civilian agencies would be integrated in these foreign fields.

b. General Hilldring replied that there was no foundation for Mr. Byrnes' fears. The Army and the Navy are thoroughly integrated, and there is, so far as understanding of the military and civilian roles is concerned, complete agreement between the Services and OFEC. General

Hilldring agreed to present to Secretary Hull in the near future, convincing evidence that this agreement did exist. (There may be, on the part of Mr. Byrnes, some concern about the progress of OFEC in resolving difference between its member agencies and in preparing itself to function in the field. There is some justification for this concern.) \* \* \*

#### VIEWS ON INTRODUCTION OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES INTO SICILY

[Min, 10th Mtg CCAC, 16 Sep 43, ABC files, CCAC files, 334 (8-9-43)]

General Hilldring . . . read the following from a paper prepared by the British members:

"London are [*sic*] of the opinion that, so far as ex-enemy territory is concerned, and at any rate for so long as military control is necessary, there is no place for a separate civilian agency. They consider that if the personnel of the OFEC team is to be employed in Italy, it must be merged in the personnel of the Control Commission. They consider that American civilian experts appointed to the economic and administrative section would, like their British colleagues, act as integral members of the Control Commission staff, and not as a civilian team or civilian teams under the Deputy Vice-President. It is their view that, if this is done, there would be grave risk of duplication between military and civilians, and of an "independent organization" acting in economic affairs without being properly responsible to the CinC as President of the Control Commission."

[Lt.] General [G. N.] Macready stated that the foregoing is a correct representation of the British views.

#### U.S. Views

Mr. Finletter stated his views as follows: That, during the strictly military period of occupation, economic problems would be handled by AMG personnel, and no civilians would be present at all; that, upon invitation from the CinC, civilians would gradually be brought into the area and given the task of handling economic problems; that the civilians would be fitted into the organizational pattern of AMG or the Control Commission, as the case might be, without in any way disrupting this organizational pattern, or in any way impinging upon the full control of the military authorities; that, on this basis, U.S. civilians would be integrated with either British civilians or British military personnel performing similar functions; that there should be a U.S.

civilian director, or chief, of all U.S. civilian personnel, purely for internal administrative purposes, and not for the purpose of changing the organizational structure of either AMG or the Control Commission, or depriving the military personnel of control; that the time may come when instructions to sections of either AMG or the Control Commission, manned by civilians, will flow directly from a combined OFEC, rather than through military channels, even though the military will retain complete, though unexercised, control of all activities in the area, just as was the case in North Africa. In expressing these views, Mr. Finletter said that he assumed that the Control Commission would exercise control over as wide a field as was covered by OFEC.

General Hilldring stated that the position of OFEC, as outlined by Mr. Finletter, is satisfactory to the War Department.<sup>15</sup>

#### BRITISH OPPOSITION STALLS THE PLAN FOR CIVILIAN AGENCY OPERATIONS DURING THE MILITARY PERIOD

[Memo, Hilldring for Col Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Secy, CAD, 21 Sep 43, CAD files, 337, Conf, Hilldring and Finletter (5-14-43) (1)]

2. On the British side, the complete control of all British activity in Axis countries is going to be under the War Office until the termination of military control, the British War Office does not intend to relinquish any part of its control until military control in an area is completely terminated. For this reason, America's expectation for turning over the control of economic functions during the period of military control to OFEC could not be accomplished.<sup>16</sup>

#### OFEC FOUND WANTING AND IS SUCCEEDED BY FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

[Exec Order 9380, 25 Sep 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 Nov 43), 205]

1. There is established, in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the

<sup>15</sup> This position was also satisfactory to General Eisenhower, who had cabled that civilian agencies might soon send their personnel into Sicily. The issue insofar as it pertained to Sicily is fully treated below, in Chapter VIII.

<sup>16</sup> In the ensuing paragraph of the memorandum General Hilldring instructs Hammond to try further to win British acceptance of the concept of civilian economic control laid down in the President's letter of 3 June. However, nothing came of these efforts. The Area Director Plan was never formally abandoned; it simply withered away owing not only to British opposition but also to the continuation of difficult conditions for the operation of civilian agencies.

President, the Foreign Economic Administration [FEA]. . . .

4. The powers and functions of the administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. As soon as military operations permit, the administration shall assume responsibility for the control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas.<sup>17</sup>

#### NEW SETUP ALSO DISAPPOINTS WAR DEPARTMENT

[Ltr, Hilldring to McCloy, 21 Oct 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

2. The establishment of respective jurisdiction in economic matters of the State Department and FEA is not making any progress. . . .

<sup>17</sup> While the charter of FEA incorporated the same mission as that of OFEC (sec. 3, above), abolished by the same Executive Order, the new organization was in one respect quite different. Whereas OFEC was merely to co-ordinate a number of independent agencies, FEA consolidated them within its own framework. The agencies brought together in FEA were the BEW, OFRRO, OLLA, and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) so far as concerned its foreign procurement activities. OFEC is generally supposed to have failed because independent civilian agencies were unwilling to sacrifice sufficiently their freedom of action. FEA would not have this difficulty. However, it was to be impeded by other difficulties, chief of which seems to have been the lack of adequate preparations for entering upon civilian economic activities under difficult conditions.

### 5. DIFFICULTIES OF CIVILIAN AGENCY PROCUREMENT LEAD TO EXTENSION OF PERIOD OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

#### DIFFICULTIES OF OFRRO IN PROCURING SUPPLIES

[Notes, ID on Mtg of WD Sup Authorities, 4 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy--Gen (Jun 43-Jul 43)]

b. Conversations have been held with Governor Lehman. He is relieved to know that he will not be expected to support operations until they have become publicly known. His position is largely dependent on the Army. He has, in fact, no authority, save letter from President, and no funds.<sup>18</sup> The Army, in short, must support his

<sup>18</sup> OFRRO obtained its funds from the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. There were varying points of view among civilian agencies as to the proper placement of relief functions, and it was uncertain at the time whether

3. All signs indicate to me that the new set up is even more hopelessly confused than the old one. Certainly no one is assuming leadership in the establishment of an orderly organization for handling of foreign economic questions.

#### CAD'S DIFFICULTY IS OBTAINING PROMPT CO-ORDINATED ANSWERS FROM THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Memo, Maj Donald H. McLean, Jr., CAD, for the Chief, CAD, 8 Nov. 43, CAD files, 334, FEA (10-16-43) (1)]

1. As a result of a recent suggestion which you made to Mr. Yost of the State Department, I met on Friday with Mr. Herman Wells who has been designated by Mr. [Dean] Acheson as Advisor on Liberated Areas. . . . Mr. Wells and his staff were primarily interested in learning how we desired the Adviser on Liberated Areas to work with the War Department. In this connection, he also raised the specific question of the type of foreign economic policy directive the War Department desired the State Department to prepare.

2. I advised Mr. Wells that our immediate problem was to have at our disposal a civilian machinery which would enable the War Department to obtain prompt answers to the increasing number of foreign economic problems which are presented by theater commanders and that in recent weeks we have had considerable difficulty in obtaining prompt coordinated answers to such questions. \* \* \*

program of requirements, but it is doubtful whether the War Department can undertake to certify his needs while doubt remains as to ultimate responsibility. . . .

#### OFRRO PROPOSES JOINT SUPPLY PROGRAM TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

[Ltr, Lehman, Dir, OFRRO, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 22 Jun 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

In the various conversations there has been general agreement as to the necessity for continuity

OFRRO would continue in its desired role. This was perhaps one of the reasons why the War Department did not count too greatly on OFRRO's procurement of civilian supplies or wish to extend it aid.

of supply and administration during the periods of military and civilian administration. There has also been a recognition of the impossibility of defining precisely the period of original military administration, prior to the development of specific military operations. There has likewise been a recognition of the fact that military operations may result in the withdrawal of the enemy from certain areas without the waging of an active campaign by our forces, thus resulting in the necessity for immediate action by the civilian relief agency in areas which cannot be precisely planned for as a civilian agency responsibility prior to the occurrence of the event itself.

In view of the indivisibility of the supply problem as between the periods of military and civilian administration, I therefore suggest for your consideration the following as a basis for co-operation in meeting these problems:

(1) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, after appropriate clearance with the War Department, should submit total relief requirements for the military and civilian periods of administration of relief to the appropriate control agencies and seek one allocation for both such periods.

(2) The War Department should support the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in its requests before the appropriate control agencies, and otherwise as may be necessary. As I have frequently pointed out, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain adequate supplies without such support.

(3) The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will immediately seek to procure a stockpile of basic necessities for use, by either military or civilian administrators as occasion may require, in any area that may be opened up.

(4) The War Department may requisition supplies held or acquired by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations for relief purposes during the period of military administration. To the extent that security reasons require, such supplies will be called forward by them without notification to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations of the destination of such supplies.

(5) The War Department will arrange for representatives of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations to enter reoccupied areas during the period of direct military administration for the purpose of making plans for the later period of civilian relief administration when the Army is ready to turn over the work

wholly or in part to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.<sup>19</sup>

WAR DEPARTMENT FEELS PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP UNNECESSARY FOR OFRRO AND UNDESIRABLE FOR THE ARMY

[Ltr, Hilldring to Lehman, 7 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

. . . I would like to establish as a general premise the thought that the War Department will provide the absolutely essential supplies to meet the urgent needs of an occupied area for the period which is necessary to permit the full exploitation of military operations and until you have sufficient time after the start of an operation to procure the supplies which will enable you to discharge your responsibilities.

Our reason for the adoption of this premise is that we regard supplies for the support of civilian population as an integral part of our troop equipment. Procurement and distribution plans and procedures have been developed accordingly. Military personnel in this country and overseas have been carefully trained and have had extensive experience in the handling of supplies pursuant to established standards of operating procedures. We feel that it would be unwise at this stage of military plans to adopt the machinery you suggest for the separate handling of this most important phase of our military supply problem. Accordingly, it is our view that we must continue to carry these supplies in our Army procurement program.

Your letter raises the question of stockpiling by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. We recognize that it is very difficult to determine with precision the time schedule of military operations, as the success of even a minor operation may lead to unexpected developments. However, going back to our general premise, with the acceptance of the above responsibility by the War Department for meeting minimum essential requirements until you have had sufficient time to procure such supplies, it would appear to be unnecessary for you to stockpile such supplies prior to the start of military operation except in those instances in which it can be shown that procurement in small quantities over a considerable period of time would prevent a drastic impingement on our own econ-

<sup>19</sup> OFRRO was, in effect, requesting the War Department to help it out of its troubles. In return it was offering little or nothing since the concession of paragraph 4—the right of the War Department to requisition OFRRO supplies during the military period—was one which the Army already took for granted.

omy which might result from emergency large scale procurement.

We agree that the War Department should support the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations in its requests before appropriate control agencies for those supplies deemed a necessary part of any specific military occupation. In such instances, we believe that we should reach an agreement with you in advance of the presentation of your requirements. \* \* \*

I might add that upon the cessation of hostilities, substantial stocks of military equipment should be available for other uses. It seems reasonable to expect that as the military requirements, which now severely tax our resources, are reduced, substantial supplies can be made available for your needs.

The War Department fully appreciates the necessity for a continuity of supply and administration in enemy-occupied areas and for the closest co-operation and the clearest understanding between our offices if we on our part are to meet our military responsibilities and you on your part to be prepared for the problems of civilian relief which will develop as a result of our military operations. Accordingly, I should be very glad to meet with you at your convenience to discuss these matters in further detail.<sup>20</sup>

#### GOVERNOR LEHMAN FEELS WAR DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES ARE IMPEDING HIS EFFORTS

[Ltr, Lehman to Hilldring, 9 July 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

On first reading the policies outlined, if I understand them correctly, appear to me to make it impossible for this Office to be prepared to discharge the responsibilities placed on it by the President and will, I believe, lead to confusion and inadequate provision for the relief needs of liberated areas. . . .<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> One can easily see other and more fundamental reasons than those cited in this letter for declining Governor Lehman's proposal. The Army had tremendous difficulties even in fulfilling its supply responsibilities for the military period. There was a risk that these would be greatly increased if it also underwrote the program of a civilian agency whose charter was doubtful, whose standing with Congress was unknown, and whose competence for its task was as yet untried. An additional source of apprehension was the fact that a joint program with OFRRO might carry over and entangle the War Department in the postwar period, contrary to all its inclinations.

<sup>21</sup> Without underestimating the difficulties faced by OFRRO, one may still find it difficult to accept the view that the War Department's rejection of Governor Lehman's proposal made OFRRO's fulfillment of its task im-

#### ARMY'S SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE EXTENDED TO SIX MONTHS

[Memo, Maj Maulsby Forrest, CAD, on a Mtg between Wright, Dir, ID, ASF, and Finletter, Spec Asst to Secy of State, 1 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 1]

It was Mr. Finletter's opinion that the proposed 90-day planning period was too short and that a period of six months (the British period) would be preferable. He based his opinion upon two considerations: 1. That 90 days would be insufficient for the civilian agencies to complete the necessary procurement and to make deliveries to the operational or base areas, and 2. That the typical military campaign would not have made sufficient progress to permit civilian agencies to take over. . . .

[Min, 10th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 27 Jul 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

V. 1. The Chairman proposed and the committee agreed that for the purpose of programming supplies the Army should be responsible for civilian supply in each area for six months plus the period of confusion after invasion, which would vary, but was estimated at 42 days. It was understood, however, that the Army might call on the civilian agencies at an earlier time to take over the actual distribution of civilian supplies, and also that if the civilian agencies should find six months too short the Army would retain responsibility for a longer period.<sup>22</sup>

#### OFRRO FEELS IT CAN GET NOWHERE WITHOUT ARMY BACKING

[Min, 5th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 15 Jul 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

V. 1. . . . Governor Lehman . . . stated, that the minutes should record it, that OFRRO "has not been able to secure the allocations or the goods." He attributed this to the lack of backing from the War Department. General Hilldring repeated his statement made at previous meetings that the Army never opposed allocations or

possible. Later UNRRA experience showed that a civilian agency can best obtain relief and rehabilitation supplies when war is over. (See George Woodbridge, compiler, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950).

<sup>22</sup> According to the History of the Civilian Supply Branch, I, p. 90, prepared by International Division, ASF, it was General Hilldring's letter of 7 July to Governor Lehman which led the civilian agencies to request an extension of the period of military responsibility to six months.

took any interest unless they interfered with an Army procurement program or with shipping.<sup>23</sup>

#### WAR DEPARTMENT COMPLETES PREPARATION OF AN ENLARGED SUPPLY PROGRAM

[Notes on a Conf of WD Sup Officers, 4 Nov 43, a revision of sec. VI Army Supply Program, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-114]

. . . [Major S. R. Waters] explained that . . . it was a program providing for the needs of 101 million people for a period of 180 days, as opposed to the former edition which provided for 70 millions for a period of 135 days after including a 45-day contingency reserve. \* \* \*

Provision of civilian supply is in no sense intended to keep OFRRO out of the picture, but to back up the responsibility of the Theater Commander and to meet Theater requisitions until, on the one hand the civilian agencies are prepared to act and on the other hand are requested by the Theater Commander to act.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Governor Lehman, however, was asking the War Department not merely to abstain from opposition but for active support. This the War Department felt it inappropriate to give, except when OFRRO's requests were for items of military necessity. General Clay indicated this to Governor Lehman at a conference of 21 July when the latter again aired his procurement difficulties. General Clay stated that "the Army would not oppose, nor actively support OFRRO's requests for allocations of food-stuffs over and above the Army basic ration." ID files, Civ Sup, DS-80. At the same conference General Clay expressed his opposition to OFRRO's program of agricultural machinery since any advance stockpiling could only be at the expense of essential military equipment. The situation points up the difficulties of a civilian agency in procuring relief supplies independently in the face of military priorities.

<sup>24</sup> The upward revision was brought about by two developments. The first was the request of the civilian agencies in July that the military authorities extend their responsibility from 90 (plus 45 days of the "pack-ration" or assault period) to six months. The second was the approval by the Combined Chiefs of a combined supply program for all of liberated Europe. See below, Chapter V, Section 4.

#### A BROAD COMMITMENT TO ALL LIBERATED PEOPLES

[Preamble to the Agreement of the UNRRA, quoted in address by the President, upon signature of agreement, 9 Nov 43, Dept of State Bull IX (13 Nov 43), 317]

. . . Immediately upon the liberation of any area . . . the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing, and shelter, aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people. . . .<sup>25</sup>

#### BUT UNRRA CANNOT FULFILL COMMITMENT UNTIL FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE

[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office, 23 Mar 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-114]

. . . Mr. Acheson [Assistant Secretary of State] stated that the difficulties with UNRRA were that the UNRRA resolution had just been approved by the Congress, that no appropriations would be forthcoming until June 1 at the earliest, that under the UNRRA charter an amendment by the Council would be necessary to go into Italy which is an enemy country and that this might not be possible for various political reasons, as indicated by the fact that the Senate had proposed an amendment prohibiting UNRRA from entering enemy countries and that even if these difficulties were overcome, UNRRA could not be ready to operate for several months after it had received its appropriations.

<sup>25</sup> For months before UNRRA came into existence, its organizational and personnel problems were under consideration in OFRRO. Policies were drafted and approval secured. Also, the section of the UNRRA *Handbook* on international organization was prepared for the First Session of the UNRRA Council. When the new organization was set up, OFRRO personnel became the American component. Woodbridge, *UNRRA*, vol. I.

## 6. THE ARMY GETS A PRESIDENTIAL ASSIGNMENT BY DEFAULT

#### PRESIDENT GIVES ARMY THE ENTIRE INITIAL BURDEN OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 10 Nov 43, WDSCA files, 014 (1943)]

Although other agencies of the Government are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with the relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent if

prompt results are to be obtained the Army will have to assume the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies. This will not only be the case in the event that active military operations are under way, but also in the event of a German collapse. I envisage that in the event of a German collapse, the need for the Army to undertake this work will be all the more apparent.

Therefore, I direct that you have the Army

undertake the planning necessary to enable it to carry out this task to the end that it shall be prepared to perform this function, pending such time as civilian agencies must be prepared to carry out the longer range program of relief.

You may take this letter as my authority to you to call upon all other agencies of the Government for such plans and assistance as you may need. For all matters of policy that have to be determined in connection with this work, you will consult with the State Department for any political advice; and upon the Treasury for such economic and fiscal direction as you may need.

#### INTERPRETATION OF THE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IMPOSED BY PRESIDENT'S LETTER

[Rpt, ID, ASF, European Relief Report on Supply and Administration in Event of Unconditional Surrender, to CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13-43), Bulky file]

1. The President by letter of 10 November, 1943, to the Secretary of War . . . directed that the Army assume the initial burden of shipping and distribution of relief supplies for liberated areas, and undertake the planning necessary to enable it to carry out this task. . . .

4. The problem arising from gradual liberation of the Continent by military operations is covered by plans currently under preparation in Washington and in the European Theater. These plans are being prepared on a combined basis and provide, for planning purposes, that the military authorities will for the initial six months period of liberation supply the civilian populations with the minimum essential amounts of food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies necessary to prevent prejudice to military operations. Supplies of this nature are in fact being forwarded now to Sicily and Italy. Under present plans it is also contemplated that the military authorities will, when circumstances permit and the theater so requests, ship to the theater additional relief supplies procured by the civilian agencies of the government. It is not believed that the President's letter is designed to increase the responsibility of the Army for minimum relief in connection with military operations.

5. *Responsibility in the Event of German Collapse.* It is, however, believed that the President's letter now places upon the Army, in the event of German collapse, the added responsibility of organizing and commencing the shipping and distribution of relief supplies in liberated areas as promptly as possible after their liberation, whether or not the areas are occupied by military forces. The criterion is not to be the necessity of support-

ing a military operation, but is to be the initial implementation of relief and rehabilitation programs devised by civilian agencies. Therefore the relief supplies to be considered will not only include the basic essentials referred to in paragraph 4 above (food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies) but, in addition, those further relief supplies necessary for the re-establishment of agricultural production, manufacture of textiles and clothing, and the restoration and maintenance of essential utilities.

6. Responsibility for shipment and distribution of relief supplies clearly includes necessary provision for operation of essential transport facilities. Consequently, Army planning must provide for supplementing transportation equipment available in the area to the extent necessary to move traffic essential to the initial phase of the re-establishment of the area. This will be the case particularly where there are no occupying forces to make available the necessary transportation. \* \* \*

#### AN INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S ABOUT-FACE

[Draft of Memo for Rcd, OCS, 18 Dec 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 3]

3. The instability of the civilian organization for relief . . . made it most difficult for CAD to work in close co-operation as directed, and Mr. McCloy on 7 November 1943 had a showdown conference with Mr. Stettinius and Mr. [Leo T.] Crowley. As a result of this conference the President on 10 November 1943, in a letter to the Secretary of War, stated that the Army would have to assume the initial burden of shipping and distribution of relief supplies in liberated areas, particularly in event of a German collapse; directed the Army to undertake necessary plans to be prepared to perform this task until such time as civilian agencies were prepared to carry out the longer range program of relief; and authorized the War Department to call on other government agencies for any needed assistance.

4. On 15 November 1943, the Secretary of War held a conference with General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Hildring, CAD, and General Clay, ASF, at which it was stated that the Secretary of War and Secretary of State had agreed that initial responsibility for civilian relief in occupied areas should rest with the Army, and that civilian agencies would concern themselves with the long-range program afterwards. This gave the War Department for the first time a firm definition of its responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation of liberated areas.

PRESIDENT'S REASONING AS INTERPRETED BY  
McCLOY AND ACHESON

[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of  
Civ Sup, DS-171]

Mr. McCloy stated that the genesis of the President's letter was that since in invasion or collapse, there would probably not be extant an organization with personnel, equipment or know-how which would be qualified to procure, lay down and distribute goods for relief purposes, the War Department had been charged with this responsibility.<sup>26</sup> \* \* \*

Mr. Acheson stated that the point of the President's letter was that insofar as the U.S. Government was called upon to furnish supplies for broad areas in which troops operate (not necessarily confined to the combat zone) this Government looked to the War Department to prepare, organize, and give direction for the whole civil relief job initially.

ARMY'S SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITY NOW EXTENDS  
BEYOND THE COMBAT ZONE

[Ltr, Hilldring to Col Karl R. Bendetsen, DACofS, G-5,  
COSSAC, 17 Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-  
43), sec. 1]

Our estimate of the situation . . . will probably have to be considerably revised. Under date of 13 November 1943, I sent you a copy of a letter dated 10 November 1943 from the President to the Secretary of War. This letter enlarges substantially the responsibility of the Army in shipping and distributing relief supplies in liberated areas in Europe. \* \* \*

The military commander will have the full responsibility and plenary power, in the early

<sup>26</sup> The explanation given in the documents quoted above is the only one that has been found. Participants interviewed could add no information about the background of the President's 10 November letter. Notwithstanding the reference to McCloy's presence at the 7 November meeting with Stettinius and Crowley, no evidence has turned up that the War Department appealed to the President for additional responsibility. The President had taken almost two years to come to the view attributed to him by McCloy in the 14 January meeting with Acheson. The 10 November letter was not a repudiation of the idea that civilians should, in principle, undertake these tasks but rested upon a recognition that civilians had not yet made themselves ready and were not likely to do so for a considerable time.

stages of liberation, and this now carries with it the direct supervision over relief and rehabilitation operations everywhere within the geographical boundaries of his command, even though this includes areas beyond "the width of our fronts and the depth of our rear" as you describe such areas in your letter. Consequently, all the European theater of operations outside the combat zone should be considered the communication zone for COSSAC civil affairs planning purposes, including the distribution of relief. . . .<sup>27</sup>

GENERAL HILLDRING EXPLAINS THE BROADER  
CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSION IMPOSED BY THE PRESIDENT

[Ltr, Hilldring to Bendetsen, 8 Dec 43, CAD files, 370.21,  
COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)]

. . . It is my impression that you have oversimplified your civil affairs problem. For instance, in your words "the entire objective of our military operations in France under RANKIN C or OVERLORD is the entrance into and the deployment of our forces for an effective occupation of Germany." I, of course, can't and don't argue with that statement. It is entirely true. However, if you accept that military objective without reservation as a basis for your civil affairs policy, you will go astray, *because* the civil affairs mission of an Army is compounded of political, economic, fiscal, relief, and social considerations that do not enter into the determination of the military mission. It appears to me from this and from previous letters that you are attempting to confine your responsibilities to the zones through which our troops advance. The proper conception, in my opinion, of the civil affairs mission is to state simply that we civil affairs fellows are responsible for the wake of battle. Any other conception will lead us into trouble. It is, in my opinion, highly erroneous to feel that we are only responsible for those acres of ground on which a combat soldier has previously set foot. We are responsible for the areas liberated as a result of military operations or by the voluntary withdrawal of hostile forces under the threat of military operations. \* \* \*

<sup>27</sup> It is noteworthy that General Hilldring was discussing not merely Germany, but areas that would be liberated such as France, where an indigenous government would presumably be allowed to assume administrative responsibility as soon as possible.

## 7. WAR DEPARTMENT ASSUMES LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN ECONOMIC CO-ORDINATION FOR THE MILITARY PERIOD

### WAR DEPARTMENT CREATES AND HEADS A COMMITTEE TO CO-ORDINATE CIVILIAN RELIEF

[Min, 1st Mtg of *Ad Hoc* Econ Comm., 14 Dec 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 4]

A meeting of the *ad hoc* Economic Committee was held in Mr. McCloy's office on 14 December 1943. General Hilldring presided. The following individuals were present: Messrs. Acheson and Wells, representing the Department of State; Messrs. [Lauchlin] Currie, [Francis M.] McGoldrick, McCamy, Coe, representing the Foreign Economic Administration; Captain Pence and Commanders Puck, Gluckstadt, representing the Navy Department; General Wright, Major Palmer and Major McLean.<sup>28</sup>

General Hilldring stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider a list of questions which had been submitted to the Committee by the Foreign Economic Administration. He stated that he would conduct the meeting by first reading a question and then a proposed answer which had been prepared by the War Department. . . .

*Question 1.* Is it advisable to consider the creation of a top committee of the U.S. government most directly concerned in relief and rehabilitation work in order to develop, present, and execute a uniform U.S. program in this field? If so, what agencies should be involved, what should be the functions of this committee and how should it organize its relation with Governor Lehman?

*Answer.* The *ad hoc* Economics Committee is the War Department answer to this question. Its function is to have one U.S. forum for the consideration and co-ordination of initial U.S. relief policy in enemy and enemy-occupied countries which may be the subject of military operations in which the U.S. Army will participate.

*Discussion.* The Committee agreed on this answer. Consideration was given to the desirability of adding additional agencies to the membership. It was agreed that this would not be necessary since other agencies, such as the Treasury, could be consulted on questions in which they had an interest.

*Question 2.* Specifically, how does the Army plan to co-ordinate its work with UNRRA with respect to the development of requirements, the

procurement of materials and the distribution thereof for the period during which military authorities are in control?

*Answer.* War Department will be responsible among U.S. agencies for developing and having developed relief figures for all enemy and enemy-occupied countries of Europe for a period of six months immediately following liberation. These estimates will be developed in collaboration with the State Department and FEA to obtain the best U.S. view. In the case of countries to be the subject of combined operations, these figures will be used as a basis for discussion with the British military in reaching agreement on a combined relief program for proposed operational areas.

It is our present understanding that UNRRA will not be involved in the military period without invitation of the military—insofar as the planning of requirements, procurement and distribution are concerned. If UNRRA should desire to present its views for the military period to the War Department, it should do so through the *ad hoc* committee.<sup>29</sup>

### McCLOY'S SUMMARY OF THE NEW DUTIES ASSUMED BY THE ARMY

[Incl to McCloy's Ltr to Sidney Stein, Jr., Asst Chief, Div of Admin Mgt, Budget Bur, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4]

In implementing the President's letter, the War Department has accepted responsibility among U.S. agencies for (a) developing initial relief requirements, in collaboration with the Foreign Economic Administration and the State Department for enemy-occupied and enemy countries, (b) the shipment and distribution during the initial period of relief supplies in such areas as may be designated, (c) presenting such requirements to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for agreement with the British and (d) procuring against such established requirements those items included in the categories of food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, transportation equipment and public utility repair equipment which are agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as being

<sup>28</sup> General Wright and Major Palmer represented the International Aid Division of the War Department; Major McLean was the ASF working member of CAD.

<sup>29</sup> This understanding as to the dependence of UNRRA operations upon invitation by the military was later confirmed by formal agreement with the international organization.

a U.S. responsibility. The procurement of all other relief items to be furnished by the U.S. is a responsibility of the Foreign Economic Administration. \* \* \*

#### SOME STEPS TAKEN BY WAR DEPARTMENT IN PURSUANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE

[Memo, Wright, ASF, ID, for the Dir of Materiel, ASF, 16 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 5]

2. The War Department was directed by the President on 10 November 1943 to plan and prepare to administer a relief program.

#### Planning

3. On 13 November the War Department issued its first tentative plan for discharging this responsibility. This plan included an estimate of probable minimum requirements for all Axis-held areas of Europe, and a proposed administrative organization and procedures for implementing the plan.<sup>30</sup>

4. This plan also included an analysis of certain basic problems requiring decision by other departments of the government which required an answer before further progress could be made. Action on certain of these problems required decisions by the State and Treasury Departments. *These decisions have not yet been fully made.* They include (a) a definition of the financial aspects of the problem and (b) policy with respect to the Balkans.

5. In the meanwhile the War Department has continued its planning and has obtained concurrence of State, FEA and the British to an estimate of relief needs for all of Europe under "unscorched" conditions. This plan was approved yesterday, 17 February, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and may now be circulated to the interested governmental agencies. The War Department had also prepared for discussion with the British and with interested U.S. agencies an estimate of relief needs for all of Europe under "scorched" conditions and has completed several operational plans which are in process of being extended to cover all of Europe. . . .<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> That the plan could be prepared with such speed after the President's directive was due to the efforts already put into revising the Army Supply Program on an assumption of broad responsibility (see above, Sections 5 and 6).

<sup>31</sup> "Scorched" and "unscorched" conditions refer respectively to the assumption of great damage or of relatively little damage by the enemy. See also p. 682, below, and Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics*, 1943-45, Chapters XXI and XXII.

#### Procurement Responsibility

6. The relief program has presented the first truly combined *supply* program [see Chapter V] that has been undertaken by the U.S. or U.K. governments. As such, it has required the establishment of new administrative procedures in the U.S. government to make possible the coordinated action which is necessary to determine supply responsibility as between the U.S. and the U.K. This requires co-ordination of the following governmental interests on both a U.S. and a combined basis: (a) Military, (b) Supply, (c) Shipping, (d) Political and (e) Financial.

#### Conclusion

16. All of the foregoing has required considerable work with the various interested U.S. governmental agencies and it now appears that no small part of the Army's task is to act as a coordinating or focal point to enable it to discharge the responsibilities which the President directed it to assume. No small part of the problem has been directly due to the shifting responsibilities and organization of the U.S. agencies, which has made it difficult and at times impossible to know which agency was, or considered itself, responsible on particular questions.

#### CCAC CANNOT INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Dir, CAD, for JCS, Rpt, Membership of Foreign Economic Administration on Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 14 Mar 44, CAD files, JCS 744/1]

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have heretofore designated the War Department as the agency responsible to them for the handling of civil affairs in territory about to be occupied and to coordinate the activities of the U.S. civilian agencies in administering civil affairs in hostile and liberated territory during the period of military occupation (JCS 250/2). . . . Since the War Department is primarily responsible for the development of an agreed American policy with regard to all civil affairs problems, including economic matters, it is vitally interested in the size and membership of CCAC [Combined Civil Affairs Committee] where combined policy is formulated with the British.

4. The War Department relies on the Department of State for guidance on all questions of U.S. foreign policy. The Executive Order which established the FEA provides that its powers and functions shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. The Department of

State has membership on the CCAC. FEA, on the other hand, is one of several civilian agencies which are called upon by the War Department in the discharge of one of the several phases of civil affairs activity. . . . All of these agencies, including the FEA, are consulted frequently in the development of an American position. However, if the War Department were required to obtain the formal concurrences of all of these agencies on every civil affairs question, it would be in the position of having been charged by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with complete responsibility but with its power to act subject to the concurrence and possible veto by agencies which the President has designated as the assistants of the War Department. To grant formal membership on the Committee to the FEA would set a precedent for other agencies of the U.S. and British Governments, whose assistance to the military is no less important than the interest which has been expressed by the FEA. . . .

5. The CCAC . . . consists of a small group of men with power to act promptly on any given subject. Its members are not authorities on every subject which is presented for decision. On the other hand, a committee of members of all U.S. and British agencies having an interest in the various aspects of civil affairs problems would be completely unwieldy. . . .

#### WAR DEPARTMENT ENTERS INTO A JOINT RELIEF PROGRAM

[Incl to Ltr, Stein, Bur of Budget, 10 Apr 44, to FEA, on Agreement with WD in Conf in McCloy's Office, 4 Apr 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-196]

(1) The State Department, the War Department, and FEA will present to Congress jointly one over-all relief program. The State Department, the War Department, and FEA will defend this program jointly as a political-military necessity, related to general military objectives even where American troops are not directly engaged.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> This marks the first time the War Department was willing to join formally with the civilian agencies in a supply program. It had previously felt unable to accept OFRRO's overtures to this effect, evidently because, as already noted, of the fear that joint effort would entangle the Army unduly in the programs of the civilian agencies.

As segments of the total program:

(2) The War Department will present the estimates for the basic essentials for Western Europe for a period of six months. This will include non-standard as well as standard items, and is to include provision for Norway. So-called non-standard items will be procured by FEA on request of the War Department from allocation of funds by the War Department.

#### EVEN AFTER UNRRA IS READY THE ARMY MAY HAVE TO RETAIN BROAD RESPONSIBILITIES

[Jt Statement of WD, State Dept, and FEA to Subcomm. of House Comm. on Appropriations, 9 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 219]

If the opening of the second front precipitates the collapse of Axis resistance, the armies may be able to turn over the control of large sections of Europe to the indigenous governments. In such event the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, in co-operation with those governments or, in certain appropriate cases those governments alone, should be able to shoulder the burden of civilian supply.

On the other hand, the Germans may withdraw from certain parts of Europe but continue fighting elsewhere. Military control may be necessary initially, and it will not be possible in practice for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assume responsibility at the beginning, although it may be called upon at the outset by the military to assist in certain supply activities where the use of its trained personnel is advantageous. Furthermore, in certain areas the necessary military control authorities may not include any substantial body of United States troops. Where these conditions prevail, it is proposed to procure essential civilian supplies for such areas out of funds appropriated to the Foreign Economic Administration for lend-lease purposes. Under these conditions and upon the request of the War Department, these supplies will be turned over to the War Department, which will assume the responsibility of shipment, and the goods will be distributed under the direction of a responsible allied military authority. . . .

## CHAPTER V

# Washington or London?

In no war of American history were preparations for civil affairs as energetic as in World War II and yet in none was as long a time required for their completion. That more than two years elapsed before all the major national and combined control agencies had been established and their basic functions defined is partly explained by the fact that the civil affairs mission was of unprecedented scope. But the cause of the delay lay also in the novelty of the approach taken in important phases of the organizational problem. Firm decisions on this problem could not be made until issues more controversial than any of previous wars had been settled to the satisfaction of all whose jurisdiction was involved. Even preparations on the purely national level were enormously complicated, as has been seen, by the initial intention of departing from the tradition of exclusive Army control; only after primary responsibility had been entrusted to civilian agencies in French North Africa and, after long debate, the effort adjudged unsatisfactory could the Army begin to shape its organization to a task of known responsibilities.

This delay on the national level in turn tended to postpone the attempt to come to close quarters with the even more complicated problem of organizing civil affairs control on the combined level. Aside from the *ad hoc* and rather loose agencies required for the limited problems of civil affairs co-operation in French North

Africa, combined machinery could not be established until the United States as well as Great Britain had created an agency to centralize its control of civil affairs both nationally and in international relations. The problem of combined organization also involved an inherent difficulty for, with the decision to dispense with the separate zones that had usually characterized international military government of the past, it became necessary to provide for reconciliation of national policies by creating tightly knit control organs on the highest level. The greatest difficulty of all came into view when it was discovered, as soon as discussions began, that Great Britain and the United States were approaching the problem of combined control from premises as divergent as those which had separated American military and civilian agencies on the question of national control. Thus a second great debate was necessary—one which if only because of international comity was conducted with more restraint than the first but with scarcely less strength of feeling. Once again the issue was the U.S. Army's share in control but in this case the Army was the sole representative of the nation.

With both governments desirous of instituting full collaboration as early as possible, it is evident that only a matter of such major moment as control could have protracted debate on the basic issues from March 1943 till the early part of 1944. Many minor differences in civil affairs

procedure existed and, in addition, a major divergence in administrative philosophy. These issues could probably have been compromised rather quickly if the organizational question alone had been involved. But the nature of combined control machinery would have an important bearing upon the major problem of Allied military government and in fact of all international collaboration—the problem of how to reconcile common with national interests. On the one hand, it was hoped that conflicting views of this problem would be reduced to a minimum if, instead of being left to take place haphazardly in every phase of operations, they were considered as early as possible by a high-level policy body whose familiarity with the basic facts of the civil affairs task as a whole would give the best promise of compromise. On the other hand, it was feared that if the combined body placed either partner in a position of advantage it would be able under the guise of compromise to shape civil affairs policy unduly in its own interest.

The hopes were greater than the fears because the two countries had common political values, including a common regard for equitable dealing on differences that required reconciliation. The caution evinced was prompted in large measure by the duty of every governmental agent to consult his apprehensions more than his hopes in representing his country's interest, but it rested also upon concrete experience in the initial phase of Anglo-American civil affairs relations. Thus all had not been harmonious in the family when the United States, which wanted to leave the French people free to determine eventually their own political destiny, at first favored excluding the de Gaullists from control in French North Africa despite earlier British support of General de Gaulle. Later, when planning for Sicily began, British authorities had argued

that the paramountcy of their country's strategic interests in the Mediterranean entitled it to the senior role in military government rather than merely the equal partnership recommended by General Eisenhower. Continuing differences in point of view could be expected from the general background of the two partners: on the one hand a country which, because its involvements in foreign power politics were occasional rather than constant, could afford to identify its primary interests with broad principles of international order; on the other hand a nation which, forced to consider short-range as well as long-range interests, tended to alternate unpredictably between pious international declarations and the position that until a better world was actually at hand some of the precautions of traditional power politics could not be safely dispensed with.

It may at first appear that each government could have expected adequate protection for its interests in the principle of concurrent decisions, which had been taken for granted in Anglo-American collaboration from the beginning. But this principle, while ensuring that each government would have freedom of action in any issue wherein agreement could not be reached, came really to very little because during military government in the theaters every major operational issue would have demanded eventually some sort of agreement whether for better or for worse. Thus the only meaningful protection of national interests would lie in ensuring that negotiations took place on terms of complete equality, and, since equality was theoretically already assured by the principle of concurrent decision, what was still needed may be designated as practical equality. This more tenuous kind of equality has probably been sought in every attempt at international organization but the record of the Anglo-American negotiations is of unique value to the student of

international relations in its clear indication of both the nature and the motivating force of the concept. Practical equality has to do with the relative degree of power or influence acquired by each partner in an enterprise through all the terms or circumstances under which it is conducted. It is not something which is specified in the charter of an international enterprise but an objective in the light of which the entire charter is drawn.

To illustrate the intricate calculus of practical equality as worked out by Americans, the site of the proposed combined committee was of major importance because government agents stationed in a foreign country are under the disadvantage of being away from their own principals and of being exposed, even if only unconsciously, to the subtle but powerful influences arising from the presence of high-level authorities of the other country as also of its entire body of technical experts. This consideration applied to the assumption that only a single combined committee would be created; if control were divided between a committee in Washington and a committee in London it would be important to note the distribution of functions lest the major areas of responsibility were assigned to the latter. But perhaps more important than anything—and pertinent even if civil affairs policy were entrusted to a single committee located in Washington—was the avoidance of any stipulation which would tend to obligate the committee to give special weight to the objectives of previous British planning, which especially in the British civilian economic agencies had gone much farther than that of their American counterparts.

The truth is that American civil affairs authorities did not start out with any hypernervous approach to Anglo-American relations but became cautious only after receiving British proposals which from the American point of view were almost

wholly on the wrong tack. The British opened the discussion with a proposal to begin the transfer of the combined control of civil affairs to British and American civilian agencies at an early stage. This not only seemed to entail divided control in the theater before the theater commander could consider it safe but appeared also to give the British the advantage of being represented by civil affairs agencies which had achieved a far more elaborate organization than the American civilian agencies had as yet developed. As the discussions progressed further, London met American views on the duration of military responsibility and proposed a scheme of control which was, indeed, on an equal basis insofar as it envisaged one combined agency in Washington and another in London. But the committee in London, which was to be formed by adding American representatives to the Administration of Territories Committee (Europe) (AT(E)), was to have jurisdiction over the European Theater, which, aside from Italy, comprised the most important areas of Europe. American misgivings became still greater when the British pressed the thesis that combined supply planning for northwest Europe should be based upon planning which had already been accomplished for that area by their own agencies. It was not difficult to presume the informed character of British planning but Americans could not overlook the fact that the premises of this planning were largely different from their own, especially in including in the military supply program categories of supplies which in the United States were the responsibility of civilian agencies.

Among American civilian as well as military authorities there was general agreement that these proposals would have the effect of entrenching British leadership and policy in civil affairs relations with the countries of northwest Europe, and there

were more than a few Americans who believed that the British had presented them with this aim in view. If the British had such an ambition it would not have been an unnatural one in view of their strong political interests in the adjacent European areas. But the fact remained that the United States had never consented to play the game under the rule of spheres of special influence, and such a rule seemed the less equitable because the huge civilian supply program would have to be sustained chiefly by American resources. It is true that the British position had in its favor administrative expediency—the advantage of so dividing civil affairs functions as to utilize as much as possible the greater proximity of London to the European governments in exile and the longer and fuller experience of British planners in respect to the problems of northwest Europe. But it seemed feasible to make adequate use of these British advantages only at the expense of carrying division of functions to the extreme of bifurcating the control of civil affairs policy making. American military leaders saw in the British proposal a revival of the same evil of divided control that they had finally succeeded in terminating in their relations with civilian agencies. They considered that the existence of two major civil affairs committees separated by the ocean would mean the artificial division of a problem that was essentially unitary, would result in duplication and waste of effort, and would entail the risk of impasse when the two committees pursued different policies on common problems. While in theory unified control would not completely satisfy the principle of equality—for one control organ could not be in two capitals—yet, realistically considered, the proper site of the senior civil affairs committee seemed to be dictated by the location of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Thus American authorities proposed a civil affairs

committee situated in Washington, subordinated to the CCS and primarily military in its composition, and possessing general jurisdiction though assisted (as was added in a later recommendation) by a subcommittee for civilian supply. Both committees would be free either to accept or to reject the conclusions of previous British planning but the special facilities in London for detailed planning for the European Theater would be recognized by the addition of American representatives to the AT(E) Committee.

British formal acceptance of the American proposals for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee came only after months of negotiations so tortuous and finespun that a single article of the draft CCAC charter, such as that giving special rights with respect to liberated Pacific islands to whichever government enjoyed previous possession, might go through revision after revision until each party was satisfied that every punctilio of phrasing took proper care of its just interests. The selections from the documentary record of the negotiations reflect the inexhaustible patience and semantic ingenuity required of negotiators if a close international partnership is to get started. One learns also that however careful the preparations, the formal beginning of the partnership gives no assurance that it will continue if its charter compromises disagreements with such vague wording as to be subject to different interpretations. One can imagine the discouragement of American authorities when they learned, after an interval so short that the birth pains of CCAC were still fresh in memory, that they and the British had completely different ideas about what the newly created CCAC was.

The Americans believed that the CCAC was the senior combined civil affairs agency but the British, as they made clear in objecting to the American proposal to place the draft civil affairs agreement with

Norway before the CCAC, believed that it was merely the partner of a combined agency in London which had jurisdiction over civil affairs in the European Theater. Thus the issue of unified versus divided control had not been settled at all, and Americans in their struggle for maximum freedom of action had merely worked themselves into a trap unless they should now make their own interpretation of the agreement prevail. The American negotiators had not foreseen that, despite the absence of any express limitation upon the jurisdiction of CCAC, the acknowledgment of a role for the London committee would be interpreted as an implicit limitation upon the seniority of the former rather than as the assignment of a minor function to the latter. The British representatives in Washington had not foreshadowed such an interpretation, and probably the cause of the misunderstanding—a confirmation of American fears on the separation of principals and agents—was that London took or came to take a different view of the CCAC charter from that of its representatives. Americans could argue that London's interpretation was farfetched but could not prove that it was wrong. With each side convinced that its own legal argument was correct and the other's the rationalization of a desire for seniority, it was impossible to avoid the spectacle of a partnership set up for the control of others turning into one in which there was passive resistance of each partner to the other. For several months neither the Washington committee nor the London committee could function because, pending settlement of the jurisdictional issue, the British withheld their co-operation in the former and the Americans their collaboration in the latter. At this stage, even though the impasse did not become publicly known, there were doubtless those on both sides who questioned the

wisdom of having attempted so intimate a partnership.

How the Americans and British found their way out of this seeming impasse illustrates the necessity of persistent hope and effort in seeking international compromise. This is, to be sure, itself a business not without danger, and it has been a common assumption among Americans—though not among Europeans who have dealt with representatives of the United States—that American negotiators tend, out of either excessive kindness of heart or sheer naïveté, to give up much more than they obtain. The present case is of peculiar interest in that the principal responsibility in negotiation was carried by American military authorities who, because this was their first intensive experience in the international politics of civil affairs, might have been expected to err somewhat on the side of concession. Yet, however cordial their personal relations with their British colleagues, their intransigence in the issue ended only when it became possible to effect a settlement in which no major American objective was abandoned. But the art of successful compromise demands that one attempt to avoid the appearance of a victory for either side, and matters were so arranged that no substantial British interest or point of prestige was sacrificed. The United States, victorious in its claim as to the jurisdiction of CCAC, assented to the creation of a face-saving but scarcely very important subcommittee of CCAC in London (CCAC/L), and agreed to appoint military representatives to assist the European Advisory Commission, for which the British desired the broadest possible jurisdiction over surrender and posthostilities problems. In return the British recognized the seniority and general jurisdiction of CCAC in civil affairs during the period of military responsibility. This was, indeed, the American goal from

the beginning, but it is doubtful that the British would have acquiesced in it had they not finally come to feel that far from being incompatible with British interest the location of the major civil affairs agency in Washington could possibly even serve it. Nothing would be a greater obstacle to Great Britain in securing sympathetic American consideration of British requirements than any residual American isolationism, a characteristic of which had been the distrust of decisions arrived at in foreign capitals even though American representatives had participated in making them. There is evidence in any case of eventual British awareness of the greater understanding which could be expected of the American component of CCS if the problems and views of the combined civil affairs committee could be personally ex-

plained to them by its members. General Hilldring has stated that the crisis with the British ended when it became possible to point out face-to-face to their high-level representatives the practical advantages which location of the senior civil affairs committee in Washington would offer in relations with the CCS.<sup>1</sup> This decided the question whether Washington or London should be the principal scene of the combined control machinery for civil affairs. Still open was the question whether Washington or London would achieve greater weight in the scales of civil affairs policy if, unfortunately, operations should prove to involve too many conflicts of national interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Interv, Weinberg With Gen Hilldring, Dec 50.

## I. WASHINGTON AND LONDON COMPROMISE TO CREATE A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

### BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSE FORMATION OF A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE UNDER LEADERSHIP OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES

[Memo, Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 190/1), 11 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

1. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff welcome the basic principles underlying the proposals contained in CCS 190<sup>1</sup> and regard this initiative as particularly opportune, since a considerable amount of work has lately been done in London on the problem of the provision of essential supplies for the local population in territories which may be liberated or conquered as a result of military operations. It is clearly very desirable that this work should be

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<sup>1</sup> CCS 190 (see above, Chapter III, Section 3) initiated the entire discussion over the formation of a combined civil affairs committee. It proposed that such a committee be created by extending to all occupied areas the jurisdiction of the Committee of Combined Boards (Chapter II, Section 3) a combined civilian agency established in 1942 to handle the supply and economic problems of French North Africa. This proposal was rejected by the U.S. Joint Chiefs on 31 March (JCS 250) (Chapter III, Section 3) because of the difficulties which, they felt, were inherent in civilian control during the initial period of military operations.

pursued and developed on a fully combined basis.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will doubtless agree with the principle of an initial military period during which the responsibility for the conduct of all civilian affairs in the area concerned (including supplies, finances, etc.) must rest solely with the military authorities and that that this initial military period should be followed by a period during which an increasing degree of responsibility will be transferred—to appropriate civilian agencies.

4. It is appreciated that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) when created, may be called upon to carry out some of the functions with which this memorandum is concerned. As, however, a considerable time must necessarily elapse before that organization is fully operative, as the exact role and status of UNRRA have still to be worked out, and as some of the functions in question may in any case fall outside the scope of UNRRA, it is considered that immediate steps should be taken to harmonize the work already in progress in London with any similar

planning that may be in progress or in preparation in Washington.

5. The representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff therefore propose in regard to the problem of providing essential supplies for liberated or conquered territories:

(a) That the principle of an initial military period (as defined in paragraph 3 above) should be formally recognized and that full liaison should be established between the War Office Directorate of Civil Affairs in London and the Civil Affairs Section of the War Department in Washington by the appointment of special representatives of the latter to sit on the London Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee.<sup>2</sup>

(b) The co-ordination of planning of civilian supplies for the period subsequent to the period of initial military responsibility (see paragraph 3 above) should be conducted on a combined basis in Washington by the appointment of a Committee of representatives of the interested U.S. and U.K. agencies which would work in parallel with the appropriate Committee in London—at present the Shipping and Supply Subcommittee,<sup>3</sup> on which the U.S. Government are represented. This Washington Committee should, it is suggested, be composed not only of representatives of the Combined Food Board, Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Raw Materials Board and Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the appropriate U.S. and U.K. civil agencies, but also of representatives of the War and Navy Departments. Its secretariat should include representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff secretariat.\* \* \*

If the foregoing principles are accepted, it is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should address a letter to the Secretary of State in the sense of the attached draft, asking him in consultation with the British Embassy to arrange for the organization of the Committee referred to in paragraph 5(b) above.

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<sup>2</sup> A committee, including British civilian economic agencies, which had been set up by the War Office in June 1942, largely for the purpose of estimating the requirements of civilian supply in liberated areas during the military period. The committee was most commonly referred to as AT(E). See also Chapter XXVII, section 1.

<sup>3</sup> A British committee which had the function of reconciling military and civilian supply policies and of providing for the transition from the military period of supply responsibility to the civilian.

<sup>4</sup> The British were thus proposing two combined civil affairs committees—one in London, the other in Washington.

## U.S. JOINT CHIEFS PROPOSE A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE UNDER LEADERSHIP OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES

[JCS 250/4, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 19 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

2. *c.* . . . Both British and the United States Chiefs of Staff agree with the principle of an initial military period during which the responsibility for the conduct of all civilian affairs in occupied areas (including supplies, finances, etc.) must rest solely with the military authorities. Both United States and British Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that upon the termination of the period of military occupation responsibility of all phases of local government will be returned either to a liberated local government or some form of territorial government, and at such time the matter ceases to be of concern to the military. This leaves only the period between the initial military operation and the termination of the military occupation and government where the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . and those of the British are somewhat at variance.

*d.* During this transitory period the plan proposed under CCS 190/1 would establish a Combined Committee of Boards, governmental agencies, and War and Navy Departments in Washington and in London under leadership of the Department of State and Foreign Office as the controlling and administrative body for the civilian affairs of occupied enemy and liberated areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not favor this procedure because it would result in a dual chain of command and require the Theater Commander in his role of military governor to report to two Chiefs. It would result in the participation in the administration of occupied areas of civilian agencies or representatives of civilian agencies having two loyalties: the first and greatest to the particular governmental department or agency by whom they are employed and, second, to the military governor or Theater Commander by virtue of his local position. It would be apt to lead to the establishment of a civilian Economic Board or shadow government in the local area in parallel to and duplicating the functions of the divisions of the established military government.<sup>5</sup> \* \* \*

### 3. Recommendations:

*a.* That the planning, co-ordination and administration of civil affairs in occupied enemy or liberated areas be conducted in a combined operation in accordance with the general policies stated

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<sup>5</sup> In other words, a repetition of the North African pattern with its aggregation of civilian agencies.

in the letter included herewith as Appendix "A" [JCS 250, in Chapter III, Section 3].

b. That this general policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be implemented for combined operations by the immediate designation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the co-chairmanship of United States and British military representatives consisting of representatives of the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff with authority to consult with such United States and British governmental departments, agencies and combined boards as may be necessary (CCS 190/2).

c. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the medium of its Combined Civil Affairs Committee have primary responsibility for the planning and administration of civil affairs in areas occupied as a result of combined operations, including the co-ordination of the activities of the United States and United Kingdom civilian agencies, and the issuance of all directives to the Commanders in Chief in the field.

d. That a letter be addressed to the President and the Prime Minister requesting their concurrence in the recommendations set forth above.

#### BRITISH CONSENT TO JCS PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT CERTAIN BRITISH INTERESTS ARE RECOGNIZED

[Paraphrase of Msg (84391), War Office to British Joint Staff Mission (BJSM) in Washington, 28 May 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

2. We are . . . in agreement that the War Department should in consultation with you proceed with a redraft of their paper for the CCS [CCS 190/1 above] on the basis that we accept a Washington Combined Civil Affairs Committee. There are a number of points which we require you to cover when negotiating the redraft of this paper with the War Department and in discussions later at the CCS. You are instructed to obtain express agreement in two of these points as a condition of our accepting the American proposal. These two points are elaborated in paragraphs 4 and 5 below. You have authority to agree the exact form of words with which to secure the satisfactory safeguarding of these provisos. \* \* \*

4. Our first proviso covers the question of British territories under enemy occupation, such as Burma, Malaya, Channel Islands and other Far Eastern and Pacific territories, including those such as New Guinea the government of which is an Australian responsibility. The interests of New Zealand might possibly be affected also. Future developments may result in the CCS

controlling combined operations in countries which are at present included in areas where the responsibility is purely British under the control of the British Chiefs of Staff. The corollary of the proposal which the Americans have made would be that the Washington Committee would handle all civil affairs questions which might arise out of the combined operations referred to above, but obviously in enemy occupied British territories His Majesty's Governments in the U.K. and Dominions have special interest and responsibilities just as the U.S. Government has in U.S. enemy occupied territories like the Philippines. Accordingly, we require you to obtain express acceptance from the Americans of the principle that final decisions on all civil affairs matters must lie with His Majesty's Government in the U.K. or in the Dominions in the case of enemy occupied British territories, with similar provision for the U.S. Government and U.S. enemy occupied territories.

5. Our second proviso is that we want the existing A.T.(E) London Committee to be expanded into a fully combined committee with strong U.S. representation which must be fully authorized to speak for the U.S. Government.<sup>6</sup> The Committee could, if desired, have a combined secretariat. U.S. representation on this committee would include State Department, Service Departments, and any other representatives the Americans may desire. It is difficult to emphasize too much the important nature of this proviso. At the present the U.S. representatives are hardly better than observers. Thus, even on minor points on which disagreement is most unlikely, it is impossible for us to feel that the War Department are in agreement or even advised of our decisions. For your information, we have been advised by the U.S. representatives that, in spite of the fact that we have at their request given them copies of A.T.(E) papers for transmission to the War Department, none has yet been sent. We must rectify this situation; otherwise the Washington Committee will be burdened with a mass of detail which you and the War Department deprecate, and the final result would be the worst form of remote control.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The British Chiefs of Staff wished the AT(E) Committee to have the primary responsibility for operations based upon the United Kingdom, that is, for northwest Europe. This became clear to Americans only after the Washington committee had begun to function.

<sup>7</sup> The War Department from the beginning had been reluctant to become involved with the decisions of the London committee. It had felt that it could not become bound by decisions into the making of which it could not enter on any basis equal to that of the British with their elaborate on-the-spot organization.

In addition we have in London the Allied Governments in whose countries future operations will take place based on the U.K. and it is essential that detailed consultation should be carried on with them on questions of liaison officers, jurisdiction, knowledge of local conditions and of administration, etc. It is also fair to say that there is in London a mass of information and a body of experience which are elsewhere unobtainable. If the A.T.(E) Committee becomes fully combined it will make possible a thorough and efficient use of these factors.<sup>8</sup> \* \* \*

#### CAD RECOMMENDS QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH CONDITIONS FOR A CCS COMMITTEE

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 1 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

##### I. Discussion.

1. The War Department and the British Joint Staff Mission are considering a proposal for the establishment of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the planning, co-ordination and administration of Civil Affairs in occupied areas.

2. The British Joint Staff Mission advise that the War Department proposal will be accepted provided (a) that a representative of the United States Government be designated to act as a member of the London A.T.(E) Committee with authority to speak for the United States and (b) that the United States or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, will control any decisions on Civil Affairs which are made with respect to any enemy occupied territories of the respective governments, such as Burma and the Philippines. . . .

3. a. Although it does not appear to be desirable to have the War Department recognize and be a part of any agreements which are made by the War Office Committee, it does seem desirable to designate an officer to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) Committee with authority:

(1) To negotiate for the United States with respect to Civil Affairs matters in the European Theater.

(2) To transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other American theaters of operations.

b. The State Department concurs.

4. There does not appear to be any objection to the condition that final decisions on civil affairs

<sup>8</sup> As the other provisos were not assented to they are not quoted. They concern principally the functions and authority which the British desired to see accepted with respect to the AT(E) Committee.

matters in occupied territories of either the United States or Great Britain be the primary responsibility of the Government with the primary interest. The State Department concurs.

##### II. Action Recommended

The Secretary of War directs:

a. That the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, designate an officer from his staff to serve as a member of the A.T.(E) London Committee, with authority to negotiate with respect to the planning of civil affairs in areas in the European Theater which are presently subject to enemy occupation, and to transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other American theaters of operation.

b. That the proposal of the British Government as to the control of decisions on civil affairs in enemy occupied territories of the United Kingdom and United States be accepted.

#### CAD PLAN FOR A COMBINED COMMITTEE LARGELY SOLVES DIFFICULT PROBLEM

[Min, 97th Mtg CCS, 4 Jun 43, ABC files, 334, CCS Min (1-23-43), sec. 4]

Sir John Dill [Br Representative, CCS] said that it seemed that the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had gone a long way in solving a difficult problem. He thought it possible to approve in principle the recommendations of the paper, subject to a few minor drafting alterations, one of which dealt with the important subject of U.S. representation on the A.T.(E) Committee in London.

General Hilldring explained that the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had achieved complete understanding with the U.S. Civil Agencies concerned.<sup>9</sup> The British Government had for some time been operating a most successful system of military government. The War Department had now set up a comparable organization. The proposals set out in the paper aimed at bridging the gap between the U.S. and British organizations, by setting up a Combined Civil Affairs Committee responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This would, in fact, legitimize an existing arrangement since the Husky

<sup>9</sup> General Hilldring had actually had little difficulty in securing their concurrence. They had apparently been concerned lest the British proposal for a combined committee of civilian agencies be accepted. This would have meant an entanglement with British agencies which threatened too great a loss of freedom of action. See Chapter IV, Section 2, note by Governor Lehman, 5 May 1943, protesting the proposal of CCS 190 on the ground that it infringed upon the mission assigned to him.

directive had been negotiated by an unofficial combined committee composed of members of the War and Navy Departments, State Department, Treasury, the British Embassy and the British Army Staff. The Civil Affairs Division had established a mechanism of linking in to their organization the interested U.S. Civil Agencies, such as the State Department, Treasury, Board of Economic Warfare, O.S.S. and Governor Lehman's organization. It was now hoped to use the British and U.S. organizations. \* \* \*

#### PRESIDENT WANTS THE NEW COMMITTEE SET UP PROMPTLY

[Draft of Note from Roosevelt to Leahy, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

I have considered the arrangement whereby the Combined Civil Affairs Committee is to act as the planning and co-ordinating group for Military Government under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and have approved it. I understand it meets with the approval of the State Department and has been drawn up with the intention of meeting the expressed views of the British to whom it has not been officially submitted. I feel it should be instituted as promptly as possible.<sup>10</sup>

#### BUT A MOOT PARAGRAPH IS DESTINED TO KEEP THE COMMITTEE FROM FUNCTIONING PROMPTLY

[Par. 6 of the Proposed Charter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCS 190/4), 12 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

Where an enemy-occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom, or one of the Dominions is recovered as a result of an operation by forces of either the United States, United Kingdom or one of the Dominions, acting alone or on a combined basis, final decision with regard to civil affairs policies to be followed in the area after the capture will be determined by the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The proposed CCAC, as a subcommittee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, did not conflict with the civilian Area Director Plan which the President was espousing at this time for operations within the theater. See pp. 100-101, above.

<sup>11</sup> This paragraph, after considerable debate, had been accepted by both the British Joint Staff Mission and CAD. But opposition to the draft arose in the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. McNarney objected to the fact that the words "after the capture" enabled the United Kingdom to impose its policies upon an American commander before the exigencies of military occupation had ended.

#### THE AMERICANS REWRITE PARAGRAPH 6 TO PROTECT THEIR MILITARY COMMANDER'S FREEDOM OF ACTION

[Min, 98th Mtg CCS, 18 Jun 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 1]

General Hilldring explained that there was a difference in substance between the U.S. and British proposals with regard to the wording of paragraph 6. Briefly, the point at issue was whether the military commander, if British and occupying U.S. territory, or vice versa, must accept the views on civil affairs of the government originally owning the territory immediately it was liberated; or whether he should plan his civil affairs in the light of the situation at the time of the occupation. In his own view the primary interest of the commander concerned must be to rid the area of the enemy and to achieve this most easily he should have no over-all restrictions with regard to civil affairs imposed on him. . . .

#### THE CCS TENTATIVELY APPROVES CHARTER OF A COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

[Charter of the CCAC (CCS 190/6/D) 3 Jul 43, Approved by CCS 25 Jun 43 with proviso that par. 6 was subject to revision, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]

##### *Organization*

1. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee (C.C.A.C.) is hereby established in Washington as an agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

##### *Membership*

2. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee will consist of: One representative each of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. State Department, the British Foreign Office, two representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission, and two additional civilian members, one of whom shall be designated by the United States and the other by the United Kingdom.

##### *Functions*

3. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall with respect to enemy or enemy-held areas occupied or to be occupied as a result of combined (U.S.-U.K.) operations:

a. Recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff general policies which should be adopted for civil affairs, including supply and related matters;

b. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the broad civil

affairs planning and the direction in Washington of civil affairs problems presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by theater commanders; and

c. Under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be responsible for the co-ordination of the British and American military and naval establishments with the appropriate civilian departments and agencies of the respective governments which are concerned with civil affairs matters.

#### *Policies*

4. a. Complete plans for a military operation must anticipate the problems which will be presented by local populations. Planning and administration of civil affairs are an integral part of military operations and cannot be separated.

b. The administration of civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate civilian departments and agencies just as soon as the military situation permits. This may be accomplished gradually, even though the area is still the subject of military control. The decision as to when and to what extent civilian departments and agencies will assist the military in the administration of civil affairs will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation of the military commander in the area. Generally, responsibility for the handling of civil affairs should be relinquished by the military as quickly as this can be accomplished without interference with the military purposes of the occupation.<sup>12</sup>

#### *London Committee*

5. At the present time there is established in London an Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee which is engaged in advance planning for civil affairs in areas which are occupied by the enemy. The Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S.A., has been authorized to designate an officer from his staff to serve on the London Committee with authority (a) to negotiate for the United States with regard to the planning of civil affairs in the European Theater, U.S.A., (b) to transmit to the War Department studies and problems relating to other theaters of operation and (c) to transmit to the Committee the views of the War Department, co-ordinated, where necessary, with those of other United States De-

<sup>12</sup> This paragraph reflected American insistence upon the principle of military control pending determination by military commanders that relinquishment of control to civilian agencies was safe. However, the paragraph also met the British position insofar as it made possible such relinquishment before the end of military occupation.

partments and agencies. [See sec. 5 for revision of 29 Jan 1944.]

#### *Reoccupation of U.S. or U.K. Territory*

##### *6. a. Combined Operations*

Where an enemy occupied territory of the United States the United Kingdom or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or otherwise, the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory may prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies desired for the handling of civil affairs. So much of this outline will be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as they determine, upon the recommendation of the force commander concerned, will not interfere with the military purposes of the operation.

##### *b. Other Operations*

For use in other than combined operations in enemy occupied territories of the U.S., the U.K. or one of the Dominions, the government which formerly had sovereignty over the territory may prepare and submit through the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Chiefs of Staff an outline of policies desired for the handling of civil affairs. This outline will be accepted by the Chiefs of Staff (U.S. or U.K.), unless it will interfere with the military purposes of the operation, in which case reference will be made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a decision.<sup>13</sup>

#### **THE DEBATE IS STILL NOT ENDED: THE BRITISH AMEND PARAGRAPH 6**

[Par. 6, CCS 190/7, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]

"When an enemy occupied territory of the U. States, U. Kingdom, or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as a result of an operation combined or otherwise the directive to be given to the Force Commander concerned will include policies to be followed in handling of Civil Affairs as formulated by the Government which exercised authority over the territory before ene-

<sup>13</sup> This paragraph was a compromise between CCS 190/4, favored by the British and CCS 190/5, which substituted the words "upon the relinquishment of military government" for the phrase "after the capture" in the former. At the CCS meeting of 25 June, Dill proposed that CCS accept the new draft tentatively pending London's opportunity to express its views upon the revision. This was done and the new committee, which became known as the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was ready to function. Under these conditions, the Charter was approved by the President on 9 July and by the Secretary of State, 10 July 1943.

my occupation. If the Chiefs of Staff or Force Commander consider that such civil affairs policies will impede or are impeding military purposes of the operation the matter will be referred to aforesaid Government with recommendations."

Washington, D.C.

3rd July 1943

3 July

Above is reply from London (Colonial Office) in commenting on P6 as approved by CCS 99th Mtg.

TWH [Col. Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., sec., CAD]

#### AMERICANS AMEND BRITISH AMENDMENT

[Min, 117th Mtg CCS, 3 Sep 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43) sec. 2]

General Marshall suggested that the word "military" should be inserted before the word "directive" in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee contained in CCS 190/7. He explained that this word was in order to ensure that directives to the theater commanders should be passed

through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels. . . .

#### PARAGRAPH ON REOCCUPATION OF U.S. AND BRITISH TERRITORIES AS FINALLY ACCEPTED

[Rev par. 6, Charter of CCAC (190/8/D), 1 Oct 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]

6. When an enemy occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as the result of an operation combined or otherwise, the military directive to be given the Force Commander concerned will include the policies to be followed in the handling of civil affairs as formulated by the government which exercised authority over the territory before enemy occupation. If paramount military requirements as determined by Force Commander necessitate a departure from those policies he will take action and report through the Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>The above-quoted paragraph 6 proved acceptable to the British Government and was incorporated in the Charter. But before this happened, another paragraph had given rise to divergent interpretations, on an issue so serious as to prevent CCAC from functioning for some time (see below, Section 2).

## 2. LONDON SUPPORTS A RIVAL OF THE WASHINGTON CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

### BRITISH CLAIM THAT A LONDON AND NOT THE WASHINGTON COMMITTEE SHOULD PLAN FOR ETO

[Memo by Representatives of Br CofS (CCS 274/1), 10 Jul 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1)]

We are concerned over the question of procedure in this matter. The situation regarding this paper is that it was prepared in London at AT(E) Committee, has been considered by the British Chiefs of Staff and approved by them, and now has been brought over here by a representative of [Lt.] General [Jacob L.] Devers [CG ETOUSA] for necessary approval by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup>The paper referred to was the British-Norwegian Agreement, CCS 274, which Devers recommended on 10 June for favorable consideration as suitable for Norway and as a guide for future similar arrangements for civil administration and jurisdiction in liberated territories. The War Department took the view that ". . . inasmuch as the TRIDENT decisions directed combined planning for

In accordance with the charter in CCS 190/6/D, paragraph 5 [sec. 1, this chapter], it is the London "ATE" Committee which engages in advance planning for civil affairs in the European Theater, in close touch with U.S. representatives. We feel, therefore, that this paper, after consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, should be referred to the London Committee and not to the CCAC, Washington, and that the American representatives in London should be fully briefed to negotiate.<sup>16</sup>

occupation of Norway, it is essential that a combined agreement be made. . . ." CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1); ABC files, 014, Norway (4 Jul 43), sec. 1.

<sup>16</sup>The British here base their claim in behalf of AT(E)'s jurisdiction upon a legal ground—the charter of CCAC. However, the paragraph referred to concerning the status of the London committee was, like so many provisions of international agreements, inherently vague—perhaps intentionally so. While both sides were to use legal arguments in the long debate which followed, the really impelling motivations were of course nonlegal. Each coun-

U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF MAINTAIN CCAC HAS  
GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER ETO

[CCS 274/2, U.S. Chiefs of Staff, 13 Jul 43, CCAC files,  
014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]

1. In C.C.S. 274/1, the British Chiefs of Staff raise two questions:

a. General procedure to be followed regarding Civil Affairs matters handled by the AT(E) Committee in London and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington.

b. Immediate procedure to be followed in handling C.C.S. 274, the projected Norwegian-British agreements.

2. With reference to paragraph 1a above:

Paragraph 5 of the Charter (C.C.S. 190/6/D) contemplates that, in the main, advance planning with respect to the European Theater of operations (U.S.) will probably be carried on by the AT(E) Committee in London. However, there is nothing in that paragraph, nor in paragraph 3 (establishing the Civil Affairs Committee), which restricts the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff nor of its Combined Civil Affairs Committee with respect to civil affairs matters in the European Theater of operations to the extent that the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to influence the course of that planning.

3. With respect to 1b above:

a. The Norwegian agreement is a most important international document. It was prepared between Great Britain and the Norwegian Government-in-Exile without participation by the United States and without prior commitment by the United States. This document has been submitted by the British War Office to the United States Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the agreements reached by

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try felt that it could best safeguard its interests if issues most directly touching them were decided by a combined committee located in its own capital. Each country, thus, felt that political as well as legal justice was on its side. The case of the Americans is, unfortunately, more fully stated in the documents which follow than that of the British. The feeling of the British that the AT(E) Committee should have had primary jurisdiction over civil affairs planning for Europe is expressed in strong though good-tempered fashion by Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan, former Chief of Staff, COSSAC, in his *Overture to Overlord* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 234 ff. He points out that the British had been engaged in this liberation and conquest business already for some years, and had been at great pains to set up an elaborate civil affairs organization. It seemed difficult to make sense out of duplicating the British efforts by giving the Washington committee primary jurisdiction over the very area which the British had been studying and preparing for so long.

the British are acceptable to the United States in the event that U.S. troops participate in the liberation of Norway.

b. The joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff have examined the agreement and found it acceptable with several minor exceptions. However, before reaching final agreement, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to assure themselves that the exceptions they have made are acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

c. In view of the fact that the document and the deliberations concerning it are now centered in Washington, and since the Civil Affairs Charter obviously permits such action, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire that their attitude, with respect to the British-Norwegian agreement, be referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and recommendation. \* \* \*

CAD BELIEVES U.S. SHOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWING FROM THE LONDON COMMITTEE

[Memo, Hilldring for Barker, DCofS, COSSAC, 13 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, AT(E) Comm. (1) London (2-27-43)]

2. I believe there is no longer any real function to be performed by the AT(E) Committee with regard to the military phases of civil affairs. Consideration should be given for the withdrawal of Colonel Ryan's membership in it, if General Devers and you consider such a move to be politically expedient.<sup>17</sup>

U.K. AND U.S. DISAGREE ON WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER NORWEGIAN AGREEMENT

[Memo, Wing Comdr T. E. H. Birley, Br Member CCAC Secretariat for Col Thomas Hammond, U.S. Member, 24 Sep 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43) (1)]

. . . I think the correct procedure would be for the agreed London paper to be forwarded from the CCAC Secretariat to the CCS with the statement that it has been agreed by the AT(E) Committee in London, and has been cleared by the British and US authorities concerned. It should not be brought up at the CCAC meeting but I think that as a matter of procedure the document should be forwarded to CCS through CCAC. . . .

<sup>17</sup> In the preceding portion of the memorandum General Hilldring had expressed the view that COSSAC headquarters was the proper and expedient instrumentality for combined civil affairs planning in the United Kingdom. COSSAC, he pointed out, had been designated by CCS as the agency for this purpose.

[Memo, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, for U.S. Secy, CCS, 5 Oct 43, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1)]

2. As a result of completing the discussions in London the present paper (CCS 274/4) is now being submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

3. As the paper will be considered at today's meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to suggest that they recommend that the document be referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for comment. This will be consistent with the intended procedure to be followed in the case of not only the Norwegian Agreement but all subsequent similar agreements which will be concluded with governments-in-exile.

4. One important reason for referring the matter to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee is that the State Department can thus comment officially on the contents for the first time, which is most essential as the US Government will undoubtedly desire to conclude a similar separate agreement with the Norwegian Government. The State Department was not officially represented during the London discussions.

[Memo, Hilldring for CofS, 4 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-3-43), sec. 1]

2. At a recent meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, the U.S. members presented for consideration a draft of a directive for the administration of civil affairs in France during the period of military necessity. . . . [Discussions on a directive and decision reached will be found below, in Chapter XXII, Sections 3-5.]

3. The British view appears to be that the War Office AT(E) Committee in London, which derives no authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should have jurisdiction to determine policy and to make broad plans for the administration of civil affairs in combined operations, particularly as to operations based on the United Kingdom. The AT(E) Committee has no independent jurisdiction to formulate policies on the administration of civil affairs on parallel with, or to the exclusion of, the Combined Chiefs of Staff or their Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

4. The U.S. members of the Committee are clear that since civil affairs are an inseparable part of military operations, broad plans and policies must be established for all combined operations by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting on the recommendation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. This procedure has been followed, with the concurrence of the British, for

operations based on Algiers [MTO]. It is consistent with the charter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and the purpose for which it was established.

5. If a decision should be made on a political level to transfer jurisdiction over these problems to a British Committee which has been operating in close collaboration with the exiled governments, the War Department and the agencies of this government which have an interest in the political and economic phases of civil affairs may be placed in the position of having to accept policy decisions on military and post military issues which have already been reached by the British through this Committee. \* \* \*

#### CCAC UNABLE TO RESOLVE DISAGREEMENT

[Memo, CAD, CCAC 33, 15 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]

#### *Problem*

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, at their 122d meeting held on 8 October 1943, agreed that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee be directed to make recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the procedure to be followed with respect to future papers of this nature (Norwegian Agreement). . . .

#### *Recommendation*

6. *a.* Basic papers relating to civil affairs in combined operations based on the United Kingdom dealing with law, order and security be submitted to the CCS for final action through either the British or the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CCS may, at their discretion, refer any such directive to their established agency for recommendation prior to final action.

*b.* With respect to planning or operations under the broad directives mentioned in paragraph 6*a* above it shall be normal procedure to refer these questions to the War Department for action of the U.S. interested departments and agencies.

*c.* This arrangement is applicable only to combined operations based on the U.K.

[Min, 14th Mtg CCAC, 16 Oct 43, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]

2. Procedure for Civil Affairs in operations based on the United Kingdom (CCAC 33) Mr. McCloy stated . . . that CCAC 33 contains a suggested procedure to be followed with respect to papers similar to the Norwegian Agreement. After considerable discussion,

The Committee:

a. Took note that the British members would convey the views of the U.S. members to London, where discussions on the subject matter of the paper were already in progress.

b. Agreed to postpone action on the paper until such time as the British members had received a reply.

#### THE DISAGREEMENT HAVING A STULTIFYING EFFECT ON BOTH CCAC AND COSSAC

[Ltr, Barker, DCOSSAC, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 23 Nov 43, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43) (1)]

. . . things require a great deal of clarification with regard to our relationship with the British agencies. . . . The difficulties arise through our relationship with the War Office and its related establishments, including the AT(E) which, unhappily, is not as defunct as we had thought it was.

. . . As you know, there has always been a considerable degree of resentment in the War Office because we declined to participate in AT(E)'s activities. I was informed yesterday that there is a disinclination on the British part to participate in Civil Affairs matters through the agency of the CCAC.

The last named disinclination stems, apparently, from two causes:

a. The aforementioned resentment about our nonparticipation in AT(E);

b. A desire, and this is very marked, to have all Civil Affairs matters pertaining to COSSAC transferred from the Washington CCAC to a similar body here in London.

All this tends to have a stultifying effect on Civil Affairs in COSSAC. For example, Major General Sir Roger Lumley, head of the British side of Civil Affairs in COSSAC, has been instructed by the War Office that he is not to be party to any transactions as between COSSAC and the CCAC. \* \* \*

### 3. AMERICANS FEAR BRITISH DOMINATION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY FOR EUROPEAN THEATER

#### BRITISH PREFER TO DIVIDE SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY ACCORDING TO AREA OF PRIMARY STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY

[Ltr, Sir Robert J. Sinclair, Ministry of Production, to Sir Frederick C. Bovenschen, USW (Br), 5 Apr 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-86]

. . . the responsibility as regards territory should be divided as between U.K. and U.S., preferably according to agreed areas of strategic responsibility or, if not on that basis, on such other basis as might be determined.<sup>18</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>18</sup> The British felt that, as regards civilian supply, the United States should assume primary planning and procurement responsibility for Italy while they themselves should assume it for the European Theater. The distinction suggested itself because operations in northwest Europe would be based on the United Kingdom and also because the British were carrying the main burden of negotiations with the governments in exile. One difficulty for the Americans in accepting the British view was that, while the British wished to reserve to themselves the main planning for the European Theater, they by no means proposed to relieve the United States of furnishing a large part of the supplies. Plans eventually agreed upon for northwest Europe supply requirements will be found in Chapter XXIII, of this volume.

#### NEED FOR BRITISH-AMERICAN CO-ORDINATION OF SUPPLY IS RECOGNIZED IN PLANNING FOR SICILY

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 10 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 4110]

. . . In view of previous cables on this subject . . . it is evident that a definitive procedure to handle all categories civilian supply for AMGOT must be established on a combined basis and clearly understood to avoid duplication of bidding here and in U.K. In view of urgency Husky Operation and without prejudice to future arrangements between U.S. and U.K. Governments and decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff, CCS took note at 80th meeting that War Department would expedite planning and necessary co-ordination with British with regard to supply of civilian population and administration civil affairs necessary immediately upon occupation enemy territory HUSKYLAND.

Therefore Allied Forces Headquarters should submit promptly to CCS for War Department its estimate even if tentative of total AMGOT civilian needs by item quantity, priority desired, destination, and markings in 15 day cycles from

D Day to D plus 90 including medical and sanitary supplies and barter goods required to supplement local supplies and production. Upon receipt and consideration your requirements by War Department source of supply as between U.S. and U.K. will be discussed with appropriate U.S. and U.K. authorities and requirements which U.K. is unable to supply which we assume to be the majority will be filled by War Department. In connection with requirements, studies being made by War Department which should enable us to make suggestions which may be helpful. \* \* \*

#### BRITISH PROPOSE DRAWING SOME FOOD SUPPLIES FROM U.S. IN PREPARING FOR SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS OF NORTHWEST EUROPE

[Msg, Br Ministry of Food to Br Food Mission to the United States, 8 May 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-83]

. . . Minister has approved following proposals:

a. To import immediately for arrival before end June so far as possible 130,000 tons of flour from North America over and above present programme of flour shipments.

b. To place orders immediately in North America for 180,000 tons of flour with intention of having it ready for immediate shipment when offensive begins.

c. To ship from North America immediately offensive begins wheat at the rate of 20,000 tons per month or 120,000 tons in all being balance of War Office requirements for the 6 months.<sup>19</sup>

#### BRITISH SUPPLY PROPOSAL AROUSES SUSPICIONS

[Memo, Arthur B. Van Buskirk, OLLA, for Stettinius, Dir, OLLA, 26 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]

(4) In our opinion, the United States should not agree to the British proposal. In the first place, if there is to be any stockpiling in the United States of American supplies for reoccupied areas these should be under the control of the United States Government in the same way that we control munitions or other war supplies. . . .

<sup>19</sup> A copy of this message was given to the Chief of the Civilian Supply Branch, ASF, by the British Joint Staff Mission, with the request that the War Department aid in executing its proposals. The Mission stated that this was but one of numerous similar matters which would be arising in increasing number.

The British should not be allowed to become intermediaries between the United States and the reoccupied territories. The supply arrangements for United States products should be direct with the territory concerned and the United States should be free to make its own arrangements, if it desires, with the country concerned as is done in North Africa. . . .

#### UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BRITISH DETERMINATION OF U.S. RELIEF RESPONSIBILITIES

[Min, Conf in Office of Wright, Dir, ID, 27 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]

Dunn of State Department says that State does not propose to recognize any relief requirements unless they have been approved by the Army. The worry of State is that London might otherwise become the final arena of requirements, even though the Combined Chiefs are in Washington. To date, Leith-Ross Committee<sup>20</sup> and AT(E) Committee have, consequently, not been recognized by State, just as they have not been recognized by War.

General Wright. It seems clear that determination of U.S. relief requirements should be made, for the military period of supply, the responsibility of the U.S. Army, and that the place for determining over-all military requirements should be in Washington, under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . .

#### GREAT BRITAIN WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO STOCKPILE CIVILIAN SUPPLIES DRAWN FROM U.S. SOURCES

[Ltr, Wright to Birley, BJS, 15 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]

With respect to your specific inquiry as to flour, we believe that the stockpiling of supplies against requirements for civil population of occupied areas is a proper responsibility of this government in all cases where the supplies are to be drawn from U.S. resources.

The above has been discussed with and approved by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, Governor Lehman, and the Food Administration for War, who concur in this letter.

<sup>20</sup> The Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, established in September 1941 under Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.

## BRITISH ASK AMERICAN UNDERWRITING OF THEIR SUPPLY PLANS FOR EUROPE

[Memo, ID on Staff Mtg, 5 Jul 43, to Discuss Proposals of Lt Col Mocatta, Br Sup Representative,<sup>21</sup> ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]

Mocatta's position was summarized as follows:

a. U.S. and U.K. would agree on total requirements for areas.

b. U.K. would furnish supplies regardless of source as it chooses and would come to U.S. for balance to supplement such supplies. All relief for Continent would presumably be based on U.K.

c. This leaves initiative wholly in U.K. hands. Further complications are:

(1) Starts U.S. Army furnishing U.K. military with food, etc., which at present it does not do.

(2) Involves allocation machinery with existing combined boards which in turn confuses military responsibility with nonmilitary agencies.<sup>22</sup>

(3) Commits us to AT(E) estimates (calories, etc.). . . .

## U.S. TO REJECT ENTANGLEMENT IN BRITISH SUPPLY PROCEDURE

[Memo, Wright for Dir of Materiel, ASF, 13 Jul 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jan-Jul 43]<sup>23</sup>

4. The U.K. has advised the War Department that its basic interest is assurance that:

(a) Supply requirements shall be reviewed by the appropriate combined boards, and

(b) That the U.S. will furnish the supplies not available from U.K. sources.

5. As you know, the U.S. has not participated in the A.T.E. proceedings except as observers.

<sup>21</sup> Mocatta arrived from England the middle of June and held a series of conferences with War Department supply authorities beginning 19 June. In addition to requesting a definite commitment of U.S. wheat shipments, he sought full acceptance by the War Department of the London AT(E) Committee's supply estimates for Europe. (ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 102.) The War Department representatives informally took the negative position outlined by Wright in the memorandum for Clay which follows.

<sup>22</sup> It was British practice to submit military as well as civilian requirements formally to the Combined Boards, a civilian agency.

<sup>23</sup> A postscript on a copy of the memorandum stated

Actual operational planning is now being undertaken at COSSAC headquarters in London in which the U.S. will fully participate. Consequently, the War Department should not agree except on the recommendations of E.T.O. as to the details of supplies to be furnished beyond food, medical supplies and fuel, but should agree only to the basic principle that minimum essential supplies shall be furnished.

6. As to supply procedure, the method proposed by the U.K. contemplates that after requirements are agreed in the Theater, the U.K. will designate which items they can supply from U.K. sources, and will ask our support for U.K. acquisitions in this country of the unfilled balance.

7. It seems more appropriate to have the U.S. Theater Commander present to the War Department requirements to be drawn from U.S. sources along with his recommendations. The War Department would then procure all U.S. supplies necessary for the combined operation, and forward them to the U.S. Theater Commander to be made available by him for joint use as he deems necessary. This procedure should meet the basic problems of the U.K. outlined in paragraph 4 above, and yet avoid the possible repercussions of having the U.S. turn its supplies over to the U.K. for relief purposes except as the final need is determined. In considering this aspect of the problem it should be realized that supplies for civilian populations, if furnished as suggested by the U.K., would in due course come under Lend-Lease.

8. On the basis of the foregoing it is recommended that:

(a) The U.K. be advised that requirements for relief of civilians will be accepted only on basis of recommendation of U.S. Theater Commander.

(b) Supplies to be furnished from the U.S. will be furnished through our Theater Commander on his requisition.

(c) Such supplies will, as appropriate, be available for joint use, in the discretion of the U.S. Theater Commander.

that General Clay had agreed with its proposals. Wright informed the British Joint Staff Mission on 24 July that questions of the type, amount, and time of supplies for Europe should be agreed upon in Washington on the basis of the U.S. theater commander's recommendations together with those of the British.

#### 4. CREATION OF A COMBINED SUPPLY COMMITTEE AND RECONCILIATION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUPPLY POLICIES

##### THE ISSUE BEFORE US

[Notes by Maj Palmer, Civ Sup Branch, on Discussions of WD Supply Authorities at Mtg of 31 May 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, 1942-43]

3. U.S. must decide to conduct relief as a sole or joint operation, as the case is to be. Present indications are that U.S. favors combined action and U.K. is dragging feet on it. . . .

##### THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION FAVORS AMERICAN SENIORITY IN COMBINED PLANNING

[Memo, Wright for Chief, CAD, Jun 43, ASF, ID, files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. I]

As to matters of supply it seems clear to me that the War Department should be designated as the executive agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Theater Commander during the period of military occupation. Within the War Department the supply responsibility would then be ultimately discharged by the Army Service Forces with the concurrence of your office. \* \* \*

. . . Mechanically the plan would work out as follows:

##### a. *As to Planning*

The Army Service Forces, with your concurrence and after consultation with the B.A.S. [British Army Staff], will recommend the basic provisions to be made for each potential area of occupation, subject, in the event of disagreement, to review by the Combined Committee. Similarly, after consultation with the British Army Staff, a recommendation will be made as to the sources of supply for such requirements. As a result of the foregoing there will be established appropriate procurement objectives for the Army Supply Program to provide the necessary Army stores to fulfill civil requirements to be drawn from United States resources. In the case of a particular operation the Army Service Forces will, again in consultation with the British Army Staff, recommend the supply requirements, the sources and the method of operation for final adoption by the Combined Board. \* \* \*

##### SUPPORT IN CAD FOR COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP

[Memo, Lt Col J. H. Hynes, Chief, Civ Relief Branch, CAD, for Chief, CAD, 24 Jun 43, CAD files, 334, CCAC (6-12-43) (1)]

1. . . . It is obvious that joint Anglo-American planning, procurement and stockpiling is essen-

tial if duplication and inefficiency are to be avoided. \* \* \*

2. . . . the British viewpoint in the matter appears to be in substantial agreement with conclusions previously reached by the Civilian Relief Branch. . . .

4. In order to facilitate the co-ordination of British-American estimates of requirements the [British] memorandum proposes that agreement be reached on the standardization of time periods and uniformity of terminology.

7. In regard to the above proposals, the following observations are made:

a. The principle of combined planning in combined operations in the strategic sphere was fully accepted with the establishment of CCS. It is no less important that the same principle of co-equal partnership be accepted and implemented in the sphere of civil affairs. . . .

b. The six months military period has the advantage of insuring against under-procurement of supply requirements. In the event of over-procurement, supplies thereby released would be available for future operations, or could be turned over to the civilian agencies in the succeeding civilian phase.

c. If the principle of co-partnership in combined civil affairs is accepted, the War Department and the War Office should, as a natural corollary, prepare and submit joint requirements and procurements schedules to the appropriate combined boards.

d. The proposal that responsibility for supply planning and procurement should be delegated by the proposed Combined Civil Affairs Committee to a Supply Subcommittee would provide the necessary machinery to deal with these important questions. It would not appear necessary however to include in the Subcommittee all the elements represented on the main CCAC. It is suggested that membership in the case of planning and procurement for the military period should be confined to representatives of the U.K. and U.S. Armed Forces. . . .

##### ANGLO-AMERICAN SUPPLY SUBCOMMITTEE—A COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP—CREATED

[CCAC 9/1/D, 9 Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-95]

##### *Organization*

1. The Supply Subcommittee is hereby established as an agency of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

### *Membership*

2. The Supply Subcommittee will consist of:
  - a. One U.S. Army Officer
  - b. One U.S. Navy Officer
  - c. One British Military or Naval member
  - d. One British civilian member
  - e. One U.S. and one British Secretary.<sup>24</sup>

### *Functions*

3. The Supply Subcommittee shall:
  - a. Study and make recommendations on supply matters referred to it by the combined Civil Affairs Committee.
  - b. Review for the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and advise them in regard to action to be taken on recommendations of other agencies referred to it by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

### *Procedure*

4. The Supply Subcommittee shall:
  - a. Establish its own method of procedure.
  - b. Form such working groups as are necessary to assist it in the performance of its duties.
  - c. Consult formally or informally with such U.S. and British authorities in Washington as necessary to be sure that supply matters under its cognizance are adequately co-ordinated.
  - d. The U.S. members of the Subcommittee will be responsible for maintaining close liaison with the interested U.S. civilian supply agencies on all matters which are of concern to them.

### AMERICANS ASK BRITISH TO SEPARATE MILITARY FROM CIVILIAN AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

[Msg, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, at Quebec Conf, to Brig Gen Walter A. Wood, Dir of Requirements, ASF, 18 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, BOSCO-IN 113]

... Our policy is at variance with proposed British policy in which A.T.E. apparently combined the military requirements with the type of requirements computed by Governor Lehman's office. We have asked the British to separate essential military from their requirements so that we may reach an agreement. We feel strongly that the War Department using military priorities for procurement must limit its procurement to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary

<sup>24</sup> It will be noted that the U.S. membership did not include any civilians while the British included one civilian representative. The British were led to include civilian representation because of the interlinking of civilian agencies with their supply procedure for the military period. McCloy stated at the second meeting of CCAC that American civilians would attend those meetings to which they were specially invited. The supply subcommittee came to be known as CCAC/S.

supplies and fuel essential to military operations at variance from a more generous relief standard or from rehabilitation measures.

### BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A COMBINED SUPPLY PROGRAM AGREED UPON BY CCS

[CCS 324/1, Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories, 22 Aug 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-98]<sup>25</sup>

### *Recommendations*

5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas that must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following principles:

- a. The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the provision of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and petroleum products), and other agreed articles considered essential to military operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the same whether supplied by United States or United Kingdom.

- b. Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount.

- c. A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States.

- d. Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country procuring the supplies.

- e. In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of civil populations in re-occupied countries, maximum use will be made of supplies, stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries. Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within any particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for such commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to fill the requirements of other re-occupied countries.

- f. The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is anticipated may be re-occupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

- g. It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the occupation of Italy, the United

<sup>25</sup> This document embodies CCS decisions reached at the First Quebec Conference (QUADRANT) in August 1943 and became the future guide for combined civilian supply planning. For further details see Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics, 1943-45, Chapters XXI and XXII.

Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal to Italy each month if the Italian stock position and the need require it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further negotiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, the United States will make available the equivalent of two ships each month for the purpose of supplying the Italian civilian population with the essential dry cargo imports other than coal if the need requires it. Should it be agreed that essential civilian requirements exceed the capacity set forth above additional shipping will be provided as may be agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the provision that Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated.

#### CONTENT OF THE BASIC RATION IS STILL UNSETTLED

[Min, Remarks of Col G. A. Rickards, Br member at Mtg of CCAC Sup Subcomm., 28 Sep 43, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-108]

##### 2. Italian Requirements

###### A. C.C.A.C. (S) 1/3

b. Colonel Rickards [British member] . . . stated . . . that the following appeared to constitute the present status of agreement and disagreement between the US and UK:

(1) Both U.S. and U.K. were agreed on the six-month period of military responsibility and the desirability of achieving a 2,000 calorie level of food relief.

(2) U.K. differed with U.S. on the composition of items required as a military necessity to achieve 2,000 calories, the U.K. feeling strongly that fats, meats, and sugar should be added, with a corresponding reduction in cheese, pulses, and soup, and that coffee was not to be regarded as a luxury item.

(3) U.K. regarded provisions to be made for relief rather as a supplement to locally available supplies so as to raise the level of consumption in any given area to one of 2,000 calories, than as a standard ration.

c. General Wright, referring to paragraph, CCS 324/1 [above] indicated that he felt that the Committee was obligated under that directive to agree on a basic ration, which, however, did not preclude consideration of further items to be added to or substituted for the ration proposed by the U.S.

d. Colonel Rickards urged that the U.S. study with care the Sinclair-Young estimates,<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Estimates of European supply requirements arrived at by working parties of the AT(E) Shipping and Supply Subcommittee.

which, he assured the Committee, had been prepared with extreme pains as to accuracy and which should be accepted as setting forth the scale on which the U.K. felt all liberated areas should be fed during the first six months. He added that it was the U.K. view that any lesser scale would fail in meeting the mutually agreed end of preventing disease and unrest.

e. Colonel [William A.] Rounds stated that there were two primary considerations behind items proposed by the U.S. for the basic ration: (1) That where items were in short supply, such as fat, the decision as to whether the needs of European or U.S. civilians were to be met must be made politically and in the open and not be concealed by the processes of military priority procurement;<sup>27</sup> (2) That provision for civilian feeding by the military must be on the basis of additional provision of normal military stores.<sup>28</sup>

#### UNSETTLED TOO, THE QUESTION OF ROLE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES IN DETERMINING SOURCES OF SUPPLY

[Min, 15th Mtg CCAC, 25 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-15-43), sec. 1]

Mr. McCloy summarized the respective positions of the U.S. and U.K. members of the Supply Subcommittee and stated that the sole question is whether the Combined Civil Affairs Committee shall authorize the Subcommittee to apply formally to the Combined Boards for their recommendations concerning appropriate sources of supply responsibility, or whether, instead, the

<sup>27</sup> General Clay put the matter in the following way: "When the War Department goes before the allocating authorities of the U.S. Government with the Army Supply Program, the Department feels entirely justified in using the high Army priority for obtaining the minimum essential civilian supply requirements . . . that are included in the Army Supply Program. The War Department, on the other hand, does not feel that it would be justified in applying to the allocating authorities for advance stockpiling on a large scale of additional civilian supplies not absolutely necessary for military operations." These, Clay proceeded to explain, were requested, if deemed advisable, by civilian agencies such as OFRRO. Min, 3d Mtg CCAC, 29 Jul 43, CCAC files, 334 (7-15-43), sec. 1.

<sup>28</sup> The disagreement over the content of the basic ration was not settled until the eleventh meeting of the Supply Subcommittee, 16 November 1943. The ration as finally agreed departed from original U.S. view by the inclusion of limited amounts of sugar, fat, and coffee, the last for morale purposes. The proportions of these items included were not as great as the U.K. members thought advisable, but their proposals were referred to civilian agencies for consideration as supplements to the military ration.

Subcommittee shall merely consult informally with members of the Combined Boards.

General Macready [British representative] stated that he and Lt. Gen. Somervell had participated in the drafting of CCS 324/1 [above] and that, while it was intended that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee make recommendations concerning monthly requirements of civilian supplies, it was definitely not intended that the Committee determine the division of responsibility between the U.S. and the U.K. without prior consultation with appropriate civilian boards and agencies which are familiar with the entire world supply picture. He stated further that since food supplies for the British Army are procured not by the Army itself but by the British Ministry of Food, British military officials must necessarily refer problems of food procurement to civilian agencies.

General Wright stated, with reference to General Macready's last statement, that it was his understanding that British civilians had been placed on the Supply Committee for the very purpose of meeting the point raised by General Macready. General Wright further stated that he construed CCS 324/1 as placing two responsibilities on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee; first the determination of requirements, and second, the division of supply responsibility between the U.S. and the U.K. He stated that therefore it does not appear appropriate to make a formal submission of this question to the Combined Boards; that such formal submission is not necessary to obtain the benefit of the experience and knowledge of the appropriate supply authorities of the two governments; and that formal submission of such questions to the various Combined Boards will seriously affect their prompt disposition.

Mr. [A. Dennis] Marris [British representative] stated that the British position envisaged the obtaining of formal recommendations from the Combined Board and not decisions which would be binding upon the Combined Civil Affairs Committee or its Supply Subcommittee.

Mr. McCloy suggested that for the time being the Supply Subcommittee be authorized to refer the pending question formally to the Combined Boards, with the understanding that when General Somervell returns to the U.S. he will be consulted and further consideration will be given to the entire question. . . .

After discussion,  
The Committee:—

Agreed that in order to avoid further delay and

without prejudice to a decision on a policy to be adopted upon the return of General Somervell, the CCAC Supply Subcommittee be instructed that formal submission of Italian civilian requirements should be made to the appropriate Combined Boards in order to obtain their recommendations as to sources of supply for such requirements.<sup>20</sup>

#### DISAGREEMENT OVER ROLE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES IS COMPROMISED

[Ltr, Maj Palmer, to the Deputy Dir of the Food Distribution Administration, 11 Dec 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 4]

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee on 23 November 1943 agreed to instruct the Supply Subcommittee as follows:

"The Supply Subcommittee shall make recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as to the requirements of civilian supplies to be provided by the military during the period of military control and also as to the respective U.S. and U.K. responsibility therefor. In formulating recommendations as to supply responsibility, the U.S. and U.K. members may refer any requirement in question to their respective supply authorities for suggestions as to the appropriate sources of the necessary supplies. The supply authorities for either government may in their discretion refer any such question to the

<sup>20</sup> Among the factors which influenced the American members was the old reluctance to concede a role to civilian agencies in advance planning for military occupation. CCAC 34, dated 19 October 1943, memorandum of the U.S. members of CCAC/S, stated: "Reasons of security make it inadvisable to delegate to nonmilitary agencies the responsibility for schedules of requirements based on operational plans. . . ." (CCAC files, 334 Combined Boards, 10-19-43). It further stated that the need for direct and speedy action is best served by centralizing supply responsibility in one combined military agency. On the other hand, the British had to take into account the fact that any determination of supply responsibility by a combined military agency might affect injuriously their own civilian economy, much more heavily taxed than that of the United States. As their civilian agencies responsible for the requirements of their economy were represented on the Combined Boards, they wished that requests for the requirements of occupied areas "be considered by those who have the responsibility for handling the problem presented by each individual raw material and foodstuff as a whole, and by them fitted into world supply and demand picture of which they alone have full knowledge." Memo, Rickards, British Army Staff, Washington, for Wright, Dir, ID, 11 Oct 43, CCAC files, 334, Combined Bds (10-19-43). This difficult issue was not settled until 23 November, as indicated in the following document.

relevant Combined Board in order to obtain its views and advice as to source of supply."<sup>30</sup>

#### DIVERGENT POLICIES REGARDING HIATUS AREAS MUST ALSO BE RECONCILED

[Min, Mtg in McCloy's office with Bovenschen, Br Permanent USW, 17 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

Sir Frederick stated that he was interested in discussing the effect of the Presidential Directive with regard to the responsibility of the War Department in Civil Affairs matters in liberated areas. He stated that before the British Government could agree to accept a similar responsibility, it would be necessary to ascertain the implications of the letter as to supply and manpower. . . .

Sir Frederick inquired as to the extent to which the U.S. Army contemplated supervision over the distribution of relief supplies. He stated that the British were anxious about the possible

<sup>30</sup> Simply stated, the compromise was that the British supply representatives were permitted to refer matters of supply responsibility to the Combined Boards as they wished to do; the Supply Subcommittee was not obligated to do so as a body.

large commitments in manpower and transport if the Army was to be responsible for the distribution of relief within hiatus areas,<sup>31</sup> or in the event of a general collapse of the enemy. . . .

General Hilldring stated as the U.S. position that requirements were being developed in the War Department for all enemy and enemy-occupied countries. . . . He stated that it was not possible to plan requirements for operational areas alone since in the development of military plans, operational areas were constantly changing. . . .

Sir Frederick stated that the War Office had hitherto assumed that procurement and distribution of relief supplies would be undertaken by the military only in operational areas and not in hiatus areas. He stated that in view of the U.S. position, it would be necessary for him to take the matter up with the War Office.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Areas outside the combat zone and line of communications.

<sup>32</sup> The British in February 1944 agreed to the U.S. position on hiatus areas when they accepted the so-called "Plan A" for combined supply operations in Europe. See below, Chapter XXIII, Section 5; see also Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics, 1943-45*, Chapters XXI and XXII.

## 5. A COMPROMISE ON LOCALE OF PLANNING— WASHINGTON AND LONDON

#### BRITISH WILL CO-OPERATE IN CCAC BUT EXPECT CONCESSIONS IN RETURN

[Msg, ASW to the SW, 27 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16774]

Had talk yesterday with [Br Foreign Secy Anthony] Eden. Quite evident he feels European Advisory Commission [EAC]<sup>33</sup> in London important achievement and does not wish to derogate in any way from the authority which he feels was given it by the terms of reference and documents which were referred to it at Moscow. He wants to dignify it and have us send a small but

<sup>33</sup> The establishment of the European Advisory Commission was agreed upon at the Moscow Conference. The Ambassador to Great Britain was the American representative on this body which was to meet in London. General Wickersham, formerly Commandant of the School of Military Government, was appointed military adviser to the U.S. representative and in that capacity was to represent the War Department and act as a liaison officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By its terms of reference, the Commission was to "study and make joint recommendations to the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostili-

ties which the three governments may consider appropriate to refer to it." The vagueness of this formulation raised the possibility of the EAC's considering questions of civil affairs arising in the presurrender period. The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs in opposition to this (see below) were incorporated in instructions from the Secretary of State to the U.S. representative on the Commission.

good staff to London immediately to assist [John G.] Winant whom the President has advised Prime Minister he intends to appoint to Commission. However Eden has agreed and I believe favors submission by Advisory Commission of their tentative recommendations to Combined Chiefs of Staff for comment and suggestion by them prior to any final submission of recommendation by Commission to Governments. Also has tentatively agreed to remove further pressure for removal of Combined Civil Affairs Committee<sup>34</sup> in London and if we are prepared to take step one above will agree to permit British representatives CCAC to take full part in all dis-

<sup>34</sup> That is, elevation of AT(E) to the status of senior combined civil affairs committee for Europe.

cussions relating to U.K. based operations, perhaps sending to Washington a man with substantial authority to augment or replace existing British representation. . . .<sup>35</sup>

[Remarks, Bendtsen, in Telecon with Hilldring, 4 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, WDTC-120]

. . . I have a very brief report to make to you in regard to certain action that I thought you should know about, if you have not already been informed. It is in regard to the action taken by the British War Ministry with respect to the CCAC. They have agreed that the CCAC shall have jurisdiction over all combined civil authorities matters with regard to Northwest Europe. I believe they have in mind proposing that there be established here in London a Branch of the CCAC, a London Echelon, which will have jurisdiction over political matters and the remainder of the questions regarding supply, etc., to come before the main CCAC in Washington. \* \* \*

#### JCS APPROVES CO-OPERATION WITH EAC PROVIDED IT DOES NOT TRESPASS UPON MILITARY JURISDICTION

[Ltr, JCS to Secy of State, 5 Jan 44, OPD files, 334.8, sec. 1]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully considered the question of military and naval advisors for the European Advisory Commission and have directed that adequate military and naval personnel be provided in London and Washington for liaison with the Commission.

Based on military considerations, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following should be incorporated in the instructions to Mr. Winant and should provide the accepted procedure for handling matters of direct or indirect military concern which may arise in connection with the work of the Commission:

a. That the European Advisory Commission, from the U.S. point of view, is an important body, whose functioning and development should be guided and maintained in accordance with the U.S. concept as to the scope of its activities and the manner of its operation.

<sup>35</sup> The British members of CCAC had for several months abstained from discussing matters which their government considered within the proper jurisdiction of the London committee.

On 7 December, the American delegates in AT(E) were forbidden active participation pending determination as to whether jurisdiction over planning for ETO would fall on CCAC in Washington or the London Committee.

b. That the Commission should keep strictly within the letter and spirit of its directive and in so doing be particular to avoid problems relating to the conduct of military operations, and concerning civil affairs of liberated or enemy territories incident to such operations prior to the end of hostilities. \* \* \*

#### BUT OPD DISAGREES WITH CAD'S PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT A SUBCOMMITTEE OF CCAC IN LONDON

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for Dir, CAD, 20 Jan 44, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]

3. It is understood that this proposal [that a subcommittee of CCAC sit in London] is a compromise designed to avoid the vitiation of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington. It is, in our opinion, very doubtful whether your proposal will not have the opposite effect. The Subcommittee in London is empowered to act on matters "which do not require reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff" and "do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Apparently the London Subcommittee can under the proposed Charter decide what does require reference. As far as is known, no other agency of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has a sub-agency with powers to act in London. It appears that your proposal may well eventually place the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in a position of a figurehead only with all real power in London.<sup>36</sup>

#### REASONS FOR CREATING THE LONDON COMMITTEE

[Min, 143d Mtg CCS, 28 Jan 44, G-3 files, ABC, 334, CCS Min (1-23-42), sec. 6]

Admiral Leahy said that while not fully briefed on this matter he was naturally averse to any proposal which involved the establishment of yet another committee in the CCS organization. Personally he was unable to see the necessity for the new committee as proposed.

General Macready explained that the agreement as put forward by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee had been reached as a result

<sup>36</sup> In an OPD Memo for record, 19 January, it was pointed out that the Director of CAD had originally been opposed to a London subcommittee. The reason for CAD's later acquiescence is indicated by the same OPD Memo. A statement made by Colonel Marcus, Executive of CAD, to OPD is cited as follows: "He stated that the British have refused to take affirmative action in CCAC meetings which has resulted in complete frustration with nothing having been accomplished for months. He said that the London idea was the only remedy and if not accepted, the CCAC would cease to exist. . . ." G-3 files, ABC, 014 (11-27-42), sec. 2.

of a special mission from London. There were, he thought, good reasons why a subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee should be set up in London to deal with the many day to day minor matters on which the Supreme Commander would require advice. It was essential to have a body closer to the scene of action, particularly since it was in London that the exile governments were situated, who would have to be consulted on many of the points which arose. The Supreme Commander himself could not deal within his own staff with all these problems. It was hoped that the new Committee would assist in arriving at rapid decisions on matters other than of major policy.

General Hilldring explained that the subject had been under discussion for some three months. There had been in London an Administration of Territories Europe Committee (A.T.E.) which was a high level British committee with one U.S. War Department representative. The present proposal was that this committee should be abolished and that its place should be taken by a subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee sitting in London and dealing with day to day civil affairs problems in Northwest Europe. In his opinion this arrangement would smooth out many difficulties and assist in the easy working of the machine. There had been a difference of opinion between the two governments as to where decisions on Northwest European civil affairs should be made. As a result of these differences of opinion, during the past three months no guidance had been given to the Supreme Commander on these vital problems. The setting up of the new committee under the terms set out in the Combined Civil Affairs proposal would, he felt sure, enable the Supreme Commander rapidly to be given the much needed directives to enable him to carry out his planning for civil affairs in Europe.<sup>37</sup>

CCAC SUBCOMMITTEE IS ESTABLISHED IN LONDON  
[Rev par. 5 (CCAC/Liaison) of CCAC Charter (CCS 190/10/D), 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 092 (3-22-43), sec. 2]

A London Subcommittee of CCAC is hereby established (CCAC/L) as agency of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

*a. Functions*

(i) To give guidance and make recommendations within the framework of the directives

<sup>37</sup> When the CCS accepted the British proposal for a London subcommittee, the British resumed full co-operation in CCAC.

issued to the Supreme Allied Commanders Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with respect to the application of such directives to day-to-day problems or to detailed civil affairs planning which do not require reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) At the request of the Allied Supreme Commanders to resolve such civil affairs questions arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters as do not justify reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but on which the Allied Supreme Commanders desire advice.

Note: Until adequate machinery is established in London, the matters relating to the Mediterranean Theater under (i) and (ii) above will continue to be resolved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee as at present.

(iii) To make recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on civil affairs matters arising within the Northwest European and Mediterranean Theaters which require decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(iv) With reference to paragraph 6 of this Charter to receive from His Majesty's Governments the civil affairs policy of His Majesty's Governments in regard to territory of the United Kingdom or the Dominions (if HMG in the Dominions desire to use this channel) which is to be recovered from the enemy and to communicate such policy to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for them to take note of and to transmit to the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be appropriate.

(v) Except as provided in subparagraph (iv) above, the CCAC/L will not consider civil affairs matters arising in the Pacific.

*b. Membership*

CCAC/L will consist of a war office chairman and a representative from the War Office, the Foreign Office, the Treasury on the British side, and one representative of the U.S. Army, one of the U.S. Navy, two civilian members appointed by the U.S. Individual persons and representatives of the department or agencies, both British and American, may be invited to attend as required.

*c. Exchange of Information*

The London Subcommittee will keep CCAC currently advised of the suggestions and recommendations made to SAC and will forward to them minutes of all meetings. There will be full exchange of information, and papers between CCAC and CCAC/L. \* \* \*

LONDON SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE KEPT IN ITS PLACE

[Msg, Hilldring to Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, CofS, SHAEF, 7 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3032]

All of us here agree with you completely that SCAEF, unencumbered and uninhibited must have complete and absolute authority and responsibility with respect to the operation of Civil Affairs. . . . In recognition of this, both Mr. McCloy and I made it clear to Bovenschen when he was here that the usefulness and success—as a matter of fact, the very existence of the Subcommittee—would be dependent upon its ability to be of service to the Supreme Commander and to perform this advisory service without interference with the Civil Affairs operations of SCAEF or without annoyance to the people involved in those operations. I am confident that he understands his position, although it may be that some bluntness on your part will as you say, be necessary to keep this point in focus, and if bluntness is necessary it should by all means, as you suggest, be applied. . . . This, however, in my opinion does not alter the desirability of making the people who render advice to SCAEF as members of the Subcommittee those individ-

uals on your staff who are struggling each day with the problems that will be discussed in the Subcommittee. . . .

THE WASHINGTON-LONDON ISSUE CONTINUES INTO POSTHOSTILITIES PLANNING

[Ltr, Hilldring to Brig Gen Julius C. Holmes, DACofS, G-5 SHAEF, 28 Jul 44, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]

The British position appears to be that coordination on supply matters should be in London.<sup>38</sup> The State Department, the War Department and FEA are opposed to this, primarily because all of the combined supply machinery is centered in Washington and only confusion and duplication can result by transferring responsibility as to this phase of the supply business to any combined group in London at this time. It is impossible to predict when the deadlock will be broken, but our position is very clear and we propose to stand firm. \* \* \*

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<sup>38</sup> The issue is now that of co-ordination of combined military agencies and combined civilian agencies in supply planning for the postmilitary period. This deadlock, like all that had gone before, was finally broken. ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 263.

## CHAPTER VI

# The Army Tries To Limit Its Commitments

After more than two years of disputation and negotiation—with civilian agencies, with the British, with nationalistically sensitive governments in exile, and even with hesitant groups in the Army—the jurisdictional claims of the military authorities in civil affairs had all been confirmed. Although there are those who interpret all organizational history as a ceaseless struggle for more power, the probability is that the Army viewed its expanded jurisdiction in civil affairs with as much misgiving as gratification. Increase of responsibility is wholly gratifying in a sphere of a primary interest, but not in that of a secondary interest which may draw too heavily upon resources needed for more important activities. Civil affairs was, undoubtedly, of great importance to the Army, but relative to the tactical mission it was distinctly secondary. And commitments to civil affairs gave rise to misgivings because the exhausting but thankless struggle with the wartime misery of governed peoples—a struggle in which the accumulation of economic, political, and moral commitments could threaten the resources required for victory—was like some swamp from which a would-be rescuer attempts to save another at the distinct risk of becoming bogged down and lost himself.

While without any thought of escaping the obligations imposed by international law, the Army had felt misgivings over the burdens of civil affairs from the beginning and had been, therefore, the more

disposed to go along with the President's decision that in North Africa primary responsibility would be given to civilian agencies. It had sought a greater role in civil affairs only when it became clear that this was necessary in the interest of military operations. The misgivings did not cease and were reflected in a care to limit the degree of control asked for. However, it was not until the Army's claims were on the way to general acceptance that caution began to vie strongly with organizational self-assertion. A close study of the trend toward self-limitation is useful not primarily because of the psychological interest of this trend and its refutation of the assumption that the Army's rise to control in civil affairs was due simply to a successful power impulse. What is of chief importance is that, before passing from the study of planning to that of operations, the reader carefully appraise the validity of the Army's advance estimate of its mission. Nothing is of greater moment in the preparations for civil affairs than a correct estimate of the commitment, and in the study of operational experience it will be helpful to consider whether the Army's preconceptions of the scope of its task were confirmed or disproved.

The documents of this chapter, though reflecting in a number of cases hitherto unconsidered administrative issues, have therefore been presented less for their pertinence to organizational history than for their bearing on the Army's belief that its commitment to civil affairs should and

could be a limited one. This belief was, as will appear, highly venturesome, but it was as much an article of faith in the period of preparations as the doctrine that the Army's role in civil affairs was a substantial one. While the desire for limitation of commitments was expressed in a great variety of issues, all of these can be subsumed under one or the other of two general problems. The first involves the extent to which the Army could lessen its responsibility by partial delegation and ultimately complete transfer of civil affairs functions to civilian agencies or restored governments (in the special case of the Balkans by requiring the British to assume sole responsibility from the outset). The second involves the degree to which military governors, even during the period wherein they retained complete authority, could curtail their administrative burden by vesting functions or responsibilities in the governed people—whether by using local organs and officials or by leaving certain politico-economic objectives to local decision and initiative.

In both these considerations dealing with the distribution of civil affairs functions there were, in theory, three alternatives: that the Army do as little as possible, that it do as much as possible, and that it undertake something between the two extremes on the basis of some principle permitting compromise between burdensome responsibility and prudent self-interest. Though the emphasis proved to be upon limitation of commitment, yet the degree of limitation was median rather than minimal. The latter would have meant merely the acceptance of such responsibility as was imposed by international law and as could not be performed by any other authority. The idea of minimal commitment was rejected when the military authorities opposed continuation of the arrangement for civil affairs control as practiced in French North Africa. To

be sure, it was rejected primarily on the ground of military self-interest, that is, because civil affairs was found to be too closely related to military operations to be delegated during the active phase. On the same ground the Army rejected a maximal commitment, which would have entailed doing entirely with military resources the tasks called for by the most generous interpretation of the needs of the governed. The median commitment accepted was that of limiting the Army's task, in relation both to that of other authorities and to that of the governed, by the principle that military control could no further exceed the minimal commitment in civil affairs than was required by, or compatible with, the interests of the war effort. In accordance with this principle, responsibility was to be accepted only in areas where U.S. forces operated and for only as long as operationally necessary. It was to be mitigated by gradually introducing civilian agencies within the military framework and was not to extend in any degree into posthostilities problems. On the same principle, the governed people were to be drawn upon (as far as was compatible with United Nations political and military interests) for organs of government and local officials, and they were to utilize their local resources to the utmost, aided only to the extent demanded by minimum subsistence needs. As regards issues of political rehabilitation they were to be guided rather through indication that the gates of salvation were open to them than by arduous effort to prevent them from going toward damnation if unfortunately they so chose.

As recorded complaints evidence, certain civilians felt that these limitations on military responsibility for civil affairs placed an undue burden upon nonmilitary agencies which had fewer resources than the Army for carrying it. Some of the critics who at an earlier stage had blamed the

Army for aiming at too much in civil affairs now blamed it for attempting too little. Whereas the first trend was attributed to overambition, the second was perhaps ascribed less to lack of ambition than to lack of charitable impulse. The statements of some Army authorities do seem rather considerably less than paternalistic, but they are not statements of personal philosophy and inclination. They are merely statements of the implications of a national directive, which, as one of the civil affairs authorities observed, had not established the Army as a welfare organization. While the enunciations of the United Nations and national war aims had been of vaguely generous tone, no change had been made in the Army's mission to warrant the assumption that it could commit the Nation's or its own resources beyond the extent demanded by international law and military expediency. If, for example, food was to be supplied to governed peoples beyond the amount necessary to prevent disease and unrest, the Army had to assume that this supplement would be the responsibility of the civilian agencies, either during or after the period of military responsibility. The best the Army could do would be to end this period as soon as possible; civilian agencies could then see what luck they would have in obtaining Congressional appropriations to finance more lavish programs.

An erroneous assumption could, indeed, be said to underlie most of the Army's efforts to limit its commitments. But that the assumption was an error became apparent only after it had been tested by operational experience. Planners propose, unforeseen events dispose, and, if the history of Allied experiences in military government shows any one thing more clearly than another, it is that military commitments could only to a relatively slight degree be limited to the extent that the planners considered desirable. The Army had, indeed, interpreted

its responsibilities more broadly than tradition required, and it had foreseen the difficulty of these responsibilities more clearly than did the civilians who had been inclined to apply peacetime standards to the civil problems of war. But even so the Army erred rather greatly on the side of underestimation. It did not foresee that in all major areas it would be compelled to carry the burden till virtually the conclusion of hostilities, that civilian agencies would be able to share the operative burden only in relatively small measure, that restored governments would cause complications largely offsetting their assistance, that the Army would be compelled to manage civilian relief in nonoperational as well as operational areas (even in Greece where Americans were caught in the cross-fire of contending political factions), and that for years after the conclusion of active hostilities military governors would be unable to extricate themselves from Germany, Austria, Japan, and Korea. The Army also did not envisage that both liberated and enemy peoples would be found with capacity for self-help largely depleted, that the system of indirect control would require a supervision almost as arduous as actually doing the job, and that the policies toward the governed would have to be fashioned on lines deviating from every traditional principle of limitation—on prodigality rather than economy of effort, on economic standards closer to rehabilitation than to mere relief, and on political principles nearer to radical reform than to conservative noninterference. At first thought this misapprehension of the task that lay ahead may seem to represent only an overoptimistic estimate of the amount of help the Army expected from others. But since it was the enormity of the problems which restricted the aid that others could extend, the miscalculations reflect fundamentally an underestimation of the difficulty and scope of the civil af-

fairs mission under the unprecedented conditions of World War II, and of the impact which every phase of the mission would make upon military interest.

In turning to the history of military government in Italy, the first and in many ways the most surprising of the major country operations, the reader, with the advantage of hindsight, should try to adopt a fair and objective point of view. This demands, first, that where the civil affairs task appears to have exceeded the planning estimates, that he ask whether the underestimation was not simply due to the unavoidable lack of foreknowledge that in this war civil affairs would advance for the first time from the periphery toward the very center of war problems. Fairness demands also that one place less emphasis upon whether the initial estimate was correct than upon the question whether the military governors were sufficiently flexible and prompt in adapting their policies to unexpected conditions. In favor of their capacity for adequate revision were a number of factors. First, civil affairs authorities were practitioners of the art of war and were accustomed to the unpredictability of

events because war is the most unpredictable of all human experiences, the great undoer of the best-laid plans. Second, their major plans were more or less tentative, and even during the period of preparations they had changed these plans as need demanded. Third, they had approached their task in a spirit conducive to a sympathetic re-examination of human needs; for civil affairs was to be regarded, in the words of General Marshall in announcing to the Director of CAD his appointment, as "the most sacred trust of the American people."<sup>1</sup> This did not require that the attempt to limit the Army's commitments should ever cease—once it did there would be danger that victory, the prerequisite of all lasting benefits, might itself be imperiled. But both humanity and self-interest required keeping in mind that the degree to which commitments could be limited depended not only upon the foresight of planners but also upon unpredictable fortunes of war, which might dictate extending the efforts of governors in behalf of the governed in the interest of both.

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<sup>1</sup> Interv, Weinberg with Hilldring, Oct. 50.

## I. TURNOVER TO CIVILIANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

### CAD CHIEF BELIEVES MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL SUCCEED ONLY IF CIVILIAN AGENCIES TAKE OVER AS SOON AS SITUATION PERMITS

[Min, Mtg in CAD, 5 Jun 43, CAD files, 337, CAD (4-14-43) (1)]

General Hilldring . . . explained the necessity to tie in closely with those civilian agencies in Washington which are concerned with military government matters. He stated that military government will be a success only if it is recognized that these civilian agencies will move into the liberated areas and take over civil affairs functions from the Armed Services as soon as the military situation permits. . . .

### CIVILIAN OFFICIAL FEELS ARMY LEADERS ARE NOT SEEKING TO RETAIN JURISDICTION

[Memo, Appleby, Dir, OFT, Dept of State (Undated) apparently in Jun 43, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library]

I am assuming that it is understood that military administration is less desirable than civil administration as soon as civil *administration* is possible. The War Department as a Department has seemed rather clearly to lean to this view, and several actions of the President have indicated that it is his view. The War Department as a whole has taken a rather broad, imaginative view not limited by conventionally military thinking. This surely is true of Mr. McCloy,

General Marshall and General Eisenhower. But there has never been any actual determination of the general policy I am assuming. And of course "as soon as possible" is a very vague policy. There can hardly be a hard-and-fast, single, general policy. The very first responsibility must be with the military authorities. The transition must be gradual, even if it can in places be rapid, and the military will have to retain a certain authority for a long time, perhaps until the end of the war, perhaps until general political arrangements for government in the respective areas are completed. But the military, except possibly for one school of thinking, will wish to simplify its responsibility as much and as soon as possible, and governmental heads will wish this to be the case for general, political reasons. The military will need to be satisfied that civilian governmental arrangements are adequate. The government similarly will need to be satisfied. . . .

#### GENERAL HILLDRING CAREFUL TO AVOID SUSPICIONS OF ARMY AMBITIOUSNESS

[Min, 9th Mtg OFEC Co-ordinating Comm., 23 Jul 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43)]

#### VII. . . .

2. . . . General Hilldring . . . reported that Anglo-American military authorities were close to agreement on all supply matters except the length of the period of military responsibility for supply. He suggested that this was essentially a civilian matter and that CAD had been unwilling to agree to the British proposal for a six months period of military responsibility for supplies for fear that civilians would think that CAD was seeking to extend its control longer than necessary. . . .

#### SPEED TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Draft of WD Responsibilities, submitted by McCloy to Asst Chief, Div of Admin Mgt, Bur of Budget, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4]

That the military should not retain the job of supplying relief and dealing with civil affairs any longer than necessary is a thoroughly established policy of the Government. In this connection a policy statement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff reads in part as follows: "The Administration of civil affairs should be delegated to appropriate civilian departments and agencies just as soon as the military situation permits. This may be accomplished gradually, even though the area is still the subject of military control. The decision

as to when and to what extent civilian departments and agencies will assist the military in the administration of civil affairs will be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, upon recommendation of the military commander in the area. Generally, responsibility for the handling of civil affairs should be relinquished by the military as quickly as this can be accomplished without interference with the military purposes of the occupation."<sup>1</sup>

*Transition from military to civilian control.* While the Army is assuming for procurement planning purposes that it will be responsible for civilian supply for a period of six months, the duration of military responsibility may be for a longer or shorter time depending upon a number of unpredictable factors. The military may find themselves forced to continue dispensing relief and handling civil affairs for an undesirably long time unless certain steps are taken in advance to pave the way for a shift of this responsibility to civilians. The following points suggest ways for speeding the transition.

1. There must be a high degree of consistency between what the Army plans to do in relief and rehabilitation and actions which civilian agencies plan to take. This requires that the military keep the civilian agencies as completely advised as possible with respect to the conduct of its relief activities during the military period. Although retaining full responsibility during the initial phase, the Army has expressed its desire to receive the advice of civilians on civil affairs. . . .

2. In order to assist the military in discharging its responsibilities and in order to enable the civilian agencies to discharge their responsibilities, the civilian agencies have detailed certain representatives to work with the War Department. This arrangement should be continued.

3. An identity of field personnel between the armed services and operating civilian agencies in the final stages of military responsibility might be an important element in easing the shift of responsibility. The Army might permit a few of its own civil affairs officers to withdraw from active duty but remain in the field as employees of the appropriate civilian agency. (The persons who would be transferred in this manner could be selected in advance.) . . .

<sup>1</sup>The British considered civilian agency participation unwise at this time (see above, Chapter IV, Section 5). McCloy felt that it would be wise to introduce into certain areas individual civilians who could work with soldiers and gradually replace them as the occasion warranted. Ltr to Hopkins, 30 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43).

## WAR DEPARTMENT WILL NOT BECOME ENTANGLED IN POSTHOSTILITIES PLANNING

[Ltr, SW Patterson to Secy of State, 8 Aug 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

I have your letter of July 31, 1944 advising of the formation of a Liberated Areas Committee and a Combined Liberated Areas Committee, wherein there may be resolved respectively the views of the United States agencies and the combined views of the United States and United Kingdom agencies regarding policies for liberated areas during the post-military period. . . .

I am very glad to designate Major General J. H. Hilldring, Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, as the War Department member of the Liberated Areas Committee. . . .

I . . . desire that the War Department membership on the Liberated Areas Committee be

limited as to time to the military period of responsibility for civil affairs, and as to competence to furnishing to the committee appropriate information as to military plans and programs, and to receiving advice and suggestions with respect thereto.

I do not believe it would be wise for the War Department to accept a membership upon the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Primarily the function of the Combined Liberated Areas Committee will be to resolve policy views of His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in order to achieve a combined policy with respect to liberated areas after the military period. . . . The resolution of the views of the two Governments with respect to policies after military responsibility has ended should, in my opinion, be accomplished through civilian channels. . . .

## 2. MILITARY COMMANDERS DO NOT MAKE POLITICO-ECONOMIC POLICIES

### BASIC POLICIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Wickersham, Comdt, SMG, for PMG, 17 Jun 42, PMG files, 321.19, MG]

8. The points of major policy inherent in the total [military government] program may be summarized as follows:<sup>2</sup>

a. Military. Military government is essentially an army responsibility, except for political and certain long range economic features.

b. Political. The political policy of military government cannot be determined by the military command. It is inherently the function of the State Department.

c. Economic. Military necessity can control the economic policy of a military government only while such necessity exists. The long view economic policy will presumably be directed either by the State Department or the Board of Economic Warfare, or some other governmental agency. . . .

### WAR DEPARTMENT INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC POLICY ONLY IF IT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE MILITARY SITUATION

[Memo, Miller, Dir, MGD, PMG, 29 Jan 43, ASF, ID files, 014 Civ Sup, N. Africa, vol. II]

The question involved is the determination of an economic policy, namely, the price to be paid

<sup>2</sup> For Synopsis of War Department Program for Military Government see above, Chapter I, Section 3.

in French North and West Africa for commodities purchased by the U.S. or the U.K., the precise question being whether world prices are to be paid or existing price levels maintained.

The announced policy of the War Department is that the function of the Army in any occupation is primarily an administrative one and that the determination of economic policy is basically a matter for civilian agencies of the government. This policy is subject only to the limitation that, if such economic policy shall have any direct impact upon the military situation, the Army reserves the right to object.

At the present stage of the discussion evidenced by the attachment, it does not appear that a determination of the question will have any immediate repercussion on the military situation. Consequently, at this time, this office feels that it has no interest in the form of the reply to be dispatched to the British representative.

### EISENHOWER KNOWS LIMITS OF HIS AUTHORITY

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 15765]

Upon my return from the forward areas, I was astonished to find a telegram from the President stating that he had received a report to the effect that I was preparing on my own authority to give some form of recognition to the French Committee. . . . No such thought has ever en-

tered my head. While I feel, along with my political assistants, that some kind of limited recognition of the collective body would be helpful here [French North Africa], I have strictly confined my actions in the case to recommendations through proper channels. I am quite well aware of the exclusive authority of the President in such matters, and I am sometimes disturbed that any rumor of such a kind can gain such force or atmosphere of validity as to create an impression that I would step out of my own proper sphere to this extent, or could impel, as in this case, the President himself to send me orders on the subject. I am completely ignorant as to how such a rumor could have started. I hope that at an appropriate time you can make it clear to the President that I have never entertained such a thought for a moment.

#### 1943 MANUAL ENJOINS HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICS OF OCCUPIED AREAS

[U.S. Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9] (7) Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of the military government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any local political elements except by directions from higher authority. . . .

#### WAR DEPARTMENT ACCEPTS STATE DEPARTMENT'S CIVILIAN SUPPLY POLICIES

[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-135]

I have read with much interest your letter dated 1 January in which you express the views of the State Department on some of the policy questions having to do with the furnishing of civilian supplies for areas to be liberated from Axis domination. Since the State Department is the agency of the administrative branch of our Government whose function it is to determine, subject to the authority of the President, the policy of our Government in our dealings with other governments or peoples, it necessarily follows that the State Department should formulate the policy of our Government as to the furnishing of supplies to the liberated areas. Accordingly, the views which you shall express from time to time relative to providing civilian supplies will be accepted by the War Department as the official statement of policy of the administrative branch of the Government on this subject.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

#### UNFORTUNATELY IT IS DIFFICULT TO DRAW THE LINE

[Msg, CCS to Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, SAC [Supreme Allied Command], MTO [Mediterranean Theater of Operations], 14 Jul 44, FAN 379]

. . . It is difficult to draw the line between Military and Political subjects. . . .

<sup>3</sup> See below, Section 6, Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44.

### 3. MINIMUM CHANGE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND AUTHORITIES

#### IDEAL TYPE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Prospectus of SMG, March 1942, PMGO files, 352.01 SMG Establishment]

The ideal type of military government is one which, coming into being amid the utter chaos of a civilian population whose armed forces have just been subjected to military defeat, can restore order and stability with dispatch and at the same time integrate the local institutions and psychology of the occupied area and the superimposed military authority with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter. . . .

#### OSS CRITICIZES PRINCIPLE OF RETAINING THE STATUS QUO

[Memo for Info No. 56, OSS on MG, pp. 5-8 of app. to Memo, Donovan, Dir, OSS, to Deane, Secy, JCS, 12 Apr 43, CAD files, 092 (3-22-42), sec. 1]

. . . Both [the Army and the Navy Manuals of military government] maintain that in the civil government of occupied territory the law enforced at the time of occupation should as far as possible be applied, and the civil administration in office at the time of occupation, as far as possible retained. No provision is made for a situation in which the legal *status quo* would be re-

pugnant to the conquerors or the administrative personnel unacceptable. \* \* \*

It is . . . quite certain that any planning for military government, based on the assumption that the legal *status quo* in the territory occupied should be supported and the existing local personnel utilized, is on dangerously weak foundations. It will not always be easy to define the legal *status quo* and it may be highly undesirable to support it when it is defined. Shall we, for example, wish to give military sanction to the legal *status quo* in Nazi Germany, which has ridden rough shod over private property rights and over civil and religious freedom? Shall we want to endorse the Nazi educational system? Even in countries not obviously hostile which are recovered from Nazi domination, the problem of the legal *status quo* will be hardly less difficult. In France, for example, shall we accept and enforce laws imposed under Nazi domination—anti-Semitic laws, for example? Analogous questions will arise in other countries, some very difficult questions in confused areas like Alsace and Lorraine. They will have to be answered by the military governor with the uncomfortable feeling that the answer he gives will itself establish a *status quo* which will tend to perpetuate itself and profoundly influence the pattern of ultimate peace.

The same thing is true with reference to the utilization of the local personnel. In Germany we shall hardly dare to maintain the Nazi administration. In France we shall have to select between conflicting factions. How shall we distinguish between friends and seeming friends? Where shall we find the administrative personnel to run the country? These are not the kinds of problems which can be solved out of military government books. The areas likely to be occupied must be studied intensively, the local personnel must be checked, the realities of the *status quo* as distinguished from the textbook version of it must be carefully appraised. . . .

#### 1943 MANUAL RESTATES PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE

[Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9] h. . . . Retention of Existing Laws, Customs, and Political Subdivisions. Local officials and inhabitants of an occupied territory are familiar with its laws, customs, and institutions. To avoid confusion and to promote simplicity of

administration, it is advisable that local laws, customs, and institutions of government be retained, except where they conflict with the aims of military government or are inimical to its best interests.<sup>4</sup> In general, it is unwise to impose upon occupied territory the laws and customs of another people. Any attempted changes or reforms contrary to local custom may result in development of active or passive resistance and thereby handicap the operation of military government. For similar reasons it is advisable, if possible, to retain existing territorial divisions and subdivisions. Laws and customs in one political division of a country may differ widely from those in another and the inhabitants therefore may be accustomed to the decentralization of governmental authority which usually parallels such divisions. . . .

#### MANUAL CALLS FOR MAXIMUM RETENTION OF SUBORDINATE LOCAL OFFICIALS

[Army-Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

[Sec. 9i] (4)<sup>5</sup> So far as practicable, subordinate officials and employees of the local government should be retained in their offices and made responsible for the proper discharge of their duties, subject to the direction and supervision of civil affairs personnel. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The difficulty in departing from noninterference as the general rule was not merely one of administrative expediency, as indicated in the Manual. It also reflected the fact that the international law of belligerent occupation, as stated in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, still incorporated the doctrine of noninterference. This doctrine was no longer adhered to in the expressed political aims of the United Nations, but international law as interpreted by conservative jurists had not kept pace with the recent changes in ideology and practice. However, the Civil Affairs Division did transmit both to Charlottesville and the theaters CA Guides, prepared by General Donovan's organization (see above), which suggested a program of defascistization and de-Nazification derived from U.S. and U.N. political aims.

<sup>5</sup> This is preceded by paragraphs providing for the discontinuance or suspension of offices unnecessary or detrimental to military government, the suspension of legislative bodies, and the removal, in most cases, of high ranking political officials.

<sup>6</sup> As will be seen in ensuing documents, military leaders were keenly intent upon minimizing responsibility and personnel commitment. In the case of France, political policy led the President to be reluctant to commit himself to the FCNL, while the Army urged the necessity of some arrangement which would permit the civil affairs burden to be entrusted primarily to the French. For details on civil administration in the countries of northwest Europe and southern France, see below, Parts Three and Four.

#### 4. MAXIMUM USE OF INDIGENOUS ADMINISTRATION IN NONENEMY COUNTRIES

##### MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT

[Statement on Liberated Areas, approved by Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at Quebec Conf, 22 Aug 43, in Notes on Conf With Hull, CofS files, 337, Confs]

(1) The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

(2) *a.* The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

*b.* Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved. . . .

##### DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SHOULD BE A FRENCH OFFICER

[Msg, Hilldring to CG, ETO, 11 Oct 43, SHAEF G-5, 10.02, ETOUSA/CA Sec]

Civil Affairs directive on France in final draft approved by the U.S. and the U.K. reads as follows:

The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or the French Liaison Mission connected with the Military Operations in France.

. . . Strong feeling here is that as long as final authority reposes in Supreme Commander, Chief Civil Affairs Officer should be French. Any arrangement which does not give leadership to French would unnecessarily initiate and perhaps even provoke French to troublesome counter-activity before and after landing. From purely military point of view we feel such a gesture

might help rather than hinder our operations and their connection with resistance movement. . . .

##### POLICE BURDENS TO BE ENTRUSTED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO INDIGENOUS FORCES

[Memo, ACofS, G-3, to Theater Comdrs, 14 Oct 43, WDCSA files, 014, 1943]

b. . . . It is not the present intention of the War Department to provide occupational Military Police battalions for use in United Nations countries such as France, liberated as a result of military operations. No provision is being made for occupational police battalions in Italy, as it is expected that the *carabinieri* and Italian Army will be found satisfactory for local security purposes. . . .

##### DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BE LEFT TO INDIGENOUS AUTHORITIES

[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's Office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

General Clay stated as the U.S. position, that . . . it was necessary to separate the supplies into those which were to be made available as relief and those which were to be sold for cash. As to the former, supervision within the area would be required to make certain that U.S. assets were not exploited. Less supervision would be required in the event that goods were sold for cash, since the principal U.S. interest would be to make certain that items in short supply in the U.S. were not exploited. Except for distribution in combat zones, it is the War Department intention to make deliveries at ports and to leave internal distribution within liberated countries to the indigenous authorities, subject to the above supervision. . . .

##### THE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT WITH NORWAY DELEGATES PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT

[Agreement between CG, ETOUSA, and the Norwegian Govt, 29 Jan 44, CAD files, 014, Norway (5-13-43) (1). For Norwegian Agreement see below, Chapter XXII, Section 1.]

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the military situ-

ation permits, the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied forces, . . .

#### DEFERENCE TO BELGIAN GOVERNMENT IN CONDUCT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Min, Mtg at Norfolk House, 11 May 44, to Discuss Liaison With SHAEF, SGS files, 014.1, Belgium, vol. I]

2. [Lt.] General [Sir A.E.] Grasett [ACofS, G-5, SHAEF] wished to make it clear that, during the early stages of operations in Belgium, the country would be under military control which was quite a different thing from military government. The agreement between the Belgian and U.S. and British Governments had been drawn up and this would be the basis for SHAEF policy in Belgium. General Eisenhower was most anxious that during the period of operations the Belgian wishes should be met in every way possible. It was General Eisenhower's intention to hand over the control of Belgium to the Belgian Government at the earliest possible moment. For this purpose he was desirous of having the best possible advice and he therefore hoped that the Belgian Government would send him a combined mission. That would be the prime object of the Belgian Liaison Mission accredited to General Eisenhower. . . . He wished to stress that during that period of military control, Supreme Headquarters would work through the Belgian local authorities. . . .

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE WILL NORMALLY BE CONTROLLED BY FRENCH

[Incl "A" to Interim Directive (France), SHAEF to SAC, MTO, on CA in Southern Fr, CCAC 54/2, 14 May 44; CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

1. . . . Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate, you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN conditions which may develop.

2. Within boundaries established by this Headquarters (HQ), you will have, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. However, Military Government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be controlled by the French themselves. In order to secure uniform civil administration SCAEF [Supreme, Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces] will utilize the leadership of French authorities (other than Vichy) in national administration and will maintain communications with you regarding policy and decisions in such matters. If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such executive action as the security of the forces or the success of the military operations may require is authorized. . . .

10. a. Initial recourse shall be had to French Authorities for necessary legislative enactments and for the punishment of civilians committing offenses of concern to the Allied Forces. It is not, therefore, contemplated that any Proclamations, Ordinances or other enactments (except the initial Proclamation establishing your powers as in paragraph 2 above) will be issued, or that military courts will be established. . . .

<sup>7</sup> The directive was issued on the basis of responsibility placed on SHAEF by the CCS for the co-ordination of all planning for operations to take place in southern France. See Part Three.

## 5. THE ARMY TRIES TO KEEP OUT OF THE BALKANS

#### U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT ONLY WHERE U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS TAKE PLACE

[Determination of War Department Responsibility for Military Government in the Balkans, 15 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1)]

2. The future status of command responsibility in the Balkans has not yet been clearly established by CCS directive. It has been accepted as a matter

of policy by CCAC that the military government of an area shall conform to the character of the military operation, i.e., unless U.S. armed forces participate, the military government in the areas occupied will not be a U.S. responsibility. . . .

5. It is recommended (1) that, unless and until it is planned that U.S. ground forces will be used in an invasion and/or occupation of the Balkans, the CCAC and the War Department be relieved of responsibility for the establishment and ad-

ministration of military government, including civilian supply, in the areas. (2) That the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff be advised that (1) above is no way to be considered as any limitation of the U.S. State Department's interest or operation in the area or of any restriction upon existing mission of the U.S. forces in the Middle East. (3) That this policy be referred to the CCS for approval of the above recommendations. . . .

#### PROPOSAL FOR USE OF AMERICAN TROOPS IS DISAPPROVED

[Paraphrase of Msg, Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), to CofS, 14 Oct 43, incorporating recommendations of State Dept representative, OPD files, 014.1, sec. II-A]

The Theater Commander should be authorized to employ troops in occupation of these territories where maintenance of law and order is necessary, and that such occupation, which is not the use of troops for warfare, be co-ordinated with British C-in-C. Otherwise American civilians participating in relief work will be either powerless to accomplish political and economic results desired by U.S., or will be entirely dependent upon British forces whose policies may not be entirely in consonance with ours. Therefore responsibility will be assumed on the civil side, which in absence of military support when circumstances demand, will be impossible of accomplishment. . . .

[Msg, JCS to CG, USAFIME, 26 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11821]

. . . It is contrary to Joint Chiefs of Staff intention to divert troops from military operations for the purpose of supporting the administration of civilian relief. . . .

#### WAR DEPARTMENT DISINCLINED TO PROCURE RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR BALKANS IF NOT THE SCENE OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

[Min, Mtg held in McCloy's office, 14 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-171]

The U.S. position was set forth by General Clay who stated that the War Department was assuming the same procedures as to requirements and procurement as in other areas. He stated that if there was an approved military operation, supplies would be provided. If there was no approved operation, the War Department would be guided by the advice of the State Department which was being sought. . . .

Sir Frederick [Bovenschen] stated that the

British Government contemplated the use of civilian relief agencies in the distribution of relief in the Balkans. He added that he did not consider that UNRRA would be in a position to assume this responsibility in the event of a collapse.

Mr. Acheson, on behalf of the State Department, expressed his firm opposition to this proposal on the grounds that if relief was not to be handled by the military, it should be handled through UNRRA, which was established for the purpose of providing relief to those countries which were not in a position to pay for their supplies. He stated that he thought the Balkans presented an excellent example of an area where UNRRA was prepared to and should perform the type of function which it was organized to discharge and that it would be most unwise to use any other civil relief agencies. General Clay concurred in this view and added that the War Department would be averse to a program to procure and ship supplies to be distributed by civilian relief agencies in the Balkans.<sup>8</sup>

#### NO AMERICAN TROOPS BUT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS IF STATE DEPARTMENT INSISTS

[Memo, McCloy for Roosevelt, 31 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-190]

It appears to have been decided that if and when military operations are conducted in Greece and Yugoslavia they will be under the combined command in the Mediterranean [AFHQ] but that American troops will not participate in operations, at least it is most doubtful if Americans will participate. A decision is necessary as to whether these Civil Affairs officers supervising distribution of supplies under the Commander in the field should be solely British or whether they should be, as in other theaters, a combined group. Presumably the ultimate decision rests with the Theater Commander. It is understood that he would be agreeable to a combined Civil Affairs group if the American Government would consent.

The question is then whether in matters of civil relief for these liberated areas pending the introduction of non-military relief organizations, the American Zone should provide their share of civil affairs officers and men in combination with the British for the distribution in these areas of civilian supplies covering the military period.

<sup>8</sup> The British favored turning over the distribution of relief supplies in the Balkans to the Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, a British civilian agency. The State Department considered that political influences would be less likely to enter into civilian relief if it were entrusted to UNRRA.

The State Department recommends that such consent be given. The War Department takes the position that this is a matter of national policy rather than a military question but will prepare itself to follow whatever decision is made. Procurement, it is planned, will be on a combined basis.<sup>9</sup>

#### U.S. ARMY WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

[Msg, CAD to CG, NATOUSA, 17 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Balkans (9-15-43) (1), CM-OUT 7582]

U.S. Policies Governing U.S. Army Participation [in Balkans]. . . .

A. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, will determine requirements and allocate procurement responsibility as between U.S. and U.K. Relief supplies will be shipped to Balkan ports as military supplies.<sup>10</sup>

B. UNRRA has been selected by the U.S.-U.K. as the agency of the U.S.-U.K. military authorities in the Balkans to administer relief and rehabilitation operations, i.e., relief services such

<sup>9</sup> The State Department by this time had recommended that U.S. military forces be permitted to participate with the British in a combined operation limited, on the American side, merely to the distribution of relief supplies. Since in any case the British would be distributing American Lend-Lease supplies, it appeared to the State Department better that the United States have a hand in controlling policies of civilian relief by contributing civil affairs officers. On 31 January, the date of Mr. McCloy's memorandum, the President approved the State Department's recommendation that U.S. civil affairs officers participate in combined relief activities in the Balkans.

<sup>10</sup> At the meeting of CCAC on 27 February, Mr. McCloy stated that it had been decided on the highest United States level that both the procurement and the distribution of relief supplies in the Balkans should be on a combined basis. The views of the War Department and the Joint Chiefs were thus overruled by political authorities. However, the Army succeeded in keeping American personnel participation at a minimum.

as public health, welfare, sanitation; distribution of relief supplies; rehabilitation of public utilities, agriculture, industry, and transport as are essential to relief; assistance to displaced persons and refugees, and related matters to relief.

C. U.S. Army participation in the distribution of relief supplies will be limited to approximately 25 officers, and no enlisted men.

D. The detailed planning of estimates will be carried on in the theater by the U.S.-U.K. military authorities, who will submit these estimates for consideration to the CCAC.

The U.S. officers, on a 50-50 U.S.-U.K. basis, should be placed in such top level positions as to make the top direction truly combined insofar as relief and rehabilitation operations, and distribution of relief supplies are concerned.

The U.S. Army will not participate in the administration of civil affairs except insofar as relief and rehabilitation operations are concerned. \* \* \*

#### NO U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A COMMITTEE CONCERNED LARGELY WITH PURELY BRITISH INTERESTS

[Msg, Hilldring to CG, USAFIME, 21 May 44, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 40485]

. . . State Department has advised the War Department of formation of Balkan Affairs Committee with relief and operations subcommittee. Terms of reference indicate this to be largely a British Committee having spheres of activity beyond the present U.S. military interest which are limited strictly to relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. State Department is opposed to the present constitution and terms of reference of the BAC [Balkan Affairs Committee] and to the establishment of the subcommittees. Pending further instruction, you will refrain from sitting as a member or observer until issues are clarified by the State Department. . . .

## 6. CIVILIAN SUPPLIES ONLY FOR THE PREVENTION OF DISEASE AND UNREST

### NO IDEA OF REVIVING PREWAR STANDARDS OF LIVING ABROAD

[Memo, Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CG, SOS, 19 Feb 43, OPD files, 400, Africa, sec. 1]

7. Present limitations imposed on military operations by the shortage of shipping and escorts

are such that it is unlikely that Theater Commanders will be able to allocate more space for civilian supply than the minimum necessary to maintain local standards of living on a basis somewhat lower than normal pre-war standards. The diversion of shipping from present essential military, lend-lease and war production purposes

to provide supplies to raise civilian standard of living of foreign areas to United States or even to local pre-war standards would be a disastrous policy at this time. . . .

#### RELIEF BUT NOT REHABILITATION

[Memo of Discussion at Mtg Between Representatives of the ASF Technical Servs and Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, 18 Jun 43, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Gen, Jun-Jul 43]

It was re-emphasized that the Army cannot concern itself with problems of rehabilitation, however desirable it might be that plans be dovetailed with those of civilian agencies for easing the period of transition. . . .<sup>11</sup>

#### IN GENERAL RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL MEET ONLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL NEEDS

[Memo, Clay for Maj Gen John C. H. Lee, CG, SOS, ETOUSA, 31 Aug 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 2]

The activities of ASF with respect to civilian supply planning are based upon the premise that only the *minimum* essential needs of the population necessary to prevent prejudice to the military operation will be provided. The primary objectives to be attained are to prevent civil unrest which would endanger lines of communication and channels of supply and to prevent disease which would endanger the health of our troops. Planning and advance procurement have been confined to certain basic necessities—a basic ration of food, medical and sanitation supplies, and fuel. It is believed that during the initial phase of occupation, civilian requirements, if any, for other supplies, such as engineer, signal, etc. equipment, may be met by the utilization of organizational equipment of troop units, and that such supplies would be used only to the extent directly necessary for the prosecution of military operations. Although no advance planning or procurement will be done here for more than the basic necessities mentioned above, an actual survey of an area after occupation may result in a need for additional items. Also, in the planning of a particular operation, the theater planning group may determine it necessary to make provision for a limited amount of additional basic necessities. Due consideration would, of course, be given to such recommendations. . . .

<sup>11</sup> This exclusion of rehabilitation considerations did not apply to rehabilitation essential to relief, such as the provision of seed.

#### CIVILIAN OFFICIAL THINKS MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM TOO NARROW

[Memo, Harold Stein, Import Div, NAEB, for Philip Reed, American Embassy in London, 22 Sep 43, ASF, ID files, 014, Civ Sup, vol. 3]

The most notable characteristic of the civilian supply program outlined in the CCS paper [CCS 324/1, Chapter V, Section 4] is its extreme narrowness of scope. . . .

The . . . implicit assumption is that broadening the range of commodities would pamper the populations of liberated areas. Presumably this applies particularly to the inclusion of other consumer goods, most notably clothing. This assumption is made in the face of a known acute clothing shortage throughout the continent. If, as is stated in the CCS paper referred to above, it is intended to enable the liberated populations to participate in the war effort, the people must be sufficiently dressed, and as a mere matter of medical prudence it would appear essential to make some provision for footwear for example, for people in Northern Europe where the winters are both cold and wet. Restricted quantities of other consumer goods, such as pots and pans and matches, are equally important. Careful programming would make due allowance for local supplies and local production possibilities, but the inclusion of some such supplies in the program does not imply pampering—rather it implies sober provision for a minimum level of health, efficiency and security. . . .

#### PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF 10 NOVEMBER 1943 NOT INTERPRETED AS CHANGING ARMY'S PROGRAM

[European Relief Report on Supply and Administration in Event of Unconditional Surrender, Rpt of ID to CG, ASF, 13 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Balkans (11-13-43)]

7. The President's letter [dated 10 November, Chapter IV, Section 6] omits any mention of responsibility on behalf of the Army for procuring supplies for relief. Consequently, it is apparent that no change is intended in the present procedure whereby military procurement of relief supplies is limited to the essential requirements of food, fuel, and medical and sanitary supplies needed in support of a military operation.

In most areas there will no doubt be requirements for industrial and other materials for a more permanent rehabilitation of the economy of the area, sometimes referred to as "reconstruction." It is not envisaged that the President's letter is intended to place upon the Army the responsibility for considering such requirements. This should be the responsibility of an economic

mission of the Government as part of a longer range program of relief.

[Memo, Handy, ACoS, OPD, for Hilldring, 14 Apr 44, OPD files, 014.1, Security]

4. It is noted that the British members quote the President's secret letter directive of 10 November to the U.S. War Department presumably as authority for *procurement* on the U.S. side for six months relief needs for all countries in Europe other than Russia and the neutrals in the event of collapse. This Division has no knowledge of any directive which charges the War Department with anything more than the shipping and distribution burden during the initial period in the event of collapse. . . .

SECRETARY OF STATE ASKS WAR DEPARTMENT FOR AN ADEQUATE RELIEF AND REHABILITATION POLICY [Ltr, Hull to Stimson, 1 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-136]

3. . . . the State Department believes that . . . in every liberated area, it is essential that there be prompt and equitable distribution of indigenous food supplies and the importation of such supplemental supplies as may be necessary in order to assure a minimum diet that is nutritionally sound. A more generous diet would be desirable wherever food supplies and shipping permit. So far as may be practicable, food to be imported should be in accordance with the food habits and needs of the different areas, even though this may result in different amounts or a different composition of rations available in different countries.

4. The State Department believes that it is essential not merely to give relief to alleviate suffering, but also to help the peoples of liberated areas to help themselves. This economic assistance should be commenced at the very earliest possible moment consistent with military operations. In addition to the reasons outlined above, the Department feels that this policy will lessen the demoralization attendant upon a people living on relief. Furthermore, to the extent that the peoples can meet their own needs, the demand against shipping and the drain upon supplies from the United States will be lessened. . . .

SECRETARY OF WAR EXPLAINS FINANCIAL AND LEGAL LIMITATIONS UPON ARMY'S SUPPLY PROGRAM<sup>12</sup>

[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 29 Jan 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-135]

With reference to procurement responsibility, it is well to bear in mind that the War Department

has been appropriated no funds, and has been accorded no congressional or executive authority, to procure civilian supplies other than those which are deemed necessary or desirable in support of military operations. Accordingly, the procuring of civilian supplies beyond those for which there is a military need must be a primary responsibility of other Governmental agencies. The procurement programs now being developed by the War Department with the aid of the Foreign Economic Administration, will include all items of every character deemed necessary during the initial period, but the advance procurement to be undertaken by the War Department will cover only food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, transportation equipment and special utility repair items. It is expected that the Foreign Economic Administration will make appropriate arrangements for the necessary advance procurement of all other supplies and materials included in the procurement program approved by the War Department, and the War Department will actively support the Foreign Economic Administration in obtaining allocations for these items. Moreover, it is understood that the Foreign Economic Administration, in accordance with its character and subject to whatever arrangements may be made between it and the State Department, will be free to program and procure further or additional items which it deems desirable. However it is to be recognized that regardless of the extent of advance programming by the Foreign Economic Administration, the military may have to determine in the light of shipping and transportation limitations what items can be brought into the areas in question during the period of military responsibility.

You place emphasis in your letter on the importance of affording "economic assistance" in addition to furnishing actual relief supplies, The War Department in preparing its estimates of the initial six months' requirements has included food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies, clothing and shoes, transportation equipment and repair items, public utility repair items, and supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture, but so far as concerns other "economic assistance" (such as industrial equipment, machinery, hand tools and raw materials) the schedules of the War Department up to the present time have been largely limited to those items which are designed to effect a reasonably direct reduction in the future burden of relief and rehabilitation.

In your letter you refer to the standards to be applied to the furnishing of actual relief supplies.

<sup>12</sup>For additional information on this problem, see Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics*, 1943-45.

You state that a nutritionally sound minimum diet should be assured and that a more generous diet is desirable wherever food supplies and shipping permit. The standards which you propose are unquestionably desirable. It may, however, be impossible because of limitations in shipping and supply to furnish even subsistence at these standards during the early period, much less "economic assistance." What can be supplied may depend in large measure upon the destruction and scorching inflicted by the retiring enemy. Also I wish to emphasize that political and governmental problems which cannot be resolved by the War Department, as for example the extent to which rationing shall be imposed in this country, may be the determining factors as to the extent and character of relief to be furnished. . . .

#### EISENHOWER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF IN HIATUS AREAS HAS LIMITATIONS

[Msg, CCS to the SCAEF, 27 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2080, Sup and Econ Branch]

3. As Supreme Commander, AEF, you will assume responsibility under operations RANKIN and OVERLORD for the initial provision and dis-

tribution of relief supplies in all liberated areas under your jurisdiction, whether or not such areas or territories constitute combat zones or lines of communication, subject to the limitations and definitions set forth hereafter:

a. Such distribution must be accomplished without hindrance to the successful completion of the operation, particularly with respect to the logistical and administrative support required to sustain the forces allocated to you for the defeat of Germany.

b. Your responsibility does not extend to such areas and territories as may now or hereafter be decided to be areas which will be occupied by the Armies of the USSR.

c. Your responsibility will not include areas or territories outside the combat zones or lines of communication, if it is determined by you that conditions within such areas or territories are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the provision of relief supplies therein.

## 7. THE ARMY IS NO WELFARE ORGANIZATION

### WHAT WE WOULD DO IF COLD-BLOODEDLY LOGICAL

[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for McCloy, 13 Apr 43, ABC files, 014 (11-27-42), sec. 1]

For instance, how ruthless are we going to be in moving into enemy countries? We are speaking now of relief and rehabilitation. Certainly, an Italian Army being driven from Italy will be more effective if it knows that the United States is taking care of the families which it has left behind. Equally certainly would it be more effective if it can force the responsibility for feeding larger portions of its population on us, saving its own resources for its military personnel. Perhaps, if we are really going to be ruthless, we should force populations in large numbers to retire with its armies, making the problem of feeding those armies a more difficult one. German success in France received great support from the difficulties in supply and movement occasioned to the French Army by the large numbers of Belgian and French refugees flying before the advancing German forces. Such a pol-

icy will not sound pleasing to American ears. It is the policy required by total war. . . .<sup>13</sup>

### CIVILIAN AFFAIRS IMPORTANT BUT ONLY FOR MILITARY REASONS

[Ltr, Hildring to Asst Secy of State Acheson, 9 Nov 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 3]

The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose mission is to defeat the enemy on the field of battle. Its interest and activities in military government and civil affairs administration are incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission. Nevertheless, these activities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success of the military effort.

<sup>13</sup> It was precisely this policy which the War Department, including Somervell, decided not to follow—not even in Germany, and much less in Italy, where cobelligerency immediately introduced political considerations in favor of civilian relief.

## MILITARY NECESSITY IS THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE [Army and Navy Manual of MG and CA, 22 Dec 43]

9. . . .

a. *Military Necessity.* The first consideration at all times is the prosecution of the military operation to a successful conclusion. Military necessity is the primary underlying principle for the conduct of military government. So long as the operation continues, it is the duty of the commanding officer to exercise such control and to take such steps in relation to the civil population as will attain the paramount objective.

b. *Supremacy of Commanding Officer.* It follows the basic principle of military necessity that the theater commander must always have full responsibility for military government.

c. *Civil Affairs Jurisdiction.* The paramount interest of the combat officer is in military operations. The paramount interest of the civil affairs officer is in dealing with civilian relationships of concern to the commander. Such interest will be expressed in restoring law and order and in returning to the civilian population certain facilities or services and restoring living conditions to normal, insofar as such activities will not tend to interfere with military operations. Whether interference with military operations will result shall be determined by the commanding officer after giving consideration to the recommendations of his combat and civil affairs officers. . . .

## MILITARY GOVERNMENT PROMISES UNPOPULARITY BUT FUN

[Ltr, Lt Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean to Marvin McIntyre, White House Secy, 9 Sep. 43, with Incl of Final Draft of 1943 Army-Navy Fld Manual for MG and CA, Roosevelt Memorial Library]

Military government as planned and practiced by the United States is going to be just about as popular on the world front as the Fair Employment Practice Committee is here. Hence, it is tough, and fun. . . .<sup>14</sup>

## CIVILIAN SUPPLY WILL NOT BE CHARITY

[Statement of Maj Gen George J. Richards, Dir, Budget Div, WDGS, before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 10 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-203]

. . . The goods which we expect to distribute in Italy are allocated to the Allied Military Govern-

<sup>14</sup> The revised draft of the manual was not particularly tough but neither was it notably tender and philanthropic. It is, of course, a question whether any military government can be popular.

ment in Italy, which in turn collects from the recipients of those goods as much money as they can pay. That portion which they cannot collect is charged to the Italian Government. The lira [*sic*] which the Allied Government receives in return for food, it holds and acts as a banker. We use that lira for engineering expenses, to purchase small amounts of supplies, and for pay of our troops.

If we desire to buy some things locally, or use it to pay troops, we go to the Allied Military Government and secure this lira [*sic*]. . . .

## MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S TWO OBJECTIVES

[Statement of Hilldring before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 10 May 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-203]

*General Hilldring:* We have felt for some time that in modern war, particularly when we storm the fortress of Europe, we would have to do some advance planning about what we were going to do with the civilian populations when we got ashore, so that we might accomplish several objectives. One of these objectives is to secure the civilian populations to the maximum extent possible, which is an obligation under international law; and second, to see that the civilian populations do not interfere with military operations in any important particular; and that they are so treated that they will be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible. That is the beginning and the end of our involvement in this business.

When neither of those two objectives any longer obtains, in other words, when the battle has gotten far enough ahead so that we can lay down our obligation under international law and so that the populations can no longer interfere with the military purposes of the operation, we intend to turn this work over to such civilian agencies as are designated to take it. . . .<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The evidence in this chapter makes clear the Army's intention to lay down the civil affairs task as soon as possible. The irony of the entire history of the U.S. Army's participation in civil affairs is that this did not prove possible during hostilities—or even for years after hostilities had ceased. The explanation of this paradox must be sought in the history of operations.



PART TWO  
SOLDIERS LEARN POLITICS  
IN ITALY

## CHAPTER VII

# Planning Joint Military Government Proves Highly Political

When the United States and Britain decided in January 1943 that the first invasion of Axis-held Europe would be by way of Sicily they ordained that the first American experience in belligerent occupation would be a type for which Americans were least prepared. For civil affairs in Italy would inevitably entail complex problems of politics, and politics was the one phase of civil affairs which American military government officers had not been adequately taught.

Italy was a country (unlike enemy countries in general) where, whatever the seeming power of Americans as occupants, they would have in fact only such freedom of action as was permitted by political discretion. This would have been true even if Italy had not soon become a cobelligerent and thus a desirable subject for political rehabilitation. Numerous Americans and Italians had ties of blood; Americans had never come to look upon Italians, despite Fascism, as upon the grim and fanatical Nazis; and that Italians could again be made true allies of the West and its ideologies was one of the cardinal assumptions of American opinion. Italians, moreover, were a people whose strong political instincts would be irrepressible; unless properly canalized they would make trouble even for an occupying army. Finally, joint occupation of Italy with Great Britain meant that the United States would prob-

ably have almost as much of a political problem with its ally (always on a polite plane but still with potential exasperation) as with its enemy. For its strategic interests in the Mediterranean would inevitably lead Great Britain to expect paramount influence, while Americans, with a certain perversity, would take Italy as the first area in which to demonstrate that such outdated concepts as spheres of influence should not be allowed in the emergent new international order.

With regard to all such problems American civil affairs officers, as trained by the Army, were, if not exactly babes in the woods, certainly not highly sophisticated. This was basically the fault not of the Army, but rather of America's entire current and historical unrealism about the Army's employment in civil affairs. The implicit contract by which the Army was allowed to have initial control of civil affairs provided that it should leave policy making to others. This was altogether proper, but, in the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding its role in civil affairs, the Army felt obliged to interpret this obligation in an extreme sense. It appears to have felt it should not even encourage its officers to give systematic thought to the political problems they would have to deal with in implementing policy. At Charlottesville the faculty doubtless concluded that it could not teach politics the way it wanted

to. It had to remain within the narrow limits of a legalistic and administrative approach to systems of government. Suffering from sufficient suspicion already, the School of Military Government could not risk incurring more; for fear that it be accused of training Gauleiters it had to assume the risk that in training administrators it would produce more of technical competence than of political understanding—much less political wisdom. The same inhibition apparently operated on higher levels. One can spend months of research in the files of the Civil Affairs Division and still not know whether it was inclined toward liberalism or toward conservatism. This is the more surprising because the division was not noted for lack of strong convictions or articulateness on the administrative problems of civil affairs. To be sure, the tremendous pressure of administrative responsibilities could lead anyone to a temporary preoccupation with means rather than ends; the real cause of a soldier's political neutralism, however, lies deeper. The division was quite aware of the tenuous nature of the Army's role in civil affairs, and it probably felt that the slightest betrayal of political predilection might destroy its own if not the Army's usefulness. To acknowledge conservative convictions in a New Deal Washington would almost certainly be fatal. To avow liberal attitudes could also be fatal—civilian agencies would probably not like soldiers to steal their thunder and in any case would not let them trespass upon their jurisdiction.

The difficulty was that civil affairs personnel in the field could not, if they were to carry out their mission successfully, ignore the political factor for a moment. Of the initial assumptions concerning civil affairs in World War II none was more fallacious than the idea that there is a distinct boundary line between the military and the political. The assumption would

have been false even if the State Department, as it often did not do, had always sent promptly political directives that were clear and comprehensive. For in actual execution such directives involve political problems and political judgments which may be more difficult than any of the questions faced by those who draft the vague generalities of the directive themselves. The only hope for civil affairs officers abroad lay in quickly realizing the falsity of all the indoctrination about their non-political role in Italy and in trying to lift themselves by their own bootstraps. Since they had not been taught the politics of civil affairs they would have to learn it themselves, the hard way.

This is precisely what they did—from the highest rank to the lowest. They had, to be sure, their own inner resources to fall back upon. They had had the political experience common to all citizens of a democracy. For the novel and unaccustomed problems at hand, however, this would not have been enough. It was an added help that the civil affairs officers who went into Italy were by and large an extraordinary group of people—politicians, financiers, lawyers, inventors, professors, philosophers, artists, and poets. Gifted with sensitivity, intuition, and the art of independent thinking, as a group they were peculiarly well qualified to profit from experience. While the Italian operation was still in the planning stage, Americans learned much of politics from their colleagues, the British. They learned even more about politics in Italy because there every major problem which confronted them in that land of excitable people, including the economic problems, had its political element. They learned politics in large measure from the people they governed, past masters at politics, inheritors of the political shrewdness of Machiavelli, still including statesmen from the pre-Fascist era who even after long retirement or hiding remembered

enough of the game to be a match, and at times more than a match, for any Anglo-Saxon of the victorious army.

Of the planning for Sicily, little need here be said because the documents tell their story of the intermixture of the military and the political so clearly. One notes that it was not a civilian statesman but General Eisenhower who signed the first document to pose the basic political problems of Sicily—the question of benevolence versus severity and the problem of joint military government. With respect to the latter, the American component of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) showed a keen political insight and at the same time a certain degree of naïveté. It was able to foresee that Great Britain might wish a senior partnership because of its strategic interests, and it was capable of recognizing that only a joint and equal military government could ensure harmony among the allies and an effective approach to the conquered. But the American planners were naïve in assuming that it would probably be easy to obtain prompt intergovernmental agreement upon this principle merely because it was militarily and administratively sound. They prepared and sent to Washington a plan for joint military government from which, as was correct for soldiers, they excluded every political consideration. Months passed without the arrival of the combined politico-economic directive essential to more detailed planning. The delay was due to a situation which the theater had perhaps failed to foresee: its plan for joint military government was not being considered in Washington and London merely with reference to its efficiency but, even more, with reference to its bearing upon the political problem of the distribution of power between the two nations.

The very foundation of the plan came into question when, first the British, and later the Americans (their fighting spirit

now stirred) desired for their respective countries a senior role. Nor, even after the President and the Prime Minister finally compromised on the AFHQ principle of no senior partnership, did the political misgivings and the diplomatic disagreements stop. Since the agreement amounted merely to the expression of a pious principle, both countries continued to scrutinize every element of the AFHQ plan to ensure that it did not give the partner an undue advantage. One cause for concern in Washington was the fact that the American planners at AFHQ, believing it a good idea to borrow from sound British practice, had proposed certain features of that practice which, as they evidently had failed to realize, were designed to give the British Foreign Office ultimate control of civil affairs in its later stages. In particular AFHQ's proposal to include both ministers as political advisers aroused misgivings. It might well have seemed that if soldiers were not to make political judgments themselves they needed the assistance of able diplomats, who, as intermediaries between the theater and the two governments, would be helpful in solving political issues not covered by the basic directives. But from the American point of view there was the danger that the British Resident Minister, a figure of considerable stature, would use his position in the theater to inject British political influence into its policies.

Considering that none of the issues could have been ignored if it is the duty of statesmen to take no chances with their country's interests, the remarkable thing is not so much the duration of the debates as the fact that all the issues were finally settled before the assault. One interesting feature of the CCS directive was that in several stipulations it upheld the principle of a purely military administration for the initial phase. That the President approved this feature of the directive at a time when

he still believed in civilian control is not as strange as it may appear. During the course of negotiations with the British it became clear to all Americans concerned that only by adopting such a principle would it be possible to exclude political influence such as a British Resident Minister might exert as part of the administration.

## I. AFHQ BEGINS PLANNING ON THE ASSUMPTION BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTERESTS CAN BE POOLED

### A RECOMMENDATION THAT POLICIES BE RECONCILED IN A JOINT MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 8 Feb 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 4174]

. . . This is the first United States operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory.<sup>1</sup> It is the first British operation involving the invasion and occupation of enemy territory other than colonial. It is as well the first joint operation against enemy territory. It will inevitably establish precedents far-reaching in scope and importance and will set the pattern for later operations in Europe. Policies now adopted will affect future operations throughout the war. We must therefore reconcile American and British policy toward Italy in order that there may be a joint and single attitude with respect to the civil and military authority and the civil population of the territory occupied. It must be decided whether a benevolent policy or one of strict military occupation in Sicily will contribute more to the rapid submission of the balance of the country. We must determine whether our attitude is to be a benevolent one from the outset or whether consideration of the establishment of a friendly liberal regime is to be postponed until the entire country is occupied. A firm understanding in these matters with Great Britain is necessary. Divergences of opinion, which for reasons of past history or future interest are certain to arise, must be definitely resolved well in advance. The British may feel that they should have primary responsibility in this area because of their vital interests

Aside from its provisions for benevolence and defascistization, the directive suggested a deliberate effort toward avoidance of political issues. Even if judged only by the immediate background, this flight from the political did not, it would seem, have altogether bright prospects of success.

in the Mediterranean. This would presumably involve the British form of Military Government and British administration thereof. The question of responsibility for relief and rehabilitation of the occupied territory then arises. I believe that we should take care that these matters of policy are settled and so clearly understood that opportunity for differences of interpretation be reduced to an absolute minimum and that this be done before the operational planning progresses too far. To permit policy to develop and be set by the progress of events would, in my opinion, be detrimental to the interests of the United States.

I recommend a firm policy of joint Anglo-American responsibility and joint conduct of military government under an agreed system, to function under the Allied Commander. This would include joint participation in, (1) its political aspects, that is, determining the general and special policies to govern the operation and, (2) the implementation of those policies by the preparation in detail of a simple and effective system of military government ready for immediate application on landing. . . .

I hope I may have a directive on the major lines of United States Policy as soon as possible. Meanwhile I have designated two qualified American officers, who have begun to study these problems; one of these I am sending to Tripoli for a short visit to observe the operation of British Military Government first hand.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The officers designated were Colonel Holmes and Col. Charles M. Spofford, former members of the Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ, which had handled the operation in French North Africa. On 11 February the War Department notified AFHQ that the President had approved in principle General Eisenhower's proposals. The message indicated the President's view that the joint military government should be headed by one British and one American officer, that it should be under General Eisenhower's control, and that the policy which it should apply toward Italians should be benevolent except that

<sup>1</sup>The President and Prime Minister Churchill decided at the Casablanca Conference that Sicily should be invaded after the end of the Tunisian campaign; in January 1943 General Eisenhower received from the CCS a directive to this effect. The above document is the first to raise the problem of military government for the new operation.

**BRITISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT PRACTICE FOUND  
BASICALLY LIKE AMERICAN**

[Memo, Col Spofford, Liaison Sec, AFHQ, for Holmes, Chief Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 2 Mar 43, CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)]

At your suggestion I have spent eleven days (14 to 25 February) in Tripoli, investigating the operation of British Military Government in Tripolitania. Herewith is a summary report to which I have added certain comments and recommendations. . . .

1. *Basis of Military Administration.* The basis of the military government administered by the British is that which we recognize, that is, the obligation of the occupying army to restore and to insure as far as possible, public order and safety. This obligation is stated in the Rules annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907 (Art. 43) to which both Great Britain and the United States are signatories.

British military administration, once occupation is established, is set up by proclamation in the usual manner, the practice being to make effective the proclamations of the Commanding General by posting them in principal places (Court House or Mayor's office) in each municipality as it is occupied. . . .

There is nothing new in principle in the basic ordinances which cover the subject matter in generally the same manner as that prescribed in the U.S. Manual of Military Government (FM 27-5). . . .

2. *Organization at GHQ—Development.* The British Army had no developed organization for military government at the beginning of this war. Such regulations as existed were to be found in one chapter of the Manual of Military Law (Art. 8, Ch. XIV), in which were set forth general principles governing the occupation of enemy territory, based on the Rules annexed to the Hague Convention. Shortly before the invasion of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, Major General P. E. Mitchell, GHQ, Middle East, organized the Enemy Occupied Territory Administration (EOTA).<sup>3</sup> According to officers who served in these territories and to reports which I read, the administration encountered great difficulty, especially in its early stages, due to lack of preparation, inadequate and untrained

it should include the arrest of Fascist leaders. General Eisenhower was asked to submit an outline plan. (Msg, WD to General Eisenhower, 11 Feb 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3847.)

<sup>3</sup>Headquarters of EOTA, known as the Political Branch, GHQ, was established at Cairo with General Mitchell as chief Political Officer and Advisor to the Commander in Chief.

staffs and more rapid progress of military operations than had been contemplated. For example, the Military Courts in Somalia were organized under a single officer which meant that serious offenses were tried by untrained personnel with little or no guidance. . . .

6. *Recommendations:* Assuming that Britain and the United States will be jointly responsible for the military government resulting from any future occupation of territory by the Allied Forces, the following is recommended:

1. That a plan of allied administration of occupied enemy territory be prepared, according to the following principles:

a. It should, so far as is practicable, follow the directive contained in the United States Manual of Military Government [FM 27-5], but should give effect to recent British experience as illustrated in EOTA [Enemy Occupied Territory Administration].<sup>4</sup>

b. It should provide for British and American administrative staff and field staff, roughly evenly divided;

c. The staff should be administratively responsible to AFHQ on all policy and political matters. . . .

**POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF DOING A GOOD JOB**

[Memo, Holmes for CofS, AFHQ, 4 Mar 43, CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania (3-2-43) (1)]

There is submitted herewith a report compiled by Colonel Spofford after his visit, to study the operation of military government in Tripolitania. This is a good job which I commend to your careful attention. . . .

As this is our first occupation of enemy territory, it will fix policy and set the pattern for future operations. It is, therefore, essential that the job be done with care and efficiency, with its effect on the future well in mind.

<sup>4</sup>Under the system developed by the British, administration in occupied areas was placed in the hands of a Deputy Chief Political Officer (DCPO) who also acted as adviser to the military governor—the commanding general in each instance. The staff was divided into three main sections—legal, finance, and police. When military operations ceased, the DCPO became military governor. In the field, the DCPO was assisted by political officers who went forward with the occupying forces. As soon as military operations permitted, a political officer took over the office of the mayor of a designated area and acted as chief municipal officer. A police force independent of military police was established, staffed at the top by an army officer with police training and augmented by civilian inspectors while the remainder of the force was recruited from local personnel. The civil police force, usually disarmed, assumed responsibility for civilian functions. CAD files, 091.1, Tripolitania.

The political implications, both immediate and potential, of the administration of military government of occupied enemy territory cannot be overemphasized. . . .

The period of the occupation will be much longer than the period of the assault. Final judgment with respect to the job as a whole will probably be determined more by the reaction of public opinion throughout the world to the *occupation* than to the *assault*. The average citizen has forgotten the German *attack* on Norway, but he is alert to the evils of German *occupation*.

This is going to be a hell of a job and we want a green light to get on with it. Spofford and I would like to outline our plans to you and the Commander in Chief orally before we put up anything to Force 141.<sup>5</sup>

#### AFHQ PLANS PROPOSES AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP AND A NONZONAL SYSTEM

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan for Military Government of Sicily, 24 Mar 43, CAD files, HUSKY Plan, Exec Off file, Job 4814]

(2) This appreciation and outline plan is prepared on the assumption that responsibility of the respective governments will be joint. Joint responsibility is taken to mean equal sharing of political, legal, and financial responsibility for both planning and conduct of the military government, as well as participation by personnel on approximately an equal basis. . . .

(4) It is clear that military government of Sicily must be conducted under a single over-all plan. The government will be based on one set of military laws applicable throughout the territory, whether occupied by British or American forces and administered under the same system, whether it be British or American personnel. . . .<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> As a result of these plans, AFHQ submitted to the War Department in early March an Appreciation and Outline Plan for Military Government in Sicily. It was to go through considerable revision by the two governments (see below) before eventuating in the organization known as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory. (A copy of General Spofford's detailed report on the British system in Tripolitania will be found in the file cited above).

<sup>6</sup> In this respect the planners deviated from the pattern applied to Germany at the end of World War I; in occupied Germany there were different national zones, all co-ordinated but free to establish their own laws and systems as far as practicable. Nonzonal military government would entail reconciling British and American systems, between which an important difference obtained with respect to the higher chain of command. The British, while recognizing nominally the paramount authority of the theater commander, expected the chief political officer to be guided primarily by advice from

#### MILITARY AND NOT CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE INITIAL PHASE

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

(63) The plan must be one for effective military government, that is, actual administration by military personnel of the essential services of the territory. In this the situation will be entirely different from that which has existed in North Africa. . . .

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, OPD Msg file, CM-IN 411]

We are in full accord that military government for HUSKY will be staffed entirely by military personnel initially. . . .

#### THE PLAN BORROWS SOME ELEMENTS FROM BRITISH PRACTICE

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

(8) The U.S. system contemplates that during the period of operations Civil Affairs Officers will, if present in the theater, act in a planning and advisory capacity only. Relations with the civil population will, in this phase, be conducted by the Provost Marshal and the military police. It is not until the phase of operations in which organized resistance has ceased that Civil Affairs Officers are directed to assume administrative functions. . . .

(64) The military administration should be set up as soon as military operations will permit. This involves following the British practice rather than the procedure recommended in the American manual. The advantages of this course are that it will:

(a) Shorten or eliminate the period of disorganization of the essential services. . . .

(b) Relieve combat troops of responsibility for civil matters during the period when it is most important to do so. . . .

(c) Obviate confusion arising from change-over from combat to civil affairs personnel at some later stage.

(65) The Military Governor will, of course, be the Commanding General of the expeditionary forces.<sup>7</sup> The military administration should be

political authorities in London as soon as the fighting had ended. The dependence of the British civil affairs officers upon political authorities was known to the War Department and led it to view the British orientation of certain elements of the AFHQ plan with apprehension (see below, Section 7).

<sup>7</sup> Since General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was the Commanding General of the expedition this meant, as Washington was to note, that a British officer was to be Military Governor. The proposal made by AFHQ in this connection was one called for by the International Law of belligerent occupation.

headed by a Deputy Military Governor with functions comparable to the British D.C.P.O. or the American Civil Affairs Officer. He should be assisted by a staff of experts covering the major fields for which the military administration is responsible as under both American and British practice.

(66) Since the HUSKY operation is the first Allied assault on European territory, the manner in which the government of the territory is conducted will have far-reaching consequences. It will be followed closely by the respective governments who will undoubtedly have occasion to communicate directives through the CinC. In order to keep the CinC advised on political and policy matters there should be established at AFHQ a counterpart of the Headquarters organization of EOTA at Cairo. For this operation this should comprise one or more officers and a small executive and advisory staff. . . . Major directives should be communicated by the CinC to the military governor directly. For the most part, however, the political section should be the channel for political questions and decisions and should relieve the CinC of as much of this administrative burden as possible. . . .

(78) The CinC will create a Political Section of his staff consisting of military personnel, both American and British. It will be the function of this staff to advise the CinC on questions affecting the administration of the territory and on political questions arising out of military occupation. It will be responsible for seeing that the directives of the CinC are communicated to the MG.<sup>8</sup>

#### THE PLAN IS SUBMITTED TO WASHINGTON AS A COMBINATION OF TWO SYSTEMS

[Ltr, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Marshall, 25 Mar 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

In compliance with the instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Holmes has brought with him the outline plan for Allied military government of HORRIFIED [Sicily]. This plan represents adaptation of our principles of military government and those of the British, which are identical, and the British administrative system, which experience has proved to be successful in the Middle East. It is also adapted to joint re-

sponsibility by the United States and Great Britain, and fits into the framework of AFHQ. . . .

#### AFHQ ENTERS UPON MORE DETAILED PLANNING WITH VERY FEW PLANNERS

[Brig Gen Charles M. Spofford, former Actg Deputy Chief, AMGOT, Rpt, Allied Military Government—Sicily and Southern Italy, 27 Sep 45<sup>9</sup> [hereafter cited as Spofford Rpt], OCMH files]

The Appreciation and Outline Plan dated 24 March 1943 had included a proposed TO/WE calling for 400 officers, evenly divided as between British and American. This TO/WE indicated tentative assignments of the officers, that is, those with specialists qualifications desired and those for general civil affairs duty. . . .

The immediate requirement at that time was the assembly of a staff of specialists to carry forward the detailed planning. The assembling of this staff was long delayed due to difficulties of procurement and transportation, since virtually the entire staff had to be recruited from outside the theater. As a basis for determining the requirements from the U.S. a survey was first made of the probable personnel which could be obtained within the theater. This was estimated at approximately 30 officers and the balance was requested from the War Department. The same procedure was followed in the case of British personnel although the position there was somewhat more satisfactory since a pool had been established in Cairo from which a number of officers could be drawn. In order to obtain enlisted personnel with language qualifications a questionnaire was sent to all units in the theater, requiring returns of those speaking Italian. These returns were screened and several hundred men were interviewed by an Italian-speaking officer, as a result of which a number of early assignments were made.

In order to administer the American personnel, approval for a provisional TO for Headquarters and Headquarters Company was requested and granted, which TO was approved by the War Department. This organization was tentative only and was not a complete or satisfactory solution of the problem of personnel administration which was later made difficult by the extension of the operations beyond those initially contemplated, and subsequently by the division

<sup>8</sup> The chart accompanying this draft failed to place the recommended Political Section under the line of authority from the Commander in Chief. Though inadvertent, the omission became the subject of comment in Washington and resulted in modification by the War Department (see below, Section 3).

<sup>9</sup> Although the report was not submitted to the War Department until 1945, it is based upon notes made currently by General Spofford while a member of the planning staff, Force 141, and, later, Chief Staff Officer, AMGOT.

of authority over the military government personnel in the theater.

The key personnel for planning were not immediately available, which delayed the detailed planning considerably. By April 15 the planning staff consisted of Major General Lord Rennell<sup>10</sup> and Lt. Col. [A. Terrence] Maxwell on the British side, together with several administrative officers who had been summoned from the Middle East. On the American side the staff consisted of Spofford and two junior officers who had been secured but had not arrived for duty. Col. [A. P.] Graffey Smith, Chief Finance Officer, and Lt. Col. Bernstein, Advisor on Currency and Exchange, arrived during the first week in May and during the same period Major [Henry T.] Rowell, who had been requested from AGWAR from the School of Military Government at Charlottesville to organize the Training Center called for by the plan, and Major [Robert N.] Gorman, Legal Officer, arrived from the U.S.

Brig. Gen. Frank J. McSherry (A)<sup>11</sup> arrived on 2 June to take up his duties as Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

The Training Center called for by the plan required facilities which were sought by Lord Rennell and Col. Spofford in April 1943. Administrative personnel to operate the center was secured and arrived in Algiers at the end of the first week in May. Approval was obtained at the time to establish the center at Chrea, near Blida, where this personnel and other administrative personnel called forward to arrive about 15 May assembled during May. The key personnel in supply, public safety, and public health did not arrive in the theater until the last week in May, when Lt. Col. [John F. R.] Seitz (A), Director of Civilian Supply and Resources; Col. [D. Gordon] Cheyne (B), Director of Public Health; and Col. Lemuel L. Bolles (A), Commissioner of Public Safety, reported at Chrea. In addition to the foregoing there arrived by air from the U.S. approximately ten officers to be assigned to the planning staff and an equal number of British officers largely from the Middle East. On 2 June the first large installment of 110 American officers arrived ex U.S. [*sic*]. During the month of June there was a steady arrival of small groups of both British and American personnel supplemented by a contingent of 94 British

officers who arrived on 27 June and 38 American officers who arrived on 1 July.

Enlisted personnel was secured in part from the theater when approximately 80 EM and 60 British OR's were assigned early in June for Administration of the Training Center at Chrea. To these were added 169 EM [Enlisted Men] who had been sent forward from the U.S. and an additional complement of British personnel. At the time Chrea was vacated on 15 July there were 285 American EM and 276 British OR's assigned to AMG, the largest part of which were attached to the contingents going to Sicily with the exception of approximately 100 who were stationed at the military government holding center at Tizi-Ouzou. . . .

#### AFHQ AGREES ON EXCLUSION OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES FROM PLANNING

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 1 May 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 411]

We are entirely in agreement that matters affecting future operations in other areas are not the concern of the North African Economic Board. Neither the Board nor representatives of Lend-Lease, BEW or other civilian agencies as such have knowledge of operation HUSKY. . . .<sup>12</sup>

#### MEANWHILE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT REACHED SPEEDY AGREEMENT

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 3 May 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

No further word has been received in regard to agreement with British Government concerning the Military Government of Operation HUSKY since your Fortune 101 of 14 April in which it was stated that a reply was being made by the State Department to the proposal left by Mister Eden. An order has been issued creating AMGOT in order that planning may proceed [see below, sec. 7]. However, lack of a final agreement between the two governments impedes this work and an early agreement is urgently desirable. The over-all directive covering political, financial and economic matters is also needed at the earliest possible date. Major General Lord Rennell is now in London and it is hoped that steps may be taken to obtain the concurrence of the British Government to the plan as agreed on by United States authorities.

<sup>10</sup> Lord Rennell of Rodd was to become the first chief of AMGOT. He had held the senior civil affairs role in the British occupation of East Africa.

<sup>11</sup> In the documents of the theater "A" and "B" after names are used to indicate American and British, respectively.

<sup>12</sup> The War Department had sent AFHQ a cable stating that for security and other reasons it was advisable to exclude civilian agencies from the planning both at Washington and in the theater. See Chapter IV, Section 1.

## 2. EACH COUNTRY WANTS TO BE SENIOR PARTNER

### CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS

[Memo for the President drafted by Haskell, Asst Dir, CAD, dated "Early March," CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)]<sup>13</sup>

Sir John Dill sent General Marshall the attached copy of a telegram from Mr. Eden to Mr. Macmillan in Algiers, which indicates that the *British are inclined to the view that they should have prime responsibility for control of civil affairs in Sicily* and should therefore institute a British administration of military government after this area is captured. This telegram attributes to General Eisenhower the feeling that, owing to vital British interests in the Mediterranean, there is something to be said for this view. Mr. Eden is apparently laboring under a misapprehension in attributing such a feeling to General Eisenhower himself. In his cable . . . of February 8, 1943, which was shown to the British, General Eisenhower anticipated that this point would be raised and expressed his views on the far-reaching implications on the future conduct of the war involved in its determination. In this cable General Eisenhower stated: "The British may feel that they should have primary responsibility . . ." but he recommended a firm policy of *joint Anglo-American* responsibility and joint conduct of military government functioning under the Allied Commander. . . .

From the beginning of the occupation, the character and efficiency of the civil administration of this area will influence the will of the Italian people and armed forces to resist in subsequent operations. I believe that the assignment of prime responsibility of civil authority to the United States and a United States administration of Sicily as it is occupied would *contribute most effectively to the rapid submission of other Italian areas*. The United States cannot avoid this responsibility which stems from the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in the Theater.

I recommend that planning should be in the hands of a joint Anglo-American body and that actual administration of Sicily should likewise be joint, with prime responsibility assigned to the United States and exercised under General Eisenhower by a joint military government set up in

<sup>13</sup> There is nothing in the files to indicate whether or not this memorandum was actually sent. However, Haskell states that it was seen by the JCS, and, according to his belief, also by the President. Interv, Epstein with Haskell, 17 Apr 50.

accordance with United States military law and administrative procedure.

I feel that this is a question for your decision. Before either General Marshall or I discuss the matter further with the British, your instructions are requested.

### EISENHOWER OPPOSES ANY SENIOR PARTNERSHIP

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 7 Mar 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3718]<sup>14</sup>

5. . . . I believe it to be essential that the military government for HUSKY be a joint Anglo-American responsibility. I believe that we should take this opportunity to emphasize Allied unity and that so doing will have political and even military advantages in dealing with the Italian population and later elsewhere. For either government to assume primary responsibility could invite undesirable speculation with regard to imperialistic intentions which could be exploited by enemy propaganda. . . .

### EISENHOWER'S VIEW ACCEPTED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS

[Msg, JCS to Eisenhower, 10 Mar 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3636]

It is the opinion of the United States Government that the government of HUSKY should be a joint Anglo-American responsibility, under the control of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, for both planning and administration, and that there should be no "senior partner" in the joint government. This is in response to your number 4962 [*sic*] of March 7. . . .

### BUT PRESIDENT WANTS THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE PREDOMINANTLY AMERICAN

[Memo, Dept of State as revised by Roosevelt,<sup>15</sup> transmitted by Leahy to OPD on 9 Apr 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

(a) The administration should be so organized that in its relations with the local population the

<sup>14</sup> This message began by informing the War Department of Eden's proposal to Macmillan, British Resident Minister, referred to above, which the latter showed to General Eisenhower. Macmillan was informed by Eisenhower that it was not appropriate for him to comment on issues which he felt should be decided between the two governments.

<sup>15</sup> The copy of the memorandum in the files is undated but, in returning his revision to Leahy on 7 April, the President indicated that the memorandum was dated 10 March. He made no changes in the above-quoted paragraphs of the State Department draft.

greatest emphasis possible is given to the American character of the undertaking. This is essential if full advantage is to be taken of certain valuable political and psychological factors which might prepare the way for substantial co-operation from the civilian population. There are, for example, the strong pro-American feeling in Sicily and southern Italy; the surety as to American long-range sympathy because of the several million American citizens of Italian origin, and the close contact, in normal times, of these elements with their families in Italy; and America's historical detachment from questions involving the relations of European states with each other. The propaganda campaign of the Fascist regime against the United States has not been as bitter or as effective, nor has it left its marks on so many elements of the Italian population, as has the abusive campaign against England, which has continued almost without interruption since 1935.

(b) It is suggested therefore that the Commander in Chief should appoint on his staff an American army officer who, with two administrative assistants qualified by previous experience in the foreign relations field, one American and one British, will be responsible for the administration of the occupied territory. . . .

#### TWO CABINET MEMBERS INTIMATE PRESIDENT HAS CREATED A DIFFICULT ISSUE

[Jt Ltr, Stimson and Hull to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

At the meeting at Casablanca it was agreed that the British General Alexander was to be the Force Commander of HUSKY. From this fact it will be claimed that under international usage it necessarily follows that General Alexander will also be the Military Governor. If this is accepted, then the plan referred to below which has been drawn up in Allied Headquarters in North Africa and recently brought here is a logical result. . . .

From discussions with one of Mr. Eden's assistants who accompanied him, Mr. William Strang, as well as from conversations had with Mr. Harold Macmillan in Algiers, it is apparent that the British Government feels that because of its interests in the Mediterranean in the past and future, the character of the administration of the HUSKY territory should be British.

It will be recalled that in February General Eisenhower sought guidance with respect to this matter, and that a telegram [sec. 1, above] was dispatched stating that plans should be made for a joint military government under his responsibility as Allied Commander in Chief. General

Eisenhower has submitted a plan which calls for Allied responsibility.<sup>16</sup> This plan is substantially as follows:

General Eisenhower, as Allied Commander in Chief, would be responsible to the two Governments for the administration of the enemy territory concerned in the operation HUSKY. He would be guided by a general policy directive covering political, financial, and economic matters and transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Later matters of broad policy would be agreed upon between the two Governments and sent to him in the same manner. It is believed important that in these matters the views of the two Governments should be reconciled and given to General Eisenhower as an agreed directive.

General Eisenhower would create at Allied Force Headquarters a military government section, which would be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff, who would be the Commander in Chief's executive in all matters relating to the administration of the territory. This officer would be American.<sup>17</sup>

As General Alexander has been selected as the Commander of the Expeditionary force, he would under this plan, by virtue of that command, become the Military Governor. The principal administrative officer under General Alexander would be British. He would have an American deputy. There would be a mixed staff of American and British officers, divided into administrative divisions as follows: legal, financial, public safety, enemy property custodian, civilian supply and resources, public welfare and public health, labor, and public information (press, radio, etc). The Administrative staff throughout the area would be mixed Anglo-American. This organization would be known as Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) and would be similar to the administrative system developed in recent months by the British in enemy territory in Africa, but adapted to conditions obtaining in a metropolitan area and giving it an Allied character. This administrative organization would be Allied in the same sense as Allied Force Headquarters. The governing principles of both the American and British system are based on the Notes to the Hague Convention of 1907.

<sup>16</sup> The AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 March, which had by now reached the War Department.

<sup>17</sup> Actually the two secretaries are describing the plan as already modified by the War Department. The AFHQ plan did not provide for a Deputy Chief of Staff nor did it enter into questions of nationality.

Both the State and War Departments believe that this plan as outlined above, which places emphasis on an *Allied* military government, would be acceptable to the British.

This plan for Allied Government does not conform to that outlined in your memorandum transmitted by Admiral Leahy which would give a preponderant American character to the administration. In the event that you feel it is vital to insist on a military government of preponderant American character, it is recommended that steps should be taken to obtain the concurrence of the Prime Minister thereto. It is believed that any attempt to proceed on a lower level would consume time which can be ill afforded and that in any event a decision would ultimately have to be reached by agreement between you and Mr. Churchill.

#### PRESIDENT ACCEPTS AFHQ PLAN FOR COEQUAL PARTNERSHIP

[Ltr, Leahy to Hull and Stimson, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Referring to the joint letter dated 13 April 1943 in regard to the form of an allied military government to be imposed as a result of the HUSKY operation, signed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, I am directed by the President to inform you that he has this date approved the proposed allied military government for HUSKY-land as outlined therein. . . .<sup>18</sup>

#### BUT CHURCHILL WANTS HIS COUNTRY TO BE SENIOR PARTNER

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

2. I hope that you may feel in view of the fact that the Force Commander under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower will be British we should be senior partner in the military administration of enemy occupied territory in that area. Our proposal will be that under the supreme authority of General Eisenhower a British General Officer should be appointed as Military Governor of HUSKY-land and that he should be assisted by a Joint Anglo-American staff. Thus there would be no dualism in actual executive decisions on the spot.

3. Such a local arrangement would of course in no way affect decisions on major policy being taken as usual by agreement between our two Governments if convenient by personal correspondence between you and me.

<sup>18</sup> The AFHQ plan as modified by the War Department (see the following section).

#### ROOSEVELT WANTS AS MANY AMERICAN APPOINTMENTS AS PRACTICABLE

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Replying to your telegram of April 13th, I have given my approval to appointment of General Alexander as the Allied Military Governor of HUSKY-land during occupation and under the Supreme Commander General Eisenhower. In view of the friendly feeling toward America entertained by a great number of the citizens of the United States who are of Italian descent it is my opinion that our military problem will be made less difficult by giving to the Allied Military Government as much of an American character as is practicable.

This can be accomplished at least to some extent by appointing to the offices of the Allied Military Government a large proportion of Americans.

I believe that this Military Government should be presented to the world as a definitely joint Allied control and that there should be no "senior partner."

#### CHURCHILL WITHDRAWS ANY IMPLICATION OF SENIOR PARTNERSHIP

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 15 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

I hoped paragraph 3 of my telegram of April 13th made it somehow clear that I contemplated HUSKY as our joint enterprise on terms of perfect equality, with our usual intimacy and confidence and with no question of a "senior partner."

This impression only applied to actual executive work to be done by Military Governor who would receive his directive from you and me in complete agreement. In executive and administrative sphere there ought to be two voices but only one voice which will say what you and I have agreed. General Alexander would be directing military operations under Supreme Commander and he would delegate powers of Military Governor to a British officer mutually agreeable to us both.

I entirely agree with you that utmost advantage should be taken of American ties with Italy and that at least half of the officers of Allied Military Government should be American and further if in any case or district it is found that American pre-eminence is more useful to the common cause this should at once be arranged. The two flags should always be displayed together and we should present a united and unbreakable front in all directions. All the above is

of course without prejudice to United States being Supreme throughout the whole of French

North Africa and my continuing to be your lieutenant there. I hope I have given satisfaction. . . .

### 3. THE PROBLEM OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION—TACTICAL OR DUAL?

#### MISGIVINGS OVER POSSIBLE BRITISH PREDOMINANCE

[Memo, Haskell for ASW, 7 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

4. Since the Expeditionary Force Commander should be the Military Governor for military reasons, the government of this particular area is already determined. If, in addition, the Military Governor's Deputy is also British and if any parallel chain of command is accepted which would permit the exercise of the authority of military government through other than tactical command channels, the British flavor of the government would be further reinforced and unity of command handicapped.<sup>19</sup>

#### U.S. WOULD CHANGE AFHQ PLAN TO SAFEGUARD MILITARY SUPREMACY

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 7 Apr 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38), CM-OUT 2948]

The plan for military government has been approved by the United States authorities with the following modification:

Page 14, paragraph C to read as follows, quote:

"The C in C will establish a military government section of his Staff, consisting of military personnel, both American and British. This section will be headed by a Deputy Chief of Staff who will be the C in C's executive in all matters pertaining to military government of occupied enemy territory including political questions arising out of military occupation."

Appendix B-1: political officer changed to Deputy Chief of Staff for military government and shown under C in C with line of authority running to latter. The resident minister shown on the right of C in C eliminated. These changes were made at the suggestion of OPD and accepted by all concerned.

Page 14 add to paragraph 8r the following, quote:

"He [Deputy Military Governor] will com-

<sup>19</sup> Colonel Haskell objected to the absence in the plan of a sufficiently clear statement of the principle of tactical supremacy. His memorandum set forth a number of changes which he felt should be made in the AFHQ plan. As only a part of these, however, were accepted, they are not quoted.

municate directly with Regional and Provincial Military Administrators with respect to the conduct of military government. These latter will work in close co-operation with the tactical commanders in the areas of their assignment with a view to giving the greatest possible assistance to the military operations. In the event that any conflict of opinion should arise between any administrator and a tactical commander, the decision of the tactical commander will obtain."

This was added in order to make it clear that a tactical commander in any area has final authority. Your comment or concurrence on the proposed changes requested.

Just before his departure Eden left with Secretary of State a proposal for military government HUSKY which is not entirely acceptable to American Government. State Department is being authorized to negotiate with British Government to obtain their agreement to our plan as modified above. It will be explained that this plan is predicated on the theory that in matters of policy the views of the two Governments will be reconciled and communicated as an agreed directive to the CinC by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Steps are being taken in Washington to create machinery to obtain agreed views on matters of policy. . . .

#### WAR DEPARTMENT REINFORCES ITS INSTRUCTION ON TACTICAL SUPREMACY

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5442]

It should be clearly understood and set forth in the operational plan when it is completed that during the assault and initial phases of the operation, officers of the Military Government assigned to task forces of units will operate as staff officers of their commanders.

It should also be set forth that at all times the tactical commanders have final responsibility and authority. The establishment of an administrative line of communication directly from the Deputy Military Governor to Provincial or local administrations may be established and authority delegated to these subordinate administrators at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding Force 141. . . .

## AFHQ POINTS OUT NEED FOR EVENTUAL CIVIL AFFAIRS CHAIN OF COMMAND

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4959]

Suggestion your Fortune 101 concurred in. . . . We assume however that words "at any time" do not exclude the possibility of centralization of authority for Military Administration at some future time. We have in mind that when operations have ceased and the territory is on a garrison basis, the general officer commanding Force 141, as Military Governor, with the approval of the Commander in Chief, should be free to establish lines of authority running directly to him and to his CCAO [Chief Civil Affairs Officer] to whom he might delegate certain of his functions.

## TACTICAL SUPREMACY MUST PREVAIL THROUGHOUT

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3586]

BIGOT-HUSKY words "at all times the tactical commanders have final responsibility and authority" contemplated that even during garrison period and after authorization lines of staff communication from Chief Civil Affairs Officer to local administrators senior tactical commanders would nevertheless have final responsibility and authority over civilian population in their areas. . . . We do not like plan which deprives General Patton and his subordinate tactical commanders from [*sic*] any authority and responsibility for civil affairs as long as their troops are present in the area. We do not favor separating command channels for military government from normal single channel of command. . . .<sup>20</sup>

## EISENHOWER STILL WANTS TO BE FREE TO ESTABLISH EVENTUAL SEPARATE CHAIN OF AUTHORITY

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 19 Apr 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11778]

Agree entirely that final responsibility and authority over civilian population is inherent in the tactical command. However following factors must be borne in mind:

1. The organization for military administration of the territory is one that will remain after the capture of the island and the task force organization has changed to that of a garrison.

<sup>20</sup> For the posthostilities period the American manual of military government (1940 ed.) provided that tactical units be used as organs of military government and that the commanding general assume responsibility in the area occupied, the boundaries coinciding with existing political boundaries.

This phase will continue until the peace treaty or recognition of some Italian government.

2. No central authority now exists in the territory, the provincial governments being separately responsible to the national capital. Uniformity and efficiency require that there be a central authority for military government.

3. As the existing administrative framework will not be replaced, the machinery for military government should be built on present administrative divisions and following provincial or territorial lines. This may or may not correspond to the disposition of the tactical commands in the area. Districts in the interior where no troops will be stationed will have to be administered.

For the foregoing reasons, even in the first phase, there should be an administrative line of communication on subjects with which the local commander would not wish to be distracted from the military governor or his deputy to the local military administrator, as proposed in your Fortune 101. In the later phase good administration and economy of effort and personnel may make it desirable to centralize lines of authority in a similar manner under the military governor. The question has no immediate application, but if and when it does arise I wish to be free to consider it in the light of conditions then existing. Any decision then made would, of course, have due regard to the accepted principle of final responsibility of the tactical commander.

## A POLITICAL SECTION HELD INAPPROPRIATE WITHIN MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

[Memo, Dunn for the Secy of State, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Sir Ronald [Campbell] asked for further elucidation with regard to the suggestion in paragraph (a) of his memorandum of today's date which suggests that a small political or liaison section composed of American and British military officers be appointed as preferable to the appointment of Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the theater.<sup>21</sup> I said that the position of the War Department in this respect was that

<sup>21</sup> Elimination of the Political Section originally recommended by AFHQ had been called for in the War Department message of 7 April (above). The British Officer who was G-4 at AFHQ on 29 April penned an interesting note on a chart made by the War Office to depict the organizational plan favored by the Americans, i.e., inclusion of a deputy chief of staff (American), head of a military government section, in the chain of command: "The objection to this setup is that the expression of higher policy may receive a U.S. twist in transmission to the executive authority on the ground. . . ." The remedy, he further indicated, was to have a direct chain of com-

as the Commander in Chief of the theater had full responsibility and authority for the new operation, it seemed perfectly logical to the War Department that he should have a Deputy Chief of Staff appointed particularly for the purpose, that it must be remembered that the Commander in Chief of the Theater was an Allied Commander in Chief acting under instructions and authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it would not seem advisable, therefore, to the War Department to have a political section on his staff as he, the theater commander, was acting under joint authority of the two governments and that the Force Commander, acting in the particular operation, was directly under his authority. There would not seem to the War Department to be any occasion for confusion in such a situation through the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to the theater commander for the purpose of dealing under his direction with the military government phase of this particular operation as such a deputy commander would not be interposed in authority

mand from the British Military Governor and the British Deputy Military Governor to the C-in-C. Though General Eisenhower was American he would be too much pressed with other matters to give military government problems much attention. See Memo, Brig. R. G. Lewis to the CAO, AFHQ, 29 Apr 43, AFHQ, CAO files, Reel 309A.

between the Commander in Chief and the Force Commander but would be acting in the manner of an assistant without any authority of his own. . . .<sup>22</sup>

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 28 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 10337]

You will recall that the acceptance by the War Department of the Civil Affairs plan for Sicily, submitted by Allied Force Headquarters, was contingent upon the establishment at AFHQ of a Civil Affairs Section. . . . It was felt here that the successful execution of such a plan would be dependent upon a small, efficient group at your headquarters to co-ordinate and supervise this important and difficult operation. . . .<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> In a note which the War Department had seen, Macmillan, British Resident Minister, had indicated his expectation that if a political section to advise the Allied C-in-C was adopted, he would be permitted to extend the range of the matters on which he would himself advise Eisenhower. Macmillan note, Political Questions at AFHQ Arising Out of Operation Husky, CAD files, Husky file (prior to 1 Jun 43).

<sup>23</sup> The Americans wished to strengthen General Eisenhower's control over civil affairs and keep the civil affairs section free from the political complications which seemed to characterize the British system, Interv, Weinberg With Maj Gen John E. Hull, former DACofS, OPD, 28 Feb 50.

#### 4. DIRECT OR INDIRECT RULE?

##### SHOULD ALLIED OFFICERS BE USED IN SOME ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS?

[AFHQ Appreciation and Outline Plan, 24 Mar 43]

###### *Local Military Administration*

(67) The question of how far down the scale of cities and towns it is necessary or advisable to go in providing military personnel for the top municipal posts is a matter on which the British and American systems differ in their emphasis. American planning (as evidenced by the dispositions for the TORCH operation) tends to rely more on local personnel. The British practice in colonial territory has been to rely very little on local personnel in the first phase and to replace municipal officials in all centers of importance from either a civilian or military standpoint. For the proposed operation, it is suggested that the line should be drawn at the level of towns with a population of 12,000 to 15,000 or in smaller towns where special conditions exist such as presence of combat troops or the existence of a port or airport in the vicinity.

The proper placing of local administrators is important not only for the actual operation of the municipal governments and services but for the effective enforcement of military law and regulations. Also, the following factors must be borne in mind:

- (a) In many towns the Podestas and other top officials will have left.
- (b) In others they will be active fascists who will be removed. Replacement with satisfactory local personnel is a difficult matter without considerable intelligence as to the local situation.
- (c) Communications will be very limited for some time; hence control from the provincial capitals will be difficult.
- (d) In many cities there will be no garrison of combat troops; the military administrators and police officers will be the only evidence of Allied occupation and authority.

###### *Police*

(68) The final establishment of the civil police is a matter which must be determined later. For

the first stages of the occupation, though, and if the M.P.'s are to be relieved of the civil police burden, there seems to be no alternative to creating an allied civil police staff of considerable size, to supervise and reorganize the existing forces. It is therefore suggested that civil police personnel should be stationed in centers down to and possibly somewhat below the population level for which administrative officers will be provided, that is, as proposed, towns of around 12,000 to 15,000. Whether civil police functions should ultimately be administered by an independent Allied force with specially recruited personnel—in line with the British colonial practice—or should be based on the Carabinieri and the other existing forces, must be decided on the basis of further study or even on the basis of experience in the early stages of the occupation. If the Carabinieri organization remains substantially intact and lives up to its reputation for training and efficiency, the latter course is certainly preferable.<sup>24</sup>

#### PRESIDENT PROPOSES REPLACING TOP FASCISTS BY ALLIED MILITARY OFFICERS

[Undated Memo, Dept of State, as Revised by Roosevelt and Transmitted by Leahy, to OPD, 9 Apr 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

5. . . . All prefects (Provincial Governors), although they are primarily administrators, should be removed, and military officers of the occupying forces put in their places. . . .

#### LORD RENNELL POINTS OUT ADVANTAGES IN INDIRECT SYSTEM

[Memo, Rennell, Br Member of Force 141 Plng Staff, for Spofford, American Member, 18 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000-100-604]

1. There appears to be some confusion of thought in such directives as have been received and in documents prepared in Washington on the form which the Military Government of HORRIFIED is to take.

2. There are broadly speaking two ways in which the Government can be conducted, which will be familiar to British Administrative personnel as "direct" and "indirect" rule. The broad

<sup>24</sup> Although the U.S. Field Manual of 1943 states that military government personnel should as far as possible deal with the inhabitants through indigenous personnel, here the President was favoring direct control. On the other hand, Lord Rennell's memorandum (below) outlines a theory of indirect control which was a departure from the British colonial practice (see above). The dispute was not resolved during the planning period but indirect control quickly became Allied policy in operations—a fact which supported Lord Rennell's arguments.

distinction between the two systems for our purposes in HORRIFIED, is whether the Allied personnel in the Civil Administration is wholly executive, or undertakes the role of controlling and directing the local administrative machine.

3. This is perhaps best exemplified by taking the case of a provincial administration, which comes to a head in the person of a Prefect; and let us suppose that the Prefect is well disposed and wholly cooperative. For the "direct rule" system, the Prefect will be replaced by an Allied Administrator, who . . . will, himself, issue orders . . . to the . . . provincial administration, and will replace local personnel in the appointments of heads of branches and divisions, leaving only very subordinate local personnel to conduct non-confidential clerical work, book-keeping, etc. In this system, the P.C. is in effective executive control, with his Allied Subordinates, of the whole machine. He gives orders to the local subordinate personnel himself and through his own officers.

4. Under the system of "indirect control," the local provincial administration continues as nearly intact as possible, and when a vacancy such as that of a Prefect or head of a branch occurs because the incumbent is unsatisfactory, or unwilling to continue in office, and has to be removed, his place is filled *not* by an Allied Civil Affairs Officer, but by another local Civil Servant. In this system, the Senior Allied Provincial Administrator . . . sits, not in the chair of the Prefect, but in a chair at his side and tells him what the Military Government wants done. The Prefect then issues his own orders, to his own subordinates, in his own name, at the direction of the Provincial Administrators. Allied personnel lower down the scale sit in with and supervise the functioning of branches and divisions to ensure that orders given by the Prefect at the instance of the Provincial Administrator are, in fact, properly carried out.

5. While there is a great deal to be said for and against the "indirect" system, I am obliged to recommend the second system and not that of "direct" rule. The principal reasons are given below:

(i) The indirect system of rule economises in Allied Civil Affairs personnel. Fewer Officers are required to control, supervise and give directions, than are necessary for their actual execution.

(ii) Local subordinate personnel is more likely to obey the orders of their own superior personnel, than those of Allied Officers, who have been put into the shoes of their former superiors.

(iii) Fewer language difficulties will arise. In "direct" rule officers will either have to be

pretty fluent in the local language, or the subordinate personnel will have to learn English.

(iv) There is an incentive to local personnel to remain at work and work loyally if they have a fair chance of being permitted to fill the vacancies of their superiors who have been removed for political reasons, or left the territory altogether. If these vacancies are filled by Allied personnel, there is less incentive for the subordinate personnel to carry on, or carry on zealously.

(v) There is probably less danger of a general strike or sitdown strike of local administrative personnel, if they feel that their own administrative machine is functioning and is responsible, under direction, of course, for the well being of their own general public.

(vi) Any Administration breakdown will tend to be attributed by the general public, under the indirect system, more immediately to their own Civil servants, than to the Allied Military Government.

(vii) The local administrative machine will be more readily educated and improved by being directed, than by being broken up before local substitute personnel can be collected in due course. I regard this process of education as particularly important and I am, by experience, acutely conscious of the difficulties of finding any reasonably good local civil service personnel to replace existing men, if wholesale dismissals or resignations take place under a direct rule system.

(viii) We do not wish to give the appearance of instituting a government which either looks like a colonial government, or gives the impression of being a prelude to annexation. We wish to build up local government on same democratic lines, so that eventually the local population will administer its own affairs. We do not wish to create a void when the time comes for the Allies to leave the territory, such as would be created if we walked out from a system of direct rule.

6. A decision on the system is of immediate importance, since the two alternatives have a direct bearing on the mechanics of administration. I will only give one instance, in the financial field.

7. Under the direct system, all taxes collected would be paid in to the Allied Military Government Treasury and disbursements would be made in respect, for instance, of works, relief, and wages, by the Allied Military Government Treasury. In other words, local personnel would come on the Allied Military Government payroll in its entirety. The budget would then become a single territorial budget covering all local receipts and expenditures as well as those of the Allied Military Government for personnel and special works

expenditures. This system not only means remaking the whole budget structure, but provides the least incentive for the local population to pay or collect taxes.

8. Under the indirect system, there would continue in existence a local treasury and treasury system, in which revenues collected would be paid and from which disbursements would be made. The Allied Military Government would only be responsible, within the limit of what is decided, for any deficit in the local budget by way of grants in aid, appropriated to each department at the discretion of the Allied Administrators. I consider that this system would give more effective budgetary control, though perhaps less control of theft in tax collection, which however we would never have the personnel to undertake ourselves. A, to my mind, sufficient safeguard in this respect, is provided in access of the local administrative personnel and population to the Allied Civil Affairs Staff to file complaints of speculation [*sic*] and dishonesty. The innate characteristics of the population will ensure that such complaints are filed, and probably to a degree which will constitute a major nuisance. . . .

#### EXCHANGE OF IDEAS BETWEEN TWO PLANNERS ON INDIRECT RULE

[Memo, Spofford for Rennell, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

2. There are several points which are not clear to me:

(a) I do not see why the factors of budget, financial control, etc., necessarily are dependent on the adoption of one system or the other. Books could be kept separately for the military component of the government in any event, and on our side will probably have to be.

(b) While the personnel requirements for direct rule will be greater, I don't see that there will be any *very* great difference. . . .

3. The question is one for high level decision and may take some time for discussion here and in Washington and London. . . .

[Memo, Rennell for Spofford, 19 Apr 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

1. Ref. Financial organization:—Under "direct" rule the AMGOT finance officers become personally accountable for all receipts and disbursements. Under "indirect rule" the local treasuries and paying in/out officers remain personally responsible. Books will be separate anyway, but the budget and account procedure would be quite different.

2. Ref. personnel required:—There appear to be 64,000 employees in public administration in HERRIED at present. 380 Allied personnel including police cannot provide enough staff to command—but only to guide.

3. There is to be a fundamental difference in the instruction, as I see it, between commanding and directing—indeed the difference between staff officers' and a regimental officer's duties—according to the system adopted.

#### WASHINGTON FAVORS DIRECT AND LONDON INDIRECT CONTROL

[CCS Directive for Sicily Proposed by WD to the BJS, 9 Apr 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

5. All prefects and all mayors of important communities shall be removed and replaced by military officers of the occupying forces. . . .

[Msg, War Cabinet Offices to Jt Staff Mission, 9 May 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

4B. We should prefer the first sentence of paragraph 5 [of proposed directive] to run as follows: When senior Italian officials, such as prefects and mayors of important communities are to be removed, they shall be replaced, at the discretion of the Commander in Chief, by Italians nominated by himself and under such supervision and such limitations of powers as he may prescribe. Since, in practice, the more senior officials will almost certainly be active members of the party the CinC will bear in mind the necessity of replacing them at the earliest possible moment. . . .

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, for BJS, 11 May 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

3. We feel strongly that your paragraph 4B is very inadvisable. Imposing on the Commander in Chief the responsibility of selecting new Italian officials for high positions will subject the military government to political dangers. It is preferable to have military officers in positions of authority and their using, in any way desired, any Italian officials. . . .

#### DRAFT MESSAGE ON ISSUE PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43, Prepared by McCloy, CAD files, Husky (after 1 Jun 43)]

Understand we have worked out with your people here directive satisfactory to Eisenhower for military government of HUSKY. Only difference of view remaining relates to possible use of Italians in high positions such as mayors of large towns and prefectures. I feel that in the initial

stages we should avoid all risk of implications arising from attempted selection of suitable Italians for these important positions. Believe much preferable remove any Italians from these positions as they are all prominent Fascists and replace them with Army officers for time being thus avoiding stirring up factions on the ground and repercussions at home. Less important jobs can continue without adverse effect to be filled by Italians or Italian replacements on good behavior. Hope you will agree. Wording can be arranged promptly and plans made accordingly. . . .

#### CHURCHILL PREFERS INDIRECT CONTROL TO EVEN GOOD GAULEITERS

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43, CAD files, Husky (after 1 Jun 43)]

. . . The second point is the degree of American and British administration and control which should be imposed on newly conquered regions. It seems wise to make them run themselves as much as possible. Malignant or prominent Fascists must be removed and we should be prepared to replace them with trustworthy administrators to the extent that these cannot be found for our purposes from the local population. I am sure that it would be a mistake to flood all these places with hundreds of British and American gauleiters, however well meaning and well trained they may be.

Of course, it is impossible to foresee in advance the nature of local conditions or the temper of the people in the conquered regions. It should be left to the Supreme Commander to propose to our Governments what British and American officers he wants and the degree of infusion into local life. My personal feelings are that he should wish to interfere as little as possible and allow things to run themselves, subject always to the paramount interests of armies and operations.

#### THE PRESIDENT WILL LEAVE ISSUE TO SUPREME COMMANDER'S DISCRETION

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 43, CAD files, Husky (after 1 Jun 43)]

. . . I agree that in the territory which is occupied in the future by our combined forces, the Supreme Commander should during the period of occupation inform our two Governments what American and British officials he desires and the purposes for which he wants to use these officials in the local administration, and that no other civil officials should be sent to his areas except those requested by the Supreme Commander.

## 5. POLITICAL ADVISERS OR AN EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY ADMINISTRATION?

### BRITISH EXCEPTION TO PRINCIPLE OF A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

[Memo, Campbell for Dunn, Dept of State, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

His Majesty's Government feel that it would be reasonable to provide that Mr. Macmillan as British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters should be kept currently informed by the Commander in Chief of all political matters pertaining to the military administration of the territory involved in the operation of HUSKY and that he should be recognized as the channel between General Eisenhower and His Majesty's Government on all political matters, in which capacity he would whenever necessary be called into consultation and entitled to offer advice.

### WAR AND STATE DEPARTMENTS OPPOSE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CHAIN OF COMMUNICATIONS

[Ltr, Dunn to Hull, 5 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy, today handed me the attached paper [above] which he said was to be considered as a memorandum of our oral conversation on the subject of the organization of the military government for HUSKY.

The War Department had been anxious to receive this reply from the British on the subject, and I had already arranged to see Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, in his office this afternoon at 3:30. I took this matter up with the War Department at that time. Mr. McCloy had with him when I arrived General Hilldring, Colonel Haskell and Lieutenant Colonel [Charles] Poletti. After discussing the British memorandum, Mr. McCloy stated that the position of the War Department with regard to the organization of the military government for HUSKY was as follows:

That there was to be no civilian participation in the organization of the military government; that after agreement between the two governments the directives as to policy and operation of the military government were to be conveyed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in North Africa; that the Commander in Chief of the Allied forces was the officer who was responsible for and who exercised authority with regard to the military government of HUSKY under the authority of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff; that the Force Commander was to exercise the authority in the particular area concerned under the direction and authority of the Commander in Chief of the theater; that any questions which arose in the political field with regard to the operation or with regard to the military government were to be matters of discussion between the two governments and that the channel of communication to and from the Commander in Chief of the theater with regard to such matters was to be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. There is to be no civilian participation in the military government aspects of the operation from the time the questions were discussed as [*sic*] between the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each government and their respective governments.

Immediately upon returning to my office at 5:30 today, I telephoned Sir Ronald Campbell and gave him the position of this Government as stated above after consultation with the War Department in the premises. Sir Ronald said that his Government was quite clear on the point that the directive to the Commander in Chief of the theater would be sent to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff here after agreement had been reached with regard to its terms by the two governments, but he inquired what the procedure would be in the event of political questions arising during the operation which had not been foreseen in the directive. I told him that it was the position of the War Department that if such political questions arose in the field they would, if not susceptible of decision by the Commander in Chief under his general instructions, be transmitted by him to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for further instructions. The Combined Chiefs of Staff could in such an instance, if they saw the necessity therefor, consult with the respective governments with a view to arriving at a settlement of such questions. . . .<sup>25</sup>

[Memo, McCloy for Hopkins, 25 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

We have about come to rest in our discussions with the British on policies and procedures to guide the combined military government authorities in HUSKY. There have been a number of

<sup>25</sup> A difficulty not foreseen by the War Department was the frequency with which, as matters developed, the theater was compelled to wait a considerable time before receiving new instructions from Washington.

tough questions, but all seems now to be settled between us except *one*—and that is the presence of a high political representative on the ground to represent and counsel the British Government on political matters which may arise from the occupation.

We have taken the position that this is to be a *military* government, that it cannot be part political and part military government if we are to avoid the difficulties of our African set-up. The presence of Macmillan or a similar figure close to Headquarters muddies the picture badly and is totally unnecessary in any event because the British have appointed a political figure to be their Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Lord Rennell) with the rank of Major General.

Our plan contemplates no political figure at all with all questions raised and determined with and by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through which the respective governments may express their views. Macmillan, like Casey, is a member of the Cabinet. He is not on Eisenhower's staff. The Military Governor is British, his Chief Civil Affairs Officer is British, and if in addition there is a British Cabinet member on the ground to 'advise on political questions' the whole character of the operation is such as to give the thing such a strongly British flavor as to destroy the President's directive for a joint rather than a senior partner arrangement.

The State Department opposes the introduction of Macmillan in the HUSKY scene. They are not using Murphy for anything except North Africa and do not wish or intend to place any political representative in the field. They want to deal in the initial stages entirely through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . .

The English counter with the statement that Macmillan has no official position, is merely on the ground so that his Government may get the benefit of his first-hand impressions which they would want to get in any case by reason of his ability and experience. They say that all they ask is that he should be able to look at all the cables as they come and go and communicate his thoughts to his Government or to Eisenhower as may seem desirable. While this is all they ask, it is a great deal, because you simply cannot have a Cabinet Minister on the ground, particularly one of Macmillan's character and ability, without his taking part in the play. . . .

Since I feel that the introduction of political representatives will prematurely introduce political questions and thus destroy just what we are seeking to accomplish, I wish you would see what can be done leading to an agreement on the part of the British with our position. . . .

#### PRESIDENT TO BE REQUESTED TO TAKE UP THE ISSUE WITH CHURCHILL

[Draft Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 10 Jun 43]

. . . Also think it inadvisable have any political officers not in uniform connected with HUSKY operation as it tends to confusion of authority and counsels. We can better maintain all decisions made purely on military basis if no diplomatic or political figures are involved. Understand urgent necessity keeping Macmillan in North Africa but feel that neither of us should have representatives in HUSKY operation in initial stages. Agreeable have Macmillan kept informed by Eisenhower of matters relating to administration of HUSKY but sole chain of communication during military government should be from military governor to Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff and all instructions from respective governments should move solely through Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower.

#### WHY ALL THE DITHER OVER MACMILLAN?

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Jun 43]

The first point is about Macmillan. He is my personal representative just as Murphy is yours. They get on well with each other and with General Eisenhower in all subjects relating to the "Torch" area. I see no reason why precisely the same relationship should not continue in the HUSKY period nor why it should not apply to the larger areas which might come under our joint control. Formal correspondence and orders would go through the Combined Staffs, but it is essential that the heads of governments have immediate and intimate information about events in the civil and political sphere. All this is working easily and smoothly now and all that is necessary is a statement from you and me that the present relationship of our representatives to the Supreme Commander will not be altered by new acquisitions of territory and will cover that territory. I have the definite impression that this will be agreeable to Eisenhower. . . .

#### THE TWO MINISTERS MAY REMAIN BUT FOR PURELY INFORMATIONAL FUNCTIONS

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 14 Jun 43]

. . . I agree that the equal status of Murphy and Macmillan should continue without change during the HUSKY and post-HUSKY periods, and also that they should continue to communicate early and intimate information regarding the political and civil sphere to the heads of their respective governments, in each case of course informing the Supreme Commander. . . .

## 6. THE CCS DIRECTS A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION AND AS MUCH BENEVOLENCE AS PRACTICABLE

### BRITISH URGE THAT POLITICAL REFORM IN WARTIME BE TEMPERED BY REALISM

[Msg, War Cabinet Office to BJS, 9 May 43, Regarding 29 Apr American Draft of proposed CCS Directive on Sicily,<sup>26</sup> CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

4. As regards Section I, we have the following comments:

A. . . . we suggest that an additional paragraph might be inserted after paragraph 6, or in whatever other place in the draft is thought appropriate, on the following lines:—The ideal would be to get rid of present office holders . . . and set up a complete new local administration, definitely anti-Fascist in character while using the old framework of machinery and local government. But it would obviously be difficult in practice to find and keep a local government working smoothly so as to relieve the Commander in Chief of all trouble and anxiety as regards civil population.<sup>27</sup> . . .

C. Paragraph 6. For the last sentence we should prefer the following to be substituted:—No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced.<sup>28</sup> . . .

E. Paragraph 8. We think the last sentence should be omitted. It is dangerous at so early a stage in the occupation of hostile territory to lay down as a principle that the enemy is to have freedom of speech and press.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> The American draft had been prepared by representatives of the State, Treasury, and War Departments. Its basic principles were taken chiefly from the State Department's March memorandum on a plan for military government in Sicily (Note 15 and sec. 2, above). The draft has not been reproduced inasmuch as, except for some changes brought about by discussions with the British, it is identical with the final CCS directive given below.

<sup>27</sup> The supplement suggested was to the paragraphs concerning defascistization. After some debate the British proposal, including a distinction between beneficial and nonbeneficial Fascist organizations, was accepted in the form represented by paragraph 6a of the final directive.

<sup>28</sup> The American draft had stated simply that no political activity was to be countenanced prior to the issuance of a further directive. The British modification was accepted.

<sup>29</sup> General Hilldring disagreed with the British on this issue, pointing out that the American draft included the safeguard phrase "consistent with military necessity." Memo, Hilldring for BJS, 11 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43.) In this case the British deferred to the American view, see final directive, par. 8, below.

### DIVERGENT VIEWS ON THE EXCHANGE RATE

[Memo, Poletti, CAD, for the Chief, CAD, 10 May 43, CAD files, HUSKY (prior to 1 Jun 43)]

The British contend that the rate should be 480 lire per pound sterling or 120 per dollar.

#### Reasons:

1. The rate should be realistic—one that can be maintained for a substantial period without the necessity of having the local currency insulated from the currency on the mainland.

2. Black market quotations range from 526 to 789 per pound. London believes lire will fall below 1000 in case of our invasion.

3. While the official prices of staple commodities show a rise of 50 to 100% over 1939, these have limited significance because a black market exists, although to what extent is not known.

4. It would be unfair to the friendly Arab population in Tripolitania to maintain the present 480 rate while giving a more favorable rate to enemy territory.

5. If the rate is too favorable, the local population will jump to the conclusion the rate cannot be maintained and it will hoard dollar and sterling currency thereby bringing about a fall in the rate.

The United States contends the rate should be 240 lire per pound or 60 per dollar or on the outside 300 per pound and 75 per dollar.

#### Reasons:

1. We believe the decision of the President that the military administration of the area be predicated upon a reasonable benevolent attitude toward the people dictates the rate we propose. Such a benevolent attitude will facilitate military operations and save lives of soldiers.

2. The rate in Husky-land can be a different rate from the one eventually fixed by us for the mainland. . . .

3. The lire in the eyes of the local population is still considered as worth more than five cents (official rate is \$.0526). Hence 60 or 75 lire per dollar will be a tremendous jolt as it is. . . .

4. We desire to impress on the people in Husky-land, as well as those on the Italian mainland and in the occupied countries that the United Nations do not intend to destroy property values. . . .

5. When the British fixed a 480 rate in Tripolitania, they advised us that it was not to be taken as a precedent. We desire a rate which is not as favorable as the French rate in North Africa and yet not too far away from it. . . . We think the friendly Arabs will not be too greatly upset by our proposed rate.

6. We do not believe British reason #5 is sound. Whatever dollar and sterling currency gets into the hands of the people, it will be hoarded regardless of the rate. Of course, there will be only a limited use of yellow seal dollars spearhead currency and no sterling at all.

#### CCS FINALLY ENDS DEBATES WITH A DIRECTIVE FOR SICILY

[CCS Directive, Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY, CCS 24, 7/5/D, 28 Jun 43,<sup>30</sup> CAD files, CCS Papers, Opn HUSKY]

This directive has been agreed upon by the governments of the United States and Great Britain and is transmitted for your guidance in the organization and operation of military government in the territory involved in operation HUSKY. You will be guided in all matters of general policy, such as those of a political, fiscal or economic nature, solely by the directives you will receive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Consistent with military necessity, you will conform to the guides herein set forth.

#### SECTION I

##### *Political Guides*

1. There shall be a military administration which will show every characteristic of an Allied undertaking. Both the American and British flags shall be displayed at headquarters and posts of the military government. The administration shall be identical throughout the area.

2. The military administration of HORRIFIED shall contain no political agencies or political representatives of either government.

3. Other representatives of civilian agencies of either government shall not participate in the initial stages. Their later participation will be sub-

<sup>30</sup> Because of the length of time consumed in Anglo-American discussions on unsettled points, the directive was sent to AFHQ in installments to avoid unnecessary delay. The bulk of it went forward on 31 May; on 10 June paragraph 6a was dispatched; finally on 28 June, after paragraphs 2 and 5 had been agreed upon by the two governments, the complete directive as given above was sent to Eisenhower. The CCS directive is of basic importance for Allied policy not only in Sicily but also in mainland Italy, to which it was later extended.

ject, as to time and extent, to decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The administration shall be benevolent with respect to the civilian population so far as consistent with strict military requirements. The civilian population is tired of war, resentful of German overlordship, and demoralized by the Fascist regime, and will therefore be responsive to a just and efficient administration. It should be made clear to the local population that military occupation is intended: (1) to deliver the people from the Fascist regime which led them into the war; and (2) to restore Italy as a free nation.

5. The replacement of any prefects and mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the military commander. He will decide whether the functioning of the military government is better serviced by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials. No actual appointment of Italians to important posts, as distinct from their temporary use, will be made until it has been approved by the two governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

It shall be made clear to any Italians who may eventually be appointed to important posts and to all other governmental officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of satisfactory co-operation, performance and behavior.

6. The Fascist Party organization shall be immediately dissolved. The entire Fascist Party leadership (the "hierarchy") from the top down to the local secretaries shall be removed from any post of authority. The Fascist militia and all Fascist youth organizations shall be abolished. Fascist leaders and pro-Nazi partisans shall be arrested. Fascist doctrine and propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced.

a. The first objective must be to get and keep a local government working smoothly so as to relieve the Commander in Chief of all trouble and anxiety as regards civil population. The following may serve as guidance:

A distinction should be drawn between (a) such organizations as do not exist for the benefit and security of the people, e.g., the party organization itself and all purely Fascist accretions which have been grafted onto the local government system, and (b) those organizations which are of direct benefit to the people and whose removal would adversely affect the efficiency of the administration. The former should be suppressed, while

there is a *prima facie* case for maintaining the latter.

7. War criminals charged by the United Nations (names will appear on list to be furnished by you) shall be imprisoned and held subject to further directive.

8. All laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color or creed shall be forthwith annulled. Freedom of religious worship shall be promulgated. To the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press shall be instituted.

9. Measures shall be taken for the prompt release of political prisoners. Upon their release, they shall be cautioned that political activity on their part, during that period of military government, will not be tolerated. The Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State shall be abolished.

10. Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, shall have any part in determining the policies of the administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any local political elements. Italian political leaders in exile shall have no part in the administration.

11. The exercise of the powers of the Crown shall be suspended during the period of military occupation.

12. Consistent with military necessity, the position of the Church and of all religious institutions shall be respected and all efforts made to preserve the local Archives, Historical and Classical Monuments and objects of Art.

13. A plan shall be prepared by you to prevent transfer of title of valuable real and personal property which are intended to defeat, evade or avoid the responsibilities, fines or punishments imposed or to be imposed on present owners or the national government.

14. Propaganda will be in accordance with directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

## SECTION II

### *Monetary and Fiscal Guides*

1. During the initial period of operations, the United States task force will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins. The British military forces will use British Military Authority [B.M.A.] notes and British coins, as well as local currency in their possession. Yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes are available in NATOUSA and additional shipments can be procured when desired from the United States Treasury and the British Treasury. Records shall be kept of the

amount of currencies used by the United and British forces.

2. The use of yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes for army payments to troops and for local procurement shall cease and Allied military [A.M.] lire shall be used in their place as soon as available, unless the military government decides that the time is not propitious for such change. The United States Treasury will have this A.M. lire currency ready for shipment to any point desired within four days after zero hour. Records shall be kept of the amount of A.M. lire issued.

3. A.M. lire currency is not intended to replace local lire currency already in circulation, but is designed to supplement it.

4. The rate of exchange between the U.S. dollar and the B.M.A. note shall be four dollars to one pound and both currencies shall be made interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.

5. The U.S. yellow seal currency and the B.M.A. notes shall be withdrawn from circulation as soon as it can be satisfactorily accomplished. The date for this withdrawal shall be determined by the military government after the operation has begun.

6. The rate of exchange to be decreed on D Day shall be 100 lire to the dollar and 400 lire to the pound sterling. A proclamation shall be issued requiring all persons to accept the U.S. yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes at the decreed rate. Transactions at any other rate shall be prohibited. Holders of local and A.M. lire notes or deposits are not entitled to obtain dollar or pound notes without special permission. They shall obtain dollars or pound notes or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by the military government.

7. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions and all exports and imports of currency shall be prohibited except as permitted under regulations to be issued by the military government.

8. Under the military government there shall be established within the area an A.M. Financial Agency. It may establish sub-agencies where deemed desirable.

Insofar as its operations relate to the provision of currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military formations of either Army, it shall draw the necessary resources from the military government currency reserve and will record the debit against the Army concerned

in the currency of issue. It is authorized to accept deposits from finance officers and from military personnel of the Allied Armies. Insofar as its operations relate to civil administration, it shall draw on the currency reserve and debit against the military government.

If found practicable, and desirable, the Bank of Sicily under the direct control of the Military Governor will be designated as agent for the A.M. Financial Agency. The Military Governor and other Allied Military Authorities, when satisfied that the Bank of Sicily is under adequate control, may use that bank for official business, and by making credits available to it by providing it with A.M. lire notes, place that bank in a position to finance other banks and branches for the conduct of their business as approved by the military government. When other effective banking facilities are not available, the A.M. Financial Agency shall be empowered to make loans. Those shall be restricted to lire loans except in very special circumstances.

The military government will control and direct all receipts and disbursements for civil administration purposes, whether by U.S. or British civil affairs officers, and through the A.M. Financial Agency, will provide all funds of whatever currency and receive all revenues and cash receipts. Thus all civil affairs officers will draw funds only from the A.M. Financial Agency.

The records of the A.M. Financial Agency shall indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursement made.

9. Upon taking over an area the military authorities shall proceed immediately to:

- a. Close all banks and financial institutions and place them under military custody.
- b. Declare a general moratorium.
- c. Impound or block for future disposal the funds of enemy government agencies, including government banks.
- d. Seal all vaults and safety deposit boxes.
- e. Obtain an inventory of the assets of the banks as quickly as practicable.

10. Holdings of gold, foreign currencies and foreign securities, all national funds and the funds of Fascist political organizations shall be taken into custody as quickly as possible, and shall be deposited with the A.M. Financial Agency or banks designated by the military government.

11. Banks should be encouraged to reopen for business under the military government if and when it deems such action desirable. No government or private bank or agency shall be authorized to issue bank notes or lire currency.

Access to safety deposit boxes or vaults will be allowed only when a proper system of supervision has been instituted. Gold, foreign currencies and foreign securities, and valuable papers, shall be withheld from the owner against accredited receipt.

12. Before banks are reopened, it should be made possible for them to arrange loans from banks or agencies designated by the military government. The lending bank may require as collateral any or all of the assets of the borrowing bank or of the directors thereof, and may accept, as collateral, obligations of the national government or of its subdivisions.

13. Except where special permission is granted, local banks shall be permitted only lire accounts, but may accept, at the decreed rate of exchange, yellow seal dollars and B.M.A. notes which they shall turn in as directed in exchange for local or A.M. lire at the decreed rate of exchange.

14. The military government shall have authority to maintain the existing tax laws and to raise such contributions for the administration of the country as are consistent with international custom and usage. All national tax receipts shall be deposited in the A.M. Financial Agency or in banks designated by the military government.

15. All branches of the National Insurance Institute shall be placed under military control and its revenues made available to the military government.

16. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone services, radio and all government monopolies shall be placed under military control and their revenues made available to the military government.

17. None of the tax or other revenues shall be used for the payment of principal or interest on national government obligations.

### Section III

#### *Economic Guides*

1. Measures shall promptly be undertaken to enable the country's own services of production and supply to assure as far as possible the provisioning of the local population. You are authorized to furnish from all stocks available to you such supplies to the civilian population as military requirements may permit. These supplies, in so far as feasible, shall be introduced for sale through existing commercial channels under rigid military control. Direct relief shall be employed only where necessary.

2. You will have the responsibility for the procurement of materials deemed essential to re-

establish the various utilities and maintain agricultural production. You will also have the responsibility for the procurement of such strategic materials as may be needed for export for the use of the United Nations. No provisions for such materials will be made except on requisitions from AFHQ.

3. Maximum prices and rationing of important staple commodities shall be quickly established. Black market practices and hoarding shall be severely punished.

4. If found necessary by the military authorities in order to avoid the sudden disruption of internal economy, provincial and interprovincial associations of employers and employees may be temporarily continued, except that Fascist or

otherwise objectionable officers thereof shall be removed, and except that objectionable features thereof shall be abolished. The Fascist corporations and their councils shall be abolished. The military government should give careful attention to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary labor relations and shall, if necessary, fix hours and wages of labor.

5. A system of control shall immediately be established for the import and export of goods by local business concerns and a license required for such shipments. In determining what exports shall be permitted, paramount consideration shall be granted to the needs of the military forces and the local population. Exports shall be permitted only to friendly countries.

## 7. AFHQ CREATES JOINT AGENCIES AND ISSUES FINAL INSTRUCTIONS

### DETAILED PLANNING AND FURTHER PROBLEMS OF RECONCILING TWO SYSTEMS

[Spofford Rpt]

#### *Detailed Planning*

Approval of the basic plan had been obtained, subject to . . . reservations . . . , by April 15 and the nucleus planning staff, consisting of Lord Rennell, Lt. Col. Maxwell and Lt. Col. Spofford, commenced amplification of the detailed plan. The first step consisted in adapting the plan (excluding the Appreciation) to the form of an instrument which could be promulgated as an order from Force 141 to the two task forces. This involved conferences with the other sections of the planning staff at 141 Force, in the course of which the division of functions between military government and the service units was discussed, elaborated and agreed upon. For example, it was agreed at conference with Gen. McClure, INC [Information and Censorship Section], that press, propaganda and censorship, would be handled by INC in close liaison, however, with AMG. It was also agreed that signal communications would be the sole responsibility of the signal units until a date to be determined after the invasion. Similar decisions were reached in the case of electric utilities, engineering, railways and transportation and like services.

With the removal of the planning staff from Ecole Normale at Bouzaréa to Chrea, liaison officers were left at 141 Force to continue the necessary close contacts with the planning staff at 141

Force. It was found necessary for members of the planning staff, particularly on the supply side, to maintain offices at Bouzaréa in order to be present at the planning conferences.

As a result of these discussions a plan was drafted and approved by the various branches at 141 Force and was published as an order of General Alexander on 1 May 1943. . . .<sup>31</sup>

The two task forces, known as 343 Force (A) and 545 Force (B), had established headquarters at Mostaganem and Cairo. In order to acquaint their planning and operating staffs with the proposed military government plans Col. Thorne Thorne (B) went to Cairo early in May where he discussed the plan and Lt. Col. Maxwell and Lt. Col. Spofford went to Mostaganem with the draft plan at the same time. These discussions were, of course, preliminary since the SCAO's [Senior Civil Affairs Officers] and staffs attached to the task forces went to the task force headquarters as soon as possible and developed task force plans within the framework of the basic plan in consultation with the task force staffs. Lt. Col. Charles Poletti, designated as SCAO 7th Army [U.S. Seventh Army, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Comdg], arrived in Mostaganem on approximately 15 June and immediately undertook the job of task force planning while Group Capt. [C. E.] Benson, designated as SCAO 8th Army, undertook the same function at 545 Force Headquarters in Cairo.

<sup>31</sup>The plan was incorporated into a manual entitled AMGOT Plan, Proclamation, and Instructions. The September 1943 edition has been used in this volume.

Concerning the detailed planning which was conducted largely at Chrea several important generalizations can be made:

(a) Every effort was made so that the instructions issued would be as simple as possible and would involve a workable compromise between British and American practice in those cases where the practice was different.

(b) Only so much of the detailed plans could be disclosed, for security reasons, to the officers intended to carry them out as was absolutely essential.

(c) Each division developed its plans and then prepared detailed and specific instructions for the guidance of its staff and the CAO's who, at least in the first instance, would have to carry those instructions out. All of these instructions together with the proclamations were then incorporated in a so-called AMG Manual, a copy of which was issued to each CAO. . . . Subsequently the AMG plan, the proclamations issued by the Military Governor, general orders issued by the CCAO, and the instructions to field personnel as amended were printed and incorporated in an AMG Manual. . . .

#### *Legal Planning*

. . . During the planning stage a very large share of the work fell to the Legal Division under the very able leadership of Lt. Col. William C. Chanler. The divisions dealing with economic, financial, police, medical and other problems of government were on solid ground because of the more or less international and universally recognized means for dealing with these problems. However, in the field of international law and the procedures relating to military government, there could be considerable difference of opinion as to the proper or desirable course to follow. It was for the Legal Division to assure unified planning, unified action and satisfactory results in these matters. The Legal Division commenced its work at the end of April. It first explored the legal procedures in use in England and the United States and compared them with a view to the preparation of the proclamations and general orders which were required to legislate in Sicily. It was found, particularly in connection with the Anglo-Saxon system of justice, that the fundamental concepts were the same in each country. Since this was the first time in history that a single administration formed of officers of separate armies belonging to separate powers was attempting to conduct military government it was most important that all points of view should be considered before the proclamations were drafted and that thorough training

should be given to officers of both nationalities in the directives that they were to administer and follow because of the possibility that these might vary from ideas with which they were familiar. It was also found at the outset that British and American practice was very similar concerning problems of international law and the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

It was found by all divisions, including the Legal Division, that the amount of intelligence available about the country to be occupied was extremely meager and inaccurate and that much of that which was available could not readily be passed on to the officers who were going to administer military government for security reasons. However, as a result of continuous deliberations during the months of May and June by D Day 12 proclamations had been prepared and printed. . . .<sup>32</sup>

Owing to the limited amount of equipment which officers attached to the combat troops could carry, it was decided that only three proclamations would be taken ashore by them in the first instance; i.e., the announcement of occupation, the definition of crimes against the Allied Military Government and the creation of the currency carried by the troops as legal tender. The remainder of the proclamations were issued and posted after the assault wave had passed each area.

While the proclamations were being written by some officers, others set up a system of military courts together with simple but comprehensive rules of procedure. These rules of procedure formed a compromise between American and British practice. After they had been agreed upon a period of training was given to the legal officers at Chrea in the newly established procedure so that the operation of the courts would be uniform and would not only do justice to those coming before them but would give the public the impression that justice was being done. . . .

#### THE FIRST ORGANIZATION FOR ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[AFHQ Admin Memo 35, 1 May 43, CAD files, Husky (prior to 1 Jun 43), Bk. 2]

#### *I Establishment of Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT)*

Announcement is made of the establishment of an organization for Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT). Functions of

<sup>32</sup> These proclamations formed the basic legislative structure under which occupied territory was to be governed. Spofford Rpt.

AMGOT are placed under the direct supervision of the Commanding General, Force 141.

## II *Functions and Objectives*

The purpose of AMGOT will be to administer the Allied Military Government of HORIZIFIED under the Military Governor of the territory in accordance with rules and usage of international law.

The objectives of AMGOT will be:

- a. To insure the security of the occupying forces and their lines of communication; and to facilitate this operation.
- b. To restore law and order and normal conditions among the civil population as soon as possible, procure the necessary food supplies for them and where necessary provide relief and maintenance for destitutes within available resources.
- c. To relieve combat troops of the necessity of providing for civil administration.
- d. To assist in making available to the occupying forces the economic resources of the occupied territory.
- e. Through efficient government of the territory and the application of the policies toward the civil population laid down by the Commander in Chief, to promote political and military objectives of the Allied Forces in connection with future operations.

## III *Military Governor*

General Sir Harold Alexander, as Commanding General, Force 141, is hereby designated Military Governor of HORIZIFIED. He will be responsible to the Commander in Chief for the conduct of the military government of the territory which will be administered through AMGOT.

## IV *Amgot Organization*

a. *Chief Civil Affairs Officer*<sup>33</sup> and *Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer*. Chief Civil Affairs Officer will advise the Military Governor on questions relating to the military government of HORIZIFIED. He will be Chief of AMGOT, and as such will be responsible to the Military Governor for the military administration of the territory.

There will be a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) who will be Deputy Chief of AMGOT.

b. *Special Divisions*. There will be initially six special divisions as follows:

Legal Division  
Financial Division  
Civilian Supply Division  
Public Health Division  
Public Safety Division  
Enemy Property Division

The general functions of these divisions will be to give advice to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer on questions in their respective fields; to furnish special personnel for the existing administrative organizations in the territory; to provide advisers and assistants to local Civil Affairs Officers as directed by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer; and, as far as they are called on to do so by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, to execute the functions pertaining to their subjects. The particular functions of the special divisions and the organization thereof will be as determined by the Military Governor and included in the detailed operational plan hereinafter referred to.

c. *Advisers*. Advisers on special subjects will be appointed as required by the Military Governor.

d. *Civil Affairs Officers*. The local military administration of the territory will be conducted through Civil Affairs Officers who will be stationed in important cities and towns in the territory. The general functions of the Civil Affairs Officers will be: to continue in operation provincial and municipal administration and essential local services, utilizing existing personnel wherever possible; to publish proclamations and ordinances, and in conjunction with Civil Police Officers to enforce proclamations, orders, etc., of military authority and to ensure that civil laws are respected; to issue local regulations to ensure security and local order; to organize and hold military courts; to co-ordinate with combat units in requisitioning, procurement, and billeting in the local area; and to assist local unit commanders in any other matters involving the civil population.

For purposes of administration, there may be created regions and provinces, the boundaries of which shall be according to the existing territorial subdivisions or otherwise, as may be determined.

e. *Civil Police*. All civil police functions in the territory shall be exercised by the Civil Police Officers (C.P.O.'s) who will be stationed in important cities and towns in the territory. The general functions of the C.P.O.'s will be: to take over and supervise the administration and control of the existing police forces; to set up patrols for security in conjunction with combat units where necessary; to co-ordinate with military in-

<sup>33</sup> The original plan had used the title Deputy Military Governor. At the suggestion of Lord Rennell this was changed to Chief Civil Affairs Officer to accord with a recent change in British terminology. Other changes were also made at his suggestion. Msg, AFHQ/CAD, 11 Apr 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 6633.

telligence and military police officers; and to assist the Civil Affairs Officers in enforcing military law locally.

#### *V Relation of AMGOT Personnel to Commanders, Combat Units, or Formations*

During the assault and initial phases of any operations in which AMGOT is concerned, AMGOT personnel assigned to Task Forces will operate as staff officers of their commanders. Tactical commanders shall have final responsibility and authority; provided however, that an administrative line of communication directly from the Chief Civil Affairs Officer to local military administrators may be established and authority delegated to such administrators at the discretion of the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding], Force 141.

#### *VI Plan of Operations*

Subject to the provisions of this Memorandum, the organization of AMGOT and its method of operation shall be as determined by the Military Governor who shall cause to be prepared an operational plan for submission to the Commander in Chief for approval.

#### *VII Assignment of Chief and Deputy Chief of AMGOT*

Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Lord Rennell to be Chief Civil Affairs Officer of HORRIFIED and Chief of AMGOT; and Lt. Col. Charles M. Spofford to be Acting Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer of HORRIFIED and Acting Deputy Chief of AMGOT.

#### A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 27 May 43, OPD files, 311.23, Security, sec. 1]

. . . U.S. Authorities object to use of word "AMGOT" for psychological reasons. U.S. and British Army Staff here suggest some other abbreviation such as "AMG" be used in future orders correspondence and markings of supplies. . . .<sup>84</sup>

[Memo, Rennell, Chief, AMGOT, for Liaison Sec, AFHQ, 31 May 43, ACC files, 10000/100/593]

1. I refer to the objection . . . which has been raised to the term AMGOT which is an abbreviation of "Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territory of ———." This descrip-

<sup>84</sup>The abbreviation "AMG" was adopted in October 1943. See below, Chapter X, note 1.

tion is accurate and the organization cannot as well be described by any other title. I dislike abbreviations myself anyhow, and propose to give instructions to use the full description which will so far as possible obviate the use of the abbreviation. . . .

6. . . . I feel obliged to oppose strongly any change and ask you to make my views known in the right quarters.

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 3 Jun 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 873]

Withdraw objection to use of name AMGOT.

#### ORGANIZATION OF MG PERSONNEL FOR INITIAL PHASE

[Force 141 Opn Instr 3, 22 May 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security (1-38)]

5. At the outset there will be two AMGOT (Civil Affairs) headquarters organizations, one with each Task Force headquarters, as well as the main AMGOT headquarters, which will remain with Headquarters Force 141. As soon as circumstances permit the two AMGOT Task Force Civil Affairs Headquarters will merge and when the whole of HORRIFIED, or a substantial part of it, has been occupied there will be only one Civil Administration Headquarters, under the C.C.A.O., for the whole territory.

The Civil Affairs administration in the provinces will then function directly under the central administration.

6. A small number of Civil Affairs officers will be attached to the Headquarters of the formation or unit commander of each assault force. Subject to the discretion of the formation (unit) commander, these officers will be sent ashore as soon as possible after the assault has consolidated any territory containing inhabited centres. These Civil Affairs officers will be in touch with the local administrative authorities, and relations with them should thereafter be conducted, whenever practicable, through these officers by formation (unit) and unit (organization) commanders. . . .

7. The Civil Affairs officers with the assault forces are destined as soon as feasible to form the provincial administrations of the areas in which the assault troops deploy. . . .

8. The Civil Affairs officers of the assault parties, as well as those with Task Force Headquarters will be attached to, form part of, and be under the direct orders of the formation (unit) commanders concerned. Subject only to directives which they and the formation (unit) com-

manders will receive on the policy to be followed during the initial phase, these Civil Affairs officers will not receive direct instructions from their superior Civil Affairs officers until such time as they can make proper contact with the latter, and the task force commander determines that the Civil Affairs (Task Force) headquarters can properly take charge of them.

During the assault and initial phases of the operation the officers of the Civil Administration assigned to task forces or assaulting units will operate as Staff Officers to the commanders. The formation (unit) and assaulting unit (organization) Commanders will have final responsibility and authority.

9. It is anticipated that the Civil Affairs officers with the assault formations will only be provided with a nominal scale of transport. The balance of transport will arrive in the follow-up convoys. These officers will therefore have to depend in the initial phase on locally requisitioned MT [Military Transport] and the use of the combat units' MT. The object of landing with few vehicles is to avoid encumbering the assaulting troops with any MT which is not strictly necessary.

Assault commanders will be made aware of this and be given instructions to assist Civil Affairs officers in the execution of their duties. . . .

#### CREATION OF A MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO CHIEF OF STAFF

[APHQ Staff Memo 50, 18 Jun 43, MTO, HS files]

#### I. *Establishment of Military Government Section.*

Announcement is made of the establishment of a MG Section, this Headquarters, responsible directly to the Chief of Staff.

#### II. *Responsibilities and Functions of the Military Government Section.*

a. This will be the executive section for the CinC and CofS in matters pertaining to Military Government of occupied territory, including political questions arising out of military occupation.

b. This Section will be the channel of communication in matters of Military Government for Force 141 and other task forces which may become concerned in Military Government in enemy territory.

#### III. *Composition of Section.*

This section will be composed of a Chief and deputy chief and a mixed British and American staff.

IV. . . . Announcement is made of the assignment of Col. Julius C. Holmes, GSC, as Chief, Military Government Section.

V. . . . Announcement is made of the assignment of Lt. Col. A. Terrence Maxwell, King's Royal Rifle Corps, as Deputy Chief, Military Government Section.

#### ALLIED MILITARY FINANCIAL AGENCY CREATED [AMGOT GAI No. 15,<sup>88</sup> AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

1. In pursuance of a Directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, there has been created an organ of AMGOT known as the Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA). AMFA forms part of the Finance Division of AMGOT and is under the command of the Chief Financial Officer.

2. AMFA has been established for the following purposes:

(a) To provide a depository, clearing house and chief office of financial transactions for the convenience of the Allied Military Forces.

(b) To provide a depository, where necessary, for funds which may be impounded.

(c) To facilitate control by AMGOT of financial and property transactions in the occupied territory.

(d) To provide a source of funds from which to make loans to and through local banks, municipalities, public utilities, private businesses, and individual persons.

(e) To maintain a complete accounting of all financial transactions entered into by AMGOT.

3. In view of the need to control the volume of currency so as to prevent inflation (which might have serious consequences for AMGOT as a whole) loans will be restricted to the minimum necessary for achieving their purpose. They will be made only in cases where they will assist in the restoration of order and rehabilitation of essential activities and are desirable from the point of view of the military effort and where local banks are not in a position to provide such financial assistance. AMFA is not intended to function as a competing agency to existing commercial banks. AMGOT officers should use every opportunity to discourage any impression (which will be only too likely to arise) that AMFA is to be regarded as an unlimited source of funds for all and sundry (see 7 below).

<sup>88</sup> General Administrative Instructions (GAI), sixteen in all, were a part of the AMGOT Plan published on 1 May 1943. These instructions, copies of which were issued to field personnel, deal with general policy and attitude toward civilians and the immediate duties of civil affairs officers upon entering occupied areas.

4. AMGOT officers, whether with the Task Forces or at Headquarters, will draw funds from AMGOT Finance Officers, who may be obliged in the early stages of occupation, to draw the money needed to carry out their official duties from Army Finance Officers or paymasters in the form of Yellow Seal Dollars or B.M.A. Pounds. However, it is planned to provide currency in terms of the local monetary unit as early as possible, preferably before the first phase of any operation.

5. The procedure described in paragraph 4 need only be employed in cases where, through lack of communications or for any other reason, AMFA cannot provide all the currency needed by AMGOT and the Army. As soon as AMFA can provide such currency, both Army paymasters and AMGOT Officers will draw funds from AMFA.

6. All moneys drawn by AMGOT Officers must be accounted for in the way described in General Administrative Instructions No. 12, dated 10 September 1943.

7. One of the major tasks of AMFA (subject to the C.F.O. [Chief Finance Officer]) is that of planning and assisting in the maintaining of controls over the credit and price structures of the occupied territory in an effort to hold inflationary forces in check. This danger of an excessive circulation of currency should be in the minds of all AMGOT Officers who are under the necessity of spending or advancing sums of money in the course of their official duties.

With a view to preventing any such inflation all AMGOT Officers should restrict issues of cash to the minimum required to serve Allied Military needs.

8. It is intended that in general all revenues and expenditures of AMGOT, as distinct from those of the local governmental authorities, shall pass through AMFA. This may make it necessary for certain AMGOT Officers to maintain current accounts with AMFA, while others may maintain accounts in local banks, through which remittances can be made to and from AMFA.

Any instructions which may be necessary in this connection will be issued in due course to all concerned.

9. As need arises, it is hoped that AMFA will establish sub-agencies possibly to the extent of placing one in the principal city of each occupied province.

#### VINDICTIVENESS VERSUS BENEVOLENCE

[Ltr, Rennell, Chief, AMGOT, to Col. A. Terrence Maxwell, Deputy Chief, MGS, AFHQ, 3 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/604]

I think we seem likely to be headed for a considerable amount of trouble in the application of the administrative policy in HORRIFIED of which I think Holmes and you should perhaps be warned.

You will remember that in General Administrative Instruction No. 1 the general attitude of Civil Affairs officers towards the local population was laid down. Paragraph 3 lays down certain general maxims of conduct and starts with the sentence "You will be guided in your attitude towards the local population by the memory of years of war in which the Italians fought against your people and your Allies." As a result of representations made to me by Spofford that the general sense of G.A.I. No. 1 was not wholly consistent with the C.C.S. directive, notably paragraph 4, I agreed to an amending G.A.I. saying that G.A.I. No. 1, paragraph 3, was to be read in conjunction with directive.

I discussed this matter with Col. Haskell of the Civil Affairs Division in Washington who took the line that the first sentence of paragraph 3 of G.A.I. No. 1 might indeed be held to be at variance with the C.C.S. directive that the administration was to be benevolent inasmuch as the sentence in question might be interpreted as vindictive. I did not as a matter of fact agree and I explained to him, as I have to others, that my experience is not of having to restrain the troops, at any rate British troops, from being vindictive and brutal, but rather of trying to prevent immediate fraternisation and treatment of the local population as domestic pets. Furthermore, I held, and hold, that an invitation to the troops to be benevolent would encourage them in these habits. . . .

I only refer to these matters to warn you of the different points of view which are now held. It is not always appreciated in London and Washington that it is difficult to create a fighting spirit among the troops in the general atmosphere of benevolence.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup>The controversial sentence was, in the end, never introduced into the printed manual. General Administrative Instructions No. 2, to which the CAO's were referred for their attitude toward the Italian people, merely restated paragraph 4 of the CCS directive and elaborated on policies to be pursued in eliminating Fascism.

## CAO'S ENJOINED TO ADAPT THEMSELVES TO A JOINT ENTERPRISE

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

2. The formation commander to which you, as a British or American officer are attached, may at any time be either an American or British officer. Your superior Civil Affairs Officer may equally be either American or British. You must understand that there are differences in procedure, custom and outlook between the two Armies of which you form a part. It will be for you to see that these differences do not affect the efficiency of your work and in no circumstances form the subject of complaints or gossiping. A serious view will be taken by your superior officers of any idle chatter or criticism of any member of the other Forces. This Administration constitutes the first attempt at a Joint Allied Administration and it is your work, your efficiency, and your attitude of mind which will make the Administration a success or a failure and will serve as a model or a warning for the other administrations which will have to be built up in other parts of the world. . . .

## THE FIRST THING IS TO HELP THE COMBAT UNITS

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, p. 83]

It is . . . important for Civil Affairs Officers to remember that the available Civil Affairs personnel in the immediately post assault phase, will be very limited, and that they must preserve a sense of proportion about what is important. The most important thing is to assist the troops in their operations. It may, therefore, be less important to formally take over a center which has been bypassed than to go forward with the combat troops to help them in procuring food and maintaining order in their immediate rear. The rule of "first things first" must be remembered and "first thing" is to clear the enemy out of the territory. The "first thing" therefore is to help the combat units, even if this is at the expense of efficient administration. . . .

## THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION

[AMGOT GAI No. 1]

4. . . . You must learn to disregard the nationality of the people whom you are administering, if you are going to be a good administrator. The principles of good administration are the same in all Countries and for all people. They are the preservation of law, order and justice, the prevention of disease and distress, the removal of fear and the creation of economic well-being. To

these, for a military government, is added as the first duty, to assist in the prosecution of the war by enabling the high Command to reduce garrison troops for use elsewhere and to provide, within the resources of the country, whatever materials are available which will assist in the prosecution of the war. . . .

## KEEP EXISTING ADMINISTRATION AND TEMPER DEFASCISTIZATION WITH DISCRETION

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, p. 80]

5. In order to economize in manpower, it will be the policy of the military government to secure the maintenance of the Italian administrative machine, subject to the elimination of the Fascist Party and its influence. The Fascist Party machine will be broken up from the earliest possible moment and in every way in which it is open for us to do so, but the machine cannot be broken up or Fascist influence eliminated in a day. Since also nearly all Italian administrative officials are, at any rate nominally, members of the Party, it will not be possible to remove or intern all members of the Party. This would merely cause a breakdown, not only of the whole of the Italian administrative machine, but also of all technical services, such as transportation, etc. The manner in which the policy of the two governments toward the Fascist Party and its officials is to be carried out will be the subject of joint directives from the governments to the Commander in Chief. Specific instructions based on these directives, will be communicated to you. In any event, you should forthwith seek out information as to the identity of officials of the Fascist Party in the territory in which you are serving, as well as the identity of Fascist leaders and Pro-Nazi partisans. You will also collect information on the Fascist Secret Police (OVRA), its personnel and its operation in your region. . . .

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS ASSIGNED A SECONDARY AND LIMITED PLACE

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, pp. 80-81]

4. . . . For obvious reasons economic development must take a second place and can only occur within the limits of transport and of military requirements. . . .

7. As soon as the storm of war has swept away from your area, you will take steps to restore economic exchanges and the normal life of the inhabitants. It is particularly important that markets and shops should be re-opened and that access to them should be permitted, since without this, the civilian population will starve. . . . Cir-

culatation of trucks, etc., to carry farm produce must be permitted as soon as military security allows. . . .

#### AMGOT PROCLAMATIONS ARE BASED ON INITIAL NEED TO SUBORDINATE LIBERTY TO MILITARY SECURITY

[Chanler, Chief Legal Officer, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, Functions and Operations of the Legal Division, AMGOT, 28 April-1 November 1943, 15 Nov 43, [hereafter cited as Chanler Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (2)]

As a result of all these deliberations and considerations, 12 proclamations were drafted by the Legal Division. . . . They covered the following subjects:

Proclamation #1. Announcement of occupation.

Proclamation #2. Definition of offenses against law and order and against the Allied Forces, which the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not commit.

Proclamation #3. Devaluation of legal currency of U.S. gold seal dollars and British military administration notes and the settlement of the rates of exchange between the same and between them and Italian lire.

Proclamation #4. The establishment of Allied Military Courts, and the definition of the jurisdiction and constitution of such Courts and of their powers of punishment.

Proclamation #5. The closing of certain financial institutions in the occupied territory and the establishment of a moratorium.

Proclamation #6. The creation of a Controller of Property with the definition of his powers to safeguard Allied property in the occupied territory and to take into his custody certain enemy State property and properties belonging to certain citizens of enemy States.

Proclamation #7. The dissolution of the Fascist Party and its subsidiary organizations and the establishment of provisions to deal with the properties of the Party and of such organizations.

Proclamation #8. To provide for rationing of food, fixing of prices and the stabilization of agricultural conditions.

Proclamation #9. To provide for the publication to be known as the "Sicily Gazette" which would contain copies of all proclamations and general orders and the production of which would be proof of its contents in all Courts.

Proclamation #10. To make financial regulations regarding restrictions on exchange and commerce and to regulate prices.

Proclamation #11. To establish certain general police and security regulations for the purposes of regulating means of communication, controlling photography, requiring identity cards to be carried by civilian inhabitants, regulating newspapers, and controlling meetings and assemblies.

Proclamation #12. To establish Allied Military lire as legal tender in occupied territory.

The two main principles which were borne in mind in preparing these proclamations were that they should be directed first to provide for the safety and security of the combat forces and secondly to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory, to continue peacefully to go about their respective occupations. It had to be borne in mind that the interests of the combat forces who were prosecuting the war were of paramount importance and that the inhabitants must undergo, at least in the early stages, some restrictions of normal liberty to make the safety of the forces certain. At the same time it was planned that these unavoidable restrictions of liberty should be gradually raised as the combat forces moved forward and as the situation and attitude of the inhabitants allowed. . . .

## CHAPTER VIII

# The Test in Sicily

Teachers of whatever rank—grade school instructors or college professors—are apt in the absence of specific knowledge or experience to resort, in the manner of Polonius, to vague generalizations and wearisome platitudes. The professors of military government at Charlottesville, unable to predict what an officer would encounter in an actual operational situation, had exhorted their students to “put first things first.” One officer, soon after the landing in Sicily, said that this platitude might be translated: “Bury the dead and feed the living.” As towns were taken over in the wake of battle chaos reigned; there was no food, fuel, power, or water; rubble, ruin, and filth were on every hand and looting was rampant. In a word, everything had to be done and generally there was little with which to do it. Directives, manuals, and wise saws were less relevant in such a situation than had been expected. And improvisation was the order of the day.

Nevertheless, the invasion of Sicily put to the test for the first time the theories, principles, and training that had been developed in the military training program and in military planning. North Africa, to be sure, had been a proving ground of sorts because hosts of economic and political problems had been encountered and civilian control machinery had been set up, even though ordinary administration had been left to the French. The difficulties here indicated that even with a friendly

administration and population civilian agencies could not deal too well with the problems of the wake of battle, and this, it seemed, would be even truer in enemy territory. Experiences in Sicily confirmed this view. They also showed that planners of the first exclusively military operation had underestimated the prospective disruption and chaos, and had consequently fallen somewhat short both in provision of supplies and in development of adequate organization and methods for rebuilding the economic and social machinery behind fiercely contending armies. Some lessons, indeed, were learned immediately upon landing.

The story of military government in Sicily has three phases: beachhead, combat, and posthostilities. The beachhead phase saw a lack of uniformity between Americans and British on how the military government officers were geared in with the tactical forces. The British Eighth Army landed on the southeastern part of the island in two groups, XIII Corps on the beaches south of Syracuse, and XXX Corps around Cape Passero. Allied Military Government (AMG) officers were not included on the loading schedules but during the first three days about thirty officers were literally smuggled into the beachhead area. Reinforcements were called up later but the officers did not operate closely with the separate tactical units. Instead they remained in pools with the advance and rear army headquarters

and took over towns as they were occupied. The American Seventh Army landed in the southeastern area on the beaches around Cape Scaramina (45th Division), Gela (1st Division), and Licata (3d Division). Only seventeen AMG officers came ashore with the Seventh Army on July 10 and 11 (D and D plus 1) and these generally remained with the headquarters of the units to which they were attached until enough territory was uncovered to set up military government on a provincial basis.

The advance of the Seventh Army was rapid. In a broad sweep northward it entered Palermo on 22 July and by the end of the month the whole western half of Sicily was overrun. In the British sector stubborn German resistance in the plain of Catania slowed the advance and the town of Catania was not taken until 5 August. The Seventh Army, after taking Palermo, turned east and the Eighth Army continued its advance northward until 17 August when the combined British and American forces entered Messina and the whole island was in Allied possession.

An advanced Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) headquarters had been established at Syracuse under Lord Rennell of Rodd as early as 22 July. About two weeks later the headquarters was moved to Palermo and gradually assumed responsibility for the whole island. By the end of July a direct channel of communication had been established between CAO's and headquarters in all areas turned over. Eventually, each of the nine provinces of Sicily was administered by a SCAO (Senior Civil Affairs Officer) who had a staff of specialists in the fields of law, finance, supply, public welfare, and public safety. The mere listing of these specialties is suggestive, but only suggestive, of the multitude of problems encountered both

during and after cessation of hostilities. There was a tendency, especially in the early stages, for AMG officers to do too much themselves and to rely too little on indigenous officials. In their enthusiasm for seeing that things got done and in their passion for efficiency the AMG officers sometimes overextended themselves.

Allied military government was able to make headway against a bewildering number of problems only because it was not faced with a hostile population. Lacking enough men and matériel, Lord Rennell remarked that "I am frank to think we shall get away with things here more by luck than by good management." The Allied propaganda before, during, and after the landings helped to persuade the Sicilians to greet the Allies everywhere as liberators. Morale was at first high but deteriorated as it became evident that the Allies could not always deliver on their promises. Though Sicilians could be, and on occasion were, difficult, there was never a serious problem of obtaining co-operation from the civilian population.

Before the island had been cleared of the enemy, indeed in the full tumult of battle, the old question of the entrance of civilian agencies was raised. But the North African experience was fresh in the minds of the commanders in the field if not of those in Washington. Furthermore the British did not want "starry-eyed" American civilians running loose in occupied territories. The President himself, who had once felt that the civilian agencies should dominate, was gradually moving toward the position that military officers must have administrative responsibility in all active theaters. The upshot was that General Eisenhower was authorized only to permit the entry of individual civilians into Sicily and that they were to become a part of AMG.

# I. MOBILE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CHAOS

## TWO PROCLAMATIONS WITH SAME THEME BUT DIFFERENT PURPOSES

[Proclamation of Eisenhower, CinC, AF, on Invasion of Sicily, 10 Jul 43, OPD Msg files, 3913]

(1) Announcement to the Italian people—To the people of Sicily. As Commander in Chief of the Allied Force I transmit this message on behalf of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain.

(2) The Allied forces are occupying Italian territory. They are doing this not as enemies of the Italian people, but as an inevitable part of their war to destroy the German overlordship of Europe. Their aim is to deliver the people of Italy from the Fascist Regime which led them into the war, and when that has been accomplished, to restore Italy as a Free Nation.

(3) The Allied Forces have no intention of changing or undermining the traditional laws and customs of the Italian people. They will take all necessary measures, however, to eliminate the Fascist system in whatever Italian territory they occupy. Accordingly, the Fascist Party Organization will be dissolved, and its appendages such as the Fascist Militia and the so-called Youth Organizations will be abolished. Fascist doctrines and propaganda in any form will be prohibited. No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced during the period of military government.

(4) In furtherance of the policies of the Allied Governments, proper steps will forthwith be taken to stop the operation in Sicily of all laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color, or creed. Freedom of religious worship will be upheld and, to that extent the military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press will be instituted.

(5) Measures will be taken for prompt release of political prisoners. The special tribunal for the defense of the State will be abolished.

(6) The Military Governor of the occupied territory will take action by proclamation or otherwise to carry into effect the foregoing measures as military conditions may permit.

(7) These evidence the principles to which the Allies are attached and for the re-establishment of which they will relentlessly fight. They are principles to which the Axis leaders, under German domination, are opposed. You will be beneficiaries of their defeat. It is therefore your interest, as men whose fathers fought for their

freedom, not to resist the Allied army, but to facilitate their mission—the lifting of the Nazi yoke from Europe by quick and total victory. . . .

[AMGOT Proclamation 1, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, pp. 28-30]

To the people of Sicily:

Whereas in prosecuting their war against the Axis Powers, it has become necessary for the armed forces of Great Britain and the United States under my command to occupy Sicily.

Whereas it is the policy of the Allied Forces not to make war upon the civilian inhabitants of the occupied territory but to protect them in the peaceful exercise of their legitimate pursuits in so far as the exigencies of war and their own behavior will permit, and

Whereas in order to preserve law and order and provide for the safety and welfare both of my troops and of yourselves, it is necessary to establish Military Government in the occupied territory.

Now, therefore, I, Harold Alexander, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., General, General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces in Sicily and Military Governor of the Territories Occupied, by virtue of the Authority vested in me by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in the North African Theatre of Operations, do hereby proclaim as follows:

### I

All powers of government and jurisdiction in the occupied territory and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility are vested in me as General Officer Commanding and Military Governor, and the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory is established to exercise these powers under my direction.

### II

All persons in the occupied territory will obey promptly all orders given by me or under my authority and must refrain from all acts hostile to the troops under my command or helpful to our enemies, from all acts of violence, and from any act calculated to disturb public order in any way.

### III

Your existing personal and property rights will be fully respected and your existing laws will re-

main in force and effect except in so far as it may be necessary for me in the discharge of my duties as General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces, and as Military Governor, to change or supersede them by proclamation or order issued by me or under my direction.

#### IV

All Italian civil and criminal courts and all universities, schools and educational establishments will be closed until further order of the Allied Military Government.

#### V

All administrative and judicial officials of the provinces and communes and all other government and municipal functionaries and employees, and all officers and employees of state, municipal or other public services, except such officials and political leaders as are removed by me are required to continue in the performance of their duties, subject to my direction or the direction of such of my officers of the Allied Forces as may be deputed for that purpose.

#### VI

Further proclamations, orders and regulations issued by me or under my authority from time to time will specify what is further required of you, and what you are forbidden to do, and these will be displayed in court houses, police stations, or other public places.

#### VII

So long as you remain peaceable and comply with my orders, you will be subject to no greater interference than may be inevitable in view of military exigencies, and may go about your normal vocations without fear.

Dated: 10 July 1943

#### HOW CAO'S WERE GEARED IN WITH TACTICAL FORCES

[Spofford Rpt. See also above chapter VII, Section 7]

Briefly the units of 343 Force<sup>1</sup> landed on the southern coast of Sicily [10 July 1943] and proceeded rapidly northward and westward through

<sup>1</sup> Task Force 343, comprising three U.S. infantry divisions, the 2d Armored Division, and the II Corps of the U.S. Seventh Army, was commanded by Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. Task Force 545 comprised various elements of the British Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The co-ordinating authority over the two task forces was the Fifteenth Army Group, known as Force 141, commanded by General Alexander.

The island of Pantelleria had been invaded on 2 June

the eastern part of Ragusa, Caltanissetta, Agrigento, Palermo and Trapani provinces. Civil affairs officers attached to the units landed with them on D Day or shortly thereafter and generally speaking remained with headquarters of the units to which they were attached, gradually peeling off into permanent assignments as the territories involved were occupied. . . .

The officers with the 8th Army, except in a few isolated cases, were not attached to and did not enter with the Division or tactical units. Instead they remained in the rear with army headquarters and were brought up when needed. The 8th Army quickly occupied the greater portion of Ragusa, all of Siracusa and the southern half of Catania. This occupation was completed on July 16 (D plus 6). Various civil affairs officers coming in on D Day or shortly thereafter were assigned from a pool established first at Siracusa and later at Lentini to the various communes in the occupied territory. . . .

On arrival in Sicily each senior civil affairs officer had his own individual approach to the problems facing his CAO's and specialists. Lt. Col. [Stephen B.] Story, for instance, at all times kept himself and his men up with the advance headquarters of the 45th Division, leaving towns in the rear to be taken over by other civil affairs officers attached to the Corps. Since reserves were few this resulted in the towns in which Lt. Col. Story and his men had the administration started remaining without CAO's for several days; but he was able to start the administration of towns as soon as they were taken further forward. On the other hand Lt. Col. [Wynot R.] Irish with the First Division more or less permanently assigned his men to various towns and areas as they were captured, moving them forward very slowly. It was his policy to allow Col. Kilroe, the JAG under whom he was serving, to take over the towns in the first instance and then turn them over to him when the command post passed them. Frequently, however, in the first few crucial days towns were without civil affairs officers in the forward areas covered by this Division. Col. [Damon M.] Gunn, JAG II Corps, also believed that civil affairs officers with AMG should not take over towns in the front line areas but should wait until the command post had

by the British 1 Division in order to provide bases for the attack on Sicily. An independent AMGOT-Pantelleria was activated and placed under Brig. Gen. [Auby C.] Strickland, U.S. Air Corps, as Military Governor. The attitude of the inhabitants was friendly. The islands of Lampedusa and Linosa had been seized on 19 June by the U.S. Seventh Army and placed under an AMG which reported directly to AFHQ.

passed the towns. . . . On both the American and British side at all times a liaison officer was left with divisional or corps headquarters. This officer could find out from G-2 when a town was about to fall and then report back so that civil affairs officers could be called up to enter it at once, if any were available with transport. [Typical experiences of CAO's follow.]

#### THE DIRECTIVE HELPS LESS THAN IMPROVISATION AND SENSE OF HUMOR

[Ltr, Graduate, SMG (Irish, CAO, 1st Div, Seventh Army), 16 Jul 43, to SMG, Charlottesville, CAD files, 46L.OI (4-7-43) (1), Bulky Pkg]

At last word came through that the town was in our hands; they gave us a Jeep and told us to get going. Shell fire was slacking; we were apparently pushing ahead. We drove parallel to the front line for some five miles to a port town on a hill. As we drove into the town, we passed groups of people who looked frightened and made the Fascist salute. A dead horse and dead civilian in the street, wounded men in stretchers, bombed houses to the Cathedral Square. A tank battle in the streets of the town had just ended. We entered the local *Albergo*, our headquarters, and the Commander was sure glad to see us, telling us that there were about 150 dead to bury. Across the street was a large building that we took over for an office—the palatial home of a fled Fascist leader. It was beautifully furnished—the dream of a CAO. One room was palatial. . . . I arranged it like a throne, with chairs surrounding a beautiful marble topped table, and me sitting back in a high-backed luxurious chair. I was still soaked and looked anything but a Governor. I did put on a tie. Took off my leggings, and sat down in my chair of state, interpreter on my right hand, and got ready for the interviews.

They all piled in, half scared, and bowed low. I was formally introduced, and told them to take seats in a half-circle around me. I made what I hoped was an impressive speech about being friendly invaders and liberators and all that sort of thing, to get a right start with them. It was quite a high moment—for the first time I felt like a governor. This exalted state of affairs, however, which I was thoroughly enjoying, and which I shall probably never reach again, did not last long. A bombing raid began on the shore and ships by the Messerschmidts. The building trembled—all hell seemed to break loose! My privy council vanished. I finally located the Podesta after the raid, hiding down cellar—Wise man! I forgot my gospel of “sweetness and light.” It had been so rudely interrupted by bomb

blasts, and I was embarrassed about starting it all over again. I had to get off my high horse and get down to business. And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury.

Later: “First things first,” says Charlottesville! No water—epidemics; no food—riots; corpses—plague! I decided to bury the corpses first. A judgment more of the nose than of the head. The Podesta said he needed a truck, which was reasonable, but there were no trucks available. A battle was going on—trucks were vital to success. A soldier said the city had two ambulances. Fine, fine! We’ll use the ambulances. But no, the Sicilian will not use an ambulance for a hearse! He has a superstition against it. I was about to exert my *power* and make them use ambulances when a medical captain came in very upset and said that 20 corpses were lying next to his field hospital and, ‘for God’s sake get them out.’ The CO troops gave me one truck for the burial of these corpses only. And I secured some prisoners of war to dig graves and load the corpses and got the Padre to go to the graves. A new difficulty had developed. The Padre insisted the corpses be put in wooden boxes. Captain said *no*, they were buried in the dark—a gruesome task. I arranged to have donkey carts collect the other corpses on the morrow, and retired. . . .

. . . The City Hall had been looted, tax receipts destroyed, ration cards torn. The city treasury had been bombed; all tax books, etc., lay in a pile of rubble. The City Hall itself was in shambles! Records, archives, papers scattered all over. With what feelings I read the ‘Directive’ on what I was to do with records, examining the town budget, checking the taxation system, etc. . . .

#### PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST IN A PERIOD OF RAPID ADVANCE

[Maj John D. Ames and Maj James H. Griffin, CAO's II Corps, Rpt, 25 Aug 43, Spofford Rpt]

#### *Assignment of Divisional CA Officers:*

. . . The rapidity of the advance involved the divisional CA officers passing through the towns and villages with only a little time in which to set up an organization to organize the civil communities under the Plan. The Corps officers followed up behind the divisional officers and set in motion the Civil Affairs Plan and in due course when further CA officers were available, allocated and posted these officers for supervision of the towns and villages in occupied territory under

Corps responsibility. In some cases it was necessary for the Corps officers to take over towns and villages in a divisional area which had either been by-passed by troops or for which no divisional CA officers were available. In this connection, on many occasions Colonel Gunn [JAG, II Corps] and other Corps officers acted as CA officers.

In the large area that fell to Corps control the difficulty of communication between towns, bad roads, the absence of telephone communication, necessitated the Corps CA officers spending the minimum time in each town and village in order to insure that towns and villages which had been in the hands of the Military Police and the C.I.C. [Counterintelligence Corps] were not left uncovered for too long a period. This factor also involved the transfer of CA personnel from town to town, and it was not possible in the first three weeks of operation to permanently assign CA officers to a single town. As provinces were completely taken, the provincial organization of CA officers was introduced and assignment made in co-ordination with the senior CA officer in the province. The number of towns covered by the Corps CA officers and the co-ordinator was 79, with a population of 689,000. The work of the divisional CA officers was in most cases limited to publishing proclamations and personal contact with city officials available, and by these means communicating the fact of actual occupation. In many cases where the advance was not so fast, divisional CA officers continued with further CA duties.

#### *The Corps duties were as follows:*

Organization of the Carabinieri in accordance with the plan. It was considered essential to investigate the use of the personnel and the adequacy of numbers of the police force. The re-organization of the Carabinieri and other police organizations were undertaken and where necessary, changes in the personnel were made. The officer in charge of the Carabinieri was made responsible for maintaining law and order, insofar as his duties were concerned, and instructed to prepare a detailed scheme for the organization of the local police control of the town. Under the proclamation for the collection of arms, the Carabinieri were named as agents for this collection and gave receipts and kept lists of private firearms turned in. Wherever possible, Military Police, Divisional or Corps, were placed on guard to prevent the looting of these arms by force by any individual. Corps CA officers interviewed the existing Podestas or Mayors, Communal Secretaries and the Municipal Staff, and in many cases

officials were relieved from their duties and other persons were chosen and substituted—this with co-operation and reports of the C.I.C. In the selection of these individuals, care was taken that they were not associated in any way, so far as was known, with any political activity. In a number of cases it was found that the officials, apart from their political leanings, were totally unsuited to occupy their position. The municipal staff was set to work—as in the majority of cases after the invasion they had ceased to perform duty, and the normal life of the community was set in motion again, as far as circumstances permitted. No attempt was made to perform direct government except in one or two cases of actual emergency. The Civil Affairs duties were confined strictly to the supervision and direction of civil activities. Checks were made to see that guards had been posted by either C.I.C. or divisional CA officers on banks and post offices and other important civil installations.

#### EVERYTHING NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION IN LIBERATED CITIES

[Narrative Based on Undated Report from Lt Col George H. McCaffrey, CAO 3d Inf Div, Seventh Army, Spoford Rpt, ex. 3-A]

At approximately 1000 hours on 17 July a message was received that Agrigento had fallen and the situation needed immediate attention. . . . Major [Robert L.] Ashworth and Lt. Col. McCaffrey with an interpreter, a veteran of the American army in the First World War, left at once in a rickety, requisitioned midget car. . . .

The Prefect in Agrigento stated that there was about three days supply of grain on hand, but plenty available in the countryside, water was available for about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the town and electric light for about  $\frac{1}{2}$  of it. He estimated the number of civilian dead and wounded at 500, many of them still in the ruins.

The Prefect was instructed to have copies of the proclamations and orders posted at once in ten places in the town customarily used for that purpose. At his suggestion the town crier made the rounds announcing that complete amnesty would be granted with respect to any loot turned in at the Carabinieri barracks within 24 hours, but the possession of loot after that time would be dealt with severely. A steady stream of people took advantage of this offer. Police agents (now provided with arm bands) started to collect the furniture and household goods standing in the streets and the public square. It was difficult to distinguish between those who were salvaging

furniture from their own wrecked homes, those who were helping themselves to loot and those who were returning it. . . .

The Prefect at Agrigento was ordered to have the PAD [police agents] continue their functions regarding rescue of wounded, burial of dead, search of ruins and caring for unexploded bombs. He was also ordered to put as many men and vehicles to work as were necessary to clear the main streets of debris to permit passage by Army vehicles and to secure unsafe structures and to pay the standard rate of wages as of 9 July for such work. He was authorized to draw up to 500,000 lire upon a 2,000,000 lire credit in the Bank of Italy for war damages.

The Bishop of Agrigento called to offer his full co-operation. He had turned  $\frac{2}{3}$  of his palace into an emergency hospital filled with both civilian and military wounded, volunteered to take charge of finding shelter for the homeless and submitted for approval a printer's proof sheet of a statement to all of his flock calling upon them to co-operate in every way with AMGOT. This statement was read at masses in the local churches the next day.

Between these conferences every minute was used to give brief interviews and issue passes to various officials and essential employees, including the public engineer, millers, bakers, doctors, midwives and others with essential functions to perform. During the later afternoon Lt. Col. McCaffrey went to Porto Empedocle with an interpreter, posted the proclamations and orders, and checked into the situation with the Carabinieri. It was very bad. All responsible officials had fled. The town was badly damaged. No stock of flour was on hand. Both aqueducts were smashed, and an estimated  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the people had fled. The port area was crowded with Army and Navy personnel. There was heavy two way traffic of supply vehicles already under way. The CO of the Port Engineer Bn. stated he was posting a guard in the port area and main street. The civil police were ordered to co-operate with the military and to be particularly watchful for looting.

In Agrigento the water supply was badly reduced by the bombardment. Some difficulty was encountered here because of direct dealing between combat units and civilian agencies. In one case the Italian engineer was almost shot because of an error made by an interpreter in repeating what he said with regard to a break in the aqueduct. The Army wanted aid by civil affairs officers in establishment of an Army C.P. in Agrigento. This took considerable time.

The leaders of the Consorzio and the Amassi in the area were ardent Fascists and had fled.

Others had to be located to take over these important functions.

There was at first considerable agitation in Agrigento in favor of the Independence of Sicily. A meeting to sponsor this cause, in violation of Proclamation I, was raided. There was also considerable discontent because of Allied inability to open the sulphur mines and thereby relieve unemployment; and because of the low salaries paid to public officials. . . .

#### HOW A HIT-AND-RUN MG OPERATED

[Lt. Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean, Liaison, MGS, Naval Aviation Hq, 4 Mar 44, Report on Information Obtained from Army CAO's Who Participated in the Assault Phase in Sicily, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-4-44), Bulky Pkg]

The colonel had a difficult decision to make in relation to combat operations in military government and civil affairs. As indicated he had only himself and three junior officers for the whole job with the Division [45th] . . . until they reached Messina and settled down there as military government. The question arose as to whether these four should continue with the Division as it rapidly advanced or drop off and set up military government in the first area captured. Some other civil affairs teams who went up the western side of Sicily tried the latter and left the advancing forces without any civil affairs officers to assist them. (This, said the colonel is why General Patton raised such hell to get more civil affairs officers sent over from North Africa in the early part of the campaign.) The colonel decided wisely on the former course of sticking with the troops.

In consequence he had to devise a procedure for military government that would meet this mobile, hit and run civil affairs situation. This is what he did:

In entering a town he would take over the city hall or other appropriate building if the city hall had been damaged. He would fly the United States and British ensigns above the door of the hall. He would then go out or send his junior officers to post the proclamations (he commented at this point that a paint brush was an essential part of the civil affairs officer's equipment). . . . He would then gather about him such town officials as remained, tell the story of their liberation, outline to them the essential features of military government and what the civilians were expected to do and not to do, call their attentions to the proclamations, and dismiss them until a later designated time. He would then go with his of-

ficers to the bank, the post offices, insurance headquarters and the like taking with him some of the Carabinieri . . . and seize all moneys, records, valuable portable equipment, etc., lock these up and post a Carabinieri guard. He would then gather the leading priests and clerics about him and talk over the problems of the town and the personnel in it and get their advice, as he recently secured that of the town officials and of the police separately, on who would be most acceptable as civilian native officials. He would then do what he could to organize machinery for food collecting and rationing. Then he would return to his meeting with the city officials, summarize the recommendations for appointments, make the appointments, outline again what he expected them all to do, notify them that rear echelon civil affairs officers would be coming in in a few days to give continuous supervision and control, and then move on to the next town and repeat. By this means he got people, while they were numb from fighting, talkative and telling somewhat near the truth, and organized them for later civil affairs control. . . .

#### INSUFFICIENT CAO'S AT THE OUTSET

[Maj Gen Lord Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT Sicily, Rpt to GOC 15th AGp, 2 Aug 43 [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

2. Some 30 AMGOT officers in charge of Group Captain C. E. Benson, D.S.O., were landed from D [10 July] to D+2 in 8th Army assault areas. These were reinforced in the course of the next fourteen days, by the end of which period there were about 80 AMGOT officers, including CAO's, CAPO's [civil affairs police officers], etc., in 8th Army area. . . .

4. With the 7th Army assaults, a group of 17 officers were landed on D and D + 1 day under Colonel Charles Poletti (AUS). This number soon proved entirely insufficient. There was much delay in landing the first reinforcement group of an additional 50 officers owing to the unwillingness of the 7th Army headquarters to accommodate any reserve of personnel in the advanced 7th Army embarkation areas. In consequence, when sudden and urgent need was felt for 62 extra administrative officers for AMGOT, the officers had to be called forward from Algiers to Tunis before they could be embarked. It was consequently not until about 28 July that the much needed reinforcement of 62 officers reached Palermo. . . . Colonel Poletti and his second in command of the AMGOT personnel in 7th Army area, Lt. Col. P. [Peter R.] Rodd, were them-

selves alone trying to cope with the problems of Palermo City. . . .

#### FIRST AIM NOT DEFASCISTIZATION BUT AVOIDANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE BREAKDOWNS

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43]

12. Initial arrests for obstruction, hostility or strong Fascist sentiments were few in the first two weeks owing to lack of information and a desire . . . to do nothing which would cause a breakdown in the administration while AMGOT officers were trying to get something running. In the eastern and central areas the three Prefects [senior officials in provinces] of Syracuse, Caltanissetta and Ragusa were arrested. The prefects of Agrigento and Enna who had previously been notified as likely to be helpful have been retained. The Prefect of Palermo had departed prior to the arrival of the American troops. . . . Where the Prefects were removed the Sub-Prefects have generally been called upon to act. A few podestas [mayors], questori [superintendent of police] and municipal officials have been arrested as well as such political (party) secretaries as have been discovered. In most cases new podestas have been appointed either from the vice-podestas available or from the more prominent citizens. . . . Whatever criticisms will be made for not arresting more people immediately I am convinced that the right course is to continue weeding out undesirables week after week, rather than to effect wholesale arrests on insufficient information and then to have to release innocuous persons. The apprehension of inevitable doom has a better morale effect generally than wholesale action and risking having to go into reverse. . . .

#### SUCCESSFUL GAMBLE IN ADMINISTRATION

[Rpt, Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT Sicily, 8 Aug 43 to GOC 15th AGp [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 8 Aug 43], CAD files, 319.1 AMG (8-17-43) (1)]

The gamble of sending single Civil Affairs Officers to take charge of large districts with no escorts and little or no transport from the very first moment of occupation without regard to their personal safety was successful. I am not aware of any case of hostility or discourtesy to an Allied Civil Affairs Officer since the landing. I am acutely aware of my own anxiety whether the experiment would succeed without some incident or even attacks on my officers by stray Italian soldiers or by hostile local elements or angry mobs when in the first days food was really very precarious and scarce. The risk is not one

which can be taken as a precedent in other countries or necessarily all over Italy. . . .

The decision to maintain the local administrations in towns has so far proved successful. In a number of places advisory municipal councils of prominent officials and persons have been nominated to advise C.A.O.'s and the podestas. Local private people and business men have proved helpful and public spirited in trying to restore normal conditions especially in heavily damaged areas. Ecclesiastical personages have all been helpful. I am particularly struck by the absence of expressed resentment or bitterness about bombing or civilian casualties.

There is no doubt that the experiment of retaining the Carabinieri as the nucleus of a local police force throughout the island and of allowing them to retain their uniforms and rifles (but not revolvers) has been successful. Except for the arrest of certain special branch carabinieri on counter-espionage duties, very few carabinieri have had to be interned for refusal to continue duty as police or for unsatisfactory behavior. The senior carabinieri officers have been distinctly cooperative in transferring personnel when it was wanted and in replacing personnel when individuals have been interned. The carabinieri have taken whatever has been done with dignity and the sense of duty which comes from a well-disciplined force with a long tradition. . . . There was a good deal of looting by the civil population during the first few days, nearly all of food stores, an increase of housebreaking and theft, and jail breaking. But arrests are being made mainly by the carabinieri and authority seems to be on the way to being restored. . . .

#### LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS KEPT FUNCTIONING THROUGH AMGOT LOANS

[Financial Div, AMGOT, Rpt for May 43-Nov 43, Spoford Rpt, ex. Y-11]

It was realized at the start of the planning at Chrea that if AMGOT officers in the field were to be successful in keeping the local machinery of government going it would be necessary to assure the availability of funds to pay the salaries of local government employees as well as other proper expenditures of local government. It was also realized that at least in the opening phases of the occupation, transportation and communication would be so inadequate, that a highly decentralized system in AMGOT of controlling expenditures of local governments and providing funds to meet deficits would have to be established. Accordingly there was issued G.A.I. No. 3 . . . containing financial instructions to

C.A.O.'s on handling expenditures and receipts of communes and S.A.I. Finance No. 2 . . . containing instructions to F.O.'s [finance officers] on expenditures and receipts of provinces and the state. . . .

G.A.I. Finance No. 4 . . . was issued authorizing F.O.'s to provide money, if necessary, to continue the function of the Amassi system in acquiring and distributing wheat and to meet other emergency situations where the carrying out of AMGOT plans made the advance of funds desirable. . . .

As soon as AMGOT arrived in Sicily, C.A.O.'s and F.O.'s had to deal with problems of expenditures of the local governments for their normal recurrent expenditures and for relief, with the problems of financing the movement of wheat which was being harvested at the time, and the price which had been subsidized by the Italian State. Control of expenditures and advance of funds were handled substantially in accordance with the above mentioned instructions. . . .

#### HOW AMGOT FUNDS WERE DISBURSED IN THE LARGE CENTERS

[Financial Div, AMGOT Rpt, May-Nov 43]

Palermo has been chosen to illustrate the types of problems confronting . . . Finance Officers. The Officer who later became the Finance Officer of Palermo Province arrived at Gela on 14 July and was ordered to follow the 7th Army's advance on Palermo, reaching the city on 8 August. Palermo, with a normal population of 400,000, was reduced to 10,000, and the surrounding communes were swollen to almost twice their normal size. The immediate problems were the acquisition of grain, through the Ammassi system, the restoration of some transport system, and the restoration of the normal financial channels for governmental receipts and expenditures.

Funds for the purchase of grain were advanced by the Finance Officer directly to the Consorzio Agrario<sup>2</sup> in cash. This was necessary since Palermo Province had 74 amassing points, of which only 32 are served by banks. The cash funds were distributed to the amassing agents who proceeded to purchase the limited quantities of grain which were offered for sale. To further aid the normal flow of grain products to the consumer the accounts of the millers and bakers were unlocked in advance of the opening of the banks on a restricted basis. The situation in

<sup>2</sup> Italian organization for collecting (amassing) agricultural produce.

Palermo contrasted strongly with conditions which prevailed in Agrigento and Caltanissetta Provinces. These latter provinces were fortunate in having large surpluses of grain, a docile agricultural population, and an absence of war damage.

Next in order of priority came the problem of restoring local governmental functions, particularly the payment of civil officials and the fire, police, and health services. In Palermo Province, as in other provinces, various communes of the province were brought under Allied control when the provincial capital had not yet fallen. Since the financial channels for payment of civil servants and communal obligations normally center in officials stationed in the provincial capital, it is often impossible to follow preliminary planning and employ such channels. In Palermo Province this problem existed with reference to food, relief and state payrolls. It is believed that the practice varied from CAO to CAO. It is submitted that the preferable method would be to employ temporarily one agency for disbursements, probably the Commune, since its employees have some knowledge of the normal system of disbursements, vouchers and accounting. . . .

#### INITIAL FOOD SUPPLY IS BROUGHT IN BY THE TROOPS

[Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 28 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 20137]

. . . Initial supply [of food] for both our troops and civil population had to be taken across the beaches. Emergency civil feeding was met from rations and continues from military stocks, hence precise quantities for civil supply not known. Stockpile of food especially for civil population established in near-by North African ports and now going in. . . .

#### IMPROVISATIONS IN THE FOOD PROBLEM

[Poletti Rpt, 31 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/650]

#### Food

When a community was vacated by Italian troops and before law and order could be re-established by Seventh Army, considerable looting took place, particularly looting of flour and other food products. All military stores of Italian Army were likewise usually seized. In all events, this supplied the people until Civil Affairs officers could reorganize matters and get additional grain into town. All sorts of improvisation occurred. Civil trucks and Italian and American

Army trucks were used. At times we put Carabinieri or soldiers on them in order to persuade, in a gentle manner, the farmer to give up his grain. Often the mills and bakeshops were damaged or deprived of coal or Diesel oil or electricity. Transport had collapsed. Again we improvised. In a few towns only did food clamoring demonstrations occur. It is gratifying that Civil Affairs was so successful. Of course, the food problem has been the most difficult, the most pressing and the most time consuming for all Civil Affairs officers, and it still is in general.

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43]

17. The food situation is interesting. There is no doubt that there is plenty of grain, enough meat for the modest local requirements, and probably enough oil. Of vegetables and fruit there is an ample supply. The difficulty is, first and foremost, transport. The troops on entering seized all available civilian transport including many mules and carts. The consequences were as anticipated. A very precarious situation developed in all towns for the first few days. Local ingenuity and resources displayed by all my officers tided over this situation and no town has starved though in many cases there was frequently not more than 24 hours in hand. Now, most places have a few days in hand. The major problem, however, was and is milling wheat into flour.

18. Nearly all the mills are electrically operated. All electricity, with the exception of a few small towns with a local supply, is drawn from the Sicilian power grid which in turn draws its supplies from the large power stations, of which in eastern Sicily Catania is outstandingly the most important. The only power station on the grid functioning in E. and S. Sicily is at Cassibile which is insufficient even for Syracuse district. . . .

#### WE NOW KNOW WE MUST COUNT ON FINDING CHAOS

[Ltr, Holmes to Hilldring, 18 Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1), No. 126]

. . . After 21 years of control the Fascist Party became so woven into the warp and woof of all phases of life in the country that when the party officials fled provincial and municipal administration came to a standstill. We did not bag a single Federal Secretary. Every town of any size has its large "Casa del Fascio," usually elaborate and pretentious. Local officials have been accustomed to coming to these Fascist Headquarters for their orders and so in almost all cases our officials

moved in. In many towns there had been so much destruction by bombardment and shell fire and the people so frightened and paralyzed that no local administration existed. In fact in many cases all of the machinery of modern life had ceased to exist: there was no government, no police, no food supply, no water, no electric light, no transportation and no organized medical service. All of these things had to be reorganized from the ground up, the dead buried, the streets cleaned of debris, water and food brought in, etc. In places where the administrative machinery was more or less intact it was in neutral. Officials and populace alike seemed to be unable to do anything to help themselves. When told what they ought to do by the military government personnel, they were perfectly willing to comply. It is possible that we shall find a more solid situation as we progress north and as the habit of being ordered about by party officials may become less of a factor following the abolition of the party by Badoglio. However, I am doubtful that this effect will be very great as the abolition of Fascism by decree and undoing what has been done in 21 years are two different things. I feel, therefore, that we should not reduce the estimates of personnel for future operations even though control of the country may be exercised by a commission under an armistice rather than as in Sicily by military government with suspension of Italian sovereignty.

#### MANY ORGANIZATIONAL LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED FROM THE ASSAULT PHASE

[Memo, Spofford for Chief, MGS, 22 Sept 43, ACC files, 10000/100/697]

1. With reference to request contained in your memorandum of 9 September 1943, the following is a consolidation and summary of points raised in memoranda submitted by AMGOT field officers on this subject.

##### 2. *AMGOT and its relations with other units.*

(i) AMGOT started in the Sicilian operation with one big handicap. It was, to almost all concerned in the operation, a new branch, whose functions and *raison d'être* were neither appreciated nor understood by the fighting services. The first task was therefore to "sell" AMGOT. This was achieved with some measure of success at the top, but efforts to penetrate the lower for-

mations were not successful. It is, therefore, of great importance that during the planning stage opportunities should be given for putting all concerned in the picture as regards the role which AMGOT is to play in the operation.

(ii) Furthermore, AMGOT officers attached to assault forces should join their units well in advance of D Day, not only to carry out what has been mentioned in the above paragraph, but also to co-ordinate their activities with those of the various army units with which they are most likely to be in contact, e.g., C.I.C. . . .

##### 3. *AMGOT in early stages of Operation.*

(i) The invasion of Sicily has clearly demonstrated that Civil Affairs officers should be present in invaded cities at the time of their capture. Civil Affairs liaison officers should be attached to combat units to help the commander to deal with civilian problems arising immediately after the assault. Adequate numbers of Civil Affairs administrative officers should be sent forward with the troops to be left in supervision of the cities and towns from the time of their capture.

(ii) In cases where the assault force is advancing rapidly, high priority is essential for additional AMGOT personnel and transport. Lack of such priority has resulted in officers being spread too thinly over the ground to be able to do their jobs properly.

##### 4. *AMGOT Transport.*

(i) It is essential that all AMGOT personnel with assault forces go in with their own transport. Dependence on the units to which officers are attached does not work. Locally requisitioned transport cannot be relied on, as experience has shown that tactical units requisition all available vehicles. Furthermore the average local vehicle is not sufficiently reliable for the strenuous work on bad roads that it must perform.

(ii) If they do not land with their own vehicles officers cannot get into cities at the time of their capture, nor can they properly supervise the large areas for which they usually find themselves responsible.

##### 5. *AMGOT Personnel.*

(i) In the early stages all specialist officers must be prepared to do the work of C.A.O.'s.

(ii) Under the present organization AMGOT officers are not provided with sufficient OR/EM clerks, interpreters, guards and for other basic duties. There have been numerous cases of

looting both by civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of AMGOT. There is no such body provided, in the AMGOT organization, and the strength of C.M.P.'s and F.S.P. [Field Security Personnel] in relation to the number of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamentably small. Shortage of OR/EM personnel heavily handicapped AMGOT officers in their attempts to prevent looting and the enforcement of the Proclamations, in particular curfew for the civilians and the "Out of Bounds" notices for troops. In cases where the advance was particularly rapid it often occurred that a town was left completely devoid of troops, particularly if the axis of advance had altered. This aggravated the problem for the AMGOT officer who found himself the sole person in uniform in a village or town, thus more strongly emphasizing the necessity for some form of accompanying OR/EM.

(iii) Other personnel points raised included the following:

(a) That some of the men, selected for their knowledge of the Sicilian dialect, were of little value in translating Italian into English, or vice-versa on paper.

(b) That they should receive more training concerning their attitude and behaviour towards the inhabitants.

(c) That a ZI Military Police Battalion, or detachments thereof, be placed at the disposal of the Senior Civil Affairs Officers.

#### 6. Supply Arrangements.

(i) Owing to shortage of transport, AMGOT personnel could not carry sufficient rations to be self supporting for more than a few days, and difficulty was often experienced in persuading the Quartermaster to provide them with rations. This could have been partly obviated if the function of AMGOT had been directly acknowledged by unit commanders as a part of the force.

(ii) Medical supplies were not provided for AMGOT personnel other than the General Issue first aid packet. In a unit which is obliged frequently to conduct its operations in comparatively isolated areas at considerable distances from Army hospital units it is felt that special provision should be made for equipping all AMGOT personnel with medical kits and equipment adequate to meet the situation.

#### 7. Communications

These were found to be of the utmost difficulty and here again the primary cause was lack of transport. The next most important reason was that priority on army signals had, quite naturally, to go to operational messages.

#### 8. Miscellaneous.

(i) It is considered essential that such identification marks as police arm bands, special police identity cards, vehicle permit cards and special passes for after curfew hours be printed in advance.

(ii) C.I.C. should co-ordinate its activities more extensively with AMGOT and should submit copies of their reports to insure a uniformity of treatment of civilians.

(iii) A lack of sufficient instruction with respect to procedure of requisitioning property caused considerable confusion. . . .

#### LESSONS IN THE ART OF GOVERNING

[Contemporary Summary of Views Expressed in Reports From CAO's Attached to the Tactical Units in Eighth Army, Spofford Rpt, ex. 3-A]

1. Talk to the population in extremely short and simple sentences.

2. Inquire from time to time from people on the street how various things are going in the town, as the people on whom the civil affairs officer relies may be unreliable and may try to take advantage of him.

3. Scrutinize all complaints very carefully because complainers are opportunists.

4. Build up the prestige of the local police force as quickly as possible. It is particularly desirable to get into the town early in order to keep them armed and to protect them from the possibilities of insults in the early stages.

5. Irrespective of the confusion adherent [inherent] in the situation, it is of great value to have the personnel well and neatly attired. . . .

13. If it is found that the Chief of an office, such as the police, is corrupt and has to be removed, it is generally true that his subordinates are also corrupt and will have to be removed or closely watched. . . .

22. Don't make promises to the population unless you are sure you can fulfill them. . . .

30. Impress upon the public officials that AMGOT does not come to take over the work of governing, but to supervise and direct the local people in that work. . . .

## 2. AMGOT HEADQUARTERS TAKES OVER AND REVIVES PROVINCIAL INSTITUTIONS

### ITALIAN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE ON NEW FUNCTIONS

[Poletti Rpt]

. . . In my opinion, the provincial seat of government must be strengthened. Functions, previously stemming from Rome, will now have to be centered in the respective provinces. . . .

### THE STOCK OF AMGOT HAS RISEN AND IT NOW SETS UP SHOP FOR ITSELF

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43]

29. The setting up of a civil government has been as rapid as I hoped but would in certain areas, notably in certain parts of 7th Army area, have been more rapid and more effective if my officers had had the full co-operation of formations generally. Formations in both 7th and 8th Armies remain ignorant of the purpose and existence of civil government. I think it is necessary in any future operations for directions to be issued to formations on the subject of civil administration which are brought to the attention of all officers. I remain of the opinion that general directions to all ranks regarding their behavior on occupying a country should be issued before any operation, on the lines of the 'Do's and Don't's' which were authorized for issue by you but never issued in 8th Army. It has nevertheless been gratifying to me to find senior formation commanders, when they have since understood why and what a civil administration does, clamouring for more staff in their areas and passing over more and more work to that staff to do in various branches which they had thought to do themselves. I should have been even more gratified had they adopted this attitude earlier.

On 31 July you decided to turn over to me under your direct authority the administration of the Provinces of Syracuse, Ragusa, Agrigento, Trapani, Caltanissetta, as well as the southern part of Catania and the western part of Palermo Provinces. The remainder of the occupied territories, that is the forward areas, remain under the direct control of the G.C.O.'s 7th and 8th Armies.<sup>3</sup> . . .

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<sup>3</sup> Even in areas where fighting was still going on, AMGOT Headquarters was permitted to give a considerable amount of actual direction to the officers in the field. Chanler, Chief Legal Officer (CLO), AMGOT, reported to Hilldring in a survey report of 27 December

### AMGOT HEADQUARTERS TAKES OVER UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS

[Rpt, Gen Rennell, for August 1943 [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1)]

AMGOT Headquarters established in skeleton form at Syracuse during the last ten days of July was transferred during the first week in August to Palermo, but the complete staff of headquarters was not fully assembled until a fortnight later, owing to delay in the arrival of the last echelon from North Africa. I transferred myself and personnel staff to Palermo arriving, after touring the western provinces, on 7 August. My Deputy had preceded me by a few days. AMGOT Headquarters cannot therefore be said to have started working as the headquarters of a government until the second half of August. The Headquarters, including files, central registers, etc., were started up from nothing, since the planning staff Headquarters and working files at Chrea were concerned with planning and not with government. Moreover, even the personnel of the Chrea nucleus had not lived together as a whole since the end of June, having been dispersed between Algiers and Palermo or used for other purposes during the assault phase. Nevertheless Headquarters officers from the first moment of their arrival in Sicily undertook extensive touring in connection with their work to familiarize themselves and provincial personnel with the problem of government.

The whole staff of AMGOT including provincial personnel was not even remotely complete in the Island until the middle of August, but before that date personnel was already being selected and held in readiness to take over the unoccupied part of Sicily and to prepare parties for operations on the mainland. It was thus necessary, as soon as provincial administration had been set up in areas occupied, to remove and replace officers. This constant ebb and flow of personnel retarded the establishment both of the Headquarters and the provincial administration; it was inevitable if the forward Civil Affairs Officers, with or immediately behind combat formations were to have the necessary experience and be of the right type; but it did not improve

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1943 that "it would have been easier if they had been able to do this by issuing formal 'technical directives' without having to struggle with the great communications difficulties of going through channels." CAD files, 319.1, AMG(8-17-43)(1)

the machine. I have thus been faced in the provincial administration, not only with the necessity of cutting down staff before I could properly do so, but also of constantly replacing experienced by less experienced officers. These are probably the main reasons why the administration has not progressed as quickly as I could have wished in dealing with local problems. These are also the reasons why my SCAO's in the last occupied parts of Sicily have not made as much progress as I, and others, could have wished. . . .

#### RESTORATION OF ITALIAN PROVINCIAL DISBURSING AUTHORITY

[Financial Div AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43]

2. . . . As operations progressed, the Revenue Section became increasingly engaged in ascertaining the Italian channels through which payments were made, with deciding what salaries and expenses should be approved, and generally with all types of State expenditure. The stage had passed in which it was necessary to give C.A.O.'s wide disbursing authority in order to immediately start the functions of the Italian local governmental machinery. The exigencies of the moment having been met, it became possible to set up controls over governmental expenditures by insuring that proposed disbursements would be regularly reviewed through both Italian and AMGOT channels. It also became possible to inquire into the nature of the various province-wide parastatal organizations, with a view either to reviving their activities or checking them off; in the process of imposing systematic control over expenditures, the C.A.O. lost in large measure his disbursing function, these being now performed at the provincial level by the FO. Since the average C.A.O. was inexperienced in financial and accounting matters and was overburdened with tasks more immediately related to public health and safety, the removal of expenditure control from his sphere of activity was also in the interests of more orderly accounting. AMGOT 2020/F dated August 22 . . . instructed F.O.'s and C.A.O.'s on the procedure to be followed in the case of AMFA funds being required to meet cash shortages for expenditures of various *sindacati*, *aziende* and *enti*, and for the payment of state salaries. C.A.O. and F.O.'s were required to obtain full information on the functions, resources, and purposes of the institutions for which an advance was desired, with particulars of estimated expenditures for the area concerned. If the organization and its expenditures were approved by higher authority, an advance would be authorized through the normal

Italian channels at as high a level as possible. In practice, this meant that the advance was to be made to the Ufficio Provinciale del Tesoro whenever possible, any necessary sub-accounts being opened in the R. Tesoreria accounts at the Banco d'Italia to cover the organization concerned.

#### WHO SHALL BE PAID AND HOW

[Memo, Poletti for SCAO's, 21 Jul 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. 3-A]

1. No more payments of military assistance benefits.
2. No more payments of pensions to army officers even if veterans of last war.
3. Any relief will be given as general relief by commune.
4. Regional state treasurer located at provincial seat shall issue warrants for the payment of all state employees—*carabinieri*, *guardia di finanze*, school teachers above rank of elementary school, medical and sanitary officers, custodians and other state civil servants.
5. The postmaster at provincial seat will exercise the power of the Minister of P.T.T. [Post, Telephone, Telegraph] and be held responsible for the functioning of all post offices in his province, including payment of P.T.T. employees, elementary school teachers and also pensions previously paid through post offices.
6. All railway administration shall be centered in Capo Compartimento Ferrovie dello Stato at Palermo. This office will pay salaries and wages of railway employees.
7. All existing provincial and communal administration except to the extent specifically forbidden shall continue.
8. The regional state treasurer located at provincial seat shall assume the provincial obligations of Rome with respect to state grants in aid to:
  - a. Hospitals, lunatic asylums, orphanages, homes for incurables, old age homes.
  - b. Scientific institutions.
  - c. Museums, monuments, and archeological sites.
  - d. Schools and universities.
  - e. Special improvement districts like drainage, irrigation.
  - f. Industrial and utility organizations only if necessary to Allied military effort.
9. The Ammassi and Consorzio system shall continue as presently except that subsidy shall be supplied through the provincial state treasurer, who in turn will be reimbursed by AMGOT.
10. The social security benefits except military family allowances shall continue to be paid and

premiums continue to be collected. AMGOT will assume the immediate cash deficit and such AMGOT funds shall be paid through the central offices of the Istituto di Previdenze Sociale and the Infortuni Lavoro respectively.

#### AMGOT RULE CANNOT CONTINUE TO BE FREE

[Financial Div AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43]

1. General Administrative Instruction No. 3 . . . stated that after the lifting of the moratorium provided in Proclamation No. 5, all fees, imposts and taxes were to continue to be paid. However no specific instructions were given as to the steps to be taken to reconstruct the Italian revenue machinery. It was found that Italian revenue officials were receiving little help from C.A.O.'s and F.O.'s and that the Italian revenue authorities almost completely lacked the transport necessary to reassemble dispersed offices and personnel and to remove records from damaged buildings.

2. The language difficulties were, as in any foreign operation, considerable, particularly in a technical and specialized subject such as Revenue and one in which there is normally little interaction or knowledge between one country and another. . . . In the early stages it was found that one of the quickest methods of procedure was to obtain the forms used and from these ascertain the work performed by the various officials and their organizations. . . .

3. Since the August bi-monthly tax collections began 10 August, immediate problems arose concerning:

(a) the treatment of contributi sindacati,<sup>4</sup> an important source of Fascist funds:

(b) the release of tax moneys from the closed banks. . . .

Thereafter A.M.G. 22 Headquarters dated 13 August . . . and a revised General Order No. 2 . . . were issued. These documents:

(a) ordered the prompt payment of all taxes.

(b) ordered that all taxes were to be paid in cash,

(c) authorized the banks to make transfers from the accounts of Essatori to the Ricevatore Provinciale,

(d) authorized the banks to pay over to the

<sup>4</sup>Taxes from the syndicates, a component of the Fascist system of centralized economic control.

tax collection agencies moneys held by taxpayers on deposit,

(e) abolished contributi sindacati.

4. Another immediate problem arose concerning the granting of collection concessions in view of the abnormal conditions caused by evacuation and bomb damage. The Italian system authorized the Ministry of Finance to grant a "tolleranza" (extension of time for payment) to Essatori and Ricevatori Provinciale in cases in which unforeseen and widespread collection difficulties occurred. A tolleranza had been granted the officials of Palermo commune for the June installment and it was decided to use this device throughout the island, wherever it was necessary. Accordingly under AMGOT/226/Headquarters dated 16 August . . . Finance Officers in the provinces were authorized to agree with the Intendente di Finanza for tolleranza up to 50% to be given by him for August tax payments in heavily bombed and evacuated localities. Authority was later given for the granting of tolleranza for October and December payments. . . .

#### PROVINCIAL PREFETS AND OTHER FASCIST OFFICIALS ARE REPLACED

[Rennell Rpt]

18. The removal and internment of Fascists proceeds. . . . There are now no prefects of pre-occupation days; the last of these in Enna was an old civil servant without pronounced leanings towards Fascism: he was removed for incompetence. Replacements have been effected ad interim from vice prefects, mayors, or local personages. Here, as in the replacements of mayors, local opinion has been consulted, including church authorities. The Fascist title of Podesta has been abolished and replaced by that of Sindaco. A limited number of better class Sicilians is being co-opted for administrative work in economic, financial and management posts.

#### CAO'S OBTAIN ABUNDANT LOCAL LABOR FOR ARMED FORCES

[End A, Fld Rpt 12, Capt David A. Morse, Dir, Labor Sub-Com, Hq AMG, Labor in Sicily From 10 July 1943 to 26 October 1943 [hereafter cited as Morse Rpt], CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

2. . . . (a) Procurement and Supply of Labor.

i. . . . In each province the main Fascist trade union office was taken over by the S.C.A.O. and opened as an employment office. The clerical and

executive staffs (except known Fascist leaders who were removed on the spot) who were familiar with the office records, and registration of workers under Fascism, were directed to continue at work under A.M.G. supervision. The public was invited to register for work and the offices were immediately overrun by men, women, and children of all ages who desired employment. Compulsory registration was not required. The problem was not one of procuring sufficient labor, but in finding enough work for the thousands of persons who for the moment were out of employment because of disorganization of trade, industry and commerce. In Palermo City alone, over 1,800 persons were registered for work the first day. . . .

ii. Certain fundamental rules were established for the employment offices. (a) Registration was voluntary. Under Fascism it had been compulsory. (b) Persons were classified for work by skill with full listing of all skills; under Fascism they were classified under one skill and could only work in that classification. (c) Preference in employment to members of the Fascist party was to be abolished. Persons were to be employed on an equal basis regardless of race or creed. (d) Preference for employment was to be given to political prisoners who had opposed Fascism and had been imprisoned by the Fascists for that reason; individuals who had been denied employment opportunities under Fascism because of religion, anti-Fascist activity, or refusal to join the Fascist party; and to heads of families who could show great economic need.

### THE ARMY IS NOW SOLD ON CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Ltr, Poletti to McCloy, 2 Aug 43, CAD files, 321 (12-21-43), sec. 2]

. . . the Army is sold on Civil Affairs. We are all delighted. It is proof of the faith the Secretary and yourself had had in Civil Affairs. . . .

. . . I should have said that one reason Civil Affairs has been so good over here is that officers move in immediately behind fighting troops. The minimum lapse occurs. That prevents continuation of looting which always commences the moment Italian troops pull out. . . .

### ONLY ONE CRITICISM OF CAO'S FROM ARMY COMMANDERS

[Ltr, Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 18 Aug 43, CAD files, 319-1, AMG (8-17-43) (1), CCS Memo for Info No. 126]

. . . We found in the planning stage that it was somewhat difficult to convince the combat commanders of the necessity of an adequate number of military government officers in the assault and follow-up stages and that it was essential for them to have transportation. Both the Commanders of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, as well as the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, have expressed themselves as now being fully convinced that adequate numbers of officers and vehicles in the earlier stages were essential. As a matter of fact the only criticism received from either Army Commander has been that there were not enough Civil Affairs Officers.

## 3. WHEN FIGHTING ENDS MORE COMPLEX PROBLEMS BEGIN

### WHAT SOLUTION FOR THE DIFFICULT FOOD SITUATION?

[Rennell Rpt, CCAC Memo for Info No. 5]

23. The food situation in Sicily has been the most serious preoccupation of the Administration throughout the period and is still far from solved yet. In theory Sicily should produce about enough grain, beans and other basic foodstuffs for its own requirements. In fact there is probably enough grain in Sicily to supply this agricultural year's needs. But it is improbable that the administration will succeed in feeding Sicily without grain imports. Twenty years of corrupt management have ingrained hoarding and black

market practices to an extent which it will take more than a few months of Allied Military Administration to change. In July I raised the price of wheat from 360 lire a quintal to 500 for that month and August, to 450 for September and to 400 for October and thereafter. The results have been disappointing. The harvest was late and somewhat scanty owing to drought; warlike operation and lack of transport delayed collections. The farming population continued to withhold grain in the conviction that the prices, though raised, could not be maintained, and that a further rise would have to be made. Up to date these prices have, however, been maintained and there are a few signs that grain is coming forward to

the collection centres under pressure a little better, but very little better in spite of police measures and the personal effort to collect of all my officers. I think, but I am not sure, that these measures are beginning to have some effect, as is the policy of paying hard cash at the collection centres instead of issuing payment or dues in accordance with Italian practice.

The standard ration was raised to 300 grammes of bread a day plus 40 grammes of pasta. It was, however, not possible to achieve this level in the large towns like Palermo and Catania. In Palermo in particular the ration remained at 150 grammes throughout August. The principal difficulty in the towns had been to move grain in to the mills and bakeries in the absence of trucks and trains. In spite of orders issued by 15th Army Group very little of the seized transport has been returned by Seventh and Eighth Armies to AMGOT for Civil Supply. Palermo and Catania have literally been on a starvation bread ration owing to the inability in which my officers found themselves of handling the wheat they had available outside. In Palermo the situation has now improved by securing a quota of rail freight to bring in grain and the ration of 200 grammes is now available to all ration book holders with virtually no queuing up. There are a number of illicit ration book holders who cannot be eliminated until 1 October, when the new books will be issued.

Some 6,000 tons of stockpiled foodstuffs from North Africa, mainly flour, called forward on the D 15 and D 30 convoys, was much delayed in arrival and instead of providing a small reserve at Palermo and Catania has had to be earmarked and diverted to Messina and Calabria. I am satisfied that with a reserve of grain or flour at strategic points in the Island, I can break the black market and make the producers disgorge grain. I am equally sure that without such a reserve we shall go on living from hand to mouth. The state is not a satisfactory one when large urban centers like Palermo have to live as they have lived for weeks with not even 24 hours reserve of breadstuffs in the town. But the cure, which requires shipping and trucks, is not one which can be applied at any rate so long as the call forward of shipping is in the hands of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, who naturally fill their own requirements first, and so long as virtually all truck transportation remains in the hands of military formations. The food situation at Messina and in Trapani provinces and road/rail communications between Trapani and its normal supply area, Agrigento province, remain seriously interrupted. I am more than doubtful whether it is

possible for a civil administration to depend entirely on fighting formations for the services necessary to maintain civil supply. [Further discussion of food supply in ch. XII, below.]

#### PROBLEM OF OBTAINING TRANSPORTATION FOR CIVILIAN NEEDS

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt, Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

79. A start on an island-wide program for motor transport was made.<sup>5</sup> Virtually all operating transport was removed from civilian and AMGOT control by the military shortly after the occupation. Under the orders of 7th and 8th Armies some vehicles were returned to AMGOT and a portion of them were put into operating condition. S.C.A.O.'s of most provinces organized their own motor pools, engaged primarily in the transportation of supplies. The creation of a motor transport subsection at AMGOT Headquarters laid the groundwork for an island-wide organization by turning over to Istituto Nazionale Trasporti [INT] (the truck and bus subsidiary of the State Railways) certain vehicles and by requisitioning garages and repair shops in Palermo capable of caring for approximately 100 trucks. INT is being used as the agency of AMGOT for operating an island-wide truck service with terminals and garage facilities in the provincial capitals. The motor transport subsection continued the operation of a bi-weekly bus service throughout the island. . . .

80. A water transport subsection was established under a U.S. Naval officer who was assigned for the purpose. Two schooners were transferred to AMGOT, one of which is a 450-ton boat used for water supply for the island of Ustica. Several smaller boats at Trapani were also taken over, which were made available to the S.C.A.O. Trapani to move in grain from Agrigento.

#### PROBLEM OF REOPENING BANKS WHEN CASH RESERVES ARE LOW

[Financial Div, AMGOT, Rpt, May-Nov 43]

Under normal conditions the banks of Italy depend on the Central Bank (the Banca d'Italia)

<sup>5</sup> On 20 September all railway operations in Sicily were turned back to civilians, under the supervision of Allied military operating units. In September, also, AFHQ ordered that as of 15 October AMGOT would become responsible for rail operations in the American area. Previously AMGOT's principal service had been that of keeping the Sicilian organizations intact through advancing funds. Rpt of Transportation, Communications and Utilities (T.C.&U.) Div, Hq AMG, 6 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/154/317.

for supplies of currency and for emergency credit through loans against Government securities or rediscount of commercial paper. The AMG knew before the invasion of Sicily began, that the Banca d'Italia and local banks held only small stocks of currency (if, indeed they had not destroyed what they had) and that in any case further shipments from Rome would cease. It was for this reason, among others, that AMFA had to be supplied as rapidly and as soon as possible with adequate stocks of some type of currency preferably expressed in terms of lire. . . .

The anticipation proved correct: cash reserves of the Sicilian banks were small, and while the Banca d'Italia branches had in only a few cases followed the instructions to destroy their stocks of currency, there were not over 500 million lire available. To be sure, holdings of currency in the hands of the public were abnormally large (though estimates differed); but until the banks were reopened and confidence restored these hoardings were unlikely to come out of hiding. Therefore it was the first task of AMFA, after the minimum needs of the military establishment and of the AMG were taken care of, to accumulate enough AM lire to provide the cash reserves essential to a reopening of the banks. Moreover, it was necessary, in order to carry out this Central Banking function in a proper manner, to enter into credit agreements (or overdraft arrangements) with all banks which felt they needed cash reserves. . . . It was also necessary in view of the inadequacy of civilian transport, to provide trucks and guards to move into the nine chief provincial branches of the Banca di Sicilia (which is the largest bank having a head office and branch network in Sicily, and is being used by AMFA as banking agent) amounts of lire judged to be necessary to meet maximum permitted withdrawals when the banks were allowed to reopen. It should be explained that when AMFA first entered into this credit agreement it was considered necessary, owing to the lack of communications, and for the purpose of building up confidence, to place a 100% cash reserve in each branch of the Banca di Sicilia against AMFA's credit commitments. . . . As a matter of fact, the public reaction to the reopening of the banks was so satisfactory that the banks never needed to draw from AMFA more than a small proportion of the sums to which they were entitled under their credit agreements.

Under the provisions of General Order No. 6, published 1 September, the Banks in Palermo Province were opened on a restricted withdrawal basis on 6 September, and in all the rest of Sicily on 15 September. During the first few days with-

drawals by depositors exceeded new deposits, then the trend was reversed. By about the middle of the month new deposits in Palermo City were 50% above withdrawals. Total credit lines of 1,630,000,000 lire were placed by A.M.F.A. at the disposal of the banks to enable them to meet the 5,000 lire per account withdrawals. At the close of business on 30 September loans to banks against these credit lines totalled only 124,000,000 lire. . . .

A.M.F.A.'s credit lines to banks . . . were restricted to the coverage of withdrawals of deposits. In view of some demand for loans from banks' customers to finance the movements and processing of crops and the reconditioning of mines, it was deemed advisable to offer additional credit to the banks to enable them to make such loans. . . .

The Bank of Sicily has functioned entirely satisfactorily as agency for A.M.F.A., both in connection with the distribution of funds in its branches in all the provincial capitals and Caltagirone, and in carrying other accounts required by A.M.F.A.'s operations. . . .

Toward the end of the month the banking situation was considered such as to justify steps being taken to prepare for the removal of all restrictions on deposit withdrawals and the resumption of normal operations. The date for such action was fixed for approximately 6 October. . . .

#### HOW REVIVE INDUSTRY WITHOUT CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS?

[Msg, ID, ASF, to CG, NATO, 15 Aug 43. CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 6263]

. . . Our economy extremely tight due to military demands and War Department cannot support procurement of listed material unless and to the extent clearly essential to military operation. We are doubtful of justification of large quantity of critical material for Sicily. . . .

#### SHOULD A FAULTY TAX SYSTEM BE CHANGED AT AN EARLY STAGE?

[Memo, Chief Finance Officer, AMGOT, for All Finance Officers, 5 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1 (8-17-43) (1)]

2. The general principles are that all Italian taxes enforced at the date of occupation should be continued (except the Contributi Sindacati specially abrogated under General Order No. 2), and that the Italian method of collecting taxes should also be continued.

It is realized that many of the taxes are cumbersome, some produce a badly arranged burden,

and some are collected through organizations which have apparently an unnecessary large "rake-off" and could be replaced. It is undesirable, however, to abrogate any particular taxes or to disturb the existing machinery, purely on the local data obtainable in the Island of Sicily, and the above general principles will accordingly be followed.

3. It is important that dislocations in the Italian revenue services should be obviated as soon as possible. This will include the re-centralization of dispersed staffs and the occupation of buildings to replace those permanently damaged. The Intendente and the Ufficio Provinciale del Tesoro should make the best economical arrangements possible. In difficult cases buildings may be requisitioned through the proper channels. . . . Similarly every assistance should be given to Esattori and other revenue collecting agents in bringing in their moneys to the banks or post offices.

#### PROBLEM OF WAGES TO BE PAID TO CIVILIANS BY THE ARMED FORCES

[Morse Rpt]

(b) . . . Civilians employed by the armed forces . . . presented problems of an emergency nature because the military was at the time the largest single employer of labour on the Island; wage rates paid were not uniform between the various branches of the services; and it was obvious that the official and unofficial army rates of pay were in most cases too high, and in some too low. Wages were not related to the economy of the Island, and in cases where they greatly exceeded prevailing customary rates, were drawing persons away from private and government employment and adding to the spiral of inflation. The lack of an official Armed Forces wage policy and scale caused confusion in the labor market. In view of these circumstances conferences were called by the Labor Section of A.M.G. attended by representatives of the Allied Armies, Navies and Air Forces, and a uniform wage scale was adopted. . . . The scale was promulgated by A.M.G. and issued to all of the branches to be issued in routing military orders or directives. The scale became effective 1 October 1943, and included 171 working categories. In addition, it was agreed that periodic joint conferences would be called by A.M.G. for further revision of wages and addition of job classifications. . . . Basic conditions of employment were also established and made part of the wage publication. An effort was made to eliminate the wide discrepancies between wages paid by the military

and those prevailing in other fields. It was borne in mind that the scale would establish an Island-wide precedent which would eventually be reflected in wages paid to government and private employees. The result was that approximately 50% of the then existing military rates of pay were reduced by L 10 to L 30 per day, while in other cases rates were left unchanged, and in some cases increased. . . . While the uniform scale was not the answer to the wage problem as such, it was of constructive value since it established a uniform scale and policy; stabilized wages and wage procedure; and revised rates to a more economically desirable level. . . .

#### HOW BUILD A SOUND JUDICIAL SYSTEM ON RUINS OF FASCISM?

[Chanler Rpt]

13. It has been found generally on arrival in occupied territory that owing to bombing and other reasons, the judicial authorities had fled from the congested towns and that there has been little or no system of justice in operation. Military Courts have been established at once to deal with offenses against the Armed Forces and a search has quickly found many members of the Italian judiciary willing and able to continue in office.

14. The Italian legal profession had not done well under Fascism. The profession had in the old days been of some standing, but with the Fascist syndicates and Fascist controls, it had sunk to a low level and the judiciary had become little more than an underpaid Government Civil Service, whose every decision had to be considered in the light of whether it would annoy the Fascist leaders. It is obvious that no sound system of justice could exist in such conditions and the older members of the profession who returned to their jobs were quite obviously thankful that the days of subservience to such conditions were over. Each, upon his return, was carefully scrutinized as to his past and his record investigated and, if it was then found that he had tried to do an honest job he was reinstated. Most of the ardent fascist judges, like most other fascist government officials, had fled to the mainland at the time of the invasion. But most of the judiciary had been outstanding in their unwillingness to embrace Fascism and while most of them had to nominally join the party to keep their positions, they had done so unwillingly. Many of the principal leaders of the Bar had actually refused to join the Fascist party at all. The Italian judiciary were informed that a much higher standard of work was expected of them and that the fullest

measure of justice must be administered in the future without thought of politics.

15. Before generally opening Italian Courts, a committee was formed composed of four high Italian judicial officials, the President of the Court of Appeals, the President of the Tribunale, the Procuratore Generale and the Procuratore del Re. This Committee met with the Officer in charge of Italian Courts and the Chief Legal Officer to discuss the various problems relating to the opening of Italian courts. Suggestions were made by them and accepted for simplifying criminal procedure in some respects so that the many persons awaiting trial could be brought to trial more quickly. Also discussions were had regarding personnel of the courts. By 19 August, all criminal courts in Sicily were permitted to reopen under the supervision of AMGOT legal officers. A similar procedure was adopted regarding civil courts and instructions were given to open those courts throughout the Island of Sicily on 31 August. Similarly efforts were made for the reorganization of an independent and democratic Bar Association upon the lines of the earlier association which had been abolished under Fascism. A General Order providing for its reorganization and constitution was issued, and the Association was formed by leading members of the Bar who were known and proven anti-Fascist. One of the great difficulties in connection with the opening of Italian Courts arose from the fact that a large number of court houses had been damaged by bombing and that others were occupied by military organizations. Transportation difficulties also made the trial of cases very difficult, especially during the early phases. . . .

#### THE ARMY NEEDS LAW AND ORDER BUT WILL NOT VACATE COURTHOUSES

[Chanler, CLO, AMGOT, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/142/381]

5. The work of re-opening courts has been hampered by the destruction of some court buildings and the requisition of others for army use. Moreover, requisition has usually been followed by dispersal of the court records. Whilst the destruction was unavoidable, it is doubted whether requisitioning of such buildings was vital. Requisitioning of court buildings is likely to do more harm than good to the combat forces, by preventing the re-establishment of law and order. It is recommended that an agreement be made, if possible, with Army Headquarters that buildings such as court houses, be exempted from requisition, except in cases of extreme urgency.

#### ONLY EXTRAORDINARY ADAPTABILITY CAN MEET THE PROBLEMS

[Lt Comdr Malcolm S. MacLean, USNR Liaison, MGS, NAHQ, 3 Feb 44, Report Summarizing Information and Advice Obtained from Major Keagwin, CAO, Enna, Sicily, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

3(a). The chief problem of MG operations is the selection of personnel and the chief criterion for their selection is their adaptability to the range of circumstances with which Civil Affairs officers are confronted. As examples of this essential adaptability he cited:

(1) The case of one of his officers, an American, a former New York City policeman who, while knowing nothing of civil or electrical engineering, has nevertheless done an excellent job as public utilities officer. He has done so by searching out skilled men among the Sicilians and driving them by cajolery and threats when necessary to find materials, make repairs, and get things going. Thus by using native electricians and much ingenuity he got operating the Enna City electric light plant which has been in disuse for seven years. He completed by mid-November nine of eleven bridges that had been blown up or washed out in the province.

(2) The case of a young lieutenant (American), former employee of the National City Bank, who despite his youth and low rank and inexperience has dealt efficiently with the procurement of tons of wheat, coal, sugar, and olive oil with millions of Allied Military lire; has worked out and got running the distribution, and has been careful and accurate in his accounting.

(3) The case of the former London constable who with one enlisted man has bossed the Carabinieri for the whole province, restored much of the telephone communication system, organized a motor pool including the setting up of a repair garage and the employment of mechanics, and taken charge of the fishing fleet along the south coast.

(4) The case of a mild mannered, gentle, faithful American captain, a lawyer in civilian life, who in the early phase directed the burial of the dead, took care of the wounded soldiers of four nations, wounded and sick civilians; who found a U.S. soldier holding up a group of Carabinieri and robbing them of their watches at the point of a Tommy gun and took the gun away from him and put him under arrest. Now he does a good job as chief judge in the Military Court.

(b) The CAO Enna province has handled the black market as smartly as this observer has

seen it done in any place thus far. He found that salt was selling for 350 lire a kilo. He got in a ton by truck and employed a civilian to sell it for 2 lire a kilo (he having bought it for 1 lire) and thus he broke the black market and made a profit for the military government. The Enna butchers were selling meat at 80 to 120 lire a kilo. He protested and they told him that they could not sell it for less. He sent two trucks to Gela and Arigento and brought back fresh fish bought

at 10 lire a kilo, sold at 16 to 20 lire a kilo. Meat dropped to 20 to 30 lire a kilo at once. When the butchers again protested he offered to raise the price of fish and thus the price of meat provided the butchers were willing to take the consequences of his posting a notice that this action was taken because of "the greed and selfishness of the local butchers." No protest has been made since. . . .

#### 4. SICILIANS BECOME SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT

##### A FRIENDLY RECEPTION

[Rennell Rpt, 2 Aug 43]

10. From the very outset the attitude of the population generally has been friendly. In certain areas and on particular occasions the population has been definitely enthusiastic. General Eisenhower's declaration in particular was very well received, had a considerable effect, and in one or two places provoked demonstrations of enthusiasm. . . .

11. Even if full allowance is made for sycophants and the desire to curry favor with the Allies at this juncture, I accept as genuine a very large measure of the anti-Fascist sentiment in Sicily and of genuine relief at its prospective termination. I have no particular comments to record on the issue of Proclamation No. 7 [Defascistization]. The announcement in Proclamation No. 1 that steps would be taken to dissolve the Fascist Party proved sufficient to set free a substantial volume of criticism of the regime. One prominent person, the Bishop of Noto, in a discussion with me, asserted that it was high time the regime came to an end, adding that in southern Sicily especially there never had been any real following for the Fascist Party where prominent members were distrusted and detested. Every one of my officers has reported in the same vein and this, coupled with the co-operative spirit shown by everyone, with very few individual exceptions, must be held to substantiate the view that the population of occupied Sicily is on the whole really friendly and anti-Fascist.

##### THEY QUICKLY ADMIRE OUR WAYS

[Chanler Rpt]

18. Particularly worthy of note is the impression created upon the public by our Courts. Spectators, both laymen and professional, crowded the court-

rooms, and were outspoken, even to the extent of committing contempt of court by applauding in their praise of the fairness of our procedure. It was a novel sight to most of them to see a judge protecting the rights of the accused, and to see the accused himself permitted to cross examine the prosecution witnesses, call his own witnesses and even testify in his own behalf, in the open courts. It is believed that a profound and lasting impression of the fairness of Anglo-American justice has been created.

##### THE CHURCH IS CO-OPERATIVE

[Rennell Rpt]

The Roman Catholic Church authorities have been co-operative and easy to deal with. The Cardinal Archbishop of Palermo in particular through his Chancellor has gone out of his way to provide comment and some information. He is not a persona grata in all sections. He has done some local touring and both he and his bishops have made use of the facilities for transmitting correspondence which my administration has placed at their disposal. The Church authorities have availed themselves to a limited extent within their scanty resources of personnel and premises to undertake elementary instruction of small children. I have heard two sermons to large congregations exhorting the people to obey and accept the Allied Military Government coupled with invective against the Fascist regime. On the other hand, the parish priests generally seem to have been as little helpful as any other Sicilians to my officers in warning them of bad characters within or without the Italian administration, or of doing anything tangible to assist in dealing with black markets. They, as all others in the country, complain of Mafia tendencies, black markets and profiteering, but are unwilling to

help the administration effectively by producing facts.

#### THE BISHOP AND THE CAO AGREE TO CO-OPERATE

[Notes, Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO (Unsigned and Undated), apparently written by a British CAO after the assault phase in Sicily, MTO, HS files, G-5 AFHQ]

One of the first things I did at Nicastro was to get into touch with the Bishop, a rather remarkable old boy of about 79. He whinnies like a nanny goat and is altogether a most attractive person. I explained to him that he would perhaps find my society in too large doses rather too embracing for a man of his years and suggested that he should attach a priest of intelligence to me as a sort of liaison officer. He offered four but I felt enough was as good as a feast and said so. The Parlece Fiere was chosen. He is an elderly and rather bird-like man who keeps one eye semi-closed. He is an excellent man of business and we got on famously. He agreed to use the Church organization throughout the 28 districts to assist my work both by distributing literature and by the use of tactful influence. I on my side agreed to consult the Church on all matters, although not necessarily to accept their views. Also I agreed to pay the utmost outward respect to the Church. For instance I always kiss the ring and attend Mass with the Municipal authorities every Sunday. All work is suspended and we proceed from the Municipio to Church.

I have used the word agreement but it was not so much a hard and fast agreement as the approach to understanding of men who had a common object up to a certain distance. We really, I believe, became friends so that we would sense each other's wishes and were anxious to do so. It is surely very silly not to make friends with the Church. I speak as a non-Catholic because they are the one great organization which stands today if not unshaken at least undestroyed by the catastrophe. We are here for the moment only but La Chiesa will remain a great power in the land long after we have taken ourselves off. The Bishop was not universally loved. The FSS [Field Security Service] told me that this was due to his Fascist tendencies but I later learned that when he became Bishop he put a stop to the orgies which annually took place on the feast day of a certain St. Antonio.

#### A CHANGE IS BEGINNING

[Rpt, Gen Rennell, CCAO Sicily, 8 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/688]

Since my arrival in Sicily, I have to report a substantial change in public sentiment. From being,

and adopting the attitude of, whipped dogs or fawning puppies immediately after the landing of the Allied troops, the Sicilians, of all classes, have reacted. They seem to me again to be becoming thinking, emotional and definite human beings.

As a whole they accepted the Allies as liberators. They have not ceased to do so. As a whole they are still friendly and anti-Fascist. They have been perhaps somewhat disillusioned by the behaviour of the Allied troops, and this is more marked as I judge in the 8th Army than in the 7th Army area. But they have not as yet displayed resentment. Superficially they are no doubt aware that the advent of the allied troops has not meant a reign of plenty; and I should say that they generally accepted so long as active operations in the island were in progress, that the needs of the troops came before civil requirements. They have been disappointed and impatient at the delay in completing the conquest of the island. But while this is attributed to the German troops in the island, there is probably an undercurrent of feeling that with the numerical preponderance of the Allied troops and their vastly superior equipment, they might have driven the Germans out before. Of what happens in Italy, or hereafter there seems to be little heed. The successful landings of July meant peace and liberation for Sicily.

The "liberation" propaganda and the innate anti-Fascism of the Sicilian has led him to regard himself almost as quasi-Ally. The consequences of not so being treated may be more serious. From an attitude of fawning the Sicilian has begun to ask, and in the larger centers to demand.

#### POOR MORALE AND DISSATISFACTION DEVELOP

[Rennell Rpt]

9. The morale of the population has certainly declined and there is dissatisfaction in the country. The failure of the Allies to secure a reign of plenty, the absence of coal and fertilizers, broken communications, and lack of postal facilities form the subject of a growing volume of complaint at Headquarters and in the provinces. Not a week passes without my receiving letters of complaint that the promises made by radio of food and goods for the occupied countries have not been carried out. One of the latest forms of complaint is that whereas Italy has been promised on the radio 200,000 tons of coal a month, no coal has yet been made available in Sicily after two months of occupation. This complaint is justified. In the present situation I am unable to hold out any hope of fertilizers arriv-

ing in time for the autumn sowing and no chemicals or manufacturing requisites will be available to make Marsala wine or start up the sulphur mines within any reasonable time. I anticipate a growing volume of justifiable complaint for many months; justifiable, that is, inasmuch as we have not lived up to our propaganda.

#### CAO'S CAN'T ALWAYS TAKE IT

[Rennell Rpt]

27. . . . I do not find that all my American or British officers are so enthusiastic about the freedom of the press as their antecedents would always suggest, when criticism or comment is directed towards the AMGOT administration.

#### THE GOVERNED ASSERT THEIR RIGHT TO SEE THE GOVERNORS

[Memo, Spofford, for SCAO, Agrigento Province, 18 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/691]

A U.S. patrol reported to the C.C.A.O. that the population of Rivona had complained to the O.C. Patrol that they could not get access to the C.A.O. who only visited the town rarely and then only saw the officials.

The C.A.O. in question . . . has, as you know, been transferred to this Headquarters but if, after investigation, you find the report to be true his successor must be told of it and be warned to contact the people as well as the officials of the area for which he is responsible.

#### THE MAFIA AND CIVIL CRIME

[Rennell Rpt]

12. One of my anxieties already reported has been some recrudescence of Mafia activities. My S.C.A.O.'s and my own sources lead me to believe that the initial impetus to this development was given by the temporary loss of prestige of the Carabinieri as a result of their being disarmed, . . . This has to some extent been remedied, but the harm was done in an interval when the rural population concluded that the Carabinieri as well as Fascism, the two great enemies of the Mafia, would simultaneously disappear. I also fear that in their exuberance to remove Fascist Podestas and Municipal officials in rural towns, my officers have in certain cases by ignorance of local personalities appointed a number of Mafia "bosses" or allowed such "bosses" to propose suitable malleable substitutes. Here my difficulty resides in the Sicilian Omerta code of honor. I cannot get much information even from the local Carabinieri who in subst-

tions inevitably feel that they had better keep their mouths shut and their skins whole if the local AMGOT representative chooses to appoint a Mafioso, lest they be accused by AMGOT of being pro-Fascist. The local Mafiosi who of course had no love for the regime which persecuted the Mafia are naturally not slow in levelling accusations of Fascist sympathies against their own pet enemies.

13. The fact of the matter is that while ordinary civil crime other than black market offenses is at a satisfactory level except in Trapani province and in most provinces has been decreasing, homicide has undoubtedly increased in the provinces reported to be Mafiosa. Many of these homicides are of the Mafia type or bear indications of Mafia antecedents. In these cases arrests are infrequent and evidence unobtainable. . . . The only remedy to this state of affairs lies in the improvement of the Carabinieri morale and organization.

#### POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS

[Rennell Rpt]

5. Four S.C.A.O.'s report some Communist stirrings, the formations of a cell here and there, and a fair amount of propaganda. There have been no further disturbances among unemployed sulphur miners, but I have no doubt that there is a considerable potential element of proletarian Communism or anarchism in these communities which could flare up into disorder and violence.

#### AT TIMES SICILIANS ARE DELIGHTFUL

[Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO]

. . . Dr. ——— struck me as a man of genuine political instincts and some personality and the first thought that passed through my mind was that it would be good fun to have him as Podesta. . . . I therefore consulted the Bishop as to whether Dr. ——— would be acceptable from the point of view of the Church. The old man gave me an excellent glass of Curacao and said while he didn't interfere in politics ——— was an excellent fellow. From my experience of British politics I took it that this meant ——— was OK by the Chiesa. Therefore I saw Dr. ——— and invited him to become Syndache. About an hour later I received a letter from the Bishop informing me that ——— had been living in sin for a long time and that it would be a cause of great sorrow if he became Syndache without first marrying the lady and would I use my excellent influence in the matter. I went and saw the Parlece and told him I was sorry but had

now offered —— the job. He told me that the Bishop had not liked to express his real feelings via my interpreter. I said that I would not personally appoint Dr. —— but that I would hold an election so that it would not seem as if I were putting in a man of doubtful morals. I then advised —— at luncheon. He gave a roar of somewhat angry laughter and said "This is too bad of Mr. Bishop." He said that he had lived with the woman for 20 years and that she was his wife in the sight of heaven. I replied that the trouble was that this was exactly what she wasn't. He then told me that the husband of the woman was alive and had an unpleasant habit of writing to her from America. He then asked me whether I wished him to commit perjury. This rather put me on the spot and I said that I thought it would be better to have an election, that this would please the people and let me out of appearing as a supporter of loose living. He laughed like hell; said he was sure he would get in and nothing would please him better. Giuseppina Rappa and her friends did not at all like the idea of —— and told me that Niccela [*sic*] Nicetera, a wealthy farmer and well-known gambler was much loved by the people. He came and saw me and expressed his willingness to be Podesta and I told him that the election would be at five o'clock next day. The next morning two other candidates appeared on the scene, a gentleman called Ernest Broglia representing the something socialists and a gentleman called Mancuse, who was also of the left. They both struck me as rather displeasing persons and I felt rather worried. Broglia decided to stand down in order to give Mancuse a better chance. Nicetera the candidate of the right came to see me and said that he had decided to withdraw his candidature which left two only in the field. I sent for Rase and asked him whether —— was sure to be elected and he said that he thought so. All my own information was to this effect and I began to feel happier. During

the afternoon crowds gathered and there was a good deal of singing. The Chief of Police seemed a little anxious but I am used to crowds and they seemed to me very good humored. At 5:30 precisely I appeared on the Municipio balcony before a crowd of several thousand; the two candidates and their supporters were with me. I received a splendid reception. Nobody listened to my speech but they all cheered and I felt very happy. I eventually got silence and told them that I was going to ask three questions. The first was "Do you want either of these men? If you want some one quite different shout his name and I will make him a candidate." A few names were called but there was obviously no strong feeling for another nominee. I then said all who want Mancuse shout his name. There was some response. I then called on the supporters of —— to do the same. There was a great roar which could be heard kilometres away. —— then addressed the people during which period I had withdrawn. . . . The people felt that they were really choosing their own Syndache and made a night of it. —— felt as proud as if he had been chosen to represent the City of Rome and always begins all his public ordinances with the "Le Dottore —— elette per acclamazione dei cittadini di Nicastro. . . ."

#### DESPITE DISSATISFACTIONS THEY RIOT ON THE RUMOR AMG WILL WITHDRAW

[Chanler to Chief, CAD, Rpt, 27 Dec 43, ABC files, 014, HORRIFIED, Govt]

A . . . good impression was created generally by . . . activities of Allied Military Government. It is interesting to note that in September there was a riot in the Commune of Florida, Syracuse Province, which upon investigation was found to have been caused by a rumor that Allied Military Government was going to be withdrawn. The people wanted to prevent the AMG personnel from leaving their commune.

## 5. CAO'S ARE ENTANGLED BY THEIR EXCESS OF ZEAL

### DON'T TRY TO DO EVERYTHING YOURSELF

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, 1 May 43, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

9. In taking over a district or any center, try to preserve the local administration and not try to do everything yourself. Give instructions to the higher Italian officials for them to pass on to their

subordinates. If you give orders to subordinates, you will find that the authority of the local administration is so impaired that we might have to take it over ourselves entirely; we have not the personnel for this. Remember that there are other areas in Europe where Civil Affairs personnel will be needed. . . .

## WE DISREGARD INSTRUCTIONS AND DO TOO MUCH OURSELVES

[Rennell Rpt]

10. . . . both educated Sicilian and municipal communities alike have done little or nothing to help themselves or us. There is an almost complete absence of any local initiative. The historical reason lies in the centralization of every activity ultimately in Rome. The consequence is that every local matter is referred to the nearest Civil Affairs Officer for action. . . .

11. I am sometimes inclined to think that if AMGOT had had many fewer officers, and been less ambitious, more local initiative might have been secured. As it is, even with my reduced establishment, officers nearly all tend to try to do too much themselves instead of asking the local population to work things out by and for their own account.

## THE HEALTH OF AMGOT PERSONNEL IS NOT VERY GOOD

[Rennell Rpt]

28. The health of my staff has not been very good: the number of cases of sand-fly fever, malaria, intestinal trouble and fatigue suggests to me the necessity of only employing fit personnel. Much of the sickness has been due to reaction from the fatigue of the first weeks.

## THE HEALTH OF SICILIANS IS EXCELLENT

[Rennell Rpt]

19. The public health of Sicily continues to be excellent. . . . The welfare section has been mainly occupied in study and plans but progress has been achieved in limited direction. The return of refugees from bombed or dangerous areas has been proceeding gradually throughout the island except in and around Messina. Notably around Syracuse the rehousing of cave dwellers, refugees from Syracuse city, has made good progress and the hygienic conditions of those still in the caves has been notably improved. It has generally not proved possible to prevent the influx of refugees to the larger cities they had abandoned in vast numbers, which has added considerably to urban problems of food, water and fuel. On the other hand, when the attempts of the Italian authorities to carry out provincial orders to stem the tide of reflux proved half hearted, we decided not to take severe measures

either with the police or the refugees, since with the advent of autumn it seemed better to face the urban problem than distress in caves and overcrowded villages.

## IT IS TIME TO LET SICILIANS DO MORE WORK

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, Sicily, for SCAO's, 6 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/693]

1. As the second month of occupation nears completion, there are unmistakable signs that our administration is not as well advanced as it should be at this time. . . .

2. It is my view that such difficulties are dependent or attributable to the failure in most localities of the S.C.A.O.'s and their subordinates to rely sufficiently on the Italian Administration. Ours is a military government of indirect control and it is essential, not only to conserve our personnel but to get the job properly done, that the most competent Italian personnel available should be drawn into the administration and put to work. At this time there should be no vacancies in the office of Syndache in any important commune and candidates for the office of prefect should have been found in most provinces, and submitted to this Headquarters for approval.

3. Italian personnel must, of course, be carefully chosen. However on the basis of the investigation that has already been completed you should be pretty well aware of the reliable elements in your province. A political check of civil servants and office holders by means of a questionnaire is to be commenced shortly of which you will be further advised. . . .

5. It will be necessary in the near future to make further substantial reductions in the administrative personnel in the provinces and possibly to combine the AMGOT personnel for one or more of the provinces in a single group. It is imperative that the responsibility for administrative routine be shifted to the most capable Italian personnel at the earliest possible moment.

## HEADQUARTERS IS TOLD IT IS DOING TOO MUCH ITSELF

[Memo, Rodd, for AMGOT Hq, 31 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

For your information, since my return from Palermo last Sunday I have been visited by the following AMGOT staff:

1 Labour captain

- 1 Sulphur lieutenant
- 1 Revenue colonel
- 1 Prison colonel
- 1 Police captain
- 1 Refugee major
- 1 Yugoslav colonel
- 1 Fireman captain and 1 fireman lieutenant
- 1 Infant Welfare captain
- 1 Legal colonel and 1 Legal major
- 1 Social Insurance captain and 1 Social Insurance lieutenant
- 1 Yugoslav diplomat a/d

You will recognize that in addition to the normal and always over-burdened interview time table of a S.C.A.O. whose door is besieged by bishops and mayors and distressed gentlewomen, not to mention his own staff, and the senior Italian officials of the province, this list represents 14 man hours (a minimum average of 1 hour per Headquarters visitor may be assumed) out of a working week of 60 hours.

I might add that in not one single case was any notice of the arrival of these officers given.<sup>6</sup>

[Memo, AMGOT Hq for Rodd, 7 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

It is true that visits of various officers from this office consume time of the S.C.A.O.'s. However, information with respect to the conditions in the Provinces is most necessary, and ultimately, if not immediately, their visits should prove of benefit to you. Much of the work is new to all of us and a great deal of co-operation and patience is required. It is our policy to reduce these visits to a minimum, and now that the initial stage of investigation is passing the volume should fall off. Visiting officers have been ordered to inform the S.C.A.O. relative to their activities in his Province.

#### WAS HEADQUARTERS PARALYZING ITALIAN OFFICIALS WITH TOO MANY REGULATIONS?

[Memo, Rodd for AMGOT Hq, 10 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/693]

I. I would submit that one of the obstacles to the development of the indirect system in provincial

<sup>6</sup> In reading the communications of CAO's to their military superiors it must always be borne in mind that, whatever their rank, these officers were apt to have the type of civilian background which develops independence of thought and tongue. Thus, while carrying out orders, they tended to tell their organizational superiors precisely what they thought, no matter how bold from the

administration is the volume of detailed enquiry and administrative direction which is issued from Headquarters, Palermo.

2. If an Italian organization is scrutinized as closely as the returns required would necessitate, and its procedure is governed by directives as detailed as those received, the officials concerned are bound to get into the habit of referring any action to be taken to the AMGOT officer in charge and not unnaturally feel that it would be unwise to take the responsibility and their reluctance is certainly strengthened by this administrative development.

[Memo, AMGOT Hq for Rodd, 24 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/693]

It is realized that the volume of detailed enquiry and administrative direction issued from this Headquarters probably causes alarm and despondency to S.C.A.O.'s who have inadequate clerical staff and an ever decreasing officer staff. At the start of an administration it is inevitable that there should be a large amount of this type of correspondence, but control is and has been kept on it.

Though close scrutiny and detailed directions at the outset may have the immediate effect described by you, it is considered that they should tend to greater efficiency on the part of Italian officials later on when they have to work on their own to a far greater extent than they do at present.

#### THOSE YOU HELP GET A HOLD ON YOU

[Some Reflections and Experiences of a CAO]

So much for Nicastro. When I shut my eyes at night I can still often enough see the people I knew there. Somehow or other, at least in my own imagining, I had come to belong to the place. Since I left Nicastro I had found myself thinking about how they are getting along almost as much as I do about my own folks and friends in England. This is no doubt only a passing matter but it is strange how in quite a short space of time the people and affairs of a small Italian country town can twine themselves around you and become a part of you.

point of view of conventional Army practice. Headquarters had the good sense to realize that it was dealing with an unusual group of subordinates, and, as the following memorandum from the Chief Staff Officer illustrates, usually answered their honest complaints and criticisms patiently.

## 6. CCS KEEPS THE MILITARY GOVERNORS ON THE JOB

### IN FULL TUMULT OF COMBAT AN INQUIRY ABOUT ENTRANCE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Msg, CAD to CG, NATO, 24 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 10261]

To assist civilian agencies in making their plans it is requested that the following information be furnished for the Island of Sicily only:

1. The approximate date you contemplate recommending to the CCS that civilian observers enter Sicily preparatory to their assuming such responsibilities for supply, rehabilitation, etc., as may be delegated to them by Allied military government;

2. Your estimate as to which agencies will be invited to send representatives such as Lend-Lease, OFRRO et cetera and their British counterparts.

3. The earliest approximate date you will recommend that civilian agencies should be authorized by you to send full working teams to Sicily.

In the event conditions are such that you do not desire to submit the above estimates at this time statement to that effect is desired.

### AFHQ DISAPPROVES ENTRANCE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES UNTIL AFTER MG IS ENDED

[Min, 14th Mtg Jt Political and Econ Council, AFHQ, 30 Jul 43, AFHQ, SAC files, Reel 72, Spec]

Mr. Macmillan said that he understood that the question had been raised whether, and if so, at what moment, representatives of civilian agencies should move into Sicily.

General Holmes said that this matter had been under consideration, but he did not see how military government and civilian agencies could usefully be mixed. He thought the treatment of liberated and of enemy territory should be differentiated. In any case it was clear that the activities of N.A.E.B. were confined to North Africa and that if, at any time, N.A.E.B. or an equivalent was set up in Sicily, the view was that the agencies should not function individually, but through a unified organization. It was open to AMGOT to ask for the loan of qualified civilians for specific purposes. He therefore suggested that any move of the kind proposed should be postponed.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> General Holmes had probably absorbed some of the climate of opinion in Washington during his visit there in March. The theater planners in general were unaware of what the President and the civilian agencies were planning at the time. With respect to Roosevelt's position, Stimson states: "Before the invasion of Sicily, Mr.

Mr. Macmillan agreed with this point of view. It should be sufficient for the present to obtain the services and advice of qualified individuals for short periods. The staffing of a new N.A.E.B. would be a much more difficult matter.

General Smith said that in his view civilian agencies should not move in until military government came to an end. He proposed that a telegram should be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recording this general view.

The Council agreed with this proposal.

### INQUIRY AS TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES IS SAID TO BE PREMATURE

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1229]

Directives with regard to military government of Sicily provide that the entire matter of civilian supply, economic developments, et cetera, would be handled by the Allied Military Government and that civilian agencies would not have anything to do with the territory until requested by the C in C. It is assumed that everyone concerned understands that in enemy territory there must be a period of purely Military Government. We can understand the desire of the civilian agencies to be prepared to meet responsibilities which in the future they may be called on to assume. However, the telegrams under reference would appear to be premature and raise certain questions. Is it intended that all territory which we occupy be treated the same? For example, is it proposed that the privileges of Lend Lease be extended to the enemy? It seems to us here that the approach to enemy territory necessarily differs greatly from the approach to liberated friendly territory.

The following observations apply to enemy territory: Our obligation would appear to be to

Roosevelt made one more effort to insure the dominance of civilian agencies in civil administration but the experience gained in this operation and in the early stages of the Italian campaign appears to have convinced him that for good or ill the armed forces must have the administrative responsibility in all military theaters. Two actions in November 1943 showed . . . how far the President had moved. First, on November 10 [see above, Chapter IV, Section 7] he wrote a letter to Stimson declaring that the War Department must assume responsibility for civilian relief in liberated areas. . . . Second, from Cairo . . . he cabled . . . that all arrangements for civilian administration and dealings with the French . . . must initially be military. . . ." See Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 559-60.

apply humane treatment and to maintain a good standard of health and subsistence. We should also develop the economic resources, first, for the benefit of our war effort and, second, to make the area self-sufficient as possible in order to save shipping. It is our opinion that the civilian agencies or a team representing civilian agencies should not be called into enemy territory so long as operations continue therein or so long as that territory is used as a base for other operations or until Military Government, that is the suspension of local sovereignty, ends. It is not believed that Military Government and an organized team representing the civilian agencies can be mixed and have efficiency. To do so would duplicate personnel and complicate administration especially with respect to shipping and supply. During the period of Military Government we should like to be able to call on the technical services of any department or agency of either government to provide consultants or advisors on specific problems. These persons, however, should be considered as experts and not as representatives of their departments or agencies.

The date when the civilian agencies may be called on for service as such in Sicily will depend entirely on developments and cannot now be estimated. In all probability they cannot be effectively employed for several months.

#### REMINDER THAT PRESIDENT WANTS CIVILIAN AGENCY PARTICIPATION

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 3075]

Your attention is invited to the President's letter dated 3 June 1943, [ch. IV, sec. 3] "concerning a plan for co-ordinating the economic activities of the U.S. civilian agencies in liberated areas." It is clearly the intention of the President that the operation of civilian agencies in occupied areas, under military control, be initiated at the earliest moment consistent with the military situation. . . .

It is obviously the intention of the President that the economic civilian agencies of the Allied Governments should enter occupied areas prior to the termination of military government if the military situation permits, and it is clearly his opinion that such an arrangement can be made to function efficiently. . . .

The purpose of this message is to bring to your attention the views of the President for your guidance in recommending a program under which civilian agencies will be admitted to participation in economic aspects of rehabilitation of Sicily.

#### CIVILIAN AGENCIES MAY SHORTLY ENTER BUT MUST BE ON A COMBINED BASIS

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 30 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 23159]

Copy of the President's letter of 3 June to the Secretary of State was furnished by Royce of NAEB. A copy of his letter to the Lend-Lease Administrator of 29 July has now been received as well.

The following represents our ideas on this general subject.

Military government takes over occupied territory immediately and must face the problems of re-establishing law and order, maintaining security of communications, suppressing elements of the population that might interfere with current or future operations, restoring facilities such as water, electric power, transportation and communications, seeing that food is supplied to the civil population. . . . Of necessity during this phase of military occupation, military government must also deal with other economic and financial and to some extent political problems that inevitably arise. . . . However, as soon as the military situation permits, the responsibility for dealing with fundamental, long-term economic, financial, social and political problems in occupied territory should shift to the appropriate agencies of government acting under control of the theater commander pursuant to directives and policies established in the case of an Allied theater, by the two governments. [Here follow the major problems which, in the light of experience in Sicily, seem to require study in preparing for further operations in Italy. Among them, the corporative system and employer and employee relationship, the elimination of Fascist cultural and propaganda institutions, and the price, subsidy, and ration systems.] \* \* \*

It is believed that the present state of operations will shortly permit civilian agencies to go into Sicily. It is, therefore, proposed that Mister Sturges, who has been designated Area Director by the Secretary of State, should accompany Governor Lehman at the time of his visit to Sicily and that upon their return to Algiers a plan be submitted to the CCS. . . . Although communications thus far deal only with American civilian agencies, it is presumed that these activities would be on a combined basis. As the military government of Sicily is an integrated Allied organization, it is presumed that activities of civilian agencies will be likewise Allied in character.

**BRITISH FEAR WHAT STARRY-EYED AMERICAN CIVILIANS RUNNING LOOSE MAY DO**

[Memo, Col Hammond, Secy, CAD, on a Mtg With Finletter, Spec Asst to Secy of State, 23 Sep 43, ABC files, 334, CCAC, Min, 3d to 57th Mtg]

Mr. Finletter made the following points:

The British are concerned over this entire matter for two reasons—1. The British Government anticipates with considerable alarm the prospect of having thousands of starry-eyed American civilians running loose in Europe, injecting into the picture ideas that might be somewhat contrary to the political doctrines of Britain; and 2. The British Government contemplates with horror the establishment in Washington rather than in London of a combined OFEC. [See above, ch. IV, for establishment of OFEC.]

**CCAC CANNOT AUTHORIZE ENTRANCE OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES INTO SICILY**

[Min, 11th Mtg CCAC, 23 Sep 43, ABC files, 334, CCAC, Min, 3d to 57th Mtg]

3. . . . Mr. Harris [British representative on CCAC] stated that the British had no objection to civilians going into Sicily if they went in as individuals and were integrated into the AMG organization and not as an independent team or organization. He stated further that beyond this the British were not entirely clear as to the manner in which civilians and civilian organizations would fit into the military organization and that they did not wish the entry of civilians into Sicily to be considered as a precedent.

Mr. McCloy stated that the War Department is anxious that civilians be admitted into Sicily as soon as it was feasible in accordance with

the President's general directive regarding the use of civilian personnel in occupied and liberated areas.

After discussion, the committee agreed:

a. That a cable should be drafted in reply to General Eisenhower's MAT 15 informing him that he has authority from the CCS to permit the entry of individual civilians into Sicily to be integrated with and become a part of the AMG.

b. That it should be made clear in this cable that CCS are not at this stage authorizing the entry into Sicily of any separate civilian organizations either on a combined basis or otherwise, but are merely authorizing the entry of individual civilians who will become part of AMG.<sup>8</sup>

**GENERAL WICKERSHAM: THE CIVILIAN AGENCY PATTERN WOULD NOT HAVE WORKED**

[Ltr, Wickersham, currently visiting HQ, AMG, to Hildring, 22 Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

. . . It is the greatest relief to tactical commanders and to the civil affairs officers that this is an army job and that other agencies are not allowed to function except under army control. Any other pattern would simply not have worked in the combat phase, or during the period of military necessity. This is due, as I see it, to your work. \* \* \*

<sup>8</sup> According to General Spofford, Preston Sturges, representative of OFEC as indicated above, was himself convinced, after studying conditions on the spot, that it was premature for civilian agencies to consider entering. (Interv with Harold Epstein, 17 Apr 50.) It has already been seen in Chapter IV that the civilian agencies in Washington, less well informed than Sturges, were of a different mind. In any case, the British put the quietus on entrance of civilian agencies as such. CCAC could only authorize the entry of individual civilians.

## CHAPTER IX

# Italian Surrender and a Design for Maximum Returns With Minimum Responsibilities

Civil affairs planning for the mainland began under circumstances which could scarcely have suggested the broad scope and historic importance the Italy operation was destined to assume. The military campaign was to last from September 1943 until May 1945 and the occupation more than two years longer; the conduct of civil affairs was to require such major efforts as the development of Italy into a cobelligerent, the extension of enormous supply and economic aid, and the re-establishment of Italy, through reorientation in self-government and liberal institutions, as a democratic republic disposed toward partnership with the Western powers.

The last thing the U.S. Joint Chiefs expected or wanted in Italy was a major, prolonged entanglement. In their view, which had long been at odds with that of the British, the Italian operation was a diversion from the cross-Channel invasion which seemed the most direct and the quickest way of ending the war in Europe. The Americans accepted an infantry invasion of the mainland only because Allied resources were not ready for the great cross-Channel effort, and in the hope that this invasion might lead to the quick elimination of Italy from the war. But the operation was under no circumstances to use up resources required for Operation OVER-

LORD—that is, it was to be conducted within severe limitations on manpower. The CCS directive of 16 July envisaged definitely only an attack on the Naples area, and General Eisenhower proposed to push only as far as Rome. Because Allied strategists could not foresee the extent to which stubbornness rather than logic would lead Hitler to reinforce Italy, they did not expect the capture of the city to take long.

AFHQ civil affairs planners were not prophets but they were alert in deducing every contingency which might affect their major problem. Essentially, this problem arose from the fact that General Eisenhower had been given an absolute objective—elimination of Italy as a belligerent—along with very limited means. If Italy should surrender and the Germans should leave the Peninsula the Allies, as the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Operations Division (OPD) noted rather grimly, did not have enough trained personnel to administer all of Italy and at the same time supervise the return and demobilization of the Italian armed forces. If, on the other hand, the fighting should prove severe, prolonged, and devastating, they scarcely had even the military government personnel for administering Italy as far as Rome. If the documentation herein displays any one noteworthy thing, it is the ingenuity

of military leaders in their attempt to solve an almost insoluble problem, and in this case the solution seemed to lie in effecting the surrender of Italy under conditions which would still leave a co-operative central government. The only difficulty—here the planners faced a second limitation imposed upon them by the highest authority—was that the unconditional surrender formula, suddenly sprung upon Churchill by the President in their joint press conference at Casablanca, was inherently repugnant to such a solution. At the end of May General Eisenhower inquired of the War Department whether he could promise Italians an honorable peace in the event of a capitulation, only to be told that this was impossible inasmuch as the unconditional surrender principle had been approved by the President and concurred in by the Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, the Military Government Section (MGS) developed for Italy a plan not only for military government but also for military government in the combat zone capable of co-ordination with armistice control over a central government in the rear zone. Presenting these plans to the CCS on 19 July, General Eisenhower again sought some freedom of action—this time in more limited degree. In something of desperation he made one of the very few recommendations in his long military career which was destined to be explicitly and promptly turned down on the ground that it was beyond his purview. This recommendation was that he “should be free in the light of developments in the situation to judge whether important military advantages could be gained by dealing with military or civilian groups or with members of the Royal family, it being understood that no authority which maintains the character of the Fascist party . . . would be made use of.” The military advantages included not only “reducing to the minimum the number of troops neces-

sary for garrison purposes” but also the fact that “the number of trained personnel necessary for Military Government would likewise be reduced.” The size of its military government component has been a problem for every army, and the general rule, in cases of a discrepancy between the scope of its task and its resources, has been for the army not to reduce its task but to strain its personnel for the conduct of civil affairs. If General Eisenhower here broke all precedent in behalf of military government—and also, indeed, in behalf of releasing garrison troops for combat—it can only be inferred that he was quite seriously concerned about the inadequacy of his manpower resources if he should be unable to entrust administration to a central Italian government. The outcome, however, was not such as to encourage other commanders to risk their standing with higher authority in behalf of a matter of civil affairs. In reply General Eisenhower was informed that in the view of the President his authority could not extend to discussing with Italians the formation of a political government—he could only discuss unconditional surrender. Undoubtedly this curb reflected a conviction that entrusting a soldier with even a tentative exercise of judgment in political matters contravenes correct principle. But, above anything else, the Italy operation revealed the difficulty of drawing a precise boundary line between the political and the military element without the risk of injury to both.

In considering the huge it not impossible task of military government that the Allied Commander in Chief (CinC) was now threatened with, one is inclined to philosophize about the peculiar difficulties of the soldier's civil affairs mission. This mission requires, in addition to all possible knowledge and skill, a patient resignation and adaptation to the most difficult strategic and political limitations. But success

often requires something else as well: some call it luck—some call it the help of Providence.

This is exactly what came to hand—on 26 July Mussolini fell from power, and the King appointed in his place Marshal Pietro Badoglio. This soldier had once led the Duce's armies, but disillusioned with Fascism, he was now ready to abolish its principal organizations and dismiss its principal leaders.

General Eisenhower at once saw a "vast but fleeting opportunity to gain all Allied aims"—aims which previously could have seemed in some degree conflicting. Indeed he saw an opportunity for realizing also an additional advantage—the conversion of an enemy into a cobelligerent. This would open the way for maximum returns with minimum responsibilities. General Eisenhower sought to obtain immediate CCS approval for effective propaganda and the prompt despatch by CCS of conditions to be presented to any Italian representative seeking an armistice. He quickly secured approval of the proposed propaganda, and AFHQ beamed to Italy a message congratulating the Italian people on having rid themselves of Mussolini and suggesting, even if rather vaguely, the advantage of immediate peace. But the document General Eisenhower needed in order to be able to announce conditions conducive to Italian capitulation was long delayed. On 30 July the CCS cabled to him only the military conditions of armistice—the so-called "short terms."

The "long terms," which included politico-economic conditions, were not ready until 27 September. This was about two months after the date on which General Eisenhower cabled about them and one cannot but wonder why the long delay. The unconditional surrender formula may well have had all the invigorating effects it was designed to have upon the will to fight, but, by the same token, it probably

had a debilitating effect upon the will to prepare prompt political conditions of peace. The British were less doctrinaire than the Americans in their interpretation of the surrender formula and had presented their American associates with a long, detailed draft weeks before General Eisenhower's cable. The Americans could not accept the draft because it did not seem to make the unconditional surrender formula sufficiently explicit. On the day after Mussolini's downfall the President made the concession that the conditions "should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender." The effort to accelerate translating this into concrete terms was hampered by the difficulty of speedily taking into account the suggestions and amendments of a multitude of national and combined agencies. At any rate, when, on 18 August, an emissary of Badoglio met secretly in Lisbon with representatives of General Eisenhower to discuss peace, the only concrete conditions ready for him were the military terms, including a stipulation that other conditions mandatory for Italy would be transmitted later. By way of encouragement, he could only be told that, while military government in some degree would have to be imposed on Italy, he needed only to consider Sicily to realize that such government would be humane.

The Italians were compelled to ponder whether this was a sufficient encouragement at a time when the Germans were daily increasing their reinforcements in Italy and accelerating countermeasures should Italy try to make peace. Moreover, they were uncertain as to Allied military capabilities, which in fact rested upon a much smaller number of divisions than the Germans had in Italy. The Italians could well have felt themselves between the devil and the deep blue sea, but the lure of peace, with the hope even if not the assurance of honorable conditions, prevailed over the fear of German retaliation.

On 3 September the capitulation was secretly signed, and it was arranged that the Allied Commander in Chief and Badoglio should announce it simultaneously on 8 September, eve of the Fifth Army invasion. Yet so much was the situation a matter of touch-and-go that at the last minute Badoglio sent word that he felt both parties had been too hasty and that announcement must be further delayed. General Eisenhower replied that he would nonetheless announce the capitulation as scheduled. An hour and a half after General Eisenhower's announcement the Marshal finally decided, "in fear and trembling," that he had best follow suit.

On 3 September the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina to the toe of the Italian boot and took Reggio Calabria. Six days later the Fifth Army sailed into the Bay of Salerno and soon established a long narrow beachhead. It was not until 17 September that the two armies formed a junction because, while the Eighth Army advanced rapidly, the Fifth Army was hit by a fierce German counterattack. For obvious reasons the civil affairs experience of the two armies differed. Both applied the lessons learned in Sicily, as in improving arrangements for loading and moving forward AMG personnel. But whereas the British advance was so rapid that there were not enough men for rear as well as combat areas, the Fifth Army had a large contingent that could do nothing for a time except try to live down the sobriquet of "Aged Military Gentlemen on tour," as the older of them had sometimes been called in Sicily. When the breakout took place, CAO's at first were occupied in obtaining Italian labor and in keeping roads clear of refugees. As the advance continued, their duties became broader until on 2 October, when Naples was taken, they faced for the first time the challenging task of governing and rehabilitating a great metropolis.

But the story of AMG achievements in Naples is less important at this point than an account of events in the little town of Brindisi, where Badoglio and the King had betaken themselves to govern in safety. Here too Allied officials came at the earliest opportunity, with the hope of establishing relations with them that would be as fruitful as the planners had presumed. On actual encounter there was some dismay. What could be called the Italian government consisted only of the Marshal, the King, and two service ministers. There were few clerks, no archives, not even a single typewriter. Certainly there could no longer be any thought of setting up at once a 400-man control commission; it would be sufficient to have at Brindisi a small Allied Military Mission. It was also decided that, rather than detract from the Government's prestige by declaring military government in "King's Italy" (as the four provinces under Badoglio were called), officers from this mission would render such assistance as was needed in supply and other matters, and at the same time exercise general supervision over an administrative machinery which Badoglio himself had already purged of notorious Fascists.

Very shortly, General Eisenhower decided to place the whole question of the status to be given the Badoglio government—"the chief question which faces us"—before the CCS. There was pathos at Brindisi, but there was also promise. This was the only true legal government of Italy (despite the one being set up for Mussolini to the north), and the King would still have a strong hold on the Italian people and armed forces. Badoglio, as reported, not only "said all the right things" but seemed sincere. Emphasizing these considerations, General Eisenhower raised the question of *de facto* recognition of Italy as a cobelligerent subject to certain conditions which would give Badoglio's government a broader and more liberal character. Then,

as though fearing he had perhaps failed to give enough emphasis to the most important consideration, General Eisenhower sent a second message pointing to the very heavy personnel commitment which would be entailed if Italy were to be ruled solely by military government. The Allied decision was to continue support of the Badoglio government subject to Badoglio's signature of the full armistice and to Italy's declaration of war against Germany. Despite Italian legal commitment not even the first of these conditions was gained easily since Badoglio declared that the severity of the terms was incompatible with the help which he said Italians were already giving the Allies. It was, in fact, decided to keep secret the armistice terms signed on 29 September, lest the government be imperiled. As for a declaration of war, Badoglio wished to wait until Rome was taken—avowedly from fear of German reprisals, but probably also from a desire to see Allied military capabilities demonstrated further. It was thus evident that armistice control over an astutely evasive government can often be more nominal than real. Repeated pressure had to be applied until, on 13 October, the King signed a declaration of war against Germany.

To complete the Allied design for Italy the Italian government still had to be developed sufficiently to enable it to administer additional territory. To this end the Allied Control Commission (ACC) was activated, and, because for the present the need at Brindisi was only for counterparts to the few existent ministries, the Allied personnel burden in this one respect was less than had been expected. Originally the belief was that territorial transfer could take place as soon as Badoglio—in pursuance of a decision taken after the more distinguished political talent had refused to serve under the King—had formed a caretaker government of technical experts. But

ACC soon realized, as did Badoglio himself, that this was impossible. By the end of November he believed he would be ready in a few weeks, but AFHQ itself was not ready because of legal issues being discussed with the CCS, and the year came to a close without the transfer having been effected.

Except for acquisition of nearly the entire Italian fleet, the Allies at this early stage had registered no impressive gains. But from the outset they had been realistic enough to put less emphasis upon actual gains than upon the minimizing of burdens. By this time, too, Allied officials had developed even more of the patience which is a prerequisite in the government of any foreign country during war. It was in fact far too early to evaluate the advantages accruing from armistice control since it had been established in only four provinces. Instead of being able to reduce military government personnel, AMG had had to increase it, but no great numbers of garrison troops had been required because co-partnership had rendered the Italians friendly and co-operative. As for the future, two considerations already held out hopes of increased returns from the design that had been adopted for Italy. First, it was already beginning to be evident that the advance might have to continue beyond Rome to be militarily successful, and, with preparations for OVERLORD now being accelerated, armistice control with its prospective saving of personnel was more necessary than ever. Second, it had become apparent that while from a purely administrative standpoint military government was far more efficient than armistice control, in the very city of Naples where military government had performed so efficiently Italians were beginning to view it as repressive of their now awakening desire again to be self-governing and politically self-respecting. Armistice control was an instrument better adapted to the

achievement of that part of General Eisenhower's directive which imposed the goal of eventual restoration of Italy as a free nation. In the light of manpower shortage armistice control was a military necessity

in any case, but in the light of their adapting it to this political goal the Allies could believe they were making a virtue of necessity.

## I. THE THEATER HOPES FOR ARMISTICE CONTROL BUT PLANS FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

### THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER PRINCIPLE MUST GOVERN PLANNING

[Memo, Lt Col Ray E. Laux, CAD, for Chief, CAD, 31 May 43, CAD files, 334, Gen Council (3-8-43)]

In reply to a request from General Eisenhower for the War Department viewpoint as to whether Italy should be promised an honorable peace in the event of a capitulation, he was informed that no such promise will be made, and that the terms would be unconditional surrender. This directive was approved by the President and concurred in by Mr. Churchill.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*

### BUT THE PLAN FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS MADE CAPABLE OF MODIFICATION

[Memo of MGS, AFHQ, on Preparations for Post-Husky Ops, 19 Jul 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec 2]

15. A scheme for military government, like all plans, should be capable of modification to meet the situation as it presents itself. This points to the need for recruiting personnel of high capacity and elastic mind. A change in circumstances might require a sudden shift in the type of control imposed upon the hostile nation.

In particular, the contingency should be borne in mind that the resistance of the Italian people may snap and some revolutionary change take place. We may be approached by some governmental authority suing for peace and giving promise of its ability to direct the political and economic life of Italy along acceptable lines. In such case it might be advantageous to come to terms with the new government and instead of imposing an AMGOT upon Italy to establish a Commission of Control to supervise the administration. From the personnel thus trained for

AMGOT suitable officers would be available in connection with such a commission. \* \* \*

### THE HUGE TASK DEMANDS A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGHLY QUALIFIED MG PERSONNEL

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 19 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 14313]

\* \* \* Gross [personnel] total is divided into following subdivisions as it is contemplated that Military Government will be organized for regions in order that the territory may be coped with as advance is made up the boot. There would be extension of AMGOT Sicily except number 6 and . . . number 7 which would require a new over-all organization. Region 1-Sicily 210. Region 2-Calabria, Lucania, Puglia 195. Region 3-Campania 138. Region 4-Abruzzi, Lazio 200. Region 5-Umbria, Marches 135. Region 6-Sardinia 100. Region 7-Central Government 417. Total 1395. Figure 417, Region 7 should ultimately be reduced by 42 officers.<sup>2</sup> \* \* \*

It is apparent to all concerned here that higher caliber staff than hitherto available will be required at head of both technical and administrative fields if a successful Military Government of so large an area is to be organized. It is suggested that Government Departments must be prepared to supply senior personnel and key men should be enlisted from industrial and commercial posts. It is felt that the experience such personnel would gain would be of high value either in the event of their transfer from AMGOT to other theaters, or of the establishment of commission of control over an Italian authority. \* \* \*

<sup>2</sup>The names given after each numbered region are Italian compartments. The personnel estimates were accepted by CCS on 31 August, but on 30 September MGS (see below, Section 7) found it necessary to ask for more enlisted troops in view of conditions found in Italy. Also, the designation of the regions was revised a number of times in the course of operations.

<sup>1</sup>For treatment of armistice and surrender terms see Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, a volume in preparation for the series United States Army in World War II.

EISENHOWER PROPOSES NOT ONLY MILITARY GOVERNMENT BUT ALSO FREEDOM TO NEGOTIATE ARMISTICE CONTROL

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 19 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 13772]

1. The United States and British Governments prescribed two objectives for operation Husky which would also apply to post-Husky. (A) The military objective of eliminating Italy from the war, i.e., destroying and rendering ineffective the Italian land, sea and air forces wherever they may be; (B) The political objective of delivering the Italian people from the Fascist regime which led them into the war and of restoring Italy as a free nation.

2. My 5973 NAF 250 establishes a post-Husky plan towards carrying out the military objective by occupying the Italian Peninsula up to and including Rome. In the course of this operation we shall be faced by two main possibilities. Either we shall have to fight all the way to Rome or at some point there may be an Italian surrender or collapse. No one can tell which of these will take place, but we consider that the first possibility must be plainly envisaged.

3. Our reason for this is that in our appreciation the Fascist Party backed by the Germans will do its utmost to keep Italy in the war. So far as we know the control of the party, supported by the presence of German forces and the Gestapo, has not yet been materially weakened. Therefore, if we achieve our plan for occupation of all Italy from Rome south, we should be prepared to find that there are still substantial Italian forces supported by Germans to the north, and that the Government has moved to a northern city. In these circumstances, the Italian administrative machinery from Rome south will have largely disintegrated.

I, therefore, recommend that as soon as possible plans should be contemplated here for the preparation of an Allied Military Government for occupied territory up to Rome inclusive and for Sardinia, and that these plans be developed so as to: (A) Be capable of expansion from Sicily northward on a regional basis as our advance proceeds towards Rome; (B) Allow for supervision over what may remain of the Central Italian administrative machine at Rome; (C) Create a reserve of personnel against the need of advancing beyond Rome.

4. While these provisions should be made for the foregoing contingency, we should nevertheless be prepared for the other possibility, i.e., that at some point the Italian will to resist stops. In such an event, there are two possibilities:

(A) There will be no Italian Military or civilian group willing or able to assume the responsibility for administration under Allied control. Should this occur, we shall have to follow the same plan of establishing AMGOT as would have been the case if an Italian Government had continued resistance north of Rome.

(B) A central administrative authority or government will emerge or can be established which can, if it be properly handled, bring the important military advantage of reducing to the minimum the number of troops necessary for garrison purposes, thereby releasing the maximum number of fighting units for further combat purposes. The number of trained personnel necessary for Military Government could likewise be reduced.

I, therefore, recommend that I should be free in the light of developments in the situation to judge whether important military advantages could be gained by dealing with military or civilian groups or with members of the Royal family, it being understood that no authority which maintains the character of the Fascist Party or any succession thereto, or which includes outstanding Fascist leaders would be made use of. To meet this contingency, plans for the staffing of a commission of control over an Italian Government must also be worked out here so as to be available in case of need.

5. While in our view military considerations should remain predominant, nevertheless it may prove possible to advance the attainment of the second basic objective of restoring Italy as a free nation should the course outlined in 4 B become practicable. In addition, so long as a military government continues our responsibility for the well being of the Italian population under our control is immediate and direct. From the political point of view I assume that whereas only Great Britain and the United States are involved as long as we employ military government, should it be decided that relations could be established with some form of Italian central authority, the attitude and desires of other United Nations, notably the Soviet Union, may have to be considered. \* \* \*

THE THEATER COMMANDER MAY NOT DISCUSS WITH ITALIANS THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11102]

The question of armistice terms and what arrangements are to be made in case the Italians request a general armistice is being discussed between Washington and London on the highest

level. It is the view of the British Government that your authority, without reference to both governments, should be limited to concluding local surrenders with any individual Italian commander. That request for a general, as opposed to a purely local termination of hostilities, even if the request came from the enemy commander in chief and did not involve any Italian Administration, concerns not only military but political and economic decisions as well, and should be referred to both governments, fighting meantime continuing even if only nominally. The President has expressed his view that you should not fix on general terms of surrender or armistice without the approval of both governments. The President

seems to approve of your dealing with military or civilian groups in Italy even to the extent of discussions concerning unconditional surrender of Italy, but not in regard to establishing a government in occupied territory. He intends that the selection of Italians except minor officials for the civil government in Italy after its capitulation, must be made by the President and the Prime Minister after receipt of recommendations from you.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

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<sup>3</sup> General Eisenhower replied on 29 July that he had been quite aware that his authority was limited to military matters and that he had been concerned only with obtaining authorization to act within such limits.

## 2. THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI AND THE SHIFT OF MILITARY THINKING TO ARMISTICE CONTROL

### MUSSOLINI'S FALL AFFECTS THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING LESS THAN THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S

[Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 26 Jul 43, G-3 files, ABC, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43) Sec 1-A (CCS 258/1)]

My thought is that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender followed by good treatment of the Italian people. . . .

[Memo, Gen Thomas T. Handy, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 27 Jul 43, G-3 files, ABC, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43) Sec 1-A (CCS 258/1)]

4. It is considered militarily most desirable that the Italian State and a structure of government continue to exist under the supreme authority of the Allied Commander. The United Nations do not have available in the Mediterranean, nor can they make available in the near future, the large military government organization for completely administering all Italy, Italian economy, and the return and demobilization of Italian forces. \* \* \*

### EISENHOWER IMMEDIATELY CONSIDERS USE OF NEW ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Alexander, GOC, 15th AG, 26 Jul 43, ACC files, 10000/100/700]

\* \* \* I personally have the conviction that if the central government actually surrenders itself it will, in its efforts to retain a unified country, attempt to surrender the whole national territory. In any event, once the central government has surrendered itself, I see many ad-

vantages to our use of existing civil machinery although, naturally, it will be necessary to replace at once all key individuals in whose co-operation we may not have complete confidence. \* \* \*

### A MESSAGE TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE TO AVERT ITALY'S BEING LEFT WITHOUT A RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 26 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 18839]

We regard it as of the utmost importance that full opportunity should be taken immediately of the dismissal of [Benito] Mussolini. If the King of Italy remains for more than a very short time as head of a country still at war with the Allies full odium in our two countries now concentrated on Duce will be transferred to the King. Situation might therefore arise where it will be impossible to arrange an honorable capitulation with the King and we may be left without any other responsible authority. It is therefore suggested that a message on the following lines should be immediately and constantly broadcast to the Italian people by this Headquarters. . . .<sup>4</sup>

[Msg, AFHQ to the Italian People, as Approved by CCS, 28 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 11150]

We commend the Italian people and the House of Savoy on ridding themselves of Mussolini, the man who involved them in war as the tool of Hitler and brought them to the verge of disaster. The greatest obstacle which divided the

<sup>4</sup>The message, approved by CCS substantially as submitted, is cited below under date of 28 July.

Italian people from the United Nations has been removed by the Italians themselves. The only remaining obstacle on the road to peace is the German aggressor, who is still on Italian soil. You want peace. You can have peace immediately, and peace under the honourable conditions which our governments have already offered you. We are coming to you as liberators. Your part is to cease immediately any assistance to the German military forces in your country. If you do this we will rid you of the Germans and deliver you from the horrors of war. As you have already seen in Sicily our occupation will be mild and beneficent. Your men will return to their normal life, and to their productive vocations and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them. The ancient liberties and traditions of your country will be restored.

#### EISENHOWER ASKS FOR A DIRECTIVE IN CASE ITALY SEEKS AN ARMISTICE

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 27 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 19545]

In the event that the new Italian Government should in the immediate future request a Military Armistice, we must be prepared to announce at once the conditions under which such a general armistice would be granted by the Commander in Chief. It is important that the broad outline of the prescribed measures be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the understanding that further details would be amplified and carried out by the Allied Armistice Commission which would be set up in Italy to operate under my general supervision. . . .<sup>5</sup>

#### PLANNERS OUTLINE THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMISTICE CONTROL

[Outline Plan for Control of Italy (MGS Paper No. 7), 21 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/141/466]

2. An Armistice control authority operates in a different situation from a military government. The latter takes the place of a government which has been expelled, while the former operates upon a government which, after submission, has

<sup>5</sup> Among the conditions proposed by Eisenhower was "immediate acknowledgement of the overriding authority of the Allied Commander in Chief to establish military government." This accorded with the previous recognition at AFHQ that both this type of control and armistice control would be necessary.

been kept in operation. The function of the Armistice control authority will be to maintain conditions favorable to the use of Italy as a base of operations, to enforce the conditions of the armistice, and to carry out such other policies as may be prescribed by higher authority. Whereas the powers belonging to a military government flow from general principles of international law, the activities of an Armistice control authority are restricted by the terms of the armistice. If, however, the Allied Nations reserve for themselves all the powers of an occupying power, they will have even under the armistice the same plenary authority they would have had if they had simply driven out the Italian Government. Still, in post-armistice conditions even more than during military government, it will be desirable to control the administration and economy of Italy by indirect methods, through the Italian Government, so long as adequate results are produced. Until further directives are given as to the organization and methods of the post-armistice control, the Armistice control authority will do all that may be necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations, but will refrain from any avoidable anticipation of questions of major policy. \* \* \*

#### EISENHOWER PRESENTS A PLAN FOR ARMISTICE CONTROL AS WELL AS MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 23780]<sup>6</sup>

1. Developments since opening of operation HUSKY have indicated need for plans for (A) Military Government and (B) Armistice control, to be available for use either concurrently or alternatively in accordance with tactical and political situation.

2. My NAF 295 [CM-IN 13772, 19 Jul 43, sec. 1 above] gave outline plan for Military Government up to and including Rome in conformity with approved operational plans at that stage which did not take into account probability of an armistice.

3. . . . Situation is now different.

4. My staff is preparing to deal with an early armistice.

5. We have prepared a plan, having in mind the following factors:

A. Certainty that Italy will remain an active theater of operations and that continued German opposition may be expected as we press forward;  
B. Desirability of producing a situation wherein

<sup>6</sup> This message is a summary of the lengthy and detailed plan set forth by MGS on 21 August (preceding document). The scheme finally adopted was, in a number of respects, different (see below, Chapter X).

a national government responsive to Italian public opinion would be in conspicuous exercise of its authority;

C. The need, however, to take whatever action might be necessary to enforce the armistice and to maintain conditions and services essential to our military needs;

D. The supply responsibilities inevitably incident to the occupation;

E. The limiting factor of personnel, since it appears that any armistice control authority must rely at least at the outset chiefly on personnel requested in my NAF 296.

Part 2.

6. In the absence of any special directive I have given authority for planning to proceed on the following basis:

7. Outline Plan post-armistice situation would necessitate (A) Allied military government organization to follow closely behind combat troops and organize and administer territory as occupied and (B) an Armistice Control Authority (ACA) answerable to Commander in Chief to supervise the administration by the Italian Government of territory not subject to military government. This area would expand as Army advanced.

8. Armistice control authority would have military, naval, and air disarmament divisions to be staffed by service officers representing those forces in this Theater. It would also have sections corresponding generally to the Italian Government departments. These sections would supervise activities of the Italian Government (A) to oversee the execution of the terms of the Armistice, (B) to insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conformed to the requirements of an allied base of operations, especially transportation and communications, and (C) to carry out any directives the Allied Government might give. The plan provides for a thinly spread control over local administration in the field. Experience in Sicily shows that with Fascist Party ousted public administration and economy are temporarily paralyzed: but situation on the mainland may not be the same. During initial period when dislocations are to be expected, regional authorities with expert staffs would be established to apply control when necessary. When conditions approached normal they would be eliminated. Thereafter Armistice control authority would conform to Italian system of direct control of provinces from centre of government.

### 3. ITALIAN SURRENDER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO TYPES OF ALLIED CONTROL

#### THE THEATER HAS STILL NOT BEEN GIVEN THE POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

[Min, 4th Mtg CCAC, 5 Aug 43, ABC files, 334, CCAC (8-9-43)]

5. . . . Mr. McCloy reviewed the fact that the President and the Prime Minister had settled the question of military terms of surrender for Italy by furnishing General Eisenhower with a military document with which he is authorized to accept an Italian surrender.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. McCloy pointed out that the document did not contain a "saving" clause which would authorize him to act if desirable in effecting *political conditions* as well as military. He stated further that additional conditions should be drawn up, agreed to and made available to him as soon as possible. \* \* \*

#### A COMPLETED PLAN OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR THE IMMINENT INVASION

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 19 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14327]

Our plans with respect to Military Government in connection with planned future operations . . . are as follows: We are organizing from personnel now in Sicily a unit to go with the BAYTOWN operation [British] and to take control of Region 2 as it is captured. A second team is being organized from personnel in the theater and those arriving from Washington and London to deal with region 3 in connection with operation AVALANCHE [American]. As these operations will be under the command of 15 Army Group, the allied military government for regions 2 and 3 respectively will be under the control of the present AMGOT organization. As soon as conditions will permit Sicily should be organized into region 1 and AMGOT Headquarters will move

<sup>7</sup> This, a short document, was sent to General Eisenhower 30 July.

to the mainland, probably in the vicinity of Naples.<sup>8</sup>

#### BADOGGIO'S EMISSARY CAN BE TOLD ONLY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLANS

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 21 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 16144]

\* \* \* Their Emissary<sup>9</sup> referring to point 10 asked for explanations as to the question of retention of Sovereignty by the Italian Government.

He was informed that our representatives' instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice and that he was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future Government of Italy. A military government under the Allied Commander in Chief would unquestionably be necessary over parts of Italian territory.

He invited the attention of their Emissary to the fact that military government in Sicily had been established and was being exercised in a fair and humane manner.

#### A DIRECTIVE TO APPLY THE SICILY PATTERN FOR THE TIME BEING

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 26 Aug 43, OPD files, 311.23, Security, sec. 1]

The jurisdiction of provisions contained in existing general directive for HUSKY is hereby extended for the time being to include that part of the Italian mainland which may be captured in the near future. . . .

Modification of existing general directive covering political, economic and financial matters will be furnished in near future.

You are authorized to designate the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, as Military Governor of such territory.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup>It should be noted that AMGOT-Sicily personnel were to be used for AMG and not for the proposed control commission. Many in the theater favored the latter course, but it had various disadvantages chief of which was sacrifice of the experience which AMGOT personnel had already obtained in military government.

<sup>9</sup>General [Guiseppe] Castellano, who met secretly the AFHQ Chief of Staff and other Allied authorities at Lisbon on 18 August. See Garland and Smyth, Sicily, and the Surrender of Italy, Chapter IV.

<sup>10</sup>Again there was dissatisfaction in one quarter of the War Department over giving the military governorship to a British general. Colonel Connor of OPD queried whether it was "desirable to create the public impression of British control of military government . . . in view of the fact that practically all civilian supplies sent into Italy will come from the United States." CAD, however, pointed out that the designation was consistent with the present chain of command and that any other would create complications. Memo, Col Hammond, CAD, for Handy, DCoS, OPD, 21 Aug 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security, sec. 1.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will transmit to you at an early date their directive wherein your relations with the Italian National Government will be established.

#### DECISION TO DEFER THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TERMS

[Msg, WD to Eisenhower, 29 Aug 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 12280]

Your NAF 342<sup>11</sup> has been seen by the President. He authorized you to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then transmit the comprehensive document to the Italian representatives.<sup>12</sup> The Prime Minister has been informed of this authorization.

#### ITALIANS AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE ARMISTICE AND BROAD TERMS OF FUTURE ALLIED CONTROL

[Armistice Agreement, Known as Short Terms, Between General Eisenhower, CinC, Allied Forces, and Marshal [Pietro] Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, 3 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1]<sup>13</sup>

Art. 10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations. \* \* \*

Art. 12. Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at later date. \* \* \*

#### INVASION OF MAINLAND AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(118) . . . the AMGOT organization [See CM-IN 14327, above] assigned to 8th Army for oper-

<sup>11</sup>Message from AFHQ of 28 August asking permission, in view of the urgent need of Italian military assistance, to obtain Italian signature of the shorter military terms first and to present the further conditions only after this matter had been settled. OPD Msg files, CM-IN 21909.

<sup>12</sup>A document with political, economic, and financial as well as military conditions.

<sup>13</sup>On this date an armistice (short terms) was granted the Italian Government by the British and American Governments. On the same date, 3 September, the Eighth Army invaded the mainland. It was over a month later before Eisenhower could present to Badoglio the long terms containing political and economic conditions. (See below, Section 5.) ACC files, 10000/136/91.

ation BAYTOWN was mounted at Taormina under Group Captain Benson, RAF, and Lt. Col. Harvey Gerry, AUS. Basic plans were developed by these officers in conjunction with AMGOT Headquarters, and a nominal table of organization was arrived at, personnel to fill which were supplied mainly from AMGOT Sicily. Motor transport was drawn mainly from 8th Army.

(119) The arrangements with 8th Army for loading and moving forward AMGOT personnel and vehicles were most satisfactory. Twelve officers were on the mainland on D Day, 25 officers with transport reached there on D+1 and eight additional officers with equipment on D+2. Region II Headquarters was established at Reggio immediately [3 September 1943, British Eighth Army invaded east coast of Calabria].

(123) The AMGOT personnel assigned to 8th Army continued with the advance of 8th Army through Calabria and Lucania. On 19 September headquarters were moved forward to Corigliano. The rapid advance made communications more than usually difficult. However, C.A.O.'s were established in each provincial capital and in large cities as they were occupied and an administration patterned after first phase administration in Sicily was established.

(124) During this period of the advance a considerable problem was presented by the demobilized and deserting soldiers of the Italian army who were clogging the roads and congesting the towns in large numbers heading for Calabria and Sicily. Some of them were armed and some had thrown away their arms. There were certain units still under their own officers fully armed. The feeding of these units was made the responsibility of 8th Army after AMGOT had indicated its inability to handle the problem. Notwithstanding the presence of the Italian forces in the area the usual proclamations were posted and steps taken to enforce the same.

(126) The advance through Calabria and into Lucania was so rapid that communication continued to be the most difficult problem.

(127) The political situation throughout Calabria and Lucania differed from that in Sicily in that the higher officials with active Fascist records had been removed by Badoglio. His reform, however, had not extended down to the Podesta and minor officials, many of whom AMGOT had to remove. The AMGOT officers continued to follow the policy of removing all former active Fascists in collaboration with F.S.P., 8th Army.

(128) With certain exceptions, such as Cosenza, war damage was not great throughout Calabria and Lucania and the services, such as water and sanitation, were in satisfactory condition through the territory. In the provinces of Catanzaro and Cosenza there was a fair amount of grain and the food situation was therefore not serious at the time of occupation. Investigation of stocks amassed from this year's harvest was undertaken to determine the long range requirements.

(129) While the advance up the Calabrian peninsula was in progress AMGOT officers were attached to the units which occupied Taranto on 11 and 12 September. . . .<sup>14</sup>

(130) . . . personnel for Region III [Campania—landing of U.S. Fifth Army] was selected and assembled in North Africa shortly prior to embarkation. The personnel was made up in part of experienced officers drawn from Sicily. The majority, however, consisted of officers arrived from the U.S. and U.K., some of whom had had a short period of training at the training center of Tizi Ouzou, and some of whom had just arrived in the theater. Many of the officers were graduates of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville. The full establishment of equipment was drawn in North Africa and was able to move at the time of embarkation.

(131) Both the 5th Army and the U.S. Navy were co-operative in loading and moving forward AMGOT personnel. The first wave [5th Army] was landed on the beaches of Paestum and Salerno in part on D Day (September 9) and the balance in the following few days. Practically the entire staff of Region III was landed by D+12, on the assumption that the army advance might be rapid and the officers needed. As the tactical situation developed, however, the personnel was not required but they were most gainfully employed, prior to the fall of Naples, and were disposed about the cities and towns of the occupied area, thus receiving valuable experience. The delay also served to give further time for the perfecting of organization and laying of plans for the occupation of Naples. \* \* \*

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<sup>14</sup> Here Rennell discusses the meeting with the King and Badoglio and the decision not to establish MG in the area where they were exercising jurisdiction. This is covered in a document appearing on p. 229, below.

**THE PATTERN OF ALLIED-ITALIAN RELATIONS IS IMMEDIATELY ADAPTED TO CO-OPERATION WITH BADOGLIO**

[Directive, Cofs, AFHQ, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM [Allied Military Mission], 12 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1]<sup>15</sup>

1. The Italian Government, to whom an Armistice had been granted, is now established in the Brindisi area.

The Commander in Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.

You are appointed Head of the Military Mission and will assume your duties forthwith.

2. *Object*

The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander in Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such co-ordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.

In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in Italy and the Italian possessions.

4. *Political Questions*

The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Right Hon. Macmillan) and the U.S. Minister (Mr. Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will, however, report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander in Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you. \* \* \*

[Min, Post-Husky Plng Comm. Mtg No. 7, 15 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/141/467]

1. b. Colonel Maxwell [Deputy Chief, MGS] stressed that following on the recent capitulation of Italy by the Badoglio government, events had occurred which had resulted in only a comparatively small and essentially military Italian mission being available to meet Allied representatives and that although there had already been

<sup>15</sup> General Mason-MacFarlane, a British officer, had been Governor of Gibraltar. He was destined to become the first Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, of which this mission was, in a sense, the precursor.

substantial gains from the capitulation in the shape of the surrender of parts of the Italian fleet, it was not considered necessary at the moment for more than a Military Staff Mission to meet Italian representatives. This being so, the time had not yet come to send Advanced Hq Allied Armistice Control into the field and that in its place the Military Staff Mission under Lieutenant General Mason MacFarlane had been charged with the duty of co-ordinating with the Italian representatives on all staff matters and would in addition be used as an *ad hoc* body to deal with all other points which might arise. In this connection it was emphasized that the intention of having Armistice Control Commission remained, but that the question of sending forward an advanced part of it had been deferred and would be brought forward again as opportunity offered. \* \* \*

**MILITARY GOVERNMENT NOT PROCLAIMED IN "KING'S ITALY"**

[Ltr, Gen Julius C. Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* General Rennell and I made a visit to Brindisi last week and with General [Mason-] MacFarlane worked out an *ad interim* arrangement with Marshal Badoglio under the terms of which we agreed not to proclaim Military Government in the four southern provinces of Apulia. In the circumstances it seemed inadvisable to give public notice of our control of sovereignty right under the nose of the little King and the old Marshal. Instead of establishing Military Government we agreed to allow the Marshal to govern these four provinces with AMG officers established in prefectures and other appropriate places as liaison officers but with the distinct understanding that they were to exercise substantial influence on local administration. Badoglio was perfectly agreeable to this as he and all concerned were abundantly aware that any reluctance on the part of the Italians to do things we require in getting on with the campaign might quickly result in the establishment of complete military control. You will note that we did not include the province of Foggia for obvious reasons [Foggia provided bases for the air forces].

As there was not sufficient Italian lire in an area to meet requirements and as our supply of AM lire was not enough to make up the difference it was necessary to declare BMA sterling notes and yellow seal dollars as legal tender.

This was accomplished by a proclamation made by Badoglio in the King's name and establishing at the same time a rate of 100 lire to the dollar and 400 to the pound as obtains in Sicily. There was a good bit of argument on this point, it being contended that a more "favorable" rate should be applied for political and psychological reasons in "unoccupied territories. \* \* \* "

#### ARMISTICE CONTROL TO BE SET UP IN SARDINIA

[Directive, MGS, AFHQ, to Regnl Allied Cmsr for Sardinia, 28 Sep 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

\* \* \* At the outset your control over Sardinia will be of a provisional character, pending the coming into operation of the Allied Commission. On the one hand you will not be conducting an Allied Military Government such as has been set up in Sicily, and on the other hand you will not be a mere military mission to offer to Sardinian authorities suggestions and advice which they will be free to disregard. You will be the agent of the Allied Commander in Chief, who has "the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war." [see above, Art. 10 of Armistice]. Subject to directions which from time to time you will receive from Allied Force Headquarters, you will speak as his representative to the representative in Sardinia of the Italian Government, which is bound "to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require." [Art. 10, above.] Accordingly you will instruct and guide the Italian authorities in Sardinia as may seem proper for the attainment of the purposes of the Allied Governments. You are not yourself to assume the government of Sardinia, but act upon and through the Italian administra-

tion there. You will not issue proclamations such as were posted in Sicily, nor countersign the decrees of the Italian authorities. It is their function to administer the territory, and yours to direct them as the interests of the Allied Nations may require. You will not allow yourself to be drawn into any discussion as to whether the Italian High Commissioner or other authorities are legally competent to do what is required of them. That is an internal question. The Italian Government must do as it is instructed, and any refusal or deliberate failure will be promptly reported to this Headquarters, which will take such steps as seem appropriate. \* \* \*

#### CORSICA COMES UNDER FRENCH

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 8 Oct 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 2356]

\* \* \* The Corsican operation was carried out almost exclusively by the French and the French National Committee early established *état de siège* in the island and appointed the Prefect [Charles] Luizet who was sent from Algiers.

Arrangements are being made with the French that our relations with respect to Corsica be the same as those obtaining in Algeria and that the two Ministers deal with political and economic questions in the same manner as for Algeria.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup>In a message of 23 July to the CCS General Eisenhower had proposed that "in the event of the entire operation being conducted by French forces . . . the civil administration of the island should be confided to the French National Committee of Liberation on condition that we enjoy similar rights and privileges to those prevailing in North Africa." He added, however, that it would be made clear that this must in no way be construed as establishing a precedent for metropolitan France. In June 1944 French troops also occupied Elba. CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16998.

## 4. EISENHOWER RECOMMENDS STRENGTHENING THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO COBELLIGERENCY

#### A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT EVEN TYPEWRITERS

[Capt Ellery W. Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, Address at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

3. . . . When we arrived at Brindisi in September of last year there was virtually no Italian Government and no administrative machine. There was the Italian Prime Minister, Marshal Badoglio,

with two service ministers but without any other colleagues or any of the officials, archives, or even typewriters that are the apparatus by which administrations can be carried on. It is no secret that all our original communications from the Italian Government of Brindisi came in the form of letters written by the hand of the Prime Minister himself. \* \* \*

YET IT SEEMS A MILITARY NECESSITY TO DEVELOP  
BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Sep 43, CAD Msg files,  
CM-IN 13972]

The military mission which I dispatched to Brindisi 13 September has been in daily contact with the Badoglio administration. The British and American ministers who accompanied [Mason-]MacFarlane to Brindisi have now returned and the following analysis of the situation made during the course of our preliminary investigation on the spot may be of assistance to both governments in determining our future Italian policy. It seems to me that certain decisions are urgently necessary.

Marshal Badoglio asserts that Italy is now in a de facto state of war with Germany. The Brindisi administration, however, is free to exercise its authority, with allied consent, over only five provinces of Italy with a population of about two millions and including about three army divisions, and insignificant air force and a certain amount of naval personnel. . . . The bulk of the country is now under German control. All of Badoglio's civilian ministries remained in Rome. The Brindisi party consists of the King, Crown Prince Umberto, Badoglio, and a group of generals and admirals including Joint Chief of Staff Ambrosio and the Army Chief of Staff [Mario] Roatta. Marshal Badoglio and his associates claim that the civilian ministers left in Rome are not disloyal but are merely separated from the head of the government by *force majeure*. It should be noted that the King and Badoglio left Rome by automobile in great haste at 5:00 a.m. 9 September, proceeding to the Port of Pescara on the Adriatic and thence by Italian cruiser to Brindisi. We believe, however, that there was dispute among the Italians regarding the wisdom of departure from Rome and the present position may be a straddle to protect better Italian interests.

The importance of the Badoglio administration is its unchallenged claim to legality. Its only contestant is the newly established "Republican Fascist Government" said to be established in Northern Italy, maintaining certain "commissions" in Rome under German auspices. While Mussolini's name is associated with the latter by German radio, our Brindisi contacts doubt that he has authorized the use of his name in that connection, believing that the party is headed by gangsters of the type of Farinacci, Scorza and the like.

We have little doubt of the sincerity of the Badoglio administration to co-operate with the Allies. From the military point of view it thus far

offers only a few divisions in territory free from the Germans. With the armed forces Badoglio undoubtedly enjoys a definite prestige. While there is a pronounced atmosphere of sympathy for the Allies, it is also coupled with a spirit of defeatism.

The chief question which faces us and has a most important bearing on our military operations in Italy is the status to be given the Badoglio Administration and Italy as a whole. This vital point of policy will govern all executive action whether in the military, political or propaganda sphere.

Badoglio has made repeated references to the spirit of the messages from the President and the Prime Minister. He points out to us that his administration is conscientiously and loyally carrying out the terms of the Armistice and has surrendered the Italian fleet. The Italian people and the armed forces naturally regard an armistice as connoting a cessation of hostilities. His administration, however, stands for war against the Germans. How will the Italian people and the army, Badoglio asks, understand that this is their duty unless a status of at least co-belligerency can be given to Italy. Most of the problems which face us in Italy, directly affecting our military operations, depend upon the reply which our government will make. We have given general instructions covering support to be given to Italian units or individuals who resist or oppose the Germans, and covering the employment of Italian naval vessels. . . . All this, however, necessary as it is to our success, is inconsistent with the terms of the Armistice, and as it will shortly become necessary for me to confer directly with Marshal Badoglio, I should be able to reassure him on a number of matters which will have a profound effect on our military relations with Italy during the period of active hostilities. For example, are the Italians to be disarmed and disbanded in accordance with the Armistice, or used to actively assist our forces? . . . Our present plan of Allied Military Government depends upon the policy we select. Will we adopt a policy of indirect control of government to replace Allied Military Government, at least in certain areas? My instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on several of these matters are clear, and are in accordance with military necessity and my own ideas, but they are not at all consistent with provisions of the long term Armistice conditions to which I am instructed to obtain signature.

This raises the critical question of what action should be taken at this point regarding the signature of the complete armistice terms. We found

that Marshal Badoglio does not clearly understand the necessity of signing these terms. In his mind the imposition of such terms is undoubtedly inconsistent with active Italian co-operation in the war effort against Germany.

It is obviously impracticable to adopt an effective propaganda line to the people of Italy until the government structure and the Italian status are clarified.

We feel that our governments might wish to consider some form of de facto recognition of the Badoglio administration as a co-belligerent or military associate subject to certain conditions:

A. A strengthening of the national character of the administration by infusion of representatives of political parties—a form of national coalition government;

B. A decree restoring the former constitution and promising free elections after the war for a constitutional assembly;

C. Possible eventual abdication of the King in favor of either his son or grandson (this requires careful study as it might prove more popular abroad than with the Italian people);

D. Whatever military requirements we might decide upon;

E. Acceptance of the Allied organization in the nature of an armistice commission, but possibly with a different title from which the Italian administration would accept guidance and ultimate instructions. Allied Military Government would gradually disappear and its personnel be integrated where necessary in the new organization, while we might agree to suspend the application of certain rights under the armistice and regard the reformed and liberated Italy as a co-belligerent.

. . . I realize that the line of action which I have suggested here will provoke political repercussions and may arouse considerable opposition and criticism. Accordingly I recommend that the burden be placed upon us, on the ground of military necessity, which I am convinced should be the governing factor.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Here again, as in the arrangements with Darlan for French North Africa, the theater commander was in effect, contrary to all the theory, making policy. For, once the argument of military necessity is invoked by a military commander in whom a government has trust, it is difficult to insist upon political policies contrary to his recommendations.

#### EISENHOWER WARNS OF THE HEAVY COMMITMENT IF THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT IS NOT USED

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 20 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 14715]

. . . My views are summarized as follows. In our future relations with Italy there are only two courses:

1. To accept and strengthen the legal government of Italy under the King and Badoglio; to regard this government and the Italian people as co-belligerents but with their military activity subject to my direction under terms of armistice, and I, of course, making such military, political and administrative conditions as I find necessary from time to time. Included in these would be the imposition by directive of such clauses of the long terms as may be necessary from the supply, shipping, economic and other points of view under the authority of Article 12 of the short terms.

2. To sweep this government aside, set up an Allied Military Government of occupied Italy, and accept the very heavy commitments involved.

Of these two courses, on military grounds, I strongly recommend the first. Since as co-belligerent it would necessarily declare war on Germany and on the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, for all elements desiring to fight against Fascism in Italy it will be the natural rallying point.

#### IN CASE OF ARMISTICE CONTROL TRANSFER OF TERRITORY WILL HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES

[Memo, Chanler, CLO, AMGOT, for Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, 22 Sep 43, CAD files, HUSKY Plan]

\* \* \* Colonel Maxwell . . . states that owing to the turn of events which have actually taken place, it has now become desirable for political reasons nominally to turn over as much as possible of recaptured Italian territory to the Italian Government immediately, even though we are not yet ready to give up the powers of an occupying force in the degree usually contemplated at this phase. In other words, the proposal is to give the appearance of withdrawal as an occupying power without necessarily giving up its powers. \* \* \*

## 5. THE POLICY OF "PAYMENT BY RESULTS" AND THE LONG-TERM ARMISTICE

### BOTH GOVERNMENTS DECIDE TO SUPPORT BADOGLIO IF ITALY DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY

[Msg, Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 23 Sep 43, Diary of the Office CinC, vol. VII., pp. 818-20]

In reply to your NAF 409 and 410 [CM-IN 13972, 18 Sep and CM-IN 14715, 20 Sep, sec. 4 above] the following directive has been agreed upon by the Prime Minister and myself:

1. You will withhold long term armistice provisions pending further instructions [see below, "Civil Affairs Provisions of the Long-Term Armistice"].
2. On the basis of military necessity you are empowered to make recommendations from time to time to lighten the provisions of the military armistice in order to enable the Italians within the limit of their capacities to wage war against Germany.
3. On condition that it declare War on Germany the present Government of Italy will be permitted, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 hereunder, to carry on as the Government of Italy and as such be treated as a co-belligerent in the War against Germany, such relationship to be based on the clear understanding that it is not in any way to prejudice the untrammelled right of the people of Italy to decide on the form of Government they will eventually have and that no final form of the Government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.
4. The Allied Military Government and the appropriate functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander in Chief which shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Badoglio Government on military, political and administrative matters.
5. You will encourage in all practicable ways the vigorous use under your direction of the Italian Armed Forces against Germany. \* \* \*

### CHURCHILL SUMS UP THE POLICY IN A PHRASE

[Msg, Macmillan, Br Resident Minister, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, 23 Sep 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 13454]

\* \* \* The P.M. has sent agreed policy of war cabinet which in effect approves our proposals. It agrees to co-belligerency, requires signature of

Long Terms, and offers return of liberated areas to Italian Government in return for broad-based coalition government, and acceptance of authority of Control Commission.

P.M. sums up policy as "payment by results."  
\* \* \*

### THE FUTURE IS FORESHADOWED: SOVIET UNION OPPOSES LIGHTENING THE TERMS

[Transl of Communication from Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov to American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 21 Sep 43, quoted in Msg, U.S. Embassy in Moscow to Secy of State, 26 Sep 43, G-3 files, Exec No. 2, Item 2]

\* \* \* No reason is seen by the Soviet Government for the proposal in point two of the message that instructions be given in respect of any lightening of the military armistice terms for Italy, especially since the message does not make clear what lightening of the terms is being contemplated. It is obvious that the Allies must be interested in Italy strictly complying under the control of the Allies with the detailed terms of the armistice which they have agreed upon and ratified. In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that only with the agreement of the Allied Governments can a change in the provisions ratified by these Governments take place. \* \* \*

### BADOGGIO IS APPRISED OF THE LONG TERMS AND THE EXPECTATION OF ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR

[Memo, Murphy, U.S. Minister, AFHQ, 27 Sep 43, Lt Gen. Walter Bedell Smith's Papers, The Capitulation of Italy.]

Macmillan and I accompanied General Smith and General [Mason-] MacFarlane on a visit to Marshal Badoglio at 5:00 p.m. today. By agreement with and under direction of the CinC, General [Mason-] MacFarlane presented to Marshal Badoglio two copies of the long armistice terms. He recalled to the Marshal that the military armistice referred, in Article 12, to the political, economic and financial conditions which will be imposed and said that the signature of the present long terms, which included all three conditions, was the principal item on the agenda of the Malta meeting scheduled for 29 September. \* \* \*

We emphasized the importance of a declaration of war if our public opinions were to sup-

port the considerable concessions from the strict armistice terms which it was proposed to make, such as the modification of the Allied Military Government, the return to the Badoglio administration of Sicily, and the decision to support the King and his Government. Both of these points were understood by the Marshal.

Badoglio seemed to be content with the status of a co-belligerent, if that could be obtained. He did not emphasize unduly a desire to be regarded strictly as an ally.

A suggestion was made by General Smith that, for propaganda purposes and for the purpose of inciting the Italians to the maximum war effort, the Italian Government might blur the edges of co-belligerency in speaking to their own people of the promised land of alliance, but that the technical, legal status must remain that of co-belligerency. He mentioned that there was no indignity in this because that was the technical relationship between the United States and Great Britain and France and Italy during the last war. He also pointed out that, for example, today the United States had no military alliance with Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

Here again Badoglio said that he would discuss the matter with the King and be prepared tomorrow morning to give us an answer. Our strong impression was that there was no need to make any concession on this point. We have the distinct feeling that the status of co-belligerency will be acceptable to the Italians. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS PROVISIONS OF THE LONG-TERM ARMISTICE

[Additional Conditions of the Armistice With Italy,<sup>18</sup> Long Terms Instrument Signed by Eisenhower and Badoglio, 29 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will be thereupon withdrawn from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of Article 4 above.<sup>19</sup> The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all airfields and Naval ports in Italy under their control.

<sup>18</sup> As of 29 September, and until modified (see below), the agreement was known as the Instrument of Italian Surrender.

<sup>19</sup> This article required withdrawal by the Italian armed forces from areas indicated by the United Nations.

19. In the territories or areas referred to in Article 18 all Naval, Military and Air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all inter-communication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian Government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in Article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander in Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in Articles 18 to 20,

A. Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over nonoccupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

B. The Italian authorities will make available on nonoccupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.

23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during

military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian Government will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and business in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander in Chief or designated officials.

29. Benito Mussolini, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police (OVRA), all Fascist youth organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander in Chief. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander in Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

32. A. Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory, will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United

Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.

B. Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected.

C. The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property of foreign states and nationals.

33. A. The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution, deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.

B. The Italian Government will give to the Allied Commander in Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets, whether inside or outside Italian territory, of the Italian state, the Bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi-state institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory, of any such assets except with the permission of the United Nations.

34. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander in Chief.

35. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander in Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander in Chief.

42. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the Control Com-

mission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities. \* \* \*

THE LETTER OF THE LAW WILL NOT BE INSISTED UPON OR CONSIDERED UNCHANGEABLE

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Badoglio, 29 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

The terms of the armistice to which we have just appended our signatures are supplementary to the short military armistice signed by your representative and mine on 3 September 1943. They are based upon the situation obtaining prior to the cessation of hostilities. Developments since that time have altered considerably the status of Italy, which has become in effect a co-operator with the United Nations.

It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into execution. We also recognize that it is not at this time in the power of the Italian Government to carry out certain of the terms. Failure to do so because of existing conditions will not be regarded as a breach of good faith on the part of Italy. However, this document represents the requirements with which the Italian Government can be expected to comply when in a position to do so.

It is understood that the terms both of this document and of the short military armistice of 3 September may be modified from time to time if military necessity or the extent of co-operation by the Italian Government indicates this as desirable.

A GOVERNMENT MAY BE OVERTHROWN BY A MERE MATTER OF SEMANTICS

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 21055]

Yesterday at Malta I met Badoglio where we signed the long term document with the Amended Preamble. There is no question in the minds of any of us that Badoglio hates Fascism and the Germans intensely but he made only one objection. He stated in the most sincere and emphatic way that if the title of the document "Instrument of Surrender of Italy" or the clause "the Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender unconditionally" become public knowledge in Italy that he and his government would be overwhelmed by a storm of reproach and that he would be forced to resign as of no further use to the King or to the United Nations.

. . . He pointed out the growing intensity of the German-Fascist propaganda directed against his still insecure government and the effect of re-emphasizing at this time a complete Italian surrender after all his efforts towards co-operation. Nevertheless he signed the document, upon my assurance that I would present to my two governments his earnest plea for modification of the items quoted above and my solemn promise that I would recommend in the strongest possible way, even if his request is not granted, the title and paragraph in question should be kept confidential so long as they constitute a danger to the Badoglio government.

My Chief commanders and advisers agree with me that Badoglio's apprehensions are well founded. . . . We all feel that our governments have much to gain and will have lost nothing by granting Badoglio's request. The terms of the document signed and the Armistice of 3 September give us full control and amount to complete capitulation by Italy. . . . Any further deterioration of Italian military morale or the possible scuttling of Italian naval units which might result from a revulsion of feeling would be a serious blow to us. I, therefore, strongly recommend that the title of the long term document be changed to read "Additional Conditions of the Armistice with Italy," that the last sentence of the preamble be changed to read "And have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, head of the Italian government and that the statement of unconditional surrender in paragraph 1 be omitted."<sup>20</sup> \* \* \*

AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE

[Memo, Samuel Reber, Vice President, Political Sec, AC, and Harold Caccia, enclosed in Ltr to Dunn, Dir, OEA [Office of European Affairs], Dept of State, 31 Mar 44, CAD files, 387.4 (7-6-43)(1)]

Experience with the Italian Armistice has shown that, apart from the obvious drawback of the two overlapping Armistice arrangements, there are certain difficulties which should be avoided if possible in the preparation of any future Armistice.

The most important of these arose because the Italian Armistice was prepared so long in advance that it bore little relation to the conditions of the Italian capitulation and Allied requirements thereafter. . . . The existence of these

<sup>20</sup> These proposals were approved, and on 9 November a revised protocol was signed. The revisions also included the addition of the Soviet Union as a party agreeing to the conditions of armistice with Italy. ACC files, 10000/109/144).

difficulties brings out that in the drafting of Armistice terms there seem to be two methods of approach:

1. To go into great detail in the Armistice terms themselves and try and cover under each heading all points which are likely to arise. This method has two drawbacks:

a. It will produce a document of enormous length, and

b. Since the lengthy document must be prepared long in advance, the conditions which it is to meet will probably have altered substantially. Consequently some of its clauses may no longer be applicable. Some may not exactly cover the requirements of the Allies and would have to be interpreted to do so; finally other questions will arise for which no precise provision has been made.

In the Italian case it was necessary subsequently to include the right to requisition and extra territoriality in the documents of transfer.<sup>21</sup>

2. To retain under each heading in the Armistice terms general powers susceptible of wide construction so that the terms can always be interpreted in the sense desired by the Allies at the time without appearing to be doing an injury to the defeated enemy. This has not always proved easy in the case of the Italian terms. In this connection it should be pointed out that in the Italian terms, the expression frequently arises that "the Italian Government will comply, etc." This is not satisfactory as the defeated Government may frequently be unable to comply, even with the best will in the world, and powers for the Allies

<sup>21</sup> See below, Chapter XI, Section 4, for the first restoration of territory.

## 6. PREREQUISITES OF TERRITORIAL TRANSFER AND A CONTROL COMMISSION DO NOT MATERIALIZE

### ARMISTICE CONTROL AND RETURN OF TERRITORY TO FOLLOW ITALY'S DECLARATION OF WAR

[Ltr, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

. . . We expect that before you receive this letter announcement will have been made of the granting to the Italian Government of a status of co-belligerency. This is in conformity with a directive we have received and will call for the immediate formation of the Allied Commission. \* \* \*

As soon as we have given the accolade to the Badoglio government as the legitimate govern-

ment of Italy we shall want to turn back to the Italian sovereignty those portions of Calabria which military operations will permit us to hand over and Sicily to Italian sovereignty. We shall probably suggest to Badoglio that he appoint a high commissioner or other civil officials as the head of a temporary government in Sicily with instructions to form an administrative council of five or ten local notables. This will be the top civil authority in the Island with which our people would deal. We cannot expect very much in the way of effective administration from the Italians until the government is re-established in Rome and perhaps not too much even then. The crowd

to do things themselves even in unoccupied territory should always be reserved as under Article 10 of the Short Terms.

At the same time these general clauses should be made very clear and not, for instance, like clauses 23 or 28 of the Italian Armistice regarding financial terms and treatment of other enemy personnel and property.

This second method should result in a document of reasonable dimensions which must, however, be of such a nature that it can be made generally known as well to enemy officials and public as to all Allied authorities responsible for its execution. The secret nature of the Italian terms has proven a handicap.

Further, the document should be accompanied by an administrative directive to the commission or body concerned with the execution of the Armistice stating what policy there should be adopted in regard to the clause. Periodic meetings of the various Allied groups which may be charged with administration of territory and the execution of the Armistice with the responsible officials of the enemy Government should be arranged to insure even application of the terms and coordination of activity whether the Allies are acting jointly or in regions. Records of these meetings should be kept.

In order to avoid the necessity of subsequently imposing harsher conditions of application for any other reasons than intransigence on the part of the enemy, this directive should insist upon a severe interpretation of the terms in the initial stages. The directive can later be revised from time to time and the burden progressively lightened if the terms are executed in a reasonable manner. \* \* \*

in Brindisi is rather pathetic and does not show evidence of any great capacity to run the show. Moreover Italy is in a sad state of demoralization and what with the destruction caused by our own operations and German demolition, together with the departure of the Fascist Party which has made the thing tick for twenty years, we shall find a dilapidated and creaking machine. This means that although nominally we shall turn over provinces as they are cleared and the fighting front moves to the north, we shall probably have to give a substantial amount of direct assistance for some time to come. As long as there is fighting in Italy we must see to it that those services essential to the operation are kept going and that there is not disorder in the rear areas. Perhaps the Italians will be able to see to some of that but I am not very sanguine about it. [See below, Chapter XI, Section 1.]

I personally believe that we can make some political capital out of the transfer of occupied territories to Italian jurisdiction by telling the world that we install Military Government only where it is necessary for military operation and that as soon as conditions permit, we shall hand the territory to appropriate civil authorities. It might even be useful propaganda-wise to have a public interment of AMGOT as AMGOT is, I believe, destined to become a comparatively small unit to operate immediately in the rear of tactical forces and moving north as the line moves north. Areas cleared and settled would in the circumstances be turned over to the Italians subject to the control we would exercise through the Allied Commission. \* \* \*

**MARSHAL BADOGLIO IS HESITANT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF AN EARLY DECLARATION OF WAR**  
[Notes, Murphy, U.S. Minister, on the Conference Aboard H.M.S. *Nelson* in Valetta Harbor, Malta Conf, 29 Sep 43, Smith Papers, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 658-59]

Marshal Badoglio opened the conversation with a statement on several points which he said he had in mind:

- (1) His desire to see the formation of a government on a broad, liberal basis.
- (2) A declaration of war by the Italian Government against Germany on the return of the government to Rome.
- (3) In the interval, he emphasized, the Italians are in a *de facto* state of war and fighting against the Germans in Corsica, Dalmatia, etc.
- (4) He stated that as soon as it would be possible to move Italian troops from Sardinia, he would be able to put eight Italian divisions at the disposal of the Allies.
- (5) He expressed the fear that Italian prisoners

taken by the Germans might be liable to treatment as *franc tireurs* and, as such, to summary execution.

General Eisenhower stated that in his opinion the effort which the Italians are at present making is ample proof of their intention to co-operate, but that in view of (5) above, it would appear necessary that Marshal Badoglio's government, which, after all, is the only legal Italian Government, declare war immediately.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he had already considered that point of view, but that the power of the government at the moment extended over only a small part of Italy which rendered a declaration of war in these circumstances extremely difficult.

General Eisenhower, however, pointed out that to the contrary the other exiled governments, occupying not an inch of their national territory have declared war against Germany. He expressed a desire to have the Badoglio administration undertake the administration of Sicily and other liberated areas, but it is not clear to him how such an arrangement can be made unless a declaration of war is undertaken.

Marshal Badoglio promised to refer this question to the King who, he said, in any event must decide. Under Italian law only the King can declare war, Badoglio therefore stated that he would reserve his answer until he could consult with the King.

General Eisenhower stated that everything Marshal Badoglio does to wage war actively against Germany will raise his government by that much in the esteem of the United Nations. He pointed out that for three long years Italy has been an enemy of the United Nations and there has been built up a mass psychology which is not as willing to accept the Italians as soldiers on the field might be. Therefore, General Eisenhower stated, it is Marshal Badoglio's duty today to do so just as quickly as possible. He inquired if Marshal Badoglio would so advise the King.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he understood General Eisenhower's point of view and would present it exactly to the King as stated because his point of view corresponds to that of General Eisenhower. [See ch. XV, sec. 1, on liberalization of government.] \* \* \*

#### TRANSFER OF TERRITORY IS DEFERRED

[Memo, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, for CofS, AFHQ, 4 Oct 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

We are pursuing our plans with respect to the government of Italy on the following assumptions:

1. Before being installed in Rome the Badoglio Government will not be in a position to (a) declare war on Germany,<sup>22</sup> or (b) complete the formation of a liberal government representing all shades of political opinion, or (c) effectively to administer any substantial portion of Italian territory.

2. That as soon as the Italian Government complies with (a) and (b) above, we shall publicly accord it a status of co-belligerency and turn over all territory which operational requirements will permit to Italian administration.

3. That for the purpose of eliminating Fascism and driving the Germans out of Italy we shall support the Badoglio Government as the actual government of Italy, meantime requiring that it be broadened and liberalized in accordance with democratic principles.

On these assumptions we propose to proceed as follows:

1. To continue the military mission at Brindisi until the King and Badoglio move to Rome. [Major] General [Kenyon A.] Joyce will be added on arrival and, as may be necessary, a few technical members such as financial, legal officers, etc.

2. To continue military government over all territory now occupied or to be occupied until the Italian Government is installed in Rome. . . . This military government would be divided into two parts. (a) An advance unit which would continue with the 15th Army Group, establish military government and continue direct control as long as the military situation may require. (b) The balance of our existing military government would be made directly responsible to AFHQ. This unit would govern all of the settled provinces until such time as they can be turned over to the Italians for administration. This Allied Military Government would be merged with the Allied Commission which would be constituted and put in operation when the Italian Government is installed in Rome. The commission would then begin to function to enforce the armistice and give instructions and guidance to the Italian administration in accordance with our present directive. The Commission would thus absorb all of Allied Military Government except the mobile unit with the 15th Army Group which would continue to report through 15th Army Group for tactical and administrative reasons to AFHQ [see Chapter X]. \* \* \*

<sup>22</sup> The King, expressing fear of German reprisals, had, as noted earlier, refused to declare war immediately.

#### CLOSE SUPERVISION OF BADOGGIO'S ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES

[Memo, Rowell, MGS, for Chief, MGS, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/92]

\* \* \* 26. Allied control of the four Apulian provinces under the jurisdiction of the Badoglio Government is exercised by liaison officers drawn from AMG and attached to the Allied Military Mission. The organization contains thirteen officers and six EM/OR's. The Chief Liaison Officer is Lt. Col. Nelson Monfort whose headquarters is situated at Brindisi.

27. During my visit to the Allied Military Mission, Col. Monfort made it possible for me to see his organization at work. In his company, I visited Taranto, Lecce and Bari, and talked with the AMGLO [Allied Military Government Liaison Organization] officers there. In Brindisi, I saw a great deal of Col. Mayne, Col. Monfort's deputy and head of the Brindisi team. The information presented below is combined from what these officers told me and what I saw for myself.

28. AMGLO officers and men are distributed in groups among the four provincial capitals and the Headquarters. The strength of each group corresponds to the importance of the capital and the amount of work to be done there.

30. The principal matters handled by AMGLO Headquarters are high level liaison and trade and supplies. Messages and requests from AMGOT [also from 15th Army Group] to the Italian Army and Government pass through Col. Monfort's office and are taken up with the proper officials. . . .

31. With regard to supplies, the four provinces are treated as a territorial unit. . . . The Italian authorities come to Col. Monfort for these supplies. It is his task to verify the documents which have been submitted and to take appropriate action.

32. In handling matters which extend to the four provinces, Col. Monfort deals with the Italian officials at the highest level: Generals Albertu, [Leopoldo] Piccardi or Innocenti. If the business involves orders to the provincial prefects or other provincial authorities, they are issued by Innocenti and the AMGLO provincial officers on the spot report anything unsatisfactory in their local execution.

33. The AMGLO provincial officer deals with the local affairs of his province. He serves as liaison officer between the civilian population and the armed forces. For example, complaints against members of the armed forces who are

alleged to have committed offenses against civilians are taken to the local AMGLO officer who refers them in turn to the proper military authority. He is in direct touch with the provincial officials of his province and keeps an eye on their behaviour. . . .

34. AMGLO does not post proclamations or ordinances. This is done either by the appropriate Italian officials or the area commanders. The latter occurs when the matter in question affects both Allied military forces and civilians; for example, hours when wine and spirits may be sold in restaurants and bars. In such an ordinance, printed in Italian and English, it is stated that the ordinance is issued in co-ordination with the Prefect. AMGLO is the co-ordinating agency.

## 7. THE BURDENS OF CONTROL BECOME GREATER RATHER THAN LESS

### NOT ENOUGH PERSONNEL

[Msg, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Chief, CAD, 30 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 20825]

Existing authorized allotment of enlisted personnel . . . is inadequate and requires upward revision. \* \* \*

(B). The thinning out process, moving personnel from rear areas to forward areas, cannot proceed as rapidly as originally anticipated due to inability of Italian Government to resume effective control under present and prospective conditions, considering probable heavy damage and dislocation of transportation and communications consequent upon heavy fighting. \* \* \*

(D). Sicily experience indicates greater need for enlisted personnel than first estimated. \* \* \*

[Rpt, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, 10 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/61, par. 6]

\* \* \* The staff which was initially detailed to accompany 8th Army under Group Captain Benson, had . . . to fulfill the dual function of acting as Civil Affairs Officers in the immediate rear of the fighting formations of 8th Army and at the same time to provide an administration in the rearward areas. The staff, which was not complete at the time the operation was launched, has consequently been scarce throughout the period with a result that in spite of some reinforcements sent from Sicily, the number of officers available to maintain administration in the rearward Provinces occupied, and largely evacuated

AMGLO exercises political functions in accordance with the general Allied policy that active Fascists shall be removed from positions of authority or influence. Col. Monfort has had at least two prefects removed from office and suitable officials put in their place. His procedure has been to collect all pertinent information from Field Security and his own officers and to present it with his recommendation to Innocenti. There has not been an instance in which his recommendation has not been carried out promptly and without objection. AMGLO officers in the provinces keep an eye on the podesta and other communal officials as well as on those of the provincial level. \* \* \*

by the 8th Army, has never constituted more than a skeleton force. \* \* \*

### DEVASTATION COMPLICATES OCCUPATION OF NAPLES

[Msg. AFHQ to CCAC, 2 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 1447]

McSherry has just returned from Naples [occupied 1 October] and reports as follows on conditions there. Head of local public health service reported there was no cholera or typhus and that prevalency of other diseases was normal. Medical supplies reported short. Number of doctors apparently adequate. Food situation serious. Reported that Germans took all stocks of food. Water situation acute. Viaduct and some of the reservoirs blown up but 15 days supply of water on rationed basis available for present population. Known breaks in viaduct can be repaired in 15 days. Considerable portion of main aqueduct is in German territory. Its condition unknown. Electrical system blown up. Main telephone exchange blown but two smaller exchanges intact. Gas works destroyed necessitating importation of coal for bakery and household use as well as for military purposes. Sewer system reported to be OK. All transportation including electric trolley busses were taken by Germans. All industrial plants, warehouses and hotels reported destroyed. It was estimated 600,000 persons remained in city. Population appeared greatly relieved upon entry of Allied troops. Reception emotional.

Cursory survey of housing would indicate this will be no serious problem. Railroad yards badly damaged. Officials appointed during Badoglio regime were present. All officials sincerely expressed desire to co-operate in any way possible. Main entrance to port reported blocked but harbor-master reported south entrance open. Harbor-master stated that port could be opened very shortly.

#### DIFFICULTIES FROM NEAPOLITANS' EXPECTATION OF BEING TREATED AS ALLIES

[Chanler, Chief, Legal Div, AMGOT, Rpt to Dir, CAD, 21 Dec 43, ABC, 014, HORRIFIED GOVT, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 13), pp. 15-16]

32. . . . The population had been wildly enthusiastic in welcoming all Allied soldiers entering the town. General McSherry and Colonel [Edgar E.] Hume, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer with the 5th Army, had entered Naples in advance of the troops and moved into the "Municipio" or city hall. The next morning, additional AMG officers having arrived bringing proclamations and flags, a rather difficult question presented itself. On looking out the window of the "Municipio," where the AMG officers had spent the night, it was noticed that a large Italian flag was flying from one of the only two flagpoles on the building. (The whole city was bedecked with Italian and some Allied flags). There was a large crowd standing in front of the "Municipio," who broke into loud cheers when Colonel Hume stepped out on the balcony. He had just given instructions to raise the British and American flags. When he saw this situation, it became immediately apparent that the good will of the population would be rudely destroyed if the Italian flag was first hauled down and then replaced by the American and British flags. After a hasty consultation, no directives having been yet received except a semi-official rumor that the Italians had been granted a status of co-belligerency, it was decided that the only practical solution, in the absence of a third flagpole, was to drape all three flags from the balcony in front of the building. This met with great applause. Unfortunately, several weeks later it was decided by higher headquarters that Italian flags should not be permitted to fly from any official building in Occupied Territory—no doubt a correct decision but not a happy one so far as the particular flag on the Naples "Municipio" was concerned.

33. Similarly, when Proclamations Numbers 1, 2 and 3 were posted on the morning after the occupation of Naples, the enthusiasm of the

crowds which read the proclamations visibly dampened. They seemed rather hostile in tone to the population which had suddenly swung around in the volatile manner characteristic of Neapolitans, at the time of occupation, to the belief that they were and always had been our greatest friends. Subsequently, Proclamation Number 1 was considerably toned down to make it appear a little less belligerent. \* \* \*

#### AMG IS ENTERING A CRITICAL STATE

[Msg, Maj Gen J. F. M. Whiteley, DCofS, AFHQ, to McCloy, 6 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3705]

\* \* \* We are entering a critical state for AMG involving the administration of occupied territory pending the assumption of authority by the Italian government, followed later by the conversion of the bulk of it into the Allied Commission and the transfer of settled territory to the Italian government. \* \* \*

#### CAO'S DEAL WITH MOB VIOLENCE IN REMOTE LOCALITIES

[Rennell, CCAO 15th AGP, Rpt, 10 Oct 43 [hereafter cited as Rennell Rpt, 10 Oct 43], ACC files, 10000/100/61, par. 18]

18. . . . Since my officers have no escorts and since it will not always be possible to occupy, physically, inhabited centres removed from the axis of advance, I see no methods of stopping . . . acts of violence. In some cases my officers have themselves and by themselves quieted mobs, as yet without much risk to themselves but I cannot be certain that in future cases if they enter inhabited towns where violence is taking place without escort, that they will necessarily escape danger to themselves. Nevertheless, if they do not enter towns in the remote places there is a risk of such localities being turned over to crude mob rule with all that that implies. As it is, in most of the major places which have been occupied, there has been evidence of looting by the civilian population.

#### ENTHUSIASM OVER LIBERATION BUT NOT OVER THE PROSPECT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Rennell Rpt, 10 Oct 43, par. 20]

20. . . . The enthusiasm with which Allied troops have been received . . . must not be construed as indicating a desire to be governed by an Allied Military Government which, as I have before stated and desire here to re-state, cannot in my view conduct a direct administration in Italy

or do more than direct an incompetent Italian bureaucracy to govern a dispirited and apathetic people.

#### SOME ITALIAN LOCAL OFFICIALS ARE CRITICAL

[Transl of Ltr, Prefect of Foggia to Badoglio, 19 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097]

\* \* \* the situation is daily worsening for two principal causes:

a) Overbearing attitude of the numerous allied troops who, as I already said, take over houses, farmhouses, and country houses, ousting tenants and peasants, forbidding them to enter their property even to get their implements.

For this reason many areas will not be farmed. The very few vehicles saved from German destruction are "requisitioned," that is robbed, because nobody indemnifies for them; they are taking over the AGIP oil tanks and also requisitioning the empty barrels, thus rendering impossible an emergency depot.

b) Intrusion in every branch of civil life by numerous officers of civil affairs who, assigned in almost all villages, are taking complete charge, ousting or changing the village Mayor, arresting persons, and letting prisoners free, issuing orders not to pay taxes, taking without consideration provisions out of civil food stores ("ammassi"), publishing price and labour tariffs different, of course, for each town, even appointing themselves (as at Serracapriola) Town Governor, shutting up City Houses (as at Castelluccio dei Sauri), quartering troops in them and forbidding the Mayor and employees to enter, thus arresting the civil life of the town, issuing orders to work at enormous prices, hiring workmen whose wages they order to be paid by the Town Administration or by Civil Engineer Department without taking notice of their financial possibilities; are now setting their eyes on the arms deposited by the citizens and they may seize them if our Military Authority does not quickly take the arms over.

They are mostly youngsters (some of them are 23-24 years old) who have no single direction of action, not co-ordinated, who act at random without knowing all our difficult corporative system which cannot be abruptly abolished.

This "civil service" which wants to do everything is raising so great a hitch in the life of the region which is more tied up now than during the period of German pillage raids.

We had thought the effort would be to help us: they didn't give us anything. We want nothing

ing tough; we only wish to be let free to pursue our errands: we'll go on, as we can, in our misery.<sup>23</sup> \* \* \*

[Memo, Benson, AMG Hq, Eighth Army, for AMG Hq, 15th AGP, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097]

1. The letter written by the Prefect at Foggia to Marshal Badoglio dated 19 October 1943, a copy of which was handed to me on my recent visit to Bari, calls for some detailed comment in view of paragraph (b) which lays at the door of AMGOT various actions with which, in fact, they were in no way connected.

2. It will be as well to take the points raised by the Prefect in detail before commenting in general on the tone of the letter and the merits and demerits of the whole Foggia position as set forth in his letter.

3. *Para (a)* There is no need for me to comment on the paragraph, which is not levied at AMGOT, excepting to point out that there is an element of truth in the words "for this reason many areas will not be farmed." If agricultural settlement buildings are requisitioned and the inhabitants moved, the land they cultivated must suffer.

As regards AGIP I am informed that the allegation at any rate insofar as Foggia town is concerned is not the case.

4. *Para (b) (i)* "Intrusion in every branch of civil life . . . are taking complete charge."

This is broadly speaking true and is the work the Allied Military Government must do, though the "taking charge" is done through the local Podestas, etc. and not direct.

(ii) "Changing the village Mayor"

I know of one case where this was done by AMGOT for very good reasons. The new Podesta appointed by AMGOT has proved in every way successful, but the Prefect sent instructions superseding him by another Italian who was not acceptable to AMGOT. This has since been rectified and the AMGOT appointed Mayor remains. I know of no other cases in which AMGOT have removed Podesta at any rate without consulting the Prefect.

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<sup>23</sup> This intemperately captious letter is of note less for the details of its allegations than as an illustration of the attitude which AMGOT at times encountered in Italian local officials. Group Captain Benson (see the following document) pointed out that because Foggia was geographically a part of the territory governed by Badoglio, it was more difficult for the prefect to accept the fact that Foggia had not been turned over to the Italian government like the other provinces of Apulia.

(iii) "Arresting persons."

No prisoners have been let free by AMGOT excepting after a fair trial, or investigation in the case of political prisoners. Gaols have frequently been found when AMGOT officials entered with the doors wide open and this has caused considerable trouble as AMGOT has had to endeavour to find and collect the prisoners so that each case could be examined.

(v) "Issuing order not to pay taxes."

The only tax which AMGOT officials have forbidden to be paid is the "Sindicati contribution" which it was decided by higher authority should be abolished. It is understood that the Prefect wishes to reinstate this as being the only method of collecting money for relief. He has been refused permission.

(vi) "Taking without consideration provisions out of civil food stores."

This had never been done by AMGOT who require all civil stocks of feed to feed civilians. The Prefect may be referring to certain surplus stocks of grain amounting in all to about 100 tons, which were sent to Naples. This, of course, was and still is a necessity to help the population of that city.

(vii) "Publishing prices and labour tariffs, etc."

No price tariffs have as yet been published by AMGOT. They are in print at the moment of writing and will be applicable to the whole of Foggia Province and other provinces as captured within the axis of Eighth Army. Labour prices have been published and are the same as those originally approved of and drawn up by the army in Sicily.

(viii) "Appointing themselves Town Governors."

I regret I am unable to answer this allegation as I do not know what is meant. Serracapriola is the headquarters of V Corps and has an AMGOT liaison officer attached to the Corps and the usual two AMGOT officers looking after the town and the district. Perhaps the Prefect is referring to the Town Major.

(ix) "Shutting up city houses, quartering troops in them, thus arresting the civil life of the town."

As an accusation against AMGOT this is merely stupid. The opposite is invariably the case, and it is AMGOT that has to fight to retain the necessary accommodation for provincial and communal administration. Examples are Foggia, where the available buildings were requisitioned by the N.A.A.F. [Navy, Army, Air Forces] and

even today there is no proper accommodation from which to carry on the Provincial Government.

(x) "Issuing orders for work at enormous prices."

The only "works" which AMGOT have ordered are the clearing of debris in the streets and works in connection with road maintenance. Authorized labour rates have been paid, which are probably admittedly too high. They are not governed by AMGOT.

(xi) "Hiring workmen whose wages . . . financial possibilities."

Certain works have been put in hand for operational needs, such as road repairs (mentioned in (x) above). Payment for this is made through the Province, but provision for payment is made by AMGOT. Foggia has had 16,000,000 of AMGOT funds, which are used to pay for outgoings which cannot strictly be called a provincial expenditure. The statement as made by the Prefect is quite false.

(xii) "Setting their eyes on the arms deposited . . . does not quickly take the arms over."

Arms are collected under the proclamation and are safeguarded and tabulated. They will be returned in due course when security allows. Instances have occurred of arms being requisitioned, chiefly revolvers belonging to Carabinieri, but never by AMGOT. \* \* \*

#### THE PROSPECTS OF RELIEF ARE DARK FOR THE CAO'S

[Ltr, Capt J. G. Seguin, CAO, to Lt Col Julius W. Holmes, SCAO, Chieti Province, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

Can't get a lamp of any kind for love or money. Am in darkness from 5:00 P.M. till next morning. It is a real draw back as I cannot do my paper work.

Can you find or steal one for me? \* \* \*

#### IN THE FORWARD AREAS AMG IS EXPECTED TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS

[Maj G. L. Wilcox, Dir, Public Safety, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1093]

\* \* \* Officials of AMG are welcomed. The people are inclined to rely too much on AMG and do not make enough effort to help themselves. They are inclined to expect to be given food and clothing and shelter and to have all their problems solved for them. \* \* \*

## AT LEAST WE ARE NOT UNPOPULAR

[Rpt of Rgn II, ACC for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

\* \* \* AMG is criticized, but almost invariably in good nature. Its failings are never at-

tributed to lack of good will or intentions. They are explained by our ignorance of the complicated mentality of the southern Italian and by our readiness to believe that most people speak the truth, whereas few do. \* \* \*

## 8. AN ENEMY IS MADE A COBELLIGERENT

### NEW PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT TO DECLARE WAR

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3, CM-OUT 1863]

\* \* \* The President and the Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible.

There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied by the Allies.

You will, therefore, put pressure upon the Italian Government for an early Declaration of War against Germany without waiting for further successes by the Allied Forces.

Immediately following such declaration a joint announcement of Italy's co-belligerency will be made by the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet.

[Msg, Eisenhower to Brig Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

\* \* \* The Marshal has shown every willingness to co-operate effectively but failure to declare war is militating against the position of the Italian Government and the recognition we can accord it. I am well aware that His Majesty and his family, the Marshal and other members of the Government are personally exerting themselves to the utmost to inspire resistance to the Germans, but in the matter of formal declaration of war they must act decisively and without further delay. The world will understand decisive action but further temporizing will be interpreted as a desire on the part of the Italian Government to evade definite responsibility. I repeat that you should present this matter to the proper authorities in the most emphatic way as I consider it of vital importance at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations.

[Memo, Gen Taylor for Badoglio, 7 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

The following is a résumé of the views of the British and American Government relative to the need for an immediate declaration of war on Germany by the Italian Government.

An immediate declaration of war is essential at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations. It is the considered opinion of General Eisenhower and the governments which he represents that now is the time to take this decisive step. . . .

The Allied leaders respect the reluctance of His Majesty, the King, to declare war for constitutional reasons. The present situation, however, is in no wise comparable to that when Mussolini led an unwilling nation into war. Now it is the nation which has declared and looks to the government for formal sanction. The thousands of gallant Italians engaged in acts of war at this moment are entitled to the rights and protection of belligerency in their relations both to the Allies and to Germany. If a constitutional validation is necessary, it can follow the formation of a broad national government in Rome, but, in the meantime, the United Nations await a declaration of war as the inevitable response of Italy to the German acts of aggression. \* \* \*

### STILL MORE PRESSURE IS NECESSARY

[Memo, Gen Taylor to Badoglio, 11 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

It has now been five days since I had the honor to submit to your Excellency the expression of the views of the Allied Governments on the urgency of an Italian Declaration of War. Throughout this period the eyes of the United Nations have remained fixed upon your Government, awaiting an expression of your intentions. Meanwhile, I understand that the Mediterranean Commission is assembling tomorrow to consider far-reaching matters of policy affecting the entire Mediterranean area with the status of Italy still in doubt. Unless the Italian Government takes decisive action at once, the Commission will convene in an atmosphere inimical to Italian interests.<sup>24</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>24</sup> The commission formed by the United States and Great Britain with the Soviet Union at the Moscow Conference, pending formation of the Advisory Council for Italy.

## FINALLY AN ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY

[Proclamation of Marshal Badoglio to the Italian People, 13 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

. . . There will be no peace in Italy as long as a single German treads our soil.

We must march forward together with our friends of America, Britain and Russia and of the other United Nations.

In the Balkans, in Jugoslavia, in Albania, in Greece and elsewhere, the Italian troops who have been witnesses of German acts of aggression and of cruelty might fight to the end against the common enemy.

The government which I lead will soon be completed by bringing in representatives of every political party. Thus a truly democratic government will be formed and I reaffirm the promise that once the war is over the Italian people will be free to hold elections and choose the government which they desire.

Italians: I inform you that His Majesty the King has charged me this day the 13th of October to announce the Declaration of War on Germany.

### ALLIES RECOGNIZE ITALY AS COBELLIGERENT

[Joint Statement by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., 13 Oct. 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active co-operation of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since 8 September and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet Governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three Governments acknowl-

edge the Italian Government's pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the Governments of Italy and the United Nations Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause.

### THE STATESMEN NOW CONTEMPLATE MILITARY GOVERNMENT ONLY IN COMBAT ZONE

[Jt Note by Hull and Eden, Policy and Administration in Connection with the Military Operations in Italy, 23 Oct 43, CofS files, 337, Conf, 1943 (142)]

The most recent developments have been the Italian declaration of war against Germany, and the acceptance by the Allies of Italy as a co-belligerent with, among other conditions, the understanding that the Italian Government should be reorganized upon a broader and more liberal basis by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist political groups.

As a result of these developments it is now contemplated that Military Government will be restricted in the future to the combat zone and that elsewhere supervision and control of the Italian administration will be carried out through the agency of a Control Commission under, so long as the military situation requires, the presidency of the Commander in Chief.<sup>25</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>25</sup> This expectation so far as it concerned early implementation, was not shared by the theater. The plan formulated by General Holmes on 4 October (see above, sec. 6) for military government over a large rear zone had already been put into effect.

## 9. RISE AND FALL OF HOPES FOR EARLY RETURNS

### COBELLIGERENCY REVIVES THE PLAN FOR EARLY ARMISTICE CONTROL AND TRANSFER OF TERRITORY

[Min of Mtg of Allied Officials at Home of the Br Resident Minister, 13 Oct 43, MTO, HS files, AFHQ Papers]

#### *The Establishment of the Allied Commission*

General Holmes outlined the present situation as to the Allied Commission for the post-armistice

control of the Italian Government. It had been planned to establish the Allied Commission soon after the Malta Conference between General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio. That plan had had to be temporarily abandoned: in its composition the Government remained too weak to be entrusted with authority, and in consequence a decision was made to continue military govern-

ment over all occupied Italian territory until Rome was reached. . . . See his memo to the Chief of Staff, 4 October.

The situation had now altered. The Italian Government had declared war, it was being treated as a co-belligerent, the occupation of Rome seemed more remote, and in consequence steps must be taken at once to develop the Italian Government. It was therefore planned (1) to send a party of high-level personnel from Tizi Ouzou to AMG Headquarters, Palermo, to merge with that body and help prepare for its transformation into the Allied Commission; (2) to send a smaller party to the seat of the Italian Government to take up the work of the Allied Commission. A skeleton Allied Commission would thus be constituted at Brindisi, and would from time to time be strengthened. \* \* \*

The position, vis-à-vis the Italian Government, would then be that we were prepared, in principle, to transfer territory to Italian administration. But this could not be accomplished at once, and we would begin with Sicily. An Italian high commissioner for Sicily would then be appointed to meet with representatives of AMG and AC to arrange for the transfer of authority.

Mr. Macmillan stressed the need for putting the Allied Commission into operation without further delay. He added that the four provinces adjacent to Brindisi, which were now actually under Italian administration, should then be brought into conformity with the system of control under the Allied Commission. First regularize the situation in the four provinces, then place Sicily under Italian administration, then go to other areas. \* \* \*

#### IT IS DECIDED TO SEND AN ADVANCE ACC GROUP TO BRINDISI

[Memo, Gen. Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, for Badoglio, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency the following personal message to you from General Eisenhower:

I observe with great satisfaction that the Italian Government has declared war on Germany. By maintaining a vigorous resistance to the German forces, the Italian Nation, through its armed forces and its civilian population, may hasten the redemption of Italy.

I take this occasion to inform you that the Allied Commission is being constituted and that an advance group of officers will shortly arrive at Brindisi prepared to discuss the most pressing problems with the Italian Government. . . .

#### NOT EVEN HOTEL ROOMS FOR THEM

[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

. . . I transmit herewith Marshal Badoglio's reaction to a very general discussion of the arrival of the Allied Commission to Brindisi. . . . He wishes me to point out that his government consists only of himself and the ministers of Navy, Air and Industry. These ministers are comparatively without staff and do not have access to the official archives. Marshal consequently feels that the arrival of a large group of economic and administrative officers on the Allied side will be unwarranted until the government is solidly installed in Rome. He adds that the housing arrangements in Brindisi as he knows it cannot possibly accommodate more than a few other officers unless they are willing to live in tents or on boats in the harbor. I repeat my previous recommendation that only one or two officers be sent here for the present to survey the situation.

#### ONLY A FEW OPPOSITE NUMBERS SHOULD BE SENT

[Msg, AMM to AFHQ, 20 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/75]

. . . Apart from military officials there are very few officials in Badoglio Government to handle administrative and economic matters. . . . In view of these considerations and General Taylor's message that Badoglio does not feel adequately equipped to administer territory now under Allied Military Government seems advisable to limit advance party of officers having opposite numbers in present Italian government. This means head Civilian Supply and Finance Sub-commissions. Other officers can be added as Italian Government grows. . . .<sup>26</sup>

#### BUT BADOGLIO IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN PREPARATIONS FOR TERRITORIAL TRANSFER IMMEDIATELY

[Memo, Gen Taylor to Badoglio, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

. . . It is important that we start examining forthwith problems connected with the gradual transfer of territory now under Allied Military Government to the administration of the Italian Government subject to guidance and instruction from the Commission. It is apparent that any measures of this sort require detailed consideration, and that it is a prerequisite that the Italian Government put itself in a position satisfactorily to discharge the responsibilities involved. . . .

<sup>26</sup> The recommendation to send only a small number was accepted by AFHQ.

**BADOGGIO WANTS NO MORE TERRITORY UNTIL HE CAN HANDLE IT**

[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 20 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

. . . I wish to state clearly Badoglio's position regarding the return of liberated territory to his government. He has told me more than once that he does not desire a complete transfer until his government is capable of handling it. He thinks that this will not be the case until he gets to Rome where he can form a government, have access to the archives and have necessary means of communication at his disposal. As this necessarily entails considerable delay he asks now that some public expression of our intentions be made to strengthen his internal position. If the Allied governments do not wish to make such a declaration, would there be any objection to Badoglio himself saying publicly what the Allies have un-

dertaken to do when the Italian government is qualified both administratively and politically to assume the responsibility?

**PERSONNEL DIFFICULTIES INCREASE BECAUSE ITALIAN AID HAS NOT MATERIALIZED**

[Brig Gen Edgar E. Hume, SCAO AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/154/204]

\* \* \* The rapid expansion of the Fifth Army from two small corps to far more than twice that size has doubled the requirements of CAO's for work with divisions in the field and difficulties have been experienced in obtaining sufficient officers suitable for this type of work. . . .

(2) The replacements received during month were without experience and the number of experienced CAO's is now small in proportion to the number of corps and divisions. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER X

# Control Agencies Are Easier To Create Than To Co-ordinate

By the end of 1943 the Allies had not only completed an elaborate organizational apparatus for civil affairs but had also concluded that it was working neither smoothly nor efficiently. In part the trouble was due to the disproportionate burden resting upon the MG component until the capture of Rome should make possible the transfer of territory and responsibility to the Italian Government. But, basically, the trouble was with the control machinery itself. In brief, it consisted of rather numerous specialized agencies for the co-ordination of civil affairs, but owing to remoteness of the over-all Algiers authority and overlapping jurisdictions, there was insufficient co-ordination of the control agencies themselves. Thus in late January, after months of increasing operational confusion, the entire apparatus had to be overhauled.

The documents herein include not only the orders detailing organizational structures and functions but also the inter-agency correspondence setting forth the reasons for both establishing and completely altering the organizational apparatus. In the latter correspondence one senses between the lines real intensity of feeling. This reaction was inevitable because those designing the organizations clearly felt that they were architects of success or failure in enterprises of great moment. By and large the arguments of the documents centered

on one main issue—the relative merits of centralization and decentralization. Both were argued for as best effecting co-ordination but whereas proponents of the former were usually focusing upon co-ordination of civil affairs as a whole, proponents of the latter were generally focusing upon co-ordination in a limited area or function which seemed to have distinctive organizational needs. As things turned out, the Allied control organization was first a centralized one, then changed to a decentralized one, and finally reverted to a centralized one, but of a type inclusive of decentralization as a subordinate element.

AMGOT was planned and operated for about three months as a unitary organization highly centralized by reason of concentration of authority at the top and transmission of such authority to lower levels through a tightly knit chain of command. The validity of the first step toward decentralization was scarcely disputable. In September, when the advance of Eighth Army was encompassing provinces isolated by poor transport conditions, AMGOT gave the SCAO's unusual freedom of decision in issuing orders on local matters. Decentralization might have gone no farther had it not been for another unexpected situation—the inability of the Italian Government to administer more than four provinces. In late September General

Rennell, CCAO 15th Army Group, wrote that one headquarters could not satisfactorily direct mobile military government and administer rapidly expanding rear areas. Not only were the two tasks together too big a job; they were also too different, especially in supply problems. On 21 October AMGOT was divided into AMG 15th Army Group, which administered areas in the wake of battle, and Headquarters AMG which, located in Palermo and reporting to MGS, administered static areas.

But even before the division was formalized the CCS—still not aware of the plan and concerned lest matters become confused after ACC had been activated—cabled that AMG should be prepared for merger with ACC. It seemed “of the utmost importance that the Control Commission . . . and AMG follow uniform policies and that their functions be completely co-ordinated under one supreme authority.” Pending the merger the personnel of the two should be as nearly the same as possible. General Eisenhower, compelled now to take a stand on the organizational issue, argued in effect in behalf of decentralization. He conceded that, once its task of military government was ended by transfer of Sicily to the government, static AMG could be merged with ACC; he urged, however that mobile AMG be left independent. Argument and counter argument followed, but in the end CCS yielded to General Eisenhower’s contention that AMG 15th Army Group should be separate in order to have the latitude required for adapting civil affairs to military needs.

This denouement envisaged only two operational organizations for civil affairs but actually it resulted in three because, though rear AMG and ACC were pledged to each other, union never came about since the former had to occupy itself with military government longer than had been expected. A deliberate trend toward func-

tional pluralism in organizational structure was evidenced when the control commission, designed by MGS, was activated with twenty-six subcommissions grouped into four sections. The ensuing creation of the Advisory Council for Italy was not, indeed, motivated by organizational pluralism but only by the desire to satisfy the Soviet claim to representation, as well as that of other countries having a political interest in Italy, without yielding them a share in executive power. But the event did mark a striking deviation from the original intention of the American component to have only a unitary and military organization, without political admixture. Moreover, the effect was to produce four sources from which political advice about Italy could validly be issued—the ACC Political Section, the British Resident Minister, the U.S. Political Representative, and a Council in which these two could be outvoted, though this was not necessarily harmful as the Allied Commander in Chief could accept whatever advice he thought best.

It still remains to speak of decentralization in the more limited sense of a trend toward geographically or functionally distinct centers of authority in the same organization. AFHQ came to have an Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) in Naples, a Peninsular Base Section (PBS) given primarily logistical but also civil affairs functions, and a Central Economic Committee (CEC) which was created when the food shortage called for co-ordination of civilian supply distribution. ACC, not to be outdone, had a headquarters for military government in Palermo, a nucleus at the seat of the Italian Government, and a rear headquarters in Naples; another branch was planned for Rome. The number of control organs now just about equaled the number of civilian agencies set up in or for North Africa; it was as though some determinism led to organizational multiplication in civil af-

fairs whether handled by civilians or by the Army. While the process of proliferation came in for a certain amount of ironic comment, such proliferation is a valid ground for irony only if it entails redundancy or confusion.

The first notable indication of misgiving about decentralization came from Lord Rennell, who had introduced it. As soon as the SCAO's administering provinces acted with too great a lack of uniformity in matters which, like price and wage controls, required regional or even national uniformity he had to curtail their freedom of action. As the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) 15th Army Group he issued a directive explicitly specifying the matters on which the SCAO's could issue local orders on their own; later, when the regions were set up, he achieved the same effect by specifying the subjects on which the Regional Civil Affairs Officers (RCAO's) could *not* issue orders without reference to headquarters. These remedies were easy because *en famille*, but General Rennell could only complain morosely when ACC groups, whom he on one occasion called "wandering minstrels," roamed uninvited into one or another of his jurisdictions to set up committees for improving matters which he considered they knew little or nothing about. So, too, members of his public health organization in Naples were offended when AFHQ decided to improve the handling of the typhus epidemic by giving jurisdiction over that one phase of public health to FLAMBO. Because almost all the control agencies had representatives in Naples, the confusion there at times seemed not far short of chaos: "AMG could order the gas turned on and PBS order it turned off; one could deal with one epidemic, the other with another; one could authorize a meeting, the other prohibit it." A source of the confusion here, as indeed also in occupied Italy in general, was that the precise bound-

ary lines between the various jurisdictions had not been made sufficiently clear. Basically, however, as it seemed to a visitor from CAD, the difficulties arose from the extreme decentralization. It simply was "not practicable to deal with the various phases of the occupation as to time, territory, and function with separate organizations." Another spectator from CAD recommended that "in all future occupations the principle be established that for any given country there be a single, governing headquarters." Others would have added that it should not be located, as was MGS, on a different continent.

At a certain point in the operational confusion not only officers on lower levels, as the CAD officer noted, but the highest operational authority in military government, General Rennell, came to the same opinion. On 5 December, evidencing a marked capacity for self-criticism, General Rennell confessed that his division of AMG had "probably been a mistake," although it had seemed logical at a time when, on the assumption of an early occupation of Rome, the expectation was that rear MG territory could soon be transferred to the government. As matters had worked out, Headquarters AMG had not co-ordinated sufficiently with the mobile headquarters accompanying the armies. If at the beginning of December General Rennell found the confusion regrettable, by January he found it intolerable. On 8 January he wrote to General Alexander that the situation could not go on. The unsatisfactory state of affairs had been brought about by the division of authority among three separate administrations—General Rennell corrected himself to mention a fourth as he thought of FLAMBO. He informed General Alexander that "unless practical coordination is effected at once we are in danger of slipping into a position so confused that it will be impossible to ensure good administration in the fu-

ture." General Rennell concluded with a recommendation which was his swan song, as he was soon to return to England. This was that General Alexander centralize authority over all civil affairs in Italy at his own headquarters.

General Alexander on 15 January 1944, having already received AFHQ's approval of the proposal to bring civil affairs throughout Italy under his headquarters, submitted a plan to AFHQ by which the greater co-ordination thereby intended would be realized. It was, in brief, to make one and the same authority, directly subordinate to him, responsible for supervising both the Control Commission and military government, and at the same time to place the Control Commission in charge of co-ordinating civil affairs throughout liberated Italy. This would "ensure continuity of policy and procedure as our troops advance and . . . centralize policy regarding food supply and kindred subjects." On 24 January AFHQ in a General Order brought into effect General Alexander's plan. General Alexander, while continuing as Military Governor, was also made the Representative in Italy of the President of ACC (i.e. of the Allied CinC), with the right to act in his behalf in all civil affairs matters except certain subjects requiring high-level political guidance or involving issues not confined to Italy. The order designated General Mason-MacFarlane (formerly head of the Allied Military Mission) as Deputy President and Chief Commissioner of ACC, and also as Chief Civil Affairs Officer of occupied territory under military government. Further, it disbanded Headquarters AMG and placed Fifth and Eighth Armies AMG under the technical control of Headquarters ACC; military government in rear territory passed also to the control of ACC.

Through other orders, ACC absorbed the civil affairs functions of FLAMBO and also of the Central Economic Committee.

General Mason-MacFarlane, because his headquarters would be with ACC, appointed Brigadier M. S. Lush (formerly Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO) Fifteenth Army Group) as his deputy to represent him at General Alexander's headquarters for the purpose of detailed day-to-day conference, as distinguished from long-term matters which General Mason-MacFarlane would discuss with General Alexander periodically. The new Deputy President proceeded quickly to streamline ACC for discharging its broader responsibilities. The most important organizational change was the establishment of a Regional and Military Government Section to co-ordinate policy and procedure in operations. In writing to the Military Governor a little proudly that "things are very different to what they were,"<sup>3</sup> General Mason-MacFarlane contrasted remote control by MGS with on-the-spot co-ordination of ACC and AMG brought together "as one show." This was the victory, in a word, of centralization.

It was not the kind of centralization, however, which the Allies had started out with. Establishment of armistice control had brought into civil affairs a diversity and complexity; the only kind of centralization that could thereafter succeed was in the exercise of co-ordinative authority, not in the conduct of operations. Operations were of two—in fact, really three—different types: ACC/AMG operations in Army areas, where civil affairs personnel formed part of the staff of the Army Commander but followed as far as possible ACC's policies; ACC operations in military government rear territory, divided into regions, where regional teams, both administrative and technical, advised Italian local officials in full conformity with Headquarters ACC policy; and ACC assistance to higher Italian officials in Italian Government territory. Obviously these diverse and widespread activities entailed numerous centers

of authority, even within any one of these spheres of operation, and in fact, the ACC, in a report of August 1944 to the Advisory Council, stressed the scope given the principle of decentralization as illustrated by the division of field operations among regional and provincial teams. Thus the reorganization represented not the adoption of one pervading principle but rather the determination of the right spheres and relationships for an operational decentralization subordinated to policy-making centralization. Armies and departments of defense had made this determination on the basis of long experience and much experimentation. In civil affairs, with little or no precedent to go on, the Allies in Italy could learn the best solution only through trial and error.

The organizational problem is never over, and, as the concluding documents show, the overhaul of January 1944 had in one area—that of Anglo-American relations—worsened rather than improved the situation. In seeing a British officer placed at the head of ACC, under a British Military Governor and a British Allied Commander in Chief (General Eisenhower had now departed for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) many Americans, who had always been disturbed by British leadership of both the

Political and the Economic Sections, felt more than ever that civil affairs in Italy was a British show. General Eisenhower himself had considered that the question of nationality should not enter into appointments, but the question involved more than national rivalry—it also involved a fear that British politico-economic policies would predominate over American policies. So keen was the resentment of Americans, at least on lower levels, that the Assistant Secretary of War reported the matter to the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, as perhaps calling for attention. After discussions with high British officials General Devers reported back reassuringly that there was a desire to effect a more satisfying distribution of positions. The difficulty was, however, that at this point Americans in ACC would probably not have been satisfied by merely minor readjustments. In their eyes the chief standard of fair allocation was equality of power on the highest levels, and the least that could have been done, whatever the present Deputy President's personal merits, was to assign the top position in ACC to an American as an offset to a British Military Governor. When General Mason-MacFarlane resigned in June, AFHQ did, in fact, appoint an American, Captain Ellery W. Stone, USNR, in his place.

## 1. MILITARY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IS BIFURCATED AND DECENTRALIZED

### STATIC AND MOBILE MILITARY GOVERNMENT CANNOT BOTH BE MANAGED BY ONE ORGANIZATION

[Msg, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, to MGS, AFHQ, 24 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

. . . I do not believe that one pair senior officers can from now on deal with (a) control of mobile AMGOT with two armies and army group headquarters, and (b) static administration in rapidly expanding area.

I have not found satisfactory up to present combination of these functions even with limited responsibilities. . . .

Therefore suggest division of responsibilities to limit mobile AMGOT to combat areas and segregate static areas to another organization dependent on AFHQ.

This is especially true of supply problems beyond day to day needs required initial phase of occupation. After this phase longer term

supply cannot be expected to depend on call forward of goods through army commanders engaged in supplying fighting troops. Call forward on scale required after immediate phase must depend on Headquarters removed from immediate combat problems, namely AFHQ.

My conclusion is that I personally cannot combine both functions.

#### AMGOT IS DIVIDED

[AFHQ Admin Memo to All SCAO's and Heads of Divs, 21 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

#### *I Division of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory Into Two Organizations*

Effective 24 October 1943, the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory established by Administrative Memorandum No. 35, AMG headquarters Palermo, is divided into two organizations: Allied Military Government 15 Army Group, and Headquarters Allied Military Government. The former will administer Allied Military Government in territory in rear of combat zones of the 15th Army Group. The latter will operate in such other Italian territory as is placed under Allied Military Government. The transfer of territory from one organization to the other will be by order of this headquarters.

#### *II Military Governor*

General Sir Harold Alexander, as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15 Army Group, will remain Military Governor of all Italian territory under Allied Military Government.

#### *III Assignment of Chief of Allied Military Government 15 Army Group and of Chief of Headquarters Allied Military Government*

Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Lord Rennell of Rodd to be Chief

of Allied Military Government 15 Army Group, and of Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry to be Chief of Headquarters Allied Military Government.<sup>1</sup>

#### AREAS UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN THE TWO HEADQUARTERS

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(5) . . . The Headquarters at Palermo under the D.C.C.A.O. continued to be charged with the administration of Military Government in Sicily (Region I) and the provinces of Cosenza, Reggio, Catanzaro, Matera and Potenza in Italy (Region II). The administration of Military Government in Region III (Compartment of Campania), the Province of Foggia and the forward areas back of the 5th and 8th Armies was handed over to AMG, 15th Army Group with headquarters at Bari. The C.C.A.O. and a portion of the headquarters staff then at Palermo proceeded to Bari to discharge this responsibility.

(6) On October 26, Region I was formally created under AMG Headquarters at Palermo [see ch. XI, sec. 1]. Lt. Col. Charles Poletti was appointed R.C.A.O. [Regional Civil Affairs Officer.] At the same time Lt. Col. George McCaffrey, previously S.C.A.O. Agrigento Province, Sicily, took the assignment of R.C.A.O. Region II, relieving Lt. Col. Harvey Gerry who proceeded to AMG, 15th Army Group at Bari. The Provinces comprising Region II had been organized on a regional basis since the time of their original occupation. \* \* \*

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<sup>1</sup> As Rennell continued in his position as CCAO, 15 Army Group, he enjoyed a formal jurisdiction over Headquarters AMG in one of his two roles. This headquarters, however, reported to MGS, AFHQ, administratively. At this time the name AMGOT was superseded by AMG.

## 2. DESPITE WASHINGTON'S MISGIVINGS DECENTRALIZATION CONTINUES

#### COMBINED CHIEFS WANT PROSPECTIVE CONTROL COMMISSION AND AMG TO BE COORDINATED AND MERGED

[FAN 248, CCS to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 6210]

1. It is of the utmost importance that the Control Commission for Italy . . . and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure and that their func-

tions be completely co-ordinated under one supreme authority. It is contemplated that AMG's responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into the Control Commission, but while the two organizations are functioning their personnel should be as nearly the same as practicable. In conformity with this, you will announce yourself as President of the Control Commission. . . .

2. Allied Military Government. The directive for AMG for HUSKY will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and the Italian Government with areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction. It is anticipated that those areas will be reduced to a minimum and that the responsibility for the control of civil affairs will be merged into the Control Commission as soon as practicable. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ WANTS CONTROL COMMISSION AND FORWARD AMG UNDER SEPARATE AUTHORITIES

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 15 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 8761, dispatched before receipt of CM-OUT 6210, above]

In view of Italian declaration of war and uncertainty of date on which Italian Government may be able to function from Rome the following arrangements are being made.

1. Allied Commission being activated and will establish a skeleton headquarters in close contact with Italian Government at Brindisi. This skeleton headquarters will consist of heads of sub-commissions of Allied Commission absorbing the Allied Military Mission. First task will be to examine with the Italian Government methods and machinery whereby Italian Territory, at present under Allied Military Government, can pass gradually to Italian Administration supervised by Allied Commission. . . .

2. Forward elements of Allied Commission have been dispatched to Palermo to join AMG headquarters. Intention is that experienced officers of AMG headquarters together with forward elements of Allied Commission will shortly join Allied Commission Headquarters at Brindisi. By that time it is intended that sufficient progress shall have been made to enable steps to be taken looking toward handing over Sicily. . . . Balance of Allied Commission, composed of remainder assigned personnel and certain AMG officers, will join headquarters at Brindisi in due course. This process must necessarily be slow owing to limitations of accommodation and communications, etc.

3. Concurrently with above AMG Headquarters will be split into (A) AMG 15th Army Group responsible to Commander 15th Army Group for military government in rear of combat zone. (B) Headquarters AMG responsible to AFHQ for military government in rear of combat zone. (C) Headquarters Region 1 which will become an Allied Commission region on the transfer of Sicily.

4. Thus, when Sicily is transferred to Italian Administration Headquarters AMG will cease to function in area and be responsible solely for Region 2 or such other territory as is not the responsibility either of 15th Army Group or of Allied Commission. As soon as necessity for such responsibility disappears, Headquarters AMG will be merged into Allied Commission.<sup>2</sup>

#### AFHQ ASKS THAT FORWARD AMG BE LEFT INDEPENDENT

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 16 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9967]

2. . . . Commander-in-Chief 15th Army Group must have command over Military Government in Combat Zone, with local freedom of action to insure that civil affairs are so conducted as to meet military requirements on the spot. Necessary directives to all concerned and co-ordination will continue under this Headquarters.

3. Accordingly submit most strongly:
- (A) That it is only the Static AMG whose responsibilities will be merged into Control Commission;
  - (B) That Deputy President of Commission should not be required to assume title of Military Governor of Occupied Territory;
  - (C) That Vice President of Economic and Administration Section should not be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of AMG.

As regards (A), we agree that functions of Static AMG in rear and Commission must be co-ordinated under Allied Commander-in-Chief, and that the former should be merged into the latter without disruption of Administration or dispersal of personnel.

As to (B), to announce a new Military Governor at this time would lead to confusion and misunderstanding. Considering the short time during which AMG is expected to continue in rear areas, the adverse effect on Italian morale of announcing a new Military Governor, and the

<sup>2</sup> AFHQ and CCS thus agreed on the early merger of the Allied Commission with rear AMG, although AFHQ wanted it, as long as separate, to be under the military governor rather than the Control Commission. The idea of placing the rear zone of military government territory under the control commission apparently originated in September when MGS Outline Plan No. 7 was being considered. Spofford, together with Chanler, then proposed that in the second phase of military government the authority of the tactical commander be passed directly to ACC rather than to a National Headquarters under AFHQ as proposed by MGS. This plan, he considered, would make for better continuity of administration when the area was eventually transferred to the Italian Government. Memo, Spofford for Gen Holmes, MGS, 18 Sep 43, G-5 AFHQ Papers, in MTO, HS files.

desirability of maintaining clear distinction between Military Government and new situation where Italian Government will administer under Commission's control, it had already been arranged for Alexander to remain nominal Military Government. Alexander has agreed to this.

As to (C), for like reasons objectionable and confusing to designate Commission Vice President by a Military Government title.

4. Request that Directive in FAN 248 [CCS Msg 14 October, above] be amended so that only Rear AMG will be merged into Commission, and that the Officers of Commission mentioned in paragraph 3 above be not designated for any Posts in Allied Military Government. . . .

WASHINGTON THINKS THE AREA UNDER AMG TOO IMPORTANT TO BE SEPARATELY CONTROLLED [Msg, McCloy to Eisenhower, 17 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 7604]

We visualize the combat zone will necessarily include substantial economic areas on peninsula such as Naples and Rome. Therefore we feel there is the greatest necessity for identity of personnel, policy and administration. As practical matter what you refer to as Mobile AMG will be the real Government of Italy as it will for sometime include outside of Sicily the greatest population centers of the country. Due to small geographical areas involved we think some identity of personnel is not only practicable but desirable and common direction of the two administrations can best be effected by this means. Identity of personnel in key jobs such as Chief Civil Affairs Officer and Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section is particularly important because the major economic problems are going to arise in the Rome Naples areas. If you have some reluctance to alter Alexander's title or to raise Joyce's title to Military Governor I feel there is no inclination to press. . . .

### 3. MORE ORGANIZATIONS BRING MORE PROBLEMS OF CO-ORDINATION

RUSSIANS OPPOSE AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMISSION UNDER THE THEATER COMMANDER

[Paraphrase of Msg, American Embassy at Moscow to the Secy of State, 26 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43) (1), sec. 1]

The Embassy received this morning a secret communication which was signed by Molotov under date of 25 September.

AFHQ INSISTS A LIMITED FORWARD ZONE SHOULD BE UNDER TACTICAL COMMAND

[Msg, Eisenhower to McCloy, 18 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 11001]

2. When we describe Mobile AMG 15th Army Group we mean Military Government extending back only to rear boundaries Army areas. . . .

4. . . . Moreover, the actual center of Allied Military Government activity is at Palermo. It is at Headquarters there that the personnel for most of the Commission's subcommissions must be organized. This is all in hand, and being done under unified direction. When circumstances permit, the entire organization will function from seat of the Italian Government, which will be at Rome as soon as that city becomes available. It seems evident that senior personnel, who will be unifying activities at Brindisi and Palermo, can not at the same time be supervising the day to day developments of military government along the front of 15 Army Group. Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section, who must give attention to organization of the many technical subcommissions which will be controlling entire Economic and Administrative system of Italy so far as securely recovered, can not at same time act as Chief Civil Affairs Officer in combat zone. The control of Civil Affairs immediately in rear of the fighting must be under command of tactical commander, in this case Alexander. It would violate principles of command were he to receive orders from any other sources than C-in-C.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

5. This explanation should make it clear that mobile AMG 15 Army Group will not be the real government of Italy and will not retain Naples or Rome areas after the front has been pushed beyond them.

<sup>3</sup> On 23 October the CCS cabled that it agreed to let forward AMG continue under tactical authority.

\* \* \* The establishment of an Allied Commission . . . is not considered necessary by the Soviet Government. It is common knowledge that after the ratification of the detailed Armistice Terms the three governments established the Military Political Commission,<sup>4</sup> and conse-

<sup>4</sup> The body of interested United Nations first envisaged at the Moscow Conference but not actually established until later, when it was called the Advisory Council for

quently, the Control Commission which Article 37 of the detailed terms contemplated falls to the ground. Soviet Government has concluded, therefore, that Military Political Commission should include in its work the co-ordination and direction of all activities of the military agencies organized on enemy territory and of any Allied civil authority concerning Armistice questions and of control over compliance with Armistice terms. Therefore, one of the functions of the Military Political Commission should be to issue from time to time directives and instructions on political, military and administrative matters to the Badoglio government, while the Allied Commander in Chief retains complete direction of military operational questions. Therefore, no reason is seen by the Soviet Government for an Allied Commission with these functions to be established under the direction of General Eisenhower. \* \* \*

#### SOVIET PROPOSAL OF DIVIDED AUTHORITY WOULD EMBARRASS THE CINC

[CCAC Paper, Military Political Commission in Mediterranean Area, 1 Oct 43, CAD files, 334, CCAC (9-17-43) (1)]

\* \* \* The Soviet Government proposes that military operational questions only should be left under the direction of the Allied Commander in Chief; while the Mediterranean Commission would issue instructions and directives on other military and political and administrative questions for the Badoglio government. This division of control, whereby there would be two independent sources of authority in the same theater of operation, would be quite impractical and would place the Commander in Chief in an impossible position. Even if confined to political and economic and administrative questions it would be impractical inasmuch as such questions in an active theater are all predominantly affected by military considerations. Moreover, one of these sources of authority as proposed by Soviet Government would not even be under the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. \* \* \*

#### RUSSIAN BID FOR A SHARE IN EXECUTIVE POWER PROMPTS EDEN TO PROPOSE A PURELY ADVISORY BODY

[Msg, Eden to the Dept of State, 1 Oct 43, OPD files, 014.1, Security]

In the view of the Prime Minister and myself nothing must derogate from the authority of the

Italy. In contrast to the Allied Control Commission, the Advisory Council was from the outset envisaged as including the Soviet Union. The Soviet's preference for the latter is thus understandable.

Commander in Chief. Questions affecting interrelation of political and military affairs can only be settled by the Governments concerned. The advice of Politico-Military Commission or of its individual members will be most valuable to them.

In rejecting the Soviet Government's proposal it will be desirable

(a) to indicate role proposed for Politico-Military Commission in regard to Italy, and  
(b) to offer the Soviet Government a satisfactory position on the Control Commission for Italy or whatever authority is set up to ensure the carrying out of the terms.

As regards (a) I suggest that Politico-Military Commission should keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and political problems arising therefrom. For this purpose it should have access to the Control Commission and Allied Commander in Chief. In the light of this information and of their joint examination thereof, its members should tender advice on Italian affairs to their Government either collectively or individually. . . .

As regards (b), our aim might be to associate a Soviet member on a basis of equality with British and United States members. Precise method by which this should be done depends on structure of the Control Commission. I should welcome the views of the United States Government on this point.<sup>5</sup>

#### EISENHOWER WANTS FINAL AUTHORITY OVER BOTH CONTROL COMMISSION AND ADVISORY COUNCIL

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 10939]

1. These are my views on the relationship between the Politico-Military Commission, Allied C-in-C and Allied Control Commission.

2. Whilst there is no objection to the Politico-Military Commission obtaining information from this headquarters on matters which concern them, Allied C-in-C must continue to receive instruction, whether political or military, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from them alone.

3. As regards the Allied Control Commission, experience in North Africa goes to show that so long as active military operations are being carried on, final authority regarding the Political relations between the occupying armies and the local Administration should remain with the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

<sup>5</sup> The United States accepted Mr. Eden's proposals (see below, page 260, Note 10).

4. When operations have ceased, the Commander-in-Chief's interest is reduced to the safety of any bases and the security of any lines of communication on which he may be relying, and normal diplomatic machinery can safely be allowed to function.

5. In applying this analogy to Italy, there would be three periods.

6. During the first period (from the present moment until the Badoglio Government is in a position to exercise effective authority) it is enough that skeleton arrangements be made for a Control Commission.

7. Period Two will be reached when the Badoglio Government is in a position to exercise effective authority. During this stage, operations in Italy will be continuing, and the maintenance of the Commander-in-Chief's authority remains the governing factor. At this point, the Control Commission will become fully operative, and as soon as this happens the Russians and French, and also the Greeks and Yugoslavs, will have to be associated with it. The following arrangement is recommended. Commander in Chief will be President of the Control Commission. His Deputy will be day-to-day managing head. An advisory council to the Commander in Chief (in his capacity as President of the Control Commission) to be formed of High Commissioners representing the U.S.A., UK, USSR, French Committee, Greece and Yugoslavia. They would meet and act as a body and make their own arrangements as to which High Commissioner should be chairman (either the most senior or in rotation).

8. The dual function of the Advisory Council should be to advise the President of the Control Commission on general policy and to take care of any special interests of the States represented on it or their Nationals.

9. Period Three would *not* arrive until either the campaign in Italy was at an end or, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the Allied Governments could bring the direct military control of the Italian Government to an end.

#### THE CCS PRESCRIBES FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, Directive for Control Commission, 23 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/136/256]\*

##### \* \* \* A. Functions

1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under your orders and general directives.

\*The message began by restating the expectation of ultimate merger of AMG and ACC as in the CCS message of 14 October, section 2 above. It added, however,

2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.

3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.

*B. Organization.* The Control Commission will be divided into four sections: (1) Military, (2) Political, (3) Economic and Administrative, and (4) Communications. Each section will be in charge of a vice president, and will be divided into subcommissions as indicated below:

*C. The Military Section, six subcommissions:* (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, and (6) Material Disposal.

*D. The Political Section, three subcommissions:* (1) Foreign and Internal Political Affairs, (2) Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, and (3) Information, Press, Censorship.

*E. The Economic and Administrative Section, two subsections:* (a) Economic and (b) Administrative, each under a director.

*(a) The Economic Subsection, eight subcommissions:* (1) Finance, (2) Foreign Trade, (3) Industry and Commerce, (4) Public Works and Utilities, (5) Fuel, (6) Food, (7) Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries, and (8) Labor.

*(b) The Administrative Subsection, six subcommissions:* (1) Interior, (2) Legal, (3) Public Safety, (4) Education, Fine Arts and Archives, (5) Public Health, and (6) Property Control.

*F. The Communications Section, three subcommissions:* (1) Shipping and Ports, (2) Inland and Civil Air Transportation, and (3) Postal and Tele-Communications.

G. Each Government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes.

H. The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander in Chief, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This is *not* intended to prevent direct communication on routine matters between the commission and London and Washington. All such direct communication would, of course, be authorized by the respective heads of sections and subcommissions, and a copy of every such communication made a part of the records of the commission.

as stated in note 3, that only rear AMG would be merged with the control commission.

#### 4. Personnel

a. Allocation of posts between U.S. and U.K. The commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in number to 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.

b. The allocation of the principal posts between U.S. and U.K. is as follows: (Agreement *not* yet reached) [see below, sec. 7, Msg CCS to AFHQ, 7 Nov 43].

The Deputy Vice President of each section will be of opposite nationality to that of the Vice President.

The nationalities of heads of the sub-commissions will be left to your decision and, insofar as possible, these posts will be distributed equally between the U.S. and U.K. The assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality.

5. Generally speaking, the personnel of the Military, Economic and Administrative, and Communications Sections should have military status and the personnel of the Political Section should have civilian status. Military personnel may at the outset be used in the Political Section, but should be replaced with civilian personnel as soon as practicable. Arrangements may be made where necessary to employ civilian experts within the control commission.

6. It is contemplated that provision will be made for representatives of the dominions and the other interested United Nations to have access to the control commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point.

ACC IS ESTABLISHED UNDER AFHQ WHICH WILL CO-ORDINATE ITS RELATIONS WITH AMG  
[AFHQ Admin Memo 74, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

#### *I—Establishment of the Allied Control Commission*

Announcement is made of the establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, effective 10 November 1943.

*II—Functions* [Identical with par. A, preceding document.] \* \* \*

#### *III—President of the Allied Control Commission*

1. The Allied Commander in Chief will be ex-officio President of the Allied Control Commission.

2. A senior officer will be appointed to serve as his Deputy on the Commission.

#### *IV—Organization of the Allied Control Commission*

1. The Allied Control Commission will maintain a National Headquarters and will have such Regional, Provincial or other outlying offices as may be found convenient.

2. The Allied Control Commission will be organized into Sections, each administered by a Vice President. A Section will comprise a number of related Subcommissions, each charged with a special function.

#### *V—Relations With Allied Military Government*

1. The relations between the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government operating in the field will be co-ordinated by this headquarters.

2. Whenever it is decided that an area under Allied Military Government shall thereafter be administered by the Italian Government subject to the directions of the Allied Control Commission, the latter will extend its activities to include that area.

3. The decision when an area is to be transferred from one government to another will rest with the Allied Commander in Chief.

4. Personnel both for the Allied Control Commission and for Allied Military Government will be provided and allocated by this headquarters.

#### *VI—Relation to Allied Force Headquarters*

1. The Allied Control Commission will operate under Allied Force Headquarters.

2. All communications between the Allied Control Commission and the governments of the United Nations will be transmitted through this headquarters.

#### *VII—Assignment of Acting Deputy President*

Announcement is made of the assignment of Major General Kenyon A. Joyce as Acting Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission.<sup>7</sup>

#### THE ADVISORY COUNCIL—AN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL TO ADVISE AND ULTIMATELY TO CONTROL

[Agreement Signed by the U.S., U.K., and USSR at the Moscow Conf, 8 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/136/226]

An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith composed in the first instance of representatives of the U.K., U.S., Soviet Union, and French Committee of National Liberation. Rep-

<sup>7</sup> Joyce was an American, thus providing a counterpart to the assignment of the military governorship to a British general.

representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war (see note 9, below).

2. Each representative will be assisted when necessary by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander in Chief.

3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational problems. Members of the Council will be supplied by their respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on Political and Military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several representations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have the power to take final decisions. They will not of course concern themselves with military functions of the Allied Commander in Chief.

4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will enforce the terms of surrender.

5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander in Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander in Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations over matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

6. The Allied Commander in Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the U.K. and U.S. Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander in Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of Italy's administration to an end, the Commander in Chief will relinquish the Presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission.

#### THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL IS MARKED BY MORE PROBLEMS WITH THE RUSSIANS

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy<sup>8</sup> to Secy of State, 30 Nov 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43) (1), sec. 1]

. . . Today at AFHQ the initial formal session was convened.<sup>9</sup> It was decided that Massigli should be the presiding officer at this first session, as we had come together on French soil. In the future the position of Chairman will rotate among all the members, which means that a substitute must be available for each member. . . . The Council's Secretariat will include an individual from each national group to be selected by the members concerned. It has been decided that English will be the language of the sessions.

Mr. Vychinsky [Andrei Y. Vishinsky] expressed the keen desire to go to Italy at once. . . .

The Russian members, on reaching Algiers, had the impression that Article 37 of the long-term Armistice Agreement with the Italian Government meant that the Soviet members were appointed automatically to the Control Commission. Chief of Staff has told the Russians that CCS must approve all appointments and that Article 37 merely provides in general that Control Commission shall have representation from the U.N. . . . From our early talks with Vychinsky [*sic*] it became clear also that he thought the functions of the Allied Control Commission were to be decided by the Advisory Council. This concept has been corrected in accordance with specifications of the Moscow Conference. \* \* \*

#### BADOGGIO CLAIMS AN ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE ITALY

[Msg, Badoglio to Eisenhower, 4 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/5]

. . . You are aware with what interest Italian public opinion follows this question. It is therefore superfluous for me to repeat once more what a strong and natural disappointment would come from the knowledge that a committee, expressly formed for the purpose of studying Italian affairs, located in Italy and in the very city where the Royal Government has its seat, should

<sup>8</sup> On 1 November Murphy was made U.S. Political Adviser and U.S. member of the Advisory Council.

<sup>9</sup> At the end of December 1943 the Council decided to give membership also to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments.

start its work with absolute exclusion on our part. And it is for this reason, dear General, that I would be deeply grateful if you would use all your authority and weight in obtaining authorization to have an Italian member also sit in at the meetings, under whatever circumstances you may see fit. I personally believe that the title of observer would be sufficient for the time being. . . .

#### IT IS FOR THE VICTORS ALONE TO ADVISE THE CONTROL COMMISSION

[Msg, AFHQ to ACC, 7 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/5]

. . . Control Commission is representative of the United Nations, to execute Armistice, insure that conduct of Italian Government conforms to Allied requirements, and be organ for conducting relations with Italian Government. Advisory Council, with present representation confined to British, American, Soviet and French representatives, is charged to watch machinery of Control and advise President of Commission on General Policy connected therewith. It would not be in accord with nature and purpose of this body to grant Italian Government either representation or right to send an observer.

#### SOVIET UNION AND THE FRENCH COMMITTEE RECEIVE REPRESENTATION ON ACC

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 7 Dec 43, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, CCAC-48]

. . . Advisory Council met at Brindisi on 3 December 1943; at meeting, Vyshinski (*sic*) held that U.K. and U.S. Governments understood at Moscow that Soviet Government had right to appoint representatives to ACC, under Article 37, and recall appointments already made, the two Governments being so informed.

Similar view regarding French representation on ACC held by French Committee per Massigli.

It was decided by Advisory Council to inform Allied C in C of above and to refer question to Governments respectively. Importance is evidently attached to status on Commission by Russians. \* \* \*

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Jan 44, ABC files, 387.4, CCAC-48/2]

The appointment of a Soviet Member to the Allied Control Commission for Italy is approved. The question of the appointment of a French

member is still under consideration by U.S. and British Governments.<sup>10</sup>

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 12 Feb 44, ABC files, 387.4, CCAC-48/3]

The appointment of a French Member to the Allied Control Commission for Italy . . . is approved.

#### STATE DEPARTMENT FAVORS CO-ORDINATION IN COMMUNICATIONS TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Murphy to CofS, AFHQ, 17 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/226]

\* \* \* In the State Department's views, the Advisory Council for Italy has no direct relationship with the Italian Government, but must use the machinery of the Control Commission for any questions which it wishes to take up with the Italian Government.

The State Department agrees that it will be impossible and undesirable to prevent individual members of the Advisory Council from having personal relations with the members of the Italian Government. It interprets the terms of reference and the directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the effect that individual members of the Advisory Council acting in their official capacities may address the Italian Government. The State Department does not agree with the British view that its member of the Advisory Council should be the channel through which the British Government will communicate with the Italian Government on matters which do not concern the other Governments represented on the Council.

The State Department advises that while it is recognized that Messrs. Macmillan and Murphy are the principal British and American representatives in Italy, it would appear appropriate for them and the other members of the Advisory Council to make any individual official communications which they may have to the Italian Gov-

<sup>10</sup> CCS Paper 453 points out that the United States representatives who were at the Moscow Conference considered that no understanding was reached at that conference substantiating Soviet claims to the right of representation on the Control Commission. Both the British and the Department of State believed it politically advisable, however, to defer to Soviet wishes, and the War Department had no objection. The question of representation for the French National Committee required longer consideration because it was not, like the Soviet Union, a party in behalf of the United Nations to the full armistice terms. CCAC files, 334, Contl Com (9-17-43), sec. 1.

ernment through the Political Section of the Control Commission. It is stated that the advantages during active military operations in Italy of

permitting the Italian Government to establish and maintain communications with only one United Nations body are obvious.

#### 4. TOO MANY COOKS FOR THE BROTH

##### GENERAL RENNELL ADMITS THAT DIVIDING AMG HAS CAUSED IN-CO-ORDINATION

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGP, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

The present administration of occupied Italy displays all the unsatisfactory characteristics of a transitional organization with certain permanent features which in my view make it likely to continue to be unsatisfactory.

At the end of September AMG was divided into two areas, A.M.G. Forward, namely, the 5th and 8th Army areas, and A.M.G. Rear consisting of the rest of the occupied parts of Italy namely the "Compartimenti" (groups of provinces) of Sicily, Calabria and Lucania.<sup>11</sup> The G.O.C.-in-C., 15th Army remained Military Governor of the whole area occupied, forward and rear. The reason for the division of occupied territory into two administrative areas was that the C.C.A.O. had to be with G.O.-in-C. 15th Army Group which was moving to the mainland, but the administrative headquarters of A.M.G. at Palermo could not be moved to a temporary home such as H.Q. 15th Army Group were likely to occupy pending the fall of Rome. The division was probably a mistake but seemed the only solution at the time.

The C.C.A.O., to whom the Military Governor had delegated all powers except the signature of proclamations and the confirmation of death sentences remained titular C.C.A.O. of the whole. In practice the C.C.A.O. personally administered the forward areas from Bari where the headquarters of the 15th Army Group were placed; the D.C.C.A.O., Brigadier General McSherry, administered the rear areas from Palermo, referring direct to M.G.S., A.F.H.Q., on all administrative matters. He was supposed to keep the Military Governor in touch with major developments in

the rear areas, but failed signally to do so. In addition to these two administrative areas of Allied Military Government, the four southern provinces of Apulia [Apulia] . . . as well as Sardinia remained under the Italian Government at Brindisi. . . .

As a temporary measure this arrangement could have worked satisfactorily had, as was envisaged at the beginning of October, the Italian Government been transferred to Rome and the Allied Commission of Control been set up at its side with little delay since upon this happening the whole of A.M.G. rear would also have been handed over to the Italian Government under the control of the A.C.C. In view of the early expected transfer, the A.C.C. was brought into existence on 11th November, when the Allied Military Mission ceased to exist and the staff was merged into the A.C.C. Nevertheless up to the time of writing no additional territory has been handed over to the Italian Government; and in consequence the division of the administration of Southern Italy into three parts described has proved most unsatisfactory. The quality of A.M.G. in Sicily and Southern Italy has deteriorated and considerable political difficulties have arisen from the diversity of regime in Apulia, Lucania, and the forward areas, such as Naples and Foggia.<sup>12</sup>

##### ACC EFFORT TO IMPROVE MATTERS SEEMS UNHELPFUL

[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

\* \* \* the Administration of AMG Forward and Rear has been rendered much more difficult and less efficient by the constant visits of parties

<sup>11</sup> At this time, AMG Forward (AMG 15th Army Group) was responsible for all territory north of the provinces of Salerno, Potenza, and Bari (Region Three) and the small part of Region Four then in Allied hands. AMG Rear (Headquarters AMG) was in command of all territory (including Sicily) south of the northern boundaries of the above-mentioned provinces. It had not proved possible to develop a joint ACC/AMG headquarters at Headquarters AMG as was originally contemplated. AMG Admin Memo 2, 4 Dec 43.

<sup>12</sup> It is interesting that Rennell is here questioning, from the vantage point of hindsight, the division of AMGOT which he himself recommended. (See above, section 1, his memorandum of 24 September.) To be sure, as he points out, his original recommendation was based upon the assumption that with an early capture of Rome extensive territory could be transferred to an Italian Government functioning effectively in the capital. Had there been this early transfer of territory, the areas of military government to be co-ordinated would have been much smaller.

of A.C.C. officers who rarely remain long enough in one place to learn anything of value, but who seek to justify existence by criticising matters which they do not understand or trying to institute committees to perform functions which are not their concern. This especially true at Naples. \* \* \*

#### STILL ANOTHER CO-ORDINATING AGENCY IN CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[AFHQ Admin Memo 92, 19 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/62]

1. To insure the necessary co-ordination and control of civilian supply and economic matters in occupied or controlled territory of the Italian mainland, there will be established in Naples a Central Economic Committee under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer or his Deputy, responsible direct to this headquarters. In addition to the chairman, there will be one senior representative of AMG 15th Army Group and one senior representative to be designated jointly by the Allied Control Commission and AMG Headquarters. The representative of ACC/AMG will be the executive vice chairman. The vice chairman and the representative of AMG 15th Army Group will devote their full time to the work of the committee. [Chapter XII deals with civilian supply and the food crisis.]

2. Such other personnel as may be required will be made available by the Allied Control Commission, AMG Headquarters and AMG 15th Army Group upon the request of the committee. Necessary vehicles and other equipment will also be provided by these three headquarters as requested by the committee. \* \* \*

#### REPORT TO CAD ON ADMINISTRATIVE IN-CO-ORDINATION AND ON NOT TOO PROMISING ATTEMPTS AT REMEDY

[Rpt, Chanler, former CLO, AMGOT Hq, to the Dir, CAD, 21 Dec 43, CAD files, 091.1 AMG (5-27-43) sec. 2.]

57. A . . . complicated problem which confronted AMG as soon as operations in the field commenced was the extent to which such a central headquarters should itself centralize or decentralize its functions of government. It was the original intention to give the greatest possible amount of power and independence to provincial Senior Civil Affairs Officers, with only a minimum degree of centralized control from headquarters. This policy was adopted in an-

icipation of the difficulties of communication which would exist, at least during the early phases. The facts amply sustained the expectation. There were many provinces which were almost entirely out of communication with headquarters during the first five or six weeks, and after the 8th Army had swept through the Calabrian Peninsula, an even worse situation arose. . . .

58. Accordingly, the theory of decentralization proved to have been soundly conceived. On the other hand, it had many disadvantages in practice despite the difficulties of communication. The business of government is an extremely difficult and specialized one, and it is expecting too much of any organization to count on having enough competent Civil Affairs Officers to give each independent power to govern a province containing in many cases as many as 400,000 to 500,000 people. Some proved unequal to the task and required continual guidance from above. Others who had plenty of ability and initiative proved too independent over the decentralized system, with the result that increasing divergence in both policy and practice began to appear in different provinces of the island.

59. To give a few examples by way of illustration: The Senior Civil Affairs Officer of one province which was itself not a great wheat producer, but which was surrounded by wheat producing provinces, decided on his own responsibility that the best way to solve his food problem was to increase the price of wheat in his province. Owing to bad communications, he did this without reference to headquarters, and this was not discovered until complaints were received from the neighboring agricultural provinces that their wheat was being drained out to the province where the price had been raised. . . .

61. This problem received very serious discussion and consideration at AMG Headquarters, which found itself divided between "State's Righters" and "Federalists." Finally, a directive was prepared, entitled "Powers of Local Legislation," which was agreed to by all, drastically limiting the rights of provincial Senior Civil Affairs Officers to issue local orders. A list of about 14 subjects was prepared as to which they had the right to issue local orders without reference to headquarters. Most of these were of a police nature. Everything else had to be referred to headquarters except that in case of real emergency and inability to communicate, they were authorized to issue any necessary order

and to immediately inform headquarters of the action taken.

62. The same issue arose again in a different phase by the end of October, when the regional organizations were set up. After considerable discussion at headquarters a directive was in the course of preparation by the end of November, approaching the subject from the opposite standpoint: instead of providing what subjects the regional Civil Affairs Officers were permitted to deal with on their own responsibility, this directive covered the subjects which they were not permitted to go into without authoritative reference to main headquarters.<sup>13</sup> This change of course was necessary because a regional Civil Affairs Officer, having a much larger area to govern, must have greater independent power.

64. Unquestionably, decentralization is not the most efficient form to adopt for a military government, provided communications between provinces and headquarters are reasonably well established. The political advantages of decentralization (such as the prevention of dictatorship by an overpowerful central government) are of course non-existent in military government, which in the first place, is only temporary, and in the second place, is essentially vested with dictatorial powers in any event. \* \* \*

#### LORD RENNELL ATTEMPTS TO SECURE CO-ORDINATION AMONG RCAO'S

[Directive, Rennell to SCAO's Fifth and Eighth Armies and RCAO's Rgns III and IV, 1 Jan 44, ACC files, 10260/142/2673]

I have, during the last few weeks, tried to co-ordinate the efforts of the three administrative authorities governing that part of Italy not under German occupation, viz, Italian Government, AMG Rear, and AMG, 15 Army Group, in so far as decisions which affect the whole territory are concerned. AFHQ has now issued an instruction that no decisions which affect salaries and wages of civil servants, prices of basic commodities, wage rates, etc., are to be made without previous consultation with the three authorities concerned.

2. I wish the same principle to be applied within AMG, 15th Army Group. Unilateral decisions on matters which will affect other Regions, or commands, will not be made without reference to these Headquarters who will consult the other R.C.A.O.'s and S.C.A.O.'s and make the decision. As an example I should expect an

<sup>13</sup> The proposed directive here referred to is reproduced in the following document, dated 1 January 1944.

R.C.A.O. to refer to these Headquarters before issuing orders on the following:—

(a) Matters likely to affect occupied territory as a whole, as opposed to the specific region (e.g. price, wage and ration scales).

(b) Matters involving some relationship with other Regions (e.g. inter-regional shipments, inter-regional supply movement, movement of refugees).

(c) Matters which raise legal, political or ecclesiastical questions of a character which may require handling by this Headquarters or higher headquarters (e.g. policy as to internees and foreign nationals, matters affecting ecclesiastical personnel, repeal or suspension of Fascist Laws.)

(d) Matters involving a substantial change in Italian law or administrative procedure, other than of local application (e.g. modification of social insurance systems, agricultural tax structure, labour laws).

(e) Matters involving policy affecting institutions organised or operating on a National basis (e.g. banks, insurance companies).

There will be other matters not on this list which I leave to the discretion of the R.C.A.O.'s and S.C.A.O.'s.

3. This smacks of centralisation; but the need for co-ordination in administering even forward combat areas is so great that I believe that you will find this degree of centralisation a help rather than a hindrance. \* \* \*

#### THIS CONFUSION CANNOT GO ON—THE MILITARY GOVERNOR MUST CO-ORDINATE

[Draft Memo, Rennell for CG, 15th AGp, 8 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

1. I must draw your attention to the unsatisfactory state of affairs from the administrative point of view in that part of Italy not under German occupation caused by the division of authority among three separate administrations. . . .

2. These three administrations were established without any apparent provision for local co-ordination and the administration of ——— million people in this area is quite impossible unless co-ordination is effected. Moreover, since the setting up of these administrative organisations, various functions which should properly be carried out by the Italian Government or A.M.G., have been delegated direct by A.F.H.Q. to Advance Adm. Ech., A.F.H.Q.<sup>14</sup> and thus a fourth administra-

<sup>14</sup> This advanced echelon of AFHQ was established at Naples in the middle of October and operated in economic matters through a so-called Central Economic Committee. See AFHQ Admin Memo 92, 19 Dec 43, above.

tive authority has appeared to deal with supplies and food distribution, transportation, and latterly, the typhus epidemic in Naples city.

3. The result of this has led to confusion in the administrative field. Unilateral legislation has been promulgated by the separate administrative authorities. In Region I the wages of civil servants were raised without reference to any other part of the territory. The Italian Government has recently issued decrees relating to the basic price of oil and wheat. Advance A.F.H.Q. issued an over-all price for petrol. Other instances of unilateral procedure need not be quoted.

4. Administration under these conditions is virtually impossible even from the point of view of military government. It is not my province to plead for the Italian Government but from their point of view, remembering that we have assured them of our support and must indeed give them our support as an administrative machine, the position must be quite impossible.

5. It is, in my opinion, essential that co-ordina-

tion should be achieved between the (civil) administrative authorities and that that co-ordination should be centralised at your Headquarters as Military Governor in the present circumstances and as G.O.C.-in-C. of Allied troops in Italy in the future.

6. In an endeavour to carry out what I believe is the policy of the Allied Governments I am trying to administer the forward territories, subject always to Allied military interests, in such a way that they can be easily turned over to the Italian Government in the future. This concerns the appointment of Italian officials acceptable to the present Italian Government and the framing of legislation which is in keeping with Italian administrative policy for the future, for I conceive it our duty that some kind of continuity shall prevail.

7. But unless practical co-ordination is effected at once we are in danger of slipping into a position so confused that it will be impossible to ensure good administration in the future.

## 5. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR BRINGS ACC AND AMG TOGETHER WITH ACC CO-ORDINATING

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR WILL ASSUME OVER-ALL RESPONSIBILITY AND STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT  
[Msg, Alexander to AFHQ, 15 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/594]

. . . In view of urgent necessity of simplifying the organization for the direction and control of civil affairs in Italy I propose to make following arrangements on assuming responsibility for all occupied Italian territory. First. Mason MacFarlane as head of the Allied Commission of Control to assume responsibility for all Italian territory including that which under existing procedure would be under separate AMG control. This will ensure continuity of policy and procedure as our troops advance and will centralise policy regarding food supply and kindred subjects which is essential if best use is to be made of available resources. Second. Mason MacFarlane to be my adviser on all civil and political matters and to be represented at my headquarters by Brigadier [M. S.] Lush acting as his deputy. MGS staff now with Flambo [AFHQ advance administrative echelon] to be embodied in Lush's staff. Under this system I would deal with long term policy by means of periodical meetings and discussions with Mason MacFarlane and with day to day affairs through Lush who would be guided

by general directives issued by Mason MacFarlane. This would I understand facilitate considerable reductions in AMG staffs, would ensure unified and properly integrated policy and would enable me to exercise general control and obtain considered advice through one channel only which is essential from my point of view. . . .

### AMG IS INTEGRATED WITH ACC UNDER THE TACTICAL COMMANDER

[AFHQ, GO 5, 24 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

\* \* \* *I General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force to Exercise Certain Functions of President of Allied Control Commission*

General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., while serving as General Officer Commanding in Chief, Allied Central Mediterranean Force,<sup>15</sup> will be the Representative in Italy of the President of the Allied Control Commission and act for and on his behalf carry

<sup>15</sup> Fifteenth Army Group was brought on 18 January 1944 within the newly formed Allied Central Mediterranean Force. On 9 March 1944 the name was to change once again, to Allied Armies in Italy.

out the functions of the President of the Allied Control Commission in Italy in respect to such matters as shall be delegated to him from time to time by the President of the Allied Control Commission. General Alexander will continue to be the Military Governor of such occupied territory in Italy (including Sicily) as remains under Allied Military Government.

## II *Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, To Be Chief Commissioner and Chief Civil Affairs Officer*

Lieutenant General Sir Frank N. Mason MacFarlane, K.C.B., D.S.C., M.C., while serving as Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission will be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission; he will also be Chief Civil Affairs Officer of occupied territory under Allied Military Government. His Headquarters will be Headquarters, Allied Control Commission and, in addition, it will be the Civil Affairs Branch of Headquarters Allied Central Mediterranean Force.

## III *Disbandment of Headquarters Allied Military Government: 15th Army Group: Responsibilities of Allied Control Commission*

1. Headquarters, Allied Military Government, 15th Army Group (now Allied Central Mediterranean Force) is disbanded. Headquarters, Allied Military Government, Fifth and Eighth Armies, will operate under the operational command of Commanders Fifth and Eighth Armies and under the technical control of Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.

2. All Italian territory not under Allied Military Government will be administered by the Italian Government, under the direction of the Allied Control Commission.

3. A Regional Organization on the present lines will be maintained until further orders. The responsibility for all territory now under Headquarters Allied Military Government passes to Headquarters, Allied Control Commission.

## CERTAIN QUESTIONS MUST STILL BE REFERRED TO HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

[Memo, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, for the CG, ACMF, 28 Jan 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy (sec. 1-B), CCAC, Memo for Info No. 22]

2. Certain powers and duties under the Armistice and under the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff are fastened upon the Allied Commander in Chief. As an incident to his command he is

made the President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The purpose . . . is not to divest the Allied Commander in Chief of the office of President of the ACC, which has been vested in that appointment by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but merely to authorize and direct the C.G. CinC ACMF to perform on his behalf, in Italy, certain of the functions which belong to the President of the ACC. By the creation of a command over the Allied Central Mediterranean Force, and by the measures provided in GO No. 5 of AFHQ, a unified control over Allied Military Government and Allied Control Commission has been made possible. It is the desire of this Headquarters that so far as is practicable all problems of Civil Affairs arising in Italy shall be solved on the ground and under the control of the G.O. CinC ACMF, and accordingly the Allied CinC empowers the G.O. CinC ACMF to act for him in such matters.

3. Certain subjects will require reference to this Headquarters. This will be the case with matters which call for high political guidance, or raise issues not confined to Italy. Civilian Supply is another category where reference to this Headquarters will often be requisite, in view of the responsibility of the theater commander to decide, if needs be conflicting. There will, moreover, be questions other than the foregoing which because of their importance, intrinsically or as precedents, should be submitted to the commander on whom the final responsibility rests. \* \* \*

## BUT THINGS ARE NOW VERY DIFFERENT WITH ON-THE-SPOT CONTROL

[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Gen Wilson, CinC, AF,<sup>36</sup> 20 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

\* \* \* You probably know that there is pretty strong feeling over here as regards the way in which M.G.S. has endeavored to run things over here by remote control rather than by leaving things to the people on the spot to do. Furthermore, there is evidence that questions occasionally get blocked and held up in M.G.S.

With A.C.C. and A.M.G. now running as one show under one Headquarters things are very

<sup>36</sup> Wilson had succeeded Eisenhower as Allied CinC on 8 January, when the latter left for England to assume charge of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion. General Wilson's title was, on 9 March, changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED).

different to what they were and it may be that M.G.S. has not yet accustomed itself to the new set-up.<sup>17</sup> \* \* \*

#### THE LESSON IS CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

[Memo, Clabaugh, CAD, for the Dir, CAD, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-28-43) (2)]

3. No estimate of the situation in Italy could be made at the time of our visit without taking cognizance of the difficulties in the organization of civil affairs. The problems inherent in the situation were multiplied and intensified by the creation of two military governments in Italy separated by what came to be known as the "Mason-Dixon Line"—the northern border of Salerno, Potenza and Bari Provinces.

4. The military government of Naples was under the command of the 15th Army Group located at Bari; the military government of Sicily was under AMG-ACC located at Naples; to communicate with each other they had to go through Algiers. ACC was established at Brindisi (the staff living 60 miles away at Santa Cesarea), with a forward headquarters planned at Salerno and a rear headquarters at Naples. A separate group was planned for Rome. There was a forward echelon at AFHQ, but with only two or three civil affairs officers attached to it. Both AMG and the Peninsular Base Section

<sup>17</sup> The version of the issue in AFHQ was quite different. It was to the effect that MGS had wished ACC to assume more responsibility but was compelled—particularly in civilian supply—to run much of the show itself because of the unreadiness of the newly organized headquarters. In any case, MGS, after the amalgamation of AMG and ACC, was of much less importance in operational issues of Italy, although, in regard to the Mediterranean Theater as a whole, its importance increased and it was elevated in May 1944 to the status of G-5. See Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, OCMH, Chapter V, page 7.

[PBS]<sup>18</sup> were exercising jurisdiction over Naples. For instance, AMG could order the gas turned on and PBS order it turned off; one could be dealing with one epidemic, the other with another; one could authorize a meeting, the other prohibit it. At one and the same time there were headquarters at Palermo, Naples, Salerno, Bari and Brindisi dealing with problems of more than local or provincial import. Questions of fiscal policy, social insurance, price control, power, distribution, transportation and many others are national in their scope and do not respect artificial lines. The experience demonstrates that in the administration of occupied territory, it is not practicable to deal with the various phases of the occupation as to time, territory and function with separate organizations. The line of demarcation is seldom clear. There is overlapping in all. What is indicated, in the opinion of the officers interviewed, is one continuing integrated organization sufficiently flexible to meet the various phases as to time, territory and function, but avoiding the conflicts that are inevitable under separate organizations even with the best of intentions. This applies to the division as between AMG 15th Army Group and Regions I and II, which were under AMG/ACC. It applies also to the relations between AMG and the Base Sections. As to AMG and ACC, their eventual merger was facilitated by their organization along parallel lines. They were in effect a single organization. The experience here affords a pattern for the transition from military government to allied missions in the case of the other countries yet to be liberated.

5. The transition and integration finally came in the case of Italy with the appointment of Lt. Gen. Mason MacFarlane as Deputy President of the ACC and Chief Civil Affairs Officer with jurisdiction over all Italian territory under Allied Control. \* \* \*

<sup>18</sup> The section of AFHQ which was vested with logistical functions in Italy.

## 6. ACC IS STREAMLINED FOR GREATER CO-ORDINATION

#### A NEW STATEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF ACC

[Memo, Hq, ACC for All Concerned, 23 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/1065]

5. The Allied Commander in Chief will be ex-officio President of the Commission. The General Office Commanding in Chief, Allied Cen-

tral Mediterranean Forces, will be acting President. The acting senior officer of the Commission will be Chief Commissioner who will serve as Deputy President of the Commission.

6. The Commission will be divided into five Sections: Economic, Administrative, Military, Political, and Communications. Sections will be in charge of Vice Presidents or Directors and, in

each case, will comprise one or more Subcommissions. . . .

7. Each Section or Subcommittee will maintain a headquarters staff. Some will also have representatives in the field. The existing regional organizations will be continued initially to correspond to such regional authority as may be set up by the Italian Government, or otherwise as administrative convenience may dictate.

8. A.C.C. personnel in the field will be known as Control Commissioners with designation of their particular specialist category where appropriate. For example, Control Commission (Legal), Control Commission (Public Health). The Chief Control Officer in the Region will be known as the Regional Control Commissioner (RCC).

9. Particulars as to the nature of the duties of A.C.C. field officers will be specified by the Subcommissions to which they are assigned. However, the following guides are applicable to all:

(a) The primary function of A.C.C. officers in the field will be to give assistance and guidance to and to supervise the local Italian officials and to convey such instructions to them as may be authorized either in specific instances or generally under this and further directives.

(b) Each A.C.C. officer will also carefully observe the operation of the Italian Government in the area or administrative field of his responsibility in order to determine whether the terms of the surrender are being vigorously and effectively enforced. The results of such observations will be the subject of periodic or special reports to higher headquarters.

(c) A.C.C. field personnel will have no power to command or direct Italian officials in connection with the performance of their duties. In this respect their powers and duties are to be contrasted with those of officers of AMG.

(d) Particularly during the transition stage and until the authority of the Italian Government is fully established and the administrative machine is functioning smoothly, the Italian officials will probably require considerable advice, information and assistance from A.C.C. officers. It is entirely proper in this way to support the authority of the Italian officials. Care should be taken, however, not to interfere directly or to give the appearance of interfering directly in or with the local administration except in real emergency.

(e) A.C.C. personnel must also take great care to avoid becoming involved in political disputes or conflicts. A.C.C. officers will deal only with the officials selected by the Italian Government. The competency of these officials and the quality of their administration will be the re-

sponsibility of the Italian Government. However, when officials behave in a manner likely to prejudice the position of the Allied Forces by violation of the terms of surrender or otherwise, A.C.C. personnel will take any action that may be authorized and promptly submit a report with recommendations to higher headquarters.

(f) Close co-ordination will be necessary between A.C.C. and tactical and administrative forces in the area. Certain committees have already been established (i.e. Local Resources Boards). Information as to these committees and other inter-service agencies will be communicated to field personnel where necessary. It is essential in order that confusion be avoided that the channels of communication with the Italian authorities remain as few and as simple as possible.

10. The disposition of A.C.C. personnel and their operations will be communicated by Regional Commissioners or by A.C.C. Headquarters. The following general rules will, however, apply:

(a) Generally there will be no A.C.C. field officers in the communes or in a position comparable to that of the C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. under AMG. General administration will, therefore, be subject to A.C.C. control at the provincial level. Such local inspection as may be required will be worked out from A.C.C. regional or provincial Headquarters.

(b) In the transition stage and until the Italian administration is functioning satisfactorily A.C.C. personnel will, subject to subparagraph (a) above, be disposed on a basis approaching that of AMG. An effort will be made to reduce numbers as quickly as conditions permit.

#### *Regional Organization*

11. It is understood that the Italian Government intends to appoint Italian Regional Commissioners in certain areas to function until the Italian Government can effectively communicate with and maintain control of the provinces. In other areas to be turned over, the Italian Government may communicate directly with the provincial officials. In either case, A.C. will initially appoint a Regional Control Commissioner. In regions in which there is an Italian Regional Commissioner the R.C.C. will, under directives of A.C.C. headquarters, establish control at the regional level and work with his Italian counterpart. In regions where there is no Italian commissioner the R.C.C. will serve as channel for communication with A.C.C. personnel in the field and as a regional representative of A.C.C. Headquarters. \* \* \*

CHANGES IN ACC AND THE REASONS FOR THEM  
[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane, Deputy President, ACC, to Hq, ACCMF, 26 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/100/62]

1. With the inevitably scattered lay-out of the organizations with which A.C.C. has to deal it is essential that the Deputy President should have a Vice President as his personal deputy both to act in his absence and to be located near one of the main co-operating organizations where the situation necessitates this.

2. I am abolishing the post of Chief of Staff. This Officer and his office had far too much to do.

I am substituting a Secretary-General with adequate staff to deal with co-ordination at Main Headquarters and much of the work hitherto done by the Chief of Staff will devolve upon the Regional Control and Military Government Section now being formed.

3. It has become quite clear in practice that a combined Administrative and Economic Section was too big, too unwieldy and altogether too large to be effectively worked as one entity.

I have, therefore, divided it into an Administrative Section and an Economic Section each under a Vice President.

I have added the Subcommissions for Internal Transportation and Shipping to the Economic Section and have established the previous Communications Section which did not warrant a combination under a Vice President.

4. I have set up a new Regional Control and Military Government Section. This will be the executive section for dealing with Allied Military Government and control "in the field." It will also be responsible for security and internal administration. It will deal with a great deal of work hitherto done by the previous Chief of Staff.

The section will be of great importance and fully warrants its head being a Vice President.

5. The Political Section is advisory only and it will function adequately under joint British and American directors. This is what it has been doing for the past four months.

Its advice on the subject of questions connected with Displaced Persons will be most valuable and always sought, but there are many disadvantages in placing the Displaced Persons Subcommission under the Political Section.

6. As regards the Independent Subcommissions, all these work very much on their own. They do not fit into any of the main sections and they are best left to work independently under the direction of the Deputy President working through the Secretary General.

I am fusing the P.W. Subcommission and Displaced Persons Subcommission as under the

existing organization there has been a great waste of available resources. This Subcommission will have a P.W. Subsection and a Displaced Persons Subsection but the personnel at the disposal of the Chief of the Subcommission will be available for either Subsection and can be switched from one to the other in accordance with the pressure of prisoners or refugees at the moment.

7. I have kept the balance of British and American appointments just about equal on the higher level. Admittedly both Vice President and principal assistant in the Economic Section are American but the majority of the heads of sub-commissions in this Section are British. \* \* \*

#### CO-ORDINATION OF THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BY A NEW SECTION IN ACC

[Memo, Hq, ACC, for All Concerned, 31 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

6. It is the wish of the Chief Commissioner that the Regional organization should continue both in the areas under Military Government and those under advisory control. The S.C.A.O.'s, 5th and 8th Armies, the R.C.A.O.'s of Regions III, IV and V, and the Regional Control Commissioners of Sardinia and Regions I and II will maintain their organizations (on a reduced scale in the two latter cases) and all specialist officers in the Regions as well as the C.A.O.'s and C.A.P.O.'s and C.C.'s [Chief Commissioners] will be under their command.

7. In order to centralize control of the Regional organizations (including 5th and 8th Armies AMG) and to ensure compliance by the Italian Government with the advice rendered to them and the execution of the Chief Commissioner's orders, as advised by the Economic and Administrative Sections, a third Section has been set up to be called the Regional Control and Military Government Section headed by an Executive Commissioner having the status of a Vice President under whose immediate command will come the R.C.A.O.'s and R.C.C.'s and their staffs both administrative and specialist in all matters, and the S.C.A.O.'s, 5th and 8th Armies and the military personnel of Headquarters, ACC, for administration and discipline.

8. On all matters of policy the Chief Commissioner's orders and directives (as advised by the Subcommissions) will be passed to the R.C.A.O.'s and R.C.C.'s by this Section. Heads of Subcommissions will correspond with their representatives in the Regions (but not with representatives of other Subcommissions) on routine technical matters only. R.C.A.O.'s and

R.C.C.'s will address themselves on all matters to the V.P. of the R.C. [Regional Control] and M.G. Section, which will also carry out (in the Establishment Branch), the MS, A&Q, G-1 and G-4 duties for all personnel of the ACC. All postings and assignments to Regions and to Headquarters will be made by the Section and no transfers of personnel from Region to Region will be carried out except by this Section.

9. This Section will also be responsible for Displaced Persons, Security and for proper liaison between ACC and Regions and all Allied military (all services) formations.

10. It is important to maintain the channel of communication to Regions and Army AMG's through this Section in order that co-ordination of policy, continuity in administration and close liaison with military formations and units may be ensured, so far as is possible, both in the areas administered by Allied Military Government and in the territory in which the Allied officers act in an advisory capacity-only.

11. It is therefore, the Chief Commissioner's wish that Subcommissions should err on the side of passing too much through this Section, especially during the early stage, rather than of dealing direct with their representatives in the field.

#### FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE ARE TAKEN OVER BY ACC

[ACC Hq, Rpt for Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, ACC (1-27-44), sec. 1]

2. Action by the executive staff was limited by the fact that the Committee was not able to obtain an adequate number of officers. The additional officers required were not made available by ACC/AMG either because there were no officers with the proper qualifications on its staff or because ACC/AMG considered the qualified officers could not be spared. However, the executive staff did initiate central records of supplies on hand, allocate supplies arriving at the ports, initiate a study of the possibility of increasing the basic ration, commence a survey of the warehousing problem and of the bulk wheat handling problem, initiate a study of existing civilian motor transport, and handle, in conjunction with MGS Advance, the bidding for tonnage and diversions of ships and various matters referred to it by the Local Resources (Italian) Board.<sup>19</sup>

3. On 20 January . . . General [Mason] Mac-

Farlane stated that it was the wish of ACC to take over the functions of the Committee . . . as soon as the necessary reorganization of ACC could be completed so as to enable it to perform the functions of the Committee. \* \* \*

#### ALL FOOD PROBLEMS ARE PLACED UNDER A FOOD SUBCOMMISSION OF ACC

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 22 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 8564]

Food Subcommittee should be responsible for whole field of Food Policy, including rationing, import and export, agricultural production and comprehensive policy of fixing prices to merchants, processors, distributors, retailers, and consumers.

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

(35) During the month the Food Subcommittee was organized at Headquarters A.C.C. and assumed the responsibility for the importation, warehousing and distribution of food. Requisitions continue to be made through the Industry and Commerce Subcommittee. A substantial portion of the staff of the Food Subcommittee came from the Central Economic Committee and the balance from the Industry and Commerce Subcommittee.

#### ACC/AMG ORGANIZATION IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT ARMY TERRITORY

[ACC to the Advisory Council for Italy, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Government, 25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/268]

12. The functions of ACC differ in different parts of Italy. Three phases may be distinguished; two in Military Government territory, which is that territory which has not been restored to the administration of the Italian Government and is still under Allied Military Government and one in territory restored to the Italian Government. The two phases in Military Government territory are:—

(a) Army Areas where the representatives are directly under the control and form part of the staff of the Army Commander;

(b) Areas behind the Armies which are formed into Regions under the command of Regional Commissioners who are responsible to the Chief Commissioner through R.C. and M.G. Section. \* \* \*

13. In Army areas policies formulated by the Chief Commissioner are in theory paramount but it is not possible or desirable to place all into

<sup>19</sup> A board established under AFHQ for the utilization and conservation of Italian local resources for the Allied armed forces.

effect at once.<sup>20</sup> Only those of first importance to operations are brought into force, as may be expedient according to the course of operations and the requirements of the Army.

26. In the Army areas, that is to say, where operations are progressing, a team of Allied Officers on the same lines as the Regional teams under a Senior Civil Affairs Officer is attached to the Headquarters of each Army. These Allied Military Government teams set up the initial phases of Military Government in a liberated territory as the Armies move forward. It is they who post the Proclamations of the Commander in Chief and appoint the provisional Italian local government immediately after occupation. Their primary duty is to establish law and order among the civilian population, to maintain the people with sufficient food and to render first aid to public utilities affecting the health and economics of the territories. Their secondary duty is to establish normality particularly on the agricultural and economic side as soon as the shock of battle has passed over the territory. The staffs of these Army AMG's are distributed among the Corps and Divisions of the combat troops. When a town is taken a Civil Affairs Officer with technical staff is posted therein. As the Armies go forward the staffs of Regions already formed under which the newly liberated areas will fall, follow up the Army AMG's and reinforce the staffs on the Army AMG's. Eventually, as the Army line moves forward the area is handed over to the static Regional Commissioner who maintains in places [*sic*] officers he had already sent up as reinforcements for the Army and begins regional control under Allied Military Government.

27. It will be seen that the Army AMG's are constantly moved forward, taking over new areas, while the Regional organization comes later and is on a static and more permanent basis.

28. In the forward areas the Provinces and Regions are governed under AMG. The administration, however, is carried out always through the Italian machinery of local government and the fullest employment is made of Italian officials purged of their Fascist element. One of the primary duties of both AMG Armies and Regional Commissioners is constantly to remove Fascist personnel, Fascist institutions and Fascist doctrines. \* \* \*

#### ACC ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS IN MILITARY GOVERNMENT REAR TERRITORY

[ACC to the Advisory Council for Italy, 25 Aug 44, Rpt, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Govt]

14. As conditions become more settled, the extent to which these [ACC] policies are carried out extends until in the Regions under Military Government they are all in operation. In these areas the responsibility is full and can be implemented by direct order and extends to the actual administration of the territory.

16. As an example of our increasing close relationship with the Italian Government we have evolved a system whereby the decrees passed by the Italian Government are almost invariably made operative by use in Military Government territory. That this is possible is a tribute to the co-operation between ACC and the Italian Government in the planning of decrees. In this connection it should be mentioned that the policy of ACC is that except in certain cases where military necessity dictates policy (e.g. restriction of movement) the Italian Government are the planners and draftsmen of decrees and ACC are advisers on the general policy to such decrees.

23. Policy is framed in the Administrative, Economic and Political Sections under their Vice Presidents in consultation with each other and the Chief Commissioner. This policy affects and is affected by external matters and the interior, political and economic situation in the country. The execution of policy is carried out by teams of Allied Officers both administrative and technical, in the field. In order to decentralize the work of the ACC in the field, the territory has been divided up into Regions under the command of Regional Commissioners. At present there are six Regions, viz., Region I (Sicily), Region VI (Sardinia), Southern Region (Calabria, Apulia, Lucania, Campania), Region IV (Lazio, Umbria and Rome), Region V (Abruzzi, the Marches), Region VIII (Tuscany).

24. In order further to decentralize, these Regional teams are divided into Provincial teams, each under an Allied Provincial Commissioner. The Regional Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner have under their command Provincial Officers who deal with local government, police officers, legal officers, supply officers and many other technical officers who are in fact representatives of the Subcommissions of the Administrative and Economic Sections in the field. The Regional Commissioner is the commander in the Region and has the over-all responsibility

<sup>20</sup> No scheme of organization could make everyone happy and, with the change to centralized control under ACC, Fifth Army AMG seems to have felt that its peculiar needs were not always understood. See History of AMG Fifth Army, 19 Jul 44, MTO HS files.

for the work of his Regional team. The Provincial Commissioner is responsible for his Provincial team to the Regional Commissioner.

25. The work of Regional Commissioners and their staffs in the field is controlled by the Regional Control and Military Government Section at ACC Headquarters under a Vice President known as the Executive Commissioner.

29. A Regional Commissioner and his staff, like the SCAO of an Army AMG, is faced con-

tinually with every kind of problem, both administrative, economic, religious and social. Regional teams have to be prepared to meet and deal with every kind of situation that may arise from the extraordinary circumstances of occupation after battle. Quite apart from the subjects dealt with by the technical representatives of the Administrative and Economic Sections, the serious problems of refugees, displaced persons and patriots arise. \* \* \*

## 7. ANGLO-AMERICAN UNITY AND DISUNITY

### BRITISH OBTAIN THE SENIOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POSITIONS IN ACC

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 7 Nov 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 2879]

Directive for Allied Control Commission for Italy as furnished you in FAN 248 [Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 23 Oct, sec. 2, above] lacks agreement on the question of allocation by nationality of the principal posts on the Commission.

Agreement on this question has now been reached as follows:

Deputy President of the Commission—U.S.<sup>21</sup>

Vice President in charge of the Military Section—U.S.

Vice President in charge of the Political Section—U.K.

Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section—U.K.

Economic Director—U.K.

Administrative Director—U.K.

Vice President in charge of the Communications Section—U.S.<sup>22</sup>

### AN ISSUE EN FAMILLE: BRITISH PREPONDERANCE IN ACC CREATED

[Msg, McNarney, DCofS, to Eisenhower, 14 Nov 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5738]

Cable deals with your proposal to the CCS to appoint a British officer, Admiral McGrigor

<sup>21</sup> Message from War Department to General Eisenhower, 18 October 1943, states that the proposal of a U.S. Army officer as Deputy President was an American proposal and at variance with the British recommendation. CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 7851.

<sup>22</sup> According to the statement of General Hilldring at a JCS meeting of 7 September 1943, the British insisted upon the senior economic and political positions and Secretary of State Hull acquiesced. (JCS files, Supplementary Min, 113th Mtg, 7 Sep 43.) The senior economic position, however, was shortly to pass to an American. In the January reorganization of ACC the Administrative and Economic Section was divided, and Henry F. Grady, President Roosevelt's nominee, became head of the Economic Section.

[Rear Admiral R. R. McGrigor], as Acting Vice President of the Military Section of the Allied Control Commission. Before the War Department presents its views on this recommendation to the CCS, I would like you to consider the conditions which surrounded the allocation of principal posts on the Allied Control Commission to the U.K. and U.S. It was considered highly desirable by the State Department, as well as the War and Navy Departments here, that the Allied Control Commission should represent an equitable distribution of U.S. and U.K. strength so long as the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean is American. It is the feeling here that the assignment of the vice presidency of both the Political and Economic Sections to the British already constitutes a commission which is over balanced in favor of the British and we are therefore very reluctant to also assign the military vice presidency to a British officer, unless there is a most compelling reason on your part for doing so. . . .

### EISENHOWER PAYS LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NATIONALITY QUESTION

[Msg, Eisenhower to McNarney, 15 Nov 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9197]

It is difficult for me to appreciate the considerations involved in the allocation of principal posts on the Allied Control Commission, particularly on the Military side, as I do not pay much attention to the nationality of the military officers serving in Allied Forces and make their assignments as required by efficiency and economy of personnel. My recommendation of Admiral McGrigor as acting Vice President of the Military Section was prompted by the fact that as Flag Officer Liaison Italy he is now doing and will do the actual work of co-ordinating the operations of the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine, and I am certain it would be more simple, direct and

efficient to put him on the Commission in the capacity of acting Vice President. The Italian Naval strength is the only military factor of importance to us at this time. . . . With the President, Acting Deputy President, and Chief of Staff all American General officers, I see nothing inconsistent or unbalanced in the designation of McGrigor as head of the Military Section.<sup>23</sup>

#### REPORTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ON LOWER LEVELS DIFFER

[Memo, Wickersham for the SW, 8 Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \* One of the outstanding achievements of AMG is the complete co-operation of British and American officers with each other. Teamwork was in full operation as a well understood partnership. Many officers told me that they forgot half the time whether some other member of the team was British or American. The most thorough good feeling existed by each service towards the other.<sup>24</sup> \* \* \*

[Maj John Boettiger, Chief, Public Info Branch, CAD, formerly ExecO, Hq AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt to Dir, CAD, 2 Mar 44, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 3]

\* \* \* The Eighth Army AMGOT British commanding officer, Group Captain Benson, was all that anyone could desire. He was intelligent, efficient, friendly, a great leader. He had a keen appreciation of ability, and many times asked to have more *American* officers assigned to his staff. His immediate headquarters was half staffed by Americans, although the policy was to have the Eighth Army AMGOT two thirds British.

It seemed to me that the plan was working out admirably. However, among individual officers differences developed. They started with such piddling matters as a British officer asking an American colleague not to repeat his offense of going into the kitchen of our small mess to drink a cup of tea and chatting with a British enlisted man who had prepared the tea. "It just isn't done in *our* army." Americans had difficulty

understanding the relationship of British officers and their batmen—at least, they did until they got accustomed to having their own boots shined, beds made and tea brought to them in bed at 6 a.m.!

I think these things could have been overcome, but there were other than social differences. The whole British army system is so different from ours. The nomenclature is different, the forms unlike. Personally, I think we wasted a tremendous lot of time in learning the other's methods. I saw no disposition on the part of either army to profit from contact with the other's system.

In AMG-Fifth Army there were most serious differences between American and British officers. Painful efforts were made on both sides to keep these from flaring up. It might have been a relief to let them flare, but it was thought best to keep striving with a bad situation. It was most embarrassing for an American officer to complain to higher headquarters of a British opposite number, and it surely was equally difficult on the British side. \* \* \*

#### WASHINGTON ACQUIESCES IN ALLOCATION OF TOP POSITIONS TO BRITISH

[Msg, Hilldring to Devers, DCinC, ACMF, 14 Jan 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 5662]

Bovenschen, Sir Frederick, now in Washington has asked the War Department for its views regarding the reallocation of top position in the Allied Control Commission as a result of the assignment of General Wilson as President and General [Mason-] MacFarlane as Deputy President of the Commission. Except as to the Vice President of the Military Section, it is the feeling of the War Department that no change is advisable or necessary and there is some doubt here as to the wisdom of the replacement of Admiral McGrigor. Your views and those of Smith with regard to Bovenschen's question are requested as a matter of urgency.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> On 19 November the CCS approved General Eisenhower's proposal to appoint Admiral McGrigor. AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 12062.

<sup>24</sup> General Wickersham was reporting from Italy, where he was collecting from many sources data and impressions on Allied civil affairs policy and organization. Much the greater part of the evidence available seems to support his finding that British-American relations were good. On the other hand, see below for evidence of disagreements, particularly on alleged British predominance in ACC. Probably no generalization can be safely drawn except that the relationships were not so perfect that tensions did not occur, and not so bad that the working of the joint system was seriously impaired.

<sup>25</sup> Dunn had already indicated that the State Department was also satisfied with the allocation of positions, although preferring that, if any reallocation was to be made, the position of Economic Director be allotted to the United States. CAD Memo, Burnett, CAD, to the Dir, CAD, 13 Jan 44, CAD files, 334, ACC, sec. 1. A number of Americans in the theater did not share the satisfaction of the War and State Departments. Possibly at this time the Washington authorities were more interested in SHAEF and other issues pertaining to Northwest Europe than in Italy, where, as yet, few issues had arisen involving serious divergences in American and British policy. In June 1944, however, when General Mason-MacFarlane resigned as Deputy President, ACC, he was replaced by an American. See above, p. 252.

## WHEN POLICIES THREATEN TO DIVERGE FRANKNESS IS BEST REMEDY

[Ltr, Henry F. Grady, Vice President, Econ Sec, ACC, to Gen Mason-MacFarlane, 14 Apr 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 1]

There has been forwarded to me copies of your correspondence with [Lt.] Colonel [Henry] Parkman [Jr.]. Colonel Parkman's letter to you of the 18th of March was written at my request and I am sorry that it annoyed you to the extent it apparently did. All my dealings with you have been most happy and I feel you have done and are doing a splendid job. Any question of your own fairness has never entered my mind. There are questions, however, that transcend the very pleasant relations which I hope you and I will always continue to enjoy.

It is distasteful to me to discuss whether a Britisher or an American is in this position or that. I have been interested primarily in seeing the job done provided British and American post-war objectives are the same. But I want to be perfectly frank with you and say that I am not sure they are fundamentally the same. As Assistant Secretary of State in charge of economic matters, I worked ardently for effective British-American collaboration. British officials who had occasion to deal with me can testify as to that. With the approach of the war's end, however, many of those in this country who went all out for aid to Britain when Germany might seriously threaten Britain's destruction are deeply disturbed—disturbed because collaboration for the peace shows signs of breaking down.

The ACC and corresponding organizations that will be set up in other liberated areas will be engaged in ad hoc peace making and these agencies are British dominated or give every promise of being so. This is certainly true in Italy and the evening up of numbers by making American heads of the Monuments and Education Sub-Commissions does not change the fact of control. The control is certainly British. I found that this was also to be true for the Balkans and the Near East, and when I got to London I discovered that again the organization was topped by a British Major General. This despite the fact that supply comes almost entirely from the United States. You know that since last August our contribution in the Italian theatre has been almost 90%. In addition, the Italian Army is being fed entirely with American food though the channel of distribution is British. It is hardly con-

ceivable that if the ratios were reversed the control would be American.

To have the control of ad hoc peace making in British hands in all the principal theatres means that America's position is that of a minor partner in reconstructing the post-war world. If the British conception of the post-war world is a secure and expanded British Empire rather than a world system in which preferences, sterling blocks and spheres of influence are eliminated, then British and American objectives are at variance.

The public statements of British leaders, including the Prime Minister, give basis to the fear of many of Britain's friends and admirers that British and American objectives for the post-war *are* fundamentally different. This matter concerns both of us. Continued British and American collaboration is essential to the future of the world and to the best interest of the British people. The greatest tragedy would be for the breach that is starting to widen. The danger is that America may recoil and in disillusionment again retire from world affairs as it did after the last war. You and I want to do whatever we can to prevent this, I am sure. One way to prevent it is for American and British officials to discuss common problems with perfect frankness, as I have done in this letter.

## ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR CALLS ATTENTION TO FEELINGS OF MANY AMERICANS IN ITALY

[Ltr, McCloy to Devers, DSAC, Mediterranean Theater, 7 Jun 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* We have been made conscious recently that there was a succession of officers coming back from Italy who comment rather critically about the British emphasis which is being placed upon the Allied Control Commission's administration in Italy. I would not bother you about it were it not for the general unanimity of view which those recently returning from Italy seem to express. I have difficulty in outlining specific instances and it would not be consistent with the point which I want to make if I made anything of the particular things I may speak of. The fault seems to be that a certain atmosphere does exist, whether justified or not. \* \* \*

I want particularly to emphasize the fact that it is the persistence of this thought among our lower officers, chiefly though not exclusively in the Civil Affairs work, of which I am talking, and that I am far from making any protest or com-

plaint. I can perhaps best describe the matter by saying that after the British took over the headship of the Allied Control Commission the American element in the administration was rather submerged, particularly in some of the lower echelons, to such an extent that our people had the feeling that the British were not as solicitous as we had been of the combined aspect of civil administration in Italy. \* \* \*

Dill called me up yesterday and said that in response to an informal letter he had sent to Wilson, Wilson had replied that he had not understood how such a feeling could arise, inasmuch as he thought he had been very careful about this phase of Anglo-American co-operation, and pointed out that the governors of both Naples and Rome were Americans. . . .

It may be that the difficulty arises wholly from oversensitiveness on the part of the Americans. The only important thing is that we have felt that we had sufficient evidence of an attitude of mind amongst the American officers to justify calling it to the attention of the theater. \* \* \*

#### STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO SET MATTERS RIGHT

[Ltr, Devers to McCloy, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \* I wish to assure you that real steps are being taken to put us on a much fairer basis than has been so in the past. . . . MacFarlane has always been a square shooter, has done a magnificent job, and we all have great confidence in him. On our side of the fence we are improving personnel, and have promoted our personnel according to their abilities and our allotments from the War Department. . . . Spofford [ACofS, G-5, AFHQ] assures me that everything is improving. Gen. Wilson has been most helpful and aggressive. He is very anxious that we keep an even balance in this theater and does everything to improve the conditions which he found when he came to the theater, namely that on the top level everything was fine, but on the lower levels with the younger officers, particularly on the American side, there was considerable complaint. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XI

# They Must Be Made To Stand Alone

If the difficulties inherent in military government always tend to bring about an ironic discrepancy between initial aims and actual accomplishments, one should be especially prepared for this in cases where, as in the Allied occupation of Italy, the occupants set for themselves aims that are unusually high. The CCS directive to the Allied Commander in Chief implied, and the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 spelled out, the high aim of restoring Italy eventually to the partnership of free nations and of restoring to it as soon as practicable free and democratic institutions. Actually, the conditions of war delayed inevitably—or at least so it seemed to Allied authorities—any substantial return of political freedom, except in the negative sense of elimination of Fascist laws, organizations, and leaders. The aim which was long concentrated upon, especially in the earlier period of occupation, was merely restoration of the ability of Italians to stand as much as possible on their own, administratively. This was indeed a prerequisite for the development of self-governing capacity in a democratic sense. The rehabilitation of Italian administrative ability was, however, dictated more immediately by the fact that the Allies did not have enough trained personnel for administering Italy themselves. It was imperative to make Italians able to do it in such manner as would satisfy at the same time both Allied military needs and Italian elementary civil needs. This task did not

prove easy to accomplish, in part for reasons which have an ironic aspect. While transfer of responsibility was both in Italian and in Allied interest, there were more than a few Italians who were reluctant to take on responsibility and there were some Allied officials who were almost equally reluctant to delegate it. In some cases and contexts, higher Allied authority had to remind CAO's that the Italians *must* be *made* to stand alone.

The present chapter deals with the earlier effort to rehabilitate Italian self-government, in the sense solely of developing administrative competence (the more political phases of the preparation for freedom and democracy being taken up in other chapters). The effort even in this limited sense had so many aspects that an adequate understanding is possible only through study of the documents; all that can be attempted by way of introduction is to outline briefly its general scope and its component phases, to suggest approximately the degree of success or failure, and to indicate a few of the more important factors which determined the outcome. It should be stated first that delegation of responsibility was even more important in its application to Italian central government than to Italian local government and that the concentration of the earliest efforts on local government (indicated in the sequence of the documents) reflected only the fact that relations with the Badoglio government did not become possible till

more than two months after the invasion of Sicily opened the Italian operation.

The documents concerned with local government illustrate first the efforts to put into successful operation the policy of indirect control, which, as already noted in the documents on the opening phase in Sicily (Chapter VIII), could only be very partially applied until after the combat had died down and replacements had been secured for those Fascist officials who had either fled or by reason of their hostile or otherwise unsuitable character had to be immediately dismissed. Since the system of indirect control meant that Allied officers would leave the direct performance of all civil functions to Italians and would limit themselves to supervision, it could work satisfactorily only if all civil posts were manned by Italians with a reasonable degree of administrative competence. To recognize this is also to understand the difficulty which was experienced by the CAO's in making the system work even after replacements for dismissed officials had been obtained. That Italians in many cases were far from adequate did not at all warrant the inference drawn by some that the Italian as such is not a good administrator. In the pre-Fascist era Italian administration was far more successful than Mussolini gave the world to understand in his aspersions against the democratic system he destroyed; it was in fact the system he introduced which, in its centralizing and anti-individualist tendencies, left Italians, particularly in the more rural areas, less fit for administrative tasks. They were weakened not only in the capacity to comprehend administrative problems but also in the moral fiber required to assume the risks of decision and action. Under Fascist rule the only safe course was to await orders from above, and it was natural for officials so indoctrinated to imagine that under the Allies too it was much more prudent to be passive than to

make decisions which might seem wrong to Allied officers if not also to the officials' fellow-citizens. In the face of administrative catatonia, inefficiency, or petty corruption, many Allied officers were tempted to do the job themselves—until they reminded themselves or were reminded by higher authority that while this course might be the easier in any one case, it would lead, in the aggregate, to an impossible burden. Even the task of supervision strained the relatively few CAO's, and was doubtless one of the reasons why they put more and more effort into implementing the Allied policy of re-establishing the pre-Fascist advisory organs of local government and economic co-operation, and, in addition, created communal committees to help cope with such social problems as the reopening of schools. This revival of pre-Fascist institutions (illustrated in the second group of documents dealing with local government) was certainly a gesture in the direction of democracy, but it was not, in its appointive rather than elective basis, democracy, and it served most immediately to draw segments of the citizenry into the counseling and watching of Italian local officials and thus to relieve the CAO's of full responsibility.

However far Italian proficiency in local government might have developed—and considerable progress had been made in even the first few months—the Italian territory under AMG after invasion of the mainland was so great that even the task of supervision, embracing as it did extensive rear as well as combat zones, would soon have become impossible had not the Allies prepared for turning most of it over to a central government. The job of developing Badoglio's government so that it could assume this task in all rear zones rather than merely in the four provinces of King's Italy did not get really under way (for the Allied Military Mission assisted only in especially vital functions) until,

after the Italian declaration of war, when the Allies decided definitely to support it. The Government was, at the outset, altogether too weak an affair to take on more territory than it already had, and the possibility of transferring additional territory depended not only upon sufficient increments in ministries and personnel, but also upon such help as ACC was activated to give it. But, to the unpaternalistic British at least, it appeared that there was a wrong as well as a right way to help, and, from the overcomplex and overstaffed way ACC looked to them at the outset, they very much feared that ACC would descend upon Brindisi in such large numbers and with such overzealousness that instead of being helped the Italians would be smothered and debilitated. Fortunately, the few accommodations available at Brindisi made it imperative to reduce the ACC liaison detachment to a small number, and if the warning of AC Headquarters against overpaternalism was not itself sufficient deterrent, Badoglio himself gave further warning. He made it clear almost at once that he hoped and expected that ACC personnel would not intrude into every petty matter but would limit themselves to those major issues where advice was appropriate and needed in the common interest. This stand asserted Italian national pride, but the truth is that AC officials could have considered correctly that their help was needed in almost everything. The situation initially was discouraging, not only in the absence of enough Italians but also in the lack of initiative of those who were on hand. Real progress did not begin until Badoglio, having definitely failed in his efforts to build up a cabinet representative of all major parties (see Chapter XV), decided, with both Italian and Allied approval, to organize merely a temporary government of technical experts who would be replaced when Rome was reached. Even after this decision had been implemented there

supervened further delay so far as concerned territorial transfer. Badoglio badly wanted the increased prestige this would give him, but he indeed tended to discourage rather than urge early transfer, for he knew that taking on too much before he was ready would in the end only discredit him.

Near the end of November both he and AC believed he would be ready in another month, but the transfer did not take place on 20 December as planned. This time the delay was due to the fact that the Allies themselves were not ready, in the sense that they could not agree among themselves on the legal method of transfer. That AFHQ and the U.S. War Department debated for almost two months on this question may seem, at first thought, to suggest that once delegation of authority was possible they had inhibitions against it comparable to those of authorities on a lower level. The inhibitions were not, however, analogous, except to the extent that even the highest authorities preferred also to delegate authority only with a very minimum of risk despite the fact that in the matter of delegation versus avoidance of risk one cannot eat one's cake and have it too. But the danger that was feared in this case was not Italian inefficiency but the undue curtailment of rights which seemed essential to the prosecution of the war. Both AFHQ and the War Department wished to avoid such curtailment but they differed with each other on how best to avoid it. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex legal issue one may say that the difference between the two was basically one of premises in respect to the question whether adding to the Italian Government's scope of administration entailed return of sovereignty and of the rights which the Armistice gave the Allies in occupied as distinguished from originally unoccupied territory. AFHQ believed that such transfer was legally unavoidable, whereas the

War Department considered that the rights vested by the Armistice in the Allies enabled them to require the Government to do anything anywhere in Italy they wished without changing the status of any territory from occupied to unoccupied. Thus AFHQ proposed to safeguard such rights as the Allies wished to continue enjoying by requiring Badoglio to enter into an agreement reserving those rights to the Allies—an agreement to be kept secret lest it injure Badoglio's prestige with Italians. On the other hand, the War Department, fearing that the secret agreement detracted from Allied rights insofar as it implied a restoration of Italian sovereignty in the territory transferred, wished to have merely a proclamation that the Italian Government entered the new territory without any detraction whatsoever from previous Allied rights there, and would administer it not as sovereign but as agent of the Control Commission. From a purely practical standpoint it may not seem that the War Department was accomplishing anything specific by its greater caution, since at a certain point it admitted that a secret agreement might be desirable and that the one AFHQ had drawn up contained all Allied rights which needed to be reserved—except the purely academic right of continuing legally to be occupant. At any rate, the War Department gave in after AFHQ informed it that Badoglio would probably resign rather than accept a public proclamation that in the transferred territory the Allies would continue to be occupants. The CCS authorized AFHQ to proceed with its original plan except as modified in minor respects; on 9 February, finally, the Allies transferred to the Government Sicily, Sardinia, and all mainland territory south of the borders of Bari-Salerno provinces, the only exceptions being certain Italian islands needed for military purposes.

How much the new dispensation would ease the Allied administrative burden depended upon both the Allies and the Italians—upon the Allies insofar as they would be willing to forego the considerable supervision permissible to them even in unoccupied territory, and upon the Italians insofar as they would so effectively assume responsibility as to make it seem unnecessary to the Allies to continue close supervision. At first the outlook was none too promising in either respect. As for the Italian Government, even Italians openly avowed a distrust in the readiness at this stage to administer with sufficient efficiency. As for the Allies, they decided to continue their regional organizations in an advisory capacity, to exercise close supervision over those functions which affected vital Allied interests, and to refrain from immediately reducing Allied personnel at all; indeed, further, they soon added to their supervisory rights by requiring of Badoglio that he submit all senior appointments for Allied approval. When, in the fall of 1944, the Allies announced the New Policy of further relaxing controls, nearly all this seemed retrospectively to be continued paternalism. On the other hand, if it was such there were mitigating circumstances: Italians had at this earlier stage still not become administratively mature, they were without the administrative resources that would become available only with the capture of Rome, and they were so far aware of their incomplete readiness themselves that they tended to ask for the continuation rather than the withdrawal of substantial Allied assistance.

As is indicated by the concluding sections of documents, concerned with the sequel to the first territorial restoration, Allied civil affairs authorities did confine themselves in the new territory to advice, while the Italians performed their broadened task without any fiasco even if with-

out any brilliance. Further, the Italian Government and AMG both contributed to a greater co-ordination of civil affairs in Italy—the Government through adopting AMG's local government plan in its own territory, AMG by adopting the principles

of new Italian legislation in military government territory. Italians were at least on the way toward standing substantially on their own and the Allies were learning to let them alone.

## I. THE CAO'S LEARN TO USE INDIRECT CONTROL

### IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ANGLO-SAXON OFFICIALS TO SUPERVISE ITALIAN OFFICIALS

[Rodd, SCAO, Enna Province, Rpt to AMGOT Hq, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

2. For so many years now Italian public officials have become so accustomed to shelve responsibility that they have to be forced by threats to assume it. For every action taken they expected an initialed approval by the next man higher up until Rome and Party mandarins were reached. In some cases, and in the beginning, there may have been other motives for their reluctance. Some felt that by doing the minimum required of them and abiding by the strict letter of their instructions, they could escape the charge of co-operation with the enemy in the event of a change in the fortune of war, and yet retain their jobs. It was in this latter belief that they proved most immediately mistaken.

3. It was also not without difficulty that my staff could be persuaded to leave Italian officials alone in the execution of the tasks assigned to them. Inefficiency and petty corruption jangled Anglo-Saxon nerves and susceptibilities, while the limited experience of the officers did not afford them a nice judgment of the limits within which these would have to be tolerated. There were frequent appeals from the population itself for the redress of grievances or the exercise of the paramount influence of the Allied authority. These were often unjustified, often still dishonest, but occasionally required action. The manner in which intervention or pressure was used had to be carefully watched and was, on my direction, left to myself or one of the more experienced and preferably Italian speaking staff, lest the dignity of the offending Italian became irretrievably undermined.

The third stumbling block for a self reliant Italian bureaucracy is the very large volume of minute direction and detailed inquisition which flows out of AMGOT Headquarters in Palermo. Often the Italian official cannot understand what

is expected of him and, as often as not, the departmental officer in the province is in the same boat. He is driven, however, to the conclusion that the inquisition may easily be followed by reproof and that the directives are evidence of a mistrust of his own methods (and is probably justified, in this belief). [See Chapter VII, Section 4, and Chapter VIII, Section 5, on indirect control.]

### IT'S WELL TO LOOK OUTSIDE THE CIVIL SERVICE

[Rgn I, Sicily Admin Instrs 4, 30 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/141/4]

4. The selection of officials outside the civil service, although an emergency measure, is warmly recommended, for the choice of public spirited men with personality and universally accepted probity should not only enable the system of indirect rule to be greatly extended, but also infuse into the organs of local government a fresh vitality which is so abundantly needed. \* \* \*

### AT ALL ODDS THE CIVIL POLICE MUST BE GOTTEN INTO SHAPE

[Hq, AMG, Palermo, Rpt for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(29) The Regional Public Safety Division [Region I, Sicily] came into being at a time when the crime rate and general civil disturbances were on the increase and when the morale of the civil police agencies was at a low ebb as a result of insufficient wages, a rising cost of living, loss of prestige resulting from military occupation and interference with civil police functions, and other attendant circumstances.

(30) One of the basic problems—that of insufficient salaries—was partially solved by General Order No. 14 which granted the adjustment upward of all wages of State employees and, so far as the ordinary rank and file of the police

organizations was concerned, had the effect of a 70% increase. Even this, however, considering the actual economic conditions existing in the Island, could not be said to produce a wage scale that was really commensurate with the conditions of employment and the duties rendered, or expected to be rendered, by the Police.

(31) The question of increasing the bread ration of the police forces was considered but it was felt that this would probably aggravate the existing discontent, cause prejudice against the police, and bring on pressure from other sources for similar special consideration. Hence, the police continued only to draw the same allowance as all other citizens.

(32) Other general conditions affecting the efficiency of the police were the lack of materials—cloth, leather, etc.—for the replacement of wornout uniforms and equipment, and lack of mobility, since most means of transportation and, more important, the control over spare parts and tires, were in the hands of the military or of AMG. In order to alleviate the situation the following measures were adopted:

(a) A request was sent through channels to AFHQ for a supply of cloth that could be made into uniforms.

(b) Members of the Carabinieri, Publica Sicurezza and Guardia di Finanza were given priority on the purchasing of any remaining boots or other equipment from the "Unione Militare," through the Property Controller.

(c) Provincial Supply Officers were requested to make available any local stocks of leather for the repair or manufacture of shoes for the police.

(d) Requisitioning of private motorcycles, cars and trucks for the use of the Carabinieri was ordered. \* \* \*

#### SHIFTING OF RESPONSIBILITY IN SICILY MAKES FURTHER HEADWAY

[Col Spofford, former CofS, Hq AMG, Oct 45, Spofford Rpt, p. 33]

*Rgn I—Sicily—activated 26 October 1943 with Poletti, RCAO*

(b) Owing to the shortage of military government personnel and the difficulties of communication generally, it was decided to set up a number of regional Italian agencies to control the appropriate provincial Italian agencies throughout Sicily. This was done in the fields of labor, public welfare, civilian supply, banking, and postal services and prisons. It was believed that upon the transfer of territory a regional commissioner would be appointed to Sicily so that pro-

vincial authorities would be responsible to him and not directly to the national government on the mainland with whom they could not communicate.

(c) Early in November the process of withdrawing CAO's and CAPO's from the communes to the provincial capitals was begun. This process of withdrawal was gradual and enabled the communal authorities, particularly the podestats, better to assume the responsibility which they would have to discharge after the transfer of territory. This process had been completed well before February 11.

(d) Every effort was made to impress upon the people the fact that it was their responsibility to govern themselves. Italians who came into the national and provincial headquarters seeking assistance were routed by experienced enlisted men to the appropriate Italian agency and few if any complaints were received by Allied officials except through Italian channels. Provincial orders were frequently issued over the name of the Italian prefect, the order also indicating that it had been approved by the Allied Military Government. In these and other ways efforts were made to push forward the Italian officials so that the people would look upon them and not the Allied Military Government as the proper organs to which to turn in matters of Government. Experience has proved that the above were steps taken in the right direction. \* \* \*

#### CONDITIONS ON THE MAINLAND COMPEL EARLY RELIANCE UPON ITALIAN OFFICIALS

[Rpt, Col Spofford, Oct 45, Spofford Rpt, p. 23]

*Rgn II—Mainland—activated 24 October 1943 with McCaffrey, RCAO*

(b) Owing to the large number of small communes spread over a large area and the small number of large cities it was not practical to assign CAO's to particular communes. All CAPO's worked out of provincial headquarters covering an average of twenty communes apiece after the whole territory was occupied.

(c) Since there was little disruption of administration caused by war damage, Cosenza and Reggio being the only towns which were badly hit, and since Marshal Badoglio had already removed the Fascist prefects and replaced them with new non-Fascists, there was nothing to prevent the administration from continuing as theretofore. Accordingly, banks and courts were permitted to remain open if they were already open when the CAO entered the town. This practice proved to be entirely sound and perhaps if it

had been carried out in those parts of Sicily where there had been little fighting it would have taken a much shorter time to restore the normal life of the areas. \* \* \*

#### CLOSE SUPERVISION BUT NOT OPERATION OF ADMINISTRATION IN NAPLES PROVINCE

[Lt Col James T. Kincaid, SCAO, Naples Province, Report on Activities in Rgn III, 7 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/129/168]

3a. When Naples Province was activated on 23 September 1943, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer instructed all officers assigned to him that actual operation of Italian Government functions would not be undertaken but that close supervision and direction would be maintained with responsibility established. This was stated as an underlying principle and foundation of military government but actual operation was also a physical impossibility due to an acute shortage of both officers and enlisted personnel. The soundness of this instruction was repeatedly emphasized as the occupied portion of Naples Province was extended; for example only one officer was available for assignment in an area covering 27 communes with a combined population of 500,000. It is not felt that operation of Italian Government divisions and departments is to be desired and it is recommended that the policy of supervision and direction with established responsibility be maintained in all future relations. For adequate control and supervision at least twice the officer personnel and three times the enlisted personnel available to this Province should be made available to meet similar conditions that arise in the future. \* \* \*

#### LOCAL OFFICIALS GREATLY FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT OF AMG IN NAPLES

[Col Hume, SCAO, Rgn III, Rpt, Allied Military Government Region III (Fifth Army), 9 September-15 December 1943 [hereafter cited as Hume Rpt, 9 Sep-15 Dec 43] ACC files, 10000/129/167]

\* \* \* It having been learned that a member of Marshal Badoglio's government was in Naples the officers of the Allied Military Government called upon him in the Prefettura. This official, Hon. Leopoldo Piccardi, is Minister of Labor, Commerce, and Industry. . . .

After talking with the heads of the city government, the chiefs of the several police forces operating in the city were called into conference to be given instructions. They were told of our plans for military government of the city, with particular emphasis on the duties of the police. They

all assured us of immediate and complete co-operation, and this we received. We gave each policeman accepted for service an armband identifying him as a representative of the Allied Military Government civilian police service. We made it clear that we expected all members of each of the police forces to give his best service to us, and that we would not accept any excuse that a particular type of work was to be given exclusively to any one police organization. \* \* \*

Each special staff office (Public Health and Welfare, Economics and Supply, Finance, etc.) called into conference their parallel Italian officials and directed them to carry on their duties under our supervision. These officers directed these departments of government and constantly made checks to make certain that their orders were carried out. \* \* \*

The nature of the position of the Civil Affairs Officer in Naples and the Campania is such that he has met personally nearly all of the important military, civil, religious, and cultural leaders. . . .

During the first week of our occupation contact with the Italians in official position was maintained largely through Signor Leopoldo Piccardi. Piccardi, as the only member of Marshal Badoglio's government actually present, and as it was impossible to communicate with the Marshal or any of his other representatives, was willing to act for his chief in matters of interest to us. His co-operation was unflinching, and did much to assist us in the difficult period of establishing Allied Military Government. The Prefect of Naples, Domenico Soprano, was intensely unpopular on account of his having co-operated with the Germans, particularly in regard to requiring Italians to serve in German labor battalions. It was thought necessary that Soprano be removed. This was done by Piccardi. \* \* \*

#### NAPLES' BANKS ARE SHOWN HOW TO REOPEN SUCCESSFULLY

[Hume Rpt, Allied MG Rgn III (Fifth Army), 9 Sep-15 Dec 43]

\* \* \* In the few days beginning 25 October, plans for a full bank reopening in Naples City and Province were rapidly matured. A branch of AMFA for Region 3 . . . was established on 25 October.

The bankers were instructed to put their best tellers on the job, to have plenty of money in sight and to do everything possible to instill confidence on the part of the public in the banks. A news article was prepared . . . for publication in the "Risorgimento" (a local newspaper pub-

lished under the supervision of the P.W.B. [Psychological Warfare Branch]) announcing the opening of the banks and stressing the fact that the public would have a place to deposit their funds in safety, in a further effort to give the public confidence in their banks. A deposit of L. 600,000,000 was made by AMFA . . . in the Banca d'Italia for the expressly stated purpose of advancing funds, if necessary, to other banks to cover their cash requirements for reopening. Emergency credit loans totalling L. 425,000,000 were granted by the Banca d'Italia to the other banks in Naples city under a credit agreement arranged by the C.F.O., by which bank guarantees thereunder the obligations of all others proportionately to the ratio of its deposits to the deposits of all. By this arrangement, which incidentally was new to Italian bankers, it was not necessary for AMG to make any advances to the banks individually. \* \* \*

The banks in Naples city were opened without limitations on withdrawals and the moratorium lifted in Naples City on 30 October. . . .

#### OTHER ITALIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ALSO PUT ON THEIR FEET AGAIN

[Financial Div, AMGOT Hq, Monthly Report on AMG Administration for October 1943, Spofford Rpt, ex. X-3-B]

13. An important development during the month in the banking field was the issuance of General Order No. 10, effective 12 October. By this order the provisions of Proclamation No. 5 closing banks and other financial institutions were rescinded, and such banks and institutions were permitted to resume their normal functions without any restrictions as to deposit withdrawals and other obligations to customers, except in the case of the Bank of Italy. The latter was permitted to engage only in (a) Royal Treasury operations, (b) transfers from free credit balances at the request of individuals or persons, (c) payment of its "vaglio cambiari." The requirement that a representative of the AMG be present at the initial opening of safe deposit boxes and at the releasing of articles in safe custody was maintained. By the same General Order, the moratorium established by Proclamation No. 5 was terminated, except as to the Bank of Italy's obligations toward banks and other financial institutions and as to their obligations to the Bank of Italy.

14. The banks are now restored to normal functioning, including the paying of their

assegni circolari (circular checks) and vaglia cambiari (also a form of circular checks issued by Banco di Sicilia), but there still remains the question of resumption of service on the government debt, which constitutes a large portion of the assets of all banks. The credits made available to the banks by AMFA will continue outstanding. Not only was no increase in these credit lines necessary, but on the contrary the use of AMFA credit is only a small percentage of the total available. Of total credits of 1,700,000,000 lire, the banks were using at the end of the month only 380,000,000 lire. Following the publication of General Order No. 10, the CFO and AMFA jointly sent to all the banks a letter amending the existing credit agreements by eliminating the previous requirement that cash loaned by AMFA must be used only for payment of withdrawals by depositors; the same letter admonished the banks that in their loaning operations they must exercise caution and avoid speculative loans. The banks are required to furnish to the CFO end-of-the-month balance sheets. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN BANK OFFICIALS ARE SOMETIMES USED CONTRARY TO REGULATIONS

[Observations and Recommendations, Property Custodian, AMG Rgn III, in MacLean, Liaison, MGS, AFHQ, 17 Jan 44, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

2. a. The section on property custodianship in the volume of AMGOT Rules and Regulations . . . was found in practice to be more honored in the breach than in the observance. Its theory was found neither to jibe with common sense and efficient practice nor to cover most of the problems met.<sup>1</sup>

c. They advise the use of the principle of indirect control in functioning of the office since direct control demands a large number of personnel and keeps the controller's eye on detail rather than on large operations and policy. They advise adequate personnel for indirect control which they have not had. . . .

d. . . . All detail in the Naples area was assigned [by Italian Sequestrators] to the Bank of Naples Trust and Accounting Departments. They collected rents, appointed caretakers, arranged for repairs, kept records, and kept and rendered all accounts. The AMG Custodian of

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<sup>1</sup> The functions of the Controller of Property, set forth in AMG Proclamation 6, embraced both the protection of Allied property and the custodianship of enemy property.

Property continued this system and found that it worked well. He advises that in future occupations where similar systems are in force, they be retained as otherwise the Navy or Army Civil Affairs will be under necessity of furnishing many officers and enlisted men for property control. \* \* \*

#### WHEN ARMY AND PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES DO NOT COINCIDE, ITALIAN OFFICIALS MUST BE ACCOMMODATED

[AMG 15th AGp Admin Instrs No. 4, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10700/151/2.]

1. With the establishment of Regions in the immediate rear of Army boundaries it becomes necessary to make provision for the indirect government of Provinces and Communes where part of the Province or Commune is in one Region or Army area, and the remainder is in another Region or Army area.

2. The boundaries of Army areas are fixed, wherever possible, to coincide with the boundaries of Italian administrative Provinces or Communes, but military requirements often make this impossible. AMG must, therefore, be organized in such a manner that the wishes of the C.G. or G.O.C. in an area are fully met and also in such a manner that the division of authority between Army areas does not hinder the functions of Italian local government in divided Provinces and Communes.

3. Where a Province or Commune is partly in one Region or Army area and partly in another Region or Army area, the Prefect or Podesta of that Province or Commune will be allowed to exercise his administration over the whole Province or Commune from the usual place of government, or, if such place is not in occupied territory, from the most convenient place for the purpose. \* \* \*

#### WITH SHORTAGE OF QUALIFIED OFFICIALS ONE CANNOT BE TOO SQUEAMISH

[CAO, Montedorisio, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, 16 Jan 44]

\* \* \* The proper administration of governmental affairs is slowly, but surely, being effected. We have been greatly hampered in this work by

lack of reliable personnel who have the requisite knowledge of governmental functions. While on this subject it might be well to mention that I have heard rumors that the present Sindaco was a big gambler, unreliable, and not the proper person for the office. There may be some truth in the rumor but, so far, I have been unable to verify it. And, as he is an intelligent person, knows the commune and the people who live here very well, puts forth conscientious effort, I hesitate to recommend any change because I would be unable to find any one in this commune, with anything like his ability, who could replace him. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN INITIATIVE STILL LEAVES SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Mar 44]

5. Efforts during March to improve the administration of Italian agencies were concentrated largely on attempts to instill initiative into local officials and to get them to assume greater responsibility. Frustration of this objective was encountered in two major aspects: The incompetency of several key officials for whom immediate replacements were not available and the inadequacy of procedure and organization to accomplish a satisfactory job. In spite of this, considerable progress was made in preparing the Italian administrative machine for the assumption of responsibility. \* \* \*

#### PATIENT SUPPORT OF ITALIAN POLICE PAYS DIVIDENDS

[Lt Col Walter Doherty, Chief of Public Safety, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for May 44, ACC files, 10000/143/320]

4. a. It is remarkable the transformation in the appreciation of the C.C.R.R. [*Carabinieri Raeli*, the National Police force which formed a part of the Italian Army]. In the early days of the occupation of Italy this body of men were accused of being corrupt and useless generally as civil policemen. By tactful usage, support and combined use with Military Police of the Allied Forces their worth is now deemed invaluable. So much so that there is a general clamor for more and still more C.C.R.R. \* \* \*

## 2. AMG REVIVES INSTITUTIONS WHICH DEVELOP LOCAL GOVERNMENT

### THE FIRST STEP IN POLITICAL REVIVAL IS TO ALLOW CRITICISM OF AMGOT

[Rennell, Rpt to GOCinC, 15th AGp, 21 Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1)]

4. I have directed INC generally speaking to allow "Sicilia Liberata" considerable freedom in editorial notes and articles in conformity with my directions regarding freedom of speech and press. Some of these comments have from time to time taken the form of mild criticism of AMGOT orders and provisions. One of these, commenting on the difficulty of paying taxes as prescribed by AMGOT orders with absence of banking facilities aroused the ire of my Financial division. I informed my Finance Officers and also told the editors that I took *no* exception to such comments which were both justified and healthy. The two editors were distinctly surprised and are, I think, still wondering what has happened. I asked them to take certain lines in their comment to the public which they will do: I want them in particular to warn the public not to expect too much too quickly and to offer constructive criticism to AMGOT. \* \* \*

### AMGOT OFFICIAL SUGGESTS SETTING UP SMALL COMMUNAL COUNCILS

[Directive, Rodd to All Concerned, 6 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

\* \* \* I think it is . . . desirable that, with the fatherly blessing if not the official approval of AMGOT which cannot make constitutional changes yet, a small council be set up in each commune to assist the mayor, take some of the responsibility off his shoulders and explain the necessity of unpopular measures to their constituents. The councils may vary from three to nine in membership. C.A.O.'s need not consult me before setting them up but should be guided by the following suggestions:

- (a) Representatives from a number of different classes and interests should be included.
- (b) Consult the priests and the doctor, though you need not necessarily follow their recommendations.
- (c) Try and get one of the more intelligent small farmers on to the council.
- (d) The schoolmaster often makes a useful member and acts as liaison officer with mothers of large families.

### COMMITTEES FOR OPENING SICILIAN SCHOOLS WILL BE FORMED ALSO

[Directive, AMGOT Hq to SCAO's, 14 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/144/30]

Before the schools can be opened much spadework will have to be done. It is necessary to estimate the extent of the damage to school buildings, and what buildings are available, and to work out systems for excluding pro-Fascist teachers and text books.

At the outset, therefore, committees are to be formed in each province.

The following will inform S.C.A.O.'s of the guiding principles to be observed in forming these committees. (As a reminder, it should be pointed out that these committees are not concerned with Church Schools.)

The committees should include approved representatives of the Provincial Educational authority (Provveditorato agli studi). In order, however, to begin developing a democratic tradition, the deliberations should not rest solely in the hands of these officials, who have in the past been completely under centralized control. Half the committee should consist of other, and purely provincial, interests. Among these are such as representatives of the universities, the more important schools and colleges, private schools, and societies and organizations concerned with educational and cultural problems. \* \* \*

### PRE-FASCIST LOCAL ORGANS AND DEMOCRATIC TITLES ARE REVIVED

[Sicily, Rgn I, Admin Instrs 4, 30 Oct 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV, J-1]

1. In order to restore Provincial and Municipal Administration to a pre-Fascist level and in the interests of uniformity the following instructions are laid down for immediate application in each individual province.

2. When the post of Prefect is vacant and a suitable civil service career official of the necessary grade and qualifications is not available an Acting Prefect must be nominated who, besides the requisite capabilities, should have a suitable political background. The same principle applies if a vacancy exists for a Vice-Prefect and no suitable career official is available to fill the appointment.

3. In both instances nominations, supported by information for guidance, are to be submitted to

the Regional Civil Affairs Officer for transmission through channels for approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

6. The organs of local government which are to be revived in consultation with the Prefect are the following:

*Consiglio di prefettura* which is composed of the Prefect or his substitute, who presides, and two senior Councillors of the Prefecture. Its powers and functions are regulated by specific laws and the Prefect may request the opinion of the Council on any matter. Included in its functions is the approval of accounts of communes and charitable institutions.

*Giunta Provinciale Amministrativa*: The formation and functions of this body are regulated by a series of laws and regulations which date from 1865. It is composed of ten members with the Prefect or his substitute as President, and includes from the Prefecture, two Consiglieri, a Deputy Prefect-Inspector and the Chief Accountant. The remaining members are chosen from experts in legal, administrative or technical affairs, nominated by the Prefect and approved by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer acting for AMG. *Deputazione Provinciale*: Replaces the Rettorato. The Deputazione consists of a President and unpaid members nominated by the Prefect and approved by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer on behalf of AMGOT. The President is also head of Provincial Administration. . . .

7. Communal Administration is to be regulated in the following manner:

*Sindachi*: In place of Podestà the democratic title of sindaco (mayor) must be universally adopted. As it is not possible to apply the electoral system at the present time, new appointments or changes where necessary will be made by the Prefect who will issue the regular decree after consideration of any nominations submitted by Senior Civil Affairs Officers.

*Segretario Comunale*: (Town Clerk):—This official is a civil servant and cannot be appointed mayor, nor be lightly dismissed. The Prefect has full power to effect transfers, retirements, and appointments of Town Clerks and changes should be effected only through him under the standing procedure which must be closely followed.

*Giunta Comunale*: Normally this body would be selected by the consiglio comunale from amongst its own members duly elected by public ballot. Under present emergency conditions, the Giunta Comunale is to be nominated by the mayor with the concurrence of Senior Civil Affairs Officers or local Civil Affairs Officers and the appointments confirmed by the Provincial Prefect. \* \* \*

8. In the selection of the members of the above agencies, consideration should be given to various shades of political opinion, excluding extremists, and labor and agriculture must be adequately represented.

9. It will be found that local officials are fully conversant with the legislation and procedure in regard to local government bodies, and can act upon Senior Civil Affairs Officers' directives for the rapid execution of this order.

10. In conformity with the above, from now onwards, all Provincial and Communal Decrees and Orders must be issued in the name of the Prefect or local Mayor respectively and bear only the "VISTO" of the Senior Civil Affairs Officer concerned.<sup>2</sup>

#### TEMPORARY REGULATIONS ISSUED FOR APPOINTING FUNCTIONARIES

[Sicily Rgn Official Order 25, 11 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/141/4]

Whereas the Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws approved by Royal decree of 3 March 1934, no. 385, concerning the composition and functions of the Provincial and Municipal administrations, do not conform to the new political situation, necessary changes have to be made. Bearing in mind the Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws approved by Royal decree of 3 February 1915, no. 148, as those which better respond to liberal and democratic ideas, and

Whereas it is not possible at present to hold administrative elections which would mean applying in full the Unified Text of the law of 3 February 1915 no. 148;

Considering, therefore, the necessity of issuing temporary regulations in order that the Communal and Provincial Administrations may function, since those rules contained in above mentioned Unified Text cannot be applied;

Considering that the Unified Text of 1915 contains regulations which consent exceptionally the substitution of the Council of Aldermen to Town Council and the Provincial Delegation to Provincial Council, at the present moment they may be given general terms;

Whereas, therefore, exceptionally, and as a temporary measure it is only necessary to issue regulations for the appointment of Mayors, Council of Aldermen, President of the Provincial Administration and of the Provincial Delegation;

In virtue of the power conferred on me, I, Charles Poletti, Lt. Colonel, Regional Civil Affairs Officer,

<sup>2</sup> For later extension of this model of local government to the mainland, both in military government and Italian Government territory, see below, Section 6.

Order

1. The Mayor is appointed by the Prefect subject to approval of the Allied Military Government.
2. The Council of Aldermen is appointed by the Prefect, subject to the authorization of the Allied Military Government.
3. Each Province has a President and a Provincial Deputation.
4. The President is the head of the Provincial Administration and President of the Provincial Delegation.
5. The President is appointed by the Prefect subject to the approval of the Allied Military Government.
6. The members of the Provincial Delegation are appointed by the Prefect subject to approval by the Allied Military Government.
7. Until such time as the Town and Provincial Councils are constituted the Town Council will be substituted by the Council of Aldermen and the Provincial Council by the Provincial Delegation who will retain all the other powers attributed to them by the aforementioned Unified Text of Municipal and Provincial laws of 1915.
8. To the grounds for ineligibility established by the Unified Text of 1915 are added the following: No one is eligible to the office of Mayor, Alderman, President of the provincial administration and delegation, or Provincial Delegate, if they have held an office in the Fascist Party.
9. All other regulations of the Unified Text of the Provincial and Communal laws approved by Royal decree of 3 February 1915, no. 148, remain in force provided they are not in contrast with the present order or with special rulings issued or to be issued by the Allied Military Government.
10. In the application of the dispositions contained in the above articles, and for doubtful cases of a general character rulings will be issued by the Allied Military Government.

#### REPRESENTATIVE COMMERCIAL CHAMBERS ARE ESTABLISHED IN SICILY

[Sicily Rgn Official Order 44, 7 Dec 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV, J-2]

\* \* \* Art. 1) There is instituted the Union of the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of Sicily, which will have its headquarters in Palermo.

Art. 2) The union (of the Sicilian Chambers) is a public agency which has the function of representing, co-ordinating and guarding the economic interests of the commerce, industry, labor and agriculture of the entire Region, and assuring and promoting its development in the field of national economy.

Furthermore, it is a consultant agency of the administration of the State for all questions concerning commerce, industry, labor and agriculture.

Art. 3) The organs of the union are the Permanent Committee of the Presidents, and the General Council of the Sicilian Chambers.<sup>3</sup> . . .

#### PROGRESS ON MAINLAND IS SLOWER

[AMG Hq, Report for December 43 on AMG Administration, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

21. Local government in Region II has progressed more slowly [than in Sicily] in part due to the fact that the territory is sparsely settled and communication is poor. Catanzaro was the only province which had a giunta or similar body on which the citizenry were presented. The giuntas in the other provinces consisted of office holders sitting ex-officio. Progress in Reggio, due to the fighting and the distance separating it from regional headquarters, and in Salerno, which is loaded down with troops and was the scene of much destruction, has been slow.

#### DEMOCRACY CANNOT BE RESTORED WHILE A WAR IS ON

[Memo, Benson, Officer Comdg, AMG, Eighth Army, for AMG, 15th AGP, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1097]

\* \* \* There is undoubtedly a feeling of dissatisfaction amongst the people particularly in the back areas that the "political choice" which they have been promised is not eventuating as quickly as they hoped. This feeling is accentuated probably by the fact that the form of government which we are using is still totalitarian in fact, though we profess that it is not in theory. For example, the Prefect is still the dominating figure in the province and his decision as regards appointments of podestas are those which are and should be listened to. You will therefore find that a violently anti-Communist prefect will be influenced in his appointments by his political views, which is inevitable until such time as elections can be held. This is impossible in an operational zone, particularly as elections in this country will almost certainly lead to serious demonstrations.

<sup>3</sup> AMGOT had from the outset been inclined toward reviving representative economic bodies, but at first it had been only practical to do so on a communal or provincial basis.

### BUT INFORMAL COMMUNAL COUNCILS CREATE A BETTER FEELING

[Capt M. S. McGaw, CAO, Vasto, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

\* \* \* a better understanding of the problems between the military and the civilians is afforded by meetings of the AMG officials with the Sindaco and his committee of citizens. A great improvement in feeling between the various groups concerned has resulted. \* \* \*

### COUNCILS MUST BE SET UP WITH CIRCUMSPECTION

[Memo, Capt C.G.R. Williams, Interior Subcom, to Dir, Interior Subcom, 10 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

1. After Lieutenant Lewis' lecture today, on the Giunta Municipale today [*sic*], Lord William W. B. Stansgate [Vice President, Administration Section, ACC] raised a general discussion. Among other things he asked if any of the officers present had actual experience of setting up such a body and how they had proceeded.

2. *Lieutenant Colonel Morton* (A) said that when he was a forward CAO, Fifth Army he had set up a similar body in the Commune of Sessa, on the Garigliano. He felt the need of an advisory Committee to be composed of the leading citizens, regardless of their political views so long as they were men of integrity. He first got the Sindaco and the Segretario Communale to suggest some names. He then got these men to suggest others. He also got the opinion of each man upon the others who had been proposed. He took the ten who were most highly thought of and constituted them his advisory Committee. This process took him a week. He first had this ten "vetted" by FSS and the CRR. He found the Committee very helpful. He does not know if his successor continued it. \* \* \*

### THE PRE-FASCIST CITY COUNCILS ARE REVIVED IN NAPLES PROVINCE

[Msg. Mason-MacFarlane to State Dept, 13 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

. . . In conformity with a regional order of the Allied Military Government, dated 15 March 1944 providing for a gradual restoration of local self-government abolished under the Fascist regime, a council of aldermen representing "the various political tendencies of the community, Labor, Agriculture, Industry, and the Professions" was installed in Naples on 12 May. The

council will act in an advisory capacity to the mayor of Naples, Gustavo Ingresso. Its members were appointed by the Prefect of Naples Province, Francesco Selvaggi, with the approval of the Allied Military Government. It is pointed out that the establishment of the Neapolitan City Council is merely one of a series of similar councils established in other parts of the three provinces of AMG Region III.

### DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT A PRIMARY DUTY OF ALLIED OFFICIALS

[Min of Remarks by Lush at Conf of RC's, 31 May 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

\* \* \* Brigadier Lush said that he had noted in the reports given by Regional Commissioners at the previous day's meeting very little reference to the progress of local government. He asked Regional Commissioners to remember that the development of local government, the only basis of sound administration, was the primary duty of Regional Commissioners. The economic problems would be often more obvious and clearly most important but they should not be allowed to exclude attention to the administrative side of Regional work. \* \* \*

### FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER TWENTY YEARS

[Memo, History of Local Government Sub-Commission, by Capt Ralph R. Temple, Actg Dir, Local Govt Subcom, 30 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

\* \* \* To appreciate the nature of the work of the Subcommission, it is necessary to have in mind that, under the Fascist regime, previously existing democratically elected bodies, which functioned somewhat on the lines of the British and American system, were abolished. \* \* \*

One of the first things that had to be done, therefore, was to abolish this system which did not countenance interference with the executive by any other body and replace it with one which restored as much of pre-Fascist democratic rule as war conditions warranted. [For offices and agencies to be restored, see Instrs No. 4, 30 October 1943, above.]

\* \* \* For the first time in over 20 years, the man in the street played a part in the destiny of his town or province, without fear of reprisals. The office of the Prefect was retained as was the position of mayor, the democratic pre-Fascist title of "Sindaco" being revived to replace the Fascist one of "Podesta." \* \* \*

### 3. ACC STARTS A JOB WHICH CALLS FOR PATIENCE

#### LET'S NOT ENCUMBER THEM WITH TOO MANY SUPERVISORS

[Ltr, Maxwell, Deputy Chief, MGS, to Macmillan, Br Resident Minister, 16 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

\* \* \* All three Generals from their separate points of view are equally anxious about the proposals made in recent telegrams from Military Government Section for the constitution of the Allied Commission. From the political point of view, I feel bound to sound two notes of warning. First, any large army of experts here in the period before Rome is reached or a proper government formed will either do nothing useful or, if they are active, will overwhelm the present administration.<sup>4</sup> As General Taylor has indicated in his telegrams from here, what are wanted are a top-notch man or two and one or two assistants who will stay here permanently and inspire and sustain such governmental machine as exists. Secondly, in the period after Rome has been reached and a broad based government, we hope, got going, I doubt if an Armistice Commission of some six hundred officers will be found to be a workable proposition. Certainly, it is more than doubtful whether prominent anti-Fascists will agree to serve for any length of time in a government which will in effect only be a colonial administration. Won't they say that they have not waited over 20 years to be pushed about by graduates from Tizi Ouzou? On this point we come back to General Alexander's aphorism: "Have we come to free or to enslave Europe?" May we not find it more profitable from the military as well as political point of view to choose the former? \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup> ACC in its original form was the brain child of MGS in Algiers, which was headed by an American. The British in Italy tended to believe from the outset that the organization was too large, especially in view of the poor conditions of transport and communication under which the organization would for some time have to operate. They also considered, as the above document shows, that there was danger of ACC being so overactive in supervising the Italian Government that Italians would feel themselves smothered. (See the comments of Sir Harold Macmillan as quoted by C. R. S. Harris, *Allied Military Administration of Italy, 1943-1945* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), p. 114.) When Mr. Macmillan, to whom Colonel Maxwell addressed the above-quoted letter, became Acting President of ACC in November 1944 he put into effect a curtailment of the commission's supervisory functions.

#### GETTING ACC STARTED EVEN MODESTLY IS NOT EASY

[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, to Eisenhower, 28 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

This is a short report of progress up to date.

1. *Getting the Commission started.* The principal difficulties to be overcome are:

a. The fact that the Italians have no central government organization in being here with which the experts on the various subcommissions can usefully deal.

b. The fact that it will be necessary to arrange for adequate telegraph and telephone communications for the Italian administration if it is to function smoothly.

As regards accommodating the Commission here we have made several reconnaissances and it will be quite possible to fit them in between Brindisi and Lecce which is quite sufficiently near at hand.

I have explained exactly what we want to do to Badoglio, [Guido] Jung and Piccardi. They are all out to help and co-operate and naturally appreciate the prospect of taking over the administration of Southern Italy south of the northern boundary of the Prefectures of Salerno, Potenza and Bari.

I have impressed upon them the urgency of calling at once to Brindisi all the best available experts to get a proper central administration running and to provide qualified executives with whom the branches of our Commission will be able to function.

The main difficulty in getting the existing Italian Government to function fully and properly at the moment is not so much the problem of broadening the basis and increasing the numbers of the ministers but the fact that Badoglio and the King are obviously inclined to think that it is not worthwhile making any great efforts until we get to Rome which they still imagine will happen in the near future.

I talked about this to General Alex[ander] who did not in the meantime wish me to pass on his views on the subject to Badoglio. On the other hand unless I can make it clear to Badoglio that there is at least a strong possibility that in the present campaign we may not reach Rome I very much doubt his really getting down to it and producing here the central government adminis-

tration which will be essential if the Italians are to take control of Italy south of our forward Army areas. \* \* \*

I am most anxious to get the Commission started as soon as practicable but as I have already explained it will be difficult to do this usefully until the Italians get better organized in Brindisi and until I can get the communications problem solved. I am taking November 12th as my target date so that everyone will have a definite date to which to work. In the meantime, I am not communicating this date to the Italians as it may well be that, particularly on the legal side in respect of the transfer from AMGOT to Italian plus Commission control, there may be unforeseen difficulties. \* \* \*

You will see from all the above that the problem is none too easy and exactly how much of the Commission will be able to function usefully remains to be seen. That the entire Commission, the establishment of which was based on the assumption that we would be working with a full Italian Government machine installed in Rome, can be usefully employed in the meantime is at least extremely doubtful.

I have discussed the question of making the handing over of control to the Italians from AMGOT conditional upon a broadening of the Government by Badoglio with Murphy and Macmillan and they agree with me that this is hardly necessary. If I am to get this show running reasonably soon and smoothly I want to work to as early a target date as may be practicable and we do definitely know that Badoglio is clearly doing his best to broaden the basis of his Government on the lines we desire. \* \* \*

#### ACC IS INSTRUCTED ON OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

[Directive, AFHQ to Joyce, 1 Nov 43, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

12. Measures are now being taken to bring the Allied Control Commission into operation at the seat of the Italian Government, and to develop the Italian Government to the point where territory at present under Allied Military Government may be placed under its administration. This will involve the following steps:

a. A small party, composed of officers from certain of the Subcommissions, has been dispatched to Brindisi. This group joining with the members of the military mission will be organized into the advance command post of the Allied Control Commission. Through these representatives the

Commission will establish contact with the Italian Government and begin the preliminary examination of immediately pressing questions. One task will be to commence planning for the transfer of territory to Italian administration, which will, however, be subject to the guidance and supervision of the Allied Control Commission.

b. . . . Headquarters Allied Military Government at Palermo, now under command of this Headquarters, will be transferred to your command. When you are prepared to have Headquarters AMG brought under command you will notify this Headquarters.

c. The Italian Government will continue broadening its political composition and strengthening its administration structure.

d. When it is determined that the Italian governmental system is in condition, politically and administratively, to be entrusted with the responsibility, the transfer of areas will be undertaken, on order from AFHQ. When you consider that the time has arrived for such transfer, in part or in whole, you will advise this Headquarters.

16. Certain considerations should be observed in order that no precedent may be created prejudicial to the United Nations or the Allied Control Commission. Long-range commitments should be avoided except on instructions from the Allied Commander in Chief. You are acting through and upon the Italian Government, and are not yourself assuming the government of the liberated territory. Allied officers should not allow themselves to be drawn into any discussions as to whether the Italian Government is legally competent to do what is required of it. It is a domestic question, in which in general we are not interested, by what particular measures the Italian authorities give effect to our demands. It is for them to decide upon the appropriate form of internal action and prepare draft documents. Major documents should be submitted to the Commission, in order that errors and implications prejudicial to the United Nations may be detected. In proper cases you would consult this Headquarters before concurring. The representatives of the Allied Governments should not thrust the Italian authorities aside and frame their measures for them, but should have control over important acts before they are taken.

17. The operations of the Allied Nations throughout Italian territory must be free from any restraint, regulation, taxation, public charge

or other impediment. No Italian Court shall be allowed, without the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief, to exercise jurisdiction over any member of the Allied Forces or person accompanying such forces, or over any officials of one of the Allied Nations. If complaint is made to you of the conduct of any member of the Allied Forces you should call upon the complainant to substantiate the charge with a statement of particulars, in order that any disciplinary action found necessary may be taken.

18. The members of the Commission, whether acting officially or otherwise, should maintain a correct attitude toward members of Italian Government, neither autocratic on the one hand nor familiar on the other. They should bear in mind that the provisional arrangements between the Allied Governments and that of Marshal Badoglio are dictated by war needs and are not to stand in the way of the Italian people, after the elimination of Fascism and the eviction of the German Forces, having a government of their free democratic choice. In the meantime it is important that there be built up an anti-Fascist Government on the broadest base possible. It is desirable that all healthy elements which can deliver some good be rallied to the common effort. The success of the plan to entrust the Italian authorities with the administration of Italian territory under supervision of the Allied Commission is dependent upon the development of an Italian Government on whose intentions and ability the Allied Governments can rely.

#### THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE TOLD OF THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION

[Ltr, Joyce, Deputy President, ACC, to Marshal Badoglio, 18 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/63]

Two reports, one from the Headquarters, 15th Army Group and one from Allied Military Government in Naples, indicate that certain appointments are being made in territory under the jurisdiction of the Military Governor without prior consultation with the Allied authorities. It is clear that there has been some misunderstanding in this respect, since insofar as territory administered by the Allied Military Government is concerned, the General Officer Commanding in Chief is the Military Governor and is responsible for the administration and for officials engaged in the administration. \* \* \*

I should be grateful if Your Excellency will issue the necessary instructions to prevent any such moves being carried out without prior con-

sultation with the appropriate Allied Authorities.<sup>5</sup>

#### IF ONLY THEY'D GET DOWN TO WORK

[Min of Conf Between the Italian Under Secy for Education and the Education Advisers of ACC, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/999]

#### *The Minister was asked:*

I. What were his plans for the Ministry? Answer: First of all he said that none were formulated. But later he made the points: that his purpose would be to re-establish the honest character of education, to get rid of Fascist influence, and to return to where education would have been had Fascism not intervened.

IIA. How soon would he have a ministry capable of taking over the educational administration now being carried on from Palermo? First answer: Only when he reached Rome. Second answer: Nothing definite could be given before Wednesday, 1 December, when he would have had a chance to consult with the Marshal.

He was asked to make his answers under two headings—How soon, etc., from now, and how soon after the move to Sorrento.<sup>6</sup>

IIB. After further conversation he was asked to give at hazard a date, without binding himself until he had had time (until next Wednesday) to consult the Marshal, when he would have a Ministry. Answer: 25 December. His further talk on this point showed, however, that he did not mean a working Ministry, but an assemblage who would begin to plan with him.

IIC. On being further pressed to clear this point, he said that the whole matter was a vicious circle. He could not get his Ministry together until they had control of the territory, but they could not have control of the territory until they had a working Ministry! He then asked that we continue to run education until Rome was taken (despite the return of the King to power) in order to give him the opportunity of making a working administration. He was told that he must not assume that this request would be agreed to by us. \* \* \*

III. When asked what were his plans for the internal working organization of the Ministry,

<sup>5</sup> The Government had representatives in military government territory who were concerned with national matters. Purely local officials in MG territory were of course appointed by AMG.

<sup>6</sup> At that time the government was expected to go to Sorrento but at the end of March it moved to Salerno instead. Conditions here turned out to be better than at Brindisi but Salerno, too, was overcrowded. Naples was precluded because it was under Military Government.

he was unable to answer effectively. It seemed to us that he had given no adequate thought to the matter. He asked our advice, in the light of our experience, and he promised to give a more considered opinion on Wednesday, 1 December. \* \* \*

He left us with the impression that his mind was not clear, and that he was anxious to have help from us, and that he had no sense of urgency. He stated that for 20 years he had been out of public life as an anti-Fascist, and had only come back now as a patriot to serve his King and country.

#### DON'T SUPERVISE US BEYOND ALL REASON

[Transl of Ltr, Badoglio to Joyce, 28 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

\* \* \* It . . . seems to me that intervention on the part of the [ACC] sections should be limited to questions of general interest, and not to supervise the daily and current routine. If in order to transfer a clerk or pay a salary or admonish a lazy employee we are to be under the control of the section, I believe utter confusion will result. \* \* \*

#### NEITHER BRINDISI NOR SALERNO AFFORDS ADEQUATE FACILITIES

[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

\* \* \* Much of the difficulties which have arisen sprang from the remoteness and squalor of Brindisi. General [Mason-]MacFarlane had recognized from the outset the necessity of moving the Italian Government from Brindisi; General Joyce accepted this doctrine. But much time was wasted by everyone concerned waiting for Rome to fall. Naples, where the dissident democrats like Sforza had congregated, was vetoed by the consideration that Naples had to remain an AMG area until another port on the west coast could take its place as a main supply base since it was not possible to allow Naples to be taken over by any such vapid and synthetic Italian Government as could be maintained at this stage. . . . Eventually with end of December, [it was decided] to move the Italian Government and the Commission to Salerno. Much time must, however, elapse before the move can be effected owing to the delay in clearing accommodations and making available adequate communication facilities. \* \* \*

[Transl of Ltr, Vito Reali, Minister of the Interior, to Col. Cyril B. Spicer, Dir, Interior Subcom Sec, 15 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

I beg to inform you by this letter that, in consequence of the present lack of space, there is no possibility of preparing even one room which can be used eventually as an office for the Liaison Officer of the Interior Subcommittee. \* \* \*

#### IN SOME SPHERES NOTABLE PROGRESS IS GRADUALLY MADE

[Agriculture Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/825]

\* \* \* The Subcommittee is . . . pressing forward with the work started last November with the Ministry, then located in and confined to Apulia, King's Italy, to replace the top-heavy and cumbersome group of corporate organizations in Agriculture which grew up under the Fascist system and which were the basis of all production and distribution control of Italian Agriculture, with a simplified, straight line organization, manned by men technically trained and with administrative responsibility, running down from the Minister through the Compartments, Provinces, and the Communes.

Many of the confederations, Ente Economici and syndicates which formed the basis of Italian agriculture have been abolished or have become inactive in the regions formerly under AMG control.

After a thorough study of the whole Italian organization in Agriculture under the Fascist regime by members of this Subcommittee in cooperation with those officials responsible for the agricultural set-up under the Badoglio Government it was decided that the system of vertical Enti's and syndicates, each separate and distinct with many officials and employees and with taxing power as well as certain political functions, would be eliminated and these organizations returned to the principle of an educational and service institution for farmers. Early in December 1943 a broad outline of the plan for the new set-up of the Ministry was worked out with the then Minister, Tanasso Siciliani. . . . Some progress was being made on this reorganization but there was hesitancy upon the part of the Minister to take, especially in Apulia which was then the only portion of Italy under the Italian Government, the drastic steps necessary to abolish the maze of Enti's and organizations and eliminate the large body of personnel employed by them. \* \* \*

[Hq ACC, Rpt for May 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

27. . . . Following close on the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture and the announcement of the programme for collecting wheat and barley last month, activity has been intensified through the Subcommittee and the Ministry of Agriculture to develop the necessary directives which will make possible the implementation of the collection decree, for the general co-ordination and broad supervision of the collection program. Reports from the field indicate that the Communal and Provincial Committees in most provinces are functioning and declarations are being completed. . . .

#### IN OTHER SPHERES ACC CAN ONLY MAKE THE BEST OF A BAD SYSTEM

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Interim Rpt, 11 Jan 44, Spofford Rpt, ex. 4-R]

4. The Italian Ministry of Finance strongly believes that it is politically impossible at this time to make the basic changes which are necessary in the existing tax-structure and tax-collection machinery. So far, our main task in the revenue field has been to get the most out of the present tax system. This has meant re-building revenue staffs, securing the necessary paper and printing facilities, and making minor changes in the existing tax structure. . . .<sup>7</sup>

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Final Rept. 16 May 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

8. . . . Once territory reverted from AMG to the Italian Government, the Allied Commission adopted the policy of advising the Italian Government but not of enforcing orders. For example, one of the earliest policy problems to confront the Finance Subcommittee arose, in November 1943, at Brindisi, when the Italian Government presented its first statement of proposed expenditures. The Chief of Staff of ALCOM [Allied Commission, Italy] ruled at that time that the Italian Government would not be ordered to reduce certain expenditures, and from then on the Italian Government had complete budgetary freedom.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Plans were made by ACC for revision of the tax system when political circumstances should give the Government more courage for drastic changes.

<sup>8</sup> See Chapter XIII for the details of the financial issue. This section has not been designed to set forth the specific measures or proposals of ACC but merely to give the general pattern of its relationship with the government and the difficult conditions which for some time hampered its efforts. Its activities in relation to specific issues are taken up in other chapters, under various functional headings.

#### EXAMPLE OF THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SUBCOMMISSION AND A MINISTRY

[Ltr, Labor Subcom, ACC, to Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor, 14 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/146/19]

1. This Memorandum is submitted as a statement of the present working relationship of the Labor Subcommittee with the Ministry. If the Ministry is not in full agreement with the statements made herein, it is requested that a prompt report be made in order that a complete accord may be reached.

2. As a matter of policy, it is understood that the Ministry will not make any changes in laws, decrees, ordinances or policies affecting labor or labor organizations, and will not make any major personnel changes or any changes in personnel appointed by Allied Military authorities without prior approval of the Labor Subcommittee. In addition, the Ministry will keep the Subcommittee advised of any labor shortages, disputes, or programs which may affect work being performed for the Allied Military Forces, or which may affect labor policy in areas now under direct control of the Allied Military Forces.

To facilitate the clearance of these matters, a Liaison Officer for the Labor Subcommittee is stationed at ACC Rear Headquarters, and will visit the Ministry regularly each day. \* \* \*

#### IN QUANTITY IF NOT ALWAYS IN QUALITY BADOGLIO'S CIVIL SERVICE GROWS

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/175]

\* \* \* The Ministry now has a staff of approximately 100. The size of the staff is slowly growing, but the capacity of the persons employed shows little improvement. As a result of the inadequacy and incapacity of personnel, most financial problems must be handled by the Minister himself.<sup>9</sup> \* \* \*

#### A LARGE PANOPLY OF SUBCOMMISSIONS ENTERS INTO ACTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT

[ACC Rpt to Advisory Council for Italy, Functions of the ACC and Its Relations With the Italian Government,<sup>10</sup> 25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/268]

##### *Interior Subcommittee*

Supervises the working, defascistisation and reorganization of the internal administration of

<sup>9</sup> It must be borne in mind that many of the best Italian civil servants were still in German-occupied Italy.

<sup>10</sup> The subcommissions listed are merely those of the economic and administrative sections—the two sections concerned directly with civil administrative functions of the government.

Italy (i.e., the Ministry of Interior and provincial and communal authorities). It also arranges for the preparation and dispatch of teams of senior Italian officials to reorganize the administration of newly liberated provinces and is in almost daily contact with the Ministry of Interior on these matters.

#### *Public Safety Subcommittee*

Is concerned with the Italian Police, Prisons, Fire and Civil Defense Services. In Regions and Army areas it is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the efficient functioning of these Services. At Headquarters, liaison is maintained with:

Minister of Interior on Civil Police, Fire, Civil Defense and control of civilian movement.

Minister of Justice on Prisons and Prosecutions.

Minister of Communications on registration and licensing of vehicles.

Royal Carabinieri and Royal Finance Guards on Police.

Allied Force (P.M. [Provost Marshal] and Security Section) on Police and Security matters.

#### *Public Health*

Is responsible for all phases of the care of health of the Italian public and the prevention or control of outbreaks of epidemics or diseases of all kinds: it supervises the work of the Italian Health Officials and the reorganization of medical and welfare services; it advises as to diet scales; organizes the supply and distribution of medical supplies, the manufacture of medicines and the production of sera and vaccines. It is also concerned with the prevention and control of the diseases of animals. For these purposes it consults frequently with the appropriate Health and Veterinary Officers of the Ministry of the Interior.

#### *Legal Subcommittee*

Advises the Chief Commissioner, his staff and Subcommittees on Legal matters; prepares proclamations, general orders and directives implementing Italian legislation; operates and supervises the Allied Military Courts; supervises the administration of justice by Italian courts; peruses, criticises and negotiates amendments of such Italian legislation as may affect the work of ACC; maintains liaison with the Italian Minister of Justice for these purposes.

#### *Education Subcommittee*

Purges text books and personnel of Fascism, restores schools and academics to routine operation

to return them as normal as possible to the Italian Government. Maintains liaison with the Minister of Public Instruction on epuration, appointments and transfers to the senior posts in both Universities and Schools and revision and printing of books for the schools.

#### *Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Subcommittee*

So far as operations allow protects and preserves the art, monuments, objects, etc., of Italy and renders first aid to those monuments damaged by the passage of war. It collects information with regard to the displacement of works of art either through wartime dispersal, enemy theft or illegal sale. It co-operates with the Italian Ministry of Public Instruction and with the President of the Pontifical Commission for Sacred Art.

#### *Property Control Subcommittee*

Protects and controls the property and assets in Italy owned by nationals of the United Nations and France, and under certain conditions it may take charge of abandoned property, property of enemy states and of the Italian Government (including semi-statal and Fascist organizations). Liaison in these matters is maintained with the Italian Ministries of the Treasury, Finance and Corporations.

#### *Agriculture Subcommittee*

Formulate policies and plans for revival of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, to secure maximum production of these industries and provide administrative supervision of operations of Italian Ministry of Agriculture.

#### *Commerce Subcommittee*

Advising and assisting appropriate organizations and agencies of Italian Government on administering and reviving the commercial economy of the country. Administering control of prices of all non-subsistence commodities and rationing and control of goods, etc. on short supply. Responsible for exports.

#### *Finance Subcommittee*

Initiates and develops in conjunction with Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Treasury, Bank of Italy, Social Insurance Institutions, etc., policies, plans and procedures for restoration and maintenance of ordered financial and economic conditions, stabilized currency, and anti-inflation measures. Controls Italian Financial Institutions.

Maintains records as to Italian indebtedness to Allied Nations and vice versa.

#### *Food Subcommittee*

Advises and directs, and exercises administrative supervision over Italian Government on equitable food distribution by price controls and rationing systems and controlling distribution of essential imported foodstuffs and local food supplies.

#### *Industry Subcommittee*

Formulates recommendations as to policies and plans concerning Italian industrial production, re-activation of normal exporting industries and rehabilitation of essential industries. Maintaining close liaison with Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour and supervises execution by Italian Government of instructions from A.C.C.

#### *Labour Subcommittee*

Supervises the policy, organization and administration of all labour activities and exercising controls essential to the needs of the Allied war effort. Advising Italian Government on revision of Italian Labour legislation, formation of free association of employers and employees and for arbitration between them. Supervises all activities of labour exchanges.

#### *Public Works and Utilities Subcommittee*

Assumes responsibility from Armed Forces for reconstruction and maintenance of roads and bridges, maintenance and repair of power plants, pumping installations, etc. Through Italian agencies arranges for rehabilitation, reconstruction or repair of public works, public utilities (electricity, gas, water, etc.). Advises and exercises supervision over Ministry of Public Works.

#### *Shipping Subcommittee*

Co-ordinates in conjunction with the competent authorities and G-4 Movements and Transportation Subcommittee matters referring to the use of all Italian vessels in the movement of service or civilian cargoes. Supervises the working of the Italian ship operating committee known as Cogena. Liaison with the Mediterranean Shipping Board.

#### *Transportation Subcommittee*

Arranges with MRS [Military Railway Service] rail transport to meet essential civil needs in areas under Army control. In other areas exercises supervisory and advisory duties to insure maximum use of limited rail and road facilities. Planning and liaison with Italian Ministry of Communications on future needs and policy of shipping in coastal waters and inland waterways. In conjunction with Italian Government, control and distribution of coal.

## 4. THE FIRST RESTORATION OF TERRITORY AND ITS DIFFICULTIES

### POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES CAUSE POSTPONEMENT OF TERRITORIAL TRANSFER <sup>11</sup>

[Memo, Rennell for GOCinC, 15th AGP, 8 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/945]

\* \* \* at the end of October, a decision was reached by A.F.H.Q. to bring the Allied Commission of Control into existence and to hand over, with effect from the 10th November, the rear areas in toto to the King of Italy [see above ch. X, sec. 3].

At a date subsequent to this decision, it appeared that Marshal Badoglio had not found it possible to form a broad based Italian government, as the Italian government had undertaken to do. It appeared that the principal obstacle to the formation of such a government was the continued existence of the present King of Italy on

the throne. Up to the time of writing no decision on the subject has been reached, but in view of the political difficulties encountered by Marshal Badoglio it was decided in the course of the first week in November that the territory administered by the Military Governor in the rear of the southern boundaries of the Fifth and Eighth Armies should not be handed over to the King of Italy, but that nevertheless the Allied Commission of Control should be brought into existence. \* \* \*

### SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL CRISIS REVIVES PLAN FOR TERRITORIAL TRANSFER

[Min of a Mtg of ACC officials, 12 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/36]

. . . General Holmes suggested that as a matter of general policy it should be accomplished as quickly and as safely as possible stating that he

<sup>11</sup> For the details of the political discussion and its outcome, see Chapter XV.

thought that there was a lot to be gained in many ways by turning this territory back to the Italians. He stressed two qualifying points; namely, the Political and Administrative requirements. . . . It was understood that Badoglio could get . . . technicians together within a week's time. Then, a week after that we should be able to turn over the territory. We will have to provide some facilities for the Italian Government; also lines of communication. The latter should not constitute a burden on us. . . . General Joyce stated that the territory should be turned over just as quickly as possible as it would bolster this ad interim Government and more than anything else, it would be an earnest showing before the world on the part of the Allied powers and draw attention to the policy of putting them on their own. Also, it was conceded to be the only way these officials could carry on; namely, by learning to do by doing. \* \* \*

#### BADOGLIO PREDICTS EARLY READINESS FOR THE TRANSFER

[Transl of Msg, Badoglio to Joyce, Actg Deputy President, ACC, 26 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

During the meeting in Malta with General Eisenhower, he mentioned to me that as soon as my government would be completed and in condition to function all liberated provinces would be put under Italian jurisdiction, leaving only under direct Anglo-American control those provinces in the zone of operations.

I believe that in about two weeks, when the Commission sections will be working smoothly with the separate Italian Ministries, we shall be able to say that the functioning of the Government is completely normal and such as to guarantee a good administration.

The transfer of these provinces under our direct control may then be established between the 10th and 15th of December.

Allow me to say that a statement on this subject emanating from Anglo-American sources would have the great value of cutting off all rumors issued by enemy propaganda, especially in regard to Sicily. \* \* \*

#### PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ENTAIL FURTHER POSTPONEMENT

[Note, Brig R. E. Gueterbock, Vice CofS, ACC, on visit to Brindisi, 27 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

Contact was made with the Italian government. From discussions it was apparent that the earliest date for handing over territory is 20 December 1943. The principal limiting factors are accom-

modation, provision of communications and setting up Italian governmental machinery. \* \* \*

#### THE CCS IS ASKED TO APPROVE THE PROPOSED METHOD OF TRANSFER

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Nov 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 9018]

It is proposed to restore all occupied territory south of the northerly boundary of Salerno, Potenza and Bari provinces, including Sicily but excluding Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa, to Italian jurisdiction during the first week in December. In restoring this territory to Italian Sovereignty certain formal steps are being taken to preserve various rights needed by the military forces in such territories for the effective prosecution of the war, and to insure the recognition by Italian Government of the validity of the acts of the Allied Military Government. Three documents have been prepared to accomplish these purposes.

The first is a proposed secret document to be signed by General Alexander as Military Governor, transferring the territories to the Italian Crown upon certain terms and conditions therein set forth. The document also extends these rights to all other Italian territory not at present occupied by Allied Forces, which has been liberated and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, so as to include Apulia and Sardinia. The rights in question are in addition to and without prejudice to rights reserved under the existing Armistice terms in occupied territory. This document also provides for the inclusion of the maintenance cost of Allied Troops or other personnel within the area restored as occupation costs.

The second is a short proclamation to be published by the Military Governor announcing the termination of Military Government and of all proclamations and orders issued thereunder and formally transferring the territory to the Crown of Italy, subject to all rights of the Allied Commander in Chief and the Allied Control Commission. This document does not list the particular rights reserved.

The third is a proclamation and decree to be issued by the King of Italy simultaneously with the issuance of document B. By this document the King assumes the powers of Government in the restored territory and declares that all proclamations, orders, sentences and other official acts of the Allied Military Government will be recognized as valid in Italian courts, and calls on the Italian people to co-operate with the Allied Forces in driving Germans out of Italy.

In addition to the above documents, further technical decrees to be executed by the King are in course of preparation. Their purpose is to continue in force certain provisions of proclamations and general orders issued by the Allied Military Government, such as wage and price regulations, etc., so as to prevent a lapse between the date of restoration and the time the Italian Government may act upon such subjects itself. They are what is commonly known as "transitory legislation." Approval of the foregoing is sought.

#### WHY AFHQ THOUGHT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT MUST PRECEDE TRANSFER

[Memo, Col G. R. Upjohn, Deputy CLO, ACC, undated but probably in Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

\* \* \* On the handover to the Italian Government the position changes overnight. All powers and duties of the Military Governor come to an end save insofar as the same may be preserved by agreement. Thus in the absence of agreement, the regulations made and the special offences created by the Military Governor cease to be of force or effect and his military courts have no further jurisdiction; his currency ceases to be legal tender and his moratorium and price control comes to an end. He no longer has any powers of requisition and possibly his troops do not enjoy extra-territorial rights although this last point is of some controversy. Again his supervision of education comes to an end and the schools may forthwith revert to their former teachings and practices and he withdraws from properties of which he has taken custody. Furthermore, although International Law validates the acts of the Military Governor in occupied territory during the time of occupation, it gives no continuing validity to the consequences of such acts after the cessation of occupation, e.g. contracts entered into during the occupation cannot necessarily be sued on afterwards, sentences imposed by Allied Courts do not have to be recognized by the Italian Government and therefore prisoners incarcerated for the full term of their sentences.

The above presents the position in the absence of agreement. Where there is agreement between the parties then the position is in my view accurately summed up by saying that the powers, rights and duties of the military forces in the territory formerly occupied by them are governed entirely by the agreement reached between the parties, that is in the present case the Armistice Terms.

These Terms confer on the Allied Commander in Chief very broad powers in unoccupied territory and provide the charter of our status in such

territory. While the Terms do not deal in detail with our powers, rights and duties in unoccupied territory, the powers conferred by the Terms are sufficiently wide in my view to form the basis for a series of detailed agreements which for the reasons appearing . . . must be essentials of any transfer of territory to the Italian Government.

#### CCAO IS MORE CHEERFUL ABOUT THE TRANSFER THAN SOME ITALIANS

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO 15th AGp, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

\* \* \* The Badoglio government is quite adequate to govern, with only light guidance, the 19 provinces which are in hand. They are at least as competent to do so as most of the officers who have been sent out to staff the A.C.C. or to provide A.M.G. personnel for regions yet to be occupied. \* \* \*

[Msg, MGS, AFHQ, to Hq ACC, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/63]

Advised by Poletti that at recent meeting Prefects Region I, all incumbents except one career Prefect expressed view that they would be unable to continue in office after turn over if oath to the King was required. Similar attitude said to be taken by considerable number of Sindacos and other officials appointed by AMG. This general reaction stems from fact that King associated with Fascism in minds of these officials. Poletti believes feeling sincere and for most part not dominated by partisan considerations.<sup>12</sup>

#### ADVISORY COUNCIL APPROVES THE TRANSFER WITH POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS

[Ltr, Murphy, U.S. Member, Advisory Council for Italy, to Gen. Smith, CofS, AFHQ, 15 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

Reference is made to your letter of 1 December 1943, in which you communicated the request of the Commander in Chief for an expression of opinion by the Advisory Council for Italy with respect to the question whether the proposed transfer of presently occupied Italian territory to the control of Marshal Badoglio's Government would, at this time, be interpreted as a gesture of confidence and support of the present head of the House of Savoy. If in the opinion of the Council this action would be so interpreted, it

<sup>12</sup> The prefects, as matters developed, did not have to take the oath because the agreement with the government provided that appointments of prefects made by AMG would be confirmed.

was further requested whether it would be desirable to delay the transfer of the authority over presently occupied areas in Italy until the Italian Government is established in Rome on the broad basis which has been indicated would be acceptable to our Governments.

After the deliberation of this question, the Advisory Council unanimously decided officially to recommend to the Commander in Chief that all Italian occupied territories south of the line Salerno-Bari and including Sicily and Sardinia be transferred to Italian administration, subject to the guidance and instructions of the Allied Control Commission. This recommendation was made with the understanding that the transfer be subject to two conditions, namely: (1) that the administration, central and local, will be carried on by officials of proven good faith and Allied sympathies; and (2) that the transfer involves no commitment to Marshal Badoglio's Government after the capture of Rome.

The Council agreed that the transfer might at the outset appear to reflect new and additional support of the present Italian Government and the House of Savoy, but was unanimously of the opinion that the two conditions set forth immediately above would adequately correct any such tendency.

The Council agreed on a further recommendation to the Commander in Chief in the following terms:

"The Advisory Council for Italy recommends to the Commander in Chief that a specific directive be issued to the Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission that in exercising the functions of control he should be guided insofar as military necessity permits by the terms of the declaration regarding Italy made at the Moscow Conference, with particular reference to the second of the measures set out in that declaration."

It will be recalled that the text of the second measure here referred to is as follows:

"2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups."

#### THE CCS WISHES NO COMPROMISE OF RIGHTS OR TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 9 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 3624]

In restoring territories mentioned to Italian jurisdiction [see above, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 November] it is important that no rights under

terms of surrender be compromised by any agreement with the Italian Government or any representative thereof. . . . It is believed that the surrender terms, in particular paragraph 10 of short terms [Chapter IX, Section 3] and paragraphs 22, 36 and 42 of long terms [Chapter IX, Section 5], are sufficiently broad in scope to give you authority to direct the Italian Government to do anything which you might feel necessary for it to do, without the necessity of a secret agreement as proposed in your document number 1. . . . In view of these factors, and since we are not transferring "sovereignty" or "territory," but rather administration of territories, the proposed secret document is considered inadvisable and should not be entered into. \* \* \*

As regards proclamations, decrees and technical decrees to be issued by the Italians, these should be in the name of the Italian Government rather than of the King if this is in accordance with constitutional processes. Proclamation and decree mentioned in your fourth paragraph should refer to assumption of administration of government rather than to assumption of "powers" of government. It is important in connection with all proposed documents that Royalty, Crown and King be not emphasized. \* \* \*

[Paper of CCAC cited in Msg, Hilldring to Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, 18 Dec 43, ACC files, 10060/100/91, CM-IN 10937]

\* \* \* Consideration has been given to the documents prepared in connection with the proposed transfer of governmental administrative functions from AMG to Italian Government. It is apparent that these documents were prepared under the impression that full administration of the territory was to be restored to Italian sovereignty, thus giving up the rights of an occupying power. Under no circumstances should any governmental powers be surrendered to the Italian Government which would have the effect of changing the character of the areas involved from occupied territory to non-occupied territory within the meaning of Article 21 of the Long Terms. It is suggested that this objective might be accomplished by a proclamation issued by General Eisenhower or General Joyce stating that the powers of government heretofore vested in the Military Governor are hereby transferred to the Allied Control Commission to be exercised by it through the Italian Government and its duly authorized representatives.<sup>13</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>13</sup> On 19 December, General Holmes, Chief of MGS, cabled to General Hilldring acknowledging that AFHQ had gone on the presumption that sovereignty in the areas to be transferred could be restored to the Italian

**AFHQ FEARS THAT TOO SEVERE TERMS WILL IMPERIL BADOGGIO GOVERNMENT**

[NAF 587, Gen Wilson, CINC AF, to CCS, 13 Jan 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 3776]

1. Your FAN 315 of 5 January was fully discussed this morning with General Mason-MacFarlane, General W. B. Smith and Mr. Macmillan.<sup>14</sup> All agreed that to present such documents at this time may well be regarded by Badoglio as amounting to a breach of the understandings we have reached with him. The repeated insistence upon the expression "Occupied Territory" added to the long and elaborate reservations may seem to be taking away with one hand even more than is being given with the other.

2. Badoglio's regime is being very hard pressed by internal political ambitions and by external criticism. For this reason it is quite likely, and General [Mason]-MacFarlane from his experience, thinks more than likely, that Badoglio will refuse the transfer on these terms; in such an event the chance of obtaining a more amenable alternative Government would appear small. A keen-sighted Royalist might advise the King to do the same. We should then be in a serious predicament since our plans have been laid upon the assumption that there will be early transfer of territory and that the control commission will come into early and effective operation. \* \* \*

**THE CCS DECIDES TO LET AFHQ EXERCISE POLITICAL DISCRETION**

[Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, 23 Jan 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 13664]

You are hereby authorized to proceed as outlined in your NAF 587 [above] in regard to the transfer of the responsibility for administration to the Italian Government.

Government, subject to necessary Allied rights. This had seemed the implication of the Moscow Declaration on Italy. It was still the belief of AFHQ that the proposed agreements between AFHQ and the Badoglio government would safeguard Allied rights sufficiently. AFHQ feared that the proposal of CCAC—that AFHQ merely give the Italian Government the right to administer the territory under the supervision of ACC—would be unacceptable to Badoglio and damaging to his political prestige. During the interchange of ideas between AFHQ and CCS, McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, arrived at AFHQ. He was apparently convinced by theater authorities that their views on the political and legal aspects of the issue had merit. On his return to Washington McCloy presented reasons for reconsidering the original position. The combined chiefs did reconsider, but even with modification its proposals continued to embody safeguards which AFHQ, as appears in the following document, considered politically impracticable.

<sup>14</sup>The CCS in this message required, among other things, that the Italian Government recognize the terri-

**RIGHTS ARE RESERVED BY ALLIES IN THE RESTORED TERRITORY**

[Secret Agreement Between Alexander, GOCinC ACMF, and Badoglio, 9 Feb 44, CCS Memo 199, ABC files, 014, HORRIFIED, Govt, secs. 1-4]

\* \* \* *Territory Restored:* That portion of the Mainland of Italy south of the northern boundaries of the Provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, and Sicily and adjacent Islands (but not Pantelleria or Lampedusa or Linosa).

*Terms of Restoration:* Without prejudice to any rights, powers and immunities of the United Nations under the Armistice terms heretofore granted to the Italian government, all of which remain in full force and effect throughout all Italian territory, there is hereby reserved to the United Nations and to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces and to such officers or other representatives, including the Allied Control Commission, as he may designate, the rights, powers and immunities described below, in any part of the said territory and in all other Italian territory which has been liberated from German domination and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, hereinafter referred to as "the Unoccupied Territory":

1. There will be made available to the Allied Forces such facilities, utilities and installations as may be required by the Allied Commander in Chief or his agents for such disposition, use or operation as may be determined.
2. The right to maintain and quarter troops in such parts of the Unoccupied Territory as they may see fit.
3. The right to hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody prisoners of war and civilian internees as may be directed by the Allied Commander in Chief.
4. The right to declare any area to be a Military Zone and to exercise therein the rights of an occupying power or enforce such other controls as may be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief.
5. The right to convene Allied Military Tribunals for the trial of any person violating any order or regulation issued by the Allied Military Authorities and of any person otherwise doing any act hostile to the Allied Forces or any member thereof in any part of the Unoccupied Territory, and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such tribunals may direct.

\_\_\_\_\_ tory as continuing legally to be "occupied," and that the Allied CINC might cancel any act of the Italian authorities or resume government if required by military or other exigencies.

6. The right to conduct and carry on to ultimate conclusion the trial by Allied Military Tribunals of any person charged with an offense heretofore committed and cognizable under any proclamation or order heretofore issued by or on behalf of the Allied Military Governor.

7. Any official in the Unoccupied Territory previously appointed by the Allied Military Government may only be removed by the Italian Government with the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief.

8. The right to requisition private and public property and services.

9. The right to reoccupy the whole or any part of the Unoccupied Territory at any time or to take such other steps or exercise such other powers in any part of such territory as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war.

10. The rights to import and export and to control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the Allied Forces may determine without the payment of any impost, tax, charge, or duty of any kind whatsoever either to the Italian Government or to any of its political sub-divisions or agencies except as may from time to time be agreed by the Allied Commander in Chief.

11. The right to engage in such operations and import and export such military or other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war free from the imposition of any imposts, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

12. Any official or other representative or, in respect of any activities for official account, any agency of the United Nations, civilian or military, may enter and remain within the Unoccupied Territory free from the imposition of any import, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.

13. No member of the Allied Forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian court for any cause whatsoever either civil or criminal without the consent of the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces.

14. All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied Troops or other personnel within the Unoccupied Territory will be chargeable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation.

15. Proclamations or Decrees to carry out the purposes set forth in Document 'D,' annexed hereto, and made a part of these terms and conditions, will be issued by the Italian Government at the time of transfer of the territory.<sup>15</sup>

#### ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER BUT VALIDATES AMG ACTS

[Proclamation by Italian Government to the Italian People, 9 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

\* \* \* 1. Military government by the Allied Forces in the territory restored has terminated;

2. All powers of government and jurisdiction in the territory restored and over its inhabitants, and final administrative responsibility, subject only to the rights therein reserved to the United Nations, are vested in the government of Italy, and all persons in the territory except members of the Allied Forces and other representatives and agents of any of the United Nations are hereby declared to be subject to the laws and decrees of the government of Italy;

3. All Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by the Military Governor or under his authority in the said territory and which have been terminated therein by the Military Governor as upon its restoration, are hereby recognized by the Italian government as having been validly and legally issued and are declared to be of the same legal effect as if they had been issued by the Italian government in accordance with Italian law, and they will be so recognized by all Italian courts and officials.

4. All acts done by any member of the Allied Forces in pursuance of such Proclamations or Orders, and all official action of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removal from any office, public or private, are hereby recognized by the Italian government as legal, valid and binding, and will be so recognized by all Italian courts and officials.

5. All sentences imposed by Allied Military Courts are hereby recognized by the Italian government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian court and will be so recognized by all Italian courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the United Nations. \* \* \*

<sup>15</sup> Document "D," not included here, was a letter to the head of the Italian Government setting forth certain measures previously established by Allied proclamation (e.g., prohibiting syndicate payments) which the Italian Government was to continue through the issuance of decrees or proclamations.

## AN ITALY WHICH SHALL GROW IN STRENGTH AND STATURE

[Announcement of the Territorial Restoration by Gen Wilson, 10 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/132/324]

3. When the Allied Forces first occupied the territory of metropolitan Italy, military operation and the best interests of the civil population made military government a necessity. It was a military necessity that order should be established and maintained among the civil population behind the lines so that our troops could continue their fighting under the most favourable conditions. It was a human necessity that the men, women and children in the occupied territory should be assisted so far as conditions allowed in recovering from the misery and devastation which warfare had imposed on their homes and lands. Accordingly, Allied Military Government was established on the basis of international law. It was conducted with humanity and justice.

11. For the reasons given at the beginning of this announcement [i.e. in par. 3], it will be necessary for Allied Military Government to continue to function in the combat zone. But it is also foreseen that as our armies advance and normal conditions are restored in the territory progressively occupied, future transfers will be effected. The situation now in the making will make it possible for these future transfers to be made to an Italy which has grown in strength

and stature. We look to the Italian people to translate this possibility into a firm reality and to work together toward the common victory. Nothing must stand in its way for it is the indispensable condition of the freedom of all mankind.

## MARSHAL BADOGLIO SOUNDS A FANFARE

[Msg, Badoglio to Italian Legations Abroad, 15 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

. . . Nearly all liberated Italy was restored by the Allies to Italian administration on 11 February. This is a first step toward renewed unity of the country and at same time indication and proof of restored confidence. The Royal Government will spare no effort to reorganize the unitarian life of the country, to further its rebirth, and to carry on the war of liberation with utmost energy. \* \* \*

## THE POPULATION SEEMS LESS JUBILANT

[Msg, Hq ACMF to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 20 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

People generally apathetic and more concerned with living conditions. Preference for the continuation of AMG or at least for Allied Control for some considerable time is expressed in all regions and both army areas. This is due to fear that Italian leaders are not capable of governing. . . .

## 5. ADVISORY HELP IN RESTORED AREAS MUST CONTINUE

### MORE STRESS NOW ON HELPING THEM WALK ALONE

[Ltr, Exec Cmsr, ACC, to RC's and SCAO's 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

2. Regional control in these [restored] areas will continue but henceforth will be of an advisory nature. The Italian Government, through its various ministries, will be advised and controlled by Headquarters, Allied Control Commission. Regional Commissioners will be informed of the nature of advice given and will endeavor to ensure, in co-operation with the Italian authorities, that this is carried out in every aspect of government in the Regions.

4. The administration . . . will need all the assistance and advice which can be put at its disposal. . . . Initially, doubtless, inefficiency in administration may be anticipated. But Regional officers must do everything in their power to up-

hold the authority of the Italian officials and to abstain from any executive action themselves. They must be careful in their dealings with Italian officials and the Italian public and in their speech with all and sundry, including other Allied officers, not to bring the administration into contempt, even when its officials seem guilty of inefficiency, corruption and worse. They must help to sort things out and must report any case of bad administration immediately. Regardless of politics it is the duty of Regional officers to put whatever Italian administration may be in office on its feet and to keep it there.

5. In the initial stages of advisory control considerable numbers of Allied officers will be maintained in the Regions. The tendering of advice, however, is more likely to be successful if it emanates from a few key men in touch with senior officials of the Italian administration than if every Italian official is bolstered up by the pres-

ence of an Allied officer. The Italians must learn to stand on their own legs. It is the policy of the Chief Commissioner, therefore, to reduce the numbers in Regions substantially as soon as may prove possible and Regional Commissioners should plan to this end.<sup>18</sup> \* \* \*

THE INTERIOR SUBCOMMISSION WILL ADVISE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE RESTORED AREAS

[Revision of Nov 43 Directive of Interior Subcom, 12 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/141/470]

(A) *Mission*

The recreation of an efficient and honest administration of the country's internal affairs to be carried out by the Ministry of the Interior having regard to the general functions of the Allied Control Commission and in particular to

- (1) the abolition of the Fascist system
- (2) the enforcement of the Armistice terms and of the surrender agreements or other arrangements relating thereto.

(B) *Major Functions*

I. (1) To review as and when deemed necessary all appointments made to and the conditions of service under the Central, Provincial, and Communal administration.

(2) To determine whether the organization and control of services which function under the Ministry are adequate for and in accordance with the purposes and conditions of A, above.

(3) To ensure, where there is departure from or failure to observe such conditions that the necessary steps are taken to effect compliance therewith.

II. To ensure that an efficient system of Provincial and Communal administration is organized and conducted in such form as is necessary to give effect to A, above, together with any

<sup>18</sup> This statement of the role of ACC in restored areas differs sharply from that held initially, which contemplated something closer to substantial help than to mere high level advice. On 28 September 1943 General Holmes wrote that "although nominally we shall turn over provinces as they are cleared . . . we shall probably have to give a substantial amount of direct assistance for some time to come." CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43) (1). However, in September transfer was expected to take place almost immediately, when the government was "a dilapidated and creaking machine." By February local government in the restored areas, as also the Badoglio administration, had had six months of Allied tutelage. As the ensuing documents seem to show, Italian officials were still not ready or disposed to "stand on their own legs" and the transition to ACC's purely advisory role was not without difficulty.

amendments or alterations of such system which may be required for that purpose.

III. To secure uniformity throughout all areas in regard to the system of local government referred to in II above.

IV. To take all necessary action in regard to the financial policies and plans of local government agencies insofar as they concern the Ministry.

V. To ensure that the Ministry of Interior adopts an impartial and proper relationship with regard to religious bodies and to secure the just administration of government funds connected therewith.

VI. To consider and report on applications for the release of such Italian prisoners of war as are necessary and required for specific work connected with Communal, Provincial, Regional, or Allied Control Commission Administration.

RIGHTS IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY WILL BE EXERCISED WITH RESTRAINT

[Allied Admin Ins.rs 6, 15 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/109/586]

3. *Requisitioning*

The Allied Forces have retained the power and right to requisition private and public property and services in Italian Government Territory—*this right must be exercised sparingly and only for reasons of genuine military necessity*. This right will be exercised through the Italian authorities. . . .

4. *Allied Military Courts*

As the Proclamation of the Military Governor ceases to operate in Italian Government Territory, all crimes will normally be tried under Italian law and in Italian Courts. The Allied Forces, however, have reserved to themselves the right to hold Allied Military Courts in Italian Government Territory for the trial of civilians who commit acts seriously hostile to the Allied Forces and to punish them in accordance with the Italian Penal Codes.

The reservation of this right is not intended to encourage the trial of civilian offenders by Allied Courts, but is to enable them to deal with the most serious offences against Allied personnel or property which cannot be dealt with by the Italian Courts. . . .

Consequent on reservation of the power to try such offenders there is reserved to the Allied Forces the power to arrest persons who are believed to have committed such offences. High ranking Italian officials and officers of the Italian

Armed Forces should, however, only be arrested in collaboration with the appropriate Italian official (e.g. the Prefect or the Commanding Officer of the officer concerned). \* \* \*

#### AMG MUST CONTINUE FISCAL CONTROL IN THE RESTORED TERRITORY

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44]

C. 7(a) During the latter half of February and the month of March, there existed in that portion of King's Italy which was formerly AMG Regions I and II dual authorities in the field of budgetary control. This resulted from the fact that such territory had been placed on 11 February under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, which could not at that time assume control of fiscal operations. By agreement AMG continued to function in the area until 31 March 1944. . . . The assistance of AMG during March was requested by the Italian Government, but resulted in the case of at least one province in the issuance of "authorities to spend" by both AMG and the Italian Government. \* \* \*

#### AN OPPORTUNISTIC GOVERNMENT MINISTER MUST BE STOPPED FROM UNDOING THINGS

[Lt Col Spicer, Rpt for Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/617]

\* \* \* After almost daily contact with . . . the Minister of the Interior since his arrival here, I come to the conclusion that he is chiefly concerned insofar as the administration of local government is concerned, in reinstating his "career officials" who were deposed by AMG and in endeavouring to remove certain AMG appointees whom he does not approve because they are either, in his opinion, not sufficiently high grade in career to hold such posts, or because they are not "King's men."

He is shrewd, and I have found him helpful in many matters, but in my judgment, he is not a difficult man to read. I am convinced, moreover, that he has begun to see the red light, and I do not think he will pursue his former course much further, although he was at the outset indubitably embarked on this policy. \* \* \*

#### IT IS DECIDED SENIOR APPOINTMENTS SHOULD RECEIVE ACC'S PRIOR APPROVAL

[Ltr, MacFarlane to Badoglio, 10 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

Recent events over certain appointments have shown that it is clearly desirable for us to have a mutually satisfactory arrangement to prevent mis-

understandings and subsequent difficulties which it is in all our interests to avoid. I would suggest, therefore, that it should be agreed that you will let me know before any appointment to the Government is actually announced. Equally, I should be glad if you will impress upon all the members of your Government that they should, in turn, consult the appropriate authorities in the Allied Control Commission before making any senior appointments in their own departments either at the seat of the Italian Government or in those provinces under Italian jurisdiction. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, 13 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

After having worked with me for quite some time, you know that it is my absolute decision to proceed in any matter in full accord with the Allied Control Commission over which you preside.

With regard to this, at next Thursday's Council of Ministers, I shall give definite orders to the effect that no government appointment be made without previous agreement with the Commission.<sup>17</sup>

#### AFTER TWO MONTHS THE SITUATION STILL CALLS FOR PATIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

[Hq, ACC, Rpt for Mar 44]

2. In the areas handed over to the Italian Government, Regional and Provincial Commissioners are taking stock of the situation and feeling their way slowly in the change from Executive to Advisory status. The new relationship between the Italian Government, the people and themselves needs delicate adjustment because the people still rely in many cases on the American and British officials who have been in charge of their affairs since the invasion last Autumn and in many cases remain the same individuals. The numbers are being very substantially reduced but this adjustment is a delicate one and time must be allowed for the people so long benumbed and muzzled by Fascist officialdom to realize that they have in fact regained their freedom. . . .

3. Meanwhile, the administration is suffering from certain inherent disabilities consequent on the character of the Italian people and the nature

<sup>17</sup> While initially left undefined, the range of higher officials receiving prior ACC approval came by practice to extend down to "prefects of 1st class." In June (see below, Chapter XVII, Section 1) this range was so defined. There was nothing in the Armistice calling for Allied prior approval of Italian appointments; the right was established by the above interchange.

of our occupation. A Prefect cannot do so much as an Allied Governor, yet the natural normal tempo of Italian Government (in peace time) cannot be permitted without serious detriment to the war effort. This is where constant adjustment is necessary and if progress may seem slow it should be remembered that pressure on the Italian Government is only applied when absolute military necessity demands. [Min, Remarks by Brig. Lush at Conf of RC, 14 April 1944 in ACC files, 10000/101/443.]

#### LATER REFLECTIONS OF THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER OF SICILY ON THE POLICY OF TRANSFER

[Memo Prepared by Poletti, former RC, Sicily, for McCloy at Suggestion of Hilldring, 16 Nov 45, MTO, HS files]

3. Our experience in Italy shows that Military Government in certain areas in Italy was terminated far too early. It was an unsound decision to end Military Government in Sicily in February 1944 and go through the hollow gesture of transferring the administration of that Island to an Italian Government when it consisted of only Marshal Badoglio and two and one half stenographers. The result wiped out in large

measure the good work previously done by Military Government and also created situations, the effects of which are still being felt in Sicily two years later.

4. Military Government, our experience indicates, is the most effective vehicle to administer occupied territory. Military Government is far superior to hybrid organizations which operate on a basis of merely giving advice and of exercising supervisory functions. The intelligent administration of Military Government demands the use of the people of the country to the fullest as public officials and moreover, the gradual shifting to them of the duties of government. This can be done without losing efficiency because in the last analysis the authority, and sole authority, still rests with Military Government. As soon as Army officers are in an area only as advisors, the job in large measure collapses. In other words, Military Government should be kept in an area as long as the Army wishes to have any responsibility for the administration of the people. It should not undertake to discharge its responsibility and to protect its interests through civilian agencies or through military personnel operating not with authority, but only with the power to give advice and supervise.

## 6. THE GOVERNMENT IS ENCOURAGED TO CO-ORDINATE WITH AMG

#### GOVERNMENT WILL BE ASKED TO MAKE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIFORM WITH AMG TERRITORY

[Memo, Spicer for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 24 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

2. In the first place, it must be recorded that the position of local government in the AMG period was covered in Sicily by the issue of a Regional Order issued by the then RCO, Lieutenant Colonel Poletti. This was accomplished by the Administrative Instructions and has been operating successfully through Region I [sec. 2, above]. The position in Region II has unfortunately not made such progress, and as far as can be ascertained, a similar order drafted at this Headquarters and approved by an officer of the Legal Subcommittee, was not signed and issued, nor had, to any serious extent, the Administrative Instructions been carried out in that province.

4. The question that requires decision, therefore seems to me to be whether, as in the territories now taken over by the Royal Italian Government, or in the territories to be taken over by them in the future, they should be guided on the

basis of the local government as set up and operating in Region I, which was instituted and carried through successfully by Lieutenant Colonel Poletti, and whether indeed the system as now applied and operating in Region I can be continued without the full consent of the Royal Italian Government, and if that consent is not forthcoming, what action, if any, can be taken.

6. . . . It would appear to me that Allied Control Commission's policy in regard to all territories coming under either its administration or executive control should be, insofar as possible, uniform, and it would be ill-advised to institute local government in occupied Italy (as opposed to restored Italy) which differed materially in its organization. Such a policy can only lead to misunderstanding and would certainly not result in smooth working in regard to further handovers which, I believe, is the policy of the Allied Control Commission.

10. My recommendations are, therefore that, (1) The Minister of Interior should be requested to arrange publication of a decree by the Royal Italian Government corresponding to the attached

Region I order, provided the Chief Commissioner and his Vice President are in agreement. (2) If there are any departures or alterations of a major nature, that arrangements are made by this Sub-commission with the Minister to have them brought to our notice, when the Legal Officer's views will be obtained. (3) When finally agreed upon, the decree shall be promulgated both in Royal Italy, and in occupied territory—in the latter case under the signature of the Chief Commissioner or Executive Commissioner. [See below, Directive of 25 July 1944.]

#### THE PRE-FASCIST SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT WILL PREVAIL THROUGHOUT LIBERATED ITALY

[ACC Exec Memo No. 39, Jul 44 (first revision of May Memo), ACC files, 10000/136/17]

1. The present position with regard to the organization of Italian Provincial and Communal Administration in Italian Government Territory and Military Government Territory (with the exception of Fifth and Eighth Army AMG area) is as follows:

A. In Italian Government Territory local government is now regulated by Royal Decree No. 111, published in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* on 22 April 1944. All Regional Orders dealing with the reorganization of local government ceased automatically to be effective in any territory on the date on which such territory was restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

B. In Military Government Territory (with the exception of Fifth and Eighth Army AMG areas) Royal Decree No. 111 was made applicable by virtue of the Executive Commissioner's endorsement published in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* of 10 May 1944. The actual operation of the Royal Decree dates from the time a copy of the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* is actually handed to the Prefect by the Allied Control Commission, or by such other method as it may authorize in the future.

2. With a view to uniformity and continuity of the same pattern of local government throughout Italy, those of the provisions of the Royal Decree No. 111 outlined in Schedule "A," as can be applied to Fifth and Eighth Army AMG areas shall be so applied as soon as possible. It should be noted, however, that Royal Decree No. 111 is a transitory measure, passed as a war emergency gap pending the restoration of elections.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The Administrative Instruction (Schedule A) attached to the order is merely a restatement, with minor changes, of the outline of pre-Fascist provincial and municipal organs which was given in Section 2, above, in Sicily Region Administrative Instructions No. 4.

#### ITALIAN GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION WILL BE MADE OPERATIVE IN AMG REGIONS ALSO

[Directive, ACC Hq to All Concerned, 25 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/141/2]

1. Italian legislation in Italy Government territory is promulgated by publication of Decrees in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* of the Kingdom. In order to ensure the continuity of the Italian legal system over as much of Italian territory as is compatible with Allied Military interests and for the purpose of extending appropriate Italian legislation to Military Government Territory the procedure of implementation which has been applied in the past will now be followed in the newly liberated provinces of Military Government Territory administered under Regional Commissioners.

2. The legislation enacted by the Italian Government in Brindisi and Salerno and published in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*—Special Series No. 1/B to 6/B and 1 to 39 in force in Italian Government Territory has been collected and reprinted in book form. In accordance with the principle set out above it is now proposed to render the bulk of this legislation operative in the provinces of Military Government Territory by an endorsement of the Executive Commission, ACC. Such endorsement, reproduced on each copy of the reprinted collection, provides that all laws contained in the reprint shall become operative in Military Government Territory with the exception of certain enumerated decrees which have been reproduced for information only.<sup>19</sup>

#### THE DIVISION BETWEEN AMG AND GOVERNMENT TERRITORY HAS GRADUALLY BEEN BRIDGED

[Memo, Lush for G-5, AFHQ, 29 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/74]

7. The policy of the Allied Control Commission in the last six months has been gradually to bridge the division between Allied Military Government territory and Italian Government territory. We have evolved a process by which legislation in many cases is identical and we have aimed at similarity of principles and procedure,

<sup>19</sup> A memorandum of ACC Headquarters for the Advisory Council, 26 August 1944, stated that the decrees of the Italian Government were made operative in AMG territory "almost invariably." It noted also that ACC's policy was that, except in certain cases where policy was dictated by military necessity, the Italian Government planned and drafted decrees while ACC acted merely as adviser.

diverging from that policy only in the case of operational necessity. There can be no doubt as to the beneficial results of this co-ordination to the

military forces, the civil population, and the Italian Government when it comes to take over more territory. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XII

# Military Necessity Demands Relief of Civilian Distress

Despite a policy calling for maximum self-help from the Italians the Allies were compelled to expend a vast amount of effort and resources in civilian relief. This was particularly true in the first phase of the military occupation because planners had underestimated the extent to which, in food supply as well as other matters of vital import to civilian life, conditions of war can create serious emergencies. The documents of this chapter deal with three such emergencies—an unexpectedly severe food shortage, a typhus epidemic, and an unforeseen refugee problem—emergencies that became critical in the winter of 1943-44. In the face of such problems the Italians could not be expected to “stand alone.” Aware that civilian unrest and disease threaten the success of military operations, the Allies gave help from a strong motive of self-interest as well as from a sense of humanitarian obligation.

Allied invasion plans for Sicily and southern Italy were based on the assumption that these areas could supply most civilian food requirements, an assumption that proved to be wholly erroneous. The planners seem to have been led astray by unreliable statistics on yields and imports and faulty intelligence on the extent of the black market. The Fascists of course had their reasons for misrepresenting conditions. The Italian economy had been strained by Mussolini's ill-fated schemes of foreign conquests, the loss of Italian workers

to Germany, and Allied bombings. The Allied invasion merely furnished the *coup de grace* to a tottering system. Under normal conditions there would have been enough grain in Sicily but an exceptionally poor harvest, lack of internal transportation, and the collapse of the hated *ammassi*—the Fascist system whereby farmers had to bring a certain percentage of their grain to the government warehouses—produced a serious food problem where it was least expected.

The food shortage was aggravated by the invasion of the mainland where the retreating Germans destroyed much of the 1943 crop. In October the food situation was serious; by November it became acute. The main responsibility for procurement and shipping of civilian supplies for Italy had been placed by the CCS on the United States. The needed supplies were available, but both shipping and port facilities were inadequate. Military Government Section of AFHQ did not call forward the programmed requirements for October and November from the United States on the assumption that sufficient reserves could be found in North Africa. General Smith, the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, acknowledged that this was a serious error. However, the situation was alleviated and actual starvation (though not malnutrition) was averted by securing temporary loans from the French in North Africa and from the Middle East forces.

Another factor in the food crisis was the administrative confusion arising from divided responsibilities of AMG and ACC. The latter body, it will be recalled, was in the process of formation in October and November and had not organized a Food Subsection. As a stop gap measure AFHQ established a Central Economic Committee at Naples in mid-December to allocate imports, transport, and movement of inter-regional surpluses between AMG 15th Army Group, Headquarters AMG, and ACC. This organization was under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson who was also commander of FLAMBO. CEC was abolished in January 1944 when ACC assumed full responsibility for civilian supply.

Aside from faulty plans, limited shipping and port facilities, and overly complicated organization, a basic difficulty in early operations was failure of the fighting forces to appreciate the importance of civilian relief. Civilian needs were considered marginal, to be brushed aside in any conflict of interests. By mid-December the situation had become so serious that General Eisenhower, just before leaving the theater, issued instructions which recognized that in emergencies minimum civilian needs would have to be met even at the expense of the military buildup. Where the consideration involved direct interference with military buildup and maintenance the decision rested with the Commander in Chief of the Fifteenth Army Group. This action, according to Lord Rennell, "put the supply of civilian requirements in its right perspective."<sup>1</sup>

Allied plans for southern Italy were based on medical intelligence no more reliable than the economic data that had been used. A typhus epidemic had been considered possible but was dismissed as

unlikely. When the Allied forces entered Naples on 1 October they found the city without water or soap and with its sewage system sabotaged. Furthermore many of the natives had formed the habit of living at night in air-raid shelters, where overcrowded and unsanitary conditions prevailed. In combination these conditions provided an ideal medium for spawning and spreading the louse-borne typhus disease. By December the CCS was being informed that an epidemic was constituting a threat to military personnel. Emergency measures were required to bring the disease under control. These included calling in the U.S. Typhus Commission, transferring jurisdiction over typhus control from AMG to AFHQ's advance echelon in Naples, and "dusting" users of air-raid shelters with D.D.T.

A third problem that reached extraordinary proportions during the fall and winter of 1943-44 was that of refugees—Italians displaced from their homes by the fighting. The flow began into the Eighth Army area in November when the Germans deliberately drove hundreds of civilians southward through their lines or carried out a scorched-earth policy that had the same effect. In February the problem lessened in the Eighth Army area and increased in the Fifth Army area. After the Anzio landing 14,000 refugees a month passed through the Fifth Army and by spring it was feeding 200,000.

As the problem increased in magnitude, organization for dealing with it was steadily improved. Until the Army saw that the flow of refugees was a serious interference with operations, there was no special agency for handling it; the Fifth Army Group in January created in AMG a Refugee Field Section, represented at Army and Regional Headquarters, for better supervision of the field efforts. Still later, ACC, to co-ordinate handling of refu-

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Harris, *Allied Military Administration*, p. 89.

gees in the combat zone with that in rear territory, established an Italian Refugee Branch. Finally, when the problem of displaced persons also became urgent, ACC placed the care of refugees as well as of displaced persons under the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommittee. The improvement in organization was paralleled by improvement in methods. The crude improvisations by the armies at the outset were replaced by regular dispatching centers and by the use of empty military transport to send refugees to the rear, where Italian authorities were required to find lodging and care for them in Italian communities until large camps could be built. Still later, in the spring, ACC realized that as the movement of refugees—first away from their homes and then back again—would always be to some extent uncontrollable, it was better to set up camps closer to their original residence and thus avoid clogging of the roads used by the Army.

Malnutrition and refugees were, of course, problems throughout the occupation and in addition, as the concluding documents of the chapter show, the poor and the sick were always present and in need of help. Even the less urgent problems of civilian distress were dealt with in the light of possible harm to military

operations, but in the more routine relief measures a greater attempt was made to limit Allied efforts to supervision of the Italian agencies. The Public Health Division of AMGOT, together with its Welfare Branch, enlisted the help of the still existing Communal Public Assistance Boards or reconstituted them; it did, indeed, determine the standards of public relief and of social welfare care in general. In the immediate wake of battle the CAO's and the AMG public health officers of course had a greater burden than in rear areas—either because the local relief agencies were no longer functioning, or because they lacked resources, or because, as was often the case, they were not accustomed to take hold with speed and efficiency, measured by Anglo-American standards. Moreover, as early as September, surveys of operations in Sicily convinced AMGOT of the need of securing greater co-ordination of the services of Italian relief agencies. Later, when ACC came into existence, its sub-commissions concerned with public health and relief attacked the problem of reorganization of Italian agencies on a broader scale. They realized, however, that there was "no time for theorizing or permanent social planning until the needy Italian people are better clothed and fed."<sup>1</sup>

## I. A SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGE DESPITE THE ASSUMPTION OF LOCAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY

### AMGOT BELIEVES SICILY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT BUT PREPARES FOR EMERGENCIES

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 5 May 43, ACC files, 10000/100/593]

\* \* \* (1) *Food*. As indicated maintenance project and AMGOT plan, we believe that area as whole produces adequate food stuffs and that when whole area is occupied there should be no need, on the basis of existing standard of living, for import of essential food stuffs. However, be-

lieve it wise to establish reserves against following contingencies: <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This is only a summary of AMGOT thinking at the outset, but the actual plans developed did not deviate in basic features from the ideas stated above. The belief that food supply in Sicily would be adequate was based on false figures put out by the Fascist government as to yields and imports in recent years. (See below, Section 2, Archibald S. Alexander's 13 November letter, paragraphs 1, 2, 3.) While the theater hoped that after a month normal supply channels could be reopened, the AMGOT planners, to provide against the contingencies indicated

(a) Local distress if urban centers should be cut off by military operations from surrounding rural sources of supply; (b) wheat shortage due to export or destruction of harvest by enemy. Reserve contingency (a) should be related to population of two principal urban areas. . . .

Against contingency (b) are working out a wheat stockpile from coming harvest. It is estimated that ample surplus will be available for any reserve we may wish to set up. . . .

#### WASHINGTON SUPPLY AUTHORITIES AGREE THAT LITTLE IMPORT OF FOOD WILL BE NEEDED

[Memo, Somervell, CG, ASF, for Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, Chief Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD, 18 May 43, ID files, Basic Policy-Italy]

\* \* \* After a short period the area would be self sustaining for food, or would be carried by adjacent areas, and such food supplies as might be necessary during the initial period could probably be supplied from North Africa, thus minimizing the shipping problem.<sup>2</sup>

#### TRANSPORT ANTICIPATED AS CRITICAL FACTOR

[Memo, Italy: Discussion of Portion of Civilian Supplies Necessary for Initial 135 Day Period, by G. K. Berkey, Plan Div, Strategic Logistics Branch, ASF, 5 Aug 43, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 1]

The statement that we must be very careful not to over emphasize Italy's food deficiency can not be made too strong. . . . Unless we hold firmly to the assumption of furnishing only the bare necessities it may well have adverse effect upon the United Nations' war program in terms of ships as well as supplies. \* \* \*

To sum up a fair but not philanthropic appraisal of the situation shows that if trans-

in the AFHQ message of 5 May, recommended that a 32,000-ton stockpile of wheat flour be accumulated by the U.S. Army. The plan of imports approved by the War Department included food and medical supplies to cover estimated minimum needs for a period of from 90 to 120 days. The chief component of the food was approximately 5,000 tons of flour, to provide the bread and pasta which are the principal elements of Italian diet. The Sicily supply program also included minimum requirements of coal and charcoal and petroleum products. No provision was made for clothing, for barter goods, or engineering equipment (which the Corps of Engineers was expected to provide. ASF, ID files, Hist of Civ Sup, I, 65-66.) It will be remembered that by May the War Department itself was estimating civilian supply requirements as a check on the theaters.

<sup>2</sup>The theater's supply program for the mainland as well as Sicily went forward 22 August, about six weeks after Sicily had been occupied but before there had been time fully to appraise the factors which would determine civilian supply. For the six months beginning October 1943, the planners estimated that only 15 percent of the

portation can be maintained between producing and consuming areas and sufficient petroleum products are available to move produce from the fields to railheads or markets . . . that the subsistence problem in Italy is not one of more seriousness than the exigencies of war make inevitable.<sup>3</sup>

#### SEPTEMBER: AMGOT-SICILY SEES TROUBLE AHEAD

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/501]

18. A continued source of embarrassment is the shortage of supply in the face of statements made by responsible officials of both governments as to what has been done and what is to be done in supplying the civilian population. No one realizes more the difficulties of importing civilian supplies in the face of overriding military demands than AMGOT supply officers who are working daily with the supply and transportation officers of the armies and base sections. The difficulty is rather with the propaganda agencies. These must realize that enemy populations are prone to remember promises made even over the air and that the result of predictions which cannot be carried into effect is the reverse of that intended.

72. Available information indicates that grain for distribution through official channels in Sicily will be exhausted at the end of the year.<sup>4</sup> Local shortage, of course, will be felt sooner and in grain deficient provinces the shortage will be accentuated by transportation difficulties. Various plans were in effect in the provinces for forcing the surrender of hoarded wheat. In view of the prospective shortage, requisitions were made for imports to provide a reserve against a break down of transport in the various grain

population south of Rome and 10 percent north of Rome would require supplementary feeding during the first ninety days, and 10 percent in both areas during the second ninety days. The subsistence items provided for included flour, dehydrated soup, evaporated milk, dried vegetables, cheese, laundry and toilet soap, and household matches. Coal and petroleum requirements were also included. ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-101.

<sup>3</sup>As matters developed, transportation could not be maintained adequately between producing and consuming areas; this was to be one of the major difficulties of civilian supply even when sufficient stocks were on hand. In the final report of the Transportation and Shipping Subcommittee, AC, it is stated: "It is felt that it was not fully realized at the beginning the importance transportation played in the economic life of a country and the vital need for its speedy rehabilitation." ACC files, 10000/109/480.

<sup>4</sup>The producers in Italy were required to turn in a set proportion of their produce to government-controlled warehouses at fixed prices.

deficient provinces and to take care of the island-wide shortage prior to the next harvest.

73. The average daily ration on 30 September was approximately 165 grams of bread and 15 grams of pasta. Some provinces were receiving the maximum permitted ration of bread of 300 grams and 40 grams of pasta, while in one province (Messina) the ration was as low as 100 grams of bread. The largest portion of the ration in Messina was supplied from imported stocks which were practically exhausted at the end of the month. Interprovincial transportation complicated the problem, which was solved in part by coastal shipment. \* \* \*

#### OCTOBER: TROUBLE AT HAND

[Civ Sup and Resources Div, Hq AMGOT, 15th AGp, Report on Operations in Sicily, for Jul-Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/154/317]

5(c). . . Early in October . . . the three "surplus" grain-production provinces began to realize that their production would not carry their own population through to the next harvest, and so cut down their supplies to the deficiency provinces. Problems arose in consequence in Trapani, Syracuse, and Catania. This had been foreseen early in September and imports bid forward, but the bulk of these did not arrive; and a general reduction in the bread ration resulted, in most cases of 200 grams, in two or three towns to 150. By the end of October the nonarrival from AFHQ of promised imports gave cause for anxiety to the military commander, who foresaw a potential source of civil unrest in our total lack of food reserves, combined with the growing difficulty of transport by road owing to the diversions around blown bridges, which ran across the river beds, being impassable when streams filled up. Civilians employed by the armies on dock work, etc., were moreover not capable of sustained effort on the low rations available. \* \* \*

[Memo, McSherry, DCCAO, AMGOT Hq, Considered at 14th Mtg of Exec Council, AMGOT Hq, 15 Oct 43, app. B, Grain Supplies, ACC files, 10000/143/447]

6. In considering what action can be taken, it is as well to set out in detail the fundamental facts governing the situation. They are as follows:

(1) Before the date of commencement of effective control, considerable quantities of wheat disappeared into hoards and particularly into the hands of the black market operators.

(2) The quantities amassed since that date have been exceedingly disappointing. This is largely due to continued black market cornering and to withholding by producers.

(3) The quantity of wheat available from controlled sources will not support even an inadequate ration for more than a month or two. Black market sources are, under existing conditions, available for those who can afford to pay. They will probably continue to be available but the price is likely to increase considerably and the number of people supplied from this source will be correspondingly reduced.

(4) Plans for stepping up the rate of amassing are for various reasons, weak and ineffective.

#### NOVEMBER: SITUATION IN SICILY CRITICAL

[Memo, Maj Archibald S. Alexander, Actg Chief, Econ and Sup Div, AMG Sicily Rgn, for RCAO, Sicily Rgn, 13 Nov 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV-h]

12. e. The medical aspect of the situation will become serious by mid-winter if no improvement in food imports occurs. Malnutrition will entail susceptibility to epidemics which in turn will bring a serious risk for the Allied armies in this theater of operations.

f. The possibility of having to recall troops needed elsewhere to control the civilian population should not be overlooked. It need not be emphasized what a confession of failure would be involved. It has already been necessary to transfer troops into critical areas and also to use air force personnel for the maintenance of law and order.

15. . . since, existing stocks are so low (under 800 tons of flour for over 1,000,000 people in the four largest cities) and since there is no unused resource left for obtaining any large additional amount of grain in the island, *imports must begin at once in order to prevent such a deterioration in the situation as might involve total failure of the occupation of Sicily and the unforeseeably wide repercussions on actual combat operations, on the people of countries still under enemy domination, and on the population of the United States and Great Britain, who have had promises made on their behalf which will not have been kept.*

#### DECEMBER: FOOD CRISIS HAS NOW REACHED MAINLAND

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

42. The heart of the problem in the economic field continued to be that of feeding the civilian population. Civilian morale continued to depend on the size of the bread ration received. During the month the most acute shortage was in Region II [Mainland], rather than Region I [Sicily] as heretofore.

45. Before the middle of December it appeared that no flour or grain whatever was left in Reggio, Catanzaro and Cosenza Provinces and that only 100 grams a day had been issued during the previous two weeks. Nothing had been received from requisitions and bids totalling some 22,000 tons. The situation was temporarily relieved with the transfer of 1500 tons from Sicily and 3800 tons received from the middle east. The desperate situation was in part caused by the similar situation in Region I in November as a result of which 1200 tons had been diverted from Reggio to Sicily by AFHQ. Arrangements had been made to move 500 tons of flour from Naples and 2500 tons of grain from Foggia. By the end of the month 320 tons of flour and 1150 tons of grain had been shipped, but since the combined consumption of the three provinces at 180 grams is 6000 tons of flour per month, more was needed. Promises were made of further shipments but at the end of the month actual stores were nonexistent. The provinces of Matera and Potenza are considered self-sufficient until March 1944. The province of Salerno on 21 December

was only receiving 50 grams of bread a day. \* \* \*

[Public Health Dept (PHD), AMG Rgn III, Rpt for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/159/1087]

6(1) The food situation throughout December has been grave and by the end of the month when any hoards may have been exhausted, it had become acute and an important contributing factor to both typhus and V.D. [venereal disease]. Due to reasons which this Division is not competent to assess, the people have only been able to get through *Alimentazione*, i.e., the Food Control, 125 grammes of bread and 1/2 kilo of pasta. . . . The humble bean (fagioli) for generations scorned by everybody but the lowest classes has risen to a delicacy which can only be afforded by the rich at 150 lire per kilo as compared with a lira or less in normal times. It is not for this Division to discuss the political effect which this acute shortage is having and is likely to produce but it is necessary to emphasize the seriousness of the situation from the medical point of view. \* \* \*

## 2. EXPEDIENTS WHICH ARE TRIED BUT FOUND WANTING

### RATIONING ATTEMPTED BUT CONDITIONS NOT RIGHT FOR IT

[Civ Sup and Resources Div, AMGOT Hq, 15th AGP, Rpt, Jul-Oct 43]

5(e) In accordance with instructions, the existing rationing system was continued; indeed, there was no alternative. It was not very successful, however, for several reasons: lack of sufficient reserves of food to honour the ration regularly, thereby causing loss of confidence in the ration; the black market; the large number of people who claimed to have lost their ration cards during the fighting; the breakdown of the rationing machinery among bakers and retailers; and the amount of forged ration cards in circulation (estimated at 2,500 in Palermo alone). . . .

### THE STOCKPILE IN NORTH AFRICA FAILS TO YIELD ENOUGH HELP

[Civ Sup and Resources Div, AMGOT Hq, 15th AGP, Rpt, Jul-Oct 43]

6(a) . . . The Civil Supply Division was made responsible for estimating requirements of essential civilian supplies and for requisitioning such supplies through the appropriate military chan-

nels. Before the occupation began the planning staff had estimated requirements of foodstuffs to cover the first 90 days; it was thought that this food might be required in the three largest towns, Palermo, Catania, Syracuse, owing to the expected breakdown of the normal supply system during the battle. Accordingly stockpiles were established in North Africa amounting to 13,600 short tons of food, to be shipped theoretically as follows:

D+ 15-2300 tons  
D+ 30-3500 tons  
D+ 45-4500 tons  
D+ 60-3300 tons

In addition a reserve stockpile of 32,000 tons flour was to be built up in North Africa from French resources. These stockpiles were to be called forward by the task force commanders as required.

In fact, no urgent need for them was felt in the first 60 days; but it was not known how long it would take to get them after calling them forward, and it was felt very early that a reserve of food in Sicily was necessary. Consequently the D30 stockpile was called forward on 1 August; about 3200 tons of it arrived on a coaster on 30 August, and when about 500 tons were unloaded it was diverted to Reggio di Calabria where Allied troops had just landed. On 8 August the

D15 stockpile was called forward; 1200 tons of this were received on 5 September (the remainder was never received). It thus appeared that one month was the gap between calling forward and receiving supplies. On 2 September, therefore, the D45 stockpile was called forward, and on 9 September the D60 stockpile; at the same time the anticipated worsening of the food position made it necessary to bid forward (out of the 32000 tons reserve flour stockpile) 2000 tons flour to arrive by 25 September and 15000 tons to arrive by 15 October. In spite of the fact that normal convoys still called in Sicily, and that at the end of September a large part of the Italian merchant navy had become available to the Allies, only a small proportion of these bids was received up to the end of October. In fact, 3600 tons flour arrived at Palermo on 10 October, and 2000 tons more on 30 October, this latter shipment having been scheduled for Catania; it was therefore necessary to transport over a half of these two shipments across the island to Messina, Catania and Syracuse. Fortunately some use of the railways was permitted for civilian needs about this time, and the transfer was effected by rail.

The responsibility for effecting shipment to Sicily lay with AFHQ, once the proper bidding procedure had been completed by Headquarters AMGOT. A visit to AFHQ by the Deputy Director of Civilian Supply early in October elicited the information that (a) much of the stockpile was at ports at which normal convoys did not load, and therefore any tonnage allotted to us on those convoys was forfeited; and (b) that the French had not yet been persuaded to collect together, much less to mill and bag, the 32000 tons emergency stockpile of flour. \* \* \*

#### POLICE ACTION AGAINST HOARDERS IS CONSIDERED

[Memo, McSherry, considered at 14th Mtg., Exec Council, AMGOT Hq, 15 Oct 43, app. B, Grain Supplies]

12. With regard to the question of the discovery and collection of supplies outside controlled channels, much remains to be done, and it is almost entirely to this sphere of action that attention must be directed. Some help can be obtained by the reduction in the quantity which farmers are allowed to retain. The main effort must, however, be directed against hoards in the hands of farmers and black market operators. This problem has been discussed at length, but, with the exception of sporadic efforts in various provinces, no positive general vigorous action has been initiated. The position indicates that the matter is now one of the gravest urgency. It is essentially a police matter and the choice of actions which

ultimately rest with the Public Safety Division is whether they will *now* take action to deal with this present problem or face the eventual one of handling the grave and growing food disorders, which may certainly be otherwise anticipated.

#### IT IS NOW KNOWN WHY THE BELIEF IN SICILY'S SELF-SUFFICIENCY WAS WRONG

[Ltr, Maj Alexander to RCOA, Sicily Rgn, 13 Nov 43]

1. On the basis of facts known prior to the invasion of Sicily, it was believed that after the emergencies due to the Allied invasion, the destruction in combat zones and the disorganization of governmental and transportation agencies, the island would be self-supporting, insofar as food was concerned, well into the spring, or even until the next harvest if rations were reduced.

2. Three factors have changed this belief. First was the fact that the Fascist government, in order to make its self-sufficiency program appear more successful than it was, is stated by most Sicilian experts to have published wholly false figures as to yields and imports in the island in recent years. . . .

Second, scarcity of fertilizer for two years and considerable destruction of or interference with harvest, due to military operations, heavily reduced the yield in some parts of the island and decreased the crop as forecast by from 10% to 25%.

Finally, the extent to which the black market flourished before the invasion was naturally minimized by the Fascist government and the effect which this factor would have on the situation was not fully foreseen by the Allies.

3. In consequence of the foregoing factors it was inevitable that the problem of feeding Sicily would be more difficult than appeared to be the case in the summer of 1943. What has happened since the invasion and the harvest has aggravated the situation. \* \* \*

#### NEW PROGRAM TRIED IN NOVEMBER

[Ltr, Maj Alexander to RCOA, Sicily Rgn, 13 Nov 43]

10b. As of 1 November, a three-fold program was ordered throughout the island (see Regional Order No. 13 and Administrative Instructions No. 9). . . .

(1) The maximum bread ration was reduced to 200 grams per person per day and pasta rations were prohibited, thus bringing the consumption in producing provinces down nearer the level elsewhere and conserving dwindling stocks. This has produced much resentment in producing provinces and at least one instance of

violence when grain was being taken out to another province, resulting in looting of the grain, burning of the truck and disarming of an AMG officer.

(2) The amount which producers may legally keep was reduced about 20% and they were ordered to deliver this 20% to their ammassi for purchase at the August price of 500 lire per qli [quintale]. This order was implemented by forbidding the issuance of a milling permit to producers who had not obtained a certificate that they had turned in their 20%. Without this permit they cannot mill flour from their own grain, and they have no ration cards for bread purchases. If this order is effective, by 20 November, about 400,000 qli should be turned in. It is not believed possible, however, on the basis of amounts turned in to date, to obtain as much as half the total due.

(3) Each AMG officer in a grain-producing area was ordered to spend at least four days a week, until further notice, exclusively on searching for and confiscating illegally-held grain. (Under G.O. No. 3, after 31 October all grain held in excess of seed and family food allowance is subject to confiscation). AMG officers in non-producing areas were ordered to help themselves and with their trucks, when requested. Surprise road blocks, especially at night, were ordered. \* \* \*

#### THE ITALIAN MULE MUST GIVE WAY TO MOTOR TRANSPORT

[Memo, Maj O. A. Spencer, Sup Officer, AMG Eighth Army, for Maj James J. P. Todd, Chief, MGS Adv Ech, 20 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/159/1087]

3. No action can be really effective unless civil motor transport is provided. . . . Present efforts directed at stimulating the Consorzio and making the best use of mule transports. This however is inadequate statistically and unsatisfactory in practice as the mules are now wanted for plowing,

etc., and the Army object to them on the roads anyway. \* \* \*

#### USE OF BARTER GOODS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED

[Telecon, Hilldring and Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, 10 Dec 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 6]

\* \* \* Hilldring—We have made several suggestions with regard to this thing, and as I said in my radio to you it is not possible for us brass hats to sit here in Washington and to tell you people what to do, and I avoid it. However, there is one avenue which we think here has not been sufficiently explored—that is to utilize barter goods, that is trade goods, to get these people to release the food that they are hoarding. We believe over here that you cannot get this stuff out of hoarding at the point of a bayonet. We think it is better to use calico cloth and jingles to attract the farmer's wife than to try and buy the stuff into the market. In other words, the reason that the farmer does not release his goods is because when he goes to market with his money there is nothing for him in the market to exchange that for.

Smith—Well, as a matter of fact, you would be simply astonished at the things you can buy in Italy. Pure silk stockings—you can buy as many as you want. The prices have gone up now, they were at \$3.00 a pair when I first was over here, and you could buy them by the gross if you wanted them. You could buy all the . . . hats you wanted for \$1.50 a piece, I got six to give away. You could buy wrist watches and things of that sort in any quantity. The shops are rather well stocked. It is far different from the situation in North Africa. Italy does not seem to have suffered from any shortage of supply except in the way of leather goods. I think probably the fact is that luxury items are plentiful and the cheaper commodities are a bit thin. \* \* \*

### 3. FOOD IMPORTS TO PREVENT STARVATION BECOME THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY

#### HOARDING IS A RESULT NOT A CAUSE

[Clabaugh, Chief, Econ Branch, CAD, Rpt to Dir of CAD, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-28-43) (1)]

We went into Italy thinking that hoarding was a greater factor in the shortage of wheat than we now conceive it to be; that hoarders and black

market operators should be vigorously prosecuted; that lack of confidence in the currency and lack of consumer goods for which to spend it were largely responsible for the hoarding of wheat. These are not unnatural surmises. But we had not been in Sicily and Italy very long before we realized that the shortage was actual and acute; that hoarding was more a result than a

cause of the shortage; that while violations should be prosecuted vigorously, no amount of prosecution would correct the trouble. The amassing of grain was unpopular and unsuccessful under the Fascist control. It is estimated that only one third of the available crop was distributed legally. That is not to say that the difference is now hoarded, but rather that it was sold through the black market.

#### APPEAL FOR FLOUR

[Msg, Eisenhower for CCS, 21 Nov 43, CCAC files, 475, Italy (9-30-43), NAF-525]

Immediate urgency exists for flour for Italian civilians in occupied territory. . . . Request immediate arrangement . . . 10,000 tons for earliest possible shipment. . . . Conditions in Sicily and Sardinia have required immediate relief to avert an acute situation thereby exhausting existing reserves. . . .

#### A LARGER FOOD PROGRAM IS SENT TO WASHINGTON

[Ltr, MGS, AFHQ, to CCS, 26 Nov 43, CCAC files, 433 (10-7-43), sec. I]

##### 1. *Object:*

To move into this Theater, on schedule, amounts of grain or flour adequate to provide minimum bread rations for the Italian population and to establish a stockpile for the provisioning on a similar basis of other areas which may be invaded by the Allied Force.

##### 2. *Assumptions:*

(a) Population to be fed with imports. Fifty percent of the population of Italy south of Rome and in Sicily and Sardinia will have to be fed with imported grain or flour. Of the population north of Rome, 70 percent will have to be so fed. [Only 10 percent was estimated in earlier programs.]

(b) Daily ration. The daily minimum ration will be set at 200 grams of bread per day. \* \* \*

##### 3. *Discussion:*

(a) Data are now available on the basis of which it is possible for the first time to estimate the minimum amounts of flour which will have to be made available for Italian consumption during the first six months of 1944 if we are to prevent civilian starvation and resulting disorder which will interfere with military operations and will provide propaganda for the enemy.

(b) It is proposed to rely primarily on grain and flour for this minimum provisioning of Italy because (1) the diet of Italians is based on bread and other flour products and (2) grain and flour are the most convenient foods for our purposes. Prior to the invasion the effective basic ration in Italy was 220 grams . . . per day, bread and pasta combined. It is proposed that under existing world conditions we cannot undertake to supply more than the bare minimum ration, which is taken to be 200 grams per day (two fifths pound), with increase for medium and heavy workers.

(c) The grain and flour situation in Italy, which we expected prior to our invasion of Sicily to be bad but not intolerably so, has deteriorated rapidly. The principal causes are: (1) Harvests were about 25 percent below normal. (2) Ordinary war damage, to which now must be added the virtual certainty of widespread and systematic rural devastation, confiscation and disorganization as the Germans retreat. (3) Extreme reluctance of producers to deliver to the legal market or even sell in the black market except at extremely high prices. This reluctance is due to such factors as . . . little incentive to sell because of lack of goods to buy in return. (4) A well-established and deeply rooted black market system, which is proving extremely difficult to choke. There is probably enough grain in Sicily to supply to the population of this island a basic ration somewhere between 200 and 300 grams . . . per day. But the conditions just enumerated, plus the difficulties arising from the disorganization of the Italian governmental machinery, make it doubtful if enough of this grain can be brought onto the legal market to provide bread for half this population, on a ration of 200 grams. On the mainland and in Sardinia the prospects are that an actual and serious deficit in grain confronts us.

(d) Imports of flour on a large scale will be necessary during the first half of 1944—i.e., until the next harvest begins to be available. Contrary to original estimates, we are currently providing imported flour to about 75 percent of the inhabitants of both Sicily and Sardinia. It will not be safe to assume that more than, say, 40 percent of the Italian population will be fed from local foodstuffs. \* \* \*

(e) This policy of provisioning Italy by import of flour or grain calls for two related steps: (1) Stronger and more determined practicable measures must be taken to bring domestic grain out of hoard, however disappointing past efforts have been. (2) Responsibility of provisioning the civilian population will be turned over to the Italian Government as soon as possible, because

the continued attack on hoarding and the black market can best be carried out by that government with Allied sanction behind it and because in this manner the Allies will be relieved of the full onus of a situation which is a legacy of Fascism. \* \* \*

4. *Recommendations:*

(a) It is recommended that grain or flour shipments for civilian consumption in Italy be scheduled for the first six months of 1944 (including existing requisitions) as follows:

<i>In month of</i>	<i>Metric tons</i>
January .....	70,000
February .....	80,000
March .....	93,000
April .....	120,000
May .....	147,000
June .....	190,000
<hr/>	
Total, six months .....	700,000

(b) It is recommended that an additional 134,000 metric tons be accumulated within the period 1 January-30 April 1944 as a stockpile to meet operational contingencies, calculated on the basis of four months' consumption by 5 million people on a basic ration of 200 grams per day.<sup>5</sup>

WHATEVER IT COSTS WE CAN'T LET THEM STARVE  
 [Telecon, Hilldring and Gen Smith, CofS AFHQ, 10 Dec 43, CAD Msg files, WDTC-91]

\* \* \* *Algiers:* Well I tell you, I am not worried about the immediate situation which is all right because we have got some wheat from the French, and also we have dug up a little in the Middle East which we can get if we have to. I am very much worried on the long range viewpoint, because I am convinced that we have greatly underestimated our commitments, about feeding the civil population and also for taking care of such military persons as we may have to keep from starving, in order to keep them from being a burden on the countryside. . . . I did file with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at that meeting in Cairo a revised list of tonnage which we anticipate will be required for taking care of that Italian population.

*Washington:* Yes, I saw that, and it almost knocked me out of my chair.

*Algiers:* Yes, it is rather startling, isn't it?

*Washington:* Yes, it is.

<sup>5</sup> This proposal was not accepted but the remainder of the program received CCS approval.

*Algiers:* Well to be absolutely honest, and I don't care how you manipulate the thing, the fact still remains that regardless of military operations, number one priority is to provide a minimum of food for the Italians.

*Washington:* That is right. You can't starve them.

*Algiers:* And I don't care how you work it, that still remains first priority. After we have done that, then we can use what is left for military purposes and I think that we are going to find that it very definitely limits the size of forces that we could use on the peninsula. There isn't any other way to figure it. \* \* \*

*Washington:* In any case it is apparent that the advance information that we had about the ability of the Italians to feed themselves was highly inaccurate. [Sec. 2, above] That is, the information here and in London and in Africa and everywhere else is certainly inaccurate if the figures that apply in this last paper represent the real need for food because we were satisfied from the record over a long period of years that with respect to food, the Italians were practically self-supporting. \* \* \*

OUR FOOD REQUISITIONS ARE BASED ONLY UPON MILITARY NECESSITY

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 14 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9014]

It should be understood that our requisitions for food are not based on humanitarian or any other factor but that of military necessity. Conditions in Southern Italy and Sicily are such that unless reasonable quantities of food are supplied very promptly, we will experience sabotage, unrest, and a complete cessation of all those activities considered necessary to our advance. \* \* \*

AN AVOWED MISTAKE WILL BE RECTIFIED BY TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS

[Msg, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Chief, CAD, 14 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 9363]

Our postponement of November shipments of flour into December, because of anticipated availability of North African wheat, and limited shipping and port facilities for large ships was a serious mistake and it has caused acute shortage both because of increased requirements over estimates, and failure of North African wheat to be made available on schedule.

The loan of an additional 20,000 tons of wheat now agreed by French from North Africa and 7,000 tons expected from Mid East, should take care of our needs until arrival of convoys. \* \* \*

OTHER TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS: CENTRAL CO-ORDINATION AND DIVERSION OF ARMY SUPPLIES TO CIVILIANS

[AFHQ Admin Memo 92, 19 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/105/360]

I. *Establishment of Central Economic Committee (Italian Mainland)*

1. To insure the necessary co-ordination and control of civilian supply and economic matters in occupied or controlled territory of the Italian mainland, there will be established in Naples a Central Economic Committee under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer or his Deputy, responsible direct to this headquarters. In addition to the chairman, there will be one senior representative of AMG 15th Army Group and one senior representative to be designated jointly by the Allied Control Commission and AMG Headquarters. \* \* \*

II. *Civil Food Controller (Italian Mainland)*

1. The situation in regard to supply and distribution of food for the Italian civil population is grave, and is liable, if unremedied, to have an adverse effect on our ability to conduct operations. It may be desirable in certain cases to accept some diversion of military transport and/or supplies in order to alleviate situations which would result in internal security commitments,

rather than to allow such internal security commitments to arise. The primary interest of this headquarters in meeting the minimum food requirements in Italy is to avoid interference with military operations. It is an over-riding military consideration that the civil population be fed. In emergencies where this consideration involves direct interference with military build-up and maintenance, the decision of the General Officer Commanding in Chief, 15th Army Group, will govern. Machinery for dealing with such matters is, therefore, being established immediately.

2. The machinery for the execution of this policy will be that of the Central Economic Committee established by Section I, above, under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). \* \* \*

MANY TROUBLES BUT FEW THAT FLOUR WILL NOT CURE

[Ltr, Joyce to Hilldring, 19 Dec 43, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 3]

\* \* \* This is *some job!* There are 57 varieties of grief, but only about 7 of that number that some flour would not cure. These people are hungry—and I hate to see such with co-belligerents.

Please do your best, and bring our best getter Bill Somervell into the picture. He will get flour shipped or else!

#### 4. THE FOOD SHORTAGE IS AT LEAST ALLEVIATED

FOOD ARRIVALS BRING IMPROVEMENT

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

43. On 10 December three ships arrived in Palermo, Siracusa and Catania carrying some seven thousand tons of flour or wheat. The receipt of this flour and wheat sent the black market price of bread from 120 lire down to between 70 and 89 lire a kilogram. . . . The ration of bread was maintained at 150 grams a day except that in the three producing provinces it never went below 200 grams. This ration was substantially supplemented at Christmas. It is intended to raise the island ration to 200 grams as soon as it is possible to ensure the continuance of such a ration.

INCREASING ARRIVALS BRING FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN JANUARY

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

(37) The improvement in the food situation occurring at the end of December continued in Sicily, due to the adequate imports of wheat and flour, until the last week of January. It then became serious in Catania and Siracusa in Region I, due to the diversion of a vessel containing about 5,000 tons of flour, sent to Reggio Calabria instead of to Siracusa as scheduled.

(39) During the month the bread ration remained at 150 grams in Region I except in Enna, Agrigento and Caltanissetta, the grain-producing provinces, where it was 200 grams. An order was issued in Sicily authorizing a uniform scale for non-producers of 150 grams of bread per day throughout the island and an additional 100 grams of bread for heavy workers and of 250

grams of pasta per person per week after 14 February.

(40) In Region II the supply of grain and flour also showed a great improvement. Rail shipments from Foggia to Region II, initiated in December, were completed. Three ships with cargoes of 6174 tons of flour and grain arrived at Reggio and two ships with 5407 tons at Crotona. Unloading proceeded as rapidly as possible, but the extremely limited amount of motor transport and the shortage of railway cars for transshipment are still serious handicaps. It has been possible to give a ration of 150 grams of bread daily in Reggio Province, but shortage of transport has made it impossible to raise the ration above 100 grams in Cosenza and Catanzaro. \* \* \*

#### LACK OF TRANSPORT IMPEDES DISTRIBUTION OF WHAT LITTLE IS AVAILABLE

[Gen Hume, SCAO, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/154/204]

13. a. . . . [transport] is the most vital and difficult of all the problems which have to be faced: it is not too much to say that the transport available is so inadequate that it is seriously impeding this organization from performing its correct functions in a satisfactory manner. . . . Transport is not available in sufficient numbers for the various commitments with which AMG is charged by the Army authorities, e.g. evacuation of refugees from combat zones, evacuation of seriously wounded civilians from battle areas, distribution of food and medical supplies.

At present there are insufficient trucks to distribute the flour ration which is laid down by Headquarters ACC. . . . It is estimated that over 4000 tons of food will be lost in the Venafro district because transport is not available to bring the seed and fertilizer which are ready in the Foggia district for spring sowing. \* \* \*

#### IMPROVED RATION SCALES ARE SET

[Memo, Food Subcom, Hq ACC, for All Concerned, 16 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/384]

1. The following Ration Scales have been laid down:

Normal Consumers . . . . 200 grams of Bread  
8.3 grams of Sugar per day

	A meal per shift consisting of:
Italian Civilians performing manual labor for the Allied Forces <sup>6</sup>	Flour ¼ lb. or Bread ½ lb. Fresh Vegetable 6 oz. Fresh Meat 1 oz. or Dehydrated Soup ¾ oz.

#### CHIEF COMMISSIONER SEES IMPROVEMENT BUT IS NOT COMPLACENT

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane to GOCinC, Hq AAI [Allied Armies in Italy], CMF [Central Mediterranean Forces Group], 28 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

3. The report<sup>7</sup> shows up one side, and one side only, of the picture. Such a report could be written in the second phase of any occupied country. It is notorious that the initial enthusiasm of a population towards the Army which has liberated them diminishes if that Army remains in occupation of their country, particularly if operations do not progress with the rapidity anticipated.

5. The present ration issued to the population of Southern Italy is low, but I am satisfied that in relation to the world food and shipping situation it is a fair one and that the population is receiving a subsistence ration. The Flag Officer should know only too well that 416,000 tons of food have been imported into this country and distributed to the population since our occupation. He may say that most of this has found its way on to the black market. This is, however, not the case: the bulk of the food which finds its way on to the black market consists of naval and military rations pilfered by civilians and Allied personnel.

7. In the fifth paragraph of his report the Rear Admiral infers that humanitarian considerations are not taken into account in dealing with the civilian population. The inference is entirely false and I resent it.

<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to note the higher ration for civilians working for the Allied forces. In the spring of 1944, after a large number of solutions on an individual basis, a uniform policy was adopted of providing supplementary rations not only for heavy workers laboring directly for the armed forces but also for those working indirectly. The report of the Economic Section ACC in September 1944 observed that keeping the population quiet resolved itself, in practice, into providing adequate rations for urban heavy workers. ACC files, 10000/154/328.

<sup>7</sup> A critical report of a Royal Navy Flag Officer on ACC's handling of the economic situation, in particular food supply.

8. No member of this Commission, least of all myself, can view the situation with complacency, but I think that you are probably satisfied that the condition of this population has improved considerably in the last three months. \* \* \*

#### URBAN CENTERS SUFFER MOST

[OSS, AAI, Report on the Economic Situation in Italy, 13 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/302]

6. . . . In general, the lower and middle classes of the urban centers of Naples are not far from starvation. This situation is somewhat alleviated by the fact that the Allied armies are the largest employers of manual and industrial labor and that their civilian help is generally given some kind of hot meal at noon. The average middle class family is somewhat better off, though their fixed incomes are generally insufficient to satisfy the essential requirements in housing and clothing even if sufficient for food. Of the city population, only the wealthy have a satisfactory diet. On the other hand the rural population, which constitutes 70 percent of the total, fares much better. . . . The peasantry is always able to hold on to a minimum food supply. In the provinces the chief sufferers are refugees from the north, especially where relief organizations have not functioned well. \* \* \*

#### TARGET FIGURE HAS NEVER BEEN MET

[Col W. J. Legg, Chief, Food Subcom, Econ Sec, ACC, Report to Advisory Council for Italy, 25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/132/477]

2. . . . the original intention of the planning staff prior to invasion was to import supplies of essential basic commodities to furnish a minimum daily diet of 1000 calories for normal consumers plus an additional 200 gr. of flour for heavy workers. No allowance was made for hospitals, institutions, prisons, refugees, etc. The balance required to raise the level to 1500 calories was to be made up from local resources.

3. The standard of imported supplies has not, at any time, permitted the attainment of the planned figure. Similarly the availability of local resources, except in the producing and rural areas, has not permitted the attainment of 500 calories. \* \* \*

#### BUT IMPORTED FOOD SUSTAINS ITALIANS UNTIL NEXT HARVEST

[Econ Sec. ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44, Feeding Southern Italy, ACC files, 10000/154/328, pp. 73, 78]

##### \* \* \* A. Fall and Winter, 1943-44

5. It was clear that dependence could only be placed on imported foods if the people in Southern Italy were to survive through the winter. Large tonnages of food were sent to Italy. In the five months August—December 1954, a total of 83,000 tons of flour and wheat had arrived in Liberated Italy, but in the next three months a total of 250,000 tons arrived. There was a corresponding relative increase in the other foods, from August—December to January—March: Dehydrated soup increased from 2,000 in the first period to 16,000 tons in the second period; sugar from 6,000 to 15,000 tons; meats and vegetable stew from zero to 9,000 tons.

6. In computing the requirements for the food to be imported into Italy, the Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean used as a basis that 1,000 calories per day of imported food would be supplied to 50% of the population south of Rome. AFHQ also operated on the assumption that food for the rest of the population plus an additional 500 calories for those to whom imported food was being supplied would come from local resources. The 1,000 calories were to come mainly from a 200 gram flour ration (707 calories) and the rest from dry vegetables, dehydrated soup, sugar, meat or cheese. Actually, it proved necessary to supply a minimum ration not to 50 percent but to over 80 percent of the total population in Southern Italy. It proved necessary to feed not only the large cities but the small towns and the villages.

7. During the winter and spring of 1944, 84% of the population of Liberated Italy received probably half or more of the food they ate from imports brought in by ACC. \* \* \*

##### B. Spring 1944

1. At the end of the winter, and with the new wheat and other crops, the situation in Southern Italy has become considerably better. As the armies moved northward, and the government organization has improved, food conditions in the rural areas have been relatively easy. The food situation in Southern Italy now largely becomes one of the large cities. \* \* \*

## 5. THE INITIAL FOOD EXPERIENCE TEACHES VALUABLE LESSONS

### GENERAL HILLDRING LETS GENERAL STAFF KNOW THE FACTS OF LIFE IN ITALY

[Memo, CAD, Incl with Ltr, Hilldring to Handy, ACofS, OPD files, 10 Jan 44, CAD/400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 4]

1. The Civil Affairs Division is constantly encountering on the General Staff a state of mind which instinctively resists the advance procurement or shipment of supplies to support the civilian populations in the wake of the Army. If prompt action is not taken to counteract this condition, the successful conduct of our military operations will be seriously impaired. I am not reciting a theory. My statement is founded on experiences which we have already had in Italy.

8. We have now prepared estimates of requirements designed to provide minimum relief and rehabilitation for Europe, and it is estimated that between four and seven million long tons of supplies must be moved in ocean-going vessels to continental Europe from the Western Hemisphere, England, North Africa and other outside sources to satisfy the minimum relief requirements during a six months period of military responsibility. Imports for England, Russia and the neutrals are not included in this estimate. In addition, there may be an additional coal requirement of as much as four million tons, if inland distribution is severely curtailed.

9. Quantities of supplies which I have just stated are minimum estimates of the probable needs of the civilians in the wake of our armies. They are not based on estimates as to what it would be nice for those countries to have. They are based on the application of those standards established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 324/1 [Ch. V, sec. 4]. They are military supplies. They will be required to support the troops in the U.S. Army in the accomplishment of planned military operations.

10. These facts point up one of the great lessons of modern warfare which we have learned the hard way in Italy, and which, if disregarded in the future may materially dislocate operations.

### A THEATER STOCKPILE IS AGAIN PROPOSED

[Msg, AFHQ to CCAC, 12 Feb 44, MTO, HS files, CAD/701, CM-OUT 3367]

To meet emergencies arising from changes in the tactical situation, shipping difficulties and to offset losses due to enemy action also to cover the 10 percent milling loss and normal shrinkage

through handling it is recommended that there be authorized: A stockpile of 100,000 tons of wheat/flour of which 50,000 tons be stockpiled in the theater and 50,000 tons on the eastern seaboard of the U.S. \* \* \*

The 50,000 tons to be stockpiled in the U.S. should be flour, preferably 90 percent extraction to permit immediate use upon arrival.

The total of 100,000 tons<sup>8</sup> is sufficient to feed approximately 13,000,000 people for thirty days on the present basis of the Italian ration scale. This is equal to the civil population to be fed in Sardinia, Sicily and the mainland including Tuscany, Umbria and Marches.

The proposed stockpile is intended for allocation anywhere in the theater at the discretion of the Commander in Chief and is not intended as an excessive reserve for Italy. Commodities for stockpiling other than wheat/flour will be commented on later.

### NEED OF IMPROVEMENTS IN LOCAL STORAGE, PRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION

[Grady, Vice President, Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt to the Secy of State, 28 Mar 44, p. 8, CAD files, 334, ACC (3-28-44), Bulky]

#### A. *The Emergency Food Problem*

\* \* \* Beginning with January 1944 increasingly heavy imports of grain and flour began to arrive, and a very large food import program stood on the books for the first six months of 1944. It was urgently necessary, however, to establish an efficient system for the receipt, warehousing, internal transportation, milling, and distribution of these supplies. Following the reorganization of the AMG/ACC and the clarification of channels of authority and responsibility, this task was placed in the hands of the Food Subcommittee, and is being efficiently dealt with. Warehouse space has been found, physical checking arrangements instituted, and plans for milling and internal distribution are being developed, and large quantities of food supplies are being moved from the docks with minimum strain upon the port's congested facilities, together with a substantial reduction in the leakage which develops in large proportions if the

<sup>8</sup> This was 34,000 tons less than the quantity asked for on 26 November. Because of a debate raised by SACMED's desire for authority to use the reserve anywhere in the Mediterranean Theater, CCAC/S did not approve the request until June 1944.

receipt, transportation and warehousing is not effectively policed.

The provision of imported food to meet the present emergency is however only the first step in meeting the emergency food shortage, which will grow as additional heavily populated areas are liberated. It is also necessary to find means of unlocking hoards and other supplies existing within the area, of driving out the costly system of black market distribution through the re-establishment of legal marketing channels, and to revive and promote the restoration of local food production. The substitution of open distribution for the illicit black market involves the problem of reviving responsible local commercial initiative as well as of restoring transportation facilities sufficiently to enable the local supplies which are discovered from time to time in various parts of the mainland—six hundred tons of beans in one place, thousands of tons of oranges and lemons in another—to be brought to the centers of consumption. These problems are receiving from the Food Subcommittee attention only second to that of arranging the handling of the current and prospective food imports.

In brief, it is necessary not only to handle the heavy volume of emergency food imports, but also to stimulate local food production and to foster and control the marketing of present stocks and future crops. Interwoven in this is the problem of stimulating the revival of local commercial initiative and governmental responsibility which is the core of the problem of liberated Italy. [See also Chapter XVII.] \* \* \*

#### THE WISDOM OF HINDSIGHT: WASHINGTON EXPERTS CRITICIZE THEATER PLANNING

[Combined Sup Gp for CCAC/S, Rpt of Survey<sup>9</sup>, Civilian Supply in Italian Theater, Mar–May 44, ASF, ID files, dr. 3424]

#### III. *Role of Food in Military Government*

That food for civilians was considered an important part in preinvasion plans for this area will not be questioned, although there seems to be some doubt as to how important relatively that part was considered. That food for civilians could become the key-note in the success or failure of military government after occupation, was certainly not anticipated prior to the landings in Sicily. In fact, every observation made by the

<sup>9</sup>This is the report made by the group which the CCS, through its subcommittee for supply, sent to Italy. It was presented only as a preliminary draft pending AFHQ's comments. The theater took the position that many of its criticisms were invalid.

Supply Group on this aspect of pre-invasion planning in this theater indicates that many other phases of military government responsibilities were given priority over civilian food supply in the preparation of the campaign. \* \* \*

[Comments of Lt Gen John G. W. Clark, Chief Admin Officer, AFHQ, on Rpt of Combined Sup Gp, 2 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/427]

\* \* \* The "careful study" which the Group gave to the problems of AMG on the basis of which it condemned the AMG planning, did not include an examination of the AMG plan or any of documentation underlying the planning of food requirements, nor did it involve consultation with any of the officers concerned with that function at that time. . . . Recourse to the plan itself and to the planning files and records would have indicated to the Group the following facts which are at substantial variance with its conclusions:

a. That a stockpile of 23,000 tons for Sicily was recommended by the planning staff for the Sicilian operation in May of 1943 and accepted and authorized by AFHQ, such stockpile to be created out of the North African harvest, which it was then thought would have a substantial surplus.

b. That it was foreseen in August and early September 1943, by the responsible AMG officers, that the wheat supply in Sicily would be exhausted in the six deficient provinces by the end of the year. A program, therefore, was established to bring forward the stockpile.

c. That the critical shortage which developed in December was due to the failure of the stockpile and the rapidly increasing demand resulting from the development of operations which were not contemplated at the time of the original plans, as well as to organization difficulties which interfered with the execution of the program.

Whether the AMG officers had a true appreciation of the role of food is a matter of opinion. It is, however, wholly inaccurate to state that not until months after the invasion did AMG officials awaken to its importance. . . .

#### ACC BLAMES MILITARY PRIORITIES

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, Organizational Problems, 1 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/154/328]

4. The dominant fact about supplying food to the cities in Liberated Italy was that it was taking place in an area which was primarily the rear supply area of the Allied armies. Naturally, army interests predominated. All the usual military difficulties of operation were accentuated in

the case of ACC as ACC was regarded as "marginal"—i.e., as the organization which should bear the brunt of any unexpected difficulties. Military considerations were always dominant.

5. It was never possible to know how much food was actually going to arrive. ACC would be advised that certain quantities of food were on the way. The quantities of food shown on the ships' manifest on arrival were almost never in agreement with the quantities advised. Furthermore, the supplies actually received often did not agree with the quantities on manifests. The discrepancies between advices and manifests were such that the advices could not be used in planning. ACC never knew exactly how much food it was going to get for Italy until it was actually unloaded. . . .

6. The diversion of ships for military reasons also complicated the problem. Subsistence supplies were frequently loaded on ships which also carried strictly military equipment and supplies. Sometimes only in this way would supplies secure some shipping space. These ships were diverted frequently from their original destination for reasons of military necessity. Supplies scheduled to arrive at certain ports at certain times would arrive at other ports. There the supplies might have to be unloaded to make the ship available for some other military purpose, and then came the problem of getting the supplies to the place where they were actually needed. There was scheduled to arrive in Cagliari, Sardinia, during January 1944, 3,000 tons of supplies. These supplies were actually unloaded in Oran, North Africa and coastal shipping had to be procured to get the supplies to Sardinia. Though five grain ships were scheduled to arrive in July 1944, only one arrived. One was overdue and two others were scheduled to arrive on 3 August. \* \* \*

#### SUPPLY LESSONS LEARNED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

[Combined Sup Gp for CCAC/S, Rpt of Survey, Mar-May 44]

#### XXIII. A. *The Importance of the Supply Aspect of Civil Affairs*

An outstanding lesson gained from the Italian experience, and which it is expected will be applicable to all liberated countries, is the importance of the economic and supply aspect of civil affairs. It is the opinion of the Group that the quantity of supplies needed for the relief of Europe can be influenced to a large extent by the importance assigned to the supply function in the administrative organization, and by the technical qualifications of the personnel assigned to the task.

In the civil affairs organization as originally instituted in this theater, the importance of the economic and supply roles appears to have been underestimated both in preliminary training and in field practice. It is believed that the population could have been maintained at the same health level, with far lesser quantities of imported supplies than were actually requisitioned, had the civil affairs organization been built around men selected on the basis of knowledge of and preferably experience in the Army Technical Services, and experience in civilian occupation concerned with agricultural and industrial production, control and distribution.

#### B. *Relationship Between Civil-Affairs Organization and the Army Technical Services*

In the planning for future areas the Group suggests that procedures be developed for achieving a closer integration of the civil-affairs organization with the other branches of the military establishment. In this theater, the Group has observed a sharp line of demarkation between the army technical services and the organization dealing with civilian supplies. There is on the part of many army supply men in Italy no realization that when requisitions for civilian supplies reach Washington they are in effect military requisitions from this area. It is suggested that in future operations steps be taken to bring home to the technical services their direct responsibility for ensuring adequate handling of civilian supply matters such as transportation, warehousing and engineering maintenance until civilian facilities become available.

It should be realized that in areas under active military jurisdiction the army technical services indirectly govern almost all aspects of civilian economy through the control of ports, railroads, roads, public utilities, communications, and such supplies as petroleum products and coal. In addition, the military employs large numbers of civilians required to operate and maintain these facilities. It is believed that the increased burden on the technical services would not be excessive if charged with additional responsibilities in connection with civilian supply. Actually, it is considered that in the long-run the military would profit by the more rapid reorganization of the civilian economy that could be achieved through their active co-operation with civil affairs work in the early operational phases.

#### C. *Personnel*

During the survey, the absence of technically-trained personnel was apparent. The most prevalent background among provincial supply officers

seemed to be that of police experience. Supply officers have been severely limited in number and are usually of junior rank. Still they have been called upon to assist trained Italian civil administrators through a period of severe economic dislocation and to supervise the warehousing, distribution and rationing of large tonnages of supplies. \* \* \*

In planning personnel for future operations, the Group recommends that every administrative unit should include one technically-trained officer for each of the following economic divisions concerned with supply matters: (1) Agriculture, (2) food distribution and rationing, (3) transportation, (4) fuel, public works and utilities, (5) commerce and industry, and (6) public health. In addition, at each port there should be at least two Port Officers for the supervision of port handling and warehousing of civilian supplies.

#### D. *Attitude of Supply Officers*

In the opinion of the Group, officers at all levels of the ACC, have not been sufficiently impressed with the necessity of keeping import requirements to a minimum. The easiest means of satisfying Italian officials and maintaining tranquility within an area is to accede to all demands. There will always be organized groups pressing

for special interests. \* \* \*

Another difficulty is to impress upon supply officers the need for uniform rationing in order that supplies in surplus provinces may be available for distribution in deficit areas. It is difficult in an area of surplus grain production to keep the population on a low bread ration and at the same time export the locally produced wheat to other areas. In a number of instances in surplus areas, supply officers were found to be so interested in the welfare of their own province that no positive action was being taken to hold down consumption within the province and to make surplus products flow into deficit areas.

#### E. *Liaison between CCAC and the Theater*

It is the opinion of the Group that for Italy and for future theaters as well, it is essential to have a system of liaison with CCAC to ensure that problems of supply and of distribution are properly co-ordinated. This can best be achieved by officers travelling regularly from Washington and London to the theaters. . . . It is considered that many of the supply difficulties which arose in the early stages of the Italian operation and are still current could have been avoided by this means. \* \* \*

## 6. EPIDEMIC KNOWS NO NATIONALITY

### ANOTHER PLANNING ASSUMPTION WHICH WAS TO PROVE SADLY ERRONEOUS

[MGS, Plng Comm. on Migration, Rpt, 20 Jul 43, p. 13, ACC files, 10000/164/805]

\* \* \* It is not expected that typhus will occur in serious proportions during 1943. Although it unquestionably existed in Italy during the winter of 1942-43, its precise extent is not known. It was certainly less prevalent than in the Balkans and Central Europe. An increase is not to be anticipated before the winter of 1943-44. \* \* \*

### INITIAL DANGERS TO PUBLIC HEALTH IN NAPLES

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

143. When our forces entered Naples they found that there was an almost total failure of the water supply. People were carrying water in pails, jugs, bottles and every type of container. There was a small trickle of water from some of the hydrants, but many persons standing in line were

unable to receive enough to quench thirst. The Germans had blown up the main aqueduct in seven places and all the reservoirs save one had been drained. By chance an Italian had saved one reservoir by cutting the fuse after it had been lighted by departing Germans. AMGOT took charge of the remaining reservoir and by rationing to the long queues of people made the supply go as far as possible. . . .

144. The work of restoring the water supply was begun at once, but it was ten days before water flowed in part of the city taps, and two weeks before the entire city was served.

145. The lack of water, plus the destruction of sewer mains, created a most hazardous threat of epidemics. But even if water had been available the sewers could not have functioned in the absence of pumping facilities, which were sabotaged by the enemy, and of power. Naples' sewer system is in large part constructed so as to require pumping from low levels. By a careful instruction of the public, carried out in the daily Italian newspaper published by PWB, and by

posted notices, sanitary measures were adopted, but it must be stated that severe epidemics of typhoid and dysentery might have resulted but for sheer good fortune and several hard rains providing the people with an opportunity to gather water in pans, and which also served to flush out the sewer systems. Water sterilization supplies were flown in by AMGOT as a precaution against epidemics due to the loss of pressure in the water system and the breaks in the sewage system.

146. The health situation was better than had been expected. Rumors of outbreaks of cholera and typhus had been received before the occupation. AMGOT medical officers made an immediate inspection which showed that there were no epidemics, that the incidence of infectious diseases was lower than in corresponding periods of the two previous years, and that the hospital situation was satisfactory. Medical supplies were landed in Naples from North Africa and in addition 40 tons of emergency stores had been sent forward by coaster from the AMGOT depot in Sicily. \* \* \*

#### A TYPHUS EPIDEMIC DEVELOPS IN NAPLES

[PHS/C (Public Health Subcommittee), AC, Rpt, Epidemic Typhus in Naples 1943-44, ACC files, 10000/163/546, pp. 15-19]

\* \* \* The earliest incursion of typhus into the portion of the peninsula open to investigation, and of which there is knowledge at present, occurred in late February and early March 1943. A hospital train bringing wounded and frost-bitten soldiers from the Russian front left Prilven in the Ukraine on the 19th and arrived at Foggia on 26 February. . . . On the 12th and 13th March eighty cases of typhus appeared among these repatriated soldiers—44 at Foggia and 36 at Bari. . . .

It was about this same time that the first reported cases of typhus appeared in Naples at the Military Hospital. One was in a soldier returned from the Russian front by train and three others in men brought back from North Africa by hospital ship. \* \* \*

It is probably due to the fact that the movements of prisoners are usually better recorded than those of civilians that our knowledge of the pre-epidemic phase of the Naples outbreak is concerned largely with the prisons and the part they played in the seeding of the civil population. Of primary interest is Poggioreale prison, a large provincial institution located in the industrial area of Naples. Surrounded by an artillery barracks, airplane and locomotive works as well as

soap and textile plants, Poggioreale sits on a military bull's-eye. During the Allied air raids of the spring and summer of 1943 the prison suffered several direct hits which made some of the pavillions uninhabitable. The bathing plant was demolished and hygiene in the prison sank to rock-bottom. There were no air-raid shelters at Poggioreale and while raids were in progress the prisoners were herded together in the space available in the basement. At such times the prison population which normally occupied acres of floor space was crowded into a few thousand square feet. The inmates were almost universally louse-infested. In short, conditions for the transmission of typhus were ideal once the virus had been introduced. . . .

There were plenty of opportunities to bring the virus into Poggioreale with the prisoners, both civil and military, who are known to have passed through the prison during the winter and spring of 1942-43. At this time the disease was unusually prevalent in North Africa and there are records of large numbers of prisoners, both French and Italian, who were evacuated from Tunisian prisons, some by way of Sicily and others directly to Naples. \* \* \*

. . . Of no little importance to the initiation of the Naples epidemic is the fact that in the month of August, while at least 25 cases of typhus are known to have existed in this prison and a part of which time the prison was supposed to be in quarantine, no less than 100 prisoners were liberated, some 40 or more were transferred to other institutions and 25 others escaped. In the mounting confusion of Naples in August and September these potentially dangerous sources of typhus were lost to sight. It is probable that many of these men sought refuge in the air-raid shelters which are as admirably designed to protect run-away prisoners from the law as they are to protect honest citizens from bombs. The ricovero "Tunnel 9th of May," which is the main traffic artery between Naples and Pozzuoli, started yielding cases of typhus in August and September. \* \* \*

Due to the vast disorganization of all facilities and services little typhus was recognized or reported in October, but throughout this month and November the infectious charge was building up for the inevitable lightning which was to strike in December. At the time of the Tizi-Ouzou conference on 29 September, twenty-four cases of typhus had been officially reported in the city of Naples, but by the time the first control personnel arrived on 8 December this number had increased to 107.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS ARE TOLD OF A NEW ENEMY

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 4 Dec 43, AFHQ Msg files, CM-OUT 1156]

Typhus fever is actual threat to military personnel in occupied Italy at this time. . . . Twenty known cases Typhus now in Naples alone. Personnel returning to Italy from Balkans are carriers and will cause spread in civil population. . . . DDT louse powder and dusters requested in L-9740 of 11 November . . . are in urgent necessity. . . .

## THE DIRECTOR OF THE TYPHUS COMMISSION OUTLINES A CAMPAIGN

[Min, Conf To Consider Typhus Contl Held by Deputy Military Surgeon, AFHQ, 25 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/163/7]

2. *Brigadier General Leon A. Fox* [Fld Dir, U.S.A. Typhus Com. (USATC)] stated that he had no responsibility for control but that he had visited Italy in a consultative capacity. Typhus epidemic is now a reality in Naples and entire Southern Italy is threatened. 140 cases now in hospital and 14 new cases reported on 21 December. Naples, a city of over 800,000 inhabitants, has hundreds of thousands of refugees added to normal population. Economic conditions are bad, malnourishment is general, soap and fuel are not available and overcrowding is severe. Population has not had contact with epidemic *typhus* for several generations and may be regarded as entirely nonimmune. Epidemic potential is very high.

Brigadier General Fox stated that General [Everett S.] Hughes, Deputy Theater Commander, has asked Typhus Commission to take complete charge and that he (General Fox) considers this step not only advisable but absolutely necessary. Situation is desperate and outlook is grave for civil population. Military population is threatened. Immediate action is indicated. A.M.G. in Italy should have called for help 60 days ago. It is believed too late to smother epidemic, but proper attack may bring it under control. Fox will assume complete responsibility if War Department authorizes. General Fox considers that no civil agency such as Rockefeller group can possibly function in an active military zone such as Southern Italy without insurmountable administrative and supply difficulties.

A cable on the above lines has been sent by A.G. to War Department asking for sanction for the Typhus Commission to assume responsibility for control of Typhus in Southern Italy, and for

attachment of Rockefeller Group to Typhus Commission.

4. *Plan of Campaign*. Brigadier General Fox explained his proposed *Plan of Campaign* as follows:

(a) Mass delousing of civil population of Naples.

(b) Organization of a complete case-finding service with the co-operation of Italian-speaking Physicians and Priests.

(c) Disinfection of contacts (home and place of work).

(d) Biologic immunisation of key personnel, e.g. Hospital Staffs, Police, Priests, etc.

5. *Relationship of Army*. Colonel [William S.] Stone stated that 15 Army Group has issued a Directive restricting the Military population in Naples as much as possible, limiting transit passes, and impressing the necessity of immunisation and disinfestation.

### 6. *Medical Supplies*.

(a) *D.D.T.* This is to be the chief means of disinfestation. 60 tons is on the way from U.S.A. on a fast liner. One hundred tons for A.M.G. is coming in installments. Enough MYL powder has been made available for one and a half million treatments. 1,400 pounds of DDT (conc.)—enough for 224,000 people at one ounce per head is in transit from North Africa to Naples. Brigadier General Fox pointed out that while Methyl Bromide or steam disinfestation had its place within the Unit or to deal with occasional infestation, it had no place in mass disinfestation for the population got re-infested as fast as disinfestation could normally be carried out. A substance like DDT with a continued action was essential.

(b) *Typhus Vaccine*. Where surplus required for distribution is considered American Army supplies are just sufficient to cover primary inoculations when necessary, and booster doses for personnel of the Allied Armies. Requirements for civil [population] will have to be obtained in addition. \* \* \*

### AMG MEDICAL SETUP IS CONSIDERED INADEQUATE

[Msg, Maj Gen Ralph Royce, CG, USAFIME, to WD, 26 Dec 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 16255]

Part 4. . . . Fox found nothing to co-ordinate on arriving in Naples and therefore he recommends Typhus Commission be assigned responsibility for entire typhus control program. Naples AMGOT medical set-up pitifully inadequate. No active program had been started nor do I believe

it possible with the medical services available to AMGOT. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ TRANSFERS CONTROL TO THE TYPHUS COMMISSION

[Msg, AFHQ to FLAMBO (AFHQ Adv Admin Ech, Naples), 29 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/163/7]

Policy regarding typhus control in civilian population of Naples and occupied Italy will be under the direction of FLAMBO. Initial phase of typhus control programme as far as technical and administrative aspects are concerned should be delegated to U.S. Typhus Commission which has been assigned by AGWAR to this Headquarters. Col. H[arry] A. Bishop member of this Headquarters is being sent to Naples tonight temporarily as assistant to Director U.S. Typhus Commission. Any additional supplies and equipment not available locally if requested will be provided by this Headquarters. AMG will take immediate steps to organize health departments to take over typhus control work when epidemic is under control using civilian and AMG health personnel. Transition of programme to AMG control will be arranged by you in conjunction with U.S. Typhus Commission and AMG. Military personnel temporarily attached to expedite initial programme will be returned to their proper station as soon as AMG is organized to continue typhus control work.

#### AMG THINKS CURTAILMENT OF ITS MEDICAL JURISDICTION UNWISE

[Memo, Deputy Chief Admin Officer,<sup>10</sup> 15th AGP, for Hq 15th AGP, 3 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/163/7]

2. The removal of Typhus control from the direction of Medical Services, A.M.G., and the placing of it under an operational military organization [FLAMBO] will not only cause complete confusion in medical and civil administration,

<sup>10</sup> The responsibility for typhus control in Occupied Italy belonged to AMG, operating under the 15th Army Group, from the date of occupation until 2 January 1944. Under authority of AFHQ, responsibility was transferred to the U.S.A. Typhus Commission on 3 January 1944 where it remained until 19 February. On 20 February, the direction of typhus control activities passed to the Public Health Subcommittee of the ACC, which had been officially recognized as the over-all supervisory agency for public health activities in Occupied Italy. The change in administrative responsibility caused only minor changes in the program. The Rockefeller Foundation Typhus Team, which organized the Delousing Service for the AMG in December, continued its functions under USATC and reassumed responsibility for all delousing when the Public Health Subcommittee took over.

but places upon the operational military authorities a responsibility which must be that of A.M.G. In fact, A.M.G. has been formed to relieve the military authorities of such responsibilities. This is the second occasion in which AFHQ have removed from A.M.G. a civil responsibility and placed it under FLAMBO. The first was the feeding of the civil population.

4. I am advised and satisfied that Typhus in Naples is not an hyperendemic. The situation is serious but is not out of control. Colonel Cheyne, Director of Medical Services, A.M.G., together with Colonel [E. H.] Crichton, Senior Medical Officer, Region III, have the matter in hand and with the assistance of the U.S. Typhus Commission, whose presence and help I welcome, are the best people, because they are members of A.M.G. and therefore in closest touch with the civilian population and the civilian administration, to deal with the Typhus outbreak in any city or part of the area. I submit that FLAMBO is not in such a position.

8. I shall be glad if immediate action could be taken to put the responsibility for the medical administration relating to the control of Typhus under the proper authority, i. e. A.M.G.

#### INHABITANTS OF AIR-RAID SHELTERS ARE "DUSTED"

[PHS/C, AC, Rpt, Epidemic Typhus in Naples 1943-44, pp. 50-51]

\* \* \* The importance of the air-raid shelters as foci of transmission was recognized early and led, on 27 December, to the assignment of a special squad to the dusting of their inhabitants. The work of this group was carried on in the evening between 6 o'clock and midnight because it was at this time that the *ricoveros* had their maximum population; relatively few persons stayed in them during the daytime.

The work in the shelters was in many ways the most difficult and certainly the most dramatic of all the services. It was usual for people to start filtering into the shelters in the late afternoon. The women folk could be seen trudging along, some with cots, chairs and stools, others with bundles of bedding or assorted belongings on their heads and queues of soiled and often shoeless youngsters carrying pots and pans, at their heels. These were families who had homes of a sort but who preferred to sleep night after night in the *ricoveros* rather than risk not being awakened in time to make their way through the narrow blacked-out streets and alleys in the event of a raid. Inside the shelter these families enjoyed "squatter's rights" for they usually returned to

the same place among the permanent residents in the *ricovero* each night. Many of the shelters were great cavernous excavations with cathedral-like chambers accommodating thousands of people. The main passages were commonly illuminated by small lights which rapidly dulled into glowing spots in the smoke of the fires that were built in tubs or buckets for the preparation of the evening meal and a little warmth. The vaulted funereal recesses that led off the main galleries were unlighted except for an occasional candle or small fire which cast disquieting awesome shadows on the high blank walls. Add to this atmosphere a disordered throng of miserable, frightened and soapless citizens and some notion may be had of the conditions in which the *ricovero* squads worked during the cold rainy months of the epidemic.

Plans had been made as early as October and repeatedly thereafter for the evacuation of the *ricoveros*, but this never came to pass for the simple compelling reason that there was no other place to which the occupants could be moved. The *Ricovero* Service was organized to take care of the dusting of approximately 10,000 weekly. Six teams each consisting of a physician and twelve dusters made the rounds of some 80 to 90 *ricoveros* every seven days, but this interval was finally increased to fourteen days as the number of cases reported from the shelters declined. The greatest single difficulty in *ricovero* dusting was in maintaining some reasonable degree of order. Immediately an alert sounded the shelters became so packed with people that work had to be suspended. In the event of an actual raid they were usually so crowded for days after that dusting was severely hampered. \* \* \*

#### A WARNING AGAINST FURTHER DELAY IN EVACUATING AIR RAID SHELTERS

[Memo, Col E. H. Crichton, Sr MO, AMG, Rgn III, for All Concerned, 10 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/163/1176]

1. The menace to the public health from the continued use of Air Raid Shelters had already been represented. This is a particularly urgent problem in the presence of a large scale typhus epidemic and many of the cases notified have come from "*Ricoveri*."

2. The strong recommendation made last month that they should be cleared forcibly if necessary and the people using them evacuated from Naples was not pressed further because we had no means, at the time, to ensure that those evacuated could be effectively disinfested before they were allowed to scatter all over the countryside where they could infect other areas.

3. With the arrival of D.D.T. powder and the means to use it, this difficulty has now been removed and there is therefore, no medical reason why the clearing of the "*Ricoveri*" should not be proceeded with as soon as alternative accommodation can be provided for those evicted. Without in any way wishing to exaggerate, it is the duty of this Office to warn you that further protraction in the carrying out of this recommendation is likely to prolong the epidemic and to accentuate its seriousness.

#### THE EPIDEMIC NOW SEEMS UNDER CONTROL

[Msg, PBS, Naples, to WD, 11 Feb 44, CAD files, 710 (8-13-43) (1), CM-IN 7399]

1. Typhus situation in Southern Italy shows remarkable improvement. Control features have proved even more effective than any anticipated. . . .<sup>11</sup>

After conference with Fox, [Brig. R. W.] Galloway of AFHQ, and Parkinson of ACC it has been decided that typhus control in Southern Italy will pass to ACC as of midnight February 19-20.<sup>12</sup> While Typhus Commission ceases to be responsible after the 19th, Fox has promised that Woodward and Ecke of commission will remain with ACC for not to exceed twenty days and that Fox will continue in advisory capacity throughout Italian campaign. \* \* \*

#### LESSONS OF THE EPIDEMIC

[Col Thomas B. Turner, Dir, Civil PHD, OSG, Rpt to The Surgeon General, 21 Feb 44, in MGS Rpt 15, 18 Apr 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-29-43), sec. 2]

(2) The lessons to be learned from this episode are, first, that military government must have men at the top who understand public health and have authority to act. Second, every effort should be made to anticipate trouble and to initiate preventive measures before the situation becomes acute. Third, since the Typhus Commission has been organized especially for typhus control, its advice should be sought whenever conditions favorable to the development of an epidemic exist. \* \* \*

<sup>11</sup> Brig G. S. Parkinson, Director of the Public Health Subcommittee, wrote in his report on the typhus epidemic that it would "stand out as a mile-stone in the field of public health and disease control" because "here it was for the first time that a major epidemic of this vicious disease . . . was not merely curbed but actually brought under control by the vigorous application of delousing measures." ACC files, 10000/163/546.

<sup>12</sup> ACC could, of course, provide not only a more centralized control but a medical policy better integrated with that of highest theater levels.

## ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION STAFF WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE

[Memo, Brig Gen James S. Simmons, Chief, Preventative Medicine Serv, ASF, to Chief, CAD, 25 Apr 44, CAD files, 710 (8-13-43) (1)]

3. . . . It is the opinion of this office that it is desirable that the services of the staff members of the Rockefeller Foundation should continue to be available to the ACC, particularly in view of the expressed desire of ACC. It is believed, however, that individuals so employed should be under military control and that some degree of control should be exercised by the Surgeon General, acting as the principal adviser to the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department in matters pertaining to civil public health.

4. It is therefore recommended: *a.* That utilization of services of selected staff members of Rockefeller Foundation in public health activities of civil affairs be accepted in principle. *b.* That such individuals be appointed either as consultants to the Surgeon General or as Technical Assistants to the Surgeon General, depending upon the qualifications of the individual concerned. *c.* That they be assigned to a Theater of Operation upon the request or with the concurrence of a theater commander. *d.* That these arrangements be limited to the period during which military authorities are responsible for civil public health in the areas concerned. \* \* \*

## MEASURES FOR MALARIA CONTROL

[ACC Exec Memo 54, 25 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/154/288]

1. Prevention of Malaria in this theater is of fundamental importance to Allied Forces. Experiences of 1943 in Sicily and the notorious history of areas now occupied or which lie immediately ahead, indicate clearly that the Armies will sustain serious loss of manpower if malaria is not effectively controlled. All signs point to a season of unusually high density of malaria mosquitoes and of civilian carriers of the parasite—the two main factors in the transmission of malaria.<sup>13</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>13</sup> At the beginning of April a decision was made to evacuate compulsorily all civilians from the malarial Anzio beachhead area (with the exception of essential farmers and their families), largely in order to reduce the incidence of malaria among the troops. Nearly 20,000 civilians, after being treated with antilouse powder, were evacuated.

3. A *Malaria Control Branch* has been established in the Public Health Subcommittee of Allied Control Commission. It has the following functions:

(a) To assist the Army Senior Civil Affairs Officers and Regional Commissioners of Allied Control Commission in restoring and implementing civilian malaria control agencies, and in directing their activities.

(b) To assist in co-ordinating civil and military malaria control activities.

(c) To carry out essential malaria control field tests in co-operation with the Allied Forces.

7. In each province where there is a malaria problem there will usually be found a Comitato Provinciale Antimalarico. If this committee has been dispersed, it should be reconstituted as soon as possible. The malaria committee should be advised that, if it has not already done so, it should immediately prepare malaria control plans and budgets along the general lines of preceding years. . . .

8. So far as Allied Control Commission supplies are concerned, malaria control will be based on drainage, maintenance of drainage canals, canalizing of streams, regulation of water, filling, oiling, and the proper treatment of clinical cases. \* \* \*

## WHY CIVILIAN HEALTH IS OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE TO SACMED

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 28 Aug 44, MTO HS files, CAO/301, CM-OUT 6438]

1. Decision has been made by this Headquarters to stockpile typhus control supplies in Central Medical Warehouse, Naples, in order to have them more readily available for transshipment to wherever they are required in the Theater.

2. In view of the shipping situation and the responsibility this Headquarters has in prevention of epidemics in the civilian population it is deemed inadvisable for material to be stored other than in a central location.

3. It is pointed out that the responsibility for the prevention of epidemics in the civilian population rests upon SACMED, that the health of the civilians cannot be considered as being in a separate category from the health of the Military, since the presence of an epidemic in the civilian population constitutes a direct threat to Military Operations. \* \* \*

## 7. REFUGEES ARE A SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEM

### ITALIAN REFUGEES INTERFERE IN INITIAL ADVANCE UP THE PENINSULA

[AMGOT Hq, Rpt for Sep 43]

(133) . . . At the outset the function of AMGOT consisted largely of aiding the army commander in various ways, including the controlling of vast numbers of refugees who crowded the roads. This constituted a danger to security, since enemy spies might freely mingle with the refugees and obtain information concerning Allied emplacements.<sup>14</sup>

(134) In co-operation with C.I.C. and the army provost marshal, AMGOT prepared an order issued by the Army commander, prohibiting civilian movement across enemy lines, under penalty of death, and also warning that severe penalties would be imposed for cutting of communication wires. Later, when the refugee movement continued on a large scale, a program was laid out by the regional C.A.P.O. for establishing control points at which all civilian stragglers were halted, questioned and after proper investigation given passes of identification. \* \* \*

### EIGHTH ARMY REFUGEE POLICIES AT FIRST ARE AVOEWEDLY CRUDE

[Ltr, AMG Hq, 15th AGP, to Col Hume, SCAO, Fifth Army, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/164/121]

. . . the refugee problem as . . . met in the Eighth Army area.

We have handled some 7,000 refugees of various sorts. As you know, the Italian very readily becomes refugee minded, especially if there is a bit of free ration thrown in. Therefore we think that the types deserving of our first consideration are these:—(1) the refugees who come through our lines, (2) the foreigners. Others might be (3) those who for military reasons are compulsorily evacuated from towns or country areas and (4) a smaller category, includes those who have been bombed out of their houses and for whom no alternate or local arrangements can be made. \* \* \*

<sup>14</sup> Refugees were first met in any sizable number in Cosenza Province. To the south, people did not generally flee far from their homes. However, the refugee situation became serious with the advance beyond Naples in the Volturno operation. The AMG Eighth Army report for November stated that the southward flow had increased from 100 to 550 a day.

At present refugees from Eighth Army are transported to Bari or Lecce in agreement with the Italian Government following various conferences at Brindisi, Bari and elsewhere. . . . Our responsibility is to clear refugees from the forward areas so that military operations are in no way adversely affected by such. Their welfare at all points, while important, must necessarily take a second place. \* \* \*

Roughly the plan has been that bonafide refugees are collected in the Divisional areas and are returned to a railhead by returning empty military lorries whose normal work, e.g. collecting supplies and ammunition, takes them back to the railhead. By liaison with the Movement Control people at Army the Evacuation Officer arranges for sufficient rolling stock to be in a siding in anticipation of the arrival by road of the refugees, and thus they are entrained. There has been little opportunity for interrogation by the intelligence people and practically no medical inspection to eliminate infectious diseases, lice, imminent pregnancies or abortions and the like has been possible. \* \* \*

. . . It was not much good thinking of Camp—tentage is scarce—hutting is out of the question as railheads will move. Buildings of sufficient size are almost unobtainable in the forward area. Therefore some condemned rolling stock has been obtained and if the road convoys arrive before the trains are actually in position then the refugees are put into the wagons and await the arrival of their train. Sanitation has been provided and it has been our hope to get some arrangements for warming up food or producing a mine stove to warm them up. Weather conditions are becoming progressively more severe. We give them Army rations. \* \* \*

### IN THE FIFTH ARMY IMPROVISATION TOO

[AMG, Fifth Army, Report for Week Ending 12 December 1943, ACC files, 10000/100/1093]

\* \* \* The refugee problem is becoming more serious with the static conditions prevailing on this part of the front and the great amount of destruction to civilian property and houses which the Germans are now able to carry out before they are driven back. The final arrangements for setting up an organization for medical and security screening and subsequent evacuation of refugees involve the co-operation of many different

branches. . . . At present problems are dealt with by improvisation as they occur. On much of the front the problem is solved by local dispersion among communes in Corps rear areas, but several hundreds have had to be moved back behind the Corps rear boundaries. The great number of troops billeted in this area and the shortage of food complicate the problem of housing and feeding refugees [in] large numbers. SCAO's with Corps have managed to obtain army rations for those in forward areas.

#### MANY ARE ASKED FOR HELP BUT ALL SAY NO

[1st Lt. Theodore W. Liese, Internees and DP's Subcom, Diary, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/164/314]

The AMG people from the 45th came in with question of moving some 2500 refugees from the forward area for security sake, done so at the request of the division artillery company. The rest of the day was spent talking this over; and with Maj. Jo Chambers going to see Col. [Francis H.] Ox, chief of staff of PBS in respect of rations for these people; Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., of rail transport, to find out if the rail would pick them up at railhead and bring them on back to Naples; public health to find out if there was enough food in Naples to feed this number of people; and Col. Kraege head of Naples city to get his permission to bring them in; the result of which was "no" on all counts. \* \* \*

#### IN SOME PLACES THE SITUATION IS PITIFUL

[Penciled Memo, partly illegible, Seguin, CAO, San Salvo, for SCAO, Chieti Province, 12 Dec 43, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

1. Friday, 10 December at 0930 hours, an A.A. ammo transport column brought in 160 refugees. Investigation showed that they were picked up at some road corner around Altessa. The sergeant in charge could not say who gave them to him or where they came from.

2. I collected them. They were in the most pitiful state, all ages from six months to 70 years, two pregnant women, one third without any shoes, etc. I found only twelve kili of bread in the communal bakery; luckily I scrounged 28 more kili from private sources. They all were at the point of starvation.

3. At 1130 hours, with the help of CMP, re-embarked them on transport going south.

4. It is impossible to receive refugees here. No room, no staff to handle them, no accommodations of any kind. There is also no food. Bread

cannot be had constantly on hand to face eventual influx of refugees. \* \* \*

#### TO IMPROVE ORGANIZATION AN ARMY REFUGEE SECTION IS PLANNED

[Memo, Lush, DCCAO, 15th AGP, for Hq 15th AGP, 8 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/164/63]

1. The evacuation of refugees from the forward areas is now under review here. In view of the increase in the number of refugees some reorganization seems indicated, and it has been decided to create a new section in AMG 15 Army Group to deal with this.

2. This Section will be represented at Army and Regional Headquarters and all the officer personnel is being found from existing staffs, or from officers whose arrival is imminent. These officers will come under the immediate command of S.C.A.O. and R.C.A.O. of Armies and Regions respectively.

4. Up to the present it has been possible to utilize forward Staging Camps and P.O.W. Camps in Army Areas, but it is felt here that it is desirable that the refugees organization should be completely independent as regards tentage, accommodation stores and camp personnel, from the P.O.W. organizations. It seems certain that with the large number of P.O.W.'s, refugees could not possibly be handled at the same time at the same place unless the numbers of refugees were negligible, which seems unlikely. \* \* \*

#### A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN IS DRAWN UP

[Memo, Col L. R. Hulls, Chief, Refugee Fld Sec, AMG Fifth Army, for DCCAO, 15th AGP, 21 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/164/63]

The central point around which the refugee organization 5 Army will function is the main camp at Base, the purpose of which is as follows:

1. Transportation of refugees must be done by such empty returning transport from Front to Rear as is available. With numbers unknown it is, of course, *not* possible to make special arrangements in the way of earmarking transport, ahead.

The unknown factor of numbers will be taken care of by siting camps on the L of C where bottlenecks may develop.

Small camps will be sited in Corps areas, and the flow of refugees from these and elsewhere will come into a main camp at Base. Here the Civil transport system carries refugees south, but the number of trains is limited, and consequently it is at this point that a large bottleneck must be

provided for. Without this, the plan for handling refugees in anything approaching an orderly manner, cannot function.

2. In order to avoid indenting for large quantities of tentage and accommodation stores, etc., the intention is to make use of—if at all possible—existing buildings (e.g. old barracks, school or convent).

Many are suitable but are being used on requirements with higher priority. \* \* \*

#### THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS OF DEFINITE MILITARY IMPORTANCE

[Memo, Robertson, DCCAO, AFHQ Adv Admin Ech, for Hq Fifth and Eighth Armies, 23 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/164/63]

There has recently been a steady increase in the number of Italian refugees evacuated from forward areas. Some of these evacuations result from our advance, others are due to the necessity for clearing certain areas for training and operational purposes. \* \* \*

This matter is one of definite military importance. If well ordered arrangements are not made for the evacuation of refugees, our communications will be encumbered, quite apart from the serious political repercussions and humanitarian considerations involved. You are therefore requested to give this matter most serious and prompt consideration and also to assist AMG officers to the best of your means in the execution of their task.

#### CRUDE DISPATCHING CENTERS ARE SET UP

[Refugee Fld Sec, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/154/204, app. A]

#### 4. Welfare

a. The Army Refugee Camp at Vairano was established during the month to accommodate the refugees from the II Corps area and to consolidate all the refugees from CEF [*Corps Expéditionnaire Français*] and II Corps areas for entrainment to camps in the rear. All refugees are deloused and fed the refugee rations of pasta, biscuits, olive oil, dehydrated soup, tinned tomatoes and meat or vegetable stew when time permits. During the month 2,400 cans of "C" Army rations were served. These rations were obtained from the Army Quartermaster—for emergency rations. Over-night accommodation for about 300 is maintained.

b. A refugee camp is set up at Venafro for the care and processing of refugees from the CEF. All the refugees are deloused, given medical treat-

ment if needed, and fed, if time permits, before sending them by truck to the railhead at the Army Refugee Camp at Vairano. Over-night accommodations for about 450 persons is provided. \* \* \*

[Maj Raymond Kenny, Welfare Officer, Rgn IV, Rpt, 6 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/154/204, app. D]

\* \* \* At Vairano there is a refugee center which consists of a group of tents in a field secured by barbed-wire. There are no bathing facilities or disinfection accommodations, and the center, which is at the rail-head, acts merely as a dispatching center for refugees received by lorry and forwarded by railway.

The Sessa refugee center is more adequately organized. It occupies a substantial building and includes departments for reception of refugees, bathing, disinfection, sleeping rooms, kitchen and messing facilities, property examination and control. About 200 refugees per day are said to pass through the center. Expenses for the maintenance of this facility are said to be paid out of communal funds; since all of the refugees are non-residents of the commune it seems inequitable that the costs should be borne by the commune. This subject should be brought to the attention of financial control. \* \* \*

#### ACC CREATES A REFUGEE BRANCH TO AID IN MOVING REFUGEES TO KING'S ITALY

[Memo, Hulls, Dir, Italian Refugee Branch, ACC, for RCAO, Rgn III, 6 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/164/121]

1. It is with the greatest difficulty that refugees from the battle zone—and as they are an operational commitment, they are the first that must be dealt with—are being removed and transported South. . . .

2. This Branch which has been officially created to deal with the whole refugee situation throughout the country, has only this week commenced to operate as such.

3. A meeting with a representative committee of the Italian Government took place yesterday, and the first step decided upon was to carry out an immediate survey of the extent to which refugees can be absorbed in Southern Italy and Sicily. \* \* \*

#### LIKE IT OR NOT ITALIANS MUST HELP

[Min, Remarks of Col Hulls at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 4 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/162]

\* \* \* (a) As the Transit Camps essential to a successful solution were still not provided, the

more or less direct flow of refugees from the front to rear (Regions) had to continue.

(b) For military reasons some areas were still banned as reception areas. It was hoped that bans would be lifted but whilst they were on, the accommodation problem was accentuated.

(c) Refugees were known to be unpopular in reception areas. This is understandable but must be surmounted.

The immediate problem was to cater for 50,000.  
*Suggestions*

1. Every household in the reception areas must be obliged to take in some refugees.

2. The numbers to be accommodated in an area would have to be a percentage of the existing population, with variations according to the type of area. Variation from 5 to 10%.

3. Sending refugees abroad was ruled out owing to shipping problems. Therefore, start would be made on the percentage basis at once. Noted that Region II absorption had been 1% only to date. \* \* \*

#### MANY ITALIAN AUTHORITIES DO NOT LIKE TO HELP

[Min, Remarks of Hulls at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 14 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

1. From 1 March to 14 April it has been necessary to move 21,000 refugees from forward areas and disperse them in Southern Provinces. This included 11,000 from the beachhead. . . .

3. Real trouble for refugees commences when they arrive in reception areas and are dispersed in communes. In general the Italian authorities have failed to look after these people, whose condition in certain places is deplorable. It is intended to leave no doubt in the minds of Italian Ministers that this responsibility is theirs. We recognize their difficulties, the main one being food, and intend to assist without allowing them to think that we are assuming their burden. People don't like refugees and it is very difficult to billet them. It is essential that they be kept off the lines of communication. The main requirement from the Italians is personal service. We are making it clear, that if their welfare committees will work, e.g. in setting up soup kitchens, we will make available food supplies which will give refugees a hot meal a day.

Comments of Chief Commissioner: The Chief Commissioner stated that we are now doing our best to set the Italian Red Cross on its feet, which would help the refugee problem.

#### SEMISTARVED REFUGEES WILL NEVER BE WELCOMED

[Conclusions Reached at ACC Conf as Summarized in Memo, Exec Cmsr, ACC, for Admin Sec, ACC, 20 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/164/212]

4. . . . (a) *Food*—Refugees receive a ration equivalent to about 750 calories a day. They cannot take advantage of local produce, as do others, to supplement their rations, as their monetary means do not permit. ACC health authorities have laid down in agreement with other authorities, that a non worker requires 2500 calories a day, whilst light workers and adolescents require more.

5. It is agreed:

(a) To make available to the Italian authorities at all centers and communes, where a specific number of refugees have been sent, foodstuffs in addition to the above mentioned rations, sufficient for one hot meal a day to be provided to these refugees at a soup kitchen to be organized by the Italian authorities.

(b) That this meal is intended to supplement in part, the disparity between the existing ration and the above mentioned 2500 calories.

(c) That the Italian Government sees to it that soup kitchens are set up at once, and run by local committees, and that the food in question reaches the refugees and none others.

(d) That in conjunction with the above, the Italian authorities make available for refugees local resources, such as nuts, fruits, vegetables and wine, in order to make up the remaining shortage in their daily food supply which will still be considerable. It is for the Italian Government to decide how they will do this; whether by a much greater monetary allowance than at present, or otherwise, but it must be done adequately.

6. It is considered that the above measures are essential, because refugees in a state of semi-starvation will never be welcomed amongst other people already short of supplies, and a general billeting scheme will not work until proper food provision for refugees is made. \* \* \*

#### HANDLE REFUGEES WITH PATIENCE

[Memo, Capt R. J. Simpson, ACC Transport Officer, for Italian Refugee Branch, 21 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/164/212]

1. Never separate Refugee families or their luggage, unless it is absolutely necessary. Even though it may appear at times that the Refugees

are carrying too much luggage, especially what to us appears as unessentials. Remember these simple people have been taken from their homes, and have carried with them cherished belongings. It will save a lot of wear and tear on your nerves if you do not try to get them to discard any luggage. For if you do, it will only create discord and ill will and loss of valuable time.

2. In the loading or unloading of refugees from trains, ships, etc. give them time to take care of their own belongings. . . . The Italian peasant does not trust any stranger to handle his precious belongings, and will yell to the highest heavens if you do this.

3. Remember that though it might seem harsh treatment to the uninitiated American or Englishman to crowd 35 to 40 people in one truck along with considerable baggage, this is taken as a matter of course by the Italians who have been under crowded conditions all their lives, and do not complain. Of course judgment must be used if the trip is to be a long one.

4. Although it seems no one wants to be bothered with refugees, including the Italians themselves, if you use patience and diplomacy one can generally get the necessary transportation and other supplies to handle the job.

5. The refugee problem is a much greater one than most people imagine. The way it is handled will be one of the determining factors whether the Allies, especially England and the U.S.A., will hold the respect and good will of the Italians or their Nationals after the war is over.

6. Patience is one of the essential virtues one must have in the handling of refugees or refugee problems.

#### IN THE SPRING ADVANCE FIFTH ARMY FEEDS 200,000 CIVILIANS

[Hq ACC, Rpt for May 44]

\* \* \* The Armies progressed rapidly, leaving behind a trail of destruction wherever battles were hard fought. Townships like Pontecorvo, Cassino and Piedimonte ceased to exist as dwelling places, whilst others could accommodate only a small percentage of their inhabitants. As long ago as last September it is recorded that the enemy completely emptied one place, the population fleeing to the neighbouring hills. Considerable movement of the population took place as a result of all this and as examples, Fondi increased from 19,000 people to 30,000 and Teracina from 14,000 to 23,000. Many suffered from exposure and lack of food.

The feeding and medical treatment of all these people, together with the evacuation of refugees, fully extended AMG staffs but presented no new problems. By the end of the month 200,000 people were being fed in the Fifth Army area alone. \* \* \*

#### THE CAMPS ARE NOW MORE ADEQUATE

[Min, Remarks by Lt Col F. M. Brister at Conf of Regnl Cmsrs, 30 May 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

1. Since the date of the last Conference the activities of the Branch have widened.

2. There are eight forward camps in the Eighth Army area, both mobile and static, with a capacity of 4,600, and a smaller one in the Fifth Army area.

3. Main camps are located at Aversa, Capua, Foggia and Naples, the latter having three camps with a holding capacity of 11,000. The main camps on the West have handled 45,000 refugees including about 9,000 since the latest Fifth Army push, have dealt with 91 battle casualties, and treated 4,750 in camp hospitals. Each camp has an infirmary sufficiently large to take care of all except chronic and very serious cases. Ten to 30% of all refugees have been treated for scabies. In these camps there have been 25 births, 11 deaths, 14 weddings, 47 christenings, and many confirmations. 90,000 garments have been issued to about 30,000 persons.

4. Social, religious and educational activities have been instituted in addition to the vital ones of food, medical care, disinfestation, inoculation, registration, etc. There are also work facilities for the refugees; these include baking, shoemaking and tinsmithing. \* \* \*

#### A NEW POLICY: RETENTION IN FORWARD AREAS

[Doherty, Chief, Public Safety, AMG Fifth Army, Rpt for May 44]

##### *e. Refugees*

There has been a complete change in the treatment of these people. It was realised that to attempt to pass back all the population found in freshly won territory would have meant a complete block of the highways. A policy was determined whereby they were shepherded in Communes, food sent to them and to hold them where found. When a commune became overcrowded and the feeding was over-taxed, organised movement to places in rear were effected by military transport. Generally speaking, the control has worked well.

It has been the aim to get people back to their regular habitation as quickly as possible. In some cases passes had to be dispensed with in view of the urgency in getting people off roads coupled with the fact that personnel was not available and the numbers so great. There has been no hitch and no complaints. \* \* \*

#### THE MOVEMENT IN REVERSE: REFUGEES STREAM BACK TO THEIR HOMES

[Memo, Hulls for Italian High Cmsr for Refugees, 9 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/164/189]

1. It appears that the Italian authorities are still encouraging people to attempt uncontrolled self-repatriation to their homes.

2. Our attention today is again called to the arrival from the South of 500 civilians at Barletta. Upon arrival, they have no means of proceeding further, no organization to take care of them, and no alternative but to return whence they came.

3. Until the Italian government gives strict and precise instructions to their Prefects throughout Italy, that this movement must be stopped pending properly organized repatriation, this sort of thing will continue. The result, of course, is that much suffering is caused to the people attempting these moves, and much discontent with the authorities responsible for allowing them to attempt these journeys. \* \* \*

#### FUNDAMENTALS OF REFUGEE PROBLEM AS SEEN BY ACC

[Statement of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcom, 30 Nov 44,<sup>15</sup> ACC files, 10000/136/236]

The primary purpose of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommittee is to prevent interference with military operations by reasons arising out of the massing or mass movement of refugees and thereby also to relieve the Army from using its own personnel and resources for such purposes.

From these primary purposes arise most of the secondary but more obvious tasks which one so easily tends to consider as the real purpose of this Subcommittee. A starving population is a centre of trouble; it will thief, murder and riot in its struggle for existence and is liable to move en masse following rumors as to where food may be found; as it moves, it devastates the countryside, ever increasing in size the number of those starving. It is a breeding ground for disease and as it moves, so it spreads disease.

The first necessity, therefore, is food; then, to keep down disease and to maintain morale, follow housing and clothing. \* \* \*

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<sup>15</sup> By this time Italian refugees and DP's were both handled by the same subcommission; the change was made on 24 September 1944.

## 8. THE POOR AND SICK ARE ALWAYS WITH THEM

#### GENERAL POLICIES OF RELIEF

[AMGOT GAI 6, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, pp. 119-24]

\* \* \* 1. *Objective.* To prevent starvation in the civilian population, and, in so far as practicable, to continue the operation of normal relief and assistance programs which existed prior to Allied Force occupation.

#### 2. *Policies:*

(a) By definition, the term relief applies to aid granted individuals who have insufficient purchasing power to buy the minimum food, clothing, shelter, fuel, medicines, soap and essential household necessities necessary to support life.

(b) Except in *extreme emergencies* such as may arise because of refugee congestion or acute food shortages, responsibility for supply and administering aid to needy individuals will wherever possible, remain in the hands of local public or other authorized welfare agencies. AMGOT

relief funds or tactical force food supplies will be requested only when there remains no other alternative to acute suffering among the civilian population.

#### 3. *Existing Local Agencies and Institutions:*

(a) In each commune there exists a Communal Public Assistance Board (Enti Comunali di Assistenza) which has authority to operate free canteens, to issue free milk rations, provide free meals for poor school children and maintain dormitories for the homeless. This board is also responsible for the relief of unemployed and otherwise needy persons. In addition to the Enti Comunali di Assistenza certain private and religious agencies may be found operating in the relief or closely related welfare fields, e.g. the Italian Red Cross.

(b) Responsibility for determining the relief needs of individual cases will remain with local welfare agencies. If the responsible public welfare

officials are gone, an acting public welfare officer will be appointed. If no qualified public officials are available a person from a local private welfare agency will be designated. These new appointments will be made by the Podesta or acting Podesta but only after securing the approval of the CAO. All such appointments will be regarded as temporary until approved by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer after clearance with the Welfare Section of the Division of Public Health in AMGOT Headquarters through regular administrative channels.

(c) Certain groups of chronically ill, physically handicapped, and aged adults are normally cared for in institutions operated by either public authority or private welfare groups. As in the case with the general relief agencies, existing arrangements will be continued or other satisfactory arrangements substituted. . . .

#### 4. *Form of Relief:*

(a) Unless existing local agency practice runs to the contrary, relief will normally be issued in the form of weekly cash payments. However, it is possible that existing relief agencies are operating certain parts of their programs on a commodity or a relief order basis as in the case of mass feeding of refugees and supplying milk to small children and nursing mothers. It may even be necessary to establish new feeding centers to meet temporarily acute situations encountered in first phases of the operation. In this event, requests for emergency food supplies supported by recommendations of P.H.D. will be sent to tactical commanders who have authority to issue army rations provided this can be done without detriment to the military effort.

#### 6. *Local Agency Relief Standards:*

(a) Relief, whether issued in the form of cash or in kind, will be in amounts necessary to make up the difference between a minimum budget standard necessary to provide the essentials of life and the total available resources of the individual or family group. \* \* \*

(c) At the outset C.A.O.'s will accept the standard which responsible local relief and welfare agencies consider to be adequate and will continue existing programs on that basis. In instances where the local budget standards appear too high or too low it should be submitted to the P.H.D. of AMGOT through regular channels for review and recommendations. . . .

(d) Relief budget standards will give first priority to tinned milk for children up to six years of age, nursing mothers, and pregnant women, and a second priority for children from six

years to twelve years of age inclusive. It may even be necessary to limit general milk ration entirely to this group. Other essential budget items are medical care, food, soap, fuel for cooking, shelter, clothing, household necessities and, in the cities, utility services: water, light, gas, etc. \* \* \*

#### 7. *Medical Care for Relief Groups:*

(a) Medical care for all classes of the population is a responsibility of the Health Officer of the commune, who may have a number of assistants. . . .

(b) Medical care for the more needy elements of the commune is generally less adequate than for people able to pay for private care and it will be the continuing responsibility of local relief agencies to insure that their cases are not neglected. Relief workers are in a position to discover cases of disease and to refer them to medical services for treatment and care. If medical stores are required they will be included in relief budgets unless supplied by hospital or clinic dispensaries. A relief program which disregards the rehabilitative aspects of medical care simply builds up a permanent load of unemployable individuals. For this reason follow up medical care for the needy sick must have equal priority with food and other essentials in a relief budget.

#### 8. *Co-operation with sources of Employment:*

(a) Unemployment, a common cause for the issuance of relief, must be reduced to a minimum by the closest possible co-operation between relief agencies, employment agencies, and individual employers. The Army will hire labor either directly or through established labor exchanges and unemployed relief recipients must therefore be required to register at places where people are being hired. Relief will be withheld from those refusing to work for other than reasons satisfactory to AMGOT welfare authorities, such as health, lack of clothing, etc. In some instances it may prove advisable to place men directly from the welfare agencies, but established employment procedure will be followed wherever possible. \* \* \*

#### FREEMASONRY AMONG MEDICAL MEN

[Cheyne, Dir, PHD, AMGOT-Sicily, Preliminary Rpt, Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/408]

\* \* \* As was anticipated, the "Freemasonry" which exists between all medical men the world over of whatever race or colour came well out and it is gratifying immediately to report everywhere the closest co-operation with enemy medical personnel both civil and military. This happy

state has continued and has been extended by the higher placed Sicilian medical officers to the senior medical officers of AMGOT. Then the Provincial Health Officers of Siracusa, Catania, Palermo and others have been interviewed and a commencement has been made in meeting ordinary civilian practitioners in the various towns. This fosters good relationship which in turn will be reflected in a higher standard of medical work so influencing the health of both the civil and military population. It is hoped that efforts to expedite the completion of formalities connected with the release on parole to their civil duties of Sicilian military medical officers may be successful, and this will materially affect the medical personnel situation. \* \* \*

#### HOW IMPOSE AMERICAN STANDARDS OF SPEED ON ITALIAN RELIEF AUTHORITIES?

[Memo, Capt Archibald S. Alexander for Col Poletti, 13 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/411]

2. *e.* It was reported that virtually no bread or pasta, the staple articles of Sicilian diet, had been obtainable for several weeks, even on the black market. In consequence, those who had not hoarded had had only fruit and vegetables, at best, for many days. \* \* \*

There were lines outside some bakeries, even though it was Sunday. No bread was available, and members of the crowds to whom I spoke seemed in many cases desperately hungry. \* \* \*

3. *a.* Early on 2 August, I held a conference at the Municipio with the heads and assistants of the relief organizations and the heads of the city and province bureaus concerned (except for certain of them who had fled before our occupation and in whose places subordinates came). \* \* \*

*b.* . . . I told them that though we expected to exercise supervisory and control powers, with special reference to preventing discrimination for political or racial reasons, and though for the moment we were prepared to lend money to the city for use in starting the relief machinery, the primary responsibility for administration would remain with Italian officials. I then requested their verbal opinions as to the immediate relief needs. \* \* \*

*d.* I told them that Colonel Poletti had decided that *immediate* relief, to cover present emergency, was to be given on a uniform basis, regardless of status, i.e., old-age, repatriate, unemployed, pensions, family of member of Italian armed forces, bombardment victim, etc., and *only* in case of immediate want and lack of resources. Former special payments, e.g. "Military Assist-

ance," to families of members of the Italian armed forces were to be discontinued, and *no* payments made unless actual need was established.

*e.* . . . I suggested that for the emergency period all persons needing assistance be directed to and handled at the Teatro Massimo, where the combined staffs and files of all organizations would be concentrated. This suggestion was agreed to as an emergency measure, and the C.A.P.O. for AMG Palermo was at once requested to instruct all Carabinieri and police that thereafter the needy be directed to apply at Teatro Massimo beginning at 0830 on 4 August 1943, which was about 44 hours later. I felt that this was the earliest time at which it would be possible for the new emergency organization to function with any efficiency. The Italian officials threw up their hands at the idea of such speed. I told them we would help when possible but would hold them to the schedule fixed. \* \* \*

#### AMG RESTORES PUBLIC HEALTH FACILITIES IN SICILY

[Cheyne, Dir, PHD, AMGOT Hq, Rpt 11 Oct 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. Y-10]

##### 2. *Health of the People*

The Division exists primarily to maintain and improve the health of the people in order that this may never be a menace to the health of the Armies passing through the country or actually engaged in active warfare in the vicinity of such people. With the movement onward of the victorious armies this function may appear to be decreasing in importance, but it is by no means ended.

The health of the people has been good beyond expectation. As mentioned in previous reports, typhoid fever alone has caused concern. \* \* \*

##### 3. *Communicable Diseases*

An effort has been made to re-establish reporting of communicable diseases as previously done under Italian health regulations. The disruption of communications between individual physicians and communal health officers, as well as the break in communications between communes and provincial capitals at the time of the invasion, led to a complete breakdown of the reporting system. \* \* \*

##### 4. *Hospital Organization*

. . . As soon . . . as towns were occupied, immediate steps were taken to assist, by improvisation in the first place, such hospitals as had

suffered severe damage, and in the second place to undertake as quickly as possible the structural repairs necessary.

It is the policy of AMGOT to provide the funds necessary for re-building and though of necessity, it is a matter which requires time and patience, a definite advance in re-building has been noted. \* \* \*

#### *Medical Stores*

Medical stores are obtained from two sources—(1) Captured Italian materials, (2) Drugs and dressings imported from the United States. Essential medical supplies are first distributed to hospitals and later to selected pharmacies. A central medical store has been set up at Caltanissetta, a town approximately in the centre of the Island, from which all the provinces draw their requirements. These stores are not as yet a free issue and a system of accounting is being prepared, by which each province draws its medical stores upon repayment.

Each province has received initially a 20-ton brick containing such essentials as wool, gauze, iodine, bandages, anaesthetics, suture material, sera and vaccines, sulphanilamides, dentured alcohol, insulin and antiseptics. \* \* \*

Once the initial demands have been met, a smooth flow of imported American supplies from the Central Medical Stores is coming into operation to supply the current needs of the provinces. \* \* \*

#### CO-ORDINATION OF SICILIAN WELFARE AND HEALTH AGENCIES

[App. VII, Cheyne Rpt, 11 Oct 43]

##### *1. Administration of Relief*

The results of surveys and field trips into the provinces indicated a need of the co-ordination of the services of the various agencies in existence. This co-ordination was recommended to the Provincial S.C.A.O.'s through the Welfare Officers and as a result there are departments of public welfare either functioning or about to function in Palermo, Trapani, Catania, Enna and Messina. The other four provinces are without the service of welfare officers, but recommendations are being made to the S.C.A.O.'s from this Headquarters Section and plans are now underway to integrate the various welfare functions into Provincial Departments. Wherever existent, these departments are under the direction of a civilian director who is responsible for the administration of the entire relief program. The

actual granting of family relief is done on a communal basis through the agency of the Enti-Comunale di Assistenza. In order to have uniformity in all provinces, this Section has initiated a system of regular monthly reporting of relief granted for each commune, as well as a system of case recording. \* \* \*

[Hq AMG, Rpt, for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

\* \* \* An important step forward in the administration of public health in Sicily was the issuance of Order No. 9 which established the autonomous Provincial Departments of Public Health, with power to control and co-ordinate all organizations and materials concerned with the administration of public health within their particular provinces. This was well received by the Medical Provinciali and the medical profession as a whole since it centralized and consolidated into one organization what had previously been a conglomeration of different agencies, often working at cross purposes or in duplication. Another very important aspect was the fact that the purchase and distribution of all medical supplies was also controlled through the new organization. \* \* \*

#### PROBLEM OF RELIEF STANDARDS

[Sicily Rgn I, Admin Instrs 6, 1 Nov 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. IV, ]-1]

*1. a.* One of the first actions of provincial departments of Social Welfare will be to issue general policies for the guidance of local communes in the granting of public assistance. There is much too wide a variation in local agency understanding as to which cases are eligible for public relief and the amount of payment allowable. For example, discontinuance of military allowances to families of soldiers (the sussidio militare) and of payments made in lieu of money formerly sent by relatives living in America or other foreign countries, has resulted in serious hardship for many people. It has also created considerable misunderstanding as to whether payments formerly made to these, and other special groups, are to be paid by communal assistance agencies.

*b.* The AMG policy is that all relief must be granted solely on a need or "means test" basis, regardless of former pension status. Under AMG policy the maximum daily assistance grants (for use in calculating 15 day payments) are L. 25 for the head of the family and L. 5 for other dependent members of the household. This scale is obviously excessive for the average

relief case in rural communes although there may be exceptional cases in which aid should be granted at this level for specific periods of time. The following points should be considered in establishing standards of public assistance in any commune or group of communes:

(1) Relief grants must not exceed prevailing wages in the locality unless these wages have fallen below a minimum subsistence level.

(2) Relief granted in any individual case should take into account the past or probable future income of the applicant. In instances where persons of good potential earning capacity can be expected to again become self-supporting within a predictable period of time, relief should be granted at a level sufficiently adequate to maintain health and family morale. This does not mean, however, that the stated maximum relief allowance for Region 1 (L. 25 per day for the family head and L. 5 for each additional dependent) is to be granted as a right to all persons who, in the past, have enjoyed large incomes. Such income may have been greater than they can expect in the future. In these cases the necessity of adjusting to a more simple standard of living must be pointed out and relief payments made accordingly. . . .

(3) In no case will relief be granted to persons refusing to accept employment at work for which they are fitted to perform and such persons, if already receiving relief, will be removed from the rolls. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENTS AND ACC SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS

[ACC Excc Memo 58, 13 May 44, ACC files, 10000/109/5]

1. Regional Commissioners (RC's) in Allied Military Government territory will cause all Prefects to establish in their provinces a Social Welfare Department to ensure:

a. the provision of assistance to those in need;

b. the care of dependent, neglected or delinquent children;

c. the institutional care of the aged, crippled or infirm;

d. guidance as to and control of other welfare activities for which provinces are or may become responsible.

2. The Establishment of Welfare Departments in areas under SCAO's Five and Eight Armies is optional.

4. Regional Commissioners in Allied Military Government territory will detail an officer of their Headquarters staff hereinafter referred to as the Regional Welfare Officer (RWO) to be responsible to them for supervising the work of these departments.

5. Regional Commissioners of Italian Government territory will similarly detail an officer to be responsible to them for assisting, guiding and advising Italian officials as to their Welfare responsibilities and functions.

6. The primary functions of RWO's is to ensure the granting of adequate assistance to those whose means of support would otherwise be insufficient to enable them to acquire the necessities of life for themselves and their dependents whether that insufficiency is due to the low standard of wages, personal incapacity, infirmity, age or the number of dependents.

a. In Allied Military Government territory RWO's will ensure that suitable instructions as to the provision of assistance are issued and be responsible for seeing that these instructions are effectively carried out.

b. In Italian Government territory RWO's will watch the working of welfare organizations and use their best endeavours to procure the provision of adequate assistance.

8. The agencies in Italy responsible for granting assistance in money or kind are set out in Appendix "B." RWO's will make themselves acquainted with the scope of these organizations and see that the full and best use is made of their resources and will endeavour to develop and extend their usefulness in their proper spheres.

9. The principal body responsible is the Ente Comunale di Assistenza. This should be developed into an effective and general relief agency which should deal adequately and promptly with every application for relief or advice informing the applicant of the decision made.

11. Schemes for the medical treatment of the necessitous poor will be developed.

12. Effective supervision of institutes and of the machinery of relief requires constant visits and inspections which is the function primarily of Italian officials but RWO's cannot form an opinion of the effectiveness of such inspections unless they themselves are fully acquainted with the machinery and powers and themselves undertake inspections.

13. Schemes for the care of juvenile delinquents and their removal in suitable cases from an unsuitable environment should be developed in conjunction with Regional Legal Officers.

**WHAT AMG MEDICAL AND WELFARE OFFICERS DO WHEN A TOWN IS OCCUPIED.**

[Lt Col T. Parr, Sr PHO, AMG Fifth Army (Fld), Rpt, 30 May 44, ACC files, 10700/163/26]

1. . . . when information has been received from Headquarters Corps that a town or commune has been taken the Corps S.C.A.O. arranges for a C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. to visit it as soon as it is practicable. His duty is to ascertain, in a quick survey, the state of the town, whether any local government, or remnants of it, exists, the number and living conditions of the people and the situation regarding sick, injured or wounded civilians, food conditions, medical supplies, etc. If the town is still under fire he arranges to evacuate its people, if any, through normal channels, but, if firing has ceased, he sends for food and medical supplies. As soon as possible the rest of the 'team' i.e.—the Corps Medical Officer, Red Cross Representative, Corps Evacuation Officer, Police Officer and Finance Officer [arrives]. . . .

Soup kitchens, first aid posts or ambulatories, and refugee and food distribution centres are established as soon as possible and available water or food supplies are investigated.

It has been found by experience, especially in recent operations, that, within 12 to 24 hours, the population of such a commune, if it is not too badly damaged, doubles or trebles itself and this has to be allowed for. The sick and wounded may vary from 1 or 2 to 50 on the average but these numbers gradually increase as the scattered population returns. \* \* \*

The Medical Officer having made his survey . . . sends in his report as to prevailing diseases, sanitary and welfare problems and medical facilities. If necessary he treats sick and wounded civilians and where required arranges for their evacuation. The distribution of medical supplies is his responsibility and he establishes first aid posts or ambulatories. All available practitioners or nurses are mobilized to assist in this. The Red Cross representative helps in all these activities and later each commune is visited by the Welfare Officer in turn to assist and advise or settle administrative problems. Local committees are then selected to work under the Sindaco, or the Commissario appointed by the C.A.O. if he is absent, to carry on the good work. It should be emphasized here that any two of the team such as the C.A.O. and M.O. or C.A.P.O. and R.C. representatives are able to organize these activities leaving the more specialized work of each member to be performed later as they arrive. \* \* \*

Naturally when a town has been subjected to the ravages of war it is usually found that water supplies, housing and cooking facilities are non-existent or severely curtailed. Communal food kitchens have then to be set up. This is done under the supervision of the C.A.O. concerned with the help of the Red Cross representative and Sindaco or a leading citizen appointed as Commissario in his absence. These officials choose some central and convenient place and then form a local civilian committee to assist. The main issues from these soup kitchens are dehydrated soup, for which special recipes in English and Italian have been printed, and biscuits. Later, food as per ration list referred to is issued to each person. Tickets are given to each person and also covers his, or her, dependents. The tickets are presented at the counter and the daily ration is supplied as the people file past. \* \* \*

The T.C.U. representative at this Headquarters makes a survey of water sources as soon as possible. He has already received the Medical Officer's report as to contamination. He prepares a plan, lists what repairs and spare parts are necessary to get the water in by the quickest means. In the meantime, water has to be supplied by water carts or other improvisation, and wells have to be cleaned. Where no local supply is available water is obtained from Army sources. As this is chlorinated it is not too popular with the Italian who has queer ideas in regard to it.

It has been found from experience that it usually takes three or four weeks to effect temporary repairs in order to get a sufficient head of water. As a rule, reservoir, pipes, pump and other facilities are found to be damaged or wrecked, either by the accident of war or by the enemy. \* \* \*

*Hospitalization.* This has always been the greatest problem from the Public Health and Welfare point of view in AMG Fifth Army. It has been comparatively easy to get medical supplies forward with the ready help of the Economics & Supply Division, and to arrange for first aid in local areas but, to get patients evacuated, and to obtain sufficient and suitable hospital accommodations has always been, and is, an extremely difficult task. With the resources at our disposal it is not a problem easy of solution.

There have been a variety of reasons for this. For instance, (1) No provision was made for motor ambulance cars on the original ACC equipment tables, nor was there for other medical transport for that matter. (2) Owing to depredations, lack of spare parts and damage from use, the Italian Red Cross which, before hostilities

commenced, used to cater for civilian needs and provide motor ambulance transport was unable to help. (3) Existing civil hospitals have suffered war damage or have had their equipment looted or stolen. (4) The staffs of these hospitals have either fled to safety, or joined, or have been taken away by, the Germans. (5) No beds or blankets and no instruments, or very few have been available from ACC sources. \* \* \*

#### IMPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES

[Parkinson, Dir, PH Subcom, AC, Rpt, for Jul-Dec 44, to Advisory Council for Italy, 19 Jan 45, ACC files, 1000/136/228]

\* \* \* 1. From the beginning of Allied Military Government activities in Italy, up to 1 January 1945, there have been imported into Italy approximately 3,500 long tons of medical supplies, having an approximate value of 6,000,000 dollars. Practically all of these medical supplies were of United States origin, the bulk of them having been shipped to this theater direct from the United States. A small portion was shipped from U.S. Medical Supply Depots within this theater. A negligible amount was of British origin being principally supplies which were furnished direct from British Medical Depots to AMG installations in emergency.

2. It must be remembered that the amount of medical supplies furnished to Italy by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is only that amount

of supplies that will save life and prevent the spread of disease to Allied troops. For Italy this represents five-thirteenths of the estimated requirements as computed on the status of medical practices in Italy and the numbers of hospital beds. The kinds of supplies allowed, and the quantity are limited by this policy, and it is not possible to fill all requests made by the Italian civilian population. Penicillin is one example of an excellent drug which is not available to Italian civilians because of its short supply to the Allied troops. Medical supplies are therefore furnished on an emergency basis, and first priority is given to the AMG Army areas; second to the hospitals, clinics and ambulatories; third to doctors; and lastly to pharmacies for general sale to the public. . . .

b. Italy was divided into Regions for administrative purposes and in each of these Regions there was a Regional Public Health Officer who was responsible for the distribution of medical supplies within his Region. \* \* \*

#### WELFARE AIMS MUST BE LIMITED TO ESSENTIALS

[Welfare Branch, PHS/C, AC, Rpt, for Dec 44, ACC files, 10700/163/26]

\* \* \* It is apparent that there is no time for theorizing or permanent social planning until the needy Italian people are better clothed and fed. Every effort of the Welfare Branch is being bent in this direction. \* \* \*

## Soldiers Battle With Economics

Although some of the emergencies of civilian life were overcome, the Italian economy was a serious problem throughout the occupation. In the first of the two stages which marked Allied efforts to cope with what can only be called the near-breakdown of the Italian economy, civil affairs authority faced, in addition to the problems inherent in the initial war devastation, the difficulties arising from the limitations of early military policy. The U.S. Army had accepted these limitations—and persuaded the British to accept them also—in the planning period when, expecting to turn over civil affairs relatively soon to civilian agencies, they had felt justified in confining themselves to relief and very simple rehabilitation. Accordingly the Army restricted its supply program to food, medical and sanitary items, and other classes of supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest from interfering with military operations. Seriously needed supplies in other categories, it was presumed, would be obtained by civilian agencies, though as matters developed, it was difficult or impossible for such agencies to secure from supply and shipping authorities allocations over and above those certified as militarily necessary. Thus, illogical as it may seem, it was easier for AFHQ to get thousands of tons of wheat than for it to obtain agricultural or industrial machinery occupying less cargo space and designed to reduce the need for imports by increasing local production.

Rehabilitation in the sense of reconstruction was to be reserved for civilian agencies; certainly, however, the military authorities were expected to rehabilitate the economy of the occupied country to the extent necessary to prevent civilian upheaval from interfering with military operations. What was not foreseen was the degree to which, in Italy, war damage alone would bring the Italian economy to the brink of disaster. Even a minimum rehabilitation program presented a problem of staggering proportions. Allied bombings and the far more destructive German demolitions had reduced the Italian economy to a shambles. Industrial plants had been destroyed or damaged; transport and communications systems had been disrupted; agricultural machinery and farm animals had largely been seized by the retreating armies. Moreover, in their efforts to make the country as useless as possible as a base of operations the Germans had laid their knives at the jugular vein of the Italian economy: the hydroelectric system on which, since Italy is lacking in coal, 90 percent of the industrial system depended. Earlier efforts at recovery had to be made amidst active military operations, which compelled the Allied forces to hang on to such supplies, transportation, and machinery as were available, as well as the relatively few large industrial buildings that remained intact. The physical devastation, bad as it was, was not as bad as the evils that came in its

wake. Invasion, only the last in a train of misfortunes, led to a general shortage of basic commodities, serious inflation, and a shakiness in the financial position both of private banking and of the government.

The situation in Italy was far worse than the drafters of military government economic doctrine could have foreseen when they enjoined CAO's "to revive economic life" and so "to develop the area as a source of supply for future operations." The question was not whether Italy could aid the Allies in the future but whether, within the limits of the supply program, the Allies could aid Italy sufficiently to make it usable for present military operations. In theory a re-examination of the entire concept of military necessity could have been demanded at this point to determine whether this concept could not validly be broadened instead of being defined in terms of fixed supply categories. But initially the Army was still trustful that the civilian agencies could, as planned, soon take over and meanwhile step into any serious breach. In the earlier stage, and until experience showed that this inveterate assumption was not valid, military authorities concentrated upon economic rehabilitation within the limits of existent policy, while at the same time attempting to provide such rehabilitation materials as were needed by the few plants capable of producing for the war effort.

Economic and financial experts in uniform were on hand who, while convinced at the outset that the measures available were chiefly palliatives, still hoped that palliatives might be sufficient for the time being. In some spheres, especially those where the expedient of Allied military lire could be employed, initial Allied measures did some temporary good. As a first step the banks were reopened a few weeks after the invasion of the mainland and unlimited withdrawals were permitted. Within a short time deposits were exceeding with-

drawals and a complete financial breakdown was prevented. However, it was necessary at first for the Allied authorities to give aid to the government, not only in printing military lire but in lending them as well. The general policy was that the currency needs of the government should be met through the banks. In November 1943, however, an emergency arose whereby the Italian government had to pay off a maturing issue of government bonds. It was essential that this obligation be met if the credit of the government was to be maintained. With permission from CCAC, funds up to 300,000,000 lire were made available to the Treasury and the Bank of Italy. Thereafter, emergency arrangements were made for the Bank of Italy to assume responsibility for financing governmental needs, and direct advances by the Allied Military Financial Agency (AMFA) to provincial and local agencies were no longer needed. But distrust in the currency could not be suppressed and to the Allied Commission (AC), at least, there seemed justification in the government's plea that it needed financial assistance to offset the huge national deficit created by Allied expenditures in military lire for which Italy would have to pay the piper in the end. Later, in 1944 and again in 1947, the government was granted dollar equivalents for Allied lire expenditures in Italy. The extension of substantially less aid earlier in the occupation would have been more useful. But Allied public opinion was then indicated by the financial officer who wryly commented that Italians demanding financial help should be advised of the taxes in England.

The basic economic problem was control of inflation. The roots of the evil went back to the Fascist regime, which had spent lavishly to finance Mussolini's military exploits. The already weakened system of price and rationing controls collapsed with the invasion and, though the Allies con-

tinued all of them, the system could never be rebuilt. Nor did the reduction of controls to a few basic foods work much better. The inflationary spiral continued, wage increases were allowed and then disallowed, and farmers preferred to hoard wheat rather than sell at official prices. As the problem mounted, the FEA toward the end of 1943 dispatched a special mission headed by Adlai Stevenson to investigate. This group laid the principal blame on the expenditure of A.M. lire by Allied troops and also criticized by implication the rate of exchange of 100 lire to the dollar on the ground that it undervalued the lira. The FEA experts were skeptical of current theater hopes of successfully applying selective price controls and subsidies. Soon ACC itself became skeptical—just when the CCS, concerned over the mounting theater calls for wheat imports despite shipping stringencies, cabled AFHQ suggesting an attempt to defeat the black market by still more drastic measures. The Supply Subcommittee of the CCS added a second group of visiting experts to the theater at the same time that ACC was just setting up still a third group—an Anti-Inflation Committee consisting of representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries as well as of some financial specialists already in the theater.

All three committees made useful suggestions although perhaps their chief usefulness lay in convincing higher authorities (in Washington and London) that not too much more could be done than was already being done. Some authorities in the theater, such as, for example, the vice-president of an ACC Section who believed that the worst ills could be overcome if the government were required to pay larger sums to Italians on relief, also seemed in need of an education in economics. But by and large, theater officials, professional soldiers as well as former civilians, were learning something of economics through

hard experience. They were not surprised, therefore, when the Allied Anti-Inflation Committee reported that just as inflation had no single cause so there was no simple remedy. Both this committee and the Combined Supply Group, however, emphasized the need for a limited program of imports, not only to relieve severe shortages but also to help restore production, especially agricultural, and to counter inflationary tendencies. The difficulty with this suggestion lay not only in the continuing shipping shortage but even more—since the type of imports recommended would not take too much cargo space—in the severe limitations on the Army supply program in respect to rehabilitation supplies. The latter difficulty would be overcome if, now that the 6-month period of military responsibility for civilian supply had ended, responsibility could be taken over as planned by civilian agencies which would have greater latitude in importing rehabilitation supplies. In February and March the Assistant Secretary of War negotiated on this question with both FEA and the State Department, and though these negotiations failed, the Secretary of War returned to the issue again in June in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State. The civilian agencies wished the War Department to continue its supply responsibility because they were now hopeful that before too long UNRRA could assume the burden—a hope the materialization of which was delayed again and again due to unforeseen difficulties.

Under the circumstances AFHQ and ACC could only continue to put their chief efforts into measures other than basic rehabilitation. As the visiting experts had advised, but as the theater would probably have done of its own accord, ACC intensified its attempts to increase Italian production. The measures included preparations for an all-out amassment program for the new crops, and the aid of the

Italian Prime Minister and even of the Vatican itself was enlisted for the attendant propaganda effort. In addition, as the Combined Supply Group had advised, ACC waged a campaign to reduce the number of ration cards by ferreting out the large number of illegal cardholders. Still further, it tried to get a greater proportion of local resources for civilian needs by reducing unnecessary military pre-emption. It did so chiefly by bringing the issue to the attention of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED) and gaining his support in a reorganization of the military Local Resources Board designed to give ACC greater representation. SACMED also gave signal aid by announcing, avowedly to reduce inflation and effect dehoarding of grain, an increase of the bread ration in Southern Italy to 300 grams. Finally, now being supported in this move by the visiting economists and supply experts, ACC requisitioned agricultural rehabilitation supplies, such as fertilizers, and at the same time requisitioned clothing and raw materials to stimulate local production.

Most of the supply requests had to be rejected by Washington because of shipping and supply stringency. Despite advice from the CCS that he would have to meet the increase in the bread ration entirely from local production, SACMED let the increase go into effect as the psychological effect of its announcement had already proved beneficial. The requisition for wearing apparel elicited in July an inquiry as to the basis on which it was justified; AFHQ tried to make out the best possible case on the ground of minimum civilian needs; the CCAC then asked directly whether the requisition could be justified by military necessity; and AFHQ in its reply of 13 September, felt that it could not in good conscience answer in the affirmative. This, as AFHQ probably fore-

saw and as it was advised on 27 October, doomed the requisition within the framework of the military supply program.

On 15 September, two days after being asked whether civilian clothing was a military necessity, General Wilson addressed to the CCS a rather extraordinary communication, which is reproduced at the end of this chapter and which brings the first phase of rehabilitation efforts to its climax if not its conclusion. His motives may have included irritation over the wearing-apparel correspondence, a sense of injustice at Washington's criticism of the theater's efforts, a belief that reasoning could still produce some immediate good, and a judgment that even if it did not, the present unsatisfactory situation should be set forth in the record. Whatever the underlying motives which prompted it, the letter is marked by a tone which at least shows the exasperation of the sender. This did not preclude humor, as General Wilson referred to the case in which a requisition of paper for keeping Italy's tax records had evoked the inquiry as to whether it could be justified by military necessity. Instead of attacking the narrow interpretation of military necessity (which the British had never liked from the beginning) General Wilson took the still more radical course of suggesting that a broader criterion than military necessity now seemed to be called for if the Allies, in concentrating upon the current military aims, were not to be defeated in their ultimate objective of a reasonably prosperous and contented postwar Italy. He asked whether the directives on civilian supply and economic assistance could not be reconsidered, and he requested that, if it was now Allied policy to assist Italy beyond the point required by military necessity, he be informed of the extent and type of industrial rehabilitation desired, the extent to which, if at all, he might take

inflation into account, and the degree to which he could take measures for encouraging exports.

As he must have known even before the CCS so informed him, General Wilson had raised a question calling for political decision. Already the President and the Prime Minister had been driven by various forces and considerations to ponder this

question, and in less than two weeks after SACMED's letter they announced jointly a new policy toward Italy. Its economic and supply implications conformed to SACMED's suggestions, and the subsequent history of Allied assistance to Italy revolves about the efforts to implement the new dispensation. (See Chapter XVII.)

## I. ONLY LIMITED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS PLANNED

### TWO GOALS—REVIVAL AND USE OF LOCAL ECONOMY

[*U.S. Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs*, Dec 43]

k. *Economics.* The basic economic policy of United States military government is two fold: first, to revive economic life and stimulate production in order to reduce to a minimum the needs of the area for United States and allied assistance and to develop the area as a source of supply for further operations, and second, to use available goods and services as efficiently as possible for the satisfaction of military and civilian needs. \* \* \*

### RESTRICT LOANS OF MILITARY LIRE TO A MINIMUM

[AMGOT GAI 15 (see n. 35, p. 184), AGO files, AMGOT Plan, pp. 179-80]

3. . . . loans will be restricted to the minimum necessary for achieving their purpose. They will be made only in cases where they will assist in the restoration of order and rehabilitation of essential activities and are desirable from the point of view of the military effort and where local banks are not in a position to provide such financial assistance. AMFA is not intended to function as a competing agency to existing commercial banks. AMGOT officers should use every opportunity to discourage any impression (which will be only too likely to arise) that AMFA is to be regarded as an unlimited source of funds for all and sundry. \* \* \*

### AVOID USE OF SHIPPING SPACE FOR FOOD IMPORTS [AMGOT GAI No. 1, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, p. 81]

7. . . . Shipping space to import food must be avoided; food must at all costs, be secured locally

if possible. It is most important that agriculture and fishing (subject to Naval approval) should be resumed and that everything should be done to assist the farming population to carry on with their work. \* \* \*

### REHABILITATION ALLOWABLE ONLY FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

[Ltr, McCloy to Hopkins, 30 Sep 43, CAD files, 334, OFEC (5-29-43) (1)]

\* \* \* I have no doubt we can do the job with a little adjustment, but I do think that so far as Army responsibility for relief is concerned it should be confined to subsistence levels. We may have to undertake rehabilitation for our own purposes as we are already doing in Sicily, but so far we have tied it down to that and I think rightly. We have already distributed some seeds in Sicily but we balked at a very large farm tractor program for Italy generally that Governor Lehman wanted us to get started on.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>1</sup>The rehabilitation supplies allowed under the disease-and-unrest formula were difficult to define. Whereas relief supplies consisted of commodities needed directly to prevent distress, rehabilitation supplies were regarded, in general, as commodities which would not, like flour and medical supplies, provide relief directly and immediately. It was considered, however, that rehabilitation supplies could be brought within the disease-and-unrest formula where they would directly and rather promptly result in the production of supplies needed for relief. Of such a character would be the seed referred to by McCloy. Perhaps farm tractors under certain conditions could also have been regarded as essential in preventing disease and unrest. But the difficulty here was not only that procurement for the Army Supply program had not been directed toward acquisition of agricultural machinery but also that such machinery was needed for farm production in the United States. In fact, when OFRRO suggested a tractor-program General Clay pointed out that it would deflect American productive facilities from essential military equipment. (ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-80)

## ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS EXPECTED TO PAY FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES

[FEA Survey Gp, Brief Report on Economic Activities of ACC, 5 Feb 44, CAD files, 334, FEA, (10-26-43) (1)]

\* \* \* Goods for civilian consumption have never been provided to Italians on a charity or relief basis. It has been assumed even from the beginning that the Italians would pay. At the outset . . . AMG was directed to sell goods imported for civilian consumption at the highest prevailing legal price. This they did, collecting lire from civilian wholesalers. \* \* \*

## AFTER SIX MONTHS CIVILIANS ARE ASKED TO TAKE OVER RELIEF BUT DECLINE

[Min of Mtg in McCloy's Office With Asst Secy of State Acheson, and Others, 23 Mar 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-194]

\* \* \* Mr. McCloy asked Mr. Acheson when the FEA and UNRRA would have money to relieve the Army of its relief responsibility. Mr. Acheson outlined the UNRRA problems and stated that in his judgment the Army should look to the greater part of 1944 with Italy as a supply responsibility. General Richards stated that this was very hard to justify. In reply Mr. Acheson stated his justification for the Army's continuing was that Italy had become a responsibility of the U.S. Government by virtue of our military operations and that for this reason the U.S. Government could not divest itself of the responsibility. He stated that the FEA and the Army were the only available agencies of this Government and that the FEA was in no better position than the Army since the FEA has always maintained that it is merely an adjunct of the military and an agent of the Army for certain procurement functions. Therefore, he added, if the Army did not feel it could use its funds, FEA could not do so. . . . In conclusion, he stated that he was arguing to get the Army to broaden its views on the relief problem so that it would retain relief responsibility in all areas until UNRRA or some other international relief agency could take over the job. \* \* \*

Mr. McCloy stated that the Army was in good

shape as long as it stuck to the wake of battle theory and that it was impolitic for the Army to be engaged in the relief business as such. He added that there is a point when Congress will very well ask what the Army is doing in Sicily. \* \* \*

## ARMY AGREES TO WAIT UNTIL UNRRA AND FEA TAKE OVER

[Memo, Clay, Dir of Materiel, ASF, 5 Apr 44, on Conf With Civilian Agencies in the Office of McCloy, ID files, Basic Policy: Italy]

1. At a conference held in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, on 4 April 1944, attended by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget, Foreign Economic Administration, State Department, and War Department, the following agreement was reached with respect to the submission of estimates to Congress for appropriations for civilian relief in occupied and liberated areas.

a. The War Department will present the estimates for the basic essentials for Western Europe for a period of six months, justifying these estimates on the basis of military necessity in connection with planned operations. This will involve increasing present budget estimates by adding thereto the funds which were to be requested by FEA for clothing, agricultural seeds and fertilizer, farm machinery, and sundries.

b. The War Department will continue its present provision of supplies for southern Italy and Sardinia until UNRRA is prepared to take over with October 1944 set as the objective date. It is presumed that military necessity will justify this continuance of operation. However, no additional funds will be requested for this purpose.

c. The War Department will continue its present provision of supplies for Sicily. However, the Foreign Economic Administration will develop ways and means to assume the responsibility for this area at the earliest feasible date, if possible, by 1 July.<sup>2</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>2</sup> The target date, however, was later to be pushed forward again.

## 2. ALLIES FIND A SERIOUS DEGREE OF INFLATION

### AMGOT MAY SUCCEED WHERE MUSSOLINI FAILED

[Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May 43–Nov 43, Spoford Rpt, ex. Y-11, p. 63]

1. . . . Ever since 1930 Italian budgets had consistently shown heavy deficits, resulting from Italy's self-sufficiency campaign, the Abyssinian and Spanish adventures, and the administrative burden of the corporative state. Italy's additional war expenditures were 60 billion lire in 1940–41, and 80 billion lire in 1941–42. To meet these increasing expenditures the Italian government had resorted, during the war, to direct currency issue and inflationary borrowing methods. Thus the inadequate taxation program of the Italian government, declining revenues from existing taxes, the greatly increased currency circulation, the shortage of consumer goods and the surplus purchasing power consequent upon these factors, produced a heavy upward pressure upon prices which the government made numerous unsuccessful attempts to relieve. The deterioration of the wartime financial situation was obvious to the Italian people and the inflationary trend was thereby aggravated.

2. With this background in mind, the Finance Division of AMGOT Headquarters in Palermo created, as soon as the required personnel was available, the Finance Intelligence Office for the purpose of collating information on the inflationary picture and suggesting measures for dealing with it. \* \* \*

### IN AUGUST BLACK MARKET PRICES ARE 1,000 PERCENT OF OFFICIAL PRICES

[Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May–Nov 43]

6. At mid-August the available price data permitted the construction of an index only for Palermo. An index of twelve foodstuffs showed that black market prices were 1000% of Italian official prices and 489% (unweighted) of AMGOT prices using 1940 as a base. \* \* \*

### BY OCTOBER CERTAIN BASIC FOODS AVAILABLE ONLY ON BLACK MARKET

[AMGOT Hq, Study of Cost of Living Among Palermo Relief Families, 11 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1040]

The main diet of the poorer people in Palermo has regularly been bread, pasta, olive oil, beans and such green vegetables as are in season. Directly prior to the occupation, bread, pasta, olive

oil, and horse beans were all available in the rationed amounts on the regulated market at the specified government prices. Fresh vegetables were not rationed and were obtainable.

Since the occupation, pasta, olive oil and horse beans are not obtainable on the regulated market and can be secured only in the Black Market. A comparison of the difference in the prices is as follows:

<i>Pasta</i> . Regulated Price . . . . .	4.20 lire a kilo (Unobtainable except in Black Market.)
Black Market Price . . . . .	50.00 lire a kilo
Percent of difference of Black Market price over Regulated . . . . .	1090 p.c.
<i>Olive Oil</i> . Regulated Price . . . . .	22.00 lire a litre (Unobtainable except in Black Market.)
Black Market Price . . . . .	120.00 lire a litre
Percent of difference of Black Market price over Regulated . . . . .	445%
<i>Horse Beans</i> . Regulated Price . . . . .	7.00 lire a kilo
Black Market Price . . . . .	20.00 lire a kilo
Percent of difference of Black Market price over Regulated . . . . .	186%

*Bread* is obtainable now on the regulated market regularly in the full daily ration amounts only if the family representative is always fortunate enough to be approximately in the front ⅓ of the bread line, which is not very likely. The people in the rear of the line get none, because there is insufficient quantities of bread in the stores. Our investigation showed that the families interviewed generally obtain bread only three days a week instead of seven. Therefore, they can thus secure only ⅓ of the rations allowance of 150 grammes per day. To obtain the remainder they must resort to the black market at what are to them prohibitive prices. The black market price of bread is eight times the regulated price.

Many women with numerous children, being widows or wives with husbands absent from home find it difficult to stand long periods in the bread lines, since they have nowhere to leave their children. Yet if they do not stand in line, they do not get any bread at a price they can afford.

Green vegetables are not rationed and are freely obtainable in season, but the price has increased since the occupation by about 2000%. Because there is little variety on the market at any single season the people cannot eat vegetables to the exclusion of all other foods. \* \* \*

Prior to the occupation, the relief granted was barely sufficient to live on. Now with the greatly increased cost of living and the unobtainability of most kinds of staple food within their economic reach, the condition of people in Palermo on relief appears to be somewhat less satisfactory than before the occupation. \* \* \*

#### INADEQUATE WAGES AND HIGH PRICES CAUSE CIVIL DISORDERS

[Msg, AFHQ to CCAC, 20 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 19050]

A series of processions and strikes in Palermo against alleged insufficiency of wages and high price of foods caused disorderly demonstration outside Municipio and Prefettura on 19 October. Italian troops fired on demonstrators and killed 14 persons. There were no Allied casualties. British troops are being confined to barracks and leave of U.S. personnel has been cancelled. \* \* \*

#### A PROGRAM IS DRAWN UP FOR CONTROL OF INFLATION

[Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May-Nov 43]

7. Upon instructions from the Economic and Financial Council on 13 September, the Intelligence Officer of the Financial Division prepared a comprehensive plan for inflation control. . . . The chief recommendations in this report were:

- (a) Tax revenue should be increased and the existing system reviewed.
- (b) Savings channels should be restored.
- (c) Pressure for wage increases should be resisted.
- (d) Appeals continued to troops to use discretion in local spending.
- (e) Energetic enforcement of all price and rationing orders.
- (f) Systematic supervision of distribution channels, notably wheat and olive oil.
- (g) Importation of certain basic commodities.
- (h) Construction of a price index to measure cost of living. \* \* \*

#### AMGOT WILL BE JUDGED BY ITS ATTACK ON INFLATION

[Ltr, Lt. Comdr Frank A. Southard, Jr., Financial Advisor, AMGOT Hq, Program for Inflationary Control in AMG Territory, 22 Sep 43, in Finance Div, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, May-Nov 43, p. 68]

2. As much as by any other criterion, the AMG will be judged by the resoluteness, capacity, and

energy with which it attacks the inflation situation in Sicily. \* \* \*

#### SUCCESS OF MILITARY OPERATION IS AT STAKE

[Finance Subcom, AMGOT Hq, Rpt, The Problem of Public Finances, Prices, and Inflation Control in Italy, 13 Oct 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. Y-11, p. 69]

\* \* \* The usefulness of Italy as a base for continued military operations would be gravely prejudiced should the financial situation materially deteriorate. \* \* \*

#### AMGOT-SICILY USES EXISTING PRICE CONTROLS

[Civ Sup and Resources Div, AMGOT Hq, 15th AGP, Rpt on Operations in Sicily, for Jul-Oct 43]

15 (a) By *Proclamation No. 8* prices of foodstuffs and goods officially in force before D Day were to remain at the pre-occupation rates, except for commodities subject to seasonal or regional variation for which SCAO's were to fix fair prices based on those normally current. Many factors made this difficult to enforce, however: the natural tendency of the Italian to "sting" a foreigner, especially the supposedly wealthy Anglo-Saxon race; the knowledge that the lira had been devalued, leading to attempts to increase prices by an equivalent amount; the flourishing black market; the tendency of the soldier to pay any price asked and often not to bother about the change; the shortage of stocks and consequent desire to realize on those that there were, etc. There was no organized attempt to control prices of other goods at first, with the natural result that where these goods existed, prices rose alarmingly and daily. Vigorous measures were taken with the co-operation of the military authorities in Syracuse, where prices were soon under control and several shopkeepers in prison; but in Palermo the evil was never tackled, and was still rampant at the end of October. General Orders 4 and 5 were published in September; it was, however, much harder to arrest rising prices than it would have been to prevent them from rising at all.

(b) *General Order No. 4* fixed prices for goods and services generally at the pre-occupation level, and required all items displayed for sale to be plainly marked with its price; lists of these prices were to be sent to CAO's. This order, with the co-operation of the purchasers, could have been enforced as regards the markings of prices; it was not so easy, however, to decide whether those prices were in fact the pre-occupation prices. CAO's had no time to check them, and often

in fact no data against which they could be checked; while in Palermo, if every offender against the order were prosecuted, every trader and hawker in the city would have been in the courts. With General Order No. 4 a list was issued to SCAO's giving overall maximum prices within which they were to set prices in their provinces.

(c) *General Order No. 5* called for a declaration of stocks over a specified minimum of grain, oil, sugar, vehicles, tyres, fuel, building materials, etc., and trafficking in the commodities specified in the order was forbidden. Declarations had to be made to CAO's by 15 October, so that it was not possible to consider the results at Headquarters by the end of the month; it was pointed out by all SCAO's, however, that they had neither the staff nor the time to examine these declarations in any detail. \* \* \*

#### AMGOT-SICILY ALSO USES EXISTING RATIONING CONTROLS—JUST AS UNSUCCESSFULLY

[App. D to Memo, 30 Sep 43, considered at 13th Mtg, Exec Council, AMGOT Hq, 1 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/143/447]

3. After inquiry, consultation, discussion and considerable reflection, one is forced to the conclusion that AMGOT is not likely to be more successful in effecting control than was the former administration. . . .

5. It is submitted that a control of the whole range of agricultural products is doomed to failure and that it may be possible to control reasonably effectively a limited number of products. . . .

6. The only practical method of ensuring an

equitable distribution of commodities in short supply is by rationing. It is, however, suggested that the list of rationed agricultural products and derivatives be strictly limited to absolutely essential articles of consumption. The list for the present should be confined to bread, flour, pasta, olive oil, and sugar. The maximum ration for each commodity for each province, depending on the supply position, should be advised confidentially to each S.C.A.O. who should be permitted to fix a ration within those limits which he feels could be honoured. The ration would be subject to periodical revision according to the supply position.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE REMEDY IS KNOWN BUT CANNOT BE APPLIED

[Civ Sup and Resources Div, AMGOT, 15th AGP, Rpt, Jul-Oct 43]

15. d. A memorandum on inflation prepared by the Financial Division declared that the way to combat the Black Market was to introduce adequate food and consumer goods into normal trade channels; it was unfortunate that, for reasons given earlier in this report, this measure could not be taken, though there was full agreement with the theory.

<sup>3</sup>This plan was carried out in Sicily by Administrative Instruction No. 9, issued in connection with the new ration cards, which was to go into effect on 1 November 1943. Through these cards, rationing was continued for bread, pasta, olive oil and sugar, but for no other items for human consumption. Similarly the ammasso laws were continued for wheat, olive oil, and olive oil residues. All other commodities produced in Sicily could henceforth be sold to the public free of any obligation to deliver to ammassi, i.e., government-controlled warehouses. ACC files, 10000/100/951.

### 3. MATTERS ARE HELPED NEITHER BY ALLOWING NOR DISALLOWING WAGE INCREASES

#### WAGE INCREASES PROVE UNAVOIDABLE

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

(96) On 20 November 1943 General Order No. 14 granting a temporary wage adjustment was published, granting salary increases to governmental employees in accordance with a stipulation schedule and permitting private employers to make increases in accordance with the same schedule.

(97) During the month considerable labor unrest was evident, traceable to two causes: (a) Lack of adequate supply of food at reasonable prices; (b) Wages insufficient to maintain a minimum standard of living. . . .

(98) An example of the kind of situation that arose is that of the Società Generale Elettrica della Sicilia. On 8 November, 650 employees of the Società Generale Elettrica della Sicilia in Palermo left work to search for flour substitutes,

leaving 50 essential workers at the plant. At the conference that day, the workers insisted their action was not a "strike" but a human and necessary attempt to obtain food for their families. At the same time increased wages were demanded. The workers returned to work when it was explained that efforts were being made to make food available and that a wage increase was under immediate consideration. . . .

(99) The issuance of General Order No. 14 undoubtedly reduced the demand for higher wages; however, the wage increases did not compensate for the actual increases in the cost of living. The scarcity of food, the increasing black market, and the rising cost of living continued to contribute to labor unrest at the end of the period under review.<sup>4</sup> \* \* \*

#### THE INCREASE IN WAGES IS PARALLELED BY RISE IN LIVING COSTS

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43]

(75) In December increases in wages and salaries for public employees were authorized in Regions I and II, and authority was given for the adjustment of wages between private employers and employees. The order was naturally well received by private employees, but . . . the effect it had in helping them has been nullified by the rapid increase in prices. Prices have risen sharply, particularly in Region II in the provinces bordering on Apulia and Campania. This was caused in part by foraging parties entering the Region, with or without permits, to buy foodstuffs. Lack of personnel made effective control of these actions practically impossible, especially with respect to those operating under the cloak of military authority, against whom civilian police could not be expected to take any action. Some illustrations of the extent to which prices have risen in Region II, largely as a result of such foraging parties, may be cited. On the coastal road south of Taranto fowl which previously sold at 25 to 35 lire now bring 150 to 200, while turkeys previously sold at 150 to 200 lire now sell for 800 to 1200. Eggs which were in ample supply at 3 to 4 lire early in October, are now practically unobtainable at 14 to 15 lire. Preliminary reports on a black mar-

<sup>4</sup>The increase had been offered by the Finance Sub-commission even though there was fear it would further the inflationary spiral. Once granted in Sicily, the same type of increase had to be given shortly afterward on the mainland.

ket grain case indicate that several tons of wheat were sold originally for 1600 lire per quintal and resold for 2300. \* \* \*

#### AMG OFFICERS TOLD TO RESIST FURTHER DEMANDS FOR WAGE INCREASES

[Memo, Col Spofford, Actg CofS, Hq, AMG, for AMG Officers in Hq AMG and Rgn I, 8 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/141/4]

1. Control of inflation in areas under A.M.G. (or A.C.C.) is one of the major requirements of A.M.G. Under this policy substantial additional wage increases cannot be granted, for such increases would be powerful inflationary forces. Officers are requested and instructed, therefore, to be extremely careful when wage questions are being considered to do or say nothing contrary or prejudicial to the A.M.G.'s efforts to control inflation.

2. Officers should understand that substantial additional wage increases leading to inflation are more harmful in the long run to the people than are the results of the present wage scale. The quantities of goods available in the area under A.M.G. control is limited to the amount on hand, plus the amount which can be produced in the area, plus the amount which can be imported. Because of war conditions payment of higher wages, with the consequent higher prices, will not alleviate the supply situation by increasing significantly the amounts of goods produced or imported. However, by furnishing added impetus to the inflationary tendencies the higher wages and higher prices will do positive harm. Inflation disrupts the civilian economy and creates civil unrest, thus reducing the amount of goods produced and available for consumption. The lot of the civilian is made worse and progress of the Allied armies is hindered because more men and more resources must be diverted to uses behind the combat lines. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNMENT PASSES FOR WAGE INCREASE AND IS TOLD AN INCREASED RATION IS BETTER

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for AFHQ, 3 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/427]

5. I had a meeting yesterday evening with Badoglio and the Ministers for Finance, Agriculture and Interior. They pressed me very hard indeed on the subject of raising salaries and wages

in Italy, particularly those of civil servants and Government officials. They painted a most gloomy picture and stated very definitely that they would be unable to prevent serious disorders if something were not done rapidly to alleviate the situation. . . .

6. I informed them that as they already knew, I was doing all I could to secure an increase in the bread ration and that this was an obviously better way of dealing with the situation rather than an increase in wages which could under existing conditions be nothing but a vicious palliative. They agreed unreservedly, but stressed the importance of being able to announce any increase in the ration at the earliest possible moment. Failing this it would be absolutely necessary to do something about wages. \* \* \*

#### PEGGING OF WAGES SEEN AS PRIMARY CONTROL OF INFLATION

[Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy),<sup>5</sup> Rpt, 19 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/429]

5. The inflationary pressures are being held in check with the greatest difficulty. The primary control is the pegging of wages, which in turn depends on the purchasing power of current wages, in terms of a minimum subsistence ration. \* \* \*

<sup>5</sup>The Allied Anti-Inflation Committee, which was appointed by the Chief Commissioner of ACC in early 1944, included representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries as well as financial experts in the theater. This lengthy study points out various causes of inflation and makes varied recommendations; excerpts from the report are included here in different contexts.

#### 4. AMG/ACC NOW TRIES SELECTIVE PRICE CONTROL

##### PRICE CONTROL POLICIES WILL BE UNIFORM BUT PRICES WILL VARY LOCALLY

[Ltr, MGS, AFHQ, to CCS, 10 Jan 44, ABC files, 014, Horrified, Govt, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 19)]

1. With a view to agreeing on a price policy to be followed in Italy, the Military Government Section of this Headquarters called a conference 5-6 January at which were represented other interested Sections of this Headquarters and the field organizations primarily concerned, namely, the Central Economic Committee, the Allied Control Commission and Allied Military Government Headquarters, the Allied Military Government 15 Army Group, and the Allied Commission for Sardinia. . . .

2. The price policy embodied in these documents may be summarized as follows:

a. *As to prices of local goods*, the inflationary trend should continue to be resisted, and to this end the prices of certain important commodities should be held at low subsidized levels for the time being. The determining of individual prices or of general price ceilings, and the nature of the rationing system, are special problems lying within this general policy and are matters to be dealt with in the field.

b. *As to prices of imported goods*, the general policy is that all imports will be charged as book entry to the Italian Government at landed cost, either in the appropriate foreign currencies or in lire as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may direct. The prices at which the imports will then be sold should in general be not less than landed

cost; but sales at a loss may be permitted if a price based on landed cost is so high as materially to disturb the general price structure. The resulting subsidy in these latter cases will be for the account of the Italian Government. Even though legal retail prices are not fixed, Allied authorities will watch and if necessary control the retail price of imported goods, consulting with Italian authorities where appropriate.

c. *As to prices of exported goods*, Italian producers will be paid in lire at prices judged to cover actual production costs plus a fair margin of profit except where a lower price prevails in the open market. The goods thus purchased for export will be sold abroad at prices prevailing in the market of sale, except in the case of French Africa and Corsica where prices will be related to f.o.b. prices of comparable articles in world markets. . . .<sup>6</sup>

[Min of Remarks of Col Bernstein, Financial Adviser, Hq ACC, at Conf on Price Policy, AFHQ, 5-6 Jan 44, MTO CAO-701]

3. . . . (1) On behalf of Headquarters ACC/AMG, Colonel Bernstein gave a general review of the rise in prices which had been going on and is tending to go on in all regions of Italy and dealt with the price control system adopted to arrest such upward movements, namely the fixing of legal prices for basic goods and the

<sup>6</sup>Subsidizing exported goods was seen as anti-inflationary in encouraging Italian production. The policies adopted were approved by the CCS and were formally promulgated by AFHQ on 12 May.

issuance of a general list of price maxima as a guide to local enforcement. The view was expressed that rise in prices was inevitable, but that it should be slowed down, particularly during the next three to six months. In his view it would continue to be necessary to subsidise certain basic commodities and to control prices for them, as letting all prices move up to the level of landed cost would only upset the present structure and would lead to further increases in wages. \* \* \*

#### FEA MISSION THINKS THE PROSPECT FOR PRICE CONTROL NOT BRIGHT

[FEA Survey Mission, Rpt on the Econ Activities of ACC, 5 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/143/453, app. A, Rpt for Mar 44]

#### 4. Price Control

... At a meeting of AMG officials in Algiers on 5 and 6 January, it was agreed that price increases in Italy are in general to be resisted and that the AMG will continue to have the responsibility for establishing legal prices for basic goods. However, the control and fixing of maximum prices was delegated to operations in the field, and it was agreed that each case was to be dealt with locally on its merits within the framework of the general policy.

The fixing of satisfactory and enforceable maximum prices is, as our own experience in this country indicates, an extremely difficult task calling for the services of experts in all lines of business. Even to fix and adjust maxima for basic commodities only will require the continuous efforts of a specialized staff. AMG does not appear to have any such staff at the present time. Furthermore, the fixing of maximum prices in relation to cost in a period of tremendous scarcity and rapid inflationary rises is next to impossible. Certain vital prices in Italy, such as the prices of wheat and coal, are heavily subsidized by the government and cannot be increased from artificial levels without serious disturbance to the whole cost of living. All in all, the prospect for price control is not bright. \* \* \*

#### WHEN LOCALLY DETERMINED PRICE CONTROLS FAIL ACC CREATES A CENTRAL PRICE CONTROL GROUP

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/154/328, p. 89]

#### II Situation at the beginning of March 1944

Control over prices and wages had almost completely broken down. Control of wages was

mostly confined to government, public utilities and banks. Control of prices was largely confined to the part of the wheat and olive oil crop which was amassed, and to imported foodstuffs. Public utility rates, railroad rates and fares also remained under control, and the law freezing rents was still being observed wherever tenants continued to occupy the same premises that they had occupied before the Allied invasion.

Furthermore, such control as existed was largely local in character, and without central co-ordination. In the four provinces of Apulia that had remained under the King's administration, price regulations in effect were largely those existing under fascism, with minor modifications but without effective enforcement. In Sicily, price restrictions had been removed on all but a few key commodities. In Naples, enquiry revealed the existence of an extensive list of price ceilings which AMG had imposed in October 1943, upon entry into Naples, but which no attempt was being made to enforce.

#### III Establishment of the Price Group

The Price Group was created on 8 March 1944, to reconcile and combine the viewpoints of the various subcommissions on price policy. \* \* \*

#### PERSISTENT DIVERGENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE PRICE GROUP

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44]

\* \* \* In the deliberations of the Price Group, there have usually been two principal points of view. First, the Subcommittee which makes the recommendation, usually either Agriculture or Industry and Commerce, is concerned with setting a price that will encourage production, and somewhat reduce the temptation to sell through illegal channels. This may mean, and often does mean, not merely a price that will enable producers to make both ends meet, but often one that will be sufficiently attractive to producers to evoke a spirit of semi-voluntary co-operation with the authorities. . . .

The opposing point of view was usually held by the Finance and Labor Subcommissions. Finance was influenced by its policy of holding the line against inflation into resolving every doubt in favor of a lower price rather than a higher one. Labor was concerned with the fact that while the Price Group was continually recommending increases in official prices, the Labor Subcommittee itself was under rigid orders to hold the

line against an increase of wages, and was doing so with considerable degree of success, at least in those occupations in which some control of wages is possible.

The final recommendations of the Price Group have, on the whole, represented the first of these two points of view rather more than the second. The reasons for this were:

(1) that there was usually some doubt, often considerable doubt, as to whether any price limit would actually be enforced, and

(2) that a feeling of conviction, however strong, that cost statement was inflated, did not suffice to indicate precisely what the correct figures would be, and

(3) an almost complete lack of relevant information. \* \* \*

#### CCS CALLS FOR MORE CONTROLS TO ARREST INFLATION

[Msg, TAM-162, CCS to AFHQ, 9 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/427]

A serious view is taken here of the critical nature of inflationary developments in Italy. It is recognized that political and military conditions make it difficult at this time to introduce and administer measures to counter effectively the inflationary pressures. \* \* \*

In view of increased import programme, is it possible to arrange with Italian Government to impose and enforce stricter measures against black markets?

Programme of control of Italian Government finances and curtailment of budgetary deficits should be pursued with utmost vigor by ACC and the Italian Government should be made fully aware of its responsibility for taking all possible corrective measures.

Also request ACC to continue vigorously its present efforts, both as to maximizing production and facilitating transportation and distribution in connection with local crops.

#### ACC NOW BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE FEWER CONTROLS

[Memo, Econ Sec, ACC, for All Concerned, 10 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/154/347]

2. The present position regarding price controls is chaotic. A large proportion of the existing legal price limits are disregarded by everyone. The civilian population is coming more and more to take it for granted that laws regarding prices

exist only to be broken. This situation tends to bring all laws, and the authorities who make or sanction the laws, into disrepute.

3. This headquarters believes that price controls should be retained *only* in connection with those commodities for which:

(a) price control is urgently necessary for reasons of economic policy, *and*

(b) enforcement of price control is practicable.

All price controls which do not satisfy these conditions should be abolished, and all restrictions on trade in commodities not subject to price control should be abolished. . . .

4. It is the view of this headquarters that price controls can be enforced only if accompanied by effective control over supplies and channels of distribution. Hence this headquarters desires to proceed immediately with a review of the existing price controls, to determine which ones should be retained, and to have established and enforced a uniform and workable system of price controls for all of Italy free of the enemy. \* \* \*

#### ANTI-INFLATION COMMITTEE SAYS PRICE CONTROLS ARE ONLY PALLIATIVES

[Conclusions of Rpt of Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), 19 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/429, p. 29]

4. Stricter price control, control of distribution and of the allocation of consumer goods, raw materials and equipment, are extremely important, but in the present state of supply will be palliatives and insufficient to avoid inflation.

5. Although the financial measures are important, most of them cannot be effective in the immediate future.

6. To prevent rapid deterioration of the Italian situation, some increase in the import of consumer goods, raw materials and equipment is essential.

#### BUT WITHOUT CONTROLS THINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN WORSE

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44]

\* \* \* Only that measure of interference with normal economic incentives which limited personnel of ACC has been able to accomplish has prevented more serious inflation, starvation and serious disorder. Only the controls supervised by ACC have prevented a much larger portion of available food from going to the black market at a higher price. This in turn would have increased labor unrest and demands for

wage increases, resulting in a real inflationary spiral of prices and wages. \* \* \*

#### WITH CONTINUED SHORTAGES OF GOODS THE INFLATIONARY SPIRAL CONTINUES

[Memo, Hq ACC, Status of Anti-Inflation Recommendations . . . , 24 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/427]

The degree of inflation has of course increased. The exact increase in the price index and in currency circulation will be found in the Monthly Reports of the Finance Subcommittee for July, August and September. The Government deficit has increased as more territory has come under

the jurisdiction of the Government. Allied expenditure has also increased. There is still an extreme shortage of practically all goods. . . .

[Rpt, Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), 19 Jun 44, ACC files]

3. Prices in liberated Italy have increased considerably more than have means of payment. . . . A cost of living index computed by ACC for Region 3 (which includes Naples Province) and covering clothing, rent, fuel and miscellaneous, as well as food, shows a rise of 320 percent since June 1943, and 133 percent since September. \* \* \*

## 5. IMPROVEMENT IS SOUGHT THROUGH SUPERVISION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FISCAL POLICIES

#### THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S FINANCES ARE FOUND IN POOR SHAPE

[Interim Rpt, Italian Govt Finances—Last Quarter of 1943]

2. Information on Italian State finance is difficult to obtain because of the scarcity of able Italian finance personnel; lack of Italian governmental files, communications and transportation facilities; dislocation and other difficulties caused by the war; and the absence of the Government from Rome.

3. The Italian Government has been operating at a deficit since the fiscal year 1930-31. In the last quarter of 1943, the Government has had only four provinces of Puglia (Bari, Brindisi, Lecce, and Taranto) to draw on for its revenues. Normal State expenditures in these four provinces usually greatly exceeded revenues. From 12 September 1943, on top of the normal expenditures were imposed the expenditures of the Central Government.

6. The deficit of the Government in the last quarter of 1943 was financed by advances from the Banca d'Italia (around three-fourths of the total), and AMFA (around one-fourth of the total). The bulk of the funds advanced by the Banca d'Italia came from bankers' deposits funneled into the Banca d'Italia by shutting off other outlets for bank funds. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNMENT LACKS FACILITIES FOR PRINTING ITS CURRENCY

[Msg, CCAC to Eisenhower, 5 Nov 43, OPD files, 311.23, CAD, sec. VI]

. . . Due to prospect of gradual termination of AMG and in conformity with terms of the Sur-

render of Italy, under which the Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations may require, it is considered highly desirable that provision of supplies of AM Lira notes should be suspended and superseded as soon as practicable by supplies of Italian currency. Pending possession of adequate printing facilities and supplies of Banknote paper in the area, arrangements should be made here or elsewhere on behalf of the Italian Government for the production of such lira currency. \* \* \*

It is requested that you now enter into further negotiations with the Italian Authorities relative to supplying of Italian currency as indicated above, and that you keep us advised of developments. Production demands on the Treasury Department make it difficult to increase its present delivery schedules of Allied Military Lira currency. . . .

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Interim Rpt, Italian Government Finances—Last Quarter of 1943, Summary, Spofford Rpt, ex. 4-R]

8. The Italian Government has no facilities for producing its own currency. Although the armistice terms provide that the government shall make available such currency as the Allied Forces require, actually it has been necessary for us to supply the Government with currency. Arrangements are now being made to use the facilities of American bank-note companies under the supervision of the United States Treasury for the manufacture of Italian lire, and to import plates, ink, paper, and other necessary supplies into Italy so that the currency eventually can be manufactured in liberated Italy.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>Not until 1946 was the Italian Government in a position to provide the lire currency.

**ALLIES URGED TO HELP THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE ITS PUBLIC DEBT**

[Msg, AFHQ to CCAC, 24 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14687]

Italian government meeting service charges on debt in Sardinia and four provinces of Puglia, and issuing postal savings funds in Sardinia. It appears evident service charges must generally be met in non-German occupied Italian territory in order to pave way for improvement in public credit essential to handling fiscal problems, including mopping up of excess funds in hands of public. Consequently it is urged that change be made in monetary directive so as to permit resumption by Italians of service on Italian debt and permitting AMFA to advance AM lire for this purpose. . . .<sup>8</sup>

**DIRECT ADVANCES MAY BE MADE BUT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE HELD TO A MINIMUM**

[Msg, CCAC to AFHQ, 17 Nov 43, OPD files, 311.23, CAD, sec. VI]

. . . AMFA is authorized to make advances to Italian Government, including the Italian armed forces, whenever such action is deemed desirable in view of military necessity and duly related circumstances.

In TAM 66 [TAM-MAT, the cable series between CCAC and AFHQ] we advanced the general principle that Italian needs should be handled through regular banking channels in so far as possible and AM Lire supplied to the banks when the banking system is short of currency. This principle should not be followed if you determine that you can more effectively enforce controls which should be exercised over Italian expenditures by advancing funds directly to the Italian authorities rather than by having the Italian authorities obtain their funds from the banks.

It is necessary, in the interest of checking inflation, to keep expenditures by the Italian Government to a minimum. Control by the Control Commission and its agencies over budget, pay of troops, etc., will therefore be necessary. The method of such control can best be judged by those on the spot. You should, irrespective of shortage of currency, maintain sufficient control

<sup>8</sup> Paragraph 17 of the Monetary and Fiscal Guides of the CCS directive (Chapter VII, Section 6) had prohibited the use of revenues for payment of principal or interest on national government obligations.

or scrutiny of Italian expenditures to satisfy yourself that anticipated expenditures are proper and reasonable in amount. You should make arrangements so that a statement of anticipated Italian expenditures and receipts be furnished to you at stated intervals. \* \* \*

**SCIENTIFIC EXPENDITURE CONTROL IS FOUND IMPOSSIBLE**

[Interim Rpt, Italian Govt Finances—Last Quarter of 1943]

5. The existing Italian budgetary procedures make impossible any scientific expenditure control. A more efficient system of procedures is being prepared. No attempt was made to control expenditures of the Badoglio Government until December, and even then, there was not enough data available, and due to poor communications, not enough could be collected in time to permit any substantial control over the December budget. \* \* \*

**SOME IMPROVEMENT IS OBSERVABLE**

[Finance Div, Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43, Spofford Rpt]

(94) During the month there was a partial resumption of the servicing and amortizing of the Italian state debt, which was received very favorably by the public. The amount of Italian 4% Treasury Bonds, 1934-43 issued in Sicily and Region II was small, and the repayments to date have involved an even smaller cash turn over than was anticipated. The resumption of full dealings in one-year Treasury Bonds on 15 December . . . has resulted in new subscriptions . . . which already exceed the repayment of three months' arrears in maturities and the sales of unmatured bonds. \* \* \*

**BANCA D'ITALIA TAKES OVER ADVANCE OF CURRENCY AFTER JANUARY 1944**

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44]

4. As soon as the branches of the Banca d'Italia were again part of a functioning central banking system, arrangements were made for the Banca d'Italia to assume responsibility for financing all Governmental expenditure.<sup>9</sup> This system eliminated the need for ACC to advance currency

<sup>9</sup> The Banca d'Italia had its main office in Rome, and consequently, when it became separated from liberated Italy the banks were cut off from their source of currency reserve and their means of co-ordination. ACC's first task was to re-establish a central banking system by setting up a head office of the Banca d'Italia in Naples.

for Italian Governmental uses. The Allied Financial Agency [AFA] had earlier advanced money to help meet communal, provincial and state deficits. Through the institution of a system of financing whereby the public deposited money in the banks, the banks redeposited the money at the Banca d'Italia, and the Banca d'Italia made the money available to the government, the necessity for further AFA advances was eliminated. From 30 January 1944, no AFA advances were made to the National Government. This system was extended to the AMG regions and from 1 May 1944 all advances of AFA funds on any level in the AMG regions were stopped. Only in the AMG Fifth and Eighth Army Areas may such advances still be made. Even here, these are greatly minimized by using the Banca d'Italia to move currency forward as soon as possible. Not only were all currency advances by AFA for Italian governmental purposes stopped, but the Banca d'Italia was able to make an initial repayment of AFA of over one-third of the previous advances made, or a total of 2,100 million lire. \* \* \*

**THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS FINANCIAL AID BUT CAN GET LITTLE MORE THAN ADVICE**

[Interim Rpt, Italian Govt Finances—Last Quarter of 1943]

3. If any substantial volume of resources were provided to the Italian Government by the United Nations most of the problems of the Badoglio government would be solved for the present. (The provision of AM lire cannot be regarded, of course, as aid in this sense, as AM lire under the Armistice Terms are an obligation of the Italian government not of the United Nations). However, the basis on which we must operate is that the Italian government must in the main meet its difficulties with the resources available to it.

4. The mission of the Finance Subcommittee must therefore be that of aiding the Badoglio government in conducting a rear-guard action. The best that we can do is:

(a) Assist the government in increasing its revenues within the narrow limits possible of the existing taxation system.

(b) Control expenditures by making sure that they are made for approved purposes and that there is a minimum of waste.

(c) Assist the Italian government in rehabilitating its credit as best it can in view of the situation.

(d) Exercise as much of a drag as possible on inflation by holding down the issuance of new currency to the bare minimum.

(e) Use our influence through the Ministry of Finance to discourage increases in costs, prices, and incomes.

**THE GOVERNMENT WANTS A BETTER EXCHANGE RATE BUT FINANCE SUBCOMMISSION DISAGREES**

[Memo, Finance Subcom, ACC, 29 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/429, app. to Rpt, Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), pp. 51-52]

1. The Italian Government's argument as presented in Marshal Badoglio's letter and as presented orally by the Minister of Finance to representatives of the Finance Subcommittee from time to time is briefly as follows:<sup>10</sup>

(a) The present rate of exchange increases substantially incomes of soldiers spent in Italy and constitutes, therefore, the major inflationary factor.

(b) People in Italy are "exchange rate conscious." The sharp downward revision in the exchange value of lire has caused psychological reactions which have aggravated the inflation problem in liberated Italy.

2. The extent to which soldier expenditures constitute an inflationary factor in liberated Italy is exaggerated in the Italian Government's argument. A reduction of these expenditures will *not* change the course of inflation in Italy, although it may slow down the inflationary process. \* \* \*

3. . . . Distrust of the currency is undoubtedly present in Italy; and it may have some effect in stimulating inflationary price movements. But will one exchange rate rather than another change distrust into confidence? Changes in the exchange rate, whatever the character of the change, are an extremely important factor in creating distrust. To change the exchange rate now would increase the distrust of the people in the currency, particularly since the currency would be fixed at a value which is obviously too high to be maintained over a long-run period.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Badoglio's letter of 24 February 1944 to the ACC Chief Commissioner requested a change in the dollar value of the lira (ACC files, 10000/143/453). This request led to a study of the question by the Finance Subcommittee.

<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the Vice President of the Economic Section of ACC, Grady, stated in his report to the Secretary of State, 21 March 1944, that the lira had been given an unduly low valuation which did aggravate Italian inflation. ACC files, 10000/109/1547.

## TAX REFORM IS DESIRABLE BUT CANNOT BE FORCED

[Reform of the Italian Tax System, app. to Financial Recommendations, Rpt of Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), 19 Jun 44]

\* \* \* Action must be taken to correct the following extreme weaknesses of the Italian revenue system:

1. an assessment procedure that is both unduly slow and highly inaccurate;
2. a collection system which invites high costs, collusion and corruption;
3. excessive reliance on per quantum consumption taxes.<sup>12</sup>

[Lt Gen John Clark, Chief Admin Officer, AFHQ, 30 Jul 44, Comment on Rpt of Allied Anti-Inflation Comm., p. 32, CAD files, 319.1, ACC, sec. 2]

\* \* \* While this headquarters concurs in the general recommendations as to taxation and revenue contained in Section III of the body of the report, it expresses no opinion on the recommendations set forth in the Appendix entitled "Reform of the Italian Tax System." It is believed that the implementation of the general recommendations in the body of the report must remain primarily a matter for the Italian authorities. Implicit in the development of the policy of tax rates and exemptions are a number of broad social and political questions which this headquarters does not undertake to appraise.

## THE GOVERNMENT FEARS REACTION TO A LIRA ACCOUNT FOR ALLIED PROCUREMENT

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 12 Oct 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-42)(1), sec. 7]

1. An administrative memo of the Headquarters (No. 95 of 1943) has governed, since December 1943, Allied local procurement of supplies, services and facilities in Italy. This memo was premised on the obligation of the Italian Government under the Armistice terms to make available such resources or services as the U.N. may require [see Chapter IX, Section 5]. The general policy, accordingly, except in combat zones or for minor day to day procurement, was to avoid payment by Allies.

2. There have been numerous exceptions to

<sup>12</sup> The above is an excerpt from the introduction to a highly technical report on reform of the Italian revenue system—a reform which went far beyond the measures suggested in the main body of the Anti-Inflation Committee's section on revenue changes essential to the control of inflation.

this policy of non-payment. Such exceptions have been due to difficulties of the Italian Government in arranging financing for firms which supply services, goods or facilities to Allies and which need cash to maintain operations, and have been due to serious shortcomings of Italian Government procurement services.

3. Administrative memo No. 95 modified on 1 August 1944 by Administrative Memo 31 of 44 was drawn up to meet this situation. This directs ACC to require the Italian Government (a) to improve the procurement services and (b) to set up a lira account to enable the Allied Forces to make cash payments for supplies, services and facilities where it is impracticable to have recourse to Italian procurement agencies. Wherever feasible, the general policy of non-payment is preserved.

4. The lira account, which would operate comparably to the franc account in North Africa, would have the following advantages.

a. The expenditure of funds drawn by Allied Forces from AFA, which are charged to Armed Forces appropriations in Washington and London, would be reduced since payment would be out of funds provided by the Italian Government.

b. Payments to local enterprises would be facilitated because of reductions on Allied side to pay and the long delays on the part of the Italian Government in arranging direct reimbursement.

c. The Italian Government would be encouraged to improve procurement services to Allied Forces (the franc account in North Africa operated in this way).

5. There have emerged out of protracted discussions between ACC and this Headquarters the following political objections to the establishment of a lira account at this time.

a. The quantity and value of Allied procurement, supplies, services and facilities in Italy would be revealed to the Italian Government.

b. It would focus attention on the obligations generally of the Italian Government under the Armistice by rendering visible the present invisible deficit that is currently accruing to the Italian Government.

6. Prime Minister Bonomi and Minister of the Treasury were presented informally with the terms of administrative memo No. 31 on 9 October 1944. The political effect of the proposed lira account would be "disastrous" according to the statement of the Prime Minister. Adverse public reaction is feared by Bonomi to any step by the Government to assume direct and

open responsibility for Allied payments in Italy since this would imply that our Government had abandoned efforts to obtain a modification of the financial clause of the Armistice. Bonomi also fears the effect of additional deficit financing on public confidence. Such additional deficit currently would be over one and one half billion lire per month.

7. From the standpoint of financial policy and from a technical viewpoint, this Headquarters considers the establishment of a lira account desirable. Pending advice from you whether political objections override the advantages, action however is being delayed.<sup>13</sup>

THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL FOR A STABILIZATION LOAN  
[Memo, Hq AC, Actg Chief Cmsr to G-5 AFHQ, 5 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

1. On 9 Jan 45 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Government presented to the Allied Commission in Rome a long memorandum dealing with the economic and financial difficulties faced by Italy and with the financial measures the Italian Government believes necessary to mitigate these difficulties.

2. Briefly summarized, the Italian memorandum argues as follows:

a. The financial situation of Italy is extremely difficult since both the national deficit (estimated at 300 billion lire) and the need for reconstruction expenditures are rapidly increasing.

b. The memorandum lists certain remedial steps which can be taken. . . . It is argued that little can be done along any of these lines if the Italian economy is in imminent danger of economic and financial collapse. The first condition, therefore, is that the Allies furnish financial relief designed to:

(1) Increase the confidence of the Italian people in the lira, and

(2) Make possible the purchase of essential supplies abroad.

c. This financial relief should take the form of setting up credits in dollars or sterling corresponding to (1) the total amount of AM lira issued by the Allies, and (2) the total payments by the Italian Government on behalf of the Allies, whether chargeable to the "costs of occupation" or the costs of carrying the war against the enemy from Italian soil.

<sup>13</sup>This issue for various reasons dragged on for months until, finally, G-5 dropped it.

d. In leading up to this proposal the memorandum is at great pains to make a distinction (which is not carried over into the proposals) between the costs of occupation and the costs of carrying the war against the enemy from Italian soil. The memorandum also dwells on the contradiction between the Treaty of Armistice and the state of co-belligerency, quoting the announcement that the conditions of armistice would be modified in Italy's favor to the extent of Italy's contribution to the common war effort.

5. The tone of the memorandum reveals a sense of self-righteousness and a lack of realism. . . . The memorandum places stress on the destruction wrought on Italian soil by the use of the country as a battlefield; but the use of Italy as a battlefield is surely to be traced to her participation in the Axis partnership rather than to a voluntary choice by either Italy or the Allies.

6. The Allied Commission agreeing that Italy needs financial relief, emphatically does not agree that the Allies *owe* it to Italy in any legal sense. It is therefore recommended that the proposals summarized in paragraph 2 c above not be approved by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

7. It is further recommended, however, that further measures of financial relief for Italy be urgently adopted by the United States and/or the United Kingdom Governments, *even if such measures cannot result in any early purchase of shipments of supplies.* \* \* \*

THE FINANCIAL ADVISER THINKS THE LOAN WOULD NOT HELP

[Memo, Southard, Financial Adviser, AFHQ, 16 Feb 45, ABC files, 014, Italy, sec. 4, app. C to CCS 789]

\* \* \* With this recommendation of the Allied Commission I am in strong disagreement, on three grounds: (a) The Italian financial situation is not one in which foreign "stabilization" loans will be of any material benefit. (b) The Italian Government and the Italian people should not be led to expect that their financial and economic problems can be solved by entries in the books of the U.K. and U.S. Governments or central banks. (c) Having in mind the heavy demands that will be made on the U.K. and U.S. Governments by all the liberated countries, dollar and sterling credits should be related to approved programs of rehabilitation and not granted in bulk sums in advance solely for their anticipated psychological effect on the internal financial situation of the borrowing country. \* \* \*

## ITALIANS WHO EXPECT HELP SHOULD KNOW THE TAXES IN ENGLAND!

[Ltr, Lt. Col. N. T. Board, Rgnl Finance Officer, Abruzzi-Marche Rgn, to a Provincial Commissioner (PC) 27 Jan 45, ACC files, 10500/115/113]

. . . Were I a Provincial Commissioner I would have plastered up on every wall in my Province the fullest details regarding the taxes that we have to bear in England. It would be an eye opener to these people and might cause them either to reform or to abandon themselves from the highest precipice. \* \* \*

## 6. THE THEATER TOLD TO REDUCE IMPORT BURDEN BY INCREASING ITALIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY

### THE CCS DECIDES TO HAVE ITALIAN FOOD PROBLEM STUDIED

[Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, SAC, MTO, 25 Feb 44, MTO files, CAO/701, CM-IN 13801]

Supply authorities, both U.S. and U.K., gravely disturbed by increasing size your requirements of food for civil relief, which if fulfilled, are bound to have serious effect on other commitments. It is therefore of greatest importance that U.K. and U.S. Governments should be in possession adequate information as to conditions in Theater, particularly as regards food, so that they can relate your requirements to other needs. In absence of such information it might become necessary to consider cutting down your demands because of their impact on other requirements which may have equal or greater priority since position may soon arise where your and other demands cannot be met in full.

In order to avoid this necessity, or to ensure at least that in any necessary reductions the claims of your theater are fully represented and understood, it is most desirable that study should be made on the spot by persons who have knowledge of overall requirements and can report on conditions which have necessitated increased demands. Such information will also be of greatest value in planning for other areas. \* \* \*

### WASHINGTON URGES MAXIMUM EFFORT TO AVOID FOOD IMPORTS

[Ltr, Hilldring to Gen Holmes, DACofS, G-5 SHAEF, 21 Mar 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 5]

. . . One of the outstanding conclusions to be derived from the Italian experience is that the

The next time you have a protest regarding taxation, I suggest you bring the following points home to them. Our opinion is continuously being sought regarding 1) inflation and 2) whether we intend to maintain the value of the Lira. You do not require me to tell you what effect that non payment of taxes is going to have on the former. Regarding the latter, are we likely to bolster up the value of the Lira when the Italian people themselves are not prepared to play their part? Every province brings forward excuses why it should not pay taxes. \* \* \*

greatest possible effort should be directed towards agricultural rehabilitation, the purpose being to hold the demand for foodstuffs made upon U.S. and U.K. to the absolute minimum. In Italy and Sicily indigenous production has failed to meet expectation by a wide margin, and it has been necessary to import considerable quantities of foodstuffs, with the resulting drain on U.S. and U.K. stockpiles and shipping.

### ABOUT THE SAME TIME BADOGLIO APPEALS TO ACC FOR MORE FOOD IMPORTS

[Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 26 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/384]

I submit to your benevolent study the very grave problem of food supply for the populations of the liberated territories. As you are aware, almost all supplies in the "Ammassi" have been exhausted for some time.

So that the food supply is now based almost exclusively on the ration distributed by the Allies. \* \* \*

This ration reduced to calories, we have from 500 to 540 calories per person, compared to the 3000-3200 necessary for the average person for light work, and 4000-5000 necessary for heavy work.

These figures, in the enormous gap between what is and what should be, are so painfully significant as to require no illustration on my part.

And as this situation is closely connected with agricultural production and social tranquility, I make once again a warm appeal to you so that once again you will bring all your influence and friendship to bear on this problem which is not

only Italian, but has similar importance also for the United Nations.

#### ITALIANS ARE TOLD THEY WILL HAVE TO DEPEND MORE ON THEIR OWN RESOURCES

[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Badoglio, 31 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/384]

\* \* \* I agree that the calorific value of this ration is small but you know better than I to what extent the population can obtain supplementary food such as vegetables and nuts which are very high in calorific property. Vegetable and nuts which are very cheap can more than make up for all the calorific losses due to deficiencies in the other part of the ration.

You plead for importation of more food. I must point out to you, however, that while giving every consideration to this the Allied Nations must take the view that the remedy in part lies in the hands of the Italian people themselves. It is true that almost all the supplies in the Ammassi have been exhausted. It is equally true that the Italian producer has signally failed to take his quota to the Ammassi. There is, I believe, sufficient olive oil in occupied and liberated Italy to feed the whole population on an adequate ration. It has not been produced. It will be difficult to persuade the people of the Allied Nations to help a population which in this respect has failed collectively to help itself.

I must remind you that with the advent of the harvest imported supplies from abroad will decrease as this country will be expected to depend more and more upon its own resources. This is a question of agricultural production and distribution and it is the duty of the Italian Government to do everything possible to ensure maximum production of all foodstuffs, and their availability to the population.

#### THE VISITING EXPERTS ADVISE ACC TO SCRUTINIZE CRITICALLY THE NUMBER OF RATION CARDS

[Msg, Combined Sup Gp, CCAC/S to Econ Sec, ACC, 13 Apr 44, ASF, ID files, Civ Sup in Italian Theater, app. 3-D]

\* \* \* a). The estimates of number of ration cards are prepared by the Italian Provincial Officials and are used as the basis for computing import requirements. These estimates are admitted by the Italians themselves to represent higher figures than the actual number of population requiring rations. Moreover the Italian Government itself has no record of number of farmers who retained official allowances of their own products. The present percentage of 75% of total

population represented by ration cards against which imported flour/wheat is issued in presently occupied Italy is considered by the Group as inflated and should not be used as indication of population to be fed with imported grain during future operations in other areas. Although efforts are being made to obtain more accurate ration card figures Provincial Supply officers of ACC are not yet in a position to give revised figures.

b). The Group believes that this situation results in larger demands for imported food supplies than are actually needed. Reductions in total requirements of the Italian area after 1 August 1944 could undoubtedly be effected if proper machinery were instituted for obtaining more accurate estimates of the number of ration cards actually required.<sup>14</sup> \* \* \*

#### THE VISITING EXPERTS ALSO ADVISE MAXIMUM PRODUCTION AND AMASSMENT OF WHEAT

[Memo, Combined Sup Gp for Econ Sec, ACC, 28 Apr 44, ASF, ID files, Civ Sup in Italian Theater, app. 8-B]

3. In making specific application of . . . basic directives to agricultural work in Italy, it would appear that the maintenance of wheat production at the highest possible level and an equitable distribution of the amassed product are highly desirable if Allied shipping and supplies are to be conserved. This Theater requested last December that 700,000 tons of wheat and flour, in addition to other foods, be imported into Italy for civilian feeding during the first six months of 1944. It is to be hoped that an effective production and amassment program for the crops in Italy will prevent a recurrence of such enormous requests this coming season, when all of the Allied resources may be taxed to the utmost. Notwithstanding long-term considerations in respect to Italian agriculture, it is far better that Italians produce wheat, even at a temporary economic loss, than for Allied lives and ships to be lost in importing it as was the case this season. Wheat is not a new crop being foisted upon Italy, and considerations which have to do with soil exploitation should be submerged during the war emergency, as has been done in the Allied countries that supply the wheat imported into Italy. The debatable issue of what is best for Italian

<sup>14</sup> During the spring of 1944 a campaign, under the supervision of ACC, was waged to take away ration cards from persons not entitled to them because they had producers' allowances or because they had duplicate cards. More than 700,000 improperly held cards were found on the mainland alone. Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44.

agriculture from a long-time policy viewpoint is not a strong factor under present war circumstances of necessarily having to limit all shipments of civilian supplies to the minimum. A prime objective of military government work in agriculture is to see to it that this saving of shipping is accomplished. \* \* \*

#### ACC PLANS AN ALL-OUT AMASSMENT EFFORT INCLUDING AID FROM THE VATICAN

[Memo, Enforcement of Grain Collection in Sicily, issued by Hq ACC, 6 Jul 44, to All Concerned, ACC files, 10000/105/663]

1. The terms of the decree ordering the collection of grain is to be enforced in Sicily with the greatest vigour. We must expect opposition and obstruction from the people and drastic measures will be necessary.

2. The following action by the Italian Government, ACC and other authorities is recommended:

##### *A. By the Italian Government*

(i) A firm statement should be made by the Prime Minister over the air and in the Press, to be repeated at frequent intervals, making it clear:

(a) that the price of L. 1000 per quintal will not be increased by war bonus or any other means;

(b) that the collection of grain will be enforced by every means at the disposal of the Government and that heavy penalties will be imposed on offenders;

(c) that it is the duty of all Sicilians to make themselves self-supporting as an Island by bringing in the grain for proper distribution.

(ii) This statement to be followed by continuous propaganda and to be backed up by personal tours of the Island by the Minister of Agriculture and if possible the Prime Minister himself (not by Under Secretaries), directed towards the collection of grain and not towards political purposes. The High Commissioner and Signor Orlando should carry out similar tours.

(iii) Direction to be given to the High Commissioner and the Italian tribunals that penalties against the decree must be increased to the maximum and offenders brought immediately to trial.

(iv) Instructions to be issued by the Ministers of Interior and Agriculture to Prefects and Agriculture Inspectors insisting on drastic action being taken and a Special Order of the Day to

be issued to the Carabinieri concerning their responsibilities in helping to collect the grain and to arrest speculators.

(v) Arrangements to be made (with MMIA [Military Mission to Italian Army]) to place the maximum number of Armed Forces (including Carabinieri) at the disposal of the High Commissioner to enforce the decree.

(vi) The acceleration of the promulgation of the road haulage decree which enforces the formation of the Provincial Consorzi to utilise private trucks on call at fixed tariffs. \* \* \*

##### *B. By the Vatican*

The intervention with special directions to Cardinal [Luigi] Lavitrano for a special drive through the Churches.

##### *C. By A.C.C. Headquarters*

(i) The appointment of Colonel A. E. Young, Assistant Director of Public Safety Subcommittee, as officer in charge of enforcement of grain collection under the authority of Regional Commissioner, Region I.

(ii) Arrange for the employment in Sicily of 7,000 parole POW about to be made returnable to the Italian Army or for the dispatch of two battalions from elsewhere.

(iii) Arrange for the immediate dispatch of inner tubes for motor tyres for requisitioned cars.

(iv) Consultation with the Ministry of Justice for the rapid trial of offenders against the decree.

(v) Immediate consultation with PWB and PRO [Public Relations Officer] with the object of getting out forceful propaganda appealing to the emotions of the people and dispatching suitable officers for this purpose. \* \* \*

#### MEASURES ALSO PROPOSED AGAINST UNDUE USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES BY MILITARY FORCES

[Memo, Gen Alexander, GOC, AAI, for AFHQ, 21 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/196/427]

5. The essence of the criticisms levelled in the report against the working of the Local Resources Board is that, instead of confining itself to allocating among the Armed Forces that amount of local resources which has been found by the Allied Control Commission to be surplus to minimum civil requirements, the Board has arrogated to itself the function of determining also the civil requirement. To some extent there is ground for this criticism. In the first place I do feel that the

influence of the Allied Control Commission on the Local Resources Board and its Committees has not received due weight. . . .

8. To correct the alleged shortcomings of the Local Resources Board, the report proposes the creation of an "Allied Economic Council." . . . The task of this Council would be to assess minimum civil requirements. The Local Resources Board would remain in being and be responsible for allocating the surplus after the civil requirement has been determined. . . .

10. The Local Resources Board is an established organization. It unquestionably gives satisfaction to the fighting Services. Its procedure is understood. I think that it would be a great pity to weaken it by the establishment of a second and overriding body.<sup>15</sup> \* \* \*

#### THE ALLIES PROPOSE—THE SICILIANS DISPOSE

[Min of Remarks of Col A. N. Hancock, Deputy Rgnl Cmsr, Sicily Rgn, at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

2. Sicily has one major problem at present—the collection of its own grain harvest. One of the two recognized deficiency provinces has collected 60% of its quota. Palermo has collected less than 6%. In spite of vigorous action of prefects, ACC

<sup>15</sup> The criticism by the Allied Anti-Inflation Committee (Italy) of allocation of Italian resources to military needs will be found on pages 27–28 of its report of 19 June 1944, in ACC files, 10000/136/429. In consequence, a number of measures to increase the availability of local resources for civilian production were, in the course of the next six months, actually taken. First, the Allied Forces Local Resources Board (AFLRS) was so reorganized as to increase the representation of ACC as against the military element. Second, there was created an Industrial Co-ordination Committee of AFLRS—a committee which included among its functions the consideration of applications to requisition such industrial plants as were being unnecessarily retained by the military forces.

officers, etc., satisfactory results are not yet being obtained. The new High Commissioner, [Salvatore] Aldisio, did not think it possible to collect more than two thirds of the quota. He believes there is organized resistance in some provinces and that a social security problem is looming ahead. In practice the policy of laying down quotas is not working out.<sup>16</sup> \* \* \*

[Memo, Brig M. Carr, Rgnl Cmsr, Sicily Rgn, for Hq, ACC, 28 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/105/663]

10. . . . The High Commissioner is, I feel, untiring in his efforts to achieve a successful amassing, but he cannot obtain co-operation and is severely handicapped by lack of drive and a spirit of laissez-faire (coupled with the normal official working hours) from all subordinate offices, and passive resistance on the part of the farmers, including the big landowners. . . .

11. Presumably, it might become necessary in the not too distant future, in view of the grave bread problem with which the Island may be faced, to take some stern and comprehensive measures, such as the requisitioning of all grain on the Island and of all mills. Such measures could only be taken if backed by sufficient force. \* \* \*

Third, through AFHQ Administrative Memorandum 42, 21 September 1944, it was laid down in principle that locally produced foods which were readily stored or transportable would not be available for allocation to the armed forces after 1 October 1944. Finally, AFHQ issued, as did also the commanding generals of the Allied forces, directives to the armies to requisition civilian resources only out of necessity and to take care that, in any case, they did not injure the potentialities for later civilian production. (For example, AFHQ Administrative Memorandum 13, 17 March 1945.)

<sup>16</sup> The fact that the amassment in Sicily fell short is the more striking in that the crop had been good.

## 7. REHABILITATION SUPPLY PROGRAM: LIMITED IMPORTS NOW TO REDUCE IMPORTS LATER

AN EARLY SUGGESTION WHICH WAS AGREED WITH BUT COULD NOT BE FOLLOWED

[Ltr, Southard, 22 Sep 43]

\* \* \* *Import basic commodities such as wheat and sugar for resale.*

It is recognized that this action gives rise to serious policy problems.<sup>17</sup> But there are two rea-

sons why it would be helpful. One, as everyone knows, is that it will weaken the speculative forces now maintaining the black market. The second is that it will give farmers a greater incentive to sell their crops if they can buy some coveted article such as sugar with the money they obtain. In many countries under similar circumstances it has been the common experience the farmers prefer to hold commodities instead of money. \* \* \*

<sup>17</sup> Because of the shortage of shipping and supplies.

## THE NEED FOR LIMITED REHABILITATION IMPORTS IS CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE

[Clabaugh, Chief, Econ Sec, CAD, Rpt for Dir, CAD, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 319.1 Foreign (3-28-43)(1), sec. 1]

5. p. . . . The Sicilian and Italian experience indicates the importance of importing limited amounts of agricultural and industrial supplies. Even where apparently not justified by military consideration, such a program would in fact aid the military effort by increasing the local production and thus saving shipping. This of course should be the test. But other benefits include a reduction in unemployment and the relief burden and an improvement in internal security. \* \* \*

## CCAC EXPERTS ADVISE IMPORTING FERTILIZERS TO INCREASE LOCAL PRODUCTION

[Combined Sup Gp, Report for CCAC/S, May 44, ASF, ID files, Civ Sup in Italian Theater, Mar-May 44]

### II. 1. Amassment

(a) Conditions in Italy require rigorous amassment of essential food crops to provide for equitable distribution of domestic products at reasonable prices. Successful amassment will be dependent upon (1) establishing and enforcing an equitable system of prices and rationing for products to be amassed and also for essential items used in production and in living, and (2) establishment of an effective amassment organization.

(b) For the immediate future, amassment should cover wheat and barley, pulse, and olive oil.

3. *Fertilizers.*—Phosphates and nitrogenous fertilizers must be made available if Italian food production is to be maintained at desired levels.

(a) Nitrogenous fertilizers cannot be produced domestically in adequate quantities in time for the 1944-45 crop season, and Allied imports of minimum needs will be required.

(b) The domestic capacity for the production of superphosphates should be utilized by arranging for the importation of rock phosphates and of materials needed for practicable emergency rehabilitation. \* \* \*

## ALLIED OFFICIALS ARE ALSO ADVISED TO CALL FOR DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION MATERIALS

[Digest of Memo of 5 May 44, Dir, Agriculture Subcom, ACC to Rgnl Cmsrs for Agriculture and Other Officers, in the Brochure, Reactivation of Italian Agriculture, Rome, Jul 44, p. 1, ACC files 10000/109/825]

2. a. Basic economic policy of Allies is to revive economic life and stimulate production in order

to reduce to a minimum the needs of Italy from the Allies and to develop Italy as a source of supply for further operations. \* \* \*

d. The over-all criterion of essentiality in emergency rehabilitation is that of saving shipping space and conserving essential Allied Supplies. If the import of a few tons of parts for drainage or irrigation machinery would result in the production of large quantities of essential foods that would otherwise have to be imported during 1945 there is reason for a specific request accompanied by a well-considered statement of justification. \* \* \*

## IMPORT OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL CONSUMERS GOODS ALSO NEEDED TO EFFECT DEHOARDING OF GRAIN

[Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), Rpt, 19 Jun 44,<sup>18</sup> pp. 20-22]

The Economic Section of the Commission recognizes, and the Committee concurs, that in order to provide a minimum of essential consumers goods as an inducement to farmers to bring their crops within governmental control and to provide a minimum subsistence for all persons in the liberated portions of Italy, there must be a marked increase in the supply of consumers goods. It is also recognized that shortage in tonnage and a short position in consumers goods industries in the United States and the United Kingdom militates against any considerable increase in imports to Italy of civilian supplies. It is therefore the objective of the Allied Control Commission and of the Italian Government insofar as possible to

<sup>18</sup> Although this report was not presented formally until 19 June, there is no doubt that its conclusions were made known in ACC and AFHQ earlier and were among the influences which prompted authorities to decide both in May and early June to try to bring more imported supplies into Italy. For example, SACMED in his message of 8 June to CCS (see below) cites the conclusions of the ACC Allied Anti-Inflation Committee as justifying his increase of the bread ration. Therefore the report is quoted earlier, from the standpoint of chronological sequence of documents, than the actual date of the document warrants. Increase of supplies, in part through imports, was only one of the many recommendations, but it was the recommendation which was given greatest stress as promising quick results. The requisitions for imports of clothing, footwear, etc., alluded to in the document, had in fact already been made in pursuance of the recommendations of the Combined Supply Group. In addition to a desire to use the imports to influence producers of grain, AC was prompted by the hope of countering inflationary tendencies by increasing supply and by awareness that "without adequate wearing apparel vitally essential services will inevitably be diminished." ACC Rpt, Industry and Commerce Subcommittee Contribution to Anti-Inflation Measures, 24 May 44, ACC files, 10000/154/977.

bring about the increase in the supply of consumers goods through domestic production and manufacture. In this way, it is hoped to obtain a maximum increase in civilian supplies with a minimum import of consumers goods and those raw materials, equipment and transport which would make possible local production and distribution of consumers goods in quantities considered essential. \* \* \*

Requisitions for imports of clothing, footwear and materials for their manufacture and repair were forwarded by the Allied Control Commission to Allied Force Headquarters on 10 March 1944. \* \* \*

The Committee wish to emphasize the extreme importance of meeting these requisitions immediately as an aid to combatting inflation. \* \* \*

#### SACMED AUTHORIZES A HIGHER BREAD RATION TO INCREASE AMASSMENT AND REDUCE INFLATION

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 8 Jun 44, ABC files, 430, sec. 1 (CCS-602)]

. . . I am authorizing a temporary increase in the bread ration now officially in force in southern Italy to 300 grams effective 1 July. This is an increase of 40 grams over the previously authorized target figure of 260 grams, but only 200 grams have been possible from the recent supplies under our control. It is not intended by this measure to increase the total bread consumption, and I am reserving the right again to reduce the bread ration if the supply situation after the harvest has been collected should make this necessary. \* \* \*

The chief purpose of the proposed increase is to prevent the failure of the program of amassing; that is, the collecting of grain in warehouses controlled by the government. The proposed increase at this time would have a very great psychological effect, and my expert advisers believe that it might make all the difference between achieving a goal of 43% collection and failing to collect more than 20 to 25%. \* \* \*

I have been influenced, in addition to reasons set forth above, by views expressed in your TAM 162 [see Section 4] emphasizing importance of pursuing stronger measures against black market and arresting inflation in Italy. It has been reported by the Anti-Inflation Committee recently appointed by the Chief Commissioner, in which representatives of British and American Treasuries are included, that prevention of further rise in wages is the keystone of anti-inflation policy. Wage earners are now obliged to pay black market prices to supplement ration of 200 grams. It will be impossible, if this con-

tinues, to resist general demands for wage increases which if granted would intensify greatly inflationary situation. It is urged by the Committee that black market in food and other necessities be broken by control of supplies at source and by enforcement of strict rationing at controlled prices. If there is no increase of the bread ration and vicious system of allowing supplementary ration to be acquired in black market continues, we incur not only the grave risk of breakdown of amassing program but every prospect of inflation getting out of control and threatening seriously maintenance in liberated territory of economic and social stability.

#### SUPPLIES AND SHIPPING FOR THE INCREASED BREAD RATION CANNOT BE PROVIDED

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, 26 Jun 44, ABC files, 430, sec. 1 (CCS-602/1)]

\* \* \* Note is taken . . . that an increase of the official bread ration in Italy has been authorized and announced by you. It has been shown by careful study here that maintenance of the new ration scale would probably result in wheat import requirements greater than shipping and supplies which are available in the light of the needs of other European areas. Moreover, the hope had been entertained that an effective amassment of the harvest in Italy would bring about wheat-import requirements substantially less on a per capita basis than those of the past season. . . .

It is necessary, in the light of the above, now to advise you that you will have to meet entirely from the Italian crop any additional consumption in which the increased ration scale results.<sup>19</sup>

#### IN SOME DEGREE THE INCREASED BREAD RATION SEEMS TO HAVE ACCOMPLISHED ITS PURPOSES

[Ltr, Gen Wilson to CCS, 24 Sep 44, MTO, HS files]

\* \* \* It is apparent that the purpose for which the temporary increase was granted has been, in large measure, achieved. The amassment is, on the whole, proceeding successfully, particularly in the areas where the larger ration has been actually distributed. While it is impossible to measure the effects of this factor with accuracy, I believe that there has been collected

<sup>19</sup> The ration increase was put into effect nonetheless in Southern Italy because it had already become known to the Italian Government that SACMED had proposed it. To have withheld it under the circumstances would have been injurious to Allied-Italian relations, to say nothing of the inherent need for the increase and the fact that its announcement had already proved beneficial (see following document).

substantially more of the current harvest than would have been the case had the lower ration remained in effect. Moreover, the anti-inflationary effect of the increase has been definitely felt. In Naples the black market dropped rapidly upon increase of the ration, and the cost of living has since resisted upward pressure, due largely to the availability of a subsistence ration without recourse to illegal channels. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the action which I felt compelled to take in June has proved well advised. \* \* \*

#### REQUISITION OF CLOTHING FOR CIVILIANS MUST BE REJECTED AS NOT A MILITARY NECESSITY

[Memo, CCAC Sup SubComm., 27 Oct 44 (CCAC 115/1), ABC files, 430 (26 Nov 43), sec. 2]

4. In LAC 541 dated 16 July 1944 . . . AFHQ advised that the clothing program could not be justified on the basis of military necessity but that provision would:

a. Provide minimum essential needs for persons in liberated areas.

b. Induce families to bring their crop within governmental control.

c. Assist price control and fiscal measures by soaking up excess purchasing power. \* \* \*

9. In NAF 778 dated 13 September 1944 (C.C.A.C. 138) it is implied by AFHQ that the Theater cannot certify a program of clothing for Southern Italy to be required within the limitations of existing policy governing civilian supply during the military period.

10. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that SACMED is unable to certify the clothing program as required to discharge the military responsibility for civilian supply within existing policy governing such responsibility. In the absence of such certification under existing policy governing military responsibility for civilian supply, the Sub-committee is not justified in authorizing for procurement the program requested by SACMED. The program set forth in LAC Airgram 32 should be referred to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for appropriate action.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> A British-American civilian agency which was responsible for civilian supply in the postmilitary period and for such additional supplies in the military period as could not be justified for inclusion in the army supply program.

## 8. WHY THE THEATER DID NOT DO BETTER IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC REVIVAL

#### INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION ALLOWABLE ONLY WHEN ESSENTIAL FOR MILITARY NEEDS

[Memo, 17 Feb 44, MGS, AFHQ, to Industry and Commerce Subcom, ACC, repeated to Anti-Inflation Sub-Comm., 25 May 44, ACC files, 10000/154/977]

\* \* \* No industrial rehabilitation will be undertaken in liberated Italy which is not

A) Absolutely essential to military needs whilst the war is going on, and

B) Essential to the minimum civilian needs of individual territories.

#### INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION IMPEDED BY DELAY OF SUPPLIES

[Grady, Deputy Vice President, Econ Sec, ACC, Report, 20 December 1943 to 4 March 1944, to Department of State, 28 Mar 44 [hereinafter cited as Grady, Rpt to Dept of State, 28 Mar 44], p. 13, CAD files, 334, ACC (3-28-44), Bulky Pkg]

Efforts to stimulate industrial output have . . . been greatly impeded by several factors, including the general shortage and destruction of facilities and supplies, and the priority requirements of the military operational authorities. A further limitation has resulted from delays in ob-

taining imports of essential supplies. Such items as a few hundred tons of caustic soda for the soap industry, or of carbide for miner's lamps in the sulphur industry, and of explosives for coal mining, amount to little in the aggregate as compared with the amount of local production for local use or for export, which they make possible. Serious delay in the resumption of such local production occurs when the arrival of these essential items is delayed for months while the necessary requisitions are assembled and revised to meet the precise formal requirements of the military supply system, and are forwarded through the various headquarters in the chain of authority until they finally reach the agencies in Washington which will finally consider and decide upon them, before they can be finally procured and shipped.

#### ECONOMIC RESTORATION MUST AWAIT RESTORATION OF A SHATTERED TRANSPORT SYSTEM

[Grady, Rpt to Dept of State, 28 Mar 44, pp. 10-11]

*C. Restoration of Transportation Facilities* is perhaps the most essential factor in the resuscitation of Italian economic activity. In all three

phases—rail, road, and water, transportation facilities are far below the minimum necessary to enable full use to be made of Italian manpower and to reduce dependence on outside supplies. Dilapidation and destruction of existing facilities, coupled with the heavy pressure of military demand for operational purposes, make it difficult to procure transportation for even the most essential civilian needs, and have compelled the application of strict control, particularly in the case of the railways.

(1) *Railway transport* is under the control of the Director General of the Military Railways, responsible to the Commander in Chief. Operation is partly by military crews, partly by civilian railway men. After immediate operational requirements are met, secondary military and essential civilian requirements are dealt with on the basis of bids from the regions, filtered through the Transportation Committee to the Movements and Transportation Organization of A.F.H.Q. . . .

The serious need for repair of rail and equipment will become intensified as additional territory is liberated, in view of the very effective procedures of destruction being employed by the German forces. In view of the overall shortage of transportation equipment required for the Allied war effort, it seems unlikely that any substantial rehabilitation of Italian railways will be accomplished for an extended period.

(2) *Road transport* is likewise in a very attenuated condition (aside from military movement) because of the shortage and breakdown of vehicles. Local road transport seems to rely largely on the two-wheeled native horse- or donkey-drawn wagons. As an emergency measure connected particularly with the distribution of the emergency food imports, some one thousand trucks are in process of being turned over by the military authorities for essential civilian transport, two hundred to be operated by the military authorities with Italian drivers and the balance to be operated, under A.C.C. supervision, by private Italian transport companies. . . .

Thus with road transport as with rail transport, although some diversion of facilities from military work has been arranged to meet the very minimum of essential civil requirements, any thoroughgoing rehabilitation of internal transportation facilities, essential as it is to the improvement of local economic activity, must wait until primary military necessity has been satisfied. \* \* \*

(3) . . . On the one hand there is a general deficiency of vessels of the coaster type, and on the other hand such schooners as have escaped destruction are either requisitioned for military purposes . . . or are in concealment or engaged in uncontrolled "black market" activities.

#### NO SINGLE CAUSE AND NO SIMPLE CURE FOR ITALIAN INFLATION

[Rpt, Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), 19 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/429]

1. Some degree of inflation is common to all countries at war, arising from an increase in purchasing power without a corresponding increase in goods to be bought. This characteristic rise in prices can only be kept in check by steps designed to prevent excess purchasing power being spent—e.g., taxation, public loans, pegging of wages, control of prices, rationing, allocation of resources, etc.

2. In the liberated portion of Italy few of the conditions necessary for holding inflation in check could be expected to operate. The previous system of taxation and war controls was identified with Fascism and in any event was administered from Rome. The collapse of Fascism and the separation of liberated Italy from the Capital paralyzed many branches of the Government. In the circumstances, it is reassuring that the situation is not worse. Inflationary tendencies are dangerous, but are not yet out of hand. . . .

4. Three main forces are responsible for this rapid rise of prices in Italy.

a. The first of these forces is the very high level of Allied military and Italian Government expenditure, financed principally by the exceedingly inflationary methods of overdrafts on the Central Bank (in the case of the Government) and disbursement of military lire (in the case of the Allied expenditures). Some progress is being made in increasing tax revenues, but the Government deficit is now running at about 3 billion lire per month. \* \* \*

b. The second factor tending toward inflation in Italy is the extreme shortage of practically all goods. This shortage, together with the rapid increase in purchasing power mentioned in (a), has been responsible for the growth of a black market of dangerously large proportions.

c. The third influence in the inflationary situation is public distrust of the currency. This factor probably has not so far reached dangerous proportions. People are still willing to deposit

money in the banks and are still buying postal bonds in moderately large volume. But "regular" dollars and sterling sell at fluctuating premia in the black market, a situation which is evidence of an incipient distrust of the lire which may readily assume importance should the public lose hope of effective stabilization.

5. The inflationary pressures are being held in check with the greatest difficulty. The primary control is the pegging of wages, which in turn depends on the purchasing power of current wages, in terms of a minimum subsistence ration. The keystone of this structure is cheap bread and the success of bread rationing at a low, subsidized price derives from getting control of the grain harvest and reducing the temptation to sell in the black market. An important factor is the willingness of the farmers and the public generally to hold cash and bank deposits and to save money rather than spend it. As was indicated in the preceding paragraph, a most dangerous situation would arise if people became unwilling to hold money and rush to buy goods at any price, as happened in Germany in the early twenties and as is now happening in Greece. \* \* \*

#### RECONSTRUCTION IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 5 Jun 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

It has been the understanding of the War Department that plans for the participation, if any, of the United States in European economic reconstruction would be formulated and announced by the Department of State to be carried out by appropriate civilian agencies after the military period. Under these instructions and concepts, our military civil affairs agencies have confined themselves to the relatively restricted field of relief and rehabilitation and, in the absence of any definition of national policy of economic reconstruction, have obviously been unable to point their activities toward any such program.

It has occurred to me that it would be helpful if the Department of State would advise the War Department of whatever long-range plans it may have formulated for United States participation in European economic reconstruction so that arrangements can be made for the coordination of the limited activities under Army jurisdiction with any larger program which may be contemplated.

The area of immediate concern is, of course, Italy.

[Ltr, Hull to Stimson, 8 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

Questions of policy pertaining to rehabilitation and reconstruction which were the subject of inquiry in your letter of 5 June 1944 have been under consideration in the Department for many months. It has been recognized that the responsibility of the Army would be a limited one and confined largely to rehabilitation of those industries and public works which will be necessary for the further prosecution of the war or which will result in production of supplies which otherwise would have to be imported and which perhaps would prevent suffering and unrest among the civilian population. Perhaps some further work of rehabilitation, again in very limited amount, will be carried forward by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. It is expected that at the next council meeting there will be discussed the question of its activities in ex-enemy areas. In any event, much more will need to be done by other civil affairs agencies in order to restore the productive capacity of the liberated areas.

The Department, together with other agencies of this Government, has been actively engaged in planning for rehabilitation and reconstruction. A memorandum prepared in the Department on reconstruction financing and related problems has been approved by the President and steps are now being taken toward the implementation of the recommendations which were made. The policy as outlined is that this Government will engage in a properly considered program of foreign investment to aid in the financing of reconstruction in war-torn areas, including facilitating the export of capital goods for such purposes. \* \* \*

#### THE POLITICAL ADVISER AND AC BOTH NOTE UNREASONABLE USE OF MILITARY PRIORITIES

[Paraphrase of Msg, Alexander Kirk, U.S. Political Adviser, to State Dept, 17 Aug 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 9]

To improve conditions in liberated Italy we must have the transportation facilities to get a more just distribution of supplies . . . and better production from the view of industrial establishment available, most of these having been seized by the military. So-called military considerations should not be translated as solely consideration of the military. . . . We are talking about only relieving conditions by better distribution and use of what is here and have no reference to wiping out the black market or eventual rehabilitation which only foreign imports can bring about.

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, Hq ACC for Sep 44, [hereafter cited as Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44], ACC files, 10000/154/328, 1 Sep 44, p. iii]

4. The paramount priority of the military over the civilian economy and the lack of effective power of pressure on the civilian side have depressed the civilian economy not only where there has been a clear-cut choice between military and civilian needs, but also in many cases where a slight military inconvenience would have meant a large civilian gain. A good example of the former is the case of phosphate rock. After months of hard work in preparing the fertilizer industry to resume production, phosphate rock was not shipped from North Africa for treatment in Italy. Example of the latter is the case of a rope factory (Corderia Napoletana) which was completely ready for production but which was used instead as a QM storehouse, while other buildings were available as storehouses. The lack of power of ACC to effect changes in cases of the latter type is well illustrated by the fact that the Army Air Forces successfully took over a Rome hotel which had been previously allocated for ACC headquarters officers' billets. \* \* \*

#### INCREASE IN RELIEF BENEFITS USELESS WITHOUT INCREASE OF GOODS

[Memo, Brig. Gen. William O'Dwyer, Vice President, Econ Sec, ACC, for Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/117]

2. Italy does have an extensive social insurance system including provision for sickness, invalidity, marriage, maternity, old-age, death and tuberculosis insurance, unemployment insurance, and relief, and workmen's compensation. The benefits paid under the system are, however, completely inadequate. The basic benefit for unemployment insurance, for example, varies from 2.5 to 7 lire daily for manual workers, and from 4 to 12 lire daily for non-manual workers.

5. With reference to paragraph 3(a) of my letter of 16 Aug. 44, it is my thought that, in view of the woeful inadequacy of the benefits under the present system of social insurance, the Government should prepare a program of relief which would provide adequate food, clothing and housing to every person in need. \* \* \*

[Draft of Reply Made to O'Dwyer Orally by Capt Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, 6 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/117]

2. a. In your letter of 16 August 1944 you pointed out (and I agree that your statements are sound) that persons in the lower income

brackets are unable to sustain themselves because of the inadequate supplies of food, that the available housing is inadequate and that the stock of clothing will be inadequate to meet the rigours of Winter. It does not appear to me that any reasonable amount of tampering with the present schedule of relief payments can relieve these inadequacies. I should think that it was elemental that an increase in monetary payments with no increase in the quantity of food, housing and clothing available will simply increase prices without in any way ameliorating the condition of recipients of relief. \* \* \*

#### CRITICISM OF ACC PERFORMANCE DRAWS RESPONSE FROM G-5

[Ltr, Hilldring to Col Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 29 Jun 44, CAD files, 380, Reconstruction (4-30-44)]

\* \* \* We have been concerned around here, both the British and the Americans, for some time about the inability or the indisposition of ACC and AMG, particularly ACC, to undertake in a serious, forthright, and effective manner, the institution of a systematic rehabilitation program in Italy.

We have no fault to find particularly with the relief side of the program. . . . What we refer to are those measures and the importation of those means which will reduce the importation of food, drugs, coal, clothing, etc.

I have talked to . . . dozens of . . . people who have come out of the North African Theater in the last few months, and they all tell me the same story. They say that we in Washington and the British in London and you in Algiers have a complete comprehension of the necessity for a program of systematic rehabilitation, but that the idea either is not understood or is not accepted in ACC. Our authority to carry through our relief obligations in the next year in Europe is in jeopardy at the moment because of the disinclination or the inability of ACC, . . . to get into the business of making Italy self sustaining, and to get into this business with vigor and efficiency. . . .

#### REHABILITATION RECORD IS NOT TOO BAD IN VIEW OF CONDITIONS

[Ltr, Col Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, to Hilldring, 7 Sep 44, CAD files, 380, Reconstruction (4-30-44)]

. . . While I understand your position, and appreciate well the serious nature of the problem, my investigations and talks at ACC have convinced me that the record is not as bad as you have been led to believe.

. . . I propose in this letter to try to give you the picture as I see it, and to indicate some of the ideas and plans that are being developed for the future.

I.

a. *Scope of the Task.* It is important that the task of rehabilitation in Italy be viewed in proper perspective. This task is not a small one or one that can be accomplished in a short time. It is necessary to live in Italy to appreciate the extent to which the country's power to produce has been destroyed, its economy disorganized and its people demoralized. Over 40 million people have been supported in the relatively small area of Italy in the past by means of a highly intensive system of production that required many years and large amounts of capital to build. To rebuild it after this war, many years and large amounts of capital will again be required. This is the task of a generation and not in our life-time will it be completed. A few Allied officers, working in the most difficult conditions, over the course of a few months or a year can only scratch the surface of the problem.

b. *Degree of Destruction.* The extent of the destruction suffered by Italian industry cannot be over-estimated. The destruction by Allied bombing was considerable, but it is the demolitions of the retreating Germans that have been most effective because of the thorough and scientific manner in which they have been carried out. . . . With its power to produce extensively destroyed, it will be difficult for Italy to meet its minimum needs at home and buy the foods and other goods it must obtain from abroad. . . .

c. *The Scarcity of Transport.* Some of the difficulties that have affected the problem of rehabilitation may also be mentioned. Chief among these has been the scarcity of transport. The armies, as a general practice, pressed into service practically all of the country's automotive transport, and carried it forward with them as they advanced; the railroads have been almost wholly destroyed and to the extent that they have been put back into operation by the Army they haul for the most part military supplies; few coastal vessels can operate because of restrictions on the use of ports and the shortage of fuel. As a result it has generally been with the utmost difficulty that parts could be moved to a factory to repair it, or that raw materials could be gotten to it or the finished product gotten away. . . .

d. *Taking of Supplies by the Armies.* The difficult logistical problems involved in the operation through Italy have forced the armies to resort to a maximum of local exploitation. Sup-

plies of every description have been requisitioned by the military to fill the needs of the moment. Faced with immediate requirements, the armies could not plan the most economic use of such supplies, and little consideration could be given to the difficulties created by the seizure of stocks which had been gathered for civil purposes. The same logistical considerations which prompted such seizure by the Armies apply with even greater force to the program of replacement of these civil supplies. . . .

e. *Taking of Productive Facilities by the Armies.* Perhaps more serious in its effect on Italian industry, has been the requisitioning of plants and warehouses and the taking of machinery by the armies. Such large industrial buildings as are found relatively intact are useful as billets, bakeries, etc. and as warehouses for military stores. Where plants have been used for these purposes, delicate equipment has almost inevitably been damaged by the troops occupying the premises. Machinery and electrical gear required by one or the other of the services have been removed. Military expediency does not permit of consideration of the long-term benefits of selective requisitioning, and thus industrial plants are frequently immobilized by the removal of a few vital machines for army uses. Losses of this kind, difficult to replace promptly even in normal times, are for the most part irreplaceable under existing conditions. These are problems in which, by reason of the necessary priority granted to tactical troops, the ACC up to the present has had little power to interfere, but which have obviously retarded its efforts toward essential rehabilitation. \* \* \*

II. . . .

a. . . . A large part of the time up to the present has been consumed, necessarily, in studying different industries, visiting various factories, and preparing programs of rehabilitation. In all, more than a thousand different plants have been surveyed by the Industry Subcommittee and reports have been submitted covering several hundred. To the first of August approximately 1,342,000 tons of shipping had been saved by products which have been obtained for use by the Allies in Italy. While a substantial part of this total has been procured by the services themselves, a not inconsiderable share results from the work of the ACC.

III. g. . . . The need for a comprehensive directive on rehabilitation is being felt increasingly at both AFHQ and the ACC. Such a directive should state in clear terms what Allied policy on Italian economic rehabilitation is, for as you will

appreciate, it is difficult for us and the ACC to carry out to the satisfaction of Washington and London a policy which has never to our knowledge been clearly expressed. A comprehensive directive would deal *inter alia* with the following points: how many and what industries should be rehabilitated; to what points should rehabilitation of these industries be carried; what is the terms of the program we are expected to develop; what are its objectives; is Italy to be made self-sustaining (to use the words of your letter), or are the more liberal economic principles identified with our recent State Department policy to be followed; by what standards can we measure our success or failure in rehabilitating individual industries and the Italian economy as a whole? We would be glad to co-operate with you in the preparation of such a directive. \* \* \*

**SACMED TELLS CCS A MORE ADEQUATE CRITERION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC AID IS NEEDED**

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 15 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

1. As the operational stage in large parts of occupied territory is ended, and as battle line in Italy moves north, I believe it necessary that there be a re-examination of problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation. In the forward areas purely military factors continue to be predominant, but problems connected with civil administration, especially of an economic nature, raise general problems on which I require guidance in my position as President of the Allied Control Commission. \* \* \*

3. The limited directives which have prevailed appear no longer to be adequate in the light of the altered operational conditions. The Armistice agreement which governs the Allied Control Commission's operations includes no commitment to the people of Italy as to any measure of

economic aid. But, presumably because of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, there has arisen the expectation if not the assumption among Italians that there would be forthcoming an additional measure of relief and assistance. In both countries public utterances have tended to encourage this view. Furthermore, if at this stage the two Governments continue to consider only what is essential to the interests of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring the creation of a reasonably prosperous and contented postwar Italy, which is one of their long-term interests. Despite this fact the criterion of military necessity governs and is being strictly adhered to in the provision of supply. . . . An example which is not of much importance in itself but which indicates the kind of question now arising—in answer to a requisition of paper necessary for proper keeping of the records of Italian taxes, it is asked (CAL 566) if the paper is essential to the control and management of the civil population.

4. For the above reasons I ask that the directives which determine the furnishing of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation [Chapter V] be reconsidered, and that, if it is the policy of the governments to assist Italy beyond the degree required by strict military necessity of the Allied troops, there be a revision of the standards applicable to that assistance. I request especially that I be informed:

(a) to what degree, if any, it is desired that there be carried out industrial rehabilitation in Italy and what industries should be given priority if any rehabilitation is desired.

(b) to what degree, if any, I may take inflationary factors into account, and to what extent I am responsible for measures to counter the tendencies toward inflation.

(c) within the limits of available shipping, to what degree, if any, should experts be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade be created. \* \* \*

## Military Expediency Is Not the Whole Story

Graduates of Charlottesville had once known how to define civil affairs and its function. That was at Charlottesville; now, in Italy, they could no longer be sure. Before they tackled the job, it had seemed beyond question that their mission was to conduct civilian life in such a way as to serve military expediency. But if military expediency meant largely, as they had once been told, making the foreign country a benefactor and not a beneficiary of the occupying army, what was the meaning of the present situation? The Allies were using precious little of Italy's local resources but they were straining their own shipping resources by importing for Italians huge quantities of food and agricultural rehabilitation supplies. To obtain those supplies AFHQ had had to certify to the supply and shipping authorities that they were a military necessity. Evidently the meaning of military expediency and necessity had greatly broadened since the military government manual had been published. But what of the meaning of civil affairs itself in the light of the present facts? Did being in civil affairs mean working for the Army, for the Italians, or for the better world all hoped would some day come? The CAO's could well have been confused because, depending on which of their many objectives they had in mind, they could have answered any or all of these questions in the affirmative.

One thing was clear—certain of their enterprises extended beyond the range of military expediency even in its broadest sense. Yet, from the beginning, they had been in accordance with Allied policies in Italy.

These policies, all illustrated in the documentation of the present chapter, reflected the fact that in Italy, for the first time in the history of belligerent occupation, military government had been saddled not only with the job of serving an Army's needs but also with implementing political, economic, and humanitarian policies that were of civilian and national rather than of military import. The military government handbooks had not altogether overlooked this contingency because in setting forth the functions of military government they had supplemented the reference to military expediency with a mention not only of international law but also of national policy as arbiters of the duties of military government. But even the most recent manual had been drafted before anyone could have foreseen how far military government in this war would have to serve in a twofold role—part military, part political—and before field operations had shown how difficult if not sharply conflicting service to two masters would be. Not only the CAO's but the highest headquarters were at times troubled, but the more patient among them accepted with

resignation the fact that the directives which came to them through the CCS often reflected civilian rather than military aims. The principal civil affairs problem had really become the job of working out the best possible accommodation between military and political interests. Unfortunately, neither the CCS nor any other authority outside Italy was giving much if any help in solving this problem.

The more military authorities understood how the political leaders themselves had been forced by history and circumstances into adopting an ambivalent national aim in this war, the more tolerant they were of the difficulties being imposed upon them. The Moscow Declaration of October 1943, for example, announced the politically imperative intent of the signatory powers to restore free institutions to Italy. The basic declaration destined to make the war in Italy as elsewhere a political as well as military enterprise was, of course, the Atlantic Charter, which envisaged a better international order embracing the defeated Axis powers as well as all others. The intention proclaimed therein of destroying Nazi tyranny was construed to apply to Fascist tyranny also when the United States and Great Britain later came to consider the question of policy toward Italy. Even before this policy was formulated in a directive, the civilian departments had begun to study the implementation of Allied war aims under prospective military government, and the Office of Strategic Services, in conjunction with other civilian agencies, had begun to prepare civil affairs guides for all countries expected to be occupied by the United States. In announcing broad political war aims the Allies in World War II were simply following the precedent set in World War I, but in intending to have fulfilment of these aims started under the military government the political authorities were blazing a new trail. Changes in

the basic polity of an occupied country had been regarded as contrary to traditional concepts of international law; in any case, military governors had never undertaken or thought it necessary to prepare their personnel for such a task. The legal issue seems to have been overlooked or considered a secondary technical matter which skilful jurists could be depended upon to somehow clarify satisfactorily. The difficulty for military government officials in reconciling their duties to the Army with their duties to political objectives seemed sufficiently mitigated by the decision to turn over the conduct of civil affairs at an early stage to civilian agencies. The CCS directive for Sicily authorized, as far as was compatible with military needs, a policy of defascistization so broad as to apply not only to all Italian administrators but also to Italian laws and institutions.

As though the implementation of this policy were not staggering enough, the CCS directive, in accordance with the President's desire, contained another principle which it was novel for military government authorities to adhere to in an enemy country—the principle of benevolence. All of America's wars had been regarded as leading to benevolent results for the enemy, once defeated, and all had been conducted with such benevolence as is required by the restraints or duties of international law. But to make benevolence, even as qualified by military expediency, an explicit criterion of the policies of occupation required the President's unconventional imagination, his appreciation of the still strong bonds between Americans and the Italian people, and possibly too a prescience that this enemy would change into a co-belligerent. The President had so habituated Americans to novelties that no American at AFHQ was surprised. However, Lord Rennell, Chief of AMGOT, did point out with courageous candor that to emphasize benevolence in the instructions to

troops might weaken the sternness of spirit required for a fighting job. His proposal to change the instructions could not be carried out because it did not accord with the CCS directive nor with the new attitude toward civilian values in general.

During the assault and all the more active combat phases even the CAO's had to be quite practical, but once these were over, the Chief of AMGOT could not control the excessive or untimely benevolence of many and, indeed, did not always try to. For example, in Sicily the CAO's spent weeks rescuing from Italian jails wretches who had long been languishing there without benefit of trial, while others pondered and worked hard over the problem of reopening the shattered schools. All this had its reflections in organizational developments. No educational advisers had been present in the planning period, but some were soon brought in, and especially as plans developed for ACC, were followed by a host of experts in other welfare specialties. Because American cultural organizations had made Secretary Stimson see the importance of taking all possible measures to minimize damage to Italy's historical monuments and art treasures, advisers in the fine arts joined the staff, to undertake an unprecedented job in the history of warfare. There were also labor specialists, well aware of what the American labor organizations wished to see done toward institution of free Italian labor unions. Nor could benevolence, if it was to be extended to an ex-enemy, be denied in any measure to the refugees from United Nations countries or even from the cobelligerent Yugoslavia of Tito. The CCS directed AFHQ to provide care for all of them until the governments concerned, mostly in exile, could resume responsibility. Accordingly, a Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommission was developed in ACC.

At best, it is hardly possible to serve two masters without confusion. It is true that

the directives always stated that military necessity was the overriding master, but this left quite unanswered the question how much of one's service could be devoted to the more amiable master if the claims of benevolence did not conflict with military necessity too greatly and clearly. The American CAO's had been fully prepared by Charlottesville to expect confusion in the foreign countries to which they would be assigned, but they had not been prepared for the confusion in their own minds. An example of such confusion is evident in the plight of the lawyers who served as judges in the Allied military courts—the only instruments of justice until the Italian courts could be reopened with a purged judiciary. They knew that Allied courts had to protect the Army's interests, but they had also been told to impress the Italian people with the quality of Anglo-American justice. Since Fascist courts had been notorious for oversevere sentences CAO's tended to mete out only mild sentences—until Headquarters admonished them that for the sake of military installations in Italy harsher punishment should be given out as a deterrent. After several months of such troubles in all spheres, British authorities decided that benevolent idealism must at least be held in reasonable check, and they accordingly opposed the American proposal to introduce civilian agencies into the theater. Informally they admitted their apprehension of "starry-eyed" civilians "running loose," that is, being under civilian directors instead of military orders. American civilian agencies acquiesced and one cannot help wondering whether this unexpected attitude was not the result of an unavowed belief that acquiescence had its advantages. The agencies may have deduced that if they remained altogether in Washington not only would they be less fettered in continuing to propose idealistic policies, but also they would have much quicker access

to both the White House and the War Department and could thus do more for the military government effort at home than abroad.

But so far as the civilian departments being able to influence policy in the way that it now needed to be influenced is concerned, their reasoning was wrong. It was only in the field and from the lessons of field experience that they could learn how far it was necessary to modify the political aims they had imposed upon military government, not only from the point of view of military expediency but also from that of successful implementation of their own aims as well. The War Department, and especially military operational authorities, had contributed very little in the policy-forming stage by way of a practical point of view which is always needed to temper somewhat a political ideal. Partly responsible was the fact that the CCAC, the subcommittee of the CCS wherein the accommodation between civilian and military points of view could best have been made, had not even come into existence when the directive for Italy was drafted; CAD was in existence, but it considered that its function was co-ordination and final drafting rather than actual participation in civilian policy deliberations on purely political problems.

Ensuing troubles were inevitable, and they are most apparent in the effort to carry out the objective which American civilians took more seriously than any other—defascistization. The ideal conflicted with military expediency in attainment of the Army's most vital goal—the continuation of Italian administration so that military operations would not be disturbed by disorder in civilian life. By its directive to liberate the people from its fascist regime, and other provisions whether mandatory or contingent upon military discretion, the CCS authorized a broad defascistization. This broad scope

was premised in some measure upon an assumption which proved to be false—that Fascist officeholders were just about as fanatical and inimical as the officials of Nazi Germany. Even, however, if Allied leaders had known the true situation, the sweeping nature of the program was probably inevitable politically, because political beliefs of this nature are largely emotional in their origin and do not yield to reason in much degree until the harsh problems of application are encountered. Thus it was only after some difficulty that the President had been dissuaded from his original requirement that top Sicilian officials be replaced by Allied officers.

The initial assumption that Fascist officials were as dangerous militarily as they were bad politically applied generally only to officials of the Fascist Party who were also administrative officials. Such party officials, however, in most instances fled before the Allied armies neared, and those who remained were quickly ferreted out and arrested by military intelligence units. AMG's task, then only beginning, was ferreting out and then dismissing, either at once or as soon as possible, all "active and influential party members." (AMGOT GAI 2.) A just determination of these was not easy, nor was the task of finding enough or sufficiently qualified replacements in areas remote from the centers of Italian political talent. The CAO's seem quickly to have concluded that the remaining Fascist officeholders fell generally into three classes of which only the third raised a security problem. First there were the nonpolitical conformists (who had joined the Party to keep their job); second, the political opportunists (who had joined primarily to get a job); third, the presumptive scoundrels. The last were not determined to be scoundrels by technically correct judicial process but by popular indictment: especially in the smaller towns, the Italian populace tended to riot or to threaten riot

if certain Fascist officials were not promptly dismissed. The CAO's, feeling that most Italians were basically not only long-suffering but just, believed that their demonstrations had merit except possibly when directed against tax collectors. The "scoundrels" were not known to be inimical to the Allies—indeed they would probably have gratefully co-operated in return for Allied protection—but their dismissal was certainly necessary to military security insofar as this called for preventing public disorder or commotion.

But headquarters knew that if it avowed that its criterion of the objectionable Fascist officeholder was the hostility of fellow Italians, civilian departments at home could well feel that the defascistization directive was being applied either ironically or quite naïvely. It also knew that there were other political considerations which in the long run would outweigh the expediency in not taking epuration too seriously. The conformists and the opportunists might give AMG docile service, but while untainted Italians might not riot over their remaining in office, they would feel bitter and disillusioned if the Allies kept too many of "the old gang" to lead Italy toward the realization of democratic ideals. Thus AMG had to find some formula which promised the dismissal of enough to show its political sincerity, but not so many as to threaten administrative breakdown. One formula after another was tried and abandoned because it dismissed either too few or too many. At one point the standard adopted presupposed almost divine omniscience in CAO's because, on the basis of a questionnaire, they were to determine whether the officeholder had joined the Party from base inclinations or merely from necessity. One CAO, whether from a feeling of omniscience or because he felt headquarters would rather

see too many than too few kicked out of office, distinguished himself by suspending nine hundred officeholders in one province alone, thereby temporarily disrupting the administration.

Many Italian liberals, however, thought that CAO's were dismissing too few, and AMG was immeasurably relieved when the Italian Government completed preparations for its own epuration program and was thus in a position to assume the burden itself. In a certain sense reverting to what many CAO's had felt the most practicable and democratic procedure in the first place, AMG in all the more settled areas let Italians decide whom to dismiss—not, indeed, by popular clamor, but by the formal device of provincial Italian committees which were appointed by AMG but which rendered judgments in accordance with the government's legislation. Even before the government completed its legislation some such solution as this could have been worked out, and probably would have been except for one thing. AMG knew that much attention in the United States was centered on this political issue and that it could not afford to take any initial step which would have seemed at all like an evasion of responsibility.

It only remains to note briefly, for whatever light this may throw upon both the equities and the practical considerations inherent in the issue, what the Italians did with the problem once it was placed in their lap. They immediately found that it was difficult to progress any faster than had AMG. After a time they called in to their aid Count Sforza, the most eminent of the Italian liberals. As High Commissioner for Epuration he studied the problem and concluded that the best course was to make quick examples of the worst cases and then let the entire painful issue die down. Needless to say, at the end of

Allied occupation the number of former Fascists still in office was greater than the number dismissed.

As with the job of epuration, so for all other tasks requiring AMG/ACC to serve both military expediency and politico-social amelioration, a formula of compromise could not be found which satisfied both. It is a little hard to conclude that this was because soldiers, with a bias in favor of expediency, were the administrators. Even Lord Rennell, who had warned against overbenevolence, did not practice what he preached. Certainly he showed no sentimentality in his account of the interned Yugoslav refugees at Ferramonte whom all his officers, because suffering does not tend to ennoble, found "difficult." But though the refugees at times seemed more intent on getting special dispensations than on showing gratitude, Rennell did not decrease but increased their preferential treatment. AFHQ promised funds to Tito's partisans if they would aid the escape to Italy of still more Jews threatened by the Germans. But the theater's facilities became so overtaxed that for a time—until a camp in French North Africa could be opened up—the policy of active aid in escape had to be suspended. To cite quickly some of the frustrations in other matters, not all laws reflecting Fascist doctrines could be abrogated, because in some cases

the doctrines were too closely intertwined with essential regulations which had to stand until the Government changed the statutes in entirety. Labor was given the right to organize but in wartime it could hardly be given the right to strike; schools were reopened with purged textbooks but without teachers qualified to teach democracy or even to use modern pedagogical methods; higher military levels were furnished maps and instructions designed to minimize damage to historical monuments and works of art, but it was often impossible, through too small a special staff, to get the word of this objective down to the officers and troops in charge of the guns.

At best, military government is an unnatural form of government in an abnormal context. Even when it is oriented entirely toward military expediency, the most that can be expected of military government is that it keep failures down to a reasonable minimum. But in World War II the difficulties were compounded by the unprecedented requirements that military government destroy totalitarian systems and begin the rebuilding of democracies. This of course had advantages far outweighing the difficulties, and it may well be that the Allied occupation of Italy will mark the beginning of a new epoch in the conception of the soldier's role in military government.

## I. IMPERIUM AC JUSTITIA

### JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

[AMGOT GAI No. 1, 1 May 43, p. 80, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

\* \* \* You will administer to the best of your ability with a sense of impartiality and justice, without fear or favour. In administration and especially in the administration of justice, all men and women must be equal for you. \* \* \*

### SECURITY OF ARMED FORCES DEMANDS ALLIED MILITARY COURTS

[AMGOT Plan for Military Government of Sicily, p. 10, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

#### *Constitution of Courts*

(39) Civilians charged with offenses against the law of Military Government will be brought before Allied Military Courts. Allied Military Courts will comprise General Military Courts,

Superior Military Courts and Summary Military Courts.

General Military Courts will consist of not less than three officers, at least one of whom shall be a Judicial Officer of AMGOT. Superior Military Courts will consist of one or more officers at least one of whom shall be a Judicial Officer of AMGOT, if available. Summary Military Courts will consist of one officer who shall be a Judicial Officer or a Civil Affairs Officer of AMGOT, if available. Every officer of AMGOT who is a qualified lawyer is a Judicial Officer for the above purposes.

#### *Establishment of Courts*

(40) In areas where AMGOT is functioning under the orders of a Task Force Commander, acting for the M.G., Allied Military Courts will be established under the authority of such Commander; and in areas where AMGOT is functioning under the orders of the C.C.A.O., acting for the M.G., Allied Military Courts will be established under the authority of the C.C.A.O. . . .

#### *Powers of Courts*

(41) General Military Courts will try serious offenses including all cases involving the death penalty. Superior Military Courts will try offenses meriting punishment of not more than 10 years. Summary Military Courts will try minor offenses and may not impose a sentence of more than one year's imprisonment. \* \* \*

#### ANGLO-SAXON JUSTICE INTRODUCED

[AMGOT Proclamation 4, p. 44, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

\* \* \* Section 1. *Public Sessions.* The proceedings of every Allied Military Court shall be public except when otherwise ordered by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer or the Court.

Section 2. *Rights of Defendants.* Every defendant before an Allied Military Court is entitled:

(a) To have in advance of trial a copy of the charges upon which he is to be tried, if he so desires;

(b) To consult a lawyer before the trial and have a lawyer or other representative of his own choosing defend him at the trial, except that the Chief Legal Officer or any Court may at any time prohibit any lawyer or other person from appearing in any court. In any case, the Court may at the request of the defendant or otherwise, assign

to him an officer to assist in the defense of the case;

(c) To apply to the Court for further time to prepare his defense, which application the Court may grant or deny in its discretion;

(d) To bring with him such material witnesses as he may desire or have them summoned by the Court at his request;

(e) To give evidence on his own behalf at the trial, but he may not be compelled to do so;

(f) To have the proceedings translated for his benefit when he is unable to understand them otherwise. \* \* \*

#### THE PUBLIC LIKES OUR INITIAL LIGHT SENTENCES

[Rennell Rpt, sec. 1]

20. . . . Allied Military Courts are functioning in all provinces but General Courts are only convened by special order when needed. The sessions of all courts are public and are frequently well attended by the public. The public comment is favourable. The courts have, as a whole, a tendency to administer too light sentences. I am attempting to correct this, but if unsuccessful I shall have to consider recommending the establishment of minimum sentences. \* \* \*

#### BUT MILITARY SECURITY CALLS FOR HEAVIER PUNISHMENT

[Directive, Col Spofford to SCAO's and Sr Legal Officers (SLO's), 1 Oct 43, ACC files, 10260/142/2749]

5. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer is concerned about the smallness of sentences imposed for grave offences where the accused has been found "guilty." The attention of all officers who sit on Allied Military Courts will be drawn to the fact that sentences must not only be assessed on the circumstances in which the offence was committed, but also on the gravity of the offence, the frequency with which the offence occurs and its effect on Military Security. As an example, illiterate peasants have frequently been committing the grave offence of cutting off pieces of Military telephone wires. This offence has generally been committed openly to obtain binding wire and with little or no knowledge of the possibilities of its results on the Allied Forces. Nevertheless, the offence must be punished severely as it is a grave offence, is very prevalent and the whole security of the Army may be jeopardized by it.

### THE APPEARANCE AS WELL AS THE FACT OF JUSTICE IS IMPORTANT

[ACC Exec Memo 6, 10 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1577]

3. (1). . . . Attention is called to the statement in Special Administrative Instructions Legal No. 1 that "It is as important that justice should seem to be done as that it should be done." Every care should be taken

(a) To ensure not only that the judges are impartial, but that they appear to be impartial alike to prosecution and defense. No officer who has taken part in the investigation of any case (other than merely determining whether the case is suitable for trial by a General, Superior or Summary Court) is eligible to hear that case;

(b) To ensure that the evidence is fairly and accurately interpreted, particularly where evidence for the prosecution is given in a language other than Italian. The judge should address his remarks directly to the witness and the interpreter should interpret literally the judge's words. Interpreters should not be allowed to frame questions themselves nor to give merely the purport of questions and answers. \* \* \*

### ALLIED TROOPS COMMIT LESSER OFFENSES

[Memo, Rodd, SCAO, Enna Province, for CCAO, AMGOT, 25 Aug 43, ACC files, 10104/115/13]

Yesterday some Rangers who are quartered near here wanted meat and shot a cow. The cow belonged to Maria Barbusca, who is the mother of a farmer called Francesco Petralia and lives in Enna at 224 Via Donna Nuova. They skinned and galloched the beast in the field of another farmer whose name I do not know but who is very displeased. The kill was made near Villarsosa station.

Donna Maria's son resented the slaughter of his mother's cow and was handed one of the notes attached. Donna Maria herself also objected and was handed the other.

I cannot help feeling that the recklessness with which the Fifth Battalion of Rangers commit the . . . American Consul to two payments for one cow should be visited with reproval.

### ACTION TAKEN AS TROOP OFFENSES CONTINUE

[Com of Public Safety, AMG Rgn 3, Report on Activities of Regional Headquarters, Public Safety Division, to 15 December 1943, p. 9, ACC files, 10000/129/168]

#### *ix. Conduct of Troops*

Instances of drunkenness, assault, looting and rowdiness were continually being reported.

The Italian police were powerless to deal with Allied soldiers, who frequently seized the weapons of CCRR and Metropolitani or released civilians who had been arrested for crime.

Many cases were reported of soldiers selling illegally large quantities of cigarettes, rationed foodstuffs and Army petrol, which quickly found their way on the black market.

A favorite pastime was the "requisitioning" of vehicles, articles of furniture or other property by handing the owner a slip of paper, usually signed in a facetious manner. Most of this requisitioning amounted to plain theft. For too much license was allowed to individual officers who had genuine grounds for requisitioning and it is recommended that the very strictest control be exercised in the future to prevent wholesale abuse.

All reports of crimes by Allied soldiers were forwarded to the Provost Marshal General concerned (and in suitable cases to Allied Claims Commission), but in almost every case the injured party was unable to give a description of the culprit which would lead to his identification.

It was apparent that insufficient Military Police were available to deal with the troops. Close contact was maintained with the Military Police and among other measures the following were adopted:

a) Notices were distributed to all Military barracks worded:

"TO ALL ALLIED TROOPS  
THE GERMANS LOOTED ITALY  
THESE PEOPLE TRUST YOU"

b) Hours of drinking by troops were restricted and curfew imposed.

c) Certain areas were placed out of bounds to troops.

d) Soldiers sent to rear areas were forbidden to carry weapons.

e) Joint patrols by Military Police and CCRR were inaugurated in Naples.

f) Requests were made for unit commanders to warn troops about their behaviour, to caution them against the danger of venereal disease and of drinking liquor sold on the streets.

g) Publicity was given to the number of arrests made for selling adulterated liquor.

\* \* \*

### ACC DEFENDS ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST TROOP ENCROACHMENTS

[Ltr, Upjohn, CLO, ACC, to Joyce, Actg Deputy President, ACC, 15 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/91]

This seems an appropriate moment to draw to your attention the extremely important question

of policy which arises with regard to the attitude in respect of unoccupied territory of the purely military organizations operating in Italy and Sicily, 15th Army Group, FLAMBO and its Districts 1 & 2 and their subareas and the various boards (e.g. communications, internal transport, local resources) set up by them.

The attitude of these bodies is from a purely military standpoint quite understandable. Whatever may be the legal and political concept of unoccupied territory, the purely military mind quite reasonably sees a de facto occupation by the military of large areas even in unoccupied territory, e.g. Bari, Brindisi and Taranto and the execution by them of many administrative matters in such territory, e.g. control of shipping, railways and telephones and even the repair of telephone lines. In consequence it is difficult for them to appreciate the essential difference between occupied and unoccupied territory and this is already leading to misconceptions, e.g. in the right of arrest and disposal of persons offending against Allied Forces, a faulty approach to the problem of telecommunications, high handed action in dealing with employees of the Bari Radio Station, the treatment of the whole of Italy as "occupied" by the Transportation Committee, and so on. \* \* \*

It is suggested therefore that this Commission should take up with the Military Bodies I have mentioned above this important question and ask them to make it plain to all officers the essential difference between occupied and unoccupied territory. . . .

#### THE DEBT FOR LIBERATION HAS ITS LIMITS

[Memo, Capt Theodore M. Willcox and Capt Deane Keller, CAO's, AMG Fifth Army, for Fifth Army Claims Officer, 11 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/115/225]

3. The two undersigned while in pursuit of their duties of inspection in Albano were contacted by [Fernando] Lucidi and taken to his wine repository. His story is this: He had vast quantities of wine in his shop in large hogsheads. He had walled them up and painted the stones white, so that the Germans might not know of this stock and in this way they were successfully deceived. When the first Allied troops, he said Americans, came through, he was so overjoyed that he tore down part of the wall, stuck a hose attached to a hand pump in one of the hogs heads and proceeded to dole out free wine to these first soldiers who came by his place. The word spread rapidly among the outfits coming through Albano and soon his yard was crowded with vehicles carry-

ing demijohns, water flasks, barrels and other types of containers. He told Capt. Keller that to this point, 7 June 1944, they had taken 22,000 litres of wine without paying or giving a receipt. He was in despair and asked advice.

4. This is what Capt. Willcox and Capt. Keller saw: There were one or two American soldiers with small litre flasks. There were many British soldiers with a weapons carrier loaded with demijohns, gasoline cans, and large gasoline barrels. Lucidi was looking on as his Italian helper worked the hand pump under the direction of the British soldiers. The receptacles were practically all full and the last one or two were being filled.

5. a. This is what Capt. Willcox and Capt. Keller did in reference to Lucidi: Questioned Lucidi as to whether he had taken his case to the CAO. He had not. Due to the rapidity of the movement of the Army and the early date, the CAO must have had several communes to look after, therefore, being difficult to reach. He was not in town in midafternoon 7 June 1944. The undersigned advised Lucidi to take from the vehicles that came in the designation of their outfits. This he had already done and he had a long list pencilled on scraps of paper. These he was told to submit to the CAO at the earliest moment together with his story. The undersigned left their names with Lucidi for future testimony. The claims service was explained to him.

b. This is what Capt Willcox and Capt Keller did in reference to the soldiers on the spot: Capt Willcox took down in his notebook the name of the soldiers' outfits and the names of their Commanding Officer. The intention of the undersigned officers was to give this information to the CAO, but he was, as stated above, not to be found. The soldiers were advised of the Rules of Land Warfare on this particular point and were told gently but firmly that they were performing an illegal act in taking the wine without paying or leaving a receipt. The soldiers, British as has been stated above, with the exception of the two Americans, said they had been ordered by their officers to come for the wine. They had not been ordered to pay or leave a receipt. The undersigned officers carefully explained the situation to them and again that they were performing an act outside the law. They saw the point.

6. Though the greatest amount of wine taken was by British soldiers in sight of the undersigned officers, the list of outfit designations in the possession of Lucidi indicated that the

Americans had visited and taken in force also. Though not asked for, it is the opinion of the undersigned officers that Lucidi should be given some recompense for the loss of his wine.

7. The above is the sworn statement of the undersigned regarding claim of Fernando Lucidi.

#### PRISONERS WHO HAVE LONG AWAITED TRIAL ARE RELEASED

[Legal Div, Sicily Rgn AMG, Rpt, Jul 43 to Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/175]

11. c. Immediate action was necessary in regard to persons awaiting trial, many of whom were found to have been in detention for months and even years. In these cases arrangements had to be made with the Italian legal authorities for the grant of provisional liberty where further delays were likely to occur in bringing the accused to trial. A further stream of applications for conditional liberty or for clemency flowed in from persons already convicted and serving sentences, but with an Italian Government now in existence, it should be possible in other areas to divert the stream into the proper channels. . . .

[Com of Public Safety, AMG Rgn 3, Rpt on Activities to 15 December 1943, p. 17]

#### xxii. *Political Prisoners*

Police were instructed to discontinue the Italian practice of holding civilians in jail pending investigation, which resulted in persons being imprisoned for long periods without trial. They were told to comply with Proclamation 13, Article 1, which prohibits detention without specific charge.

#### AN INJUSTICE IS CORRECTED IN SPITE OF LOGIC

[Hume Rpt, 9 Sep-15 Dec 43]

\* \* \* Italian law provided that the Questore had the authority to jail without charge anti-Fascists under his "disposition of the Questore" power. It was reported to AMG that this official, apparently laboring under a perverted sense of Mosaic justice, was imprisoning Fascists under this power. He answered an inquiry by the simple reply that during the Fascist regime he had used his power to jail anti-Fascists and it was only fair that now he should use it to jail Fascists. Despite the logic of his reasoning, his victims were released, pending investigation by our security police. \* \* \*

#### COMPLAINTS OF PUNISHMENT FOR POLITICAL VIEWS MUST BE INVESTIGATED

[ACC Exec Memo 18, 14 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1577]

7. The Regional Commissioner shall be responsible for investigating the circumstances of all prisoners held in jail without trial and for investigating all cases of complaint by prisoners that they have been unjustly condemned for their political views. The Regional Commissioner shall forward to Headquarters ACC his recommendations for release of all such prisoners and may pending receipt of orders thereon grant provisional or conditional liberty or release, on parole, after consultation with the appropriate Italian Judicial Official. Investigation will also be made of persons charged with crimes and never brought to trial because of political connections and report made to Headquarters, ACC. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN JUSTICE TO BE EXPEDITED

[LO, Rgn III, Rpt for Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/142/381]

14. In order to expedite the hearing of trials of persons detained in jail for an alleged offence against Italian law and to reduce the number of persons in jail awaiting trial, two Regional Orders (Numbers 30 and 31) have been made. Regional Order No. 30 required all Italian Courts to sit at least six hours a day and, in Courts having both criminal and civil jurisdiction, to devote approximately three fourths of their time to criminal trials. Calendars are to be so arranged that no judge is ever without work to do. Regional Order No. 31 appoints a Lieutenant Colonel of AMG, a Councillor of the Court of Appeal and a substitute Procurator General as a Commission to investigate the state of the jails within Region III and to report to the Regional Commissioner thereon. The Order empowers the Commission (a) to order the release of any person who has been in gaol for more than 10 days and who has not had a formal charge made against him; if the Commission is of the opinion he has been in jail for a period not less than the sentence he would have received for the crime of which he is charged, and (b) to order the release of any persons who have been in jail for more than 30 days without a formal charge made against them. An order under (a) requires confirmation by a judicial officer appointed by the Regional Commissioner; an Order under (b) does not require confirmation. The Commission

has no power to order the release of persons detained by the Allied Forces, AMG or ACC on a charge of infringing any proclamation, regulation or order issued by AMG or ACC.

#### FOOD BEFORE JUSTICE

[Maj E. L. Palmieri, CAO, Rpt to the Rgnl Cmsr, Sardinia, 1 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1354]

1. On 20 March 1944, I conferred at Ozieri with the President of the Court of Appeal, Signor Volpe, and the Procuratore Generale, Signor Spallanzani. I discussed with them in detail the necessity for re-establishing the Courts at Cagliari,<sup>1</sup> and the various problems connected therewith. These gentlemen expressed their desire to co-operate and to resume their work at Cagliari as soon as arrangements could be made.

8. On 25 March 1944, I endeavored to ascertain what progress had been made with respect to the establishment of the mess at the Palace of Justice and the requisitioning of quarters for the court personnel.

I went to the court building with the Chief Architect, Signor Valente, and found that while the masonry work had been completed, no cooking facilities had been installed, nor had any messing equipment been made available. I found also, that while living quarters had been found which appeared to be suitable, the necessary requisitioning formalities had not been fulfilled. I conferred with Judge Cardia the same day. Since he was the Member of the Tribunale who had been left in Cagliari to take care of housing and feeding arrangements, it was his duty to superintend the details of these matters. I told him that he was expected to see that the requisitioning formalities were complied with; and that a more speedy effort should be made to install the mess. Judge Cardia appeared to have been occupied with other matters, and said that the person who had been chosen to supervise the mess had gone to Sassari to procure some wine. He also stated that he had been unable to find any plates, knives or forks or dining room furniture. Judge Cardia agreed to visit the Prefect to obtain his assistance in procuring the necessary mess equipment.

I spent a considerable amount of time with Signor Valente searching for cooking apparatus since it appeared that the apparatus previously promised by the Prefect was not available. We then determined that a coal stove made of masonry and tiles would have to be constructed, and that we could not expect to procure any

cooking apparatus ready to install. Incidentally, we visited a number of public buildings which had been bombed, and searched through the debris for suitable kitchens and for suitable cooking fixtures, but found that whatever was left was damaged beyond repair. We subsequently visited two iron foundries where we arranged to have certain necessary stove parts and cooking utensils manufactured. \* \* \*

[Continuation of report, written 12 April 1944]

2. A mess for the Judges and court employees has been in full operation in a section of the basement of the Palace of Justice since 5 April 1944. The establishment of the mess was a source of considerable anxiety and inconvenience, as the court officials did not receive the co-operation they had been led to anticipate from the Office of the Prefect and the local Italian officials. After several days of fruitless discussion which resulted only in the release of requisition slips which were of no practical value, a committee of the court officials . . . called on me at the offices of the Commission and placed the problem in my hands. This matter was one of great importance to the officials involved and to the court employees receiving small salaries. . . . I went to the offices of a number of Italian officials charged with the distribution of food, in order to complete the formalities, necessary for the recognition of the mess for future allotments for foodstuffs. Captain Sullivan and I delivered to the Palace of Justice a quantity of dehydrated vegetables as an advance against the allotments about to be made, and I negotiated with a mess officer of an American regiment billeted nearby to procure some residue kitchen fats. I also procured an allowance of olive oil. I cannot over-emphasize the good will and gratitude shown by the court personnel to the Commission and me as a result of these efforts. . . .

#### AN UNDEREQUIPPED AND EXASPERATED MILITARY COURT OFFICER IS TOLD OF A REMEDY

[Memo, LO, ACC, Naples Province, for Provincial Cmsr, Rgn III, 22 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1577]

1. Lack of transport for the indispensable needs of the Military Government Courts has become so grave that the program now in operation is definitely jeopardized.

After weeks of patient effort, the net succor this office has enlisted is as follows:

(a) One taxi-cab with tires of ancient vintage.

(b) Three motorcycles without drivers.

(c) The intermittent use of a motor car and driver obtained from Naples Province on a

<sup>1</sup>The town had been badly damaged in air raids.

day [to day] request that is degenerating into a raw function of nerves and personalities.

(d) A civilian automobile for use of the Provincial Legal Officer equipped with inner tubes that cannot be relied upon with any degree of certainty. Dire necessity requires that this car be used in process serving in addition to the use originally intended.

2. It is fantastic to expect such equipment to meet the realistic requirements of a metropolitan area of the size of Naples. Resort to makeshift methods [has] been used until now but cannot continue indefinitely; the human mind and body have a point of saturation beyond which they cannot absorb. This point definitely has been reached. \* \* \*

[Memo, Lt Col Alfred C. Bowman, Liaison Officer, ACC, for Deputy Exec Cmsr, Naples Province, 26 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1577]

2. I have quite properly been requested to assist in attempting to "condition" Peninsular Base Section to the inevitable day when Naples Province will be handed back to the Italian government (or legal officers now employed here will be withdrawn) and the Base Section will have to look to the Italian courts for punishment of civilian offenders except in most crucial and aggravated cases.

3. It is difficult to accomplish much along this line in the face of an expanding court structure and a growing volume of cases tried by military courts, which to the outsider evidence intent by the Commission to enlarge, rather than contract, the scope of its operations in the administration of justice. \* \* \*

All in all, it seems to me that the more prudent course would be to start at once to reverse the present trend and force more cases into the Italian courts. This may be painful to all parties concerned, but the "headaches" involved are going to be aggravated in direct proportion to the length of time for which we permit the present policy to continue.

#### PRISONERS TO BECOME JUDGES

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, to MGS, AFHQ, 13 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/108]

As you know, one of my principal difficulties in the judicial field lies in the inadequate supply of Italian judges and legal officers. . . . I understand that a considerable number could be found in the ranks of prisoners of war held by us.

If you can obtain sanction I would like to send General [Francesco] Traina, who is ap-

proximately JAG of Italian Army, to North Africa in the first instance to see what personnel is available. . . .

Grateful if you would let me know earliest possible your reactions to this proposal. It is very necessary to explore every possibility of finding reinforcements for the Italian judiciary as the problem will inevitably become acuter the more territory we transfer to Italian administration.<sup>2</sup>

#### ITALIAN COURTS ARE STILL SLOW AND UNDULY LENIENT

[Min of Remarks of Col John T. Zellars, Rgnl Cmsr, Rgn II, at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

\* \* \* Civilian courts continue to move in a very slow manner. Procedure in most grain cases is in motion. As a result of habit, it is difficult to impress legal bodies of the importance of their duty in imposing heavy penalties on small grain violators, since these constitute a great majority of black market sources. \* \* \*

#### MENTAL RESERVATIONS AND EXCUSES OF JUDGES IN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

[Memo, Col. Dawson, CLO, Southern Rgn, for Rgnl Cmsr Southern Rgn, 18 Nov 44, ACC files, 10260/142/2822]

1. During the 7 weeks of my tenure of office as Regional Chief Legal Officer for the Southern Region, I have particularly concentrated all the available energies of my Division upon the task of securing a maximum of efficient effort from all Italian Courts functioning in the Region.<sup>3</sup>

3. Wherever I have gone, I have stressed the undermentioned considerations:

a. The supreme importance of giving priority to all cases in which Allied interests directly or indirectly are involved.

b. The supreme importance of forgetting the rights of individual offenders as apparently entrenched in the ordinary peacetime practice of taking into account the sociological desirability of reforming offenders and the supreme necessity of imposing sentences which will deter by their exemplary character other persons from committing those crimes which cannot have other-

<sup>2</sup> General Mason-MacFarlane's request was approved with the suggestion that in addition to those selected by General Traina, other prisoners of war should be screened for possible use in a judicial capacity.

<sup>3</sup> Allied Legal Officers in Italian Government territory had the duty of exercising supervision over the work of Italian courts in trying cases which affected Allied interests. They were to ensure that priority be given to all such cases and that adequate sentence be imposed ACC Exec Memo 72.

wise than an adverse affect upon the Allied war effort.

c. Pointing out clearly and firmly that rapidity of judicial action following upon police complaint is the keynote of all judicial effectiveness in the handling of crime, I have repeatedly endeavored to convince the Italian Judiciary that it is just as important that justice should appear to be administered as that it in fact is.

d. Dealing with matters of intention as they affect the destruction of Allied supplies of all sorts, I have constantly reiterated the doctrine that a man must be held to intend the reasonable consequences of his acts, that no one not an idiot in interfering with ammunition for example, could believe that he was not deteriorating its effectiveness as ammunition.

4. The general impression that I have gained as a result of all these personal efforts and of consultations with my officers is that the above propositions have met with receptions passing from an apparent enthusiastic concurrence in them, through the various grades of lip service, and passive acceptance coupled with a mental reservation that they cannot be translated into action and ending with a thinly disguised hostility. Almost everywhere I have been accorded a patient and outwardly courteous hearing and everywhere, where I have raised matters of inadequacy of sentences, tardiness in bringing offenders to justice and the ever rising tide of judicial congestion in cases affecting the interests

of the Allies I have been met with some one or more of the following excuses:

- a. Lack of transportation,
- b. Difficulty of communications,
- c. Inadequate staffing,
- d. Lack of paper,
- e. Congestion of prisons. \* \* \*

#### AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IS TURNED OVER TO ITALIAN COURTS

[Col R. H. Wilmer, Dir, Legal Subcom, AC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

\* \* \* 1. Since the last meeting [May], it was proposed that the Italian courts be allowed to carry on their work. Policy in Military Government territory is to turn over as much as possible to Italian courts even in early stages in order to reduce the pressure on the very limited number of legal officers and to lay the groundwork for restoration of territory to the Italian Government.

2. In the Commune of Naples, still under Military Government, the bulk of cases is handled successfully by Italian courts. Virtually all the normal cases are tried by the Italians except cases of a serious nature.

4. In all newly occupied provinces, Italian Courts have been kept open or reopened. Politically suitable judicial personnel found locally have been put to work and many refugee officials have been restored to their proper posts. \* \* \*

## 2. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN THE REMOVAL OF FASCISTS BE ALLOWED TO IMPERIL ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS?

### DESIGN FOR DEFASCITIZATION WITHOUT ADMINISTRATIVE BREAKDOWN

[AMGOT GAI 2, 1 May 43, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

\* \* \* The entire Fascist party leadership, that is, party officials and other active and influential party members, from the top down to the local secretaries, should be removed from any posts of authority in the civil administration. This should include Federal Secretaries who are ex-officio members of various administrative departments.

Since all holders of important governmental posts are members of the Fascist party they may not be removed at once without breakdown of the administrative system. The following general principles will, however, serve as a guide:

(a) Prefects of provinces known to be

strong Fascists will be removed but subordinate officials will carry on under supervision. Some senior civil servants, including pro-Fascist officials, may be found in the appointments of prefects, etc. These may be allowed to carry on if co-operative.

(b) The same applies to mayors, etc. of larger cities.

(c) The Prefects Council, the Provincial Giunta and the Provincial Rettorate should be retained provisionally but should not meet or take action until their membership and composition have been considered.

(d) The Consulta of Communes may be retained but should not meet or take action until further orders.

(e) Fascist militia as a military or semi-military body should be abolished or disbanded.

If in military formation, the members should be treated as prisoners of war. Military or party uniforms will not be worn.

(f) Members of the militia organization who are working personnel of docks, railways and communications, may be retained on good behavior in their ordinary employ but not as militiamen.

(g) Carabinieri will continue civil police functions on good behavior. If they refuse to do so they will be treated as military prisoners of war since they are an armed and uniformed body.

(h) The Corpo degli Agenti will be retained as local police body on good behavior.

(i) The Polizia Municipale will be retained on good behavior.

(j) It should be made clear to all administrative officials that their continuation is solely on the basis of satisfactory co-operation, performance and behavior. Officials whose performance is not satisfactory should be discharged and their pay will then cease. If they are influential and considered dangerous or suspect they should be apprehended. \* \* \*

#### EVEN MINOR FASCISTS SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN CORDIALLY DISLIKED

[Instrs, Rodd to CAO's, 6 Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

1. The disturbances which have taken place in various communes appear to have been in the main directed against the retention in office of local officials appointed under the fascists regime.<sup>4</sup>

2. Where it is obvious that local officials are cordially disliked and mistrusted by the population, C.A.O.'s should take immediate steps to replace them. There appears to have been some misunderstanding in this matter, and C.A.O.'s, in some cases, appear to be under the impression that unless otherwise instructed they should retain the sitting mayor. They should, however, before recommending to me the removal of any mayor, have a candidate ready to replace him. \* \* \*

#### BUT AT FIRST HOUSE-CLEANING IS MAINLY ON TOP LEVEL

[Lt Col Poletti, SCAO, Palermo Province, Rpt for Sep 43, ACC files, 10000/100/652]

I. The month of September saw the completion of the administrative machinery of the Province of Palermo, the establishment of a firm adminis-

trative and governmental foundation based on liberal ideals, and the complete elimination of Fascist restrictions and super-impositions. An acting Prefect, S. E. Francesco Musetto, was appointed by order dated 10 September 1943. . . . This appointment was greeted with satisfaction from all quarters, as Musetto had a long and clear record of Anti-Fascism. There followed the appointment of a Sindaco and Giunta for the Commune of Palermo by order dated 27 September 1943. . . . and subsequently, that of a Provincial President and Council on 30 September 1943. . . . Realizing that the Commune and Province of Palermo and its administration would be the subject of great scrutiny and that action taken here would have reverberations throughout the Island, all of the above appointments were made only after the most thorough consideration and consultation with leading liberals and representatives of all classes within the Province. \* \* \*

#### A QUESTIONNAIRE IS DEVELOPED TO STANDARDIZE EPURATION INVESTIGATIONS

[Memo, Maj Raffa, Chief, Political Intelligence Sec, for CofS, AFHQ, 1 Nov 43, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (1), 1 Nov 43, Bulky Pkg]

\* \* \* In the first phases of occupation, AMG officers usually had to use "rule-of-thumb" judgments in determining who were and who were not "Fascists." In many instances, information was furnished by CIC and Field Security (British), but often the only accusations against individuals were of such a character that CAO's and CAPO's were faced with the alternative either of doing the individual an injustice or of taking no action at all against persons who may have been real Fascists but against whom the evidence was not at all clear.

The dependence upon CIC, FSS, or other existing military intelligence was necessarily limited in time and scope since those agencies' mission was primarily one of concern with military security of an immediate character rather than with the long-range necessities of military government. After the first phases, CIC and FSS units generally moved on with the combat armies. Thus, no matter how useful a job such units had done with respect to Fascists arrested for reasons of military security, the problem of removing the real Fascists from public office—and the renewing of cases of persons arrested as Fascists—remained with the AMG officers. Moreover the necessity of keeping in operation the existing administrative machinery of provinces and communes often permitted of no changes in official

<sup>4</sup>The conditions in Sicily did not, at first, permit much more than removal of Fascists on high levels and the most flagrant Fascists on lower levels.

personnel until a period of greater stability had been reached.

The Political Intelligence Section was thus established as an Headquarters Staff unit to serve both Headquarters divisions and field offices. Its mission was (a) to draw up specific criteria which would lead to a more precise and just conclusion with respect to the degree to which any given public official—or other outstanding individual—was in fact the type of Fascist whose elimination was desirable from AMG's point of view; (b) to provide a method for utilizing such criteria in the provinces and communes and, where necessary, at Headquarters; (c) to co-ordinate information based on these criteria with other available intelligence information, and (d) to make studied recommendations based on such co-ordinated information.

The first immediate results of this assignment were:

(1) The drawing up of a questionnaire (Scheda Personale) for distribution to all Provincial SCAO's and by them to communal CAO's.<sup>5</sup>

This questionnaire contained about 50 items which answered in YES or NO form and taken under oath, would provide much more specific information about public officials than it had been possible to obtain previously.

(2) The fact [is] that the questionnaires could be used not only as a basis for action against public officials or other outstanding individuals (such as Corporative, Syndical, Agrarian or banking officials) but also in reviewing the cases of political prisoners. Many such prisoners, jailed or put in detention camps before AMG's arrival and in some cases by AMG itself—while technically Fascists in the sense of belonging to the party or holding minor party offices were often not of a character requiring their detention in custody. Many had been arrested on mere allegations that they were Fascists or reported to be dangerous Fascists without specification. With the view that the questionnaires would provide a more complete analysis of the cases of these political prisoners, the CAO, Palermo Province, requested a review of 211 internees in the Palermo jail. \* \* \*

#### SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS AT FIRST RETARDS EPURATION ON THE MAINLAND

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501] 185. Because of the extreme shortage of C.A.O.'s and C.A.P.O.'s, there being an average of approx-

<sup>5</sup>This report is more detailed than the Sicily Scheda Personale or personal questionnaire, the prototype of the one used later by ACC/AMG throughout occupied Italy.

imately one for each 20 communes, and because of the necessity of detailing one C.A.O. to each of the five provincial capitals and using some of them for civilian supply duty, it was impossible to visit each commune quickly and overhaul its administration with respect to the removal of Fascist and incompetent officials.

The people in many of these communes were eager to rid themselves of these Fascist officials. In several cases they became impatient and, it is believed usually under Communist Party leadership, organized demonstrations and forced resignation. This was, in a way, merely a continuance of similar actions which had occurred prior to the arrival of AMG officers on the scene.

187. An ingenious method of reconciling this popular desire for the removal of Fascists with the shortage of personnel was worked out for Potenza province. A committee of highly respected known anti-Fascists was formed and it was announced that this committee was sitting under the chairmanship of an AMG officer and would hear any complaints against former Fascists. If the evidence presented warranted prosecution, prompt action was promised. The formation of this committee and its purpose was widely advertised throughout the province and the demonstrations ceased. \* \* \*

#### FASCISTS' BANK ACCOUNTS ARE BLOCKED—A FASCIST RUNS THE BANK

[Col. Hume, SCAO, Fifth Army, Rpt. 9 Sep-15 Dec 43, an. 3 [hereafter cited as Hume Rpt], ACC files, 10000/100/1093]

\* \* \* The banks in accordance with instructions, kept blocked all accounts of fascist organizations, prominent fascists and those of a government and semi-government nature. \* \* \*

One of the principal problems of the Division was the arrest and internment by C.F.O. of Giuseppe Frignani, head of the Bank of Naples. He was known to have been prominent in the fascist party in the past and also believed to have been fairly active in promoting co-operation with the Germans. This fact was reported on arrival in Naples. On the other hand, he was said to have more or less withdrawn from politics in recent years and devoted himself exclusively to banking. He was without a doubt the most capable banker in the Region, co-operated 100% and was of considerable help to the Division. The Finance Division felt, looking at it from a banking, rather than a political viewpoint, that the best interests of AMG would be served by allowing him to remain in office, especially as

his bank would have to go through trying times and if anything should happen to the bank at a later date the Allies might be subject to criticism for removing the head of the bank. The Finance Division had no information which would indicate that he was a threat to security. . . .<sup>6</sup>

#### RETENTION OF THE OLD GANG CAUSES GENERAL DISCONTENT

[AMG Officer, Rpt, 7 Oct 43, ACC files, 10700/115/284]

\* \* \* *Giffoni* (Valle Piana)—This little township, where I stayed from 26/9/43 until 4/10/43, is gradually returning to normal, although the food situation is still somewhat precarious. Salt, oil, "Pasta," soap and clothing are totally lacking. Certain medicinals, such as antityphoid injections, bandages, etc., are required. The main point of interest, however, is the general voice of discontent at the fact that the "old gang" (fascist authorities) are still in power and until these have been removed and replaced by anti-fascist elements, no satisfactory solution to *Giffoni's* present troubles will be found. \* \* \*

#### ANTI-FASCIST VIOLENCE IS BAD AND WILL GET WORSE

[Memo, Rennell for GOC, 15th AGp, 10 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/61]

17. . . . In this [Potenza] Province two riots took place; one, also, prior to the occupation of the village of Irsina and subsequent to the departure of the German troops. Here also an organized mob assault led to the Carabinieri being hemmed in to their police post while another section of the mob killed the Communal Secretary who was also the Chief Fascist and maltreated the female members of his family, who, however, have not succumbed to their injuries. Here, five ring-leaders have been arrested and are now in prison awaiting trial. At the village of Meschita in the Northern part of the Province, within the last few days a mob of people stating that they were anti-Fascist proceeded to destroy the tax rolls and Communal records. A patrol of troops was sent to the village which had a quieting effect and the ring leaders have been removed under arrest.

There is evidence in these three cases and in a number of other cases reported from the forward Eighth Army areas by Group Captain Benson's staff that we may expect anti-Fascist demonstrations of considerable violence on an increasing

<sup>6</sup> The Fascist bank official was later replaced.

scale the further north the occupation goes. Unless C.A.O.'s and troops can enter inhabited localities directly after their evacuation by German troops, there is likely to be a repetition of scenes of violence and possible bloodshed on an increasing scale. It must be borne in mind that Fascism played little part on the whole in Sicily where its adherents were relatively few, and too few to indulge continuously in the graver acts of oppression. From Lucania north this will no longer be the case and when we get to the industrial centres of Central Italy, I shall expect to see considerable violence and this, in spite of the fact that in many Provinces the Fascist Prefects and some of the more important Fascist officials have already been removed by the Badoglio Government, as in the Province of Potenza and Matera where Badoglio's nominees are now in office. \* \* \*

#### A SCREENING POLICY IS LAID DOWN FOR ALL REGIONS

[Directive, Hq AMG to RCAO's, Rgns I and II, 4 Dec. 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

1. This directive indicates the policy for "screening" Italian officials which will be carried out by all Regions.

2. The screening will be the responsibility of the R.C.A.O. and will be designed to eliminate officials of the following categories:

- (a) Fascist and Nazi sympathizers;
- (b) Those who have actively helped the enemy;
- (c) Those potentially dangerous to the security of the Allied Armed Forces or to Allied Government administration;
- (d) Passive resisters;

\* \* \* 6. . . . (b) In the case of minor Officials who are members of a National Agency, the S.C.A.O. may decide to retain them in office, but, if in his opinion they should be dismissed, the consent of the head of the appropriate specialist or Technical Division at Regional Headquarters must be obtained. \* \* \*

#### REGION III STANDARDIZES CATEGORIES OF FASCISTS TO BE REMOVED

[Directive, Rgn III AMG to All SCAO's, 20 Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 3]

1. Referring to the memorandum of this Headquarters of 14 December 1943 pertaining to the removal of certain categories of fascists from public office, it has now been determined that the directive shall become effective on 1 January 1944. You are accordingly instructed to deliver

on or before 31 December 1943, the following communication to each of the Prefects of the provinces of Naples, Avellino and Benevento:

a. In accordance with the instructions of the Regional Civil Affairs Officer for the Region of Campania and Naples, you are directed, commencing the first day of January 1944, to take the following action:

(1) All—

Squadristi  
Marcia Su Roma  
Sciarpa Littorio  
Gerachi, and

other fascists guilty of attacks against personal liberties, shall be removed from the positions they now occupy in the government or any administration directly or indirectly controlled by the government.

(2) All cases of persons previously discharged or placed on 'unlimited leave' because of their political views and all cases in which deserved promotions have not been made because of such political views shall be carefully examined; and such persons shall be reinstated or promoted, unless there be urgent reasons against such action, in which case a full report shall be made to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

(3) All Italian subjects who are holders of decorations granted by the German or Japanese Governments shall be scrutinized, and all those who have unquestionably received such honors because of their assistance in furthering the Fascist cause shall be removed from public office as aforesaid.

(4) All promotions which have been made principally because of activity in behalf of the Fascist cause shall be annulled.

b. You will immediately communicate these instructions to the heads of all governmental departments and administrations and will inform these officials that they will be held personally responsible for the faithful execution thereof.

c. A weekly report shall be made of any action taken pursuant hereto.

2. Every effort should be made to collect as many *Schede Personale* as possible, duly filled out, before 1 January 1944, after which the purpose for which the information is required will be known.

#### DENUNCIATIONS ARE USUALLY WITHOUT SERIOUS FOUNDATION

[Hume Rpt, 28 Jan 44]

\* \* \* Great difficulty is experienced in finding suitable persons to replace former Fascist

officials who are acceptable to the people. In this connection mention should be made of the numerous denunciations with which every C.A.O. is instantly faced. These usually prove to have no other foundation than the personal interest of the individuals concerned. \* \* \*

#### REASONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF FASCISTS

[Rpt, Hq ACC, for Mar 44]

. . . the bulk of officials were and had to be Fascists to earn their daily bread. The appointment of an efficient man nearly always means the appointment of a Fascist in some degree, with resulting criticism from both press and people. \* \* \*

#### EACH FASCIST TO BE CONSIDERED ON INDIVIDUAL MERITS

[ACC Exec Memo 45, 17 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/108]<sup>1</sup>

1. This directive indicates method which will be followed in occupied territory for the "Screening" of Italian officials.

2. This investigation, an explanation of which follows, will be the responsibility of the R.C. and is designed to eliminate officials who from their past record and character appear to be unsuitable to hold public office under the aegis of Allied Military Government. It is intended primarily to expel those individuals who through their own choice and inclination were ardent or prominent members or supporters of the Fascist Party.

3. The principle of this scheme is that each official is considered individually according to his personal merits and not in accordance with arbitrary criteria. Each investigation begins with the personal background of the official in his own locality and opportunity is afforded for the opinion of Allied Security and Military Government Officers who are on the spot and therefore in the best position to judge.

4. Unless such officials have already been investigated to the satisfaction of the R.C., the following measures will be adopted.

5. The R.C. will classify the officials to be investigated into two groups. List "A" indicating the Senior Officials and List "B" indicating those of lesser importance. . . . [Lists omitted.]

6. Priority of attention will be given to List "A" on the principle that if the senior officials

<sup>1</sup>Appendix III, a "Guide" for use in analyzing *Schede* returns, was issued in connection with Memorandum No. 45. It is a codification of the principles embodied in the preceding AMG directives. A copy of this guide will be found in ACC files, 10000/136/108.

are *bona fide*, they themselves will be likely to see that their subordinates are equally trustworthy. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS CITE ILL EFFECT OF LENIENCY

[Memo, Lt Col Donald D. Hoover, Chief, Communications Censorship Branch, I&C [Information and Censorship] Sec, AFHQ, for ACoFS, G-2, 21 Apr 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 5]

1. This report is a summary of comment sheets on letters from all parts of liberated Italy, Sardinia and Sicily since the first of the year, about the effectiveness of the removal of Fascists from public offices.

2. The continuance of Fascist politicians in government positions is variously reported to have the following effects.

a. Loss of faith in the liberators.

b. A continuance of corruption and bribery in office along with lack of interest in the welfare of the people with regard to food and protection against crime.

c. Use of their positions by Fascists to secure the appointment to office of other Fascists (and the exclusion of anti-Fascists), and to steal rations from the public warehouses and sell them on the Black Market.

d. Use of Government police and postal powers to suppress opposition.

e. Sheltered organization of units devoted to the restoration of the Fascists' Empire. Redistribution of confiscated civilian guns to Fascists.

f. Apathy and even opposition to the Allied cause in the Royal Italian Army.

g. Use by Fascist officials of their position to secure military information about the Allies to relay to the enemy.

h. Mockery of Allied Government as "feeble" and "confused."

3. Summaries of 40 typical allegations. . . .<sup>8</sup>

#### BUT SOMETIMES BLAME IS UNFAIR

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, to Secy of State, 22 Apr 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (8-17-43), sec. 2]

At the Italian Advisory Council's 10 Meeting, held on 21 April, the Soviet representative, [Alexander E.] Bogomolov, proposed that a recommendation be made to General Wilson expressing dissatisfaction about the Sardinian situation, particularly the failure to eliminate Fascist

<sup>8</sup> This lengthy compilation is omitted here but may be consulted in file cited above.

officials and the large number of people waiting to be tried, and asking for immediate action, on the theory that the Allied Control officials are not sufficiently energetic in carrying out the armistice terms. General [Mason-] MacFarlane explained that . . . there had been some progress in correcting the situation in Sardinia, which had been under administration by Italians since prior to the armistice and not under Allied military control, so that the Italians themselves and not the Control Commission were the ones to remove the Fascists, and that it is hard to find adequate technical personnel to replace the Fascists.<sup>9</sup>

#### DISMISSAL OF ALL OFFICIALS OF MUSSOLINI'S FASCIST GOVERNMENT IS PLANNED

[Ltr, Chief Cmsr, ACC, to SCAO's Fifth and Eighth Armies and RC's, Rgns IV and V, 24 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

1. We must differentiate between Italian officials encountered during our present Northward advance and those who we found in office during our initial occupation of Southern Italy.

2. North of the line where operations remained static for several months Italian officials have been serving the Republican/Fascist government throughout a period when liberated Italy under a properly constituted Government was co-belligerent with us.

3. It is to be anticipated that many of these officials will flee before our advance but a proportion will doubtless remain and these should all be dismissed from their posts automatically and replaced by anti-Fascist personnel. As we move North the possibility of finding suitable anti-Fascist personnel should become much greater than it has been hitherto. \* \* \*

#### SECOND THOUGHT—CONCENTRATE ON LEADING POSITIONS

[ACC Exec Memo 67, 5 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/109/2110]

1. Inasmuch as the Directive and the separate Memorandum of the Chief Commissioner both dated 24 May 1944 have given rise to a few questions, the following constitutes a revised and consolidated directive, designed to meet these questions and possibly to forestall others.

2. Many of the Italian officials in the area north of the line marking the beginning of the recent

<sup>9</sup> The Italian Government carried out epuration on the mainland little better than in Sardinia, but it greatly stepped up the pace of epuration after it moved to Rome. (See below, Chapter XVI, Section 5.)

offensive were placed in office by so-called Republican Fascist Government or by the Germans. Others, however, despite their hostility to the Fascist Government, have been compelled through coercion to remain in office or through devotion to duty may have chosen to remain and serve their people.<sup>10</sup> \* \* \*

3. The object of ACC is to rid the country as we go through it of the important fascists and of persons put in office by the Republican [Fascist] Government. While many important fascists are not necessarily men who are now holding important administrative posts considerations of expedience make it necessary for SCAO's and RC's to confine themselves to an examination of those holding the more important posts. [See Executive Memo No. 45, above.]

5. Officials (as well as any other persons) regarded as potentially dangerous should in addition be locked up immediately. . . .

8. SCAO's and RC's have full discretion in exceptional cases to retain as a purely temporary expedient a fascist in office where the immediate administration of any locality renders this essential. In all such cases the work of the individual should be closely supervised and application should be made at once for a replacement to the appropriate Subcommission.

#### GUIDE FOR INITIAL PURGE OF LEADING FASCISTS [ACC Exec Memo 67, 7 Apr 45 (rev), ACC files, 10000/ 109/2110]

1. This revised Executive Memorandum No. 67 is issued in the light of experience gained in the working of the original Memorandum No. 67 of 5 July 1944, which is hereby cancelled. The policy and the principle of operation remain the same.

2. Our object is to remove from territory, immediately on liberation, all leading fascists from important posts, especially those collaborationists put in office by the Republican Fascist Government. This Memorandum is intended as a guide for such an initial purge.

It will be followed by a more detailed purge under GO 35 and ultimately by the procedure under DLL 159 and amending decrees and therefore this Directive is not concerned with minor

posts or minor fascist officials; they can be dealt with later.<sup>11</sup> The Allies must create a sound impression by quickly removing the leading fascists from the important posts.

3. Many officials will have been placed in office by the Republican Fascist Government; others will have taken the oath of allegiance to the Fascist Government; on the other hand, others will be career officials who have considered it their duty to stick to their posts in the interests of the civil administration; others, again (it is understood from reliable reports), have remained at their posts at great peril and have refused to take the oath of allegiance. Wholesale dismissals are, therefore, to be avoided as much injustice may be done quite apart from rendering it difficult to carry on the administration.

It is safe to assume that the worst fascists will be removed by CLN's before arrival of the Allies; the remainder of those in office will be dealt with in accordance with this directive.

6. If there is any doubt as to the fascist background of any person holding an office . . . he may be required to complete a Scheda Personale. The Provincial Commissioner may, if he considers it desirable, consult the prefect or CLN [*Comitate di Liberazione Nazionale*] on any particular case. No attention will be paid to anonymous communications.

7. Persons suspended under this Memorandum, except those mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 9, will be paid on the same basis as persons suspended under DLL 159. Temporary employees, whether employed on a day-to-day basis or on a fixed term basis, e.g., 6 months, will, however, be dismissed.

8. Lists of persons suspended under this Memorandum, specifying the offices from which they have been removed, will be submitted to HQ AC for attention of the appropriate Sub-Commission or where none is appropriate to the Civil Affairs Section.

9. In addition to the foregoing, all Italian administrative organizations whose continued existence is inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the Italian National Government, or which have

<sup>10</sup> This memorandum allowed a greater latitude in retaining Fascist officials than the Chief Commissioner's letter of 24 May. One reason was that the above memorandum was issued after the Allies had taken Rome and had become aware of how large a number of individuals had remained in office under the Fascists for justifiable reasons. Moreover, by this time the Allies had decided to turn over the more systematic epuration work to Italian committees.

<sup>11</sup> AMGOT GO 35, Suspension of Fascist Officials and Employees, will be found in Chapter XVI, Section 7. For the major features of DLL-159 (*Decreto Legislativo Luogotenenziale*), Sanctions Against Fascism, see Chapter XVI, Section 5. Shortly after DLL-159 was issued by the government, AMG adapted its epuration policy to the principles of that decree and also to the use of Italian provincial committees for carrying out the great bulk of epuration, although immediately upon occupation, in accordance with ACC Executive Memo No. 67, AMG officials used their administrative judgment in quickly ejecting the leading fascists from key positions.

been abolished by decrees thereof, are deemed no longer to exist; the holders of offices in such organizations will probably have fled, but if any such are found purporting to hold any office or to exercise any executive functions in connection therewith they will be removed from office.

Such bodies include:

a) All Ministries and Departments of the Republican Fascist Government;

b) National, Federal, Provincial and Communal organizations of the fascist party, of the Chamber of Fasci and of Corporations; of Fascist Syndicates and Federations;

c) The Fascist Militia, the National Republican Guard and OVRA;

d) Presidi, Vice Presidi and Rettorati of Provinces; Consulte of Communes;

e) The Tribunali Speciali, the Tribunali Straordinari Provinciali and the "Brescia" Court of Cassation.

10. Officials (as well as any other persons) regarded as potentially dangerous will in addition to suspension be taken into custody immediately. They may be interned or on the request of the Italian Government to AC be handed over to the custody of that Government. Whenever a person

is interned a report will forthwith be made to HQ AC.

11. It is emphasized that in carrying out the important duty of ridding the country of fascists nothing herein is intended to prejudice the right of SCAO's and RC's to dismiss and/or intern individuals at their discretion without reference to their present official position or past fascist office.

12. SCAO's and RC's have discretion in most exceptional cases to retain as a purely temporary expedient a fascist in office where the immediate administration of any locality renders this essential and no local replacement can be found. In all such cases the work of the individual should be closely supervised and application should be made at once for a replacement to the appropriate Sub-Commission. In the North, however, it should seldom, if ever, be necessary to exercise this discretion.

#### PROGRESS OF EPURATION THE FIRST YEAR WAS SLOW

[AMG, ACC Memo Summarizing Defascistization Action, 21 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

By AMG \* \* \*

#### Cases

	Results	Investigated	Dismissed	Retained	Not Completed
Region I	by 11 Feb	3671	205	3466	7234
Region II		no cases completed			
Region III	by 30 Jun	incomplete, unable to supply figures			
Region IV		has never been under AMG <sup>12</sup>			

6. It will be seen therefore that AMG for various reasons, has not made very great progress in screening Italian officials and removing those of strong fascist background.

#### By ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

28 Dec—A. The Italian Government issued a decree (which was later amended in Apr) for removing from office officials who had held certain positions in fascist organizations or had taken part in certain fascist activities. For the purpose of achieving this, the existing Council of Ministers was to deal with officers down to Grade VI, i.e. down to the equivalent of Vice Prefect; lower officials were to be dealt with by Ministerial Commission under Presidency of [Dr. Adolfo]

<sup>12</sup> The statistics cover only the Fascists removed from office through the formal procedures for epuration. Many more, of course, were dismissed on the basis of administrative judgment.

Omodeo. \* \* \*

C. So far as is known, neither the Council of Ministers nor the Ministerial Commission have ever sat, the Ministerial Commission has never even been appointed.

26 May—D. A decree for punishment of fascist offences was published making the taking part in certain fascist activities a crime punishable for certain offences by death, for others by imprisonment up to a life term.

E. A few persons have been arrested; investigation of their cases is proceeding as is investigation of other cases. No trial has yet taken place. Work has been suspended pending the issue of the new decree. \* \* \*

H. No measures yet have been issued dealing generally with the property of business activities of the so called parastatal concerns, suggestions have been made to the Italian Government but no reply has as yet been received.

### DELIVER US FROM THE RESULTS OF SUCH OVERZEALOUSNESS

[Notes of Mtg Between Brig Upjohn and Italian High Cmsr for Epuration, 5 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

Brig Upjohn said that at Perugia there had been an AMG officer who had not clearly understood his instructions and who had ordered an exceptional number of suspensions of Administra-

tive Officials. In the one province he had suspended about 900 persons. There was little doubt that a large number of persons had been suspended on insufficient grounds and also the local services had been disorganized. He was anxious that the re-consideration of these cases should be proceeded with very quickly, firstly to end any injustice and secondly so that the services could be re-established. . . .

## 3. FASCIST LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS ARE GRADUALLY ANNULLED

### INITIAL UNCERTAINTY OVER THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATIVE STATE MACHINERY

[Force 141, Appreciation and Outline Plan, 25 Mar 43 (See above, Chapter VII), CAD files, Husky]

(128) Under usage of international law occupying forces are presumed to recognize and act through existing administrative organizations.<sup>13</sup> It is also necessary to do so to conserve personnel. However, in this territory, a part of the administrative organization, particularly on the economic side, is the corporative state machinery, which is the heart of the fascist system. To what extent will the Allied Forces work with or through agencies such as the corporation . . . and the federation of employers and employees . . . ? The question is bound to arise early as in continuing salaries of officials, or obtaining labor for the occupying forces. In the latter case the authorities through whom it may be most convenient to work will be federation officials. There are several possible courses:

a. Publicly announce at the outset the dissolution of these agencies.

b. At the other extreme, disregard their fascist origin and work through them where it is useful to do so. This would involve continuing to pay officials who hold office only by reason of the fascist system and might be subject to comment or attack.

c. Eliminate gradually by order or decree the agencies which serve no useful purpose, making the test on a military rather than a political basis. This question cannot be answered finally at this stage but the general line to be taken should be determined. \* \* \*

<sup>13</sup> A provision of the Hague Convention on belligerent occupation prohibits the occupant from making changes in the basic policy of the country occupied.

### ITALIAN LAW TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS CHANGED BY PROCLAMATION OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

[AMGOT Plan for Mil Govt of Sicily, p. 14.]

(55) . . . Italian law, both civil and criminal, will be recognized as continuing except provisions which are repealed or superseded in the application of the above general principles [of defascistization].

(56) Laws which are to be annulled or suspended will be specified in proclamations of the M.G. or rendered ineffective by administrative action of AMGOT.

### THE FASCIST PARTY AND ITS ORGANIZATIONS ARE DISSOLVED FORTHWITH

[AMGOT Proclamation 7, p. 56, AGO files, AMGOT Plan]

Whereas it is the purpose of the Allied Powers to deliver the people of Italy from the Fascist Regime, *now*, therefore, I [General Alexander], General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces in Sicily and Military Governor of the Occupied Territory hereby proclaim as follows:

#### Article I

#### Dissolution of the Fascist Party

The organization known as the Fascist Party (P.N.F.) in the Occupied Territory is hereby dissolved and declared to be illegal. The property and assets of the said organization shall be taken by or delivered to officers of the Allied Military Government appointed for that purpose in accordance with directions which will be issued by the Chief Civil Affairs Officers.

## Article II

### Organizations Affiliated With the Fascist Party

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will from time to time issue Orders either dissolving the organization of any body or activity which appertains to, depends from or is in any way affiliated to or controlled by the Fascist Party or declaring that the same or any branch thereof shall be carried on as being for the benefit of the people of the occupied territory but under such control or supervision and in accordance with such modification of rules, procedure and objects as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer may direct. Any such Order may make provision for the taking or safeguarding of the property or assets of any such organization and provide penalties for failure to observe and perform any provision of the Order.

## Article III

### Disposal of Property of Fascist Organizations

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will make orders as to the disposal of any property acquired by the Allied Military Government under this Proclamation and may in his discretion as a part of any such order direct that the same property or any part thereof shall be applied by the Allied Military Government for the benefit of the people of the Occupied Territory in such manner or through such organization as he may direct.

## Article IV

### Repeal of Laws

The Chief Civil Affairs Officer will by Order annul, amend or render inoperative any law in force in the Occupied Territory which relates to a Fascist organization or any dependent or allied organization thereof or which affects prejudicially the United States or Great Britain or their nationals or any other of the United Nations or their nationals and any law which discriminates against any person or persons on the basis of race, colour or creed, and he may also by any such order provide penalties for the failure to observe or perform the same.

## Article V

### Offences

No person shall—

(1) promote, assist or attend at any public or private meeting of the Fascist Party or any organization designed to replace it;

(2) use or permit to be used any building or other premise for the purposes of conducting

any meeting, business or other affairs of the Fascist Party;

(3) print, publish or circulate or have in his possession with intent to publish or circulate any printed or written matter by or on behalf of the Fascist Party;

(4) wear or have in his possession any badge or insignia of the Fascist Party, or attire himself in such a manner as to suggest membership of the Fascist Party;

(5) make, collect or receive any subscription to the funds of the Fascist Party;

(6) take or receive any oath or give or receive any undertaking or promise to the Fascist Party;

(7) do any other act whatsoever intended or likely to promote or sustain the Fascist Party.

For the purpose of this Article the Fascist Party shall include any organization designed to replace it and any organization declared to be illegal under an order of the Chief Affairs Officer made under Article II hereof.

## ABOLITION OF THE FASCIST CORPORATIVE SYSTEM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LABOR OFFICES IN SICILY

[AMGOT GO 8, 24 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \*

## Article I

### Abolition of Certain Fascist Institutions

The Fascist Corporative Syndicate System and the following unions and councils, that is to say—

(a) Unione Provinciale Fascista Lavoratori dell'Industria;

(b) Unione Provinciale Fascista Lavoratori dell'Agricoltura;

(c) Unione Provinciale Fascista Lavoratori del Commercio;

(d) Unione Provinciale Fascista Lavoratori del Credito Assicurazioni;

(e) Unione Fascista degli Industriali;

(f) Unione Fascista degli Agricoltori;

(g) Unione Fascista del Commercianti;

(h) Unione Fascista del Credito Provincia di Palermo;

(i) Unione Provinciale Fascista Professionisti ed Artisti;

(j) Consiglio Provinciale delle Corporazioni;

and all branches, constituent syndicates, units and other dependencies thereof respectively are hereby dissolved.

## Article II

### Creation of Labour Offices

The following institutions are hereby created—

- (a) A Regional Labour Office for Sicily;
- (b) A Provincial Labour Office for each of the Provinces of Palermo, Messina, Catania, Trapani, Ragusa, Siracusa, Agrigento, Caltanissetta and Enna.

## Article III

### Rules and Regulations

Rules and Regulations will be issued by the Allied Military Government to enable the Regional Labour Office for Sicily and the Provincial Labour Offices hereby established to fulfil their objects and perform and carry out their powers, duties and functions.

## Article IV

### Objects of The Regional Labour Office for Sicily

Subject to the Rules and Regulations to be issued as aforesaid, the Regional Labour Office for Sicily will have the following power, duties and functions within the Island of Sicily—

- (a) To consider forthwith the most practicable and expeditious method of re-establishing and assuring freedom of labour organization and representation throughout the Island of Sicily;
- (b) The co-ordination of the work of and the information and statistics compiled by the Provincial Labour Offices;
- (c) The compilation of similar information and statistics for the Island of Sicily;
- (d) The issuing of periodical reports and bulletins on labour questions for issue to the public or otherwise;
- (e) To act as conciliator, mediator or arbitrator in labour cases which are of special economic significance or of interest to the entire region;
- (f) Generally to do all such other things in connection with labour matters within the Island of Sicily as may be required. \* \* \*

### BLOWS AT FASCIST CREEDS AND DEEDS

[Poletti, SCAO, Palermo Province, Rpt for Sep 43]

I. . . . As . . . . demonstration of the avowed intention of the Allied Military Government to eradicate all evidence of Fascist doctrines, an order was issued dated 24 September . . . to the effect that all references to racial origin were to be eliminated from official documents. A further order dated 28 September . . . established a Pro-

vincial Commission to investigate all property illegally diverted by the Fascists to their own use and to ensure that all property and funds so obtained were to be placed to the credit of the State. Another blow at the Fascist structure was the order, dated 9/3/43, abolishing all labor Syndicates and Unions. \* \* \*

### SOME FASCIST LAWS ARE DIFFICULT FOR AMGOT TO CHANGE

[Chanler, Rpt to the Dir, CAD, 21 Dec 43, CAD files, 019.1, AMG (5-27-43) (1)]

\* \* \* Nearly every Italian law was either inextricably interwoven with Fascism or had been so administered for the past many years as to support Fascism. It was obviously impossible to repeal all these laws until it was possible to substitute new statutes in their place. As a military occupant is not supposed under international law to change the fundamental laws of the country any more than absolutely necessary, on account of the temporary nature of his occupancy, this could not have been properly undertaken by AMG even if there had been a sufficient staff of trained legislative draftsmen to undertake such a Herculean task. It was decided that generally speaking, the only thing that could be done was to suppress obviously discriminatory statutes and obviously pro-Fascist institutions, either by decree or administrative action, and to wait the formation of an Italian Government capable of tackling the major problem of rewriting Italian law so as to completely eradicate all traces of Fascism. \* \* \*

### BADOGGIO GOVERNMENT COMMITS ITSELF TO ANTI-FASCIST LEGISLATION BUT IS SLOW TO ACT

[Memo, CLO, Legal Subcom ACC, ca. Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/132/317]

The following is a very brief survey of legislation passed . . . by the Italian Government since the fall of Fascism [aiming at the re-establishment of civil and political rights of Italian citizens].<sup>14</sup>

#### I. *Right to be tried by an ordinary court.*

a. Special tribunal for defense of the State set up by the Fascist regime to try political and

<sup>14</sup> In November 1943 the Cabinet of the Italian Government issued a communiqué listing the measures to be taken to remove Fascism from governmental administration. Msg, AMM to AFHQ, 29 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/29. These measures are reviewed in this memorandum of the Chief Legal Officer.

certain other offenses has been abolished by Royal Decree Law of 29 July 1943, No. 668.

2. *Right to elect a legislative body.*

a. Decree Law of 2 August 1943, No. 705 dissolved the Fascist Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni and provided for an election of a new Chamber of Deputies to be held four months after the cessation of the present state of war.

3. *Equality of all citizens.*

a. The entire body of provisions discriminatory against bachelors in public service, in the armed forces, etc., has been abolished by Royal Decree Law of 2 August 1943, No. 707.

b. R. [Royal] Decree Law of 20 January 1944, No. 25 restored civil and political rights "to Italian citizens and aliens formerly declared or considered to be of Jewish race." The law expressly repealed the series of discriminatory provisions reducing Italian Jews to second rate citizenship and abrogated "any other provision or rule in whatever form enacted which has a racial character or is in any way contrary to or incompatible with this decree." . . .

c. R. Decree Law of 6 January 1944, No. 9 provides for readmission into State and other public or quasi-public service of any employee:

(1) dismissed in pursuance to racial law

(2) dismissed because of his refusal to take oath of allegiance to the Fascist regime

(3) dismissed in consequence of a condemnation for political crimes or of a confinement for political motives

(4) who can prove that his dismissal was due exclusively to political considerations

4. *Right of labor to freely organize.*

The central organizations of the corporative structure have been abolished and the right to free organization of labor union has been introduced in practice. \* \* \*

[Memo, Legal Subcom, Rear Hq ACC, 27 May 44, ACC files, 10000/142/548]

1. Since the Royal Decree Law of 2 August 1943 No. 704 providing for the suppression of the "Partito Nazionale Fascista" which was published in Rome, there has been no further legislation of this character.

3. Briefly, the effect of the main decree under para (1) above was to suppress the Party itself and with it the central and provincial offices

whilst attributing the activities and assets of the affiliated bodies to various departments of state. Some of these organizations have been converted into local bodies under the existing governmental set up, such for instance as the assistance branches of the N.P.A. which were handed over to the communal assistance boards for relief work.

4. The remaining Fascist associations, legions, institutes, groups and committees were allotted for liquidation to various departments of administration, as for instance the "Gioventu Italiana del littorio" (G.I.L.) which was divided between the Ministries of War and Education.

5. The Legal Subcommittee has enquired on many occasions from the Ministry of Justice as to the progress made with the dissolution of the remaining organizations and has communicated to the Italian Government lists of fascist bodies reported to be still in existence in the provinces by the various subcommittees, notably Public Safety.

6. The latest information called for from the Minister of Justice regarding the point as to what further steps are contemplated by way of legislation or otherwise, elicits the reply that each department of state is engaged actively on this matter and is in the process of issuing individual administrative instructions, which will be communicated to this subcommittee in due course.

THE GOVERNMENT ALLEGES NON-FASCIST AGENCIES HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED UNDER AMG

[Memo, Council of Ministers, transmitted by Badoglio to Chief Cmsr ACC, 13 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/609]

\* \* \* 1. *Administrative Organization*

It has happened that the Allied authorities have suppressed in the territories under their control, agencies and institutions of fundamental importance to the Italian administrative organization such as the Economy Provincial Councils, which are only the old Chambers of Commerce; and, as for instance, in Sicily they have established in some regions new offices which have nothing to do with the administrative organization of the remaining provinces of the Kingdom.

In order to secure unity of directive in the administration of free Italy, it would be desirable if the Italian and the Allied Governments should consult one another before issuing ordinances that might have differing effects upon the organization of the public administrations. \* \* \*

#### THE FINANCE SUBCOMMISSION SUSPECTS PERSISTENCE OF OLD FASCIST CENTRALISM

[Memo, Col E. H. Foley, Jt Dir, Finance Subcom, ACC, for Legal Subcom, ACC, 6 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/142/548]

4. . . . d. So far as the Consigli Provinciali dell'Economia . . . are concerned this Subcommittee has had numerous conferences on the subject with the Industry and Commerce Subcommittee and with the two former Ministers of Finance. . . . The statement that "suggests that these organizations are the continuation of the old Camere di Commercio, nonpolitical and existing since 1862," is extremely misleading. \* \* \*

. . . We feel that far from being "non-political" these organizations were the powerful foundations of the entire Fascist system of control of the entire economic life by the Central Government. Since the abolition of these bodies in Sicily and Region II local merchants and industrialists have organized Chambers of Commerce to fulfill the legitimate functions for the economy of the Region formerly under the control of the Consigli. The Italian Government has made determined efforts to abolish these democratic organizations and return to the familiar, Fascist way of doing things. . . .

5. We feel that the advice of the Council of Ministers to your Subcommittee is one more evidence that regardless of which government is

in political power at any given moment, the Italians think of the corporative way of doing things as the normal way. This necessarily involves that measure of central government control which is described as Fascism. It is submitted that both the Italian Government and the Allied Control Commission are obligated by the Armistice Terms and the Directives, respectively, to wipe out Fascism in Italy. Our policy could probably have been more direct in this respect. The policy of the government discloses a high degree of lack of comprehension of the problem. \* \* \*

#### ACC PRESSES GOVERNMENT FOR ABOLITION OF MORE FASCIST ORGANIZATIONS

[Ltr, Admin Sec, ACC, to Prime Minister Bonomi, 30 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/142/548]

In a memorandum dated 22 June the Minister of Justice sent to the Allied Control Commission

a. a list of fascist societies which it was proposed to dissolve and

b. a list of societies which were under consideration by the Cabinet.

I have not yet received any news of the actual dissolution of the bodies referred to in list (a) and I shall be glad to hear from you when I may expect to receive from you a draft decree effecting this.

I shall also be glad to hear of your intentions in regard to the bodies in list (b)—their epuration and future conduct.

## 4. ITALIAN LABOR RECEIVES A NEW CHARTER OF RIGHTS

### CIVILIANS EMPLOYED BY ALLIED FORCES GET BETTER WORK CONDITIONS<sup>15</sup>

[Statement issued by AMGOT Hq on Uniform Wage Scale and Conditions of Employment for Civilian Employees of Armed Forces, effective 1 Oct 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. Y-7]

(a) Eight (8) hours shall constitute a work day exclusive of meal time and time required to travel to and from work.

(b) Time and one half shall be paid for work in excess of eight (8) hours in a given day. However, over time work shall be discouraged in the interest of efficiency and employment of surplus labor; and shall be permitted only in case of *emergency*.

<sup>15</sup> The Sicily labor policies were, in general, the bases of those applied later throughout occupied Italy.

(c) No extra compensation shall be paid for Sunday or Holiday work.

(d) Civilian labor shall be employed at minimum rates for a probationary period of one week. Thereafter, the rates of pay may be revised within the maximum limit of the discretion of the employing Arm or Service.

(e) Wage rates in existing services, e.g. railroad, public utilities, etc., shall be continued unchanged until further notice. In cases where such services are actually taken over by the Armed Forces, civilian personnel of the particular organization involved shall not be placed on the Military payroll.

(f) All branches of the Allied Armed Forces, and all civilian contractors engaged to work for the Armed Forces, shall be bound by the provisions contained herein.

(i) Branches of the Armed Forces which employ labor directly *shall not* be responsible for benefit payroll deductions directed and authorized by law. Responsibility for payment of such deductions shall be that of the individual employee.

(ii) *Civilian contractors* engaged to work for the Armed Forces *shall* be responsible for making such employee payroll deductions and benefit payments as may be directed or authorized by law. \* \* \*

#### THE CORPORATIVE SYNDICAL SYSTEM IN SICILY ABOLISHED

[Capt David A. Morse, Dir, Labor Subcom, Hq AMG, Summary of Report, Labor in Sicily from 10 July 1943 to 26 October 1943, 5 Nov 43 [hereafter cited as Morse Rpt], ACC files, 10000/154/318]

(c). (i) There was no free labor movement or industry association under Fascism. State labor-industry control was the key to the Fascist theory of government and was accomplished through the Corporative Syndical System. The syndicate was the base cell of the Fascist social and economic concept. Workers and employees within certain occupations were organized into separate syndicates and permitted to function by positive law. . . .

(iii) After examination of the Corporative Syndical System, conferences with pre-Fascist labor leaders, anti-Fascist groups, government representatives, employers, and workers, and after an intensive survey of the Island, it became clear that the system should be abolished. Revision was impossible. It would have meant appointing administrators of syndicates, financing them, and hence complete government regulation and control. Continuation of the system meant continuation of Fascism. It was therefore decided that each group should be left to build for itself what it thought would best serve its purposes, the social and economic welfare of the Island, and its sense of freedom and liberty. To this end, the Fascist Corporative Syndical System was dissolved and all Fascist officials removed.

(iv) . . . effective 1 October 1943 . . . General Order No. 8 [sec. 3, above] . . . dissolved the Corporative Syndical System; established a system of Provincial Labor Offices, a Regional Labor Office for Sicily, method of adjusting labor disputes; and assured a free labor movement for Sicily. . . .

(v) To assure stability during the period of transition from the old system to the new freedom, Administrative Instruction-Labor No. 2 was issued. . . . It provided for continuation of the

substantive hour, wage, and condition of employment provisions of existing collective agreements pending opportunity for revision. \* \* \*

#### AMGOT-SICILY HAS ESTABLISHED A FRAMEWORK FOR DEMOCRACY IN LABOR AND INDUSTRY

[Morse Rpt]

3.

a. By 26 October 1943 AMGOT had accomplished the following in the field of labor:

(1) Established a uniform wage scale for Sicily governing civilians employed by branches of the Armed Forces.

(2) Completed a study of the Italian wage structure and system with recommendations for revision and adjustment.

(3) Completed a cost of living study for Sicily. . . .

(4) Concluded the task of procuring and supplying labor to branches of the Armed Forces.

(5) Abolished the Fascist Corporative Syndical System.

(6) Substituted civilian government agencies for handling labor problems subject to A.M.G. guidance and supervision.

(7) Consolidated under the Regional Labor Office for Sicily previous Fascist functions which were found to be of benefit to workers and the public; having eliminated those which were found objectionable.

(8) Provided a machinery for present and future self determination of labor disputes and contracts.

(9) Assured a framework for a free labor and trade association movement.

(10) Initiated a study of co-operatives, workmen's compensation, and public health systems.

b. As of 26 October 1943 there was considerable unrest among the workers who were asking for wage increases to meet the higher cost of living. Several unions had been organized on the Island. The most prominent [was] in Palermo. . . . The public was voicing itself in the first free press that they have had in 25 years, on questions relating to labor. There had been no strikes or lockouts. There had been four important labor disputes between employers and employees, all of which were resolved by agreement between the parties after reference by employer and employee representatives to the new Regional Labor Office. The outstanding grievances were scarcity of food, the growing black market, and rising cost of living.

c. A framework for democracy in labor and industry has been established in Sicily. The third phase will answer the question of whether or not

the Sicilians will responsibly accept their new challenge of freedom. Much will depend upon the ability of the population and the Allies to meet the need for procurement and supply of food, eliminating the black market, and arresting the rise in cost of living. \* \* \*

#### ACC ACTIVATES A LABOR SUBCOMMISSION WITH SOCIAL AS WELL AS MILITARY AIMS

[Memo, Dir, Labor Subcom, ACC, for Office of Econ Dir, Hq AMG, 10 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/146/19]

1. The *Mission* of this Commission is conceived to encompass the following:

a. To formulate the policy and to supervise the organization and administration of the supply and distribution of labor (of all types) on demand by other branches to services essential to:

(1) the successful prosecution of the war, and

(2) the rehabilitation, life and well being of the Community.

b. To supervise industrial relations and determine the policy and procedure to be followed for the formation of free associations of employers and for arbitration between them.

c. To ensure that approved standards of safety and welfare are adopted in factories and workshops.

d. To secure the reinstatement in each occupied Province, as far as they are acceptable or feasible, of pre-war Labor Laws controlling hours of work and employment of women and children.

e. To study, promulgate and enforce wage standards in each industry and Province.

f. To participate with other branches in the proper collection and just distribution of Social Insurance premiums and benefits, and to supervise the organization and operation of benefit payment procedure.

2. The *Major Functions* of this commission are:

a. To ensure the accurate and complete registration of manpower (including womanpower where necessary) and the smooth working of an unbiased "placing" machine through which all vacancies shall be filled.

b. To determine, in co-operation with the services and branches responsible for manufacture and production of war materials, Agriculture and Fisheries, Public Works, Utilities and Fuel, etc., priorities in the demand for labor in short supply.

c. To plan, in co-operation with the Italian

authorities, for the absorption of demobilized Italian soldiers into Italian economic life, and for the proper co-ordination of the rate of demobilization with the rate of maximum absorption.

d. To ensure, in collaboration with other branches concerned, the welfare of employed and unemployed and their dependents.

e. To supervise the performance of these duties by the Italian Government and record facts and progress.

f. To advise on legal and executive changes necessary.

#### THE RIGHT OF ORGANIZATION IS RETURNED TO LABOR

[AMG GO 17, 18 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/142/940]<sup>16</sup>

##### *Labor Relations*

Whereas in Sicily by General Order No. 8 [sec. 3, above] and in Calabria, Lucania and the Province of Salerno by Regional Order No. 5, the Fascist Corporative Syndicate System was dissolved and a method provided for reestablishing and assuring freedom of labor organization.

Now, therefore, in furtherance of the objectives of said General and Regional Orders, I, Charles M. Spofford, Colonel, GSC, Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, hereby order as follows:

##### Article I

##### *Right of Organization*

Employees shall have the right to organize, hold meetings, and select representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to all matters pertaining to or connected with their employment, including such matters as concern hours, wages, working conditions, grievances, disputes and mutual social and economic assistance.

##### Article II

##### *Effective Date*

This Article will become operative in Sicily, Calabria, Lucania, and the Province of Salerno on the date hereof.

<sup>16</sup> Upon approval of CCS, a statement of labor policy implementing GO 8 was issued as GO 17, applicable to all occupied Italy. This order did not restore the right to strike, which remained under the regulation of Italian law that had not been suspended. In fact, local strikes had already taken place, even though not legally sanctioned.

THE ARMED FORCES ARE URGED TO ADAPT THEIR LABOR POLICY TO NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY

[Memo, Col Joseph T. R. Bain, Dir, Labor Subcom, to Exec Cmsr, ACC, 9 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/146/462]

2. General Guides

a. *Wages, Hours and Conditions of Employment.* All tactical units must be furnished with a tentative wage scale and instructions concerning hours and conditions of employment which *must* be applied uniformly to all civilians employed by the Armed Forces. The scale should be tentative, and carefully adjusted to the normal civilian scale, and subject to early and equitable revision in the field after consultation with Advance Main Headquarters so that proper co-ordination can be effected. . . .

b. Careful consideration must be given to *Cost of Living* and the economy in which employment is being offered so as to avoid economic dislocation, and control the forces of inflation insofar as possible. In the latter connection, firm controls, actually and severely exercised, must be set up to combat the black market in commodities. Soldier spending must be limited, and strictest supervision given to retail merchant prices.

c. *Civilian Wages* (as distinguished from wages paid to persons employed by Armed Forces) and *Commodity Prices* to be frozen upon occupation, and then adjusted in relation to each other as economic circumstances warrant. Wages or prices must not be acted upon separately, and must also be considered in relation to the Armed Forces Wage Scale. . . .

d. *Issue of Food to Persons Employed by Armed Forces* should not be undertaken until necessary, must be *uniform*, paid for by the individual worker, and where possible, eaten on the job. Function of supply should be to balance subsistence ration to *entire* civilian personnel. Over and above this, extra rations should be issued in cases of operational necessity and essential war work. Stress uniformity in type of ration issued, amount, and charge to individual worker. . . .

e. *Central Labor Offices* should be established by Labor Officers in their respective areas, and all labor for Armed Services supplied therefrom. If able-bodied persons refuse employment, they should be denied relief and rationing benefits.

f. *Continue Social Security Functions.* Take immediate steps to eliminate objectionable political features.

g. *Establish Principles of Free Labor Movement*, and collective bargaining. . . .

h. *Elimination or Revision of Totalitarian Systems* will be essential. . . .

i. *Must Be Central Co-ordination* of work of all bases, districts, and other unit Labor Offices (Army and Navy), so that uniformity in labor relations is achieved and maintained. This principle is essential to any successful operation. If the plan is one of Military Government, co-ordination and control should be by the Labor Division, otherwise by a Staff Labor Officer attached to the Advance Main Headquarters. \* \* \*

ACC CONSIDERS STABILIZATION OF WAGES ESSENTIAL TO INFLATION CONTROL

[Allied Anti-Inflation Comm. (Italy), ACC, Rpt, 19 Jun 44]

\* \* \* A. Stabilization of wages is a primary condition of inflation control. Maladjustments in the wage structure must, of course, be corrected and there should be latitude in the application of the policy. It is to be expected that in the process of adjusting wages to take care of individual problems, there will be a net effect of an increase in the wage level. However, the policy, or objective, should be to maintain to the maximum extent possible the existing level of controlled wages.

B. An effective wage control should be extended over as wide a section of the working population as is possible. In particular, this policy should apply to Italian employees of the Allied Armed Forces and to agricultural labor so far as possible.

C. At the present time the improvement of living conditions which may be demanded by labour organizations or the Italian Government should be accomplished by general increases in the rationed distribution of commodities at controlled prices, and not by increases in money wages apart from those which merely involve removing maladjustments of one wage group as against another.

This policy should be continued until the time arrives when the ration available to the general public at controlled prices provides a basic minimum for subsistence, i.e., a ration of 2,000 calories of food per day, and a reasonable amount of clothing, boots/shoes. After this ration has been achieved, a formula for the determination of wage levels should be applied which will adjust wages in accordance with an index measuring the increase in the price of the rationed and controlled commodities (including rent). So long as

rations are below the basic minimum the application of such a formula should not be attempted.

In general, wage policy should be such as will not provide increases in wages to compensate for price increases in the uncontrolled commodity markets.

D. One of the principal problems now being encountered in wage settlements is that of hidden wage increases. There are over 40 elements in the wage of Italian government workers. Private employers use such devices as fictitious loans. It is therefore almost impossible to know what a man's wage is or what effect a given increase would have. For one reason or another increases in one or more of these elements are continually being advocated, and in most cases it is impossible to obtain from the Government or the employer concerned a complete statement of the total income now received by the workers in question. The wage policy must include simplification of the wage structure. \* \* \*

#### A CHARTER OF LABOR RIGHTS FOR ALL OCCUPIED ITALY

[AMG GO 28, 17 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/177]<sup>17</sup>

##### Article III

###### *Creation of Labour Offices*

The following institutions are hereby created:

(a) A Regional Labour Office for each of such Regions as may be established in Military Government Territory;

(b) A Provincial Labour Office for each Province in Military Government Territory, subordinate to the Regional Labour Office. \* \* \*

#### FREEDOM OF LABOR TO ORGANIZE DOES NOT MEAN SUSPENSION OF ALL RESTRICTIONS

[ACC Exec Memo 69, 17 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/147/27]

1. The suppression of the Fascist Party has made inevitable the abolition of the Corporative Syndical System, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature of the Fascist Regime.

2. It stands to reason that the abolition of this System gives rise to the necessity of providing

<sup>17</sup> By July 1944 the various Regions had adopted their own labor programs. In order to establish a uniform labor policy, GO 28 was issued. With exception of Article III, it was a combination of GO 8 (sec. 3, above) and GO 17 (this section).

new machinery and procedure as well as a democratic form of Trade Union organization which would effectively enable the Allied Military Government to cope with social and juridical problems in the labor field.

6. No reference whatever has been made in the present General Order [GO 28] of such labor matters as are dealt with by separate legislation.

This "Labor Relations" General Order [GO 28], however, must be interpreted in the light of Italian legislation that has a bearing on labor matters and has not been rescinded and of other legislation promulgated by Allied Military Government separately. Thus, Strike and Lock-out remain illegal instruments for the settlement of Labor disputes, Collective Contracts remain in force, wages remain frozen and any re-adjustment on a basis of comparison with similar industries and at a lower ceiling than wages of employees with the Armed Forces—such readjustments becoming operative only on the approval of A.C.C. Labor Subcommittee.

7. General Order No. 28 may be regarded as a temporary measure. A draft Decree "Abolishing the Fascist Syndical-Corporative System, reinstating the freedom of Trade Union Organization, authorizing the institution of Labor Offices and governing Labor Relations" is now in the final stages of preparation by the Italian Government. It is proposed to make this Decree operative in Military Government territory, thus providing a uniform labor system for the whole of Italy.

#### LABOR DISPUTES ARE REFERRED SUCCESSFULLY TO THE LABOR OFFICES

[Econ Sec, ACC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44, p. 165]

##### 6. *Labor Relations*

There has not been an important strike in liberated Italy since the Allied landings. Strikes have been threatened and there have occurred a number of "white strikes" as demonstrations of the demand for additional food rations or higher wages. Field and Headquarters representatives of the Labor Subcommittee have held numerous conferences with union leaders and independent workers concerning demands and complaints, and have served as mediators in employer-employee meetings where strikes were threatened. Insofar as is possible, all disputes have been referred directly to the Italian Labor Offices both in Military Government territory and in Italian Government territory. In Italian Government

territory the recommendations of the Labor Offices are acted upon by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor with the approval of the Labor Subcommission. \* \* \*

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF MODERATE LABOR UNIONS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED

[Ltr, W. H. Braine, Dir, Labor Subcom, AC, to Econ Sec, AC, 25 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/146/49]

\* \* \* I recognize that military considerations are paramount. Subject to this, however, my recommendation is that as much encouragement and stimulation as possible be given to the growth of free labor unions in liberated territory; that this advice should be given by moderate and recognized agencies in order to avoid capture of these unions by subversive elements, and that so far from prohibiting intercourse by letter, or otherwise, with these newly established unions, there should be officially recognized Trade Union organizers who should be allowed to forward and arrange the development of the unions on a proper basis. . . .

#### DIVERGENCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND BRITISH LABOR POLICY

[Memo, Dir, Labor Subcom, for Econ Sec, AC, 27 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/146/33]

3. There is a divergence of practice between that followed by Fifth Army and that followed by Eighth Army on labor questions. Fifth Army posts General Order No. 28 and operates on its terms. This allows free association of workers in democratic trade unions as distinct from the Fascist-controlled syndicates. It also establishes Labor Offices to handle civilian labor questions including arbitration and negotiations. The result is that, when in due course, Fifth Army military territory is transferred to AMG/AC, there is a smooth transition having already initiated action on the lines of the policy which will eventually be followed by AMG/AC.

Eighth Army does not post General Order No. 28. Within the last few months, owing to the assignment of a Labor Officer from Labor Subcommission Headquarters (such assignment being an innovation), Orders have been made which provide for the abolition of the Fascist syndicates and the establishment of Labor Offices. This goes some way towards uniformity with Fifth Army. As distinct from the provisions of General Order No. 28, however, no recognition

is given to the establishment of free trade unions nor is their organization encouraged.

6. . . . it is desirable that Eighth Army should be invited to conform with the terms of General Order No. 28. . . .

#### THE SEQUEL TO GENERAL ORDER No. 28 IS PROMOTION OF A DEMOCRATIC ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT

[Labor Subcom, AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

\* \* \* With the Order as a basis, Labour Subcommission concentrated, from January 1945, on building up a strong, democratic and representative machinery of labour relations. The Italian General Confederation of Labour [Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (C.G.I.L.)] had been formed early in 1944 and unity of the workers, with collaboration of the three Left wing political parties (Socialist, Communist and Christian Democrat) had been confirmed in the Pact of Rome of 4 June 1944. The first general meeting of the C.G.I.L. was held in Naples from 28 January to 1 February 1945, and membership was then estimated at 1,200,000. With the liberation of the North, the movement received a new impetus, A.M.G. fostered its development, the local offices of the movement (Camere del Lavoro) were encouraged, and by October, 1945, membership of 5,000,000 workers was claimed. The C.G.I.L. made a favourable impression at and a useful contribution to the meeting of the International Labour Office held in Paris in Autumn 1945. Whilst the co-operation of the three Left Wing political parties in the labour field in Italy may not always have been perfect it has, for a continuous period of two years, been the most striking, if not the only, example of continuous collaboration in Italy, where multiplicity of political parties has led to unsettlement in the political field and to many crises.

The corollary, in joint bargaining procedure, to a strong workers' organization, is an equally strong and representative employers' association. The four Fascist Employers' Confederations were dissolved by Decree No. 369 of 16 December 1944, and Labour Subcommission has fostered the development of the General Confederation of Italian industry, the Italian Confederation of Traders, the Italian Confederation of Agriculturists, the National Confederation of Direct Cultivators, and the National Bankers' Association. \* \* \*

## 5. A PRIMARILY NEGATIVE BUT IMPORTANT MISSION IN EDUCATION

### THE FAILURE TO PLAN FOR EDUCATION

[Spofford Rpt]

\* \* \* No planning was done in the field of education as no officer was available in this field until the campaign was over in August. It is believed that this omission was serious, as in dealing with a country in which the educational program has been debauched for political reasons some substitute program should be available as soon as possible after operations cease. This involved the preparation of textbooks and instructions to teachers and a program for vetting all important educational officials. \* \* \*

### SCHOOLS SHOULD SOON REOPEN—LAST BUT NOT LEAST

[Ltr, Col Spofford, CSO, Hq AMG, to Rgnl CAO's, 26 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/999]

1. It is the policy of the Military Government to open the public schools as rapidly as is consistent with security. To wait for a general re-opening of the schools before opening schools which are ready to open now or in the near future, would cause unnecessary hardship and defeat our general purpose. The following directive, therefore, sets out the conditions under which the Provveditore may open one or more schools subject to your approval.

2. This Headquarters must approve first:

- a. the appointment of the Provveditore;
- b. the appointment of the Ispettore within whose jurisdiction the school falls;
- c. the appointment of the director of each school in question.

3. The Provveditore must show to the satisfaction of the SCAO that the building in which it is proposed to hold classes has at least minimum facilities for the holding of successful classes.

4. The Provveditore must agree to assume full responsibility that:

a. there will be no Fascist or anti-ally propaganda or doctrine in the school, and no Fascist forms, ceremonies, or organizations;

b. none of the state test books will be used in the first five grades, except those specified in the directive concerning text books, and then only after the pages specified in that directive have been removed; only text books which have been specifically approved by this headquarters will be used in the Media Schools; Gymnasias; Liceos, etc. \* \* \*

### THE REOPENING IS BOTH A POLITICAL AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGE

[Review of Educational Activities, prepared by Educational Adviser, Hq AMG, 4 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/154/317]

\* \* \* 10 September. “. . . The C.S.O. . . . has put clearly the immediate morale and political grounds which necessitate an early opening of the schools.”

“In addition we must also regard the early opening of the schools and colleges from the point of view of Allied long-time policy. It is a generally accepted principle that we must banish the will to war from Italy and Germany, and this has been implanted by many years of perverted education. The immediate heart-sickness of the Italian people may have temporarily obscured the results of this teaching. But it is to be feared that with the rigors of war passing into the background of memory the results of the ideological teachings of Fascism and Nazism will reassert themselves in some new and undesirable form . . . consequently we must set our hopes on re-education if we are to restore the peoples of Italy and Germany to political and social sanity.”

The Educational Adviser recommended (and action was accordingly taken) that:

I. All SCAO's be informed that all schools and colleges be reopened as soon as possible.

II. SCAO's to set up provincial Educational Committees. Among other purposes for establishing these committees were that they should begin to learn to take responsibility in local education, and also begin to provide the Allied Military Government with their views on the kind of education they required.

III. The SCAO's should submit to the Educational Adviser the names of all teachers so that their political backgrounds could be examined. These are handed to the Political Intelligence Section (under Major Raffa) for examination.

IV. Permission of the Educational Adviser to be sought before any text books are brought into use.

V. All extraordinary expenditures to be sent to the Educational Adviser for his approval. (This refers, in the main, to the rebuilding of war-devastated buildings.)

These recommendations were concurred in and strongly recommended for approval by the Chief of Staff Officer, Colonel Spofford. On 14 September orders were sent to SCAO's covering

the major items, and on 18 September Lt. Colonel Gayre reported in part as follows:

. . . Not only have we the physical problem of opening the actual school buildings and the big task of examining the history of each teacher so as to exclude all ardent Fascists, but we have not a single text book which can be used. Furthermore, the Italian teacher virtually cannot teach without a text book, so reliant had he become upon this method. . . . Therefore it is necessary to begin working on a set of temporary text books immediately. I propose therefore establishing a small committee of prominent Italian educationalists to produce the texts for books to be used in 1943-44.

The C.S.O. has recommended approval of the appointment of the committee, and a study of the printing and paper problem.

The following report shows, in brief summary, the results of the investigations and actions to date. \* \* \*

#### *Report on Present Status AMG Education*

1. *School buildings.* Many damaged. Whole ones often used for billeting troops and for evacuees. Standards of light, equipment, and hygiene usually deplorably low. Repairs necessary to prevent danger and damage are officially authorized. SCAO's to submit estimates of cost and time to make damaged buildings usable for school purposes.

2. *Opening of schools.* 1 December has been set for the opening of schools, but it is realized that all cannot open at this time, and some can open earlier—and, indeed, have already done so. In Pantelleria the schools have already opened in private homes and they are trying to get texts from Malta or Cairo.

3. *State examinations.* These have been authorized, to be held some time between 3-16 November and arrangements are underway.

4. *Personnel.* The selection of a Provveditore for each of the nine provinces of Sicily is underway. . . . Appointment is by Regional Education Director, after vetting.

5. *Education Committees.* By authority of the CCAO all SCAO's have been instructed to form Provincial Education Committees composed half of approved representatives of the Provveditore, half of such persons as representatives of universities, important schools and colleges, . . .

7. *Liaison.* It is recognized that work of such fundamental importance cannot be carried out without consent of the Italian people and so liaison is being established with the Badoglio Government in order to obtain their agreement.

8. *Definition of Authority—Regional and National.* Instructions have already been set out as follows:

(a) Rectors of Universities and University Professors will be nominated by the Regional Directors of Education subject to approval by the Advisor in Education and official appointment by the CCAO.

(b) Teachers, school directors and inspectors will be appointed by the provveditori, after approved by the Regional Director of Education. CAO's and SCAO's may temporarily suspend and may recommend dismissal of school personnel provided they send a full statement as to cause through the SCAO to the Regional Director of Education for review and final decision. CAO's and SCAO's may freely nominate properly qualified school personnel for appointment of school positions by the Provveditore. The Provveditore alone is authorized, subject to the approval of the Regional Director of Education, to make the actual appointments after determining the fitness of the candidate for the position. \* \* \*

#### PREPARATION OF NON-FASCIST TEXTBOOKS

[Memo, Maj Carleton W. Washburne, for Gayre, Educational Adviser, 4 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/709]

##### 1. *Necessity*

The elementary schools of Italy were all required to use a state series of text books. Every one of these books was impregnated with fascist propaganda.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, a supply of these books had not been printed for this school year.

It is impossible for the schools of Italy to function without text books—first because children cannot learn to read without books to read and second because the poorly prepared teachers of Italy are wholly dependent on text books.

It therefore has been evident from the beginning that a series of textbooks for the elementary schools would have to be published. The shortage of materials and transportation and the necessity of assuring that the new textbooks be free from fascism, made it essential that this work be done under the supervision of the Allied Military Government and Allied Control Commission.

##### 2. *Action Taken*

With verbal approval from Lord Rennell and later from General McSherry, the Education

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<sup>18</sup> According to the SCAO Region III, even the arithmetic books were found to be impregnated with Fascist ideology—the doctrine of *Credere, Obbedire, Combattere!*

Division of AMG (later, the Education Subcommittee of ACC) took the following steps:

a. Each book in the former state series of elementary school textbooks was carefully examined and every passage containing fascist or anti-ally propaganda was marked.

b. A Commission of reliable non-fascist teachers and school directors was formed in Palermo in October, with the help of the local Provveditore agli Studi [Provincial Superintendent] and his Chief Inspector. The members of that commission rewrote, under the supervision of the Education Division AMG, all the objectionable passages, substituting appropriate non-propaganda material.

c. Arrangements for publishing the books were made in Palermo in November and in Naples in January, it being decided to print in Palermo for Sicily and Calabria as had been done in the past and in Naples for the balance of occupied Italy south of Lazio.

#### PAPER MUST BE FOUND FOR PRINTING TEXTBOOKS

[Memo, Washburne for Vice President, Econ and Admin Sec, ACC, 4 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/709]

1. The Education Subcommittee is publishing for immediate use a series of elementary school textbooks, consisting of the state series of last year with non-fascist material substituted for the fascist propaganda. The publication of these books is essential to the functioning of the schools.

2. The lack of local paper makes it necessary to use imported newsprint for these books. This has already been supplied for the books being printed in Palermo for Sicily and Calabria. A supply of about 168 tons, not yet allocated to any particular Division of ACC, exists in Naples, in the custody of P.W.B. Seventy-five tons of this are urgently needed by the Education Subcommittee for the printing in Naples of textbooks for all occupied Italy (including Puglia) outside of Sicily and Calabria.

3. You are therefore respectfully requested to authorize the Economic and Administrative Section to release 75 tons of imported newsprint paper to the Education Subcommittee for the printing of text books for the elementary schools. \* \* \*

#### BUILDINGS MUST BE FOUND FOR SCHOOLS

[Memo, Lt Col T. V. Smith, Educational Adviser, Education Subcom, for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 21 Feb. 44, ACC files, 10000/105/709]

2. It took about two months from mid-September when this Division came into existence until the

middle of November to get a start on school personnel, procedures, courses of study, and textbooks. . . .

3. The one obstacle that has impeded and still impedes the opening of schools has been the unavailability of school buildings. In a number of cases this has been due to war damage. Whenever that damage had been reparable steps have been immediately taken to recondition the building. In many cases, however, the chief difficulty has been the occupation of the buildings by troops, or, less often, by refugees, hospitals, etc. Each Regional Director of Education has persistently worked to get troops out of buildings, using every type of appeal possible. But since A.M.G. has not had authority to order troops evacuated, we have been entirely dependent on the voluntary co-operation of army commanders. Sometimes these commanders have been co-operative; almost always they have been courteous; but in many instances they have said that any move was impossible. \* \* \*

#### THE STRUGGLE FOR AN ADEQUATE AMG STAFF

[Educational Div and Subcom, AMG/ACC, Rpt, Sep 43-Feb 44, Spofford Rpt, ex. Y-14]

#### Sec. V.

The inadequacy of staff all through this operation has been responsible for delays that would have been calamitous had the occupation of Italy proceeded with more speed. . . .

It is essential that constant visits be paid to Educational Establishments by both Headquarters and Regional Officers. The weeding out of staffs can only be done by personal investigation, and phases of the reorganization of education need constant personal attention. . . .

In the early part of the occupation the civilian educational authorities were completely stunned and they expected drastic measures to be taken. These they would have accepted readily. But even mild measures carried out at a later period are much more difficult. By that time a spirit of resistance has grown up, a knowledge of the A.M.G. machinery has been gained, and the possibilities of intrigue developed. . . .

The freeing of institutions from fascist influence should have been done early, but that would have needed an adequate staff. Actually the position in the early days was—for two months, no staff at all and for a long time thereafter, an Education Adviser with only one clerk and an interpreter. The lack of a number of officers to work as intelligence officers for Education has been felt severely. There are over ten thousand scholastic officials in Sicily alone.

New members have now been added to the staff in sufficient numbers to care for Regions I to IV. If additions may be depended on at the same rate for future regions all will be well. \* \* \*

#### LONG HOLIDAY OF ITALIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN IS ABOUT OVER

[Rpt, Gayre, Educational Adviser, Education Subcom, ACC, Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/709]

Estimates by Provveditori agli Studi (Provincial Superintendents) indicated that in Sicily about three fourths of the children were in school by early December. At the end of December the Director of Education of Region I stated that schools in Messina could not be opened for several months; that almost no schools were yet opened in Catania, but there was hope of gradually opening there; that it was hoped to get schools open in Siracusa in January; and that fifteen schools in Palermo were not yet open. All these cases are due solely to unavailability of buildings, and, except in Messina, primarily to occupancy of the buildings by troops, etc. Throughout the rest of Sicily schools are generally open and functioning.

Schools in Region II reported to be now generally operating.

In Matera first openings took place 3 January  
Potenza openings took place 17 January  
Reggio openings took place 25 January  
Cosenza openings took place 25 January  
Catanzaro openings took place 1 February

A number of schools are not able to operate owing to lack of premises which are (a) war-damaged, (b) occupied by troops, (c) occupied by refugees.

Window glass has been unobtainable. Help has been asked from Supply Officer by Regional Director. \* \* \*

#### TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS TEACHING IS RETAINED

[Memo, MGS, AFHQ, to Hq, ACC, 19 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/144/157]

1. A cable has been received from General Hill-dring in Washington stating that the State Department has been approached by the Apostolic Delegate to the United States for information pertaining to Italian Schools.

2. Specific information is requested on the following points:

a. Is religious teaching in schools conforming with the terms of the Lateran Treaty of 1929.

b. Are newly adopted text books in conformity with Catholic principles.

c. Are present teachers hostile to the Catholic Church or religion in general. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Lush, Exec Cmsr, ACC, to MGS, 23 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/144/157]

2. (a) Religious teaching in schools continues without change, the only teaching reforms which have been made in material are those involving the elimination of the teaching of fascism.

(b) New text-books are in conformity with Catholic principles. Books will be forwarded to you as published in accordance with your previous requests.

(c) Without the aid of a complete survey of the religious opinions of teachings, a formidable task which has not been undertaken, the attitude of teachers to the Church or to religion in general cannot be stated with any accuracy. However, the proportion of teachers replaced is small, and therefore the general body of teachers may be assumed to hold the same religious beliefs as they did before the Allied occupation.

3. Copies of Plans of Study for the use of teachers are enclosed. All of these have been discussed with representatives of the Church before publication and are in conformity with their suggestions.

#### THERE IS A LONGER-RANGE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM TOO

[Memo, Washburne, Actg Dir of Education, AC, 17 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/144/107]

The work of the Education Subcommittee falls into two distinct but closely interrelated parts. First, there is the immediate, emergency job of getting schools open on a non-fascist basis, to get children off the streets and to prevent serious unrest among the parents by seeing that the children do not lose more schooling and are decently cared for. Second, there is the assisting of the Italian Government in its attempt to organize its schools in a way which will foster healthy living, good citizenship, decent world attitude, and economic efficiency, while preserving the best cultural traditions.

#### I

The emergency job is that which has had to take precedence during the past year, and still is the dominant work in Military Government. It is not yet finished even in Italian Government territory. \* \* \*

#### II

The foregoing is so obviously the immediate mission of the Education Subcommittee, and

the needs and results are so tangible, that justification would be superfluous. The longer range program is less readily seen to relate to military needs and the purposes of the Allied Commission. But the morale of the people is recognized as an essential responsibility of military government, the welfare of the people is included among the basic charges of military government, and the elimination of fascism, a fundamental goal in this war, involves the uprooting of the causes of fascism, the substitutions of some degree of democracy for dictatorship, and the preparation of the people for a peaceful participation in world affairs rather than militarism and imperialism. In these terms the following long-range activities of the Education Subcommittee are clearly a part of its mission.

A. The Italians recognize that this educational system is inadequate—only a third to a half of the children complete the five years of elementary education; only about one in ten completes the next three years of education; only about one in thirty gets a secondary school education.<sup>19</sup>

It is recognized by the Minister and other Italian educators that those who do go to school get almost no training in health and hygiene, little or no training in even the most rudimentary economics, and no training in citizenship or world outlook. The Minister of Public Instruction and his associates, aware of these gaps, are attempting to do something about them. But they realize that they have been completely cut off from world thought, experience, and scientific investigations in the field of education for nearly a quarter of a century. They want contact with the rest of the world to help them approach the problems wisely. And they turn to the Education Subcommittee for such contact. In accordance with the expressed desire of the Minister of Public Instruction, therefore, this Subcommittee is taking steps toward answering this need in the following ways:

(1) Selecting the most significant books in the field of education, getting rights for translation and publication in Italy, and supervising this translation. This work is well under way.

(2) Getting books and periodicals from Great Britain and the United States for the leading Universities, scientific organizations, learned societies and libraries—this work is just beginning.

(3) Arranging for post-war travel fellowships for Italians to study in the American, British, and European countries. This is still necessarily in the early planning stage.

<sup>19</sup> In a note Washburne pointed out that these figures were only approximations, based on incomplete data.

(4) Arranging to bring specialists to Italy, after the war for consultation and expert advice. This, too, is, of course, in a preliminary stage of planning. \* \* \*

#### THE MISSION IN EDUCATION HAD TO BE MAINLY NEGATIVE

[Lt Col T. V. Smith, Dir, Education Subcom, ACC, Final Report on Education Mission to Mideast, Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/105/709]

\* \* \* We undertook little . . . and achieved less, to effect the teaching of precisely right things. Our mission, to repeat, was negative: we came to Italy to destroy fascism, not this time officially "to make the world safe for democracy." Not only was there immediate reaction on the part of the highest authorities in Italy—ecclesiastical, civil, pedagogical positivity. "It would be unwise," said the American Foreign Secretary, "for this government to undertake to apply, much less to impose, a foreign program for the placement of American teachers in the schools of these countries, or for the preparation of textbooks in the United States in such schools." (In terms of policy, Italy was always on the way to being a "liberated country," even if in initial fact it was a *conquered* country.) But it was anthropology rather than bureaucracy which effectively kept our program negative. Schools require teachers, and teachers cannot teach democracy until they are taught democracy. It requires a generation to make teachers who can, if they can, remake society. \* \* \*

#### EMBARRASING SHOW OF GRATITUDE

[Memo, Washburne, Actg Dir, Education Subcom, AC, for Vice-President, CA Sec, AC, 23 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/144/107]

1. The Education Subcommittee was the first to take a strong stand against its officers accepting honorary degrees, etc., from Italian universities and learned societies. . . .

2. The stand taken by us was quickly followed by a general AC directive to the same effect applying to all AC officers, and more recent orders have strengthened the first one.

3. Now I find officers in the Education Subcommittee in an embarrassing dilemma. I have just received a communication from the University of Rome, stating that the Academic Senate had, on 9 November 1944, proclaimed "Grandi Benemeriti" (great well-deservers) of the University of Rome, Brig. Gen. Hume, Lt. Col. T. V. Smith, Capt. Volla, and me. This is not an honorary degree, but it is, in a certain sense,

an honor. It was voted to us without any knowledge on our part, and there is no action that we can take to accept or reject it. Nothing is offered

to us—the University simply records formally, that it considers these officers to have benefited it and that it honors them for it. \* \* \*

## 6. THE THEATER BECOMES INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM

### INTERNEES MUST BE GIVEN CARE IF NOT RELEASED

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Jul 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 8478]

Subject to military necessity and security and the interests of the individuals concerned, . . . the following principles will be applied to *Allied and neutral civilian internees*, a large number of whom may be on Lipari Islands:<sup>20</sup>

As soon as military situation permits, they should be given medical and mental examinations, identified, and their personal and financial situations determined. Existing camps may be continued or moved to new locations within your discretion, living and sanitary conditions being made adequate. Work should be provided where practicable. Those for whom other provision is not available, such as release to relatives or friends who will provide for them, should be held in restricted residence until other arrangements for their care or repatriation can be made. Internees should not be released, particular reference to those who may later become political agitators, until it is established that they can be cared for. To the extent feasible a census of the names and nationalities should be taken for transmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that interested governments may be informed. . . .

### HOW LONG DOES THE THEATER'S DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNEES CONTINUE?

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 2 Aug 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 900]

Jovan Dononovich, delegate Yugoslav Government for the Near, Middle East and North Africa, has made representations concerning 70 [thousand] to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy, of which 30 [thousand] to 40,000 are fit for Military Service. He makes the following specific proposals:

1. To incorporate in the Italian surrender terms that the Yugoslav prisoners, internees, and

confinees must be left in the places where they now are. \* \* \*

It is assumed that we should assume direct responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. Are we to assume continuing direct responsibility or are we to assist the government concerned in caring for them?

In the light of our shipping problem it is presumed that we would agree to a minimum in transporting these persons from the areas in which they are found. \* \* \*

### A DISTURBING ANSWER—DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY TO LAST

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 3 Sep 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 1637]

3. The direct responsibility of the Theater Commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory is to continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.

4. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the Government-in-exile concerned, are to be dispatched to the desired destination.

5. While any movement within your Theater will be at your discretion and with the shipping available to you, no movement outside your area is to be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned. \* \* \*

### LITTLE FOOD AND LESS CLOTHING ARE AT HAND

[Notes on Mtg Held at MGS, AFHQ, 4 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/743]

#### Supply

4. So far as food was concerned it was pointed out that local resources would have to be used to the full and that AMG would, in default of special arrangements only be able to supplement them to the extent of the commodities for which bids had already been made. This would not of necessity produce a balanced diet or one which

<sup>20</sup> Islands just north of Sicily, which were taken in connection with the assault on Sicily.

could be regarded from a medical point of view as satisfactory for the building up of persons who for a long time may have been receiving an impoverished diet. . . .

### Health

5. The question of the provision of medical stores for use in the camps was raised. Brigadier Davis stressed that while the army would naturally do all it could the stores normally carried by field force units were based on minimum army requirements and were not designed to provide a surplus for civilians. On the other hand it was evident that AMG medical officers could not carry large stores of medical supplies with them in the initial stage. \* \* \*

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 6 Nov 43, CAD Msg files, CM-IN 3933]

Amcross here have cabled Amcross Washington urging immediate release from Mideast 25 tons assorted clothing, 20% men 80% women and children. This needed urgently for civilian refugees of allied nations now accumulating in Italy. Desire support and emphasis (urgent). . . .

### PLANS FOR ACC TO RELIEVE THE ARMY AMG

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 9 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 5872]

1. All displaced persons will be originally retained in the camps in which they are found. American, British, and French Prisoners of War are the only persons originally to be excluded from the category of "displaced persons."

2. Advanced Headquarters of a proposed eventual Displaced Persons Subcommittee has been organized temporarily under AMG Headquarters.<sup>21</sup>

3. Displaced persons will be cared for in the initial emergency stage by AMG assisted by such advanced Headquarters (including American and British Red Cross personnel) and so far as is possible by the PW Subcommittee and by Surgeon and DMS.

4. As soon as possible displaced persons will be transferred to sole control of Displaced Persons Subcommittee which will deal with all enquiries and under which Red Cross personnel have agreed to serve.

5. It is intended that if possible all displaced persons other than enemy nationals will even-

tually be screened by an accredited representative of their own government, under the supervision of intelligence officers.

6. After screening, such persons as are PW's of United Nations will be handed over to PW Subcommittee.

7. Food supplies will be provided through the supply channels either of AMG or Allied Commission.

8. Surgeon and DMS will, where possible, include in the allocation of medical supplies for forward troops a proportion of medical supplies for displaced persons.

9. Ministers and Red Cross have been consulted and concur.

### INTERNEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS SUBCOMMISSION ACTIVATED

[ACC Provisional Directive for DP Subcom, Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/75]

\* \* \*

### Major Functions

2. The subcommittee performs the following staff functions:

a. Obtains as complete information as possible regarding internees and displaced persons in Italy, enemy or enemy occupied territories and forwards it to the Political Vice President for submission to the Allied Intelligence Staff at AFHQ when necessary.

b. Arranges with the appropriate authorities for the provision of accommodation, food, clothing, welfare and health services for such persons.

c. Arranges with the appropriate authorities for the provision of as much employment for such persons as is possible subject to instructions of AFHQ.

d. Assists accredited representatives of foreign governments in respect of their nationals, subject to the instructions of AFHQ.

e. Arranges for any movements of internees and displaced persons as may be ordered or become necessary, subject to the policy of AFHQ. \* \* \*

3. The subcommittee directly performs the following functions:

a. Supervises the work of the Italian government and of approved agencies dealing with foreign internees and displaced persons. These agencies include the American and British Red Cross.

b. Assists the Prisoner of War organization in respect of Displaced Persons subsequently

<sup>21</sup> On 13 October MGS created an advance headquarters of a Subcommittee for Displaced Persons, with Lt. Col. MacFarlane as its first chief.

found to be Prisoners of War, particularly with any necessary technical instructions and information.

#### MEANWHILE AMG HAS HANDLED A DIFFICULT AND THANKLESS JOB

[Incl to Rpt by Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, on the Internment Camp at Ferramonte di Tarsio, 2 Nov 43, ABC files, 014, HORRIFIED, Govt, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 11)]

The camp is situated in a valley leading to Cosenza near the township of Tarsio on somewhat malarial ground which has been the subject of reclamation and improvement by the Italian Government. The ground, however, is not and has not, for a long time been swampy and it would be an exaggeration to describe the camp as being otherwise than in reasonable surroundings or fair farm land inhabited by Italians engaged in farming. . . .

The camp was constructed by a firm of contractors and consists of hutments which were enclosed within a barbed wire fence guarded on the perimeter by Fascist Militia and inside by plain clothes officers of the Public Security organization. . . . Given reasonable maintenance I consider the hutments to be at least as good as can be expected and very much better than I had expected. The internees had no complaints regarding the design or type of hut accommodation. \* \* \*

When the Allied troops occupied the Province of Cosenza the Italian Militia guard on the perimeter of the camp disappeared; the commander of the Militia, an officer reputed to be of Tuscan origin, also disappeared and is believed to have found his way back to Tuscany. The Public Security officials of the Italian Government were withdrawn and the management of the camp was taken over by a Camp Committee headed by a Yugoslav Jew, Professor Mirski, by profession a conductor of orchestras. His appointment was ratified by my officers and the Camp Committee is recognized as the governing body of the organization. \* \* \*

Since the occupation of the Province of Cosenza, the guards on the perimeter of the camp have been withdrawn and the inmates are free to take exercise and walk around the countryside. A number of those who dispersed themselves to the hills have since returned to the camp on account of financial difficulties in procuring a livelihood. The figure of 1600 inmates in the camp includes those who have thus returned.

The majority of the inmates in the camp were

Jews of whom 350 were refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy who arrived mainly in April 1940. Many of these were helped by Italian military authorities both to escape from Yugoslavia and to enter Italy. \* \* \*

The inmates of the camp have been described by all my officers who have had contact with the camp as being very difficult. The internees had expected with the Allied occupation of Cosenza, not only to be set free but to be transported to all the various destinations to which they expected to go or to be otherwise looked after. That they had to live in the camp for a day longer than they had expected would be the case after our occupation immediately became a source of grievance. \* \* \*

I found that the internees at the time of my visit were being provided with the same rations as were provided officially to the local population. I told the Prefect at Cosenza and my C.A.O. there that the ration of bread which for the local people has been fixed at 100 grams, was to be increased to 300 grams and that meat was to be provided with the ration three times a week together with suitable local produce in the form of vegetables and potatoes, etc. which are not in short supply. I told the Prefect in categorical terms that the refugees in this camp would receive priority of treatment over the local Italian population. I have arranged for certain supplies of captured German clothing and equipment to be made available through the Supply Officer of Region 2 to the poorer inmates of the camp but I cannot guarantee under the present camp management that this clothing will necessarily find its way to the proper beneficiaries. I have further given directions that certain captured enemy supplies are to be used to supplement the local produce on the scale which I have laid down, but here again I cannot guarantee that the internal camp [board] will ensure that every member of the camp gets his fair share. . . .

I have asked for a detachment of the British and American Red Cross organization to be sent to take charge of the camp in order to avoid so far as possible the semblance of military jurisdiction which would associate the less educated minds in the camp with the internment conditions with which they had been familiar for so long. . . . But I venture to prophesy that under the conditions of liberty in which the internees are free to live and wander about, a general dispersal is likely to take place unless a final destination can be found for these unfortunate people and their journey to that destination organized. \* \* \*

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR U.N. NATIONALS NOT IN CAMPS

[Memo, MGS, AFHQ, for ACC Hq, 29 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/164/512]

3. It is competent for the Allied Control Commission to determine a reasonable schedule of relief payments for United Nations nationals, to be paid out of AMFA funds if necessary and to be charged against the Italian Government. This schedule need not conform to that currently being followed by AMG or by the Italian Government with reference to needy Italians. Such relief payments are distinct from the advances provided for British and American nationals in TAM 70, or which could be provided for its nationals in Italy by any other United Nations government.

4. It is noted that in your judgment the current scale of relief payments to United Nations nationals in Italy is so low as to reduce the income of such persons below the subsistence level, consequently tending to increase their demands for camp care, and that you prefer the continuance of a relief scale which will encourage United Nations nationals to remain at large. Your proper course of action is to determine, in consultation with Headquarters AMG, 15 Army Group, a scale of relief payments which you judge would achieve your objective, and to arrange that proper instructions are issued. . . .

THIS IS NO WORK FOR THE ARMY

[Memo, Robertson, Deputy Chief Admin Officer, AFHQ Adv Admin Ech, for Chief Cmsr, ACC, 19 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/164/63]

I have studied with concern the Minutes of a conference on this subject, held at Headquarters No. 2 District [British Army logistical area] on 7 January 1944. My attention is particularly drawn to the following extract from paragraph 6 of the Minutes of this conference:

"The main points which emerged, however, was that the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission was only prepared to assume partial responsibility, and that consequently a large proportion of the task would remain an army liability: sufficient information had been produced to assess this liability, but its acceptance must be subject to confirmation by FLAMBO."

I wish to make it quite clear that the organization of the care and disposal of civilian refugees cannot be accepted as a military responsibility. I have offered to assist to the extent possible in relation to military requirements as regards the

provision of stores and the execution of Engineer work, and I am prepared to continue this assistance.

Meanwhile, G.O.C. No. 2 District, in view of the inability of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission to carry out its task, has provided an organization staffed by military personnel to handle refugees arriving from Yugoslavia. Part of this personnel is being withdrawn now. The remainder is liable to be withdrawn at any time. . . .

I further note that the feeding of Yugoslav refugees is at present being done from Army resources and through Army channels. I do not regard this as satisfactory and request that you will make arrangements to feed these refugees through a civil organization and from civil supplies at as early a date as possible.

DP SUBCOMMISSION WILL BEGIN TO TAKE OVER

[Memo, Gen Mason-MacFarlane for Robertson, 22 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/164/63]

I agree entirely that the organization of the care and disposal of civilian refugees is not a military responsibility. It is the responsibility of A.C.C. \* \* \*

As you are probably aware, it must take a little time for me to produce an adequate organization. Up to date the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission has been grossly understaffed and incapable of carrying out this task without military assistance. I would like to assure you that I am getting on with the job as fast as I can and the Sub-Commission is now being reinforced by personnel who have just arrived from North Africa. I cannot work miracles but will do my best to reduce my requests for military help to the minimum until such time as the Sub-Commission is capable of tackling the whole job. \* \* \*

SUBCOMMISSION WILL TELL OUTSIDE WORLD WHO ARE SAFE

[Ltr, MGS, AFHQ, for Hq ACC, 25 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1363]

1. The need for an organization which will control and handle communications with Displaced Persons, and also enquiries concerning their welfare and whereabouts, has been appreciated. Requests for the formulation of such a body have been received both in London and Washington, and the importance of establishing a system whereby communications and enquiries may be

rapidly transmitted is emphasized by the fact that a procedure for their transmission has already been instituted in enemy occupied Italy. Furthermore, its operation will have an appreciable effect on morale both in Italy and overseas, and the benefits of an accurate and complete system of records which such an organization would require will be of value at this time in the administration of these persons, and in the future will be essential in arranging for their eventual repatriation or evacuation.

3. It is therefore proposed that:

(a) There should be a set up under the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission a Records Bureau, to be known as the "Displaced Persons Records Bureau, Italy."

(b) The Bureau to be responsible for all records necessary to the administration of Displaced Persons, excluding Italians, and to be staffed as far as possible, subject to the requirements of security, by displaced persons in Allied hands.

(c) All communications to Displaced Persons, and all enquiries concerning them, to be channelled through the Bureau which will maintain details of addresses. \* \* \*

#### SUBCOMMISSION MUST WAIT MONTHS FOR ADEQUATE RESOURCES

[Memo, MGS, AFHQ, for Internees and DP Sub-Com, ACC, 1 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/164/1638]

1. It is appreciated that this Sub-Commission was despatched into the field inadequately staffed and equipped to undertake the tasks with which it was immediately faced and that personnel and equipment which were subsequently provided were not entirely adequate and served only to satisfy outstanding needs. Now that the Sub-Commission has had sufficient time in which to gauge the extent of its duties, and to estimate with a reasonable degree of accuracy its shortcomings both in personnel and equipment necessary to the efficient conduct of those duties, it is desired that steps shall be taken which will provide the organization with all available requirements, and permit it to function on a sound basis in the future without resort to makeshift and temporary expedients.

3. It should be noted that the present ceiling of British personnel in this Theater cannot be exceeded, and that neither can new units be formed nor additional personnel provided without a corresponding decrease in existing establishments. \* \* \*

#### AID NO LONGER TO BE REFUSED TO YUGOSLAVS SEEKING ESCAPE TO ITALY

[Msg, AFHQ to WD, 6 Dec 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4241]

1. It will be appreciated that the problem of Yugoslav nationals in Italy is already complicated by reason of the following factors:

A. The Yugoslavs are far from being a united nation.

B. There has recently been strife in Italy, although measures have been initiated to deal with the present situation, between Partisans and Chetniks.

C. Supplies, accommodation, clothing, and medical facilities for displaced persons in Italy is overstrained.

2. In view of the foregoing and our need, if possible, to reduce demands on accommodation, clothing, and supplies at present required for displaced persons in Italy, and particularly having regard to the prime need for operational security, neither proposal specified in your message is recommended. It is further considered that such action might create a precedent, which would lead to other demands and the influx of larger numbers of additional refugees for which we would not be able to provide.

3. It is recommended, therefore, that no direct assistance or funds be provided for these refugees, but that should they be able to reach Italy by their own efforts we shall continue to care for them as heretofore. \* \* \*

[Msg, WD to AFHQ, 22 Dec 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 8575]

The Secretary of State has been informed that, pursuant to your recommendation, it has been determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the military situation does not permit the military authorities to render any direct assistance at this time to these refugees. \* \* \*

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 15 Mar 44, AFHQ Msg files, FAN-NAF 347]

\* \* \* 1. Ask Yugoslav Partisans to furnish local currency to refugees enabling latter to arrange their escape to Italy, such expenditures to be reimbursed in U.S. dollars or such funds as the Partisans request.

2. If Partisans cannot furnish funds, ask them to aid refugees escape by guaranteeing to boat owners and other persons assisting refugees to escape that they will be compensated by Ameri-

can military authorities on refugees arrival in Italy.<sup>22</sup>

#### NOW AN ENDLESS INFLUX WHICH OVERSTRAINS ALL FACILITIES

[Remarks, Col Robert G. Kirkwood, Dir, DP Subcom, ACC, at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 14 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

1. . . . The type of Yugoslav has changed during the last month or so—previously they were received from Dalmatia but are now coming through the German lines. The latter are mostly orphans, women with children and old men and women. Refugees are now in such a condition as to require more medical attention. 90 orphans were received on one ship alone. . . .

2. Higher headquarters estimated that the Yugoslav refugee problem would cease. There were 4,500 per month in February and March. During the first week of April 2,000 were received. They are not kept in camps. We have moved 16,249 Yugoslavs to Middle East, and of these approximately 5,000 were moved during March.

3. Organization of Sub-Commission is still on insecure foundation.

4. Methods of feeding, source of feeding and accommodation stores are problems.

5. There are two hospitals at present with 100 beds in each occupied all the time. Red Cross has rendered valuable welfare and nursing assistance. There has been some support from the army, but they have been taking personnel away. Yugoslavs, Czechs, Poles and Italian Army doctors are being trained to carry on the work.

6. With reference to accommodation stores, the ACC has set up no means of supplying. Army initially supplied these, but they are becoming less and less a source of supply and we will have to make our own arrangements. We have helped ourselves as much as possible but will need some assistance in the matter of material.

7. The ration is inadequate for small children, nursing mothers, etc. This is helped somewhat by hospital comforts. The Army does not con-

sider it their job, thus the Italian subsistence ration is all that they have to fall back on. . . .

#### DESPITE MASSACRES TRANSPORT FOR ESCAPING REFUGEES MUST BE SUSPENDED

[Msg, AFHQ to MIDEAST, 4 May 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

1. . . . Germans adopting policy indiscriminate massacre in Yugoslavia. Arrivals Italy average 1850 per week over past six weeks.

2. Complete stoppage evacuation refugees to Italy impracticable but we are . . . not providing transportation except where impossible to refuse. This restriction to remain until further notice.

3. Increasing numbers refugees cannot be maintained Italy. Alternative areas for reception are Mideast and French North Africa (FNA). Proposal accept refugees FNA under examination but cannot be effected immediately as security screening arrangements in Italy inadequate in absence additional facilities here and question of maintenance etc. yet to be worked out.

4. Pending decision regarding evacuation refugees to FNA must request you accept additional 14,500 (making 40,000). . . .

#### BUT ITALY BECOMES A BASE FOR STUDY OF AID CHANCES ELSEWHERE

[Msg, WD to CG, USAF, MTO, 8 May 44, CAD files, 383.7 (1-21-43), sec. 2]

The President's War Refugee Board, composed of Secretaries Hull, Morgenthau, and Stimson, considers it necessary that the board appoint, without delay, a full-time special representative with headquarters in Bari, Italy. This representative would investigate for the board all possibilities which may exist in areas adjacent to Italy for the rescue and relief of minority groups in enemy-occupied territory who are now in imminent danger of death. Accordingly, it is requested that permission be granted for this purpose.

[Paraphrase of Msg, CG, USAF, MTO, to WD, 27 May 44, CAD files, 383.7 (1-21-43), sec. 2]

SACMED has granted permission for appointment of special representative for territories adjacent Italy. As in the case of representative under governmental Committee, representative of board will be attached to headquarters ACC but may establish headquarters at Bari.

<sup>22</sup> About the time this decision was made another had to be made which was less felicitous. The Holy See requested that Allied authorities permit Italian women, children, and aged and infirm persons residing in German-occupied Italy to return to their homes in southern Italy and the islands. AFHQ felt itself compelled to decline, principally, on the ground that the enemy would undoubtedly make use of the excellent opportunity offered to infiltrate enemy agents. CAD files, 091.4 (3-8-43), sec. 1.

## PRESIDENT DECIDES TO TAKE 1,000 REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES

[Msg, Mobilization Div, Movement Branch, ASF, to CG, USAF, North African Theater of Operations (NATO), 14 Jun 44, CAD files, 383.7 (1-21-43), sec. 2]

The President sent the following cable to Ambassador Robert Murphy in Algiers:

A. Information available to me indicates that there are real possibilities of saving human lives by bringing more refugees through Yugoslavia to Southern Italy. I am also informed that the escape of refugees by this route has from time to time been greatly impeded because the facilities in Southern Italy for refugees have been over-taxed. . . .

B. I understand that many of the refugees in Southern Italy have been and are being moved to temporary havens in areas adjacent to the Mediterranean, and that efforts are being made to increase existing refugee facilities in these areas. . . .

C. . . . I feel that it is important that the United States indicate that it is ready to share the burden of caring for refugees during the war. Accordingly, I have decided that approximately 1,000 refugees should be immediately brought from Italy to this country, to be placed in an emergency refugee shelter to be established at Fort Ontario, . . . New York, where under appropriate security restrictions they will remain for the duration of the War. These refugees will be brought into this country outside of the regular immigration procedure just as civilian internees from Latin American countries and prisoners of war have been brought here. . . .

G. . . . It is desired that you co-operate fully with the Ambassador in effecting the prompt removal and transportation of refugees selected to be moved to the United States. . . .

## FRENCH NORTH AFRICA OPENS UP AND MORE YUGOSLAVS MAY NOW ESCAPE TO ITALY

[Memo, G-5, AFHQ, to a Mil Mission, 22 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

1. During his recent visit to AFHQ General Velebit urged that assistance should be given to Yugoslav nationals who, by reason of enemy oppression or from causes connected with military operations in Yugoslavia, were compelled to leave their homes and to seek asylum in Italy. The difficulties involved in maintaining large numbers of refugees in Southern Italy in areas where military requirements must be pre-eminent were explained to General Velebit who, in agree-

ing that refugees should be evacuated from Italy to Mideast expressed the wish that should it be possible they might be accommodated in other localities where climate conditions were more favourable.

2. Due chiefly to an acute shortage of medical personnel in Mideast for the care of refugees, this Headquarters was reluctantly compelled on 5 May to issue instructions restricting the evacuation with Allied assistance of such persons from Yugoslavia. At the same time endeavours were made to find suitable alternative areas where refugees might be accommodated. An appropriate site by sea for large camps has now been chosen near Phillippeville in French North Africa, and preparations are in hand as a matter of urgency to provide accommodation initially for 10,000 with a fully equipped hospital for 600. These facilities are expected to be ready by the end of July.

3. In expectation that UNRRA medical assistance will be available in Mideast within a period of 4 weeks, and that facilities near Phillippeville will be prepared by the date indicated, directions have been given to SOMTO [Subversive Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations] that the restriction on evacuation of refugees to Italy from Yugoslavia should be lifted as from 14 June. . . .

## TWO YUGOSLAV CHILDREN BECOME A SUBJECT OF HEADQUARTERS CORRESPONDENCE

[Ltr, Col Morris King, Internees and DP Sub-Com, ACC No. 1 Sub Sec, 4 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

1. The accepted principle of this Headquarters is that delicate children should be retained in Italy during the hot weather.

2. I understand from your letter that Major Murray Wood has passed the children under reference as fit for evacuation. Major Murray Wood is doubtless correct in his finding, if he has given it on broad administrative lines.

3. I have, however, a detailed knowledge of the conditions affecting the lives of these two boys and of their health during the past eight months. They have fought as children for their country, have been mutilated and have both been seriously ill; the younger is still delicate. There is no doubt that they will benefit greatly, if they can avoid a hot climate this summer.

4. I would therefore request you to retain these children in Italy, unless there are categorical administrative reasons for their evacuation. \* \* \*

## THOSE ASKING FOR REPATRIATION ARE TOLD A WAR IS ON

[Memo, Col C. B. Findlay, Dir, Internees and DP Subcom, ACC, for Political Sec, ACC, 28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/164/583]

\* \* \* I have invariably told all non-Italian Nationals in Italy who ask if they can be sent "home" as follows:

(a) There is a "War on"—

(b) Only those essential for war purposes can be sent home. \* \* \*

## SACMED IS ASKED NOT TO BE TOO INFLEXIBLE IN HIS POLICY ON REPATRIATION

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCAC, to Gen Alexander, 16 Sep 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 31959]

. . . the indicated fact which prompted you to recommend that only those civilian nationals in liberated Italy who are deemed essential to the war effort be considered for repatriation is appreciated by CCAC.<sup>23</sup>

SACMED, however, is requested to reconsider along the following lines and to advise whether, within military needs, arrangements could be made for the repatriation or evacuation of 1800 individuals mentioned in MAT 246 or such among them as are judged worthy cases by you. The conditions would be as follows: a—that early repatriation of nationals of other United Nations and of friendly enemy-occupied nations who have been stranded in Italy and who desire to be repatriated should, subject to military security, be accepted in principle; b—that actual repatriation should remain entirely subject to military considerations which remain paramount and to the discretion of SACMED. . . .

## SURVEY AFTER THE PROBLEM OF CARE IS UNDER CONTROL

[Address of Director of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission Before the Advisory Council for Italy, 30 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/236]

\* \* \* There are at present in Liberated Italy some 23,000 Displaced Persons. Of these 9,000 live in camps and 14,000 are living in private residence. These 14,000 are entitled to certain

<sup>23</sup> In reply to a message of inquiry from CCAC about the practicability of now repatriating 1800 American and British nationals, SACMED had stated on 13 August that were he to repatriate civilians, soldiers wishing to return to the United States or the United Kingdom on compassionate grounds could no longer, without cause for grievance, be declined on the ground of transportation difficulties.

financial allowances from the Italian Government and also, in many cases, to allowances from the countries to which they belong. The nationals of the United Nations are also entitled to rations on a more generous scale than the ordinary Italian civilian ration. The Sub-Commission administers and pays these allowances and distributes the ration cards for the additional rations.

The Army is not interested in the repatriation of Displaced Persons, but for political, economic and ethical reasons, the Allied Governments desire to secure the safe return of their own nationals, to return to their own countries nationals who have been forcibly evacuated and to find homes for the stateless and persecuted. All such persons are in Italy in the charge of this Sub-Commission. Nobody can be more suitable to plan their repatriation so this duty, which does not arise from military necessity, has been appended to the functions of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission and it has become the Displaced Person and Repatriation Sub-Commission. \* \* \*

So here, at all the camps, there is a camp staff formed from the nationals there housed; at hospitals they have their own doctors and nurses; the children are taught by their compatriots, welfare work and entertainment is all self-organized; they do their own cooking and housework, conduct their own repair and other work-shops, keep their own stores, etc.

Similarly the Commission is assisted in its work and by way of supplies and by advice by many and various bodies, such as the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees, the American Friends Service Committee, the War Refugees Board, the American, British and Italian Red Cross, the American Joint Distribution Board, and, shortly, UNRRA will relieve it of responsibility for the camps in Southern Italy.

It is also assisted by military missions from ten of the Allied countries who advise on many matters but also screen the persons from the security angle. \* \* \*

There are many . . . problems such, for instance, as providing exchange for repatriation. Nine hundred Jews are shortly to leave for Palestine. CCS have been approached for instructions as to how much money they may take and how any balance remaining in this country shall be dealt with.

. . . An attempt is being made to obtain salvage clothing from the Armies and repair shops are being set up to deal with such salvage as may be obtained. The scale of the problem can be grasped when it is said that 100,000 blankets and 75,000 boots are required at once for present

urgent needs and other items on the same scale. \* \* \*

Lastly there is the problem which is the problem of the whole AC; insufficiency of Transport—the problem of providing further transport is urgent and acute.

#### UNRRA PERSONNEL ARE GRADUALLY TO BE INFILTRATED INTO ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL OF DP CAMPS

[Memo, G-5, AFHQ, for Actg President, AC, 11 Feb 45, MTO, HS files, AG 370.1-039, GEG-O]

1. In order to permit the release of Allied Commission military personnel for duty elsewhere and to launch UNRRA in actual relief operations in Italy, the plan evolved in recent discussions with representatives of UNRRA (Italy), Allied Commission and this headquarters, as hereinafter set forth, will be implemented as soon as possible. . . .

2. Notwithstanding problems which remain to be solved before transfer of administrative responsibility can be effected, Allied Commission will provide forthwith for the infiltration of UNRRA (Italy) personnel and for their participation in administration at the specified centers and installations. . . .

## 7. CULTURAL TREASURE GIVES PAUSE TO MILITARY EXPEDIENCY

#### PRESIDENT IS CONCERNED LEST ARCHIVES SUFFER AS IN PAST WARS

[Paraphrase of Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 May 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

It is felt that the great loss suffered in the past because local archives in cities and towns have been destroyed can be avoided in this war if special care is taken to preserve such archives. The President is anxious that every effort possible be made for their preservation at the time of initial occupation and during the period of occupation, and all appropriate commanders in the field will be directed to issue the necessary instructions to prevent damage to archives in localities occupied.<sup>25</sup>

#### THE CAO AND THE HUMANITIES

[AMGOT GAI 8, AGO files, 1 May 43, AMGOT Plan]

1. For the purpose of these Instructions the term "monument" will designate any site, building,

<sup>25</sup> Plans for protection of Europe's art heritage will be found in Chapter III, Section 6.

#### AT END OF HOSTILITIES TRANSITION TO UNRRA OPERATION IS ONLY BEGINNING

[Memo, DPRSC, AC, 2 Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/164/1686]

\* \* \*

*1st May 1945*

UNRRA officially assumed responsibility for 3 of the Southern Camps. The other 2 Camps housed Dissident Yugoslavs and these are still working well under a Military manager with great help from UNRRA welfare, etc., personnel.

*1st May to 1st August 1945*

UNRRA trucks gradually became available and military trucks returned. Food is still being entirely supplied from military resources. Accommodation stores, blankets, etc., are still mainly those handed over by D.P.R.S.C., A.C.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Organizations such as UNRRA, dependent upon obtaining government appropriations and faced with tremendous difficulties in transporting personnel and supplies in wartime, inevitably took longer to enter into full operation than either the Army or they themselves expected. For additional material on the DP problem and on UNRRA, see Chapters XIX and XXI.

or other structure, whether public, ecclesiastic, or private, whose historic, cultural, artistic, traditional, or sentimental value render its protection and preservation a matter of public interest. Such monuments include ruins, museums, libraries, churches, memorials, palaces, and the like.

2. As soon as practicable after occupation, the CAO should inspect all monuments within the area under his charge to determine what measures are necessary for their protection and preservation.

3. Monuments of necessary daily use, as churches, public offices, private residences, or the like, should be kept open and provisions made for existing custodians to be continued in office or new ones found. Necessary funds should be provided from local sources.

4. The CAO should use his discretion whether to keep open or to close monuments not of necessary daily use, as museums, libraries, archeological sites, or the like. Where custodians and funds are available and the monument is in good repair, it should probably be left open. Otherwise it should be closed, a notice posted

to the effect that it has been closed by military authority, and measures taken to ensure its protection and preservation by posting of guards, frequent inspection, or the like.

5. In his inspection, the CAO should note damages sustained by monuments in the course of occupation. He should render a report on such damage through channels to the CAO. He should include recommendations with respect to repairs, cost, available funds, available skilled labor, and the like. Where delay in repair would jeopardize the preservation of the monument, he should see to the execution of the repairs on his own authority. Costs of repairs should be charged to local funds save in very exceptional cases.

6. The CAO should take steps to prevent damage or defacement of monuments by military or local personnel. Such steps might include, besides ensuring adequate protection, posting of notices in English and Italian, requesting tactical commanders to warn troops against acts of nuisance, defacement or disrespect, and the like.

7. The CAO should see that all charges of damage or disrespect to monuments which come to his attention are promptly investigated by himself or by appropriate civil or military authorities and, if proven, are duly punished.

8. During the first phases of occupation, the CAO will probably not be concerned with the protection, care, and control of movable objects of art other than through steps taken to protect museums, etc. Instructions will therefore be issued later on this subject. The CAO should, however, attempt to prevent the removal of objects of art, archaeological fragments, and the like. He should also see to the proper preservation of such objects as may come to light in the course of military operations, repairs to buildings, or the like. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL NOT LOOK KINDLY ON US

[Ltr, Capt Hammond, Adviser on Fine Arts and Monuments, AMGOT Hq, to Reber, MGS, AFHQ, 24 Jul 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

\* \* \* I doubt if there is need for any large specialist staff for this work, since it is at best a luxury and the military will not look kindly on a lot of art experts running round trying to tell them what not to hit. However, the Adviser (for Sicily, one perhaps enough, for larger spheres probably several) should have rank enough to carry weight in staff councils and to be able to get things done in the field. . . .<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> In fact, only one officer was assigned to the MFA&A function in Sicily and he did not go in with the task forces.

#### AMERICAN COMMISSION SUPPLIES THE ARMY WITH PRECISE DATA AND MAPS

[Ltr, McCloy to Finley, Vice Chairman, The American Com for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, 9 Oct 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

\* \* \* The information you have furnished concerning the location of important artistic monuments in Italian provinces should prove invaluable. In order that this information can be utilized to the fullest extent possible, I have sent a copy of your letter to General Eisenhower by officer courier, with the request that it be made available to the appropriate museums and monuments officers in the area mentioned. \* \* \*

The specifically prepared maps which your Commission has furnished to the Civil Affairs Division and the Army Air Forces have been distributed to the appropriate theaters of operations, except one photostatic copy which has been retained for file. So far as military operations permit, these maps are used for the protection of the monuments, museums and other buildings plotted on the maps.

I am advised by the U.S. Army Air Forces that your assumption that the maps are used in its planning of aerial operations is correct. In this connection, your attention is called to the fact that the R.A.F. also participates in aerial operations. Your Commission may wish to discuss this subject with the State Department, with the view to bringing the use of these maps to the attention of the appropriate agency of the British Government.

As you know, the War Department has recognized the urgent necessity for taking special measures to prevent black markets in cultural treasures looted by the enemy, as well as to protect local archives, historic monuments and objects of art. We look to your Commission for advice and guidance in implementing these policies. . . .

#### TO WHAT EXTENT IS PROTECTION OF MONUMENTS COMPATIBLE WITH MILITARY NECESSITY?

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Oct 43, CAD Msg files, CM-OUT 6000]

Protection of artistic and historic monuments in Italy is subject of great concern to institutions and societies. Realizing the impracticability of declaring open the cities in which most treasures exist, following three points submitted for consideration: (1) By the use of radio, leaflets, and any other means available to you advise Italian people to remove all movable works of art from

cities and localities subject to damage by military operations. (2) Avoid destruction of immovable works of art insofar as possible without handicapping military operations. (3) Declaration of isolated cities as open when they come under our control and have no military value. Example: Assisi. \* \* \*

[Msg, Eisenhower to WD, 22 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 13405]

Appreciate great concern as to protection of Italian artistic and historic monuments. . . . Ref para 1. Italian people will be told that our air attacks are directed against the Germans. Ports, airfields, communications all kinds especially road and rail centers used by the Germans as well as all areas occupied by Germans are liable to attack and all movable works of art in such localities should be removed to place of safety or localities obviously less liable to air attack. For security reasons not prepared to designate definite localities where air attacks will be made. Is warning considered necessary with respect to obvious advance of ground troops?

Ref para 2. Concur, this policy already in effect.

Ref para 3. Agree that this might be done without prejudice to military operations provided that necessary publicity measures are taken to ensure that the declaration of militarily unimportant art center as open city may not set precedent likely to prove embarrassing later when art centers essential for military use are not so declared.

#### EXPERIENCE IN SICILY HAS TAUGHT LESSONS

[Memo, Capts Hammond, Adviser, and Maxse, Deputy Adviser on Fine Arts and Monuments, to Advisory Comms. on the Preservation of Monuments and Works of Art in London and Washington, 1 Nov 43, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1)]

1. . . . As of 24 October 1943, AMGOT has become Allied Military Government (hereafter AMG) and enters a new phase.

3. In the new organization, at the level of AMG General Hq. (which will presumably become ACC), the Sub-commission for Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (hereafter MFA&A) will be separated from that of Education and is under the acting Directorship of Major [P. K.] Baillie Reynolds, formerly Inspector of Monuments for the Office of Works in England. . . .<sup>27</sup>

<sup>27</sup> MFA&A was an integral part of ACC/AMG and internally fell into three related groups: (1) Headquarters of the Subcommission which was a part of the Administrative Section of Hq, ACC; (2) MFA&A officers assigned to the staff of AMG groups operating in the Army areas;

4. Attention is called to the suggested need of having Advisers on MFA&A more closely in touch with the initial phases of occupation than they were in Sicily. AMGOT Headquarters collected a considerable and authenticated file of damage to property and sequestration of goods both by civilians and by troops during the first, uncontrolled, days of the occupation of Sicily. Fortunately the harm to monuments and works of art was not great. However, libraries, archives, and scientific institutions suffered considerable damage and loss of equipment. Much of this could have been prevented had there been some officer on the scene specially charged with initiating precautions against it.

5. Reasonable precautions, which would not interfere with military needs, might be the following:

(a) Issuance by the Commanding General of an order requiring the posting of guards on places of artistic or cultural importance; the avoidance of the use of such places for the billeting of troops if other equally suitable places are available; and the protection of the contents of such places from damage or loss if it proves absolutely necessary to billet troops in them.

(b) Presence at Group and Army Headquarters of officers (one at each) charged with the responsibility of advising commanding officers as to what artistic or cultural places need protection and of inspecting as soon as possible after occupation to see that necessary protective measures have been taken. The ordinary CAO has no time for this task, amid his many other duties. The Advisers found in Sicily that it was much easier to secure co-operation in avoiding billeting in artistic or cultural places than to get troops out once they were in. They also found that troops billeted in such places respond readily to reasonable suggestions for the conservation of the structure or its contents since most damage or loss occurs from ignorance and carelessness rather than through deliberate malice. Civilian looting, naturally, requires adequate police guard.

7. In the second, or AMG, phase, the Adviser will be responsible for the necessary steps to reactivate the local administrative machinery responsible for monuments and works of art and for securing funds to finance the most urgent work of conservation. . . .

8. One major problem in conservation of monuments has been the shortage of building ma-

(3) MFA&A officers assigned to the Staff of the Regional Commissioners taking over as the Army moved forward. Mission and functions of the subcommission follow under date of 23 March 1944. For further details see ACC files, 10000/145/197.

terials. Damage to roofs is extensive and tiles, though manufactured locally, are in great demand and scarce. Glass for broken windows is unobtainable and the openings must be blocked with wood or brick. Wood itself is becoming impossible to obtain for scaffolding, roofs, and other uses. . . . It is suggested, however, that the Committees attempt to send at the earliest possible moment one or more dismantlable and movable steel tubing scaffolds; wood, particularly plywood; light and easily laid roofing material; and some sort of transparent, weather-proof paper or cellulose, perhaps made up in sliding panels for insertion in otherwise boarded up window spaces. It goes without saying that these materials, essential for temporary measures of conservation, are also desperately needed for general housing.

10. During the second, or AMG, phase it is suggested that Advisers, at the same time that they initiate practical measures for immediate conservation, begin the spade-work for eventual restoration. Damage can be assessed, value of restoration judged, and estimates secured. The material collected at the regional level can be co-ordinated and digested at the level of General Headquarters. Consultation and co-operation with Advisers on Education will be close. As AMG goes into the third, or Allied Control Commission, phase the direct administration will pass to the Italian government. Regional advisers will probably vanish, and ACC Advisers will turn more and more attention to general planning and to advising and assisting the Italian government.<sup>28</sup>

#### LOG OF EARLY ACTIVITIES IN NAPLES REGION

[Sec of Education and Fine Arts, AMG Reg III, Rpt for Nov 43. ACC files, 10000/100/1040]

\* \* \* The following protective measures were taken for the safeguarding of monuments and fine arts:

\* \* \* 2. *a.* A list of monuments was furnished the Adjutant General, Region III AMG, on 3 November 1943 which included (a) buildings in Naples which should never be requisitioned for military purposes and (b) monuments which are occupied by troops and for which requisitions should be lifted.

*b.* A list of monuments in the forward areas was furnished the Adjutant General, Region III, AMG, for guidance of combat units.

*c.* On 11 November 1943, trucks were fur-

<sup>28</sup> Additional measures recommended for the protection and salvage of artistic and historic monuments based on experience in Sicily will be found in SHAEF files, G-5, MFA&A, Historical, Jkt. 1.

nished the Superintendents of Museum for the removal of their office equipment, library and museum files from the Castel Nuovo where it was being ransacked and looted by occupying troops.

*d.* On 14 November 1943, accompanied by an officer from the Inspector General's Department of Headquarters Fifth Army to the Accademia and Palazzo Reale to investigate looting by occupying troops which had been reported by Italian authorities.

*e.* Periodic visits have been made to all monuments in Naples occupied by troops to check on the safety of collections and libraries still in place.

3. Funds were authorized to be put at the disposal of the Royal Superintendents of Museums for the following projects of a purely protective nature:

*a. Church of the Gerolomini:* project to construct temporary roof and scaffolding to hold up damaged coffered ceiling. . . .

*b. Church of San Giovanni a Carbonara:* project to erect temporary roof over entire church, choir and chapel. . . .

*c. Church of San Paolo Maggiore:* project to construct temporary roof over church and chapels. . . .

*d. Palazzo Reale of Naples:* project to wall up repository of state owned furniture. . . .<sup>29</sup>

*e. Museo Provinciale Campano at Capua:* project to salvage and remove to safety part of collection buried in section of building demolished by bombs. . . .

*f. Excavation of Pompeii:* project to erect temporary protection over sections exposed by bombing, to strengthen weakened frescoes and to recover monuments buried by bombing. . . .

*g. Amphitheatre at Pozzuoli:* project to erect temporary walls and custodian quarters destroyed by bombing, in order to safeguard monument. \* \* \*

#### THINGS ARE GOING BADLY IN NAPLES AND MORE SAFEGUARDS ARE NEEDED

[Sec of Education and Fine Arts, AMG Rgn III, Report on Activities to 15 December 1943, ACC files, 10000/129/168]

5. The major effort of this Section has been devoted to the task of attempting to safeguard

<sup>29</sup> In June an engineer company engaged in renovating the theater in the Royal Palace aroused the MFA&A Subcommission to cold fury. It apparently stripped the entire proscenium of its moldings, ornamental piers, hangings, and all decorative details—despite a clear understanding with the MFA&A officer that the proscenium was to remain untouched. Memo, Maj E. T. De Wald, Dir, MFA&A Subcom, for President of Admin Sec, ACC, 9 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711.

monuments which, in the early days of the occupation of Naples, were indiscriminately requisitioned to billet troops. These requisitions are still in effect and museums, the University, royal palaces and libraries are occupied by troops. Many sections of these buildings still contain important and valuable works of art, books, furniture, and state documents. It has been impossible to confine troops to the sections allotted to them and the majority of the Superintendents of the various monuments have reported many instances of the pillage and vandalism of works of art and books. Wherever possible the vandalism was investigated, detailed reports written, an investigation has been held by the Inspector General Section of Headquarters Fifth Army, but the occupation by troops continues in every instance and the Superintendents continue to report vandalism. It would seem that the only solution to this grave problem is to secure from the highest authorities the assurance that certain monuments can not be requisitioned for military purposes.

6. The historic University of Naples, the largest in Italy, has been occupied by Allied Forces since early in October. At the request of the Rector, Dr. Adolfo Omodeo, I inspected the buildings on 19 November 1943 with the Rector and several faculty heads. In many places there were visible evidences of inestimable damage done to libraries, laboratories, collections of specimens and optical instruments. It was claimed the major part of this was done by the occupying troops. A detailed report was submitted at once. To date the University is still occupied.

7. Information was received on 17 November 1943 that the Museo Nazionale had been requisitioned by 10 Base Depot (British) as a depot for medical stores and for the quartering of troops. A large part of the world famous collection is still in the Museum and there seemed no reason to believe it would escape the damage noted in Paragraph 5. The requisition was reported at once, every effort was made to have it lifted, alternate space was suggested but to no avail. As far as is known, the building will be occupied in the near future.

15. In the light of experience here, the following recommendations are made:

a. That, before the occupation of an area, the head of the Section of Fine Arts have an opportunity to meet with other officers of the Region; especially SCAO's and CAO's to explain the functions and aims of this Section.

b. That the head of the Section of Fine Arts reach an occupied area at the earliest possible moment and that, if feasible, his advice be sought

by requisitioning authorities to prevent the indiscriminate use of historical monuments for the billeting of troops.

c. That every effort be made to secure from the highest authorities the approval of a compiled list of monuments which may never be used for military purposes except with the permission of the Commanding General. \* \* \*

#### ALLIED CINC INSISTS EXCUSE OF MILITARY NECESSITY BE FULLY JUSTIFIED

[Directive, Eisenhower to All Comdrs,<sup>30</sup> 29 Dec 43, ACC files, 10700/145/1]

Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the civilization which is ours. We are bound to respect those monuments so far as war allows.

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear cut as that. In many cases the monuments can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But the phrase "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.

It is a responsibility of higher commander to determine through AMG Officers the locations of historical monuments whether they be immediately ahead of our front lines or in areas occupied by us. This information passed to lower echelons through normal channels places the responsibility on all Commanders of complying with the spirit of this letter.

#### TROOPS MUST BE CONSTANTLY EDUCATED

[Min, Discussion at Mtg of Exec Council, ACC, 4 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

\* \* \* [Lt. Col. Cripps (SO, Administrative Section, ACC) stated:]

<sup>30</sup> The directive was accompanied by GO No. 68, 29 December 1943, Historic Monuments, which put responsibility for the use of buildings for military purposes on the Allied Commander in Chief or Commander in Chief, Fifteenth Army Group, as the case might demand. It further provided that the posting of off-limit placards and the prevention of looting, wanton damage, and sacrilege of buildings were command responsibilities. A copy of this GO will be found in file cited.

238. Since most damage to historical and artistic objects was done by our troops rather than by the enemy, the representatives of this Sub-Commission should be sent forward with the troops to prevent damage. Brig. Lush said that he thought that it was the Lines of Communication troops that did the damage and not the fighting troops. The Chairman said that he thought that it was a question of constantly educating the troops as to the objects and buildings which must be preserved. Lt. Col. [Aaron E.] Harris stated that in Region IV Allied property was posted by the R.C.A.O. indicating that it was out of bounds to troops, and that a similar program might be used in respect of historical or artistic monuments. \* \* \*

[Report of Col Henry C. Newton's Conversation with Herbert Matthews, War Correspondent for *New York Times*, Francis Taylor, and Mr. Crosby, in New York, 24 Apr 44, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 3]

\* \* \* Mr. Matthews had the following comments about Monte Cassino. The 36th Division was making the main effort in this attack. The attack was progressing fairly well, and we had occupied some of the terrain features to the left of Monte Cassino. Mr. Matthews personally saw the G-2 of the Division and spoke to him about the very historic structure which the Division was about to take. The G-2 said "What's that?" Mr. Matthews then told him about Monte Cassino—it was the first he had ever heard of it. Mr. Will Lang of *Time Magazine* talked to the General commanding the artillery in front of Monte Cassino and learned that he had no particular orders and had never heard of the historic significance of the structure. Mr. Matthews then determined that no information had been given the G-2 of the 36th Division or the Artillery commander as to the sacred character of Monte Cassino.

Following this incident Mr. Matthews wrote a personal letter to General Eisenhower and conferred with General Smith of General Eisenhower's staff.

Orders were issued to the 15th Army Group but by the time they got through the various echelons of command, Mr. Matthews continued, it never reached "the man who fired the gun." \* \* \*

Mr. Matthews, at the request of the Public Relations Office, gave a talk about Monte Cassino to the troops in the rear areas just before the attack. That was the first they had heard of it. \* \* \*

#### PRECAUTIONS TAKEN AGAINST EXPORT OF WORKS OF ART

[Memo, Reynolds, Dir, MFA&A, for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 14 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

12. . . . there is as yet no evidence that the members of the Allied Forces have attempted to export works of art improperly and it is felt that there is far greater risk of this occurring through smuggling by civilians. Nevertheless, it is felt that the issuance of an order . . . and the initiation of appropriate control measures would be a wise precaution to take against the possibility of some flagrant instance occurring and exposing the Allied Force Headquarters to the charge of not having taken proper steps to prevent it.<sup>31</sup>

#### IN BEHALF OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORIANS

[Memo, Lt Col Hilary Jenkinson, MFA&A, to Dir, MFA&A, 1 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

1. I have now, I think, in hand up to a point the preparation of a list of places where Archives are or should be deposited. . . .

5. . . . I called attention to the special danger to which Archives are subject owing to their unique character, to their easy destructibility, to the fact that they may be damaged almost as irretrievably by dispersal as by actual destruction, and to the general ignorance even among men who might be expected to appreciate the possible value of a picture or sculpture, of the possible value of stores of papers or registers; especially when these are not obviously antique.

6. I took the opportunity of a conversation with Brigadier Lush yesterday to press strongly this point: because I see no possible way of dealing with the danger, in view of the enormous quantity of such Archives, except the preparation of a very short and simple explanation of the possible value of old papers and a similarly brief explanation of the way in which, with little trouble, they may be safeguarded when they are found in buildings which have to be occupied for military purposes; coupled with strict orders for the execution of such recommendations. Brigadier Lush asked me to prepare some note of this kind to be added to an order which, as I understand, is actually in preparation concerning the protection of Ancient Monuments. \* \* \*

<sup>31</sup> On 20 October Radio Fascista announced that all the art treasures of Sicily had been divided and sent to London and Washington. ACC files, 10000/154/317.

## CAN THREE JEEPS BE SPARED TO PROTECT ITALY'S ART?

[Memo, Maj J. B. Ward Perkins to Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 3 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

1. The effective work of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Subcommittee depends very largely on the personal inspection of monuments by its officers and on their liaison with a large number of widely scattered military units. . . .

2. The Subcommittee has in the past been very seriously hampered by lack of transport facilities. In practice it has proved that neither Regions nor AMG 5 and 8 Armies are very likely to be in a position to allocate transport for such purposes. In rear areas hitch-hiking affords a slow and tedious, but usually practical, solution. In forward areas on the other hand the time factor is vital, and it is essential for the proper exercise of their duties that Monuments and Fine Arts Officers should have transport at their disposal to enable them to get on the ground at the very earliest moment that operations permit.

3. The minimum needs of the Subcommittee are three small vehicles (Jeeps or P.U.'s), one for each of the officers with 5 and 8 Armies and one for general inspections by the Director or by visiting specialists. . . .<sup>32</sup>

## MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF MONUMENTS, FINE ARTS AND ARCHIVES SUBCOMMISSION<sup>33</sup>

[Statement of Dir, MFA&A, 23 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/175]

### I. Mission

To prevent as far as possible destruction of and damage to historical monuments, buildings, works of art and historical records of Italy; to safeguard and preserve them, and to give first-aid in repairs when needed; and to assist in the recovery and restitution to their rightful owners of any works of art which have been looted, removed or otherwise misappropriated.

### 2. Major Functions

(a) Advises on orders to be issued by Commanders to their troops for the protection and

<sup>32</sup> Viscount Stansgate considered the request reasonable, and presumably his recommendation to the Executive Commissioner resulted in the three jeeps being made available.

<sup>33</sup> The protection of fine arts was originally assigned by ACC to an Education and Fine Arts Subcommittee. A few months after the activation of ACC, the education and fine arts functions were assigned to distinct subcommittees. See note 27, above.

safeguarding of monuments, buildings, works of art, etc.

(b) Maintains liaison with ground and air forces in order to furnish them with information concerning historical monuments within their respective theaters of operation.

(c) Formulates and distributes plans and directives.

(d) Collaborates with other Subcommittees, including Public Safety, Public Works, Property Control, and Education.

(e) In collaboration with Public Relations prepares and/or approves publicity relating to monuments and fine arts within its jurisdiction.

(f) Acts in advisory capacity to Italian Ministry of Education.

(g) Submits periodic reports on matters relating to preservation and protection of monuments and art objects.

### 3. Operational Functions

(a) Prepares regional and provincial lists of monuments, etc. to be safeguarded, and distributes same to Regional Commissioners and to units in the field.

(b) Provides measures to safeguard monuments, etc. in regions occupied by Allied forces.

(c) Advises unit commanders on matters pertaining to requisition of national monuments.

(d) Collects information regarding the damages of war to monuments, etc.

(e) Investigates reports of alleged looting or other unlawful appropriation of art or historical objects, and recommends appropriate action for restitution of same.

(f) Aids Italian government agencies concerned with respect to preservation, including urgent repairs necessitated by war damage to national monuments, protection of works of art and historical records, including salvage, collection, housing, and restitution to rightful owners of same.

(g) Prepares guide-books for military personnel and co-operates with the Red Cross and Special Services in arranging tours for same.

## A MORE THOROUGH DIRECTIVE IS ISSUED TO THE TROOPS

[Hq AAI, Admin Instrs 10, 30 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

1. Attention is directed to the personal letter to all Commanders issued by the GOC-in-C dated 17 February 44 on the above subject.<sup>34</sup> The following instructions are issued as a guide to Com-

<sup>34</sup> This letter is filed in ACC files, 10000/145/319.

manders and in amplification of the letter above referred to.

2. Tactical considerations must obviously influence the occupation of historical buildings, etc., during actual fighting, but a rigid control over such occupation will be imposed by Commanders as soon as fighting has ceased.

3. It is not proposed to forbid the occupation by troops of any specific buildings except that churches will NOT be used for normal troop accommodation. In cases of extreme necessity churches may be used temporarily to shelter wounded personnel awaiting evacuation. This authority is not to be interpreted that they may be used as Casualty Clearing Stations or Hospitals. The responsibilities for decision as to whether an historical building is to be occupied or not is delegated to Commanders, not below the rank of Divisional Commander or officer of equivalent status, except that during actual fighting, in cases of extreme operational urgency, lower Commanders may have to act.

4. To assist Commanders in their decisions ACC/AMG have prepared lists of the principal historical monuments, deposits of important documents (archives), and artistic treasures of Italy, with the degree of their importance indicated by stars. These lists will be known as "Lists of Protected Monuments" and will supersede the lists printed in the Zone Handbook of Italy, and AFHQ General Order No. 68 of 29 December 1943 insofar as it refers to the Zone Handbook. . . .

5. All buildings listed in the "Lists of Protected Monuments" will be deemed "historical buildings" and will not be occupied when alternative accommodation is available or without the express authority in writing of the appropriate commander as laid down in paragraph 3 above.

6. As by far the greater part of the damage is likely to occur between the time the battle moves forward and the time reserve formations and administrative units assume full control, it will be the responsibility of commanders to place guards on all historical buildings during this phase, insofar as their resources allow, so that their eventual occupation will be planned and orderly.

7. Whenever it is found essential for operational reasons to occupy any such buildings, the commander of the occupying troops will be responsible for seeing that ACC/AMG are informed at the earliest opportunity and that every reasonable precaution is taken to prevent careless or wilful damage and especially souvenir hunting. In the case of museums, galleries, li-

braries, repositories of documents and other cultural institutions, the contents will be stored separately from the parts occupied, communicating doors between the occupied and unoccupied parts of the building will be blocked, as will also all unnecessary entrances from outside whether to the occupied or unoccupied parts. Notice boards will be erected, and all troops billeted in the building will be issued passes and will be the only troops permitted to enter.

Responsible Italian officials will, if available, be consulted when such measures are being considered.

8. Partial occupation of a large historical building, i.e., the occupation of only a small corner, or occupation by troops of more than one Allied Nation will be avoided wherever possible. In the past buildings so occupied have suffered a high proportion of loss and damage, not necessarily attributable to the occupying unit(s).

9. ACC/AMG has a staff of officers with expert knowledge of such matters who should be consulted in all cases of doubt. Where such officers rule that specific items, e.g. furniture, should be included in those stored separately, their ruling will be binding subject to the right of appeal of the occupying unit to this Headquarters through the normal channels.

10. In addition to the monuments, etc. mentioned in the lists, there are known to exist repositories to which the more valuable treasures of museums and galleries have been removed for safety. The sites of such repositories are not at present known: when found they are to be regarded as starred monuments, and their location reported.

11. In the case of written papers and books it is to be noted that even those which do not appear to be ancient may be of great importance, not only historically but as containing information necessary for the practical purposes of war. Casual destruction or dispersal of such collections, wherever found, will not be permitted.

12. All Operation and Administrative Orders involving the occupation of territory containing historical buildings will contain clear and specific instructions to troops on the lines indicated in this instruction.

[Amendment 1, Dec 44, to Hq AAI, Admin Ech, Admin Instrs 10, 30 Mar 44, ACC files, 10700/147/1]

1. Add new para 13—

There are possibilities of art treasure repositories, as yet unknown to the Allied Armies, being discovered in the course of future operations. In order to safeguard such repositories, it is essential that the commanders of units and

sub-units in the field should be aware of the procedure detailed below.

Whenever any unit or individual discovers what appears to be a collection of art treasures, privately or publicly stored for safeguarding, this repository will be reported at once through normal staff channels to the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officer with AMG at Hq Fifth or Eighth Army, whichever is applicable, and treated in accordance with para. 10 above. \* \* \*

#### MARSHAL BADOGGIO APPEALS FOR STILL MORE CARE

[Transl of Ltr and Memo, Badoglio to Gen MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 6 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

There have not escaped your attention the damages inflicted upon Italian buildings and monuments of high artistic value during their occupation by Allied units and officers. To the solemn declarations of the responsible political heads of Great Britain and United States, there have followed the definite orders issued by General Eisenhower and later by General Alexander for the respect to the artistic buildings which the Allied troops were obliged to use because of war necessity. Nevertheless, many irreparable damages have been inflicted and continue to be committed. The frequent contacts between the officer of the Italian Government and the members of the Fine Arts Sub-Commission do not seem to have brought concrete results.

I shall limit myself to mention, among the most serious damages, those inflicted at the Palazzo Reale at Naples from which large quantities of furniture, paintings, books and tapestries have been carried away: similar fate has befallen the Palazzo Reale at Caserta and the Accademia di Belle Arti of Naples, to mention only the principal cases.

In order to obviate in the future such serious occurrences (and in the very near future we hope to find ourselves in cities such as Rome, Firenze, Siena, Assisi, etc., where the artistic treasures are innumerable), I have summed up in the enclosed Memorandum several measures which could be taken in common agreement between the ACC and the Italian Government, and later made known to AFHQ in Italy for the execution of the consequent instructions. \* \* \*

#### *Memorandum* [Incl to above Letter]

1. Renewal of absolute prohibition to occupy and requisition for military use buildings of high monumental, archeological and artistic importance.

A list of such buildings (beginning with those of the region of Rome) shall be drawn up in agreement between the Subcommission of Fine Arts and the R. Soprintendenza Belle Arti of Naples.

Such buildings, gradually as the Italian cities become occupied, should be closed and watched over by the Military Police and by the Royal Carabinieri.

2. Always in agreement, compilation of a list of historical buildings which could be used only in case of absolute necessity, only with certain precaution.

In these the objects of art shall be removed and turned over to local Soprintendenze delle Belle Arti or to the technical offices of the Communes. The furniture of artistic value shall be assembled in an enclosure which shall be walled. There will remain in effect the prohibition to carry away the tapestries and other accessories.

[Memo, Admin Sec, ACC, for Exec Cmsr, ACC, quoting from dossier prepared by MFA&A, 25 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

7. Marshal Badoglio's proposals for action against repetition of damage in the future. In addition to the letters written by General Eisenhower (29 Dec 43) and General Alexander (17 Mar 44),<sup>35</sup> AAI Administrative Instruction No. 10 [above], which was issued on 30 Mar 44 after consultation with MFA&A and embodies the general recommendations by the Commission of Enquiry, specifically covers all the points raised by the Marshal, except that (as already clearly defined by General Eisenhower) it is considered that no *absolute* prohibitions to occupation can be made.

a. Lists of buildings, graded by importance, have been drawn up. These buildings may only be occupied under certain very clearly defined conditions and authority from a Major General or Officer of equivalent rank. Printing of these lists was necessarily withheld until the final approval of the Administrative Instructions covering them, but the first list (Lazio-Abruzzi) is now in proof.

b. The Italian Superintendents have already been consulted over the preparation of these lists.

c. Where it is found necessary to occupy a listed monument, provision is made for the dispersal of contents on the lines suggested.

d. Police arrangements are covered in general terms and have already been prepared in detail for Rome.

<sup>35</sup> Gen Alexander's letter referred to in Administration Instructions 10 was dated 17 February.

8. Liaison with the Italian Superintendents in Naples has throughout been close, continuous, and cordial. \* \* \*

**SOMEONE NOT THE "SCHOLARLY MOUSE" TYPE HAS BEEN SENT TO GET THE WORD DOWN TO THE TROOPS**

[Draft of Ltr, Hilldring, Dir, CAD, to Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, AFHQ, 25 May 44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-43), sec. 5]

. . . I will admit that Colonel Newton is ebullient, aggressive and full of his subject.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, if he hadn't possessed these qualities, I wouldn't have selected him for this work. You and I have already tried the "scholarly mouse" type. We had fifteen or twenty of them rambling noiselessly around the Mediterranean Theater and they didn't do a damn bit of good, because the word didn't get down to the troops as to what General Eisenhower wanted. . . . Some very important Americans, including the President and Mr. Stimson, are intensely interested in this project and are not at all satisfied with our first efforts and results in this field. . . . This is a new venture with soldiers, including those wearing stars, and unless some aggressive fellow devotes his time to preaching the policy of the U.S. and U.K. with regard to this matter, it will never get down to the troops, where it must get if anything is to happen.

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROTECTION OF ART IN ROME**

[Directive, Hq AAI, to Fifth and Eighth Armies and IV Corps, 3 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/154/290]

4. Rome is unrivaled in the world in its possession of ancient buildings, museums, Art galleries, etc. These treasures may almost be regarded as an international possession. It is in the interests of all civilized peoples that they are preserved.

5. Firm steps will be taken to ensure that these treasures are not despoiled either by the Allied troops or by civilians.

6. The Commander of the forces occupying Rome will ensure the guards are posted on all such places. A.M.G. will provide copies of an

<sup>36</sup> In March 1944 Colonel Newton had become a member of the Civil Affairs Division. His primary task was to set up an organization and SOP by means of which the civilian planning already undertaken could be put into effect (see Chapter III, Section 6). Early in May he was authorized to visit the European and Mediterranean Theaters to gather information and aid in the formulation of a program for preservation of fine arts and historic monuments in occupied territories. CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43).

order signed by the Commander in Chief, to be posted on these places, putting them out of bounds until such time as controlled visits may be allowed. \* \* \*

**ALLIED OCCUPATION OF ETERNAL CITY NOT PERFECT FROM THE MFA&A STANDPOINT**

[Gen Hume, SCAO Fifth Army, Rpt, The First Forty-eight Hours in Rome, 22 Jun 44 (hereafter cited as Hume Rpt, 22 Jun 44), p. 16, ACC files, 10000/105/212]

\* \* \* By the time of the occupation of Rome some of the University buildings had already been taken over by the Third Division. On the whole, the Division had avoided putting its troops in libraries or laboratories. At the suggestion of AMG, other installations were put off limits in order to complete the protection of all cultural and scientific equipment. It must, however, be added that any use of the University buildings for housing of troops is considered most undesirable by AMG. \* \* \*

On the day of our arrival, the Fine Arts officer discussed with Prof. Van Buren of the American Academy in Rome, the general situation which is extremely favourable in Rome, though considerable damage has occurred in the immediate vicinity at such places as Tivoli, Frascati and Nemi. Guards have been posted on all monuments and museums. \* \* \*

[Memo, Capt T. H. Brooke, Archives Officer, AMG, Lazio-Umbria Rgn, 26 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/145/319]

(c) The Archives of the Ministero delle Corporazioni (Rome) were ordered to be thrown out of the windows and removed for pulping by the officer responsible for the clearing of the building for use as Headquarters of The Allied Commission. This was only prevented by the intervention of the Archives Officer, Rome Region.

(d) The occupation of the Ministero dell'Aeronautica (Rome) by the Headquarters of AAI resulted in looting by troops. Repositories were broken into and the contents of filing cabinets scattered on the floor in a search for souvenirs. Photographic records in particular were thrown into hopeless confusion. \* \* \*

**CONDIGN PUNISHMENT**

[Memo, Dir, Subcom for MFA&A, for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 15 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

Report has been received from O.C. 20 Court Martial and Holding Centre that a sentence of 90 days field punishment and pay stoppages of £5 has been passed on a soldier who mutilated one of the pictures in the Palace at Caserta.

#### ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDED

[Memo, Newton, Spec Adviser of WD on MFA&A, for Vice President, Admin Sec, ACC, 24 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/105/711]

##### \* \* \* *a. Tactical Situation*

MFA&A Officers with our Armies should be advised of the impending tactical operations. It is essential that the MFA&A Officers do their advance planning the same as any other staff section if they are to properly accomplish their mission. I am under the impression that this is not being done, resulting in MFA&A Officers being rushed into a situation without time for adequate planning. . . .

##### *b. Photographic Record*

My instructions from the War Department gave emphasis to the question of photographic records. All officers on duty with the Sub-Commission are unanimous in the opinion that photographs should be made of all historic buildings and structures so that there will be a permanent record of their condition at the time they fell into Allied hands. . . .

##### *c. Transportation*

. . . Of necessity our Officers must cover a great amount of territory in the execution of their work and I feel that adequate transportation is absolutely mandatory. I recommend that each MFA&A Officer assigned to the Fifth and Eighth Armies be provided with transportation and that transportation be made available to the Officers assigned to the various Regions.

##### *d. Italian Official Transportation*

As the work progresses the Sub-Commission is placing more responsibility upon the officials of the Italian Government. They are, however, handicapped by lack of transportation or when transportation is available, by lack of gasoline and tires. This condition has resulted in a definite delay in the rehabilitation program of the area generally between Rome and Naples with the resulting possibility of severe damage to historic structures during the coming winter. It is recommended that essential Italian Officials, when approved by the Subcommission, be provided with facilities for adequate transportation.

##### *e. New Divisions*

There does not seem to be any method of indoctrinating the officer personnel of new divisions with the policies of the Supreme Commander on matters of MFA&A. Upon the relief of a division in the line it is customary to turn

over orders, documents, etc. to the staff of the incoming division. The work of MFA&A is quite unique in its character and its importance and many ramifications are of such a nature that I feel there should be liaison between MFA&A Officers and such divisions *before they go into the line*. This can be accomplished by officers especially detailed from the Headquarters of the Sub-Commission or by MFA&A officers on duty with the respective armies.

##### *f. Personnel*

The T/O [Table of Organization] for the Sub-Commission of MFA&A in this theater (Italy) has been established at twelve (12) officers. In my opinion this is an insufficient number to accomplish the mission. . . .

##### *g. Documents*

The War Department (U.S.) has provided and furnished copies of the ASFM-M-353-17 "Civil Affairs Handbook-Italy" as well as WDP No. 31-103 "Civil Affairs Information-Field Protection of Objects of Arts and Archives." It is recommended that these documents be distributed to Tactical Commanders down to and including Brigades, Regiments and other similar Tactical Sub-Divisions. \* \* \*

#### WAS IT MILITARY NECESSITY THAT THE BULL-DOZER PULL DOWN THE TOWER?

[Memo, Lush for Maj Gen N. A. Coxwell-Rogers, Chief Engineers, Hq AAF, 16 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/145/71]

When I was in Florence recently I had a talk with the head of our Monuments and Fine Arts Sub-Commission who is a little perturbed at the apparently rather ruthless methods employed by the DCRE in the area. It would be very greatly appreciated if this officer, Lt. Col Harris, could be asked to restrain his zeal in clearing up Florence and other antique areas, if the use of bulldozers, etc. is not absolutely necessary. An instance was given of the destruction of the Guelph Tower on the Ponte Vecchio which was brought down with great difficulty and, I am assured, unnecessarily. \* \* \*

[Memo, Coxwell-Rogers for Lush, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/145/71]

I fully appreciate the importance of avoiding unnecessary damage to the monuments and other works of art that are in such abundance in this country. There are, however, difficulties which are not always appreciated by local antiquarians and members of our Monuments and Fine Arts

Sub-Commission. The area round the Ponte Vecchio provides a good instance of the difficulties. The whole area was strewn with mines of all natures. Owing to debris, detection by normal means was impossible without risking a considerable number of soldiers' lives. Clearance of the area was a necessary preliminary to the repair of the water-main supplying the part of the town north of the River Arno. The employment of bulldozers was the only method which would reduce the chance of loss of life and make the early repair of the water main possible. \* \* \*

#### COMPLICATIONS IN PROTECTION OF ANTIQUE

[Ltr, Capt C. R. Pinsent, MFA&A, AMG, City of Florence, to Perkins, 24 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/145/71]

\* \* \* Saving the facades and a tower in Via Guicciardini and Via Por Santa Maria has been an up and down affair, but I hope to have successfully completed the work so well begun by Enthoven [MFA&A Officer]. The Army Engineers wouldn't risk their men's lives with their heavy machines in between dangerous-looking walls, so the Soprintendenza, took over the whole responsibility for shoring and clearing. Then, as soon as we had got properly going, with men working like ants to get the work done up to the Engineers' time, they change their minds and there we found them pushing their machines in after all, *without* first pulling down the walls they were so afraid of. So much the better for everybody, but it upset the administrative side a bit.

Now I am going round all the villas on a list supplied by the Soprintendenza and checked to some extent by Hart and Enthoven. The list contains every blessed house that had an antique stone in it, including one that had been used as a stable and fattoria and completely neglected for years, and one that had been completely rebuilt so that there wasn't an old stone left in it. We are only putting "Off Limits" notices on those where damage, if it occurred, would be ir-

remediable. A procession of people comes to the office to wangle Off-Limits notices. I have only met one who offered the house disinterestedly. \* \* \*

#### QUICK REMEDIAL ACTION IN A ZONE UNIQUELY RICH IN WORKS OF ART

[Rpt, Monuments and Fine Arts Sec, AMG Rgn VIII, 2 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/145/71]

1. Character of the Work. The formidable military obstacle offered by the Arno Valley was responsible for over two months of intensive operational activity in an area approximately 150 kilometres in length, following the curve of the River. This zone is richer in cultural monuments and works of art than any area of comparable size in the world.

2. The consequent damage to monuments of importance by bombs, shells, mines, fire, vandalism and theft has been incalculable. Prompt action and intensive labor will be necessary during the immediate future to keep the war damage from being greatly increased by weather.

3. The problems have been aggravated by the fact that enormous collections of works of art, normally concentrated in Florence, Pisa, Pistoia and Prato have been scattered over a very wide area in order to save them from damage by air action, thus exposing them to damage by artillery and troops.

4. MFA&A officers in the area have had therefore:

a. To locate, examine and safeguard deposits of works of art.

b. To visit and examine monuments, and take necessary steps for first aid in case of damage.

c. To cope with endless problems of movement control, supply, transportation, etc., arising from the absolute necessity of getting the proper civilian personnel to work repairing monuments in an area which was still highly operational. \* \* \*

## Politics Will Not Wait

On the very day of the first restoration of territory to the Badoglio government the Allied Commander in Chief (now the British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) cabled the CCS about a development which was imperiling the policies underlying Allied support of that government. A political demarche by Naples political leaders was no longer manageable by Naples AMG but had enlisted such broad international sympathies that General Wilson now felt compelled to warn his superiors. The Naples leaders were demanding not only an immediate broadening of the Italian government—in defiance of the decision to defer this till the capture of Rome—but also the abdication of the King. There was no certainty that the mass of the Italian people would approve these steps, and General Wilson asked that the CCS stand firm in the policy of deferring all political issues that might interfere with the war effort. American political opinion, however, was tending toward the view that the war effort might be hurt even more by suppressing Italian liberal elements who considered the King discredited by past association with Fascism. Probably more than a few Americans both at home and in Italy were now beginning to regret the decision to entrust civil affairs to the military authorities rather than to civilians better qualified to understand the forces thrusting toward a break with the old order. Indeed, the representative of one American civilian agency in Italy reported to Washington that the Italian leader

(Count Sforza) best able to lead a genuine democratic movement was being undermined merely because of Allied military power in Italy.

Actually, the military leaders were not taking sides politically but were merely implementing an inveterate policy, concurred in initially by civilian authorities, of postponing controversial political changes in Italy. This policy was the more natural for the Army in that it had thought that the military phase would be of short duration. As always in civil affairs matters the Army tried to limit its responsibility: it was mainly interested in the short-term objectives of maintaining stability behind the lines and securing maximum help from the Italian Government. The long-term objectives of political as well as economic rehabilitation it hoped to turn over to civilian agencies. Because of the long delay in taking Rome, stubborn and prolonged German resistance even beyond Rome, and unforeseeable internal developments the Army's concept of limited responsibility proved to be unrealistic. By force of circumstances the Army was destined to become the agency through which both the short- and long-term policies were executed. But as the documents in this chapter show, the effort to hold politics in abeyance persisted from the beginning of the occupation until, in the spring of 1944, Italian political groups, American political sympathies, and a diplomatic maneuver by the Soviet Government combined to force a change.

General Eisenhower himself had initiated the policy of postponing drastic political changes, although, like his government, he leaned in sympathies toward the more progressive elements in Italian political life. But surveying the political scene as it had developed by September 1943 General Eisenhower saw only two alternatives: to accept the government of King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio as a legitimate and cobelligerent government or to ignore the rickety regime and establish military government over all of Italy. He strongly favored the first course of action as best suited to gaining the maximum contribution to the Allied military effort with the minimum expenditure of manpower. The President and Prime Minister approved this recommendation mainly on the ground that it was the best means of winning the loyalty of the Italian armed forces, especially the Navy. When the long terms of surrender were signed General Eisenhower made it clear to Badoglio that he was expected to develop the capacity to govern and to broaden his administration by including anti-Fascist elements such as were found principally among the liberal and left-wing Italian parties.

The opportunity to broaden the government was presented with the resurgence of the anti-Fascist political parties. Even before the fall of Mussolini various groups had met clandestinely in the principal Italian cities. After Badoglio left Rome, six parties—the Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, the Liberals, Action, and the Labor Democrats—formed a Committee of National Liberation, *Il Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN)*, headed by Ivanoe Bonomi, and attempted to keep in touch with similar groups in the larger cities such as Florence, Milan, and Turin. A committee was formed in Naples and included the historian and philosopher, Benedetto Croce, and Count Carlo Sforza,

who had returned from exile in America. Holding a wide variety of opinions on other matters, the Naples group of politicians were unanimous in their opposition to the King who had collaborated with Fascism. Trying earnestly to enlist the support of the anti-Fascists, Marshal Badoglio offered the vice premiership to Count Sforza and made overtures to others only to meet with a flat refusal. Unable to obtain the collaboration of the resurgent groups Badoglio offered to resign. At this point Bonomi, President of the CNL in Rome, promised support provided the King would give assurances that a representative government would be formed when Rome was liberated. Badoglio then withdrew his resignation and suggested the formation of a government of under-secretaries chosen from administrative and technical experts. With this compromise solution adopted on 17 November the formation of a full government was postponed until the capture of Rome at which time Badoglio promised to resign.

In accepting this arrangement the military authorities hoped to postpone the abdication of the King and related political issues that might interfere with the prosecution of the war. It should be emphasized that this in no way altered the pronouncement, made at the time of the Italian declaration of war against Germany, that the Italians had "the absolute and untrammelled right . . . to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have." Furthermore, at the Moscow Conference of October the Allies had proclaimed that the Italian people should enjoy the democratic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly. The time, however, at which these rights would be extended was to be determined by the Commander-in-Chief as long as military operations continued.

By the beginning of the new year it was difficult to defer political change and im-

possible to continue prohibiting public political meetings. The military advance slowed down but the political agitation accelerated. The anti-Fascist groups continued their campaign against the King and in December requested permission to hold a national political convention in Naples. In spite of the Moscow declaration and other liberal pronouncements the military authorities, on the ground that the meeting might prejudice military interests, refused to permit it. The refusal to allow this assembly, together with the slow progress of epuration, caused widespread dissatisfaction with the Allied administration. Under pressure, MGS suggested that the political convention be held at Bari, outside AMG territory, and it also authorized a relaxation of the policy against public political meetings in AMG territory.

The Bari conference of 29-30 January 1944 drew up a program calling for the abdication of the King and the establishment of a government composed of all six anti-Fascist parties. An executive Giunta was formed to carry out these demands. The initial reaction of General Wilson, who had succeeded General Eisenhower as SACMED, was to postpone any change while the major offensive at Cassino and Anzio was in progress. He feared that opening up political questions might result in unrest and interfere with military operations. It was in the light of this advice from the field that Prime Minister Churchill made his speech in Parliament warning against breaking the handle while the coffeepot was hot. However, it had already become known to AFHQ that the U.S. State Department did not consider that the lid could be held down indefinitely upon a political situation that had already reached the boiling point. It was during this period of divergence in the political policies of the two countries that General Wilson sent the CCS his message of 9 February which warned against any

action that might increase political unrest at a time when he was committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome.

In less than a week, General Wilson changed his mind. The winter drive had broken down and it was obvious Rome would not be reached before a fresh spring offensive. Infuriated by Churchill's coffeepot speech the Giunta threatened first a general strike and then warned all those in the service of the state to regard the King and his government as rebels. Under stern warnings from AFHQ these actions were withdrawn or modified. Nevertheless by the end of February it appeared that the existing political dissatisfaction portended greater evil to military operations than did any reaction to a change of government. Furthermore, General Wilson decided that the Allies were at the time in a better position to control or moderate the demands of the Giunta than when they would be in Rome. Matters had progressed to the point where, as General Wilson informed the CCS on 18 February, a choice had to be made between negotiating on the demands of the Giunta or slapping its members in jail.

Presented with this alternative President Roosevelt urged the Prime Minister to adopt General Wilson's recommendation; at all odds he said the Allies should avoid persisting in any course that entailed putting down an anti-Fascist group by force. But the Prime Minister had already committed himself publicly to the policy of deferring political change; moreover he appears to have lost confidence in Sforza when he failed to persuade the Italian leader that upon his return to Italy he should support the monarchy as the only remaining symbol of Italian unity, at least until the war was over. Mr. Churchill's reply to the President urged continued support of the Badoglio government at least until Rome was captured and the Allies could better afford the risk of taking on as

collaborators men who were known to be less co-operative than Badoglio. In the interest of Allied unity the President went along with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office.

But neither American nor British political authorities foresaw that continued Allied delay in accepting a liberalization of the Italian Government would play into the hands of the Russians, who had no intention of missing any opportunity to strengthen their political influence in Italy. By a sudden, unilateral exchange of representatives with the Badoglio government the Soviets bolstered the position of the Italian Communist party and thus threatened the more moderate parties in the Giunta with a loss in political weight. When it became clear that the long-term political prospects of the United States and Great Britain were as much at stake as the

prospects of the parties most friendly to them, further delay seemed unwise. The American Political Representative and the British Minister made a joint visit to the King and urged him to abdicate in the interests of Italian unity, which was essential to the war effort. On 12 April Victor Emmanuel announced that after Allied liberation of Rome he would appoint his son Lieutenant General of the Realm. Upon this promise of the King the six anti-Fascist parties agreed to let their representatives participate in the Badoglio government. Settlement of the institutional question was deferred, by a commitment which the Allies secured from the new government, until the Italian people should be able to express its opinion freely. Only to this extent was it possible to make politics wait.

## I. PATIENCE AND IMPATIENCE OVER ISSUE OF POLITICAL CHANGE

### ALLIES MAKE KNOWN THEIR DESIRE FOR POLITICAL REFORMS

[Msg, Gen Smith, CofS, AFHQ, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, Setting Forth Items of Agenda for Discussions With Marshal Badoglio at Malta, 24 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 583]

\* \* \* (b) Present government to carry on; authority of King and Badoglio to be built up but with understanding this is *not* to prejudice untrammelled right of people of Italy to decide eventual form of government later.

(c) Final form of government to be decided after Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

(d) King and Badoglio to build broad based anti-Fascist coalition government which will work for Allies against Germans on basis of armistice. . . .

### THE KING AND BADOGLIO POINT OUT DIFFICULTIES IN EARLY LIBERALIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 601]

\* \* \* The King wished to know, which I insisted [*sic*], if Badoglio remain the Prime

Minister for the duration of the War.<sup>1</sup> He said it was quite possible that he might find it difficult to form a representative anti-Fascist government if we stipulated that Badoglio must remain Prime Minister.

He added that strength of Fascist Party, although latent in some areas, was still great and was much underestimated by Badoglio.

The very large Red proportion of the population were equally a menace and although, at the moment, the Catholic Party was definitely pro-Monarchy, definite reactions could rarely be foretold with accuracy. \* \* \*

He said finally that he thought that it would be most dangerous to leave the choice of post-war government unreservedly in hands of Italian people.

I commented suitably on all of the King's points. . . .

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<sup>1</sup>This conversation between the King and the Chief of the Allied Military Mission took place as the result of an invitation from the King after he had received the agenda for the Malta Conference, at which the long-term armistice was to be signed.

[Notes, Murphy, on Conf With Badoglio Aboard the H.M.S. *Nelson* in Valetta Harbor [Malta Conf], 27 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, p. 611]

The Marshal [Badoglio] indicated that the other desiderata of the Allied Governments, such as the broadening of the basis of his government and similar matters, could only be effectively dealt with after the King and his Government returned to Rome. He accepted it, in principle, as desirable.

With regard to the expression: "It is understood that the right of the Italian people to choose their own system of government after the war," mentioned in the text of the armistice terms, Marshal Badoglio wishes to see this altered to: "It should be understood that free elections will be held after the war." In other words, he did not wish to pledge the King and the Government to throw open the question of the Monarchy by their own act. We must consider whether the form of words can be interpreted to mean merely that the Allies do not in any way by their actions now commit themselves to maintain the Monarchy. Marshal Badoglio ventured the opinion also that the Italian people are not adapted to a Republican form of government and feels that the retention of the Monarchy is essential to stability and unity of the country. \* \* \*

#### TWO SOLDIERS TALK POLITICS AND GET NOWHERE

[Notes, Murphy, on Conf with Badoglio Aboard the H.M.S. *Nelson* in Valetta Harbor [Malta Conf], 29 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, Capitulation of Italy, pp. 658-59]

General Eisenhower inquired whether it is Marshal Badoglio's purpose to seek anti-Fascists and invite them to participate in his government.

Marshal Badoglio replied that the choice of members of the government will be made by the King—he himself is only a soldier, he stated, knowing very little of politics.

General Eisenhower expressed his sympathy as a soldier but stated that the Italian Government must assume an anti-Fascist complexion if it is to fight with the Allies.

In the letter which he will give him General Eisenhower will so state, but Fascism is one of those things we are fighting which we regard with deadly enmity.

Marshal Badoglio indicated that he understood all of this.

General Eisenhower reiterated that the extent he would be permitted by his government to cooperate with the Italians will depend upon this point.

Marshal Badoglio said that the fight will be (1) against Fascism; (2) against Germany; in that order.

Marshal Badoglio read a letter from the King asking for the participation of Count Dino Grandi, stating in effect that Grandi made the initial attack against Mussolini and really is responsible for Mussolini's downfall. Grandi's presence in the government would ruin the status of the Republican Fascist Government.

General Eisenhower said he would refer this question to his governments. In his personal opinion, however, Grandi had been so closely associated for so long a period of time in the minds of our public opinion with Fascism that now for him to be included in the Italian Government would be subject to adverse misinterpretation. \* \* \*

#### BROADENING THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T MEAN BRINGING IN A FASCIST

[Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 711]

Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this government that Grandi's presence in Badoglio government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps chief figure in deposition of Mussolini, he has been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian government. \* \* \*

#### SFORZA WOULD BE BETTER BUT BADOGLIO THINKS THE KING WON'T CONSENT

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 2 Oct 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 992]

From General [Mason-] MacFarlane the following message has been received.

Badoglio told me today that he hoped to ask Sforza<sup>2</sup> to return to Italy as soon as a government was formed in Rome. Badoglio would insure that Sforza was well treated but it was

<sup>2</sup> Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister in years immediately preceding the Mussolini regime, had come to the United States as an exile from Fascism. He had achieved an international reputation as statesman, as scholar, and as spokesman for anti-Fascist Italians.

quite impossible to expect that the King would agree to his inclusion in the Government.

#### THE ENIGMATIC COUNT SFORZA RETURNS BEFORE BADOGGIO EXPECTS

[Msg. Murphy to Mason-MacFarlane, 9 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/74]

Following message from Department of State is repeated to you as of interest. Count Sforza has not, in so far as Department of State is aware, stated in a broadcast that he approved the actions of the Badoglio Administration. The press has variously interpreted his remarks made at an Italian Rally on 26 September about the amount of support he is willing to accord present Italian Government. . . . He has expressed the opinion that Churchill is wrong in attempting to rally anti-Fascist forces to the King of Italy, however he has likewise taken the stand that the issue of constitutional reforms should not be brought up now and that all political wrangling should be shelved before the task of running the German invaders off of Italian soil. . . .

#### CHURCHILL HAS EXHORTED SFORZA TO EXERCISE POLITICAL PATIENCE

[Min. Prime Minister's Interv With Count Sforza, 11 Oct 43, Forwarded by Br Resident Minister to CofS, AFHQ, 28 Oct 43, G-5 AFHQ, SGS 400-4, vol. XV, quoted in Komer, Civil Affairs and MG in the Mediterranean Theater]

The Monarchy in Italy certainly counted for something and commanded loyalty. In any case it was the only thing that represented any continuity in the Italian state and was the only remaining symbol of Italy. If that disappeared, I could not see what would be left. It was essential to concentrate and encourage all that might be left of Italy's strength and purpose in the struggle against the German oppressors. . . .

The future of Italy was not my business: that was a matter for the Italian people. But the Italian people would have no say in the matter unless the Germans were driven out of Italy. The King and Badoglio were at present giving us such help as they could do to that end. There was no effective help from any other Italian quarter that I could see; the only chance was to support them.

#### THE THREE POWERS COMMIT THEMSELVES TO POLITICAL REFORM IN ITALY BUT NOT TO ANY DATE

[Three Power Declaration Regarding Italy Signed at Moscow, 30 Oct 43, Dept of State Bull IX (6 Nov 43), 309-10]

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet

Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future, the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander in Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

## MEANWHILE MANY ITALIANS HAVE BEEN IMPATIENT

[Ltr, Capt. R. Buckingham, Security Officer at Brindisi, Fifth Army, to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, AMM, 31 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/61]

\* \* \* I have formed the opinion that all is not well. There is a feeling of unrest, disappointment and surprise amongst the Italian people that a considerable number of Fascists, particularly "Squadriste" [*sic*] are still at liberty. Many of these continue to occupy their old positions and are engaged beneath the surface in certain subversive activities detrimental to the Allied cause.

Whilst complete domination by the regime

has been lessened this is thought to be only latent and it is felt by the People that conditions may later become as before, rather on the lines of the French proverb "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose."

The Italian people thought and hoped that they were going to be freed from the Fascist regime and imagined, in their despondency, that the Allied invasion would create an immediate Utopia. They are unable to understand completely what they consider to be the inaction of the Allies. That some early arrests were made is applauded but these are not considered to have gone far enough. The Badoglio Government is thought to be weak, if not favourable to Fascism for some reason.

## 2. STRANGE INTERLUDE OF POLITICAL COURTSHIP

### THE KING SEEKS A RECOGNIZED ANTI-FASCIST LEADER TO BOLSTER HIS OWN POSITION

[Msg Gen Taylor, Actg Chief, AMM, to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

\* \* \* Acquarone<sup>3</sup> explained that he had gone to Naples to try to effect the formation of a wholly non-Fascist cabinet of men of established ability. He had consulted various anti-Fascist groups and he cited in particular Enrico de Nicola and Porzio who had been respectively President of the Chamber of Deputies and Under Secretary to Giolitti when Prime Minister. Their reaction to his invitation to join the government was a refusal on the ground that they could not take part in a government headed by Badoglio. Their objection to the Marshal was not personal. But they considered it was a violation of the tradition of Parliamentary Government in Italy for a soldier to be Prime Minister. \* \* \*

### BADOGGIO WOULD DEFER POLITICAL CHANGES UNTIL ROME IS TAKEN

[Msg, Gen Taylor to Eisenhower, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

... In the course of a conversation with Marshal Badoglio today, he discussed at length his difficulty in forming a satisfactory cabinet. He states that he has a long list of cabinet possibilities drawn from individuals of many political shades

who will be available to him upon arrival in Rome. He feels that a stop gap cabinet formed prior to leaving for Rome would be useless as it would not have any of the machinery of the government available for performing its functions. . . . As it is hoped to be in Rome in a comparatively short time the Marshal, while requisitioning a present ministerial body, feels strongly that it is preferable to await arrival in Rome before taking final action on cabinet selections.

He considers Acquarone's visit to Naples a failure, adding that the old liberals whom he contacted were "ghosts" of a former era.

### ALLIES CAN WELL BE PUZZLED

[Msg, Gen Taylor to AFHQ, 15 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/26]

... The principal differences between the Badoglio and Acquarone interpretations of the cabinet situation lie in the importance attached to the Naples Group. To Acquarone they and their associates are the indispensable leaders of the anti-Fascists who must be reconciled to assure a broad and liberal cabinet of established ability. Badoglio attaches no such importance to these people and feels sure that he can develop his cabinet from liberal personalities who he expects to find in Rome.

It should be observed that the mission is in no position to check the accuracy either of Acquarone's estimate of the importance of the Naples Group or of the latter's statements of the strength of their contacts in Rome. But it is clear that

<sup>3</sup> The Duke d'Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household, who represented the King in his political negotiations.

Acquarone is speaking for the King and that in his view the Monarchy will be gravely endangered if speedy action is not taken to adjust matters with anti-Fascist groups.

In summary the choice which may be presented to the Allied governments is: will they hang with Badoglio for the time being even if he can produce only a second rate cabinet and this not until arrival in Rome or will they allow a recognized anti-Fascist to form a cabinet of his own choosing provided that it is wholly non-Fascist and that Badoglio is not briskly discarded.

It is obvious that we are approaching a crossroad in our political relations with Italy. . . .

#### THE KING IS SUSPICIOUS OF BADOGLIO

[Memo, Gen Taylor on Conversation With Duke d'Acquarone, 24 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

\* \* \* Acquarone then launched upon a vigorous attack on the Marshal whom he accused of disloyalty and of personal ambition to become regent. Although the Duke agreed that the text of the letter<sup>4</sup> showed no support of the regency movement, he felt that the inference was clear that Badoglio was encouraging it. He said that the relations between the King and the Marshal were approaching the breaking point and that the King could tolerate the Marshal no longer at the head of his Government.

Asked to outline the course of action which he, Acquarone, recommended he stated that he was first going to contact Sforza and see if he would come into the cabinet either as Prime Minister or as Minister for Foreign Affairs. If Sforza would not accept, he would next approach di [de] Nicola, whom he admitted was the only other available candidate for Prime Minister. At all events Badoglio must go at once while the completion of the cabinet would await the return to Rome, although the names would be agreed upon and be communicated to and concurred in by the Bonomi Group [Rome Committee of National Liberation, below].

In résumé, the attitude of the Duke and, probably to a lesser extent, of the King is that the Marshal is undermining the King's position and is prepared to sacrifice the latter in order to remain in power. Meanwhile they say that it is really Badoglio who is the obstacle to a unified government as is proved by the statements emanating from Rome. . . .

<sup>4</sup>Acquarone had shown General Taylor a letter written by Badoglio to the King which reported, with professions of regret, the statement by an emissary of the Rome parties that they favored a regency and would have none of the King.

#### BADOGLIO TOO IS ANXIOUS TO TAKE SFORZA INTO CAMP

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/3]

. . . Badoglio told me that he was extremely anxious for Sforza to join his cabinet. He considers that the inclusion of Sforza would strengthen his government very greatly. He himself and Sforza were and always had been on intimate terms. Badoglio added that he hoped to visit Naples on Thursday and thought he would be able to find up to three politicians there to join his cabinet. . . . Badoglio looked much older and more tired than when I last saw him and appears to be feeling the strain of his largely single-handed work.

#### BADOGLIO FAILS WITH SFORZA BUT NOW THE KING HIMSELF WILL TRY

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

. . . Present situation. The only political organization of any consequence now in being in liberated Southern Italy is the group around Croce and Sforza. It has the complete support of the bulk of the Allied press representatives, at any rate in the Naples area, in its hostility to the King. It is possible but unlikely that the orientation of the Rome group differs substantially from that of the Naples Group. In any case unless we get to Rome sooner than would appear probable it is really only the Naples Group that we have to consider at the moment. Badoglio has tried and failed on account of the King to gain their support. The King is now going to Naples to try himself. It is doubtful whether the King yet realizes that it is his own person that is forming the stumbling block to the formation of a representative government. Badoglio refuses to invite the King to abdicate but is perfectly willing to act as Regent for the King's grandson if others can induce the King to abdicate. \* \* \*

#### ALLIES WANT AN ANTI-FASCIST GOVERNMENT BUT WILL NOT INTERVENE

[Msg, Eisenhower to Mason-MacFarlane, 2 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/4]

(1) Our immediate policy should be based upon a single principle. We will not recognize or cooperate with any Italian Government unless it is prepared to accept loyalty to the terms of the Armistice and all that these imply. . . .

(2) Italians will of course appreciate that the attitude of the British and American publics to

Italy both now and in the future will be influenced by the character of any Italian Government. The more broadly based it is and the more genuinely anti-Fascist is its performance, the better will be the effect upon the public opinion of the democratic world.

(3) Apart from making these facts known, you should be careful not to intervene. \* \* \*

#### SPORZA REFUSES ON PRINCIPLE TO SERVE UNDER THE KING

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 6 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

. . . Sforza has telegraphed me text of identical personal letters to Eden and [Adolph A.] Berle [Jr.] with request that text should be forwarded by telegram to London and Washington. . . . Following is text which reached me slightly garbled in minor respects. . . .

King sent me today offer to become Prime Minister adding that personal independence towards him would be guaranteed by a solemn declaration that at end of war he would bow to any decision of nation. I answered:

1. That if all public men consulted by him

agreed on my name it was because my past gave them the belief that I may have force to unite and govern nation.

2. That since I had always believed in advantage of representative Monarchy I had already succeeded in persuading even extremists to accept formula Grandson as King with Badoglio as Regent since all princes are corrupt or dishonoured; but that I have fully realized that this is maximum can be imposed on nation;

3. Therefore if I accepted present government, my name would lose any force and prestige.

5. That apart from any political considerations, I considered morally unacceptable King's offer to become Prime Minister with mental reservation about His Person and His future. Since I am in Italy I have done my best to fortify Badoglio in his effort to help Allies but neither I nor Badoglio can do anything without a complete moral purification of a situation where rightly or wrongly it appears all forces of reaction and responsible of disaster hail King as their symbol. \* \* \*

It would help if Allies who have supreme responsibility recognize that there is a minimum that is indispensable to avoid too radical changes and to assure Italian efficiency and collaboration.

### 3. A GOVERNMENT OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS UNTIL ROME IS TAKEN

#### ROME COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION PROPOSES DEFERRING POLITICAL CHANGES

[Ltr, Bonomi, Head of Rome Comm. of National Liberation, to Badoglio as Summarized in Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 7 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

. . . He makes three conditions.

1. Reconstitution of entire Ministry so as not to imply blind acceptance of all preceding acts;

2. A completely political government with Badoglio as Military Head but not head of the Government;

3. It must be understood that an elected assembly in freed territory shall even determine the form of government. Therefore the members of the government shall undertake to abstain from any act which could compromise the free expression of the people in this respect.

He guarantees that thereby unity may be achieved.

He requests appointments be made only after Rome is freed.

He undertakes to prevent political speculations in Rome during the interval. \* \* \*

#### ATTEMPT TO BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT IS DEFERRED

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to Eisenhower, 7 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/27]

. . . As we had anticipated the King has refused to accept the views of Sforza and the Naples Group as final. . . . He has therefore used the Bonomi letter to persuade Badoglio to postpone the whole issue until arrival in Rome. As Badoglio has accepted this thesis this means that attempts to form a broad based government will be abandoned until we reach Rome. \* \* \*

#### BADOGGIO ANNOUNCES HE WILL FORM A GOVERNMENT OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS

[Transl of Badoglio Statement as Given in Msg, AMM to AFHQ, 12 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/28]

. . . In the Proclamation to the Italian people of last 13 October [see ch. IX, sec. 8] in which I announced that by order of H.M., the King, war was declared against Germany, I also laid down the proposals regarding the constitution of the government headed by me.

It was my intention to call upon the more outstanding representatives of all political parties, none excluded, so that the government could assume a completely democratic aspect.

Naturally, as I submitted to the Allied Mission, the formation of this government had to be brought about gradually, since many of those representatives were not in liberated zones and therefore not available for the time being.

I gave assurance, then, that I would contact statesmen in liberated zones in order to initiate a partial completion of the government.

In fact, I went to Naples where I conferred with Count Sforza, Benedetto Croce and others.

Count Sforza stated that he was ready to give all possible support to my government, but that he would not take any part in the same, since, in his belief, the King should abdicate, the Crown Prince should renounce succession and that the son of the Crown Prince should be made King, with a Regent appointed because of his minority. Benedetto Croce voiced the same belief.

I pointed out to them that the most important problem was that of freeing Italy from the Germans; that we should avoid any act, especially one of so radical a nature, which would cause disturbance in the liberated zone, which must be avoided in our interest and that of the Allies at all cost, and that in any case, we should await the complete liberation of Italy so that the Italian people as a whole, not merely a fraction thereof, could openly decide what form of government they preferred.

Since both Count Sforza and Benedetto Croce remained firm in their opinion and as other political leaders to whom I talked did not agree to take part in the government I returned here without having reached a final settlement.

In the meantime, the head of the Allied Mission informed me that various sections of the Mission were on the way, destined to start working with the different ministries in order to start the new administration rolling.

It was therefore indispensable to proceed with the forming of at least the executive part of the Ministries so that the work with the various sections of the Commission should not be delayed.

Now, a new matter appeared. The heads of each party made known to me that, once the capital was liberated, they favored the establishment of completely constitutional government composed of political personages, leaving to me only the military.

I then submitted a solution to the King: Form the Government, for the present, by placing technical experts in each Ministry, thereby starting the work with the Commission, and when Rome

was liberated I would present my resignation as head of the government, and retire.

The new political government formed by the King would, in this manner, find for itself a group of experts and an amount of work already in process in each Ministry, and, regardless of the prevailing conditions in Rome at that time, would be able to continue without interruption its work with the Allied Commission.

The King having approved this plan, I will now complete the government with undersecretaries who will possess, by means of proper decrees, the authority intended to consider and deal with matters pertaining to each ministry, including authority to sign all documents within the competence of the respective ministries.

In this manner the necessary administrative work will not be held in abeyance, causes for disturbances in liberated zones will be avoided, and the desires manifested by the heads of all political parties will be fully met.

#### COUNT SFORZA'S GROUP STILL WANTS IMMEDIATE CHANGE

[Transl of Pamphlet of Action Party, The Italian Situation, 25 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

\* \* \* The first task of the Allies at this moment and with these aims is to permit a liberated Italy to form *a strong administrative regime and a sound political representation* which will inspire faith and hope in, and will give a vital impulse to, the Italian people of the whole Peninsula, so that on the one hand, the Allied operations will be rendered easier and more effective, and on the other, those of the Germans more difficult and disappointing.

There exists in Central Italy the shadow of a legal government which fled from Rome at the time of the Armistice to escape from the Germans who attacked the capital and seized control of two thirds of the Peninsula, bringing on the scene a new Fascist regime depending on them and under the apparent leadership of Mussolini. This refugee government has with it the King, who represents at least the figure of the head of the state, and it is directed by Marshal Badoglio, surrounded by military ministers and one civilian, Minister of Labor Piccardi. On 14 November the Marshal added a few undersecretaries which did not change nor better the technical and non-representative character of the cabinet, so much so that he had to confess that he had not been able to obtain the concurrence of a single party from the Liberal to the Communist. \* \* \*

The people want:

(1) A respectable and respected regency at

the head of the State, if a President of a Republic is impossible at the present time;

(2) That a government of free, capable, and responsible men, representing the various currents of national opinion, be constituted as soon as possible and that it maintain honorable and fruitful contacts by assiduously and vigorously co-operating with the Allies in every field of activity in their common interest and for common ends. \* \* \*

#### MANY SEE NO NEED OF CHANGE

[Memo, Rennell, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

The Royal family lacks support but the population at large is not anti-monarchical or even anti-

King. The Army and Navy are fairly definitely and strongly behind the Monarchy and probably the King, at any rate for the present. The cadres, as all the bourgeoisie including the intellectuals and professional elements, are definitely anti-communist. . . .

[Memo, McCaffrey, RCAO, Rgn II, for SCAO's, 10 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/108]

5. For your personal information, high officials of the Allied Military Mission are thoroughly convinced that the Central Badoglio Government is definitely anti-Fascist, despite any incidents which have occurred at lower levels under circumstances giving rise to a contrary impression.

## 4. UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT POLITICS MUST WAIT

### RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICS

[AMGOT Proclamation 11,<sup>5</sup> AGO files, AMGOT Plan, 1 May 43]

#### Article IV

Section 1. . . . No newspaper, magazine, book, pamphlet or circular may be published or printed without a written permit from the Allied Military Government. . . .

#### Article V

##### Meetings and Assemblies

Section 1. *Permitted Meetings and Assemblies.* Meetings and assemblies for the following purposes may be held without permits:

(a) Meetings for religious purposes, including baptisms, weddings and funerals;

(b) Such courts of law as are authorised to function by the Chief Legal Officer of the Allied Military Government upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.

Section 2. *Other Meetings and Assemblies Prohibited.* Except for the foregoing, no person shall promote or attend any public meeting, theatrical, moving picture or other representation or performance, any public assembly or other public gathering, whether indoors or out-of-doors, or any parade or demonstration for which a written permit has not been granted. Such permits will be either specific or continuing and will be issued by or on the authority of the Commissioner of Civil Police of the Allied Military

Government through the Civil Police Officer for the locality upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.

Section 3. *Power of Civil Affairs Officer or other Officer to Disperse Assemblies.* Notwithstanding the issuance of any permit, any Civil Affairs Officer or Civil Police Officer, if he has reason to believe that public disorder will ensue or that the safety of the Allied Forces is threatened, may order any meeting, performance, assembly, or parade to be suspended or terminated and require all persons present to disperse. Any such order will be complied with immediately by all persons present. \* \* \*

[Proclamation of Eisenhower to the People of Sicily, 5 Jul 43, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 3913]

B. 3. . . . No political activity whatsoever shall be countenanced during the period of military government. [See also CCS directive for HUSKY, Chapter VII, Section 6.]

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT, 11 Aug 43, ACC files, 10000/100/688]

I saw Alessandro Tasca this afternoon principally in order to warn him that I did not want to see any further manifestations in public of the Sicilian Independence Movement. He told me that he had been associated with Sicilian Separatism, as I knew, all his life and that he and his brothers Polio and Lucio in company with about 90% of the population of Sicily, firmly believed in the absolute necessity of Sicilian Inde-

<sup>5</sup> From AMGOT Plan, 1 May 1943, embodied piecemeal in proclamation. See Chapter VII, Section 7.

pendence from Italy. I told him that whatever he might believe in, the Military Government would not tolerate public manifestations, leaflets or posters in the street, and that he would best serve the interests of Sicily if he would assist the Military Government in reorganizing Administration and in providing the population with food. I said that I should be more inclined to believe in his movement if I could see evidence of assistance. \* \* \*

[Rennell, CCAO, AMGOT, Rpt for Aug 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43)(1)]

6. . . . The Tasca family associated with the Separatist Party for many years before Fascism is . . . commendably co-operating on straight forward administrative subjects without obtruding the views they undoubtedly still hold. \* \* \*

#### INCREASING DISAPPOINTMENT AMONG SUBJECTS OF AMGOT

[Memo, Lt Col Peter R. Rodd, SCAO Enna Province, for AMGOT HQ, 5 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/647]

6. The doubts and hesitations which exercise the bureaucracy of the island have been very much increased by the Armistice and the events which followed it. Detached from it by conquest their affiliation to a definite, if inaccessible, national and administrative principle nevertheless survived until the Germans turned the whole of unoccupied Italy into a melting jelly. They have become, at least for the time being, not occupied Italian nationals, but the subjects of AMGOT. The strange and transient nightmare has become an apocalyptic reality. Their world has come to an end and this beast with many of the qualities of the Cheshire cat, which cannot be belled, haunts them with a fading grin.

12. There is . . . among the people generally a growing sense of disappointment that first the occupation and later the Armistice has not brought about the Golden Age, and a relief from restrictions in their personal liberty and the freedom of markets. \* \* \*

#### SOME POLITICAL GOVERNORS HAVE QUALMS

[Memo, Benson, Officer, Comdg, AMG Eighth Army, to Hq AMG, 15th AGp, 25 Oct 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

Representations have been made to me from various quarters as regards allowing Italians to have a greater measure of political freedom than is given under the existing AMG Government. It is not suggested that meetings should be allowed,

but that pamphlets discussing the merits or demerits of various shades of government should be permitted, after censorship, and provided they are not in any way detrimental to the Allied Cause and War effort.

It has been pointed out that stress had been laid in broadcasts on the fact that the people of Italy shall have the right to decide their own government after the war by free vote, and yet, after the armistice and her declaration of war, the people are forbidden to give any expression of political thought. This, it is considered, is reacting adversely on the relationship between the Italians and the Allies.

Whilst I would deprecate any relaxation in the operational zone in the present orders which forbid political meetings or meetings of any kind; it is a question for discussion as to how much they may be relaxed in the rear areas, and exactly what, for this purpose, could be considered the delineating line between the rear areas and the operational army zones.

If some measure of freedom were to be given in the rear, it would be probably impossible to prevent pamphlets being sent into the operational zone, but I could not consider this to be a matter of great importance. It would, however, enable the C.A.O.'s in the forward area to give an explanation of what to the Italian appears to be an illogical order, by explaining to them that as the areas pass out of the operational zone, they will have the right to give some expression to their political thoughts, and that the Allies were prepared to implement in fact what they have said in broadcast.

Could this matter be given consideration by higher authority and guidance be obtained?

#### POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS MET BY APPEALS AND WARNINGS

[Hq AMG, Rpt for Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

##### *Region I (Sicily)*

(28) During the month representatives of all the above groups [Christian Democrats, Action, Liberal Reconstruction, and Labor Front Parties] except the Separatists called on AMG officers in Palermo who again warned them that circulation of handbills and unauthorized publications and posting of manifestos could not be tolerated. They were called upon to co-operate, and agreed to do so, but requested that a greater measure of freedom be given for political activity. . . .

##### *Region II*

(131) The most aggressive "parties" are the Communists and the Socialists, and competition

between these two for positions of influence became rather sharp in Cosenza province. When the R.C.A.P.O. and other AMG officers discussed the situation with some of the Communist leaders they agreed that since we were fighting their battle and trying to help them, they would suspend political agitation and try to prevent the occurrence of disturbances of public order as long as we remained in control, but that they would do all they could to embarrass the Badoglio Government when it took charge. An indication of the state of political opinion is given by the fact that when the publication of newspapers was permitted in the province of Cosenza, eleven were started within a few weeks, each representing a different hue of political opinion.

(132) On 8 November, the R.C.A.P.O. and a Legal Officer, when visiting Rossano to deal with the cases of certain political prisoners, were informed by the Carabinieri Maresciallo that the Communists had arranged a public mass meeting to follow a procession through the town later that day. Because of the high feeling between the Communists and the Socialists, he feared trouble would result. In this fear, the Podesta concurred. The R.C.A.P.O. thereupon called the leaders of both groups together and obtained from them an agreement to suspend political agitation, and devote themselves to co-operating with AMG, which would welcome suggestions for the improvement of conditions, submitted through the Podesta. . . .

(133) Subsequently, an order prohibiting all public meetings and demonstrations, other than for religious purposes, was sent to all S.C.A.O.'s. \* \* \*

#### POLITICAL MEETINGS RESTRICTED TO PRIVATE HOMES

[AMG, Sicily Rgn Memo 43, 10 Dec 43, Spofford Rpt, ex. 4J-2]

1. AMG policy regarding political activity or manifestations of a political nature is based on the

### 5. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FINDS IT MORE TROUBLESOME TO PROHIBIT MEETINGS THAN TO PERMIT THEM

#### PUBLIC MEETINGS ARE BANNED IN A HIGHLY POLITICAL CITY

[Msg, AFHQ to AMG, 15th AGP, 4 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

In view of the special situation prevailing in Naples, with particular reference to the press and

directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The directive does not permit political activity or manifestations.

2. This means that no political party, of whatever shade or inclination, can:

a. Hold public meetings of any kind.

b. Print, or cause to be printed, affix, or distribute posters.

c. Print, or cause to be printed, or distributed pamphlets or other written material of a political nature.

3. However, AMG has never stopped private meetings in the homes of individuals. AMG has sought to permit, within the limits of its controlling directive, freedom of thought and expression. \* \* \*

#### IT IS FEARED SERIOUS DISORDERS WOULD RESULT FROM PUBLIC MEETINGS

[Hq AMG, Rpt, Public Mtgs for Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/101/501]

14. . . . The gradual process of political reawakening continued to be retarded by the ban on overt political activity which continued in effect in both Regions I and II. In both Regions orders were issued prohibiting public meetings and open action by political parties. Close touch with all developments was maintained through public safety channels, and in Region I by liaison with military security organizations. It was the judgment of the public safety officials that because of the tension between certain political groups in some towns there might be serious disorders if public political meetings were permitted.

15. The parties, so-called, continued, however, privately to crystallize their programs by private discussions. The membership of these groups were drawn from the small middle and upper classes, particularly intellectuals and professors, and a handful of professional politicians who, together with a leftist nucleus, fought Fascism underground during the late regime. \* \* \*

political activity, paragraphs eight and ten of the AMGOT Political Directive are to be interpreted as follows:

1. Expressions of political opinion, including criticism of the Italian Government, shall be permitted in the press. Censorship of the press for military security will continue, and no news-

paper will be permitted which does not submit to military censorship. Furthermore, general control of the press will continue in order to avoid waste of newsprint.

2. Normal, orderly political activity will be permitted except that public meetings and demonstrations will continue to be prohibited because of the general condition of the Naples area.

#### NAPLES AMG IS POLITE BUT A LITTLE BORED WITH THE NAPLES CLN

[Knight, ExecO, Rgn III, Hq AMG, Rpt for Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 3]

\* \* \* It is certain in the opinion of the undersigned officer that the majority of Neapolitans and of the people of Region 3 are largely apolitical and give all their thoughts to the difficulties of daily existence rather than to the form of government and other purely political considerations. It is furthermore felt that a large section of Neapolitans have considered the Comitato as a group of ineffective theorists rather than practical administrators. For these reasons, and always guided by our paramount objective of not interfering with Italian self-determination, we gratefully accepted during October and November the Comitato's suggestions while refraining from actively encouraging more frequent relations.

However, after two months no competitive political organization came into being, notwithstanding our neutral attitude towards the Comitato intended to permit other manifestations of public sentiment and desires had they been latent in the population.

During the latter part of November and the first days of December increasing political activity on the part of the Comitato and especially in the recently liberated front line areas made a general and firm interview with the Comitato desirable. It was felt that such a policy would be more constructive and lead to greater permanent benefits than a limited policy of local repressive measures by our CAO's.

Colonel Hume, RCAO, Region 3, therefore summoned the Comitato to his office on 6 December. He advised it of AMG's general desire to be as liberal as possible but that for military reasons political activity in the front line area could not be permitted at all, and that because of Naples' military importance as a personnel and supply port political activity would have to be limited in the city. It must be reported that the Comitato's reaction was entirely co-operative. The results of this frank conversation were also satisfactory, political activity in the Corps areas being virtually

eliminated and conducted along orderly lines in Naples.

It should be reported that a number of political posters did appear in the streets of Naples without the authorization of PWB.<sup>6</sup> These instances were dealt with by persuasion rather than by force because of our belief that force would not cure the evil and might on the contrary make "political martyrs" and invenom the otherwise relatively calm political situation. \* \* \*

#### WHEN THE JOB BECOMES MORE POLITICAL IT GETS MORE DIFFICULT

[Ltr, Wickersham, former Comdt, SMG, currently visiting Italy, to Hilldring, 21 Dec 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \* After the combat stage, the job begins to have a more political flavor. . . . In some ways that is a more difficult phase, because new problems come from political questions. \* \* \*

#### AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE DEVELOPS FROM A SEEMINGLY MINOR INCIDENT

[Knight, Rpt for Dec 43]

\* \* \* The second incident to receive undeserved fame beyond the limits of Region 3 was the prohibition of the convention of National Liberation Committees scheduled for 20 December 1943 in Naples.<sup>7</sup> This convention had never been discussed with this Headquarters, either officially or unofficially, no permit had been requested and none had been denied. [See letter, Lush, below.]

#### SECOND THOUGHT AFTER UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY: THE MEETING CAN BE HELD IN KING'S ITALY

[Ltr, Lush, DCCAO, 15th AGp, to Hq 15th AGp, 27 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

1. A certain amount of publicity has been given to the ban on the meeting of the Convention of Committees of National Liberation in Naples. You should, I think, know the facts.

2. On 14th December Headquarters A.C.C. (General Joyce) informed me of a proposed

<sup>6</sup> Psychological Warfare Branch, which exercised militarily necessary supervision of the organs of public information. A related agency was the Allied Publications Board which granted licenses for publications of all types.

<sup>7</sup> The first incident was a meeting of students at the University of Naples without official permit. The Rector of the University took the position that the University enjoyed extraterritorial privileges. When an AMG officer attempted to disperse the meeting, stones were thrown by students and shots were fired in the air by the carabinieri.

meeting of these committees and asked if I had granted permission. I instructed R.C.A.O., Region III (Naples) that the meeting was not to be held in Naples and so informed General Joyce.

3. My reason for this decision was that while tolerating a certain amount of political discussion and a few informal meetings in Naples, I considered a meeting of this size (over 100 delegates had been invited) was undesirable in a theater of operations, and I foresaw that permission to hold this convention would be regarded as a precedent for other similar, larger and more dangerous meetings.

4. The prohibition evoked a protest from the representatives of the Committee who asked that a formal telegram be dispatched to the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal [Joseph] Stalin. This has not been done. The protest was, however, handed to representatives of the Press and will probably be published in some British or American paper.

5. In the meantime, after consultation with Headquarters, A.C.C. and Colonel Spofford, I was able to let the committee know that the ban was restricted to 15 Army Group area and that the meeting could take place in King's Italy—Region II—under certain conditions. I understand that Bari is the most favored rendezvous.

#### A MORE LIBERAL POLICY IS AUTHORIZED

[Political Directive From CCS to AFHQ, 9 Jan 44, Following AFHQ Recommendation, ACC files, 10000/132/317]

1. Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than Fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorder.

2. These will include the right of peaceful assembly, attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine to be advisable.

3. Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting or disorder will not be tolerated.

4. To insure a similar liberal policy, the Allied Control Commission should also see that the Italian Government permits similar freedom of political activity in the portions of Italy which are restored to Italian jurisdiction.

#### NO POLITICS IN FORWARD AREAS—EXCEPT FOR ROYALTY

[Gen Hume, SCAO, AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt for Jan 44 [hereafter cited as Hume Rpt, for Jan 44], ACC files, 10000/154/204]

2. . . . any signs of political activity in the forward areas are at once suppressed. The only noteworthy incident of the month was the visit of the Prince of Piedmont (Crown Prince) to the Italian troops at the front. The Prince appears to have achieved a certain degree of success in increasing the popularity of the Monarchy. \* \* \*

#### FASCISM IS RAPIDLY LOSING ITS POPULARITY

[CAO, Montediorisio, Rpt to SCAO, Chieti Province, Sicily, 16 Jan 44, ACC files, 10507/115/23]

2. . . . The popularity of Fascism and National Socialism is rapidly nearing the zero point. Democracy and self government are being discussed by everyone but very few have the slightest conception of what it is all about. \* \* \*

#### THE NEW LIBERTY DOES NOT SEEM TOO HARMFUL

[Hq ACC, Monthly Rpt for Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

4. Throughout the whole of liberated Italy there is more political activity, generally of an orderly and quiet kind directed towards organization and definition of objectives. \* \* \*

#### CONDITIONS SET FORTH ON PERMITS TAKE CARE OF ORDER AND SECURITY

[ACC Permit to Hold a Public Mtg, ex. A of Hq ACC Directive of 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/147/27]

1. The meetings shall be conducted throughout in an orderly manner, and no person shall do or say anything:

(a) Which supports, or encourages any other person to support, any of the enemies of any of the United Nations, or any of the Fascist or Nazi parties.

(b) Which leads or may lead to public disorder.

(c) Which causes or may cause, or encourages or may encourage any other person to cause, any interruption of or interference with the military effort of Italy or any of the United Nations. \* \* \*

## 6. IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ALLIES TO BE POLITICALLY NEUTRAL

### THE CAO'S ARE INSTRUCTED TO DISREGARD ALL LOCAL POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

[AMGOT GAI No. 2, 1 May 43, AGO files, AMGOT Plan, 1 May 43]

8. Neither local personalities nor organized political groups, however sound in sentiment, shall have any part in determining your policies or course of action. It is essential to avoid any commitments to or negotiations with any local political elements, either in local or in general problems. Your job is to administer military government and to avoid completely any political discussion or commitment. \* \* \*

### WHO TALKED POLITICS WITH COUNT SFORZA?

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, for Col Hume, RCAO Rgn III, 11 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

\* \* \* While A.M.G. has no control over the activities of P.W.B. or of other military or paramilitary formations I want to be sure, at any rate, that no A.M.G. officers under my control become involved in political matters. I wish you therefore to issue a warning to all your officers that while it is their duty to report as far as they are aware all facts on the political situation in the areas to which you have posted them, they are not in any circumstances whatsoever to take part themselves in political discussions with any Italians. This was originally laid down in the Standing Instructions drafted at Chrea, but I feel that a word of warning is necessary, since it has come to my ears that certain of your officers have been seeing such persons as Count Sforza, and have been indulging in political discussions. . . .

[Memo, Hume for Rennell, 14 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

\* \* \* On enquiry among officers at Headquarters, none confirm the truth of the rumor. I, for instance, have never met Count Sforza in my life, and all our officers to whom I have spoken made the same statement. The only exception to this is that Count Sforza called at our Naples City office for an automobile permit and discussed nothing else with the officers on duty. Similarly, none have conferred with other supposed political leaders. \* \* \*

It is assumed that your letter does not refer to our efforts to get rid of Fascist office bearers. Obviously in this we have had to discuss such matters with people, in many walks of life. Unless you instruct me otherwise, we should like to continue to do so.

[Memo, Rennell for Hume, 19 Nov 43, ACC files, 10000/100/1072]

Thank you so much for your letter of 14 November about political activities in Naples. I had heard of one A.M.G. officer indulging in such activities but of course he may have been a member of the ACC wandering minstrels. \* \* \*

### THE NAPLES GROUP CONTINUES TO AGITATE

[MGS, AFHQ, Rpt, 17 Jan 44, ABC files, HORRIFIED, Govt, sec. 2 (CCAC Memo for Info No. 20)]

3. . . . The Chief political group outside the Badoglio Government is the Neapolitan Committee of National Liberation. It is composed of representatives of six political parties and the Association of Disabled Veterans and the Federation of Veterans. The political parties are the Socialists, Communists, Christian Democrats, Democracy of Labor, Liberals and the Party of Action. The President of the Committee is Professor Arangio-Ruiz, Leader of the Liberal Party. The elder statesman of the Committee is Count Carlo Sforza. He holds no official position but his influence is great with the Committee as a whole. In spite of Allied declarations that Italy must work out her own political destiny along democratic lines without interference, Sforza has acquired the reputation of being the "Allies' man."

4. The Neapolitan Committee has constantly demanded the formation of a "political" government. . . . On frequent occasions, the Committee has also stated that final decisions regarding sovereign institutions, e.g. the Monarchy, should be deferred until the day when all Italians could express their will.

5. At the same time, there has been constant agitation among elements within the Committee for the abdication of the King. At a meeting in Naples which was held on 19 December to honor the Socialist leader Amendola, a motion was passed that all persons responsible for the dishonor and ruin of Italy, from the King to the last squadrista, should be removed effectively and immediately from public office. \* \* \*

### ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL REMINDED TO BE PUNCTILIOUSLY NEUTRAL

[Directive, Hq PBS to Base Sub-Areas, 29 Jan 44, ACC files, 10000/136/114]

The present unsettled political situation in Allied Occupied Italy makes it necessary that Allied military personnel maintain a strictly neutral attitude towards Italian internal problems. Since even

the presence of military personnel at functions sponsored or organized by one of the many conflicting political groups may be used to indicate official approval of the principles of that group, extreme care must be exercised in accepting invitations even to those affairs which might appear purely social.

Military personnel will not attend Italian political meetings except on official business, and will refrain from entering into Italian political discussions with individuals.

**THE BARI CONGRESS CALLS FOR A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ABDICATION OF THE KING**  
[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 30 Jan 44, ACC files 10000/136/114]

The Six-Party Congress at Bari has today unanimously accepted a compromise program which calls for (a) the prompt creation of a government to include representatives of all the six parties and endowed with the powers necessary at this critical period, (b) the creation of a constituent assembly as soon as hostilities cease, (c) the abdication of the King. The Congress then voted to establish an executive committee composed of representatives of all parties for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing aims. It was further agreed that the present situation does not allow the immediate solution of the institutional question, but the Congress considered that the King's abdication was an essential condition of the unification of Italian effort. This compromise was reached after the Christian Democrat and Liberal Parties refused to accept the program put forward by the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties. . . .<sup>8</sup>

#### THE OPPOSITION PRESSES THE ALLIES

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 5 Feb 44, MTO, HS files, CAO-701, CM-IN 2487]

1. The executive Junta of the six parties represented at the recent Bari Congress came to see me this morning. They confined themselves to communicating to me the immediate tasks which had been entrusted to them by the parties which they represented.

These were as follows:

1. To secure the abdication of the King;
2. To prepare the formation of a government with full powers including some of those exercised by the head of the state; such a government would continue in office until such time as proper elections should be possible after liberation of all Italy.

<sup>8</sup> The three last-named parties favored Italy's becoming a republic.

2. Several speakers stressed the fact that they represented a large majority of the population of Liberated Italy. That they represented those elements of the Italian people who had always been anti-Fascist. That it was self-evident that the King would *never* be able to form a broad-based government and that his government was and inevitably must remain weak and without influence. That an unfortunate situation was now being created in Italy by what amounted to a complete political deadlock.

They emphasized the necessity for dealing with the situation with urgency as the speedy substitution for the King's government of government by the parties which they represented would enable Italy to pull its weight in the common fight against the Germans much more effectively than at present.

3. I made *NO* comment on their statement beyond saying that the Allied Governments were being kept closely informed of the political situation in Italy. I undertook to forward to the Allied Governments the programme of which they had just informed me, together with their representations regarding the urgency of dealing with the situation. I made it quite clear that the tranquility of the country and its administration must be preserved. \* \* \*

#### BADOGGIO GOVERNMENT ALSO PRESSES THE ALLIES

[Transl of Statement of Deputation From the Italian Govt, Attached to Memo from Mason-MacFarlane for AFHQ, 5 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

\* \* \* 1. The censorship which is exercised jointly by the Government and by the Allies must ensure that the head of the State and of the armed forces should not be continuously and basely insulted, and that the Armed forces should not be constantly criticized and diminished in the eyes of the public opinion.

The exercise of criticism, which any free government cannot but desire, must be kept within legal forms, and must represent a useful collaboration.

2. Government supporters and the opposition should be freely allowed to publish newspapers both partisan and nonpartisan.

3. The intervention of the PWB should be avoided in matters that concern policy, publications, choice of radio or newspaper collaborators, among both government and opposition supporters; it should be limited to the strict control of all publications and expressions of public opinion, so as to keep them in harmony with the political and military conduct of the war. \* \* \*

[Msg, AFHQ to Hq ACC, 10 Feb 44, MTO, HS files, CAO-701, CM-OUT 2757]

Herewith reply to your memorandum of 5 February . . .

On the first point you may say that it is the Allied policy that there be free expression of opinion in liberated Italy, subject to the requirements of Security and Public order.

On the second point you may say that such

facilities as may be available for the publication of newspapers will be distributed impartially among all sections of opinion.

To the third request you may reply that the policy is that Allied Officers in Italy concerned with matters of censorship, information or propaganda will act on basis of strict impartiality and without bias towards any section of Italian public opinion.

## 7. SHOULD ONE CHANGE HORSES IN THE MIDDLE OF A BATTLE?

NO POLITICAL CHANGES WHILE BIG BATTLE IS ON

[Msg, Gen Wilson, SAC, MTO, to CCS, 9 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6425]

2. . . . I should much regret any action being taken which could increase internal difficulties or political unrest at a moment when with good hope of success I am committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome.<sup>9</sup> I should not wish to have to take any precautionary measures which might involve an alteration of military plans and it would therefore suit me best to leave the political set up in Italy as it is until the issue of the battle is decided. \* \* \*

IN LITTLE MORE THAN A WEEK GENERAL WILSON CHANGES HIS MIND

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 18 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 13297]

Political situation is developing faster than had been foreseen, and has outrun previous telegrams from Algiers [see Wilson's message, 9 February, above]. There are already indications that opposition tactics may threaten to dislocate administration. . . .

1. I am convinced that a clear decision cannot be delayed and cannot be made dependent on the progress of the battle for Rome. \* \* \*

2. . . . Briefly put, the six opposition parties have agreed upon a program to permit the accession of the Crown Prince, provided the latter would agree to delegate his powers to Lieutenantancy of a single individual or of a group until

constituent Assembly can decide the constitutional question at the end of this war. They have requested Allied assistance in putting this program into effect, pointing out that if no action is taken they cannot continue to guarantee the actions of less responsible elements. At the same time, their executive committee had issued an appeal to all those in the service of the state to regard the King and Government as rebels, and not to take part in their rebellion against the Italian people. Circulation of and publicity for this appeal have been stopped as far as possible. The committees have been informed such action cannot be tolerated and they have been very severely warned. They have been operating from AMGOT Italy and any action against them for subversive activity against the Badoglio Government can only be taken by us. We cannot possibly allow this sort of thing to go on. The present attitude of the opposition threatens to interfere with our Military Operations more seriously than any like repercussions to an abdication and a change in the Government. If we take the obvious course in support of Badoglio's Administration, or allow Badoglio to do so in King's Italy, and arrest and take proceedings against the members of the opposition Executive committee we lay ourselves open to a storm of protest from almost every direction. But if we continue to support Badoglio we can hardly adopt any other course.

3. There are two main alternative courses.  
1. To bring pressure on the King to abdicate in favor of Humbert whose succession in accordance with the constitution should, in our opinion insure the loyalty of the Italian Armed Forces, and  
2, to inform the opposition that the Allied Governments will not tolerate any change in the political situation until Rome is reached and that any attempt to interfere with the Badoglio Government will be instantly repressed. In either case intervention on our part is now required.

<sup>9</sup>This message begins by referring to information received from the AFHQ political adviser that complete identity of views regarding major policy questions in Italy had not yet been reached between the British and American Governments. General Wilson stated that he would feel great embarrassment if steps were taken by either government which would show that any divergence of views existed.

4. In view of situation described in paragraph 2, we are inevitably faced with having to decide between these two courses at a very early date and we are in a better position to control the consequences now than we shall be immediately before or after capture of Rome.

5. From local angle, I recommend . . . that the Allied Government should agree at the earliest possible moment to inform the King that they insist upon his bowing to the will of his people and abdicating immediately in favor of the Crown Prince and that the Crown Prince should then be informed that he should summon the chosen representative of the opposition to form immediately a fresh government. It of course goes without saying that before any steps are initiated we would obtain an undertaking from the opposition, severally and collectively, to subscribe to all the engagements entered into with the Allies by Badoglio. \* \* \*

#### THE OPPOSITION PARTIES PRESENT A PROGRAM FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 21 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14896]

\* \* \* The Six Parties agree that the present King should abdicate forthwith to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedmont, who, however, must agree to delegate the exercise of his Constitutional Powers to a single or collective Lieutenancy which would not include either a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier but would have powers enabling it to proceed at once to the immediate Constitution of an anti-Fascist Representative Government. This delegation of powers would remain in effect until war conditions would permit the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian People. In agreeing to the accession of Humbert, the Giunta [sometimes Junta] nevertheless points out that his adherence to Fascism and his responsibility for the attack on France cannot be forgotten. \* \* \*

The expressed Policy of the Allies is to guarantee to the Italian People the free choice of their own Government and Institutions and to maintain strict neutrality in all internal Italian political matters. But since this neutrality does in fact constitute support for the King who has stubbornly refused to give way, the Giunta considers that it becomes necessary if the Allies approve the Giunta's Program for the Allies themselves to make it clear to the King and Humbert that they must follow the proposed course of action. Only by taking such action can the Allies avoid blocking the will of the

Italian People and maintain their expressed principles.

According to the Giunta, action is required immediately for two reasons, first, because the situation is steadily worsening and the moderate solution now advanced might not later prove possible either because of the state of public opinion or because of more serious events; second, the parties and patriots of Northern Italy, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, might decide to have recourse to more radical solutions of their own. Such action might in turn force the Giunta to review its present attitude. . . .

I have informed the Giunta Council, agreeing to forward the above Program to the Allied Governments, I must insist that pending a reply, no action be taken to interfere with the Badoglio Government or to aggravate the present situation and likewise that the Program should be considered confidential and should not be communicated to the press. . . .

#### PRIME MINISTER: DON'T BREAK THE HANDLE WHILE THE COFFEE POT IS HOT

[Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, 22 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

\* \* \* Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome, as I trust and believe we shall, we shall be free to discuss the whole Italian political situation and we shall do so with many advantages that we do not possess at the present time. It is from Rome that a more broadly based Italian Government can best be formed. Whether a Government thus formed will be so helpful to the Allies as the present dispensation I cannot tell, it might of course be a Government which would try to make its position good with the Italian people by resisting as much as it dared the demands made on them in the interests of the Allied armies. I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at a time when the battle is at its climax swaying to and fro. When you have to hold a hot coffeepot it is better not to break the handle off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and serviceable, or at any rate until there is a dishcloth handy. The representatives of the various Italian parties, who assembled a fortnight ago at Bari, are of course eager to become the Government of Italy. They will certainly have no elective authority and certainly no constitutional authority either until the present King abdicates or until he or his successor invites them to take office. It is by no means certain that they would have

any effective authority over the Italian armed forces now fighting with us. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Sforza and Croce to Churchill, Transmitted Through Mason-MacFarlane, 23 Feb 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Being of those who, after a painful internal struggle felt and worked as allies and friends of Great Britain in spite of fascist Italy fighting against you, we consider it our duty to inform you that your speech has caused deepest dismay among the millions of Italians who feel like us.

Sure that you realize the sincerity of our feelings not only for Great Britain but also for you to whom European freedom owes so much, we would not be loyal devoted friends of your country if hesitating to submit to you three points showing where we deeply disagree from sources of your information:

1. The alleged fear that a democratic government might "oppose requests from Allied armies" seems an unjustified attack on our loyalty to Allied cause, all the more so that our main opposition against present government is its inability to help you and validly co-operate with you.

2. Equally incomprehensible is statement about "representatives of parties anxious to get the power" since the second signer of this telegram was offered by king on 5 November to become Prime Minister and refused only because king's presence was obstacle to serious war effort—not to speak of the many offers of Badoglio to the parties to join at once the government.

3. To say that a democratic government could have "no valid authority on the armed forces" may only have been suggested to you by people who, being only in touch with the Badoglio government, ignore that we have great confidence in some Italian generals who have been always anti-Nazi and who have no responsibility in the shameful disintegration of September last. . . .

#### THE KING WILLING TO CREATE LIEUTENANCY; SACMED ASKS FOR GUIDANCE

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 29 Feb 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 20393]

1. The situation has developed owing to King having expressed willingness to accept a proposal put forward by the liberal political leader, de Nicola, which is also acceptable to Sforza and Croce. This proposal is that the King should appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant of the Realm,

and himself withdraw into private life. An announcement to this effect would be made immediately but the proposal would only take effect when Rome is reached. The Crown Prince would then proceed to form a new government on a broad base.<sup>10</sup>

2. The present situation is that neither the political leaders nor the King will make any further move or continue negotiations until they have the views of the Allied Governments. Their position is that they have put forward their respective proposals for a solution of the political crisis and they await guidance.

3. Meanwhile Allied Control Commission has been instructed to avoid conversation involving commitments as to future policy.

#### PRESIDENT: NO POLICY ENTAILING SUPPRESSION OF ANTI-FASCISTS BY FORCE

[Msg (No. 490), Roosevelt to Churchill, 7 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

Our advice from Italy indicates that political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I feel we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will be using force against anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

. . . I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply to his previous cables. As you know we prefer the program put forth by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a "lieutenant" of the realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active co-operation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian government.

<sup>10</sup>In an interview at Ravello, the King told General Mason-MacFarlane that since "the Allies had permitted him to be openly discredited and attacked through PWB and our lax censorship, he felt his position had become almost impossible . . ." He agreed to create the lieutenancy with the understanding that no more publicity would be given to attacks upon him by press or radio in Italy. ACC files, 10000/136/88.

If you will send instructions to your Chief of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.

**CHURCHILL LOOKS WITH DISFAVOR ON A SWITCH**  
[Paraphrase of Msg (610), Churchill to Roosevelt, 8 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

I am concerned about your number 490 [7 March, above]. This message is a departure from your agreement with me of 11 February . . . which in your number 483 you kindly reaffirmed describing the matter as "finished business."

I made my statement to Parliament on the strength of the first assurances.

I do not find any reason to believe from my advice that any new facts of importance have arisen or that order cannot be maintained by the Allied forces in the regions which they occupy as the result of the Italian "unconditional surrender." I think that it would be a very grievous mistake to yield to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of politicians who are seeking office. We should then be liable to establish in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but would attempt to make its position with the Italian people by standing up to the Allies. In fact we should have another, but more intractable, version of the deGaulist Committee. Meanwhile, we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of Badoglio and the King in the midst of a heart-shaking battle which is trying to aid us and work its passage.

The course you recommend, I readily admit, would have at least a transitory success and would be more popular. But it would be unfortunate, I'm sure, for the victorious conquerors to have their hands forced this way by sections of

the defeated population. The obvious open division between you and me and between our governments would likewise be unfortunate. I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary, than at the present time, to have unity of action between our two governments considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead. I am quite willing to discuss with you now the proposals set forth by General Wilson . . . whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of the realm. . . . I repeat that I am most anxious to have a broad base government to assume power in Italy, but this can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or best of all when Rome is taken and ought not to be done under duress by the Allies. . . .

**PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN HARMONY WITH THE BRITISH DELAYS A DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL WILSON**

[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 4]

In reference to your 610 my dispatch #490 on the Italian Political Situation was sent with the purpose of trying to meet the difficulties presented in NAF 634 by General Wilson.

I would appreciate your sending me suggestions as to a way to remedy the serious situation which will be acceptable to your government.

That you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others is my strongest wish. Things like timing, on which we may differ, can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self determination we are in complete agreement.

## 8. SOVIET POWER POLITICS WILL NOT WAIT

**SOVIET UNION HAS PROFESSED CO-OPERATION**

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser, to Hull, 30 Nov 43, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* It has been said repeatedly by Vishinsky that Soviet Union is primarily concerned with military phase of Italian situation and that the Russians were [willing] to join the U.S. in doing everything possible to bring the war to a rapid end.

**VISHINSKY HAS EVEN DEPRECIATED THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY**

[Memo, Rennell, CCAO, 15th AGp, 3 Dec 43, ACC files, 10000/136/62]

\* \* \* The only active political work which is going on in Italy is that of the Communist. Local communists cells are being set up in many towns and communities in occupied Italy. There is contact with the Communist elements on the

other side of the line. There is also, almost certainly contact with the Russian delegation in Algiers, who at any rate know a good deal about what is going on. Communist activity is almost exclusively local and proletarian. There is little or no intellectual or educated element in the movement, as yet. There are only two persons of any note whose names have come out as possible leaders. Mr. Vishinsky told me that he regarded this parochial communism as merely likely to be a nuisance at this stage since it had no real background or purpose. \* \* \*

#### SUDDENLY A DIPLOMATIC BOMBHELL FROM MOSCOW

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 13 Mar 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 8566]

Italian Government proposes to issue communiqué along following lines for publication and broadcast March 14:

Following the wish officially expressed some time ago on the part of Italy, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Royal Government have agreed to establish direct relations between the two countries.

In compliance with this decision, the two countries will proceed without delay to the exchange of representatives enjoying the usual diplomatic status.

Foreign office explains that the first phrase was inserted at the request of the Russian representative and refers in fact to the general expression of Italian desire for closer relations with the Allied powers, a general request which was made to all members of the Advisory Council when they first arrived in Italy in December.

#### RUSSIANS INVOKE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY

[Memo, Embassy of USSR to State Dept, 19 Mar 44, CCAC files, 000.1, Italy (11-2-42), sec. 1]

In connection with the decision reached by the Soviet Government following the request of the Italian Government on the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, the Ambassador of Great Britain, Mr. [Sir Archibald Clark] Kerr, in a conversation with Mr. A. Y. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on March 13, 1944 stated, in passing, the following:

1) The British Government should like to stress that the action of the Soviet Government, if it will be followed by other Allied Governments, would inevitably undermine the whole

foundation of the Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commission;

2) Besides, this would not be in full accord with the articles 37 and 42 of the terms of armistice with Italy.

1. The Soviet Government considers that the stated above assertions are baseless and erroneous in essence.

It is impossible to agree with the statement that the establishment of direct relations between the U.S.S.R. and Italy, as well as between other Allied nations and Italy, could in any way affect negatively the activities of the Advisory Council and the Control Commission. \* \* \*

As to the decision of the Soviet Government on the establishment of factual relations of the U.S.S.R. and Italy and on the exchange of representatives, it is necessary to keep in mind that up to the present time the Soviet Government having no direct contact with the Italian Government was in an unequal position as compared to its Allies who had established from the very beginning a direct contact with the Government of Badoglio through their numerous institutions and numerous representatives on the territory of Liberated Italy. The establishment of a direct contact between the Soviet Government and the Government of Italy to a certain extent eliminates the above-mentioned inequality and provides a possibility of direct contact between them, which already exists [*sic*] for a long time in the relations between Italy and the governments of Great Britain and the United States. \* \* \*

2. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on the question regarding the political situation which is at present in Italy. This is the more necessary since up to the present moment the governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America together have not yet considered the political situation in Italy and have not yet discussed together the question what kind of government should be in Italy in the period of armistice and what measures should be taken for its democratization.

It is impossible not to acknowledge that at the present time the situation in Italy is developing not in the direction of improvement [such as would be desirable for the Allied countries] but on the contrary in the direction of deterioration. The affairs in Italy have come at present time to a dead end, and the economic and political collapse of Italy is growing. On the territory of liberated Italy there exists, on one hand, the Government of Badoglio supported by certain groups of the population and expressing readiness to take part

in the common struggle of democratic countries against the German-Fascist oppressors. Alongside with this on the territory of liberated Italy there exists a permanent executive Junta which is backed by anti-Fascist parties and groups and striving to unite the Italian people for the fight against Hitlerite Germany and Fascism and it is impossible not to see that on the side of the permanent executive Junta there is a considerably wide union of democratic elements expressing an inclination to active operations together with the Allied democratic countries against Hitlerite Germany and the Fascist band of Mussolini. Thus, the Government of Badoglio as well as the permanent executive Junta are striving to take part on the side of the Allies in the struggle against the band of Hitler and Mussolini still controlling central and northern Italy, but in the course of all these months the Government of Badoglio and the permanent executive Junta not only were not united for common enemy but, on the contrary, were wasting strength fighting each other. Such a situation is, of course, only playing into the hands of the enemy of the Allies and is inevitably leading to the deterioration of the political and economic conditions of Italy. The experience of the recent months has shown to the full that the question regarding the uniting of democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Italy for the speeding up of the destruction of Hitlerite bands of the Fascist gang of Mussolini and, thus, the question of the establishment of such an Italian Government which would unite these forces and would facilitate the carrying out of the task of the Allies in such a government, if one judges from the statements of the British and American representatives, is being postponed until the capture of Rome and until the conclusion of military operations connected with this aim, and the existing split of forces in the anti-Fascist democratic camp of Italy is increasing more and more. \* \* \*

Proceeding from the desirability and necessity of the speediest liquidation of the split in the camp of the political groups and trends inclined to cooperate with the Allied democratic countries, the Soviet Government proposes to the governments of Great Britain and the United States to take steps toward the possible union of all democratic and anti-Fascist forces of liberated Italy on the basis of appropriate improvement of the Government of Badoglio. The Soviet Government is bringing for the consideration of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of the above-mentioned proposals regarding the general situation of the affairs in liberated Italy, bearing in mind that

this will assist the efforts of the Allies in the struggle against Hitler and Mussolini in Italy.

**THE SOVIET-ITALIAN AGREEMENT WILL STRENGTHEN EITHER BADOGLIO OR ITALIAN COMMUNISTS**

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/164]

12. Following conversations between the Soviet representative, M. [Alexander] Bogomolov, and Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Government issued a statement on 14 March that agreement had been reached with the Soviet Government to exchange diplomatic representatives. No prior consultation with the British and American Governments had taken place, and following Anglo-American inquiries at Moscow, it appeared that the intention of the Soviet Government was not to derogate from the authority either of the Allied Control Commission or of the Advisory Council for Italy. In fact, the Soviet appointment of the diplomatic representative carries only the rank of Counsellor or Minister and he will be under the orders of the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. There is no doubt that the Soviet move has had a marked influence throughout Liberated Italy. Some consider that it will strengthen the hand of the Badoglio Government and others believe that it will increase the influence of the Communist Party throughout Italy. . . .

The leader of the Communist Party in Italy, Mario Togliatti, otherwise known as Ercoli, arrived in Italy on 26 March from Moscow after eighteen years of exile. \* \* \*

**REPRIMAND AFTER A FAIT ACCOMPLI**

[Msg, AFHQ to Mason-MacFarlane, 21 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

You should point out to [Giuseppe] Prunas [Italian Foreign Minister] that the Italian Government is not in a position to enter into any engagement with any country without the consent of Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through the Control Commission. . . .

**THE SOVIET UNION AND ITALY EACH EXPLOIT ITS POSITION**

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 20 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Following message received from MacFarlane: message begins:

1. Prunas yesterday warned the Political Section that Bogomolov had told him in strict confidence that the Soviet decision to exchange

diplomatic representatives was not to be regarded as an isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet proposals based on a policy of closer relations with Italy. According to Prunas, Bogomolov frankly admitted that the Soviets intended to exploit their privileged position in Italy where there was no Soviet army of occupation and where in the minds of the Italian people they were not directly associated with the restrictions imposed by military government. . . .

3. Prunas said that the Soviet move had been very well received by the Italian people. . . . For this reason he emphasized that it would not be possible for any Italian Government to decline any further offer of Soviet friendship although the Government did not wish for such a one-sided development of Italy's international position. On the contrary they wished to base the rehabilitation of the country upon a closer association with the United States and Great Britain. They felt, however, that they were being pushed in the opposite direction.

4. It was the earnest desire of the Italian Government that something should be done to neutralize the present trend. . . . He asked whether the time had not now come when the American and British Governments could consider a substitute agreement which would retain all the military requirements of the Armistice and leave over questions that could not be decided now but which would give Italy some of the legal and formal benefits that it might expect to derive from the fact of cobelligerency.<sup>11</sup>

#### THE COMMUNIST SHIFT TO TOLERATION OF THE KING WEAKENS JUNTA

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 25 Mar 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 18318]

\* \* \* [Mason-]MacFarlane has stated that he has received a communication from the Secretary of the Junta pointing out that more than a month has elapsed [see Msg 5 Feb, sec. 6 above] since they submitted their memorandum and that it would be of assistance to him if some reply, even if of an interim nature, could be given at an early date.

In a message sent off by [Mason-]MacFarlane after the above it is stated that the Soviet initiative in establishing relations with Italian Government is having direct effect in South Italy upon the internal political situation.

It is further stated that the Communist Party prior to 16 March had not only publicly an-

nounced that the Russian decision had made no difference to their policy but had continued as prime movers in demanding that the three party petitions should go forward on Junta basis and had even offered to pay 1/3 or whole expenses involved. On 16 March however at Junta meeting they completely changed their attitude and [Mason-]MacFarlane states he has been informed by the Secretary that proposal for the petition is in process of being shelved. Moreover at Bari on 19 March Tedeschi [an Italian Communist leader] refrained from attacking the King and Badoglio and argued that only necessity was that Italy should have a strong government, this being completely at variance with line of argument contained in his previous speeches and particularly to that delivered by him at Naples meeting. It has also been stated by members of Junta closely associated with Tedeschi that the Communist Party no longer insist on the abdication of the King as condition precedent to joining in a government and would accept King's plan or might even be willing to serve under Badoglio though the King made no concession. . . .

The changed attitude of the Communist Party brought about by the Soviet initiative and presumably under orders from Moscow would appear to have loosened the structure of the Junta although it is still endeavouring to maintain some form of unity. The view is expressed that the fact that the Allied Government have made no reply to the Junta memorandum has clearly affected their ability to withstand Russian activity and that while the other parties and members of the government are fully aware of the potentialities of the Communist game they feel that if such a move is made they are not in a position to stand out. \* \* \*

#### "A PENITENT COBRA BEING MATEY"

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 28 Mar 44, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Bogomolov asked to see me yesterday and talked for nearly an hour. . . . He was clearly anxious to be friendly. He gave the impression of a Penitent Cobra being matey.

2. He contended that we had attached much too great importance to the recent agreement to exchange representatives between the Russian and Italian Governments. He assured me that this did not involve reopening diplomatic relations with Italy. The sole object was to ensure closer liaison. He stated that if the Russians had wanted to do any abnormal business with the Italian Government they would not have been

<sup>11</sup>Not long after the date of this message, the three Allied governments received from Marshal Badoglio an appeal to give Italy the status of an ally.

so stupid as to exchange representatives. They had quite different and much more effective ways of doing that sort of thing.

3. He told me at considerable length of the memorandum which the Russian Government has just presented to HMG and U.S.A. He has already spoken to Macmillan. He explained the Russian Government's proposals for solving the political problem in Italy. I understand that the Russian Government attach little importance to whether the King remains or not and that they wish the Badoglio Government to broaden its structure by including representatives of the opposition parties in the government. Bogomolov spoke at great length on the necessity for producing a Government which would be capable of producing more effective help from Italy for the Allied operations. I am reasonably satisfied that the Russians intend to take a strong line with the Parties of the Left in Italy and that they intend to ensure that these Parties do nothing to upset the war effort by actions which might dislocate the administration.

4. Bogomolov frequently stressed the fact that in spite of the great differences between the British and Russian ideologies and political structures and in spite of inevitable occasional minor friction such as the recent case of the exchange of representatives with Italy it was essential that the three Allied Governments should collaborate fully and that such collaboration should continue for many years. \* \* \*

#### RUSSIANS HAVE PICKED UP THE BALL WE DROPPED

[Ltr, Reber, Vice President, Political Sec, ACC, to Dunn, Dir, OEA, State Dept, 31 Mar 44, CAD files, 387-4 (7-6-43) (1)]

\* \* \* Recently our Note with respect to Italian dealings with the United Nations and our refusal after six months of co-belligerency to concede this status as regards prisoners of war have taken on a particular significance in the light of the Soviet move.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately that move is being interpreted as a definite indication that Russia is entering Italian internal affairs as a positive factor. Should the changed attitude of the Communist Party under a Moscow directive

<sup>12</sup> As stated above, the right to conduct diplomatic relations had been denied. Also, any change in the status of Italian prisoners of war had been refused.

result in a Left Wing collaboration with the present Italian Government, the other Parties will probably no longer hold out. Such a solution cannot fail to diminish Anglo-American influence in the ultimate political solution. We were handed the ball nearly two months ago and through our apparent failure to adopt a constructive policy have let it drop. The Russians have picked it up and are running down the field with it. \* \* \*

#### CAN RUSSIANS STILL BE BROUGHT INTO CAMP?

[Msg, CCAC to AFHQ, 14 Apr 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 23009]

. . . It has been suggested by the State Department that the new representative of the Soviet Union near the government of Italy be accorded a place on the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy, similar to that of the American and British Vice-Presidents of that section. If given such a place, the Soviet representative would then have the same opportunity for direct relation with the Italian government as the United States and United Kingdom representatives on ACC, but this direct contact would be within the framework of the established Allied control machinery for Italy.<sup>13</sup> This proposal will be placed on the agenda of CCAC for discussion at an early meeting. Your comments and recommendations are requested, as it is desired to have your views before CCAC makes any recommendations to CCS. . . .

<sup>13</sup> In other words, the Soviet Union would no longer have the excuse of nonrepresentation for any unilateral action such as that just perpetrated. AFHQ, in reply to this message, recommended that no initiative in the issue of further Soviet representation be taken for the present. In August 1944 the Soviet representative on the ACC arrived in Italy with many more assistants than the United States and the United Kingdom had contemplated or thought at all necessary. However, SACMED suggested that it would be polite to accept the Soviet increase with good grace as it might pave the way for Soviet agreement to the dispatch of Allied officers to Rumania later. The CCS approved the attachment of the additional Soviet officers to ACC, with the request, however, that AFHQ report to it if the officers went beyond their status of observers and attempted to participate in the work. The CCS also cautioned against any discussion with the Soviet representative in Italy linking the question of Soviet representation of ACC with the question of Allied representation on any control body to be set up in Rumania. Komer, *op. cit.*, II, 28.

## 9. THE KING AGREES TO RETIRE AND BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT IS BROADENED

### THE COMMUNIST EPISODE HAS DISPOSED GIUNTA TOWARD COMPROMISE

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane, to AFHQ, 7 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Resulting from the Sorrento Meeting yesterday the Giunta published a resolution recording the urgent necessity for the solution of the present political crisis without waiting for the liberation of Rome. . . . It is understood that this means that the Giunta accepted the De Nicola proposal subject to a single modification. They desire that the King should not only announce his intention of withdrawing and creating a Lieutenancy in favor of the Crown Prince but should put this into effect forthwith without waiting arrival in Rome. De Nicola is to be asked to communicate this decision to the King. \* \* \*

### THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT OBJECT TO SERVING UNDER EX-FASCIST KING

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 10 Apr 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6847]

. . . Following return of Ercoli [i.e. Togliatti] to Italy, Provincial Leaders of Communist Party met and passed resolution calling for the creation of a new strong government of temporary character supported by popular parties and capable of organizing proper war effort in the whole country. In statement made by Ercoli at time of publishing of this resolution, it appeared that whilst Communist Party thought formation of broad-based government would be facilitated by abdication or removal of King, they would not insist on it as condition and would serve under Badoglio [Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 28 March above]. On this Badoglio proposed to go ahead with broadening basis of his government. \* \* \*

### THE U.S. AND U.K. MAKE AN UNSUCCESSFUL DEMARCHE TO ELIMINATE THE KING AT ONCE

[Msg, Murphy, U.S. Representative, Advisory Council for Italy, to Secy of State, 14 Apr 44 (covering period 7-13 Apr), CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 5]

I got back from Naples last night, with Macmillan. When I reached there on 7 April, I immediately had a conference with the Soviet and British representatives and with Count Sforza, and I also had a frank private talk with General [Mason-] MacFarlane, Noel Charles [British Minister] and Macmillan and gave them your

views. They expressed their concern about the way the Soviets are undertaking to intervene independently in Italian affairs and to build up the position of the Italian Communists. Although they still belittle Sforza, they fully agree with his opinion that the Soviets are trying to "diplomatically Sovietize" Italy as the focus for a wider European program. Macmillan agrees that the time has come for us and the British to make a *dé-marche* pointing out that British and the United States are carrying the burden of both the military campaign and the economic supply of Italy, and have acted as fast as possible toward democratizing Italy. The British are even more concerned than we are about the Soviet attempt, which every day becomes more obvious, to achieve political profits at the expense of Britain and the United States.

On 10 April Charles and I called on the King at Ravello. I frankly told the King he ought to retire at once, and the American public thinks that his failure to retire is blocking a consolidation of the Italian Liberals and may adversely affect the war. The King then undertook a defense of his record and his help to the Allies. I answered that we fully appreciated what he has done, as this has helped to offset the unfavorable twenty-two year record he had made during the Mussolini regime, which had resulted in Italy's acts against the Allies and the death of many American and other Allied soldiers, as well as unlimited harm to the people of Italy; that we are glad he has within the past eight months been able to make a contribution to redeem himself, but that the time for his withdrawal has arrived.

The King became excited and said he had never had a chance before July of last year to break with the Fascists but for all these years he had been waiting for his chance, and he then protested about the civilian deaths in Rome from Allied bombings. Macmillan and I reminded him of the 240,000 casualties in Mediterranean operations that might never have existed if Italy had not entered the war.

\* \* \* On 11 April we . . . talked frankly and at length with Badoglio, who came to see us. He obviously had been groomed, and asked what we were trying to accomplish, i.e., the King's disappearance or the forming of a representative Government. We said both, and that they were tied together. He said he thought that under Italian Communist leadership the other three organized and popular parties in south Italy were

now ready to join his government, even although the King stayed on with the concession that he would reconsider his position after the Allies reach Rome. Badoglio said that the Action and Labor Parties are too unimportant for it to make much difference if they are in the Government or out of it, as they represent only small and unorganized minorities.

Macmillan and I both are suspicious that the Communists have given Badoglio secretly their assurances of support and much encouragement.

Later that day Prunas came to see us several times on behalf of the King and made it clear he would not go further than the formula that was finally published. Macmillan then told me that lacking more specific instructions from London, he was unwilling to go any further about forcing the issue of immediate retirement by the King, and I thereupon agreed upon the formula with Macmillan. We also told the Italians we considered this action one by the Italians on their own, as the king had suggested a program like this on 21 February which had met with no objections from the other Allies, including the Soviets.

When we got back to Naples after being assured that the announcement by the King would be made at noon on 12 April, we received the American and British press and had a chance to see how certain Italians, including Sforza, reacted. The reactions generally were favorable, and Sforza later stated that he approved and was satisfied with the King's action.

#### THE KING PROMISES TO RETIRE BUT NOT AT ONCE

[Statement of Victor Emmanuel, 12 Apr 44, CAD files, 319.1, Foreign (3-29-43), sec. 2, MGS Rpt 15]

\* \* \* The Italian people know that I have always been with them at their side in difficult times and in happy times. They know that eight months ago I put an end to the Fascist regime and brought Italy, notwithstanding every danger and risk, to the side of the United Nations in the struggle for the liberation from Nazism. \* \* \*

Putting into effect what I have suggested to the Allied authorities and my government, I have decided to withdraw from public affairs by appointing my son, the Prince of Piedmont, "Lieutenant General of the Realm." This appointment will become effective by the formal transfer of power on the day on which Allied troops enter Rome.

This decision, which I firmly believe furthers national unity, is final and irrevocable. \* \* \*

#### ALLIES PROVISIONALLY ACCEPT THE NEW GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Gen Wilson to Mason-MacFarlane, 13 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

I have been considering the manner in which Allied interests should be safeguarded in the event of the formation of a new Italian Government.

The most important consideration is that the new Government, whatever its composition, should accept all the obligations towards the Allies entered into by the old "Top Secret" Government, including both sets of armistice terms and all the subsequent undertakings. Please therefore make it clear to Marshal Badoglio at once that we will not agree to deal with any new Government which does not formally declare itself willing to assume all the obligations toward the Allies entering into by its predecessor.

You should also inform Marshal Badoglio that whatever arrangements may be entered into between the new Government and the King must be regarded as binding until such time as the Italian people can freely express their views. It will not be in the interests of the War effort that the institutional question should be raised again until that time and you should make this clear to the Marshal. \* \* \*

#### POLITICAL CRISIS ENDS

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 16 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

After yesterday's meeting Junta issued communiqué showing unanimous decision had been taken to accept King's plan and to enter a new government to be composed mainly of representatives of the six parties provided that such a government reiterate the pledge that the Italian people shall determine the future form of the State by means of a constituent assembly on the termination of hostilities. . . .

We learn that the six parties are all ready to serve under Badoglio on the understanding that he forms a new government. \* \* \*

#### AFTER MANEUVERING AND COMPROMISE THE FIRST POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

[Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 21 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/136/115]

Final composition of the cabinet represents a compromise reached after two days of intense discussion between Badoglio and all opposition leaders. . . . Croce and Togliatti are given much credit for the solution. The price paid for the Ac-

tion Party's decision was the appointment of the additional ministers without portfolio and the limitation of party membership to the parties represented at the Bari Congress. Sforza also used his influence to induce the Party of Action to come into line.

Badoglio hopes that the Democratic composition of his new cabinet will be favorably received by the Allied governments.

All service ministers remain unchanged. . . .

Among the new personalities whose names appear in the government are Aldisio the leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Sicily, appointed Prefect of Caltanissetta by AMG; [Alberto] Tarchiani, pre-Fascist editor of the *Corriere Della Sera*, whose presence in the government should strengthen its position among the anti-Fascist resistance groups in the north. [Attilio] Di Napoli and [Fausto] Gullo are lesser lights in the Socialist and Communist Parties. [Quinto] Quintieri is a local banker of standing who was appointed to the Finance Ministry for his technical qualifications.

#### HOPE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL DO BETTER IN DEFASCISTIZATION

[Mason-MacFarlane, Remarks in Min of 11th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 6 May 44, ACC files, 10000/132/477]

2. . . . Owing to the fact that Marshal Badoglio's former Cabinet was too weak to take a resolute stand on this subject, the purge program had proceeded somewhat slowly in the past. The new Cabinet is stronger, and it is hoped that it will be able to eliminate Fascists more effectively than the former one. \* \* \*

### 10. SOME MATTERS WILL HAVE TO WAIT

#### UNTIL AN INDEFINITE FUTURE NO REOPENING OF THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

[Transl of Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, 24 Apr 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 1-B (CCS Memo for Info No. 218)]

The Government over which I preside emphasizes that the agreement which has been arrived at with the *King* must be taken as remaining in force while and up to the limit of the time during which, the Italian people shall *not* be able to express its opinion freely, this being also in complete agreement with the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Zone.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>The new government also formally accepted the obligations toward the Allies incurred by its predecessors.

#### PREVIOUS FEARS OF A CHANGE APPEAR UNWARRANTED

[Mason-MacFarlane, Remarks in Min of 12th Mtg of Allied Advisory Council for Italy, 19 May 44, ACC files, 10000/132/477]

2. General [Mason-] MacFarlane remarked . . . that the new Government was in fact reacting more satisfactorily than the former Government to suggestions made by the Allied Control Commission and that progress is being made constantly. \* \* \*

#### COUNT SFORZA IS STILL DISSATISFIED

[Transl of Ltr, Count Sforza to Richard Bauer, Leader of Action Party, 3 Jun 44, (notation on document: "Handwriting illegible"), ACC files, 10000/136/116]

\* \* \* The Coalition Cabinet to which I lent my name on 21 April was forced upon us by the Communist initiative accepted by the Parties. \* \* \*

. . . I cannot hide from you that I am more and more worried by a strange rising and ascending collusion between Communists and Generals. Beware, I have no communist phobia; there must be some. If I were Chief of the Government, I would be so certain of the efficacy of my direct contact with the Masses to whom I would offer obvious sincerity slow and difficult progress but not immediate miracles which I know would be believed; and the Communists defeated. But with "power" in the hands of the bourgeois without fresh moral forces and of military men only thinking of their material interests, the Communists are a strong force. A common cynicism unites them all. Is it wise that there be no reserves in the Country? \* \* \*

#### THE NEW GOVERNMENT POSTPONES UNTIMELY REFORMS

[Trans] of the Declaration of the Council of Ministers, 1 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

\* \* \* The program of the present Government is basically that of its origin and composition. Formed by representatives of the anti-Fascist parties, it is not the Government of those parties in competition among themselves but one of union for the good and honor of the Fatherland, to the end of bringing our full strength to the proper settlement of the vital and urgent problems of the hour.

Many proposals which are well-known and of the utmost importance must be put aside now be-

cause they are not timely. First among these is the institutional form of the State, which cannot be decided until the country is fully liberated and the war ended. Then the Italian people shall be called together in free public meetings and, acting under universal suffrage, shall elect a constituent and legislative assembly. \* \* \*

It should not be forgotten that two world wars have upset conditions of economic and moral life and changed social relations which call for profound reforms. According to their principles and tendencies, the various parties are prepared to contribute, but it should also be remembered that these reforms of governmental, political, administrative and economic organization cannot be carried out in the midst of a war and while Italy is cut into two parts, the greater part of which is still occupied by the enemy.

The war, then, for the liberation of the Italian lands now invaded and in which to the foreign enemy has [*sic*] been joined the remnants of the nefarious regime which for twenty-two years oppressed and led us to ruin—this war is our first and supreme objective. \* \* \*

#### NO ATTACKS ON THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT UNTIL ROME IS ASSIMILATED

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane to Gen Wilson, 8 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/1116]

2. From the point of view of avoiding any possible hiatus in the administration and of the probable awkward repercussions of a change of government at the moment of our reaching Rome, the retention of Badoglio and his Government in office provides an excellent solution. We ought to ensure that this Government gets every support from us and it is even more necessary to ensure that during the critical phase while we are assimilating Rome nothing is done to foment political controversies.

3. The present solution to the political problem is undoubtedly in our best immediate interest. Yet in spite of the fact that it has been made possible very largely through the recent change in the attitude of the Communist Party, there are not wanting elements in this country who are still strongly opposed to the retention of Badoglio as Prime Minister and continue also to be critical of the fact that the King has not actually abdicated.

4. In the absence of political censorship it is very possible that we may again find attempts to undermine the authority of the Monarchy and

Badoglio. I know just how difficult any form of political censorship is. I do, however, hope that it may be possible to issue a strong directive to all concerned forbidding attacks on Badoglio and his Government and on the Monarchy until we are at any rate firmly established in Rome. It is the policy of the Allied Government to support in the meantime at any rate the Monarchy and a broad Government. It is clearly illogical to permit attacks on the administration with which we are co-operating during a period of crisis and of potential political difficulty. \* \* \*

#### NO COMPLETE LIBERTY FOR ITALIAN PARTIES UNTIL THE ENEMY GUNS HAVE WITHDRAWN

[AMG Fifth Army, Sitrep for 5-9 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/154/205]

1. . . . With regard to politics there have been several minor incidents with the Committee of National Liberation: Allied propaganda has given them the impression that once liberated the Italians will have complete political freedom. It is clearly impossible to put this into effect while the city is still within range of the sound of gunfire.<sup>15</sup> While the situation is well in hand, it would be a great help if the Italian Government could put out instructions explaining that local parties must submit to the restrictions of Allied Military Government in initial stages of occupation. \* \* \*

#### NO ELECTIONS UNTIL THE LAW PERMITS

[Memo, Hq, AC for All Concerned, 18 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/105/710]

1. It has been reported to this Headquarters that an election by popular vote of a Giunta comunale was organized in military Government territory by an A.M.G. officer.

2. While the election was extremely well organized and run by the officer concerned, and there were very special circumstances in that case, it must be remembered that pending the reorganization of the electoral lists and the liberation of further territory, it is contrary to the law of the country to hold such elections.

3. Accordingly in military Government territory Provincial Commissioners should not permit elections for Giunte Comunali or other local and provincial bodies, nor encourage in any way the holding of such elections in Italian Government territory. \* \* \*

<sup>15</sup>The city is Rome, the fall of which, 4 June 1944, is treated in Chapter XVI.

## CHAPTER XVI

# Rome Is a Turning Point

From the outset the prospective liberation of Rome seemed of great importance, and the longer the delay the greater did this importance seem. One reason was that difficulties of conducting civil affairs short of the capital became more and more evident, but perhaps another reason was that to offset the sense of frustration there developed a tendency to envisage the prospective event as a favorable turning point. Even if not militarily decisive, capture of the first European capital would give the Allied armies greater prestige. The Allies and the Italians agreed on this, but in other respects their interpretations of the happy turning point differed in emphasis. The Allies looked forward to being able to reduce their administrative burden by bringing the Italian Government to the city where the ministries, civil servants, and archives would enable it to exercise broader responsibilities. The Italians, on the other hand, liked to think that this change would enable them to raise their political status from very subordinate to more nearly equal partnership. These differing concepts bore the seeds of possible conflict because if the Italians were to become more self-assertive the Allies would face problems largely offsetting any lessening of the administrative burden.

The documentation herein illustrates mainly broad political and administrative issues which developed largely out of the difference in the two points of view. The earlier documents, however, center on the

occupation of the capital which, after an offensive launched on 11 May 1944, was reached by advance troop elements on 4 June. The very first finding could well have seemed an augury that henceforth the Italians would play a larger role. When, on 5 June, General Hume, SCAO Fifth Army, arrived in Rome he found in charge a well-organized underground, led by General Roberto Bencivengo, who relinquished to him authority over a city which Italians themselves had evidently taken measures to save from the great German damage feared by the Allies. At first there was a great glow over liberation but General Hume's group soon observed the existence of serious problems—in food, prices, and housing—and also that the citizens of Rome could be unjustly critical of the time taken to bring them under control. On 15 June the city became AMG Rome Region, responsible directly to Headquarters ACC, an arrangement that lasted until 1 August when Rome Region was absorbed into Region IV.

In the sphere of political developments even the first issue encountered—a few days before, in fact, the city was entered—foreshadowed that Allied-Italian relations would present more difficulties than before. The King, it will be remembered, had agreed to step aside as soon as Rome was reached. Plans for his retirement, which had been carefully worked out by the Badoglio government and approved by ACC, called for the immediate transfer of

all power to Crown Prince Humbert as Lieutenant General of the Realm as soon as he was notified that Rome was in Allied hands. At the same time Badoglio would resign and would be asked by the Crown Prince to form a new government to include leaders of the Rome CLN. In spite of these arrangements the King was reluctant to give up his powers as soon as promised and a few days before the liberation contended that he should personally enter the eternal city. Fearing hostile demonstrations, Allied authorities prevailed upon the King to adhere to his original promise and the instrument transferring the Royal powers to the Crown Prince was signed on 5 June.

Also, the original plan to have Badoglio form a new government could not be carried out. Some of the political leaders simply would not serve under the Marshal but agreed unanimously to serve under the 73-year-old Ivanoe Bonomi, President of the Rome CLN and in the pre-Fascist period a Prime Minister. The new cabinet consisted of some holdovers from the previous regime but despite urging by both Bonomi and General Mason-MacFarlane, ACC Chief Commissioner, Badoglio himself refused to serve. In the negotiations over the formation of the new government Allied views were represented by General Mason-MacFarlane. His message of 9 June to AFHQ, herein reproduced, does not touch on the question whether this role had been fully authorized. According to another source, he betook himself to Rome and without specific prior approval of either the British or American governments, or the Advisory Council, proceeded to advise on the formation of the cabinet. For different reasons neither government was pleased with the results of his handiwork. The Americans objected to the fact that General Mason-MacFarlane had informed the Italians that the appointment of Court Sforza as Foreign Secretary would

not meet with Allied approval. The Department of State sent a protest to London and General Wilson, SACMED, was informed that the appointment of Sforza would be entirely agreeable to the United States. The British were unhappy about the whole setup and Mr. Churchill protested to the President that Badoglio had been replaced by a "group of aged and hungry politicians." The United States was inclined to accept the *fait accompli* on the ground that the Italians should be encouraged to work out their own political solutions in accordance with the spirit of the Moscow declaration. The two governments agreed that the views of the Advisory Council for Italy should be obtained.<sup>1</sup> Reflecting the greater strength of spirit among Italians resulting from the liberation of their capital, Bonomi expressed surprise that he and his cabinet would have to wait upon any such approval. The Advisory Council gave its approval to the new government provided it would accept all the obligations of the previous government with respect to the Allies and would defer the institutional question until Italy could freely decide it. In the light of these developments Mr. Churchill withdrew his objections and the Italian ministers took their oath of office on 18 June. A few days later General Mason-MacFarlane was succeeded by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ellery W. Stone as Acting Chief Commissioner.

Only a few days after the new government was installed, it issued a decree which seemed to reopen the constitutional question contrary to the solemn commitment taken by its members upon their inauguration. Decree Law No. 151 of 22 June provided for the calling of a Constituent Assembly after the liberation of national territory to decide "the new constitution of the state." This piece of legislation was

<sup>1</sup> Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1565-66.

harmless insofar as it deferred the decision till after liberation, but it could well cause anxiety insofar as it seemed to settle in advance that a constituent assembly would make the decision. Captain Stone and his advisers felt that a referendum would be more likely to secure a true expression of feeling. If an assembly were held, they feared that the parties of the extreme left would have the opportunity to introduce propaganda and pressures calculated to overthrow the monarchy. Bonomi assured Captain Stone that the decree law did not rule out the possibility of a referendum and the matter was in fact eventually settled by a direct popular vote.

For military and administrative reasons that ACC could not understand, since it had seemed vital for a government to be set up in Rome as soon as possible, it was nearly a month and a half after liberation before AFHQ allowed the government to move to the capital. Little time, however, was wasted before territorial restoration was effected. Territory was transferred to the government in three separate installments from July to October; provisions reserving certain rights to the Allied military forces were identical with those of the first transfer. With ACC's encouragement the government took on greater economic responsibilities—especially in the administration of civilian supply and foreign trade, and in statistical and other research relating to rehabilitation import needs—and without any encouragement it completed and systematized defascistization legislation so as actually to permit Italians to get started in their own long-stalled program of epuration. ACC at first welcomed this initiative without misgiving—indeed it even proceeded to gear its own epuration machinery in AMG territory to Italian legislation and to the use of Italian agencies. However, whereas previously ACC had been embarrassed by the inadequacy of epuration measures, it now

was embarrassed on occasion by the daring or consequences of such measures. Just when the head of ACC Civil Affairs Section was admonishing the RCAO's not to spare any high-level Fascist as indispensable, AFHQ was proceeding on the ground of indispensability to effect the release of the Italian Director General of the telecommunications system in Sicily and southern Italy, an undoubted Fascist who was being tried by an Italian Defascism Commission. Moreover, the patience of ACC was severely taxed by the ineptitude of the government in not providing adequate police safeguards, at the trials of certain notorious Fascists, against either mob violence or the escape of the prisoner. Patience was also strained when difficulty in reorganizing the Cabinet to satisfy demands of left-wing elements entailed unconscionable delay in government action on pressing matters.

ACC looked upon these and other instances of the government's shortcomings as growing pains in Italian progress toward greater stature. But it was difficult to feel that the first months after liberation of Rome had brought anything like the expected relief in the Allies' administrative burden. The first restoration of territory did no more than make possible the reduction of ACC officers from 175 to 100; Bonomi himself urged only very gradual reduction of Allied personnel in Sicily until the political situation had clarified. But in addition to making possible reductions in AC personnel, the government's greater personnel resources enabled it to place Italian officials and Carabinieri at the disposal of AMG in its advance in Central Italy. All this amounted up, but the War Department had hoped that the liberation of Rome would bring a far greater easement through wholesale transfer of responsibilities to civilians. Just as it failed in its efforts to persuade FEA to take over financial responsibility for civilian supply in

southern Italy, so it even failed to bring about preparations for having civilian agencies enter the operation in Italy. Indeed, AFHQ and ACC both felt that the only way to reduce the personnel commitment under present and prospective conditions of military operations was through greater infiltration of civilian specialists into agencies within the military frame-

work—and here the difficulty was that few qualified civilians could be spared from war work at home. No switch from a heavy to a relatively light burden was reached at Rome—or, for that matter, beyond. Perhaps in view of all previous experience in civil affairs it should never have been expected.

## I. GREAT POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES FORESEEN IN OCCUPATION OF ROME

### FROM OUSSET THE ITALIANS HAVE THOUGHT EVERYTHING HINGED UPON ROME

[Memo, Murphy, U.S. Minister, AFHQ, 27 Sep 43, Smith's Papers, The Capitulation of Italy, p. 611]

\* \* \* It was obvious, throughout our conversation with the Marshal that in his own mind, and apparently in the minds of his associates, and this is confirmed by General [Mason-] MacFarlane, almost everything hinges on the return of the administration to Rome.<sup>1</sup>

### ALLIED AUTHORITIES HAVE ALSO ENTERTAINED SOME HOPES OF ROME

[Ltr, Gen Holmes, Chief, MGS, to Hilldring, 28 Sep 43, CAD files, 319.1, AMG (8-17-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* We cannot expect very much in the way of effective administration from the Italians until the government is re-established in Rome and perhaps not too much even then. \* \* \*

### POLITICAL CHANGES ARE EXPECTED

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, Cmsr, ACC, for Gen Wilson, SAC, MTO, 8 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

5. . . the fusion of political talent in Rome with the existing Government will have to be carried out as expeditiously and as smoothly as possible. Reber and Caccia (members of the Political Section, ACC) will be entering Rome at the earliest possible moment and will, I hope,

<sup>1</sup> As will be remembered Marshal Badoglio at this time thought neither a declaration of war by Italy nor a broadening of his government would be possible until Rome was reached.

be able to keep in the closest touch with political developments in the city. It is essential that other individuals and organizations do not interfere during this very important period. In the light of past experience I wish to urge very strongly that a directive be issued informing all concerned that they must scrupulously refrain from endeavoring to influence the cabinet changes and the political developments during the period until we have become firmly established in the capital.<sup>2</sup>

### PLANS TAKE THEIR SHAPE FROM POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CITY

[Paraphrase of Msg, Murphy to Secy of State, 29 May 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 5. CM-IN 23643]

The Political Committee held a meeting in Caserta this morning which was attended by Macmillan and myself as a result of an invitation from General Wilson. Staff sources informed me before the meeting that the possibility existed that in the space of 48 hours Rome might be entered by Allied troops. . . .

All ordinances and proclamations having to do with the city of Rome will, of course, be signed by liberated Italy's Military Governor, General Alexander. Acting under the supervision and direction of General Alexander, during the period when the Fifth Army is responsible for the Rome area, Hume (an American Brigadier General) has been named Commanding Officer for Rome of the AMG, and in the Rome area the

<sup>2</sup> Apparently the Chief Commissioner had in mind the divergencies among Anglo-American political attitudes and the possibility that they would result in conflicting pressures.

garrison forces will be under the command of [Harry H.] Johnson, an American Major General, will include Carabinieri, of Italian nationality, which are available to [Mason-]MacFarlane and ACC, for transfer to Rome immediately to maintain law and order. As quickly as possible Hume's ACC personnel will take over from Johnson's troops. The relinquishment to the Italians to as great an extent as possible of responsibility with respect to the administration of Rome is planned by the ACC according to statement made by [Mason-]MacFarlane. \* \* \*

According to Johnson the basis of Allied Machinery for the administration of Rome was planned to be Rome's administrative subdivisions which numbered 20 with the focus centering on the main policy office. I upheld the view of General Devers that the taking of Rome was of importance from a political rather than a military (mainly transportation) standpoint and consequently that the turning over of the city to Italian organizations acting under the control of the ACC should be accomplished as quickly as conditions will permit. \* \* \*

It was agreed to respect the Vatican's rights as a neutral state and also understood at the meeting that the Allies would not disturb enemy nationals taking refuge in the Vatican. In connection with the Vatican's press and radio it was also agreed that customary rules of military censorship would be put into effect similar to those now applied by German Military authorities. \* \* \*

## 2. FIRST EUROPEAN CAPITAL IS LIBERATED

WHEN AMG ENTERS AN ITALIAN GENERAL AND THE UNDERGROUND ARE IN CHARGE

[Hume Rpt, 22 Jun 44]

\* \* \* 1. Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark, accompanied by his chief of staff, Major General [Alfred] M. Gruenther, Brigadier General George Beucler, Chief of the French Mission with the Fifth Army and Colonel Britten of the British Increment, Fifth Army, Major General Harry H. Johnson, Commander of the troops in the Rome Area and Brigadier General Edgar Erskine Hume, Chief of Allied Military Government Section (S.C.A.O.), Fifth Army, entered Rome in several jeeps at approximately 8 a.m. on Monday, 5 Jun 1944. The Germans had been driven out of the city at approximately 10 p.m. of the previous night, some of our units having maintained contact with the enemy at intervals for the previous twenty-four hours.

[Directive, Hq AAI to Fifth and Eighth Armies and IV Corps, 3 Jun 44]

1. The political issue involved in the occupation of Rome outweighs the military importance of the city. This is a principle which must govern all the actions of the Allied Forces in regard to the city.

2. Rome is the first great capital city to be occupied by the Allied Forces. Their behavior in it and the efficiency of their civil and military administration will attract attention from all quarters of the world.

3. It may well be the wish of the Allied Governments that the Italian Government, with the Allied Control Commission, should be set up in Rome with a minimum of delay. In this case provision of facilities necessary to achieve this and to enable the Italian Government to function quickly and smoothly will be a prime responsibility of the Allied Forces. \* \* \*

14. The number of troops in Rome is at all times to be kept to a minimum. It is not the intention that Advanced Base installations should be established within the city. In general, installations in Rome will be limited to hospitals, transit camps, leave hostels on a strictly limited scale, and similar institutions for the welfare of the troops.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>3</sup>The Directive called for the immediate assumption of control by the CG of Fifth Army but for Rome later to pass under the control of Hq, AAI (Allied Armies in Italy), at which time an Area Commander, Rome, would assume immediate responsibility under AAI.

2. General Clark's party, as prearranged, proceeded directly to the Campidoglio (City Administrative Offices) where they were met by General Roberto Bencivenga of the Italian Army, who had been designated by Marshal Badoglio, with the approval of Lieutenant General Noel Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, to have civil and military control of Rome during the interval between the departure of the enemy and the arrival of Allied troops. \* \* \*

[Finance Subcom, ACC, Rpt, for Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/143/453]

B. . . .

1. When the vanguard of the Finance Sub-Commission arrived in Rome, it found that the heads of nearly all governmental financial institutions had gone North. General Bencivenga, leader of all the Rome underground forces, had made

elaborate preparations to preserve all records and to prepare dossiers on the activities of leading Fascists in each institution. This was achieved through the secret appointment of committees for each institution composed of representatives of the six parties. They had been given full instructions as to their duties during the inter regnum period between the German loss of control and the full establishment of Allied control. The same procedure has been followed in other areas subsequently liberated from the Nazis. When the Allied Military Authorities assumed control of the city, the internal committees continued to function. \* \* \*

#### PRESIDENT SEES GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IN LIBERATION OF ROME

[Paraphrase of Msg, Roosevelt to Badoglio, 7 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/461]

I wish to thank you for your message dated 6 June. That the first capital of Europe to emerge from the dark shadow of tyranny should be Rome, with all its universal significance, is found by the American people of good augury to the cause of world freedom and progress for which they are fighting. . . . Just as the entire civilized world regards Rome and the other historic cities of Italy as their inheritance, so, I am certain, the people of Italy have never been more deeply aware than now that the cause of the civilized world is their cause too and calls for the dedication of all their powers of heart and mind.

#### EVERYTHING LOOKS PROMISING IN THE FIRST FORTY-EIGHT HOURS

[Hume Rpt, Jun 44]

#### IV. Headquarters

On arrival in Rome in accordance with plans previously made, the Allied Military Government and the Rome Area Command established offices jointly in the Campidoglio.<sup>4</sup> This historical building has been traditionally the seat of the government of the city of Rome from time immemorial and it was felt that in the early stages of occupation it was important for us to begin our administration and governmental duties at such a place. \* \* \*

#### V. Finances

. . . Anticipating a shortage of cash, we brought with us 600,000,000 lire from Banca d'Italia, Na-

<sup>4</sup>All of AMG's elaborate planning had been done in connection with that of the Rome Area Command, within the framework of which Fifth Army AMG was to function. Under the Chief of Staff of the Rome Area Command and his four Chief Assistants—G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4—the needs of the AMG divisions were arranged.

ples This money, together with 240,000,000 Allied Military Government Lire belonging to AFA (Allied Financial Agency) were brought in four trucks which reached Rome with the first elements of AMG. The money was deposited in the Banca d'Italia before noon on the day of arrival. Our anticipation was verified by investigation which proved that all the banks were short of cash and that the Banca d'Italia was down to practically none. The Germans and their Fascist allies had made away with nearly all the available money in the banks. There were a few notable examples of hidden cash, two of the banks having concealed 75,000,000 lire each and one 40,000,000 lire. . . .

The officials of the Banca d'Italia were interviewed on the first day and a meeting of all the banks of the city was called for the next. At the meeting, the financial policies of AMG were explained and each bank was requested to make prompt reports of its condition. These reports have been received and analyzed. On the basis of our study of the figures, the Finance Division decided that the banks could be re-opened promptly. General Order No. 2 was posted on Sunday 11 June, making effective on Monday, 12 June, the re-opening of the banks and of the banking services of the Post Offices (the postal savings and current accounts, and the issuance of postal savings bonds). . . . To be able to re-open the banks so quickly after our occupation is a record for Allied Military Government, irrespective of the size of the city concerned. \* \* \*

#### VI. Public Safety

The entire personnel of our Public Safety Division was attached, sometime prior to leaving Caserta and Naples, to the S-Force, a special body created to enter Rome as soon as practicable to preserve records, archives and papers in public buildings, which might have been damaged or destroyed by enemy action. Thus our police officers, to whom 2800 Carabinieri and 400 Guardie di Finanza were attached, were available for immediate duty. \* \* \*

The conduct of the population of Rome with but a few exceptions, has been excellent since our arrival. Great enthusiasm was displayed. . . . In only a few instances was there anything like sniping, after the city quieted down within the first twenty-four hours. There have so far been a few cases of looting reported in and in almost all of them the culprits have been captured.

. . . One of the first and chief difficulties was the matter of disarming the "partisans". . . . It is not known to what extent these persons rendered useful services prior to our arrival but it

was considered that it would be a potential menace from now on to permit men in civilian clothing having only an armband by way of identification on to go about armed. . . .

On the other hand, it was realized that these men have a certain claim upon us and we did not wish to be accused, as we were in Naples in several instances, of not protecting those who had been our friends. At the same time that the order was issued to disarm these men, the matter was carefully explained to members of the National Committee of Liberation and they were requested to inform their several organizations as to why this was necessary. \* \* \*

Thus far about 2200 Carabinieri have come forward in response to our notice and are offering themselves for duty. They are being vetted under the direction of the Chief of Police since it is obviously unwise to take them into our service without careful examination of each individual case. \* \* \*

#### VII. Food Supply

\* \* \* Thus far food for approximately 2½ days has been transported from Anzio to Rome and held as a reserve. It was not necessary to use this immediately on arrival since it was found that food for approximately two days had been already distributed by the Germans, so that our supplies were not immediately necessary. This was a great aid to us in view of the circumstances above outlined. \* \* \*

We are distributing 100 grams of bread per day and so far this has delighted the people because, though not greater in amount than that furnished before, the white flour is a source of both wonder and delight since none has been available in Rome during the whole period of the war.

Our Economics and Supply Division has found the *Alimentazione* organization efficient and we are continuing to make our distributions through this agency. \* \* \*

#### VIII. Water Supply

At the time of the arrival of the Allied troops in Rome it was reported that while there was a reduction in the available water there was no actual famine. The water pressure however was so reduced by breaks in the Acqua Marcia Aqueduct that water was not available in the pipelines in the higher parts of the city, although available in the lower parts. . . . The engineers of AMG, in co-operation with those of the Rome Area Command, immediately undertook the work of repairing damage to the aqueduct and at the same time providing for shunt-

ing water from the smaller mains into those normally supplied by the large aqueduct. In this way, a rationed amount of water was made available in all parts of the city, except those highest.

. . . To prevent actual shortage of water for drinking and cooking purposes we have followed the practice that had been found successful in Naples—namely the setting up of power distillation units, the water derived from which being transported by water carts to water points in various parts of the city. \* \* \*

#### IX. Electricity

Since the electric power for Rome was largely hydroelectric and since the plants are still in possession of the enemy, it is not surprising that only a limited supply of current was available at the time of our arrival. Since there will be a delay before the hydroelectric lines from the south, which have been brought forward as the Allied forces advanced, can be able to deliver power in Rome, our engineers immediately gave their attention to operating at greater than previous extent the stand-by steam and Diesel for the power plants in the city.

Excellent co-operation was had from the Allied Railway Service which immediately made available to us one-thousand tons of coal or ½ of the total supply. Other fuel supplies have been located. \* \* \*

Power for trains is being made available. . . .

Trams (street cars) are ready to be placed in operation but so far only a few lines are in use because of shortage of electricity. . . .

#### XIV. Welfare

The officer in charge of Welfare is being ably assisted by personnel, men and women, of the British and American Red Cross Societies. . . .

Previous to entering Rome, contact was established with Vatican authorities asking their co-operation in co-ordinating and protecting the various organizations which had been operating soup kitchens in Rome. This they did very efficiently with the result that over 225 church-controlled and 44 E.C.A. kitchens (*Ente Comunale d'Assistenza*) have continued to feed over 300,000 individuals. Supplies of food were hidden from the Germans by all of these organizations at great risk to many of the various administrators.

Arrangements have been made to continue this work in co-operation with the Vatican authorities, who offer us the use of their extensive facilities, including if necessary, motor vehicles for the transportation of food. The presence of numerous refugees who came into this city shortly be-

fore our occupation . . . has grown greatly. The number of people receiving food from the kitchens has increased to almost 400,000. These people, who are of all ages, receive one meal per day. \* \* \*

### XXVIII. *Removal of Fascist Officials*

A conference was held on the day of our arrival with Signor Ivanoe Bonomi, former Prime Minister of Italy and Chairman of the National Committee of Liberation. He was asked to give us the names of persons in office whom he felt should be removed on account of past Fascist history. At the same time we asked him for suggestions as to office bearers for the future. He was told that his suggesting that Rome be governed by a Giunta was considered favorably. We announced that a Sindaco rather than a Governatore would be appointed. The later title was one invented by the Fascists. . . .

### XXIX. *Relations with the Holy See (Vatican City)*

Within one hour of the time we set up government in Rome we made contacts with the American and British diplomatic representatives to the Holy See. . . .

A group of Vatican authorities headed by Prince [Carlo] Pacelli, nephew of the Pope, called at our office on the first day of our occupation and in a conference many details as to future relations were arranged. We offered to place military guards about the frontiers of Vatican City and the offer was accepted and hope was expressed that we could use Italian police rather than Allied soldiers. We explained that this would be done, but that a few British and American police in addition would be available to maintain order. \* \* \*

### AFTER LIBERATION ENTHUSIASM SOON DIES DOWN

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

\* \* \* They work because they must earn their bread but to the mass of the people the war has passed them over. Particularly noticeable is the spirit in Rome, a city untouched by war and whose citizens appear to have more zeal in safeguarding their own local interests, be they physical or political, than in any progressive measures towards the rehabilitation and reconstruction of their country as a whole. \* \* \*

### A FOOD PROBLEM

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

102. . . . Admittedly, the food ration is a bare minimum. . . . Through undernourishment the

people are restless and this is one of the reasons for the political situation being more tense.

103. As a measure of the supply problem of so large a city, 7,986 tons of imported foodstuffs were distributed during the month. 93 tons went to soup kitchens and 99 tons to hospitals. These figures indicate a distribution of rationed foods of 164 grams per person per day, 160 grams of which was flour. This is 40 grams less than the amount decided upon and failure to supply the full scale was due to limitations of transportation. \* \* \*

[Hq ACC, Monthly Report for August 1944, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

36. It was becoming evident during the month that the food situation was serious and that the shortage was not due to teething troubles which would cure themselves. \* \* \*

[Econ Sec, AC, Rpt, 1 Sep 44]

\* \* \* A. . . .

1. Feeding Rome is the most difficult food problem in Italy. This is due to the inland location of Rome and to the fact that Rome under peacetime conditions draws all sorts of foodstuffs from relatively distant areas, whereas other cities in Italy depend on distant outside sources for, at most, only a few foodstuffs. \* \* \*

2. The already difficult situation is further impaired by the dependency on a few railroads. . . . The Rome-Naples railroad when opened again by the Army was largely devoted to the carrying of military supplies. The Rome-Ancona railroad which tapped the important surplus food-producing center of the Marche had been so thoroughly destroyed by the retreating Germans and our bombings that the Army decided not to attempt to put it back into operation.

D. . . .

1. Immediately accompanying the first Allied troops entering Rome were the AMG trucks of food. Although the Nazis had removed all but a small portion of the city's supplies, the amount of flour brought in made it possible to maintain the 100 gram ration without a break. Then on 21 June 1944 the bread ration was increased to 150 grams and on 25 June to 200 grams, making necessary the shipment into Rome of 300 tons of flour a day. Beginning on 18 June 1944, other imported foodstuffs began to be available to the Rome public. By the end of June, a total of 7,000 tons of food had been brought into the city and had moved into consumption channels. \* \* \*

2. Due to the absence of organized messes in the first few weeks, many troops on leave ate in the restaurants which cornered the black market

supply of food. With the low official ration, the disappearance of the black market, for the average Roman, made the food supply of the average Roman family very difficult. After a few weeks, approved restaurants supplied by the Army were opened and eased the demand in the black

3. During July the situation continued to improve. 8,000 tons of imported foods alone were supplied to the people. . . . market.

The total number of calories provided by this ration came to around 660 per day.

4. During July the most notable improvement took place in the provision of fresh produce for the markets. From an average of less than 300 tons per day at the end of June, the figure was increased by 50 percent to around 450 tons per day at the end of July.

5. In August energetic measures were taken to establish the lines of supply from the provinces of the south. Transport continued to be the bottleneck. An extra distribution of 550 grams of pasta was made in the last two weeks of the month.

6. . . . For September, the goal was set of 50,000 metric tons which would provide 2½ pounds of food per day for each ration card holder, of which there were 1½ million in the city.

7. In order to reach this goal, it is necessary to transport fish from as far away as Pantelleria, potatoes and other vegetables from around Naples, wine from Puglia (Heel of Italy). The usual districts which provide food to Rome from the north and northeast still were not available during most of September. The destruction of the Rome-Ancona Railroad has made largely inaccessible to Rome the rich food-producing districts of the northeast coast and has cast a heavy burden on the other food producing areas. \* \* \*

[1st Lt Harold B. Lipsius, Chief, Rome Black Market Cont'l Div, ACC, Rpt for Nov 44, ACC files, 10400/153/79]

\* \* \* The Sindaco of Rome has been notified by this Division of the open trading in rationed articles upon the streets of Rome. . . .

. . . One of the important reasons . . . is the attitude on the part of the populace and the authorities that trade in the Black Market is not criminal. The Prefect does not prosecute violators even after denunciations are instituted. The carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza are powerless unless they are instructed by the Prefect and the Sindaco to enforce the ration and price laws to their very letter. This division will continue its

investigations into these conditions and will continue to present its findings to the Italian authorities for their action. \* \* \*

#### A DIFFICULT HOUSING SITUATION

[Capt Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC,<sup>5</sup> Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 1 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/231]

\* \* \* The housing situation is . . . difficult. The population of Rome was already several hundred thousand above the normal figure before the arrival of the Allies. Now it is considered vitally necessary in the interests of the Allied war effort that a restricted number of Allied headquarters should be in Rome, at least on a temporary basis. \* \* \*

#### CONSTANT COMPLAINTS IN THE PRESS

[Stone, Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 11 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/231]

\* \* \* The Council no doubt follows the Roman press and will have noticed the recurrent complaints of the difficulties of daily life. Indeed we have probably all had personal experiences over the difficulties of water and light. Before these the Italians put food. As to that, I should like to say here and now that stories of starvation are grossly exaggerated. . . .

There is a shortage, I admit. The bread ration is only 200 grams a day and that is not a great deal, but it is also not starvation and even to give this ration we have had to stretch the existing means of transportation. \* \* \*

#### DESPITE DIFFICULTIES AMG HAS ACCOMPLISHED MANY THINGS

[Poletti, Rgnl Cmsr Rgn 4, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/132/6]

5. First, concerning Rome City and the area forming the ex-governatorato di Roma. The basic policy of our AMG administration was to do the job in the most rapid manner, inasmuch as we agreed that Rome should be turned over to the Italian Government at the earliest possible moment. . . . What has AMG accomplished?

6. The new structure of local government was instituted. It has been functioning with initiative and steadfast adherence to democratic principles. The Mayor has performed valiantly.

7. New able, anti-Fascist heads of governmental agencies and services were appointed and

<sup>5</sup> Captain Stone succeeded General Mason-MacFarlane on 24 June 1944, when the latter resigned because of illness.

with our assistance established into their jobs. We insisted on new faces in the public business.

8. An epuration commission was organized in co-operation with the National Committee of Liberation. This hard hitting epuration commission did a good job. AMG officers have likewise executed a vigorous epuration. Thousands of leading Fascists were turned out of office; hundreds arrested and interned. Epuration in Rome is now in the hands of the Italian Government. Without a thorough and rugged clearance of leading Fascists from positions of public trust and influence, a new Italy of liberty can never arise.<sup>6</sup>

9. The people of Rome suffered greatly during the period of German occupation. Nor was it because they received a mere 100 grams of bread. Men, women, and children were afraid to leave their homes. The Gestapo was constantly on the scent of thousands of good citizens and to hide these citizens thousands more had to risk their lives. The City was in a state of dread. The Allies have given Rome freedom from fear.

10. In this Eternal City newspapers of all political shades, magazines and periodicals are being published and read. No censorship other than military exists. There has never even been an intimation that newspapers should be reluctant to criticize Allied Military Government. Quite the contrary, the Regional Commissioner, in his weekly radio broadcasts, has urged the Italians to present constructive criticism. The Romans, stifled by 22 years of Fascism, have resumed their ancient liberty of expression. In fact, the satirical paper the *Canta Chiaro* had a wonderful cartoon the other day. It showed a bachelor at the table ready for dinner. Entering is a most attractive maid. The man asks, "What do we have for dinner tonight?" The maid, who is carrying a cute portable radio, on a lovely silver tray, answers, "Poletti on the radio." The Allies have given Rome freedom of the press, freedom of speech.

11. One of the most thrilling and satisfying experiences of the Regional Commissioner in Rome has been his work with the Chief Rabbi of Rome. The Rabbi was harbored by a Catholic anti-Fascist from the bloody clutches of the SS. Both the Rabbi and his Catholic protector were invited to our office. The Chief Rabbi was told that he could resume religious services at the

<sup>6</sup> On 8 September, in a report to the Advisory Council for Italy, Poletti observed that one of the chief impediments to epuration in the past—the difficulty of obtaining replacements—was now being overcome. In Rome many more people than before had indicated a willingness to assume public responsibility. ACC files, 10000/136/228. See below, Section 5, for development of the new epuration program.

synagogue. The Regional Commissioner and other AMG officers attended the first service. The Allies have given Rome freedom of religion.

12. Months before Rome was liberated, its people had heard the promises of the Allies to feed and clothe them. Therefore, Rome, like every other city which we have administered, had high hopes—too high to be met in the face of the primary exigencies of military operations in Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. AMG is sensitive to the needs, but it cannot ask the Army to stop the battles near Florence or postpone the landings at Anzio or Toulon. The Romans, like the people of other cities, require time to absorb the simple fact that the war continues and that sacrifices for an Allied victory must continue. Rome now appreciates the fact. Romans have been orderly and co-operative. Law and order have been fully respected. The Romans are anxious to make a contribution to the victory of the United Nations.

13. Rome has not had the food that other liberated cities have had. There have been shortages of olive oil, pasta, salt, sugar, eggs, potatoes, other vegetables and fresh fruit, and, of course, meat has not existed.

14. AMG in this Region has worked closely with Italian officials. The Food Administration was reorganized and revitalized by Italians. Food has been controlled at every entrance into the City so as to divert it from the black market into the City's general market where it can be sold at official prices. The Italian police, including those of our special black market squad, have been vigilant. Civilian trucks which had been hidden from the Germans have been brought out and organized into three large pools. Rome, of course, survives on the use of civilian trucks. Rome has no rich country nearby and these trucks have had to travel long distances.

15. The cooking of food in Rome has been difficult. Electricity coming from Terni and Tivoli, thoroughly mined by the Germans, is scarce. The gas plant has not been functioning because of the inability to transport coal to Rome. In close co-operation with the Italians we have organized a charcoal market and succeeded in making a first distribution of charcoal at non-black market prices.

16. The groundwork has been laid under AMG. The benefits will accrue in ever-increasing amounts. In the coming weeks Rome should get more food. Up to the present, the Allies have not given Rome freedom from want.

17. AMG in Rome and the Vatican have worked very closely. AMG has been greatly aided in many problems by the Vatican. Not only has

the Vatican been of tremendous assistance in the handling of refugees and refugee camps, transport, hospitals and other institutions, but also

the Vatican has borne the heavy burden of operating scores of soup kitchens which serve 300,000 hot meals each day. \* \* \*

### 3. THE KING RETIRES AND A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED

#### THE KING CONSIDERS THAT ONLY IN ROME CAN HE RETIRE WITH DIGNITY

[Transl of *Aide-mémoire* Sent by King Victor Emmanuel to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Comsr, ACC, 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

His Majesty, The King, as he has repeatedly affirmed, and officially declared to General [Mason-]MacFarlane on the 21st February last, intends to re-enter Rome, Capital of the Kingdom, and there entrust to S.A.R. The Prince of Piedmont, the Lieutenant-Generality of the Kingdom.

The return of the King to the Capital is held a condition necessary and essential for the Monarchy, for the Crown and for the prestige of the House of Savoy.

Any contract entered into away from the Capital would leave with many, if not the major portion of Italians, the impression of an act not voluntary but imposed by a Southern minority and tolerated by the Allies. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ HAS DIFFERENT PLANS FOR THE KING'S TRANSFER OF POWER

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 27 May 44, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 21151]

There have been made preliminary plans for the King's retirement and for announcement of Crown Prince as Lieutenant of the Realm upon arrival at Rome. Badoglio on receiving official information will notify King who at once will transfer to the Prince his powers. Formal resignation of his government will then be tendered by Badoglio to Crown Prince, who will invite him to form a new government. Together with Crown Prince and leaders of the six parties, Badoglio will go to Rome as soon as practicable to make contact with party leaders and principal politicians there for the purpose of making changes in government to bring about adequate representation of Rome's political resources. A visit by the King to Rome in early stages of occupation will not be permitted.

#### STRICT FULFILLMENT OF A PROMISE IS DEMANDED

[*Aide-mémoire* of Verbal Communication Made to the King's Representative by Col Monfort, DCCAO, 15th AGP, 31 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

In reply to the requests made by The King, the Supreme Allied Commander has instructed me to communicate the following:

(a) It will not be possible for The King to return to Rome in the meantime. H.M. is expected to carry out his undertaking to transfer his powers to the Crown Prince as soon as H.M. is informed officially that Allied troops have reached Rome. \* \* \*

#### THE KING CANNOT EVEN GO NEAR ROME AND THE CROWN PRINCE MUST WAIT

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane for AFHQ, 3 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

2. It is the King's wish to fly to Littorio aerodrome and to proceed to the Villa Savoya which is extremely close to the aerodrome and which would not involve entering Rome itself. There he would sign the transfer document and would then return at once to Ravello.

3. Yesterday evening I had a further talk with Badoglio on the subject.

4. Badoglio said that if the King were permitted to carry out his proposal he would have to take the Crown Prince with him and that the Crown Prince would definitely have to show himself in Rome. Badoglio considered that this would be most unwise as it was most probable that there would be hostile demonstrations and this would clearly prejudice the prospects of his own Government and successful fusion with the political parties in Rome. . . . Badoglio asked whether the King might be allowed to go to Rome as suggested and make the transfer after the formation of the new Government. I replied that this was quite impossible as the King had contracted to make the transfer as soon as Allied troops reached Rome and any delay would have inevitable unfortunate repercussions not only in the Allied countries but in Italy.

5. Badoglio remained emphatic on the point that it was essential that he and the party leaders in liberated Italy should visit Rome at the earliest possible moment to effect contact and fusion with the Rome political parties. He was most hopeful of being able to reform his Government in the course of a visit of one day. . . .

6. Since last talk with him he had, however, changed his mind on one point. He now considers that the Crown Prince should not be allowed to visit Rome until a day or two after the fused Government was formed. He was very insistent

on this point and is clearly anxious at the type of reception the Crown Prince will get unless he enters Rome under the umbrella of a Government including Rome representation. \* \* \*

#### VICTOR EMMANUEL BOWS TO THE INEVITABLE

[Paraphrase of Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to ACC Hq, 5 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

\* \* \* This afternoon the King once more made his plea to Badoglio and to me. It was explained to him by me that unfortunately it was impossible for the next few days to give him transportation to Rome and that we could not consider his delaying for so long a time the signature of the act of transfer.

The King replied that he accepted this as inevitable but that before he signed the act of transfer he desired Badoglio as President of the Council of Ministers to let him have a letter stating that it was impossible to meet his wishes and that a transfer document would have to be signed at once. Badoglio, in consultation with myself, wrote to the King a letter on such lines, stating that it was clear to him after consulting with me that it was impossible for the King in the meantime to proceed to Rome and that it was necessary to sign a transfer document immediately.

A document of transfer, which I had previously read to Charles and Kirk [U.K. and U.S. Political Advisers] and which I had also had my legal advisers approve, was then signed by the King.

#### A KING NOW ONLY IN NAME

[Order of Victor Emmanuel III, 5 June 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

\* \* \* Our beloved son, Umberto di Savoia, Prince of Piemonte, is appointed our Lieutenant General. With the support of the responsible Ministers, he will discharge in our name all the affairs of administration and will exercise all the Royal prerogatives without exception, signing the Royal Decrees, which will be countersigned and approved in the usual manner. \* \* \*

#### NOW WHAT IN ITALIAN POLITICS?

[Hq ACC, Rpt for Jun 44]

2. In view of the fact that the Rome Committee of National Liberation contained the recognized leaders of all the Parties except the Communist Party, it had long been clear that a political crisis was inevitable when Rome came into Allied hands. In the first place, whatever government was in power in the South of Italy would, inevitably, have to resign and, in the second place, it

was to be feared that, despite any commitments made by the Parties in the South, the Rome leaders would reopen the institutional question. . . .

#### AN OLD SOLDIER SUCCEEDED BY AN ELDER STATESMAN

[Paraphrase of Msg, Mason-MacFarlane to AFHQ, 9 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

1. . . . During the first conversations in Rome it became clear that Badoglio would have met with a strong and very active and vocal opposition and could not form an all party government. These conditions would have seriously handicapped the tranquility and administration of the country.<sup>7</sup>

2. All parties, on the other hand, had a common readiness to serve under Bonomi on the conditions required by me as regards the obligations taken by the previous governments towards the Allies and also in respect to the institutional question.

3. Bonomi has given me his assurance that the Government will include the most representative political leaders in Rome and the remainder of liberated Italy.

4. Both Bonomi and I did our best to persuade Badoglio to accept a post in the Cabinet. However, the Marshal was altogether unyielding in his determination to retire from the scene.

5. Bonomi has never had connections with Fascism and enjoys much prestige, particularly in Rome, because of his activities during the German occupation. Remaining in hiding, he succeeded in keeping the Rome Committee of National Liberation alive and united.

6. I think and hope that I have persuaded Bonomi to take the post of Foreign Minister. Sforza has done his best to obtain it.

8. Bonomi has a good background and experience and is well preserved. He is easy to get along with. Like that of a number of his colleagues his political past dates back to the pre-Fascist period. Although as regards Fascism all

<sup>7</sup> On 6 June 1944, Badoglio submitted the resignation of his government to the Crown Prince. The resignation was accepted but Badoglio was directed to proceed with the formation of a government to include political leaders then in Rome. Realizing that he would meet with strong opposition, Badoglio recommended that Bonomi be invited to set up the government. The Crown Prince acted on this advice and Bonomi accepted. However, the Badoglio government continued to function until the new government was approved by the Allied Governments (see following documents). Bonomi's cabinet was sworn in on 22 June 1944. ACC files, 10000/132/477 and ACC files, 10000/136/116.

of them have a clean slate they are a very elderly team and many of them at the end of a day's work show distinct strain. . . . I should say that although Bonomi seems to have considerable experience, a clear brain and a good manner when not fatigued, he scarcely seems to have the energy and the personality desirable in the head of a very mixed and rather difficult team. . . . Most of the criticism of Bonomi that has come to us from different quarters has been limited to doubt as to his having enough determination.

#### BONOMI EXPRESSES SURPRISE HIS GOVERNMENT MUST WAIT FOR UN APPROVAL BEFORE ASSUMING POWER

[Transl of Ltr, Bonomi to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief, Cmsr, ACC, 13 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

In regard to the urgent communication made to me yesterday and to Marshal Badoglio and by which the outgoing Ministry must remain in charge until the approval of the United Nations for the constitution of the new Cabinet, I must make some friendly observations to you inspired by the warm desire to maintain the closest cordiality between the people who fight together against the common enemy: Hitlerian Germany. \* \* \*

I have given proof to you recently not only to accept completely the two conditions [below] indicated by you for the formation of a new Government, but also to keep very much in mind your advice and your suggestions inspired to maintain the best relations between the United Nations and the democratic Italy which now resumes its long interrupted activity. But I would not know, in the face of public opinion of my Country, how to justify an initiative in regard to a purely democratic Government and expression of forces which have fought against German oppression, initiative which finds no precedents in the practice followed during the formation of prior Cabinets. \* \* \*

#### ADVISORY COUNCIL APPROVES BUT AGAIN IMPOSES CONDITIONS

[Msg, Chief Cmsr, AC for Italy, to CCS, 18 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/116]

\* \* \* The Advisory Council for Italy have examined the events leading up to the formation of the proposed new government by Signor Bonomi, and they consider that in all the circumstances this government should prove satisfactory in furthering the main purpose of the the Allied Powers which is the final defeat of Germany.

They must however insist that:

(1) The new government express their readiness in writing to accept all obligations toward the Allies entered into by the former Italian Governments since the conclusion of the Armistice signed on September 3, 1943, and that every member of the Government should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations including the terms of the Armistice signed on September 29, 1943.

(2) The new government undertakes not to reopen the institutional question until such time as Italy has been liberated and the Italian people can freely express their views.<sup>8</sup>

#### DID THE NEW GOVERNMENT REOPEN THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AFTER ALL?

[Memo, Capt Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, to Gen Wilson, SACMED, 3 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

1. In the communiqué of the 23rd June published after the first meeting of the new Government on the 22nd June, the following passage occurred:

"The President of the Council proposed and the Council approved a draft decree law concerning the calling of a Constituent Assembly, the oath for the members of the Government and the right of the Government to issue laws.

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State."

2. In order to elucidate exactly what this part

<sup>8</sup> In the discussion preceding the adoption of the resolution several members expressed the view that the Allied governments had the right to approve any change in the Italian government, and that it was the function of the council to advise the governments as to the desirability of approval. After the council acted, the Chief Commissioner communicated the terms to the President of the Council of Ministers and added the following additional safeguard: "I take the opportunity of reaffirming that under the regime of the Armistice, the Italian Government is bound to carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations. It is therefore essential that the prior agreement of myself as President of the Control Commission should be obtained and that the Governments concerned should be consulted through the machinery established for this purpose, before any important decisions of policy are put into effect." ACC files, 10000/136/116. The conditions imposed by the Advisory Council were accepted in writing by the new government. Five of the Cabinet members were holdovers from the old government. The Bonomi government reflected an equal representation of the new political parties and introduced new political talents from Rome.

of the communique meant, I made enquiries from the Italian Government and received the following explanation from the President of the Council and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. They were emphatic that it did not mean that the Cabinet had approved any particular scheme whereby the country should choose between a monarchical or a republican form of government. It might appear from the wording of the communique that the scheme in mind was that this question should be decided by a Constituent Assembly. This was not the case. . . . All that the Government had so far decided was that it was expedient in their first communique to reaffirm publicly their intention to ensure that the Italian people should in due course be free to choose their form of government and that a Constituent Assembly would be elected.

3. In taking note of this explanation, I made it plain that the subject was one of considerable interest to the Allied Governments. Both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had

on a number of occasions affirmed their intention that the Italian people should be free to choose in this matter at the proper moment. The Italian Government should therefore presume that the Allied Governments would wish for full details of any scheme under consideration before it becomes law. . . .

4. At this stage I would only make one comment. It is clear to me and my advisers that the best chance of a fair decision of the issue between monarchy and republic would be a referendum or plebiscite—preferably under Allied supervision. . . . The reason is simple. In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that no attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent Assembly. \* \* \*

#### 4. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COMES TO ROME AND TAKES ON MORE RESPONSIBILITY

##### THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO COME AT ONCE DESPITE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for AFHQ, 11 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/132/324]

\* \* \* As regards the move of the Italian Government, I had hitherto envisaged that it would not be possible to start moving it to Rome for at least a month or six weeks after Rome fell into our hands. It was naturally to be anticipated that we would find a very disorganized capital.

This has not been the case and with public utilities and communications of all kinds functioning adequately and with ample accommodation available there are now no material reasons why the Government should not be installed in Rome at once.

The only local difficulty in this connection lies in the fact that Rome must be kept under Military Government for, at any rate, a long enough period to enable me to decide that an administration which is of necessity, and must of necessity, be dislocated and purged is capable of functioning efficiently.

I have asked Sig. Bonomi and Sig. de Nicola whether, should the situation arise, the Italian Government would find it awkward or, from their point of view, undesirable to function in

Rome while the city was still under Military Government. They were most emphatic that they would have no objection whatever.

2. As regards efficiency of administration with all its resultant advantages; and as regards the prestige of the new Government and of the Lieutenancy, there is everything to be said for installing the Government and the Lieutenant in Rome at as early a date as possible.

All the Ministries are available in Rome and could be occupied at very short notice. More important still, large numbers of civil servants are available and ready to step into their appointments. They will naturally be subject to normal euration but it seems clear that the bulk of those with bad Fascist backgrounds have fled the city.

Conditions in Salerno are extremely difficult. There are no proper Government offices, there is a desperate shortage of living accommodation, and there is an extremely limited staff of civil servants. . . .

##### THE MOVE HAS BEEN DELAYED AND IT IS TOO BAD

[Stone, Address to the Advisory Council for Italy, 1 Jul 44]

\* \* \* The main preoccupation of the Italian Government is, of course, the question when it

will be allowed to move to Rome. Until then it will not settle down to work. As a political Government it must inevitably rely, to a great extent, upon the permanent Civil Service in the Italian Ministries. The bulk of this Service is in Rome and the Germans have not succeeded in dispersing this administrative machine. There is not room in Salerno to house it. Indeed there is not even room in Salerno for the Under-Secretaries of State to go there. I warned the Supreme Allied Commander of this when I saw him last week on the 21st June.<sup>9</sup> Since then I have been to Rome to see the situation for myself, and returned more than ever convinced that the move was essential in the Allied war interest. As you gentlemen know, the Allied Control Commission is not staffed with sufficient personnel to carry out such things as the repair of roads, the re-establishment of hydro-electric stations, etc. We must rely upon Italian organizations which we control and supervise in accordance with the needs of the Allied Command. The mainspring of these Italian administrative organizations is in the Ministries in Rome and it is in the Allied interest to get these working again as quickly as possible. So that the Ministries should not be entirely idle I have authorized that the Under-Secretary of each Ministry may get his administrative machine ready for work in Rome. But of course until the Government can move, these Ministries cannot be allowed to undertake anything beyond their own internal organization.

There is also the political aspect. It does not help the Allied war effort in Italy if the Government publicly loses prestige. Many Italians are now asking why the Government does not go to the Capital and are concluding that it is because they do not enjoy the confidence of the Allied authorities. Consequently we risk that the effectiveness of the Italian Government will diminish if it is not soon allowed to go to Rome. On my return from the Capital I once more laid these considerations before the Supreme Allied Commanders and urgently pressed for authority to transfer the Italian Government at the earliest possible date. \* \* \*

#### AT LAST THE GOVERNMENT CAN COME

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 9 Jul 44, AFHQ Msg files, CM-IN 1512]

Agreement now reached that military convenience permits move of Italian Government to Rome coming week. Except for Service Ministries

<sup>9</sup> Since the government wanted to come to Rome, and ACC wanted it to come, the hitch was evidently due to the military leaders.

planned to complete move by 15 July when Government will officially function from Rome. Necessary staff ACC and Advisory Council will likewise move.

It is expected AMG will continue to administer Rome at least until 15 August.<sup>10</sup>

#### SECOND RESTORATION OF TERRITORY

[ACC Press Release, 20 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

1. The Allied Control Commission announces the transfer to the Italian Government today, July 20, 1944, of all territories comprised in the provinces of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino and Naples, with the exception of the Commune of Naples. . . .

4. The Allied Control Commission is charged with the responsibility for ensuring the effective use of Italian resources in the common war and of representing Allied interests to the Italian national and local governments. For this reason and in the interest of the common victory which is the indispensable condition of freedom, it has been decided, in agreement with the Italian Government, that the Commune of Naples, owing to its exceptional importance as a port for Allied supplies, shall remain for the present a military zone under the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief. The United Nations also reserve the right to hold Allied military courts in territory handed over to the Italian Government for the trial of offenses against Allied forces and property. \* \* \*

#### ACC PREPARES FOR FURTHER RESTORATION OF TERRITORY REGIONS

[Lush, Exec Cmsr, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf at Rgn III Hq, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/166]

Brigadier Lush opened the meeting and told the assembly that he called this meeting in order to discuss the possibility of consolidating Regions 2 and 7 with Region 3. The Executive Commissioner pointed out that it is felt by the Acting Chief Commissioner, that large parts of the Southern parts of Italy should be turned over to the Italians entirely and it should be decided in meeting if this would be possible and practicable. He said that the decision will not cause any inconvenience. It is planned to have a Regional headquarters in Naples and not more than 6 Provincial Teams. It will be necessary to retain Allied Officers in areas where there are

<sup>10</sup> As planned, the government moved to Rome on the date set, ACC moved its headquarters on 15 July, and AMG continued in control until 15 August.

Allied troops. Another reason for retaining ACC Officers in these areas is an administrative one. The third one is a political one. This step would be an intermediate one, and later on the entire southern part of Italy would be turned over to the Italians. The Brigadier stressed the fact that these teams would have to be mobile and would look after areas wherever needed. Where Allied Forces are stationed there should be an officer of ACC. This would mean that large areas will not be covered by ACC officers at all and in these parts it will be up to the Italian local governments to make decisions alone. Sooner or later, the Brigadier pointed out, it must be up to the Italians to stand on their own feet. The longer we remain resident and the longer we remain in a position of personal control and supervision, the more difficult will it be to go away. Another point is the drastic reduction in personnel, which has to be made in order to supply the north with experienced officers. The main factor however is to give the Italians a chance to see what they can do in areas.<sup>11</sup>

#### THIS GOVERNMENT IS WEAK BUT WE MUST BUILD IT UP

[Min, ACC Conf at Rgn III Hq, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/166]

\* \* \* Colonel Upjohn [Director, Legal Sub-commission] pointed out that it is better to make a start at some time, now, and give the Italians a fair chance of a start. Mr. Caccia, Political Section (B) [British] stressed the same facts. We should build this new government up. The present Italian Government is a very weak one. It is a coalition government, having six parties competing with each other. The Allied policy will be to back them up, if they fall down. From the political point of view, we are interested in how far they are able to go. We certainly will help them administratively, too. Mr. [Anthony] Antolini, Ec. [Econ] Director, ACC, pointed out that we have built up an "Industrial Production Program." This will reflect on industry and public works. The main work is carried with the Italian Ministry of Industry, which shows the will and intelligence to co-operate.

<sup>11</sup> On August 22 Brigadier Lush announced at the Conference of Regional Commissioners that the Allied officers administering the Southern Regions (numbering originally about 300) had been reduced from 175 to 100. On 28 August the Southern Regions of Calabria, Apulia, Campania, Foggia, Campobasso, and Lucania were amalgamated for ACC administration into one Region, and were placed under one Regional Commissioner and five provincial teams, concerned primarily with supplies and transportation. ACC files, 10000/132/6.

Mr. Antolini revealed that we have some stocks of materials, which will be distributed. New factories will start production very soon. He also stated that a program in the agricultural side is set up by the end of the month. This pertains to Public Works as well. The consolidation of the economic side will be handled from Reg. [Region] Headquarters. We have some 50 Italian engineers and we will find out what they can do. Let us find what the Italians can do and give them a start. \* \* \*

#### ADDITIONAL SOUTHERN PROVINCES AND THE CAPITAL ARE RESTORED

[Announcement by Gen Alexander, CinC, AAI, 17 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

The Allied Control Commission has announced today the return to the Italian Government of the provinces of Rome, Frosinone, Littoria.

The movement which was begun on February 11th of this year with the return of Lucania, Calabria, Sicily and the provinces of Salerno and Potenza, continued on July 20th with the return of Foggia, Campobasso, Benevento, Avellino and Naples province with the exception of the port of Naples, has now restored to the Italian people a region comprising nearly half of the Area and population of the Kingdom.

And now in addition, the capital of the realm, Rome, has been restored and the Italian Government is already installed in the capital of United Italy.

That this has been made possible is due in the first place to the continuous advance of the Allied forces, who have steadily driven northwards through territory which presents considerable military difficulties and against a determined enemy.

It has been made possible secondly by the conduct of the Italian people and of their Government. It is a tribute to the Italians' desire for peace and for order that tranquility has been so readily established and that a Government representing all the political parties has been created and is functioning and in so short a time. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES MORE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS

[Lt Col C. Carroll, Director, Property Contl Subcom, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

4. Prior to the occupation of Rome it had been the policy to assume actual and formal custody of properties. With the occupation of Rome this was changed to control only, and formal taking of

custody was abandoned. It is believed that there was little difference in legal effect between the two methods, but the paper work was greatly reduced.

5. Since about mid-August we have been following a policy of taking only so much control as will prevent removal, destruction or waste, combined with a right to inspect, to advise, and to remove Fascist or obviously incompetent managers or sequestrators.

6. Two factors prompted these changes:

(a) insufficient personnel to permit of close control and management, and

(b) a desire to make certain the continuing and complete responsibility of the Italian Government. \* \* \*

[Econ Sec, Hq ACC, Rpt for Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

\* \* \* Steps were taken whereby the Italian Government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, established the office of Direttore Generale dell'Alimentazione, which assumed direct charge of co-ordinating and controlling all phases of the supply of essential foodstuffs. The Direttore Generale appointed Federazione dei Consorzi Agrari as the distributing agent throughout Italy. Through this action an organization was established for handling imported foodstuffs. The plan went into operation on 1 September for the large Southern Region, and will be extended to forward areas on 1 October. The detailed work of keeping warehouses' records, making sales and effecting collections has been transferred to Italian hands, leaving AC to perform only the quantitative accounting for imports received.<sup>12</sup>

[Memo, Labor Sub-Com, AC, for the Public Relations Branch, 25 May 45, ACC files, 10000/146/33]

\* \* \* The assumption of direct control by the Italian Government of territory which was transferred from Allied Military Government, and the greater freedom of decision and action permitted to the Italian Government, affected the scope of the Labor Sub-Commission, and from October 1944 the Italian Government, industry and labor assumed greater freedom of action in the regulation of wages in industry in Italian administered territory.

<sup>12</sup> In February the government announced its intention of appointing by decree the Istituto Nazionale per il Commercio Estero to receive, handle, and account for all imported supplies other than those handled by the Federazione dei Consorzi Agrari. ACC Exec Memo No. 2, ACC files, 10000/109/2110.

[Capt Ralph F. Germann, Agriculture Subcom, AC, Summary of the History of the Agriculture Sub-Commission, 5 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

\* \* \* It was not until the Sub-Commission entered Rome that it was possible to turn over much responsibility to the Italian Government regarding the activities which were being carried on by the Sub-Commission. . . . As time passed, new personnel was secured for key positions and more responsibility was given to the Italians. \* \* \*

#### A DESIRE TO RETURN CONTROL OF RADIO IF MONOPOLY CAN BE AVOIDED

[Note, Chief I&C Sec, Political Comm., AFHQ, for SACMED's Political Comm., 23 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC (44) 96]

1. Under the Fascist regime, the Italian broadcasting system was run as a monopoly by EIAR [*Ente Italiano Audizioni Radio*], which has been described as a private stock company operating under state supervision. As the Allied forces progressed in Sicily and Italy, the complete control of Italian broadcasting stations was taken over by PWB. Under the terms of an agreement reached on 13 May 1944 between PWB, ACC and the Italian Government, administrative and technical matters in connection with broadcasting from Italian stations was placed under the direction of EIAR with PWB retaining full control over programme management.

2. PWB proposes to turn back to the Italian authorities as soon as possible the operational responsibility and control of Italian radio. As a first step it is proposed that entertainment programmes be turned over to the Italians, PWB retaining for the time being an over-all control of radio news.

3. It is clearly the correct policy for PWB to divest itself progressively of the control of Italian radio. But some misgivings are felt at the fact that a progressive turn-over of the operation and control of Italian radio to the only existing Italian radio organization, EIAR, may have the effect, unless steps are taken to reform it, of reinstating a Fascist corporation with monopolistic powers under the direction of the Italian state. This result would be at open variance with the expressed aims of the Allied Governments, which call for freedom of speech and freedom of all channels of news dissemination.

4. It therefore seems necessary that steps should be taken now to ensure that the charter of EIAR be revised by the Italian Government in accordance with democratic principles. \* \* \*

## ACC ENCOURAGES THE GOVERNMENT TO ASSUME MORE INITIATIVE IN REHABILITATION PLANNING

[Ltr, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, to Hilldring, 7 Sep 44, CAD files, 380, Reconstruction (4-30-44) (1)]

\* \* \* III. b. *356 Industry Census*: There is . . . being compiled by the Italian Government, through the Institute Statistico, and the Economic Section of the ACC a statistical review covering the social, agricultural and industrial position of Italy today. This study will cover 356 industries. A survey was made in 1938 of all Italian industry, divided under this number of headings. The returns submitted at that time numbering some 50,000 are being microfilmed, and will be cross-referenced with the present-day census which is being assembled on one general form based on those used before. This study will provide relatively complete information of the present situation of Italy, together with that of 1938, and could serve as a basis for the preparation of whatever plans for rehabilitation may be desired. The work is scheduled for completion sometime during the latter part of October.

c. *Industry Advisory Board and Committees*: In order to stimulate and aid the Italian Government in the work of rehabilitation, the ACC has proposed to it the creation of an Industry Advisory Board to be composed of representatives of several ministries together with advisory committees for individual industries and groups of industries. The functions of this organization will be to plan and organize production programs for finished goods, ascertaining the requirements for raw materials, fuel, power, transportation and other necessities, and endeavoring to obtain or produce these supplies so far as possible within the country. Several of these committees have already been organized and have begun to function.

e. *Ministry of Foreign Trade*: After authorization from AFHQ the ACC is about to propose to the Italian Government the creation of a Ministry of Foreign Trade (discussed earlier under the names of Ministry of Supply and Ministry of Commerce). This ministry would have the func-

tions, at first under the ACC and later independently, of planning import and export programs, receiving and screening import requests from the ministries, issuing import licenses, receiving and accounting for imported goods, and generally stimulating and developing exports. It is anticipated that this ministry will play an important role in deciding what raw materials Italy is to import with its limited foreign resources, and in furthering exports so that the maximum foreign resources be obtained. \* \* \*

## FOURTH RESTORATION OF TERRITORY WILL RELIEVE ALLIES PERSONNEL SHORTAGE

[Memo, Capt Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, for Hq AAI, 12 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/322]

1. The Italian Government have recently been pressing for an early restoration to their control of the Provinces of Teramo, L'Aquila, Pescara and Chieti on the grounds that, among other things, the Province of Chieti was liberated over 9 months ago, and that in Teramo and Aquila the activities of the patriots have given ample proof of anti-German and anti-Fascist sympathies. These headquarters are in full agreement that from the administrative point of view, these Provinces could be handed back at any moment.

2. In order to conform to the new boundary of AFHQ, and thereby to simplify certain aspects of administration and legislation, it is considered that the Provinces of Viterbo and Rieti might also be handed back to the Italian Government at the same time. The damage suffered in these Provinces was not so great as in the areas where the Armies halted for a period. Public works are now well in hand, the Italian provincial administration is working and except for a small portion of Viterbo, the whole area is south of the Rear Army Security Control Line.

3. An additional advantage in this proposal is that it would enable the Allied Control Commission to withdraw at once a small number of officers badly needed in the North. [Provinces named herein handed over 16 Oct 1944.] \* \* \*

## 5. ITALIANS TAKE LEAD IN DEFASCISTIZATION

### THE GOVERNMENT FINISHES AND COLLATES ITS DEFASCISTIZATION DECREES

[Political Sec, ACC Hq, Rpt for Jul 44, pt. IV, ACC files, 10000/109/1785]

2. It has been a month of considerable accomplishment for the Government. For one thing

the various defascistisation decrees have been collated. Special courts have been set up to try Fascist crimes and these courts are empowered to give the death sentence, although, perhaps with some irony, at the same time Italy went back to her old position of "moral supremacy" by abolition of capital punishment which the

Fascists had brought into the old code. Sforza was named High Commissioner for Fascist sanctions (July 28th). These sanctions can be resumed under the following headings: cancellation of Fascist political sentences, punishment of Fascist crimes, defascistisation of state administration and confiscation of wealth acquired through Fascist connections.<sup>13</sup> Eputation of the various governmental branches is being handled through a committee formed by the department itself plus a member appointed by Sforza's commission. Sforza has been given subordinate High Commissioners to assist him, one for each of the "sanctions" indicated above. The machinery swung into gear somewhat late in the month but there are indications that it will now move rapidly and remorselessly. Some earnest of serious intentions may be seen in the dismissal of del Vecchio and [Giuseppe] Bastianini from government service, naming a new head of the Bank of Italy (Introna) to take the place of [Dr. Vincenzo] Azzolini, discharge of [Francesco] Jacomini, once Lieutenant of Albania, and in such measures as revocation of pension to veteran "volunteers" of the Spanish war. \* \* \*

[Official Transl of DLL-159, Sanctions Against Fascism, pt. II, Purging of the Administration, 29 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/147/113]

11. Officials and employees of the following bodies shall be subject to eputation proceedings:

(1) civil and military State administrations, even if autonomous;

(2) local authorities and other public bodies and institutions;

(3) special concerns operating under public authorities or bodies and private concerns recognized by the State as controlling public utility undertakings or concerns having nation wide interests.

12. The following shall be dismissed from service:

(1) any person, particularly if when holding high office, who has by participating actively in the political life of fascism or by showing himself as a consistent apologist of fascism, shown that he is unworthy of serving the State;

(2) any person who has obtained an appointment or promotion through favoritism of

<sup>13</sup> The defascistization of the state administration was the only phase of the program in which the Allied authorities felt obliged to take a systematic interest (see below). This type of defascistization, covered by a decree of December 1943 (revised in May 1944) and other types (such as confiscation of wealth obtained through Fascist influence) were brought together in one program by a new decree, DLL-159. Major features of the decree are cited below.

the party or of fascist officials of high rank.

13. Any employee who has been guilty of fascist bias, incompetence or corrupt practices such as have been introduced by fascism into public administration, shall be likewise dismissed. \* \* \*

14. Any person who has held the position of "squadrista" or "Sanzopolcrista" or "antemarchia," "Marcia su Roma," "Sciarpa Littoria" or who has been an officer in the Fascist Militia if he had been guilty of Fascist partisanship or improper conduct shall be dismissed from his office or employment, but if not so guilty he may be awarded less severe punishment.

15. Any person who has received undue promotion or any preference in any competitive examinations because of his fascist position in lieu of dismissal will be reduced in rank or be returned to his former position.

16. Any person who has after 8 September 43 distinguished himself in the struggle against the Germans may be excused from dismissal or other disciplinary measure.

17. Any employee who, after 8 September 43, moved to North Italy with or had pledged allegiance to or has in any way collaborated with the (Republican) Fascist Government shall be dismissed.

Punishment of lesser degree may be awarded to such as show that he or his relatives were exposed to serious threats or danger.

Any person who by his acts has effectively aided the patriots or has undermined the work of the Germans or of the (Republican) Fascist Government which they were apparently serving, may be excused from punishment.

In every case an account shall be made of the allowances that were due under the original terms of employment and of any excess payment which may actually have been received. Any special allowance or sum granted or paid on account of any transfer to the North will be disallowed.

18. The Commission of first instance to hear eputation proceedings will be a Commission to be established in every Ministry or autonomous authority or body. When personnel of different classes of functions is employed in a Ministry more than one Commission may be established in that Ministry.

Such Commissions will be appointed by the competent Minister and will be composed of a judicial or administrative magistrate either serving or retired, who will preside over them, and of the Chief of personnel or of an official of the Administration, and of a third member nominated by the High Commissioner for the Sanctions against Fascism.

A Commission to be appointed by a Prefect composed of a judicial official, either serving or retired, an official of the Prefecture, and a member to be nominated by the High Commissioner, will be instituted for Communes, Provinces, Public Welfare Institutions and bodies under the control of the local authorities.<sup>14</sup>

#### ACC EAGER TO USE GOVERNMENT DECREES AND AGENCIES IN ITS OWN EPURATION

[Ltr Capt Stone to Bonomi, 14 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

I have to acknowledge your letter of the 26 June relating to your request for the implementation of your defascistization decrees in newly liberated territories as soon as possible.

I asked Colonel Upjohn (Acting Head of the Administrative Section in the absence of Lord Stansgate) to discuss this matter with you, which he did last Saturday morning. I should like to affirm once again the points pressed by Colonel Upjohn to you, namely that:

(i) ACC is only too anxious to use, even in territory not yet restored to your administration, Italian Government decrees and agencies.

(ii) The matter is vitally urgent and we rely on the Government to complete its plans at the earliest possible moment.

Colonel Upjohn also saw H. E. Count Sforza on Tuesday when the following conclusions were reached subject to your approval:

(i) H. E. Count Sforza undertook, after discussion with you, to supply in a very few days the names of 3 or 4 fair and just but firm anti-fascists who may be expected to be found in each of the principal localities as we move North, and who would be secretly consulted by my officers for advice as to the immediate suspension from office of the important fascists in the locality. \* \* \*

#### SFORZA PROPOSES TO GO AFTER ONLY THE BIG CASES

[Notes on Mtg Between Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec. ACC, and Count Sforza, High Cmsr for Epuration, 30 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

\* \* \* [Count Sforza stated:] . . . He wished to make quickly striking examples of the

<sup>14</sup> Several other defascistization decrees were found to be necessary. Moreover, in October it became clear that epuration would take longer than had been expected. On 1 November, therefore, the Government directed that it be concentrated on the higher grades of officials and power was given to the President of the Council of Ministers to retire all holdover officials who, though not hardened Fascists, had become hardened by the ways of

worst cases and let matters die down. He did not think it of importance to pursue the small man and he proposed to tell Scoccimabo [Mauro Scoccimaro] to instruct the Ministerial Commissions to act on these lines.

Col Upjohn impressed upon H.E. [His Excellency] the importance of these Commissions getting to work very quickly with which view H.E. said he was in entire agreement. \* \* \*

#### GOVERNMENT'S DECREE IS ADOPTED IN MG TERRITORY UNDER REGIONAL CONTROL

[Memo, Col Norman E. Fiske, Deputy Exec Cmsr, ACC, for Rgnl Cmsrs, 4 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/147/113]

2. The decree [DLL 159 on Government epuration] has already been extended to Military Government Territory which is under Regional control. . . .

8. The responsibility for supervising the progress of defascising by the Provincial Commissions devolves upon the Regional Commissioner. . . .

9. The usual distinction between military and Italian Government territory will apply; namely, that in the former the responsible officer can direct the prefect to set up a commission and ensure that it functions; in the latter he can only advise and press. In the latter case if no satisfactory response is obtained, the matter will be reported so that Hq ACC (which has received the Italian Government's undertaking that defascising will be dealt with expeditiously) can through that Government bring pressure to bear on the defaulting party.

10. It is important that as much progress as possible should be made in areas soon to be restored to the Italian Government. If it is possible to get provincial commissions formed and functioning before the Italian Government takes over much time will be saved.

11. Nothing in this decree affects the right of a CA officer in Military Government territory to remove any Italian officials from their employment whether for fascism, incompetence, corruption or for any other reason. \* \* \*

#### REMOVE ONLY NOTORIOUS FASCISTS BUT CONSIDER NO ONE INDISPENSABLE

[ACC Notes on Mtg of Sub-Coms at ACC Hq, 6 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/105/775]

\* \* \* Col. Upjohn explained some of the principal features of Part II of the decree and

Fascism. Brig Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33d Mtg to Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228.

that we are not at present taking a sharp interest in the other parts. The object to be achieved is the removal of notorious and ardent fascists from the heads of all departments and national concerns and for the removal of all those who are notorious and conspicuous locally from their positions. It was not intended to dismiss large numbers of the unimportant because they had been fascists. To do so might disorganize administration; it might create an unemployment problem; it would create a score of persons with a grievance. Most would require to be maintained.

\* \* \* Col. Upjohn impressed on the Sub-commissions the importance of getting their Commissions at work quickly, they must press for names, excuses should not be accepted. It was not proposed to screen the persons appointed; we must trust the Italians not to appoint fascists. To screen would cause a great deal of delay but if anything was known or found out against any appointee it should be reported. . . .

The cases of all persons either removed or not re-employed would have to be brought before the Commission. Those exonerated might be re-employed. It was being arranged that we should be notified of cases against such persons so that any evidence we had might be presented and our views made known.

Attention was called to the circular letter on the decree. It would be for Regions to keep Sub-Commissions informed of conspicuous fascists who were not dealt with and see that dismissals were in fact carried out. Regions will supply Sub-Commissions with such reports and returns as may be essential to show progress but paper should be kept down as much as possible.

No person is indispensable, we are pledged to remove notorious fascists and they will be removed. \* \* \*

#### TO ACC'S DISMAY AFHQ HAS CALLED THE FASCIST PELLEGRINI INDISPENSABLE

[Unsigned Brief of CA Sec, ACC, on the Case of Ugo Pellegrini,<sup>25</sup> 28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/105/772]

#### 1. Both Churchill and Roosevelt have announced publicly that Fascists will be removed from office.

<sup>25</sup> Pellegrini was Director General of the telecommunications system in Sicily and Southern Italy [referred to as SET in documents], a position he had retained because of his great technical knowledge and ability and because of the importance of this system to the war effort. At the end of July a suspension action was taken against him by the Naples Defascism Commission, set up by Region III in accordance with the policy of instituting in AMG territory (Naples was still under MG) the epuration procedures of the government. Maj. Gen. L. B. Nicholls (British), Chief Signal Officer of AFHQ, together with other Allied communications officers, im-

mediately pointed out the bad effect which the loss of Pellegrini's services would have upon the communications system. He stated that Pellegrini, like all other Italians, had been forced to work for the Germans but that he had rendered outstanding services to the Allies and could not be spared. The matter was called to the attention of the U.S. Political Adviser who argued: "The vast bulk of the economic and commercial talent in Italy was, of course . . . inextricably bound up with Fascism. Our military authorities undoubtedly have exploited many former Fascist individuals who have given loyal cooperation to the Allies during the crucial months of the Italian campaign. Are they to be compensated by internment?" Ltr, Murphy to ACofS, G-2, AFHQ, Jul 44, AFHQ files, G-5 Reel 275-B.

2. The CC [Chief Commissioner] has stated that in execution of this policy fascists will not be retained in office on the excuse of exceptional knowledge, experience or ability.

3. The CC in his directive of 24 May followed this policy. He pointed out that officials in northern Italy have been serving the Republic Fascist Government and ordered that *all* would be dismissed automatically (para 3). He permitted only two exceptions (para 5) (a) if the official was not a fascist or (b) if absolutely necessary for the furtherance of the war effort, *temporary* retention might be permitted.

4. It is not suggested that Pelegrine's [*sic*] retention should be temporary; it is asked that the finding that he is a fascist should be over-ruled.

5. There is considerable feeling in Naples as to our failure to bring about the removal of Fascists though we have been in occupation for 9 months.

6. This is the *first* list prepared by the Naples Defascism Commission set up by Region III; it attracts therefore special attention and is a test of our intentions.

7. In view of the fact that its personnel is Italian, a reversal of its decision will have more far-reaching effects than if a decision of a RC is over-ruled.

8. It is known that Pelegrine [*sic*] is a fascist. If the decision is reversed the *bona fides* of our instructions will at once be open to attack. It will be said that our justice is not administered without fear or favor. There will be suggestions made of corruption and favoritism and wire pulling. The people's confidence that we mean to purge fascism will be completely shaken.

9. The RC states that the matter is a test case, that there is a great local interest, that he genuinely fears that there will be grave political unrest if the decision is reversed and that there is a real possibility of serious industrial trouble also, even strikes.

10. The decision is proper, the body who honestly gave the decision is entitled to be supported.

Failure to support such bodies is likely to lead to their future failure to do their duty. A large number of similar commissions are now in process of being set up under the new decree. It would be most disastrous if they felt that they could not rely upon support and that persons they condemn shall be free and retained in responsible positions which enable them to bestow or withhold favour.

11. Not only would it be improper and a breach of faith to reverse this decision. From the point of view of future administration it is also inexpedient so to do and a reversal is likely to have most far-reaching and damaging effects politically and industrially.

12. I cannot too highly emphasize the importance of not interfering with the decision in this case. I regard this as a matter of the very gravest importance.

[Ltr, Capt Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 21 Aug 44, to Hq AAI, ACC files, 10000/105/772]

\* \* \* a. Count Pellegrini was suspended from his office as Manager of SET at Naples by the AMG Epuraton Committee at the end of July with the leave of Allied Force Headquarters.

b. On 9 August 1944 he was arrested and it was apparently understood by Allied Force Headquarters that such arrest was in connection with the Epuraton proceedings and his immediate release was directed. . . .

c. A report was called for by this headquarters as to the circumstances of his arrest and a copy thereof was supplied to Allied Force Headquarters on 10 August 1944. This report disclosed the fact that the arrest was not connected with the Epuraton proceedings but was in connection with a criminal charge of giving help to the enemy.

d. Allied Force Headquarters considered this report but telephoned a confirmation of the order for release and again confirmed the order in their signal F 81582.

e. Count Pellegrini was released on 11 August and this was confirmed in my letter A/CC 250, dated 13 August 1944.

3. As this matter has been dealt with direct between Allied Forces Headquarters and this headquarters, it is thought proper that you should be informed of the foregoing facts.

#### THE PELLIGRINI CASE RESULTS IN REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR ALLIED CONSENT TO REMOVAL OF VALUABLE TECHNICIANS

[Note, Secy of the Political Comm., 28 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, PC (44), 92]

1. In accordance with conclusion 5 of PC (44) 20th meeting, the Allied Control Commission

were instructed on 8th August to inform the Italian Government that Italians employed in higher grades in technical professions and in public utilities should not, in the process of epuration, be removed without the prior consent of the Allied authorities. The instruction to the Allied Control Commission went on to suggest, in paragraph 3, that the procedure to implement this directive should be in line with the following principles:

(a) The officials and employees who are of primary interest to the military are those in the services of communications, transportation and electric utilities.

(b) A distinction may be made between (i) persons whose services are unique and whose suspension should, therefore, be permanently deferred so long as any military interest remains, and (ii) persons in less important positions for whom replacements could be found upon adequate notice of their proposed suspension.

(c) The procedure should provide for notification to the technical arm or services of the Allied Forces interested in the services of the individuals concerned at the level appropriate to the case. The most practical channel of notification would seem to be through the appropriate Sub-commission of the Allied Control Commission.

(d) The procedure should be designed to prevent any public announcement of proposed suspension or other action against the individuals concerned until the Allied authorities have acted.<sup>16</sup>

#### ACC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INTERVENTION IN EPURATION CASES VARIES

[Memo, Capt Stone to CinC, AAI, 6 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/329]

2. The Air Force Sub-Commission, acting in accordance with the recent provisions concerning the elimination of Fascist elements from the Italian Air Force, had issued instructions through the Italian Air Ministry for the return of Lt. Col. Luigi Rusco and Capt. Pietro Saulini from Sardinia to the Mainland to await their trial.

3. The Brigadier General Commanding the Allied Garrison of Sardinia objects to the re-

<sup>16</sup>In accordance with the above-mentioned instruction of 8 August, the Acting Chief Commissioner of ACC requested Prime Minister Bonomi on 5 September to inform his ministers that "technicians or experts employed by the Allied Forces in positions of high responsibility will not be suspended, dismissed or arrested except after consultation with and the approval of Headquarters Allied Control Commission." ACC files, 10000/136/329.

removal of these officers on the score that they are indispensable, having occupied key positions as Italian Commanders at the Air Bases of Decimomannu and Alghero respectively for several months. It was also stated that they had rendered excellent services to the Allied war effort and have been co-operative in every way. The views of this Commanding General have apparently received your support. . . .

4. I wish to point out that the defascization of the Italian Air Force is a matter of considerable political importance, and we are being pressed from all sides for it to be carried out with the utmost despatch. Moreover I cannot agree that any officers are entirely indispensable or irreplaceable. These two officers, having had records of Fascist activities, would be naturally only too willing to accept shelter from the Allies, and would endeavor to ingratiate themselves by working hard in their aid.

5. On recommendation of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, I have, therefore, to request that these officers may be relieved at once and sent back to the Mainland. \* \* \*

[Notes of a Mtg Between Brig Upjohn, Vice President, C Sec, AC, and His Excellency Scoccimaro, Italian High Cmrsr for Epuration, 3 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/105/819]

Brig. Upjohn drew attention to the Chief Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister, of 5 Sep 44, the Director of Public Works letter to the Minister of Public Works of the 14 Nov and his own letter to H. E. of the 14 Nov and pointed out that in spite of direct requests Ing. Tizzano, the Director General of the Ministry, had been dismissed. He asked for an explanation.

H.E. [Scoccimaro] said that action had been taken by the Epuration Sub-Commission without consultation with the H.C. [High Commissioner] and that he would give instructions that no order for dismissal should be made.

Brig. Upjohn said that Ing. Tizzano's services were essential for the war effort and it should be ensured that he should take his place the following day. His return would of course be without prejudice to any action that the Government might like to take against Ing. Tizzano when his services were no longer indispensable. \* \* \*

Brig. Upjohn referred to the Pellegrini case and inquired when the epuration proceedings would in fact begin; the Allied Commission considered this case of importance. Pellegrini was a man whose services would be useful to the Allies and the Allied Commission was anxious to know whether or not his services would be available.

H.E. said that he was at a loss to explain the various delays, excuses and obstacles with which he had met and was meeting. . . . He [Brig. Upjohn] was giving instructions that the case was to be proceeded with without delay. \* \* \*

#### AC WANTS MORE INTENSIVE DEFASCISTIZATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE

[Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33d Mtg, Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

\* \* \* The responsibility of the Italian Government is not only to remove fascists from positions of important administrative posts in connection with the Government or public companies of national importance but there also remains the question of the removal of fascists from controlling positions in trade and commerce, which problem has not yet been adequately dealt with. It is particularly important that firms which are engaged in substantial international trade should be defascised as, apart from this being in accordance with Allied policy, they may become centres of infection in other countries or may act as centres of fascist propaganda or for collection of information. It is also important that firms having large financial interests should be defascised in order to prevent substantial funds from being made available for fascist purposes. None of the decrees published so far efficiently deals with the important private concern. While it is probable that a majority of important fascists will be caught by some of the provisions of the many decrees already passed, this Commission has at the present moment under consideration a draft decree which endeavours to stop such bolt holes as still exist. \* \* \*

#### WHY THE GOVERNMENT'S EPURATION WAS SLOW

[Upjohn, Rpt in Min of 33rd Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45]

\* \* \* The problem which faces Italy is very different from the problem which faces France. France was occupied for a matter of 4 years, during which movement was restricted and therefore persons could not move far from their home towns. The only persons to be dealt with were collaborators and local memory and local feeling is sufficient to produce the evidence. Cases are therefore mostly relatively simple and can be dealt with quickly but in Italy fascism has existed for over 20 years, unjust and discriminatory laws 20 years old, not only have to be repealed, but their effects have to be undone, property unjustly

confiscated over a period of years has to be restored. Political trials of those who opposed fascism during the past 20 years have to be scrutinized and injustices corrected. The fascist administrative machinery has not only to be broken but a new administrative machinery has to be dissolved and fascist ideology has to be eliminated. In order to obtain convictions for fascist crimes it is necessary to delve into the past and enquiries are sometimes necessarily very lengthy. . . . Epuration also may depend upon the investigation of a course of conduct extending over several years.

In order to see whether assistance in dealing with these vast problems could be derived from a study of the methods employed in France, a French-speaking officer of this Commission who was not only employed on epuration but is also a lawyer, was sent to France in December. . . . In the main his conclusions were that insofar as epuration was concerned, that the Italian method was sound. It is a long term policy to proceed with justice and moderation and to leave as little desire as possible for revenge. \* \* \*

#### A FAIRLY GOOD EPURATION JOB CONSIDERING CONDITIONS

[Memo, Lt Col S. H. White, CA Sec, AC, for Vice President, CA Sec, 27 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/869]

\* \* \* If the accepted policy is to remove only

the ardent fascist in a position of authority and to regard the average civil servant as of necessity a fascist (as in many trades a skilled worker even though a conservative is of necessity a member of a trade union) then the proportion of persons dismissed, 4%, is consistent with a reasonable purge.

I think it may therefore be claimed that a fairly good job has in fact been made of epuration. It has at times been slow but that is not surprising if one considers the fact that the machine had to be created, the dearth of experienced administrators, after 20 years of fascism, the fact that legislation has been piecemeal—*ad hoc* to the various situations as they arose—(with more time and greater experience, more comprehensive and more satisfactory legislation might have been devised). Lastly, there has been the political necessity of satisfying six contending parties all jealous of each other coupled with three changes of Government and the resulting delays and negotiations. \* \* \*

Epuration may have been slow but that is partially because it has been careful; the spirit in which it has been carried out has been excellent; on the whole it has been effective and the operation has not left a feeling of resentment. There is no reason to fear that it will not be concluded in the same manner or to fear that AC will not be able to congratulate itself upon a difficult job—well done.

## 6. PATIENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT

### THIS IS A SECOND PHASE AND CALLS FOR SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT

[Capt Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Regl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/132/6]

\* \* \* The first phase of our work was what may be called the construction period. In October at Moscow our objective was laid down for us by the Allied Governments in a declaration on Italy. . . .

In April the Italian Prime Minister was able to transform his Government into a political government to include representatives of all the six parties who formed part of the Committees of Liberation in South Italy. This was a great step forward to achieve the goal that had been set for us in the Moscow Declaration. But it has always been realized that a further change would be necessary when Rome had been liberated and when many of the national political leaders of the

parties might become available. Expectations were not belied and in June, soon after the Allied entry into Rome, a new government was formed under Signor Bonomi combining the leaders of the parties in Rome and the leaders from the South in a single national administration.

I need not remind you that this Italian Government was approved by the Allied Governments and we in ACC/AMG have the duty of doing all that we can to support it in carrying out the hard tasks that lie before it. This, to my mind, is the dominant aspect of this second phase into which we have now entered. . . .

But the task of the Italian Government is a hard one. War has passed over all the territories under their administration and in this war the Germans have gone out of their way to destroy Italy. It is our job to help the Italian Government to overcome these difficulties. . . .

## A GORY EPISODE—CAN THIS GOVERNMENT MAINTAIN ORDER?

[Capt Stone, Rpt in Min of 21st Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 22 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/228]<sup>17</sup>

. . . after a short and violent fight, the mob succeeded in taking [Donato] Carretta away from the Carabinieri. \* \* \*

Carretta was then lifted, dragged to the centre of Ponte Umberto, the bridge facing the main entrance of the Palace of Justice, and then dragged to the river bank and thrown into the water. But he was not dead. The contact with the cold water probably revived him and he made feeble attempts to swim. At this sight, the more excited members of the crowd went down to the river bank, got hold of a boat and reached the floating body. With the oars they hit him again and again until he died. The body, tied to the boat, was then dragged down the river, as far as Regina Coeli, the Jail he directed under the German occupation, which is a little way down the river. There they dragged him from the water, threw him against the door of the Jail and tied his body to the grating of a first floor window.

The incident could have been avoided had the Italian authorities made adequate public safety preparations for the conduct of the Caruso trial. Allied troops were not called out because our policy is not to do so in territory under the Government's control unless Allied lives or property are endangered or there is interference with the war effort. But because certain prisoners at the jail are security prisoners arrested by the Allies, Allied Military Police were sent to the jail. Carretta's body was cut down and the crowd dispersed without violence.

I conferred with General [Thoburn K.] Brown of the Rome Allied Area Command. We agreed that there was no need to call out Allied troops. Later, I conferred with the Prime Minister and Sforza and reviewed with them the arrangements for resuming the trial.<sup>18</sup>

2. As you have no doubt heard, the trial took place without incident on Wednesday and Thursday and ended in a verdict of guilty and sentence of death for Caruso and a verdict of guilty and

<sup>17</sup> The incident occurred outside the court in Rome where [Pietro] Caruso and [Roberto] Occhetto, former Italian officials accused of Fascist crimes, were being tried. Carretta, who had been director of the Regina Coeli Jail until dismissed by AMG on 18 June, had aroused great hatred by turning over hostage Italians to the Germans, who then slaughtered them.

<sup>18</sup> According to a message from AFHQ to CCS of 19 September, the Chief Commissioner warned Bonomi that if the disorders recurred it might be necessary to call out Allied troops or even to re-establish AMG in Rome.

a sentence of 30 years imprisonment for his former secretary Occhetto. \* \* \*

## MOB ACTION IN ROME MUST NOT STOP US FROM TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY

[Jt Statement to the Press by Roosevelt and Churchill, 26 Sep 44, Dept of State Bull (1 Oct 44), p. 338]

\* \* \* The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.<sup>19</sup> \* \* \*

## THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY WHILE POLITICAL SITUATION IS UNCERTAIN

[Memo for Files, Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 13 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/171]

\* \* \* As to withdrawal of AC personnel from AC Regions, the Prime Minister reiterated the view which he expressed in September that he desired AC not to withdraw further from Sicily for the time being and until the political situation in Sicily had clarified.

As to the Mainland, he suggested that it might be satisfactory, as a start, to withdraw AC personnel in the area south of Salerno. He advised that the Undersecretary would propose a date when this might become effective at our subsequent meeting. \* \* \*

## IN NOVEMBER A CABINET CRISIS AGAIN CAUSES MISGIVINGS

[Memo, CofS, AC, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 7 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

The resignation of Bonomi's Government on 26 November and the failure to establish an Italian Government up to date, is creating delay, inconvenience, and worse, to the work of the Allied Commission and, therefore, to the Allied war effort. In the absence of a Government none of the Ministries is prepared to discuss policy or make decisions or carry out anything but the usual routine of business. In the middle of a war with the pressing problems that have to be solved in this country, the cynical disregard of appar-

<sup>19</sup> These words were part of a statement announcing a New Policy toward Italy, one feature of which was the gradual delegation of greater responsibility to the Italian Government (see Chapter XVII). While accelerated by this announcement, the trend had begun earlier and had been prompted, as noted earlier, by the desire to see the liberation of Rome mark the beginning of a lightening of ACC/AMG's heavy responsibilities.

ently all parties for the necessity of making their political aspirations subservient to the war effort which has led to the failure to form a Government, can only increase the difficulties of the Italians themselves, decrease their dignity and prestige amongst the Allied Nations and do irreparable damage. I do most earnestly recommend that the strongest recommendations be made to the Lieutenant of the Realm and to Bonomi himself that the Italians should show themselves capable of governing themselves and that a Government should be formed without any further delay.<sup>20</sup>

#### PERHAPS THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT READY FOR SO MUCH NEW RESPONSIBILITY

[Memo, Harlan Cleveland, Exec Dir, Econ Sec, AC, for Econ Subcom, 31 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/154/965]

1. From a number of complaints received from Regional Commissioners, it is fairly evident that the Italian Government is not always in a position to provide for the civil administration when territory is transferred to its jurisdiction.

2. An essential pre-requisite before territory is transferred, should be that the Italian Government has made flexible arrangements to provide for the operation of essential services and the continuance of civil administration.

3. Although this question is primarily for the Civil Affairs Section, it raises the point whether it would not be worthwhile to draw up a list of minimum essential conditions which need to be made by the Government, on the Economic side, with respect to any area of presently AMG territory before it is taken over by the Italian Government.

#### ESCAPE OF A PROMINENT FASCIST NEARLY OVERTHROWS THE GOVERNMENT

[Admiral Stone, Report to Advisory Council for Italy, 16 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

\* \* \* I. . . . The outstanding event of the past fortnight in Italy was the escape of General Roatta from the custody of the Carabinieri and his subsequent disappearance. As you are aware, General Roatta was in process of being tried with . . . others for crimes against the Italian state. . . .

2. On the night of 4th March, Roatta, who had been transferred on the order of the court from

the Regina Coeli Prison to the Virgilio Military Hospital, owing to alleged heart trouble, succeeded in making his escape. The whole press showed great indignation over the affair and stressed the seriousness of the event both from the international point of view and on account of the evidence of hidden Fascist influence which it brought to light. The Communist Party issued a statement accusing Army Police and Carabinieri of complicity in organizing the escape and generally charging the authorities responsible for epuration with frustrating the demands of the people for the punishment of Fascist criminals. They also demanded the immediate dismissal of the Heads of the Carabinieri and the Police, the suppression of the body suspected of having organized the escape, by which they presumably meant the General Staff, and the establishment of a commission of three ministers to investigate the political responsibility for the incident and to propose to the Government other radical measures for epuration of bodies alleged to be protecting ex-Fascists.

3. The Government had already issued a statement emphasizing the great impression made by Roatta's escape on public opinion and promising that all those responsible would be punished. They also announced a million lire reward for his capture and stated that the Head of the Carabinieri would be removed. On the afternoon of 6th March a public demonstration was held at the Colosseum in which all the Left-wing parties participated. After speeches by various leaders a part of the crowd moved on to the Quirinal where an attempt was made to enter the Palace. During this demonstration a hand-grenade was thrown killing one Italian civilian and wounding two Allied soldiers and an Italian Police official. Shots were fired by the Carabinieri. The crowd then carried the body of the dead man to the President of the Council's office at the Viminale where Signor Bonomi received a deputation which demanded the Government's resignation. The delegation consisted of representatives of the Socialist, Communist and Action Parties, the Unione delle Donne Italiane, a Partisan, two wounded ex-servicemen and General [Arnaldo] Azzi, himself a storm centre not so long ago. Signor Bonomi replied that he could not desert his post and that as head of a coalition of parties he would shoulder responsibility for the Council of Ministers. . . .

4. The papers of the 7th March were full of speculation on the Government's possible course of action and indeed on its chances of survival. Following a lengthy meeting of the Council of Ministers, however, a communiqué was issued

<sup>20</sup> The Cabinet crisis had arisen from the demands of the left-wing elements, who were being strengthened by the prospect of early liberation of the more radical North. The deadlock was broken when Bonomi formed a new government.

which relieved all fears of a Governmental crisis. In this communiqué the President of the Council deplored the irresponsibility of certain press organs which had led to the necessity of supervising the activities of provocative and subversive groups. It stated that after a full discussion in which individual parties composing the Government made their position clear, the Council of Ministers recognized that there was no reason to dissolve the coalition. The Council expressed the hope that it might be possible to re-establish collaboration within the Government of all parties composing the Committee of National Liberation. . . . This bait to the Socialist and Action Parties that they would be welcome if they wished to return to the Government was subsequently firmly rejected by "Avanti." The Council then proceeded to nominate General [Brunetto] Brunetti to command the Carabinieri in the place of General [Taddeo] Orlando, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, to arrange for the re-invigoration of the police, to provide for the immediate internment of "socially dangerous elements of the old regime" in accordance with Article 8 of the law for Sanctions against Fascism. It announced the preparation of a list of persons of anti-Fascist beliefs and political impartiality suitable for political life in the provinces and for speeding the purification of public life. Finally it announced the transfer of the Intelligence Staff, the former S.I.M., from the Italian General Staff to the General Staff of the Army, in accordance with arrangements proposed by the Allied Command. A commission of four ministers was appointed to re-organize the Purge of Fascist activity and to establish juridical rules for proceeding against Fascists in North Italy. \* \* \*

#### ECONOMIC AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS GIVE PAUSE TO FURTHER TERRITORIAL RESTORATION

[Ltr, Admiral Stone to Bonomi, 26 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/109/582]

\* \* \* I find that for operational reasons it would be undesirable to restore to your jurisdiction the complete compartimenti of either Umbria or Marche. The compartimento of Toscana is not yet wholly liberated. Furthermore, I think it would be unsound to transfer merely those provinces which are immediately contiguous to Italian Government territory as they are economically and administratively bound up with the compartimenti I have mentioned above; also, at the present time, large numbers of Allied troops

are in these provinces and the problems which inevitably arise in such circumstances are, I believe you will agree, more easily solved, to the greater satisfaction of both the Allied Forces and the inhabitants, by the Allied Military Government.

Accordingly, I believe the better plan will be to postpone any further restoration of territory until the liberation of further areas in the North makes possible the restoration to you of one or more complete compartimenti and I propose to advise the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly.<sup>21</sup>

#### ANTI-FASCIST SANCTIONS THREATEN ANGLO-AMERICAN INVESTMENTS<sup>22</sup>

[Ltr, Charles, Br Ambassador to Italy, to Stone, Chief Cmsr AC, 19 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

2. Clearly the effect of the [proposed] decree as it stands on the economic and industrial structure of Italy would be radical and might raise a political question whether a non-elected, interim Cabinet would not be acting essentially *ultra vires* in passing it. Yet, I feel that, however carefully any advice offered by the Allied Commission may be confined to these aspects . . . , it is highly likely that any attempt at dissuasion would be misrepresented on the Left. The Commission might be placed in the light of attempting to protect Fascist big business from the people's justice.

3. . . . Under Article 17, it would be sufficient for 20% of the shares to be found to belong globally to persons of the proscribed categories to have the whole Company brought under the control of the New Ente dominated by a single Minister who, it is safe to presume, will be a Communist. He might well order the nationalization of the Company; . . .

<sup>21</sup>The fact that Admiral Stone's decision was announced to the Italian Government shortly after the disorders in the Roatta case does not afford any basis for inferring that these disorders had any direct influence on the Chief Commissioner's decision. However, the emphasis which he gave to the economic and administrative difficulties show that the Allied Commissioner's attitude toward territorial restoration was at this time becoming more cautious. Certainly, the misgivings arising from the Government's handling of the Roatta case would not have added to the commission's confidence that the Government could handle difficult new responsibilities.

<sup>22</sup>A proposed decree provided that in the event a Fascist was convicted of specified crimes, the court should order confiscation of the property of the person convicted. Article 17 pertains to any Fascist company where the majority of the directors come under the provisions of the decree or where a fifth of the shares are held by convicted persons. ACC files, 10000/105/856.

4. I am of course unable to say how real the danger is. I have no exhaustive list even of British investments in Italian industry. But I do not think we can doubt the existence of a risk. . . . I feel that the Allied Commission have a responsibility to put in a formal reminder to the Government of this international interest in Article 17. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 27 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

In the course of the conversation which we had . . . on the 23rd of this month, you stated that H. E. Pesenti had agreed to withdraw from his draft decree any reference to corporations (Societa Anonime).

Such proposed legislation, both in its effect upon present military production and also—looking at the matter from a longer point of view—upon foreign investment, is of extreme importance to Allied interests, and I should therefore be most grateful to receive from Your Excellency, in writing, confirmation of this withdrawal.

[Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 21 May 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

I have been informed that certain amendments have been suggested to the proposed decree providing for the confiscation of illicitly acquired wealth, which re-introduce the principle of con-

fiscation of the property of private companies in certain circumstances.

This is a matter in which the Allied Governments are vitally concerned and I must ask you, my dear Prime Minister, to let this Commission see a draft of the proposed decree in its final form before it is passed by the Council of Ministers, or if already passed before its publication in the Gazette.

[Ltr, Bonomi to Stone and Text of Proposed Statement, 14 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

\* \* \* Minister Pesenti, who has kept in touch with the Commission through a delegate, informs me that a statement of the Italian Government on the matter would be enough to dispel the expressed apprehensions, and suggests the text enclosed. \* \* \*

Text: . . .

In proceedings for forfeiture involving the interests of citizens or companies of the United Nations, the Italian Government will examine carefully any observations which the United Nations may make.

[Ltr, Stone to Bonomi, 18 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/856]

\* \* \* The Allied Commission has no objection to the decree becoming law in its present state.

## 7. IN THE ADVANCE BEYOND ROME AMG TRIES NEW EXPEDIENTS

### LESSONS OF THE SPRING ADVANCE

[Hq ACC, Rpt for June 44]

\* \* \* In forward areas the month has taught many lessons: the necessity of close co-operation between AMG's with the Armies and the Regions following up behind; the vital necessity for planning well ahead with respect to supplies and transport; the necessity of having organized transport companies both with the Armies and forward Regions; the fact that the refugee problem decreases with the speed of advance; the value of training and planning in view of the inevitable breakdown in communications; the increasing necessity for a pool of Italian Government officials which can be called upon at short notice; the need for continuity with regard to legislation in the forward areas and those turned over to the Italian Government. \* \* \*

### MEASURES TO OBTAIN SHORTAGES OF ITALIAN OFFICIALS AND POLICE

[Local Govt Subcom, Rpt for Jul, 10 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/109/617]

b. . . . experience has shown that AMG with 5th and 8th Armies have at times found no administrative officials in newly liberated provinces. To cater for these circumstances, arrangements were made in collaboration with the Italian Government for the provision of a small team containing the minimum number of officials (including a Prefect) which would be necessary to restart the administration. \* \* \*

[Capt Stone, Rpt in Min of 21st Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 22 Sep 44]

3. . . . Groups of Carabinieri have been attached to the Fifth and Eighth Armies. They move into

the newly occupied territory with advancing Allied troops and constitute the first symbol of returning Italian administration. The Carabinieri have been enthusiastically welcomed by the liberated Italian population and their work in the early stages has been of the greatest assistance in establishing military government.

Steps have been and are being taken to improve the morale of the police forces generally, and discussions are being held with commanding officers.

[Memo, Local Govt Subcom, AC, on Pietro Nenni's statement in London Press, 18 Dec 41, ACC files, 10000/141/422]

8. With the advance of the Allied Armies north, it became apparent that many provinces would be liberated all at once, instead of one at a time, and that consequently it was necessary to provide a pool of prefects from which officials might be drawn for provinces as they were liberated. We pointed out to the Italian Government that a shortage of trained personnel made it imperative that non-career officials be appointed, possessing the necessary integrity and competency, in lieu of career officials. This idea was accepted grudgingly by the Government, but whole-heartedly when it was agreed by us that the title of the non-career man would be "Prefetto Reggente" instead of "Prefetto del Regno." \* \* \*

#### USE OF ITALIAN-OPERATED TRUCK POOLS

[Col Duval S. Adams, Dir, Transportation Subcom, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

7. In forward areas of the Armies, the Military Railway Service rapidly rebuilds the necessary rail lines. However, with the rapid moves of our armed forces in recent months, distances to railheads have necessarily been greater with also priority of movement for Army supply. This with the increased area occupied and additional harvest requirements, has increased the demands for truck transport. With the general shortage of trucks and the heavy military demands, our requisitions put forward months ago for some 2,000 War Department vehicles have not been filled. Further, the 1,000 War Department vehicles allocated to us in February for early delivery have been slow in reaching us. [The] last of them are only now arriving.

8. Requisitioning locally of Italian trucks always has the effect of causing their disappearance, therefore we developed early a plan for the reactivation of motor haulage companies and plac-

ing the hauling on a commercial basis under a standard tariff of rates. This policy is showing increased success and a much greater number of civilian trucks are now coming into service; there are now some 3,000 Italian civil vehicles engaged in hauling civil supplies.

9. The Italian Government is co-operating and the standard tariff of rates worked out with them, has now been published as a decree and effective in all territory under the Italian Government. The same tariff is being supplied to Regions for application in new territory as they take it over.

10. In addition, the Ministry of Communications of the Italian Government has just completed the draft of a new decree, the effect of which will be the establishment in the various provinces of central pools into which will be grouped all haulage companies with their vehicles; these will operate under the uniform tariff and under control, so that movement of priority goods, such as food supplies, will be moved first. Once this agency, called E.N.A.C. [Ente Nazionale Auto-Trasporti Cose], is working efficiently, we can then hand over to it the various truck pools now operated by ACC officers.

#### RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES IS PLACED UPON PREFECTS IN ADJACENT AREAS

[Ltr, Lt Col G. Marshall, Rgnl Public Health and Welfare [PH&W] Officer, Rgn V, to Subordinate Officer, 23 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/164/197]

At the Conference of Prefects held on the 20th August 44 at Headquarters Region V, the R.P.H.O. [Regional Public Health Officer] spoke to the meeting on the problem of refugees and of plans for their disposal.

The forward Provinces of Region V will be called upon to each absorb 2,500-3,000 refugees on a temporary basis within the Communes, in order to facilitate the rapid rehabilitation when war has passed. This procedure has become necessary owing to the impossibility of sending any more south at the present time.

The main point which it was intended to impress on the Prefects was that the responsibility to make all arrangements within their own Province rests with them and not with AMG. \* \* \*

The scheme as outlined was for a Central Camp to be set up in a large building in or near the Capital of each Province and on the main line of Communication, capable of handling 300-400.

Administration of the camp would be the responsibility of the Prefects, through a committee composed of Medico Provinciale, Italian Red

Cross, and other leading personages. It would be the duty of this committee to provide cooking utensils, blankets, and rations, the latter obtainable from the Consorzio Agrario. All refugees leaving the main camp will be given sufficient rations to enable them to live until they obtain their ration card in the Commune and the Sindaci will make all arrangements for their reception and dispersal on arrival. \* \* \*

#### GARBAGE, DIRT, AND CORPSES IN FLORENCE— QUICK REMOVAL ENTAILS IMPROVISATIONS

[PH&W Div, AMG Fifth Army, Report on Florence City, 9 Sep 44, app. A., ACC files, 10000/164/197]

\* \* \* The sanitation of the city was in a terrible state when Florence was taken over. No work had been done during the twenty days of fighting. Corpses had accumulated and there was no water to flush the sewers which had been damaged in places. The amount of refuse per diem, exclusive of human excreta is 100 tons. Provincial contractors had removed the refuse but these contractors were non-existent. As the bridges were down and no transport existed about 26 tons of refuse had accumulated and this was increasing at the rate of 100 tons per diem. The military authorities promised transport and lent two lorries for one day. No horses or carts were available and even if they had been allowed across the military bridges it was considered inadvisable to take them from the countryside and so interfere with the collection of the harvest. However, under the energetic administration of Major Richardson, the AMG Engineer, the conditions have greatly improved. The Ufficio Sanitario managed to make seven lorries which would go out of scrap and damaged vehicles. Two sites for refuse tins were picked in areas where land reclamation projects could be carried out, labour was obtained for street cleaning, notices published re enforcement of laws and committing nuisance, and the situation is now in hand. 183 tons of refuse are being moved daily and in a short time most of the nuisances will be removed. Sewers have been repaired and a certain amount of water is available. The recent heavy rains were a great help in cleaning out sewers and drains. A site was made to bury corpses in the Botanical gardens as they were not allowed to be taken across the bridges to the cemetery. The gruesome job of removing these bodies was complicated by the absence of wood and coffins. What coffins that there were had to be used two or three times to carry the bodies. All bodies have now been buried. Shortage of disinfectants is still a problem. \* \* \*

#### BY EARLY SEPTEMBER ARMY AMG'S HAVE THEIR HANDS FULL OF NEW PROBLEMS

[ACC Hq, Rpt for Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/101/502]

#### AMG Fifth Army<sup>23</sup>

1. At the beginning of September AMG Fifth Army had ten Provincial Commissioners and their teams in operation on the Arno, with a wide front to cover, and about twenty new communes were opened up. Siena Province was turned over to Regional administration on 5 Sept and the commune and city of Livorno was handed over to the P.C. shortly afterwards, the AMG Army team being withdrawn for duty further North.

2. Among new communes occupied later in the month was Pistoia, entered by AMG on 15 Sept and found to be considerably damaged. Later the communes of Firenzuola and S. Godenzo were occupied. Both towns have been completely destroyed.

3. Towns along the Arno Valley between Pisa and Florence had largely been evacuated during the last weeks of August, but many inhabitants have since returned to their homes. There are many minefields in the area, much of the harvest has been lost and considerable unemployment exists.

4. The food situation is generally serious: local resources are poorer than was expected and a large proportion of the wheat harvested has been spoilt by war and weather and is unfit for consumption. But food in small quantities is reaching the bulk of the population.

5. There has been much political activity during the month, especially in Florence. The patriot problem is synonymous with politics: they are the bone of contention between the various political parties. Attempts made to recruit patriots

<sup>23</sup> A brief glance at the military developments is necessary for viewing the AMG problems in their proper perspective. The Allied offensive which led to the capture of Rome continued beyond the capital, and, by August, Florence and Leghorn had also been taken. The next month, after a brief pause to regroup, the Allies launched a new offensive through the Gothic Line toward the Po Valley, but by December the advance had been halted just short of its goal. A rather static period followed which was not broken until the beginning of the final offensive in April. Thus, from June 1944 till the beginning of the winter the jurisdiction of AMG expanded until it embraced substantially all of Central Italy. In the new areas there were difficult problems of civilian supply, transport, refugees, devastation, and even of politics. Reference should be made, in passing, to the Allied occupation of the little republic of San Marino. When the Germans violated its neutrality by retreating through it, Eighth Army on 22 September followed in "hot pursuit." Occupation was protracted by the outbreak of a serious epidemic of typhoid fever.

for the regular Italian Army have not been very successful: patriots wish to join the Army in organized bodies rather than as individuals.

6. Carabinieri for the Northern Regions are arriving satisfactorily.

7. AFHQ is making arrangements with the Transportation Sub-Commission for the formation of Truck Companies to haul civilian supplies.

8. Pisa was under intermittent shell fire until 28 Sept. Inhabitants of the city, estimated at about 15,000 persons, were all North of the river and in view of the water shortage all entry into the town was temporarily stopped by a ring of police posts. Later the supply improved and many people returned to their homes. Patriots, who co-operated well, were duly disarmed and public order was good. The famous leaning tower suffered a few unnoticeable chips.

9. Conditions in Florence improved noticeably when the Germans had withdrawn from the Northern suburbs. The sanitation of the city, which was in a terrible state when the Allies entered, is now in hand. Law and order are good and all hospitals are functioning normally. Schools are to reopen on 2 October. A committee formed of prominent persons deals exclusively with Anglo-American nationals. Two hundred homeless Southern Italians are being evacuated daily. The food supply to the city is still unsatisfactory.

10. Political unrest in the city centres around the conflict between the Prefect and the Committee of National Liberation: AMG support is being given to the former. The city has attracted many visitors, including the Lieutenant of the Realm, Togliatti and the Prime Minister, and a host of unauthorized persons. [The document continues with a summary of similar experiences of AMG, Eighth Army.]

#### INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE CIVILIAN SUPPLY PROBLEM

[Memo, Sr SO, AMG Fifth Army, for All Concerned, 29 Sep 44, ACC files, 10700/154/2]

1. With the industrial area of Italy with its big, largely populated cities soon to come under our control, it must be appreciated that the strictest economic control must be exercised at every stage in order to utilize the limited food supplies now available to the best possible use.

2. SCAO's, CAO's, Corps Supply Officers, Provincial Commissioners, Regional and Provincial Supply Officers responsible to AMG Fifth Army are therefore responsible that imported supplies (especially flour) are requisitioned and

distributed with the *closest and strictest economy*. In this, you will be guided by the following principles:

##### a. Grain

No effort must be spared to stimulate the threshing and amassing of grain. Particular attention will be paid to the promulgation of grain and flour prices by Regional and Provincial Supply Officers; the prompt payment of farmers for wheat amassed, and the prompt ordering of POL [Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants] supplies. In the latter, the AMG Fifth Army Supply Division will continue the distribution of POL as quickly as availability makes possible.

##### b. Flour

All mills must be put to work with the minimum of delay. Where power is lacking, tractors or motors must be utilized and POL for this purpose will be given first priority.

##### c. Bread

Every CAO must endeavour to make his commune self-supporting. In addition, the Corps of Provincial Supply Officer must take advantage of the exportable surplus of flour from a surplus commune, using it in a deficient commune. In accordance with previous instructions issued by this Headquarters, the basic bread ration remains unchanged at 200 grams *except that* in communes using imported flour it is set at 100 grams increasing to 200 grams when local grain is used. \* \* \*

[Memo, Frank E. Toscani, Sr SO, AMG Fifth Army, for ExecO, AMG Fifth Army, 26 Mar 45, ACC files, 10700/154/1]

\* \* \* Experience has shown that in the initial stages of the landing at Salerno/Paestum, civilian food supplies were not properly phased and did not arrive on time. Since then, we have organized a system of supplies which has worked with marked success to the extent that communes were supplied within 48 hours after liberation during the offensive of the 5th Army of May-September 1944. \* \* \*

[Food Subcom AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

2. . . . The disastrous consequences of the non-existence of extra Italian stockpiles prior to entry [of the Allied Armies] had been fully apparent in the early days of the occupation when a hand to mouth existence had to be followed. To avoid repetition of this, stockpiles of essential foods were built up at strategic points for civilian feeding as fresh areas were ready to be occupied. As a result, throughout the remainder of the advance up the Italian peninsula, food was normal-

ly taken into communes within a few hours after the departure of the retreating enemy. The scales for the immediate post-occupation period were more generous than those allowed for areas which had been settled for a long period, as it was realized that there would be distress and a definite need for building up of morale and the physical strength of the civilian population. \* \* \*

#### IN MORE RADICAL CENTRAL ITALY POLITICS SOMETIMES CAUSES MORE TROUBLE THAN FOOD

[Memo, Lt. Col Ralph L. Rolph, Provincial Cmsr, Florence Province, for AMG Fifth Army, 10 Nov 44, ACC files, 10700/143/19]

At 11:30 to-day, 10th November 1944, a crowd estimated at between 100-150 women congregated outside the Prefettura bearing signs with inscriptions of the following character:

- "Milk for our children"
- "Away with the Fascist Prefect"
- "Long live the Allies"
- "We want Epuraton"

They asked to be allowed to send a deputation to the Provincial Commissioner. In the absence of the P.C. at A.M.G. 5 Army, they were received by Major A. J. Shove, the Executive Officer.

They said they wanted to represent to the Allied Government the feelings of the women of Florence.

They thought that the bad distribution of food, coal, and wood in the City was due to the continued existence in the administration of Fascist elements who had been encouraged by the appointment of a Prefect who had for so long worked under the Fascist regime. They accused him of having sent thousands of persons to concentration camps and said that they had no confidence in an administration honeycombed with Fascists and with Paterno at the head.

They said that the Carabinieri were making no serious attempts to deal with black market offences and said that at road-blocks they were deprived of food they had purchased in the country although they had passes to go into the country to get food.

The Provincial Commissioner arrived before the deputation left and explained that the Allied Military Government were making every effort to improve the present situation and that the food situation was quite a different matter from the political issues raised. The deputation said they would put up with privation with joy if the Fascist Prefect were not at the head of the administration.

The Provincial Commissioner said that the situation was steadily improving and he hoped a number of additional lorries would be available to bring charcoal into the City shortly, and this would help alleviate their present shortages. He said that demonstrations of this sort harmed their cause rather than helped it as the facts were fully known and appreciated.

The deputation admitted that the principal ground for the demonstration was not the food situation but the question of the removal of the Prefect.

In my view the deputation was not spontaneous.<sup>24</sup> It was dispersed without incidents.

#### AMG APPOINTS LOCAL ITALIAN COMMISSIONS TO SPEED UP EPURATION

[Ltr, Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC to Bonomi, 16 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/327]

\* \* \* When territory is first liberated, AMG officers carry out a somewhat rough and ready operation in accordance with the procedure laid down in Executive Memorandum No. 67 [ch. XIV, sec 2]. At this stage, where the territory had been recently fought over, you will appreciate that officers are extremely busy with the immediate and urgent problems of administration and restoration, and it is for this reason that the executive memorandum is deliberately made simple and easy to carry out. It is recognized that it provides only a rough guide, and there may be cases where urgent necessity demands the retention of ex-Fascists *temporarily* in office in order that pressing matters of administration may be executed.

Later on as conditions become more normal, DLL No. 159 dated 27 [translation dated 29] July 1944 is introduced, and thereafter epuration is carried out entirely by the Italian Government. As an example, I may state that this decree is at present in operation in nearly all Provinces at present under Military Government.

Certain difficulties are arising, however, owing to the inability of the Government effectively to carry out the provisions of DLL No. 159 in the more distant Provinces owing to lack of transport, the requirements of the Military authorities in restricting movement in forward areas, and so on.

To meet these circumstances it has been agreed between Count Sforza and Brigadier Upjohn that

<sup>24</sup> The Committee of National Liberation had been opposed to the Prefect appointed by AMG. The question is whether the opposition was caused by any bad Fascist record of the Prefect or by the CLN's desire to control the appointment.

it may be necessary to introduce a modified form of epuration under the Allied Military Government. The procedure will be for army Provincial Commissioners to appoint local Commissions of Italians who will then carry out epuration in accordance with the principles laid down in DLL No. 159.<sup>25</sup>

Where the personnel is suspended from office under the terms of Executive Memorandum No. 67, or G.O. 35, such suspension is temporary pending formal proceedings by the Italian Government under DLL No. 159. It is true that persons suspended continue to receive their salary, but this is because Article 22 of DLL 159 so provides, and I feel that it would be unfair to attempt a different solution in Military Government territory.

As you will see from the terms of Executive Memorandum No. 67, suspensions are made on classification basis and therefore frequently without documentary investigation, but I have already arranged for copies of all scheda personale, where such are completed, to be handed over to the High Commissioner for Epuration at the proper time. A large number of such schede have already been sent to the High Commissioner, who will also be supplied with orders made under G.O. 35. \* \* \*

#### CATEGORIES TO BE SUSPENDED FROM SERVICE BY ITALIAN COMMISSIONS UNDER AMG

[Hq AC, GO 35, 28 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/141/139]

##### 1. *Persons to Whom This Order Applies*

Officials and employees of the following bodies shall be subject to proceedings under this Order:

- a. Civil State administrations, even if autonomous
- b. Local authorities and other public bodies and institutions
- c. Special concerns operating under public authorities or bodies and private concerns recognized by the State as controlling public utility undertakings or concerns having nation wide interests.

##### 2. *Categories of Persons*

The following persons shall be suspended from service:

<sup>25</sup> On 28 November ACC Headquarters issued General Order No. 35 [see the following document] to serve as a substitute for the Italian Government machinery under DLL-159, the setting up of which was being delayed. A letter accompanying the order pointed out that it did not infringe on the agreement with the government to use DLL-159 in MG territory; the order following the lines of the governmental decree and its issuance were welcomed by the government.

a. Any person who has shown that he is unworthy of serving the State either by having participated actively in the political life of fascism or by having shown himself a consistent apologist of fascism and particularly if he has so acted when holding high office.

b. Any person who has obtained an appointment or promotion through favouritism of the party or of fascist officials of high rank.

c. Any person who has been guilty of fascist bias or corrupt practices.

d. Any person who has held the position of squadrista, or sansepolesta, or antemarcia, or marcia su Roma, or Sciarpa Littorio, or who has been an officer of the fascist militia.

e. Any person who after the 8th September 1943 moved to North Italy with or has pledged allegiance to or has in any way collaborated with the Republican fascist government.<sup>26</sup> \* \* \*

#### AMG BEGINS TO USE AC SPECIALISTS IN THE INITIAL PHASE

[Bowman, Rgnl Cmsr, Emilia Rgn, Rpt for Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/132/11]

6. In both Fifth and Eighth Army areas officers of Emilia Region have been employed either as CAO's or in a specialist capacity under the command of the respective SCAO.

7. In the case of Eighth Army a special plan has been made for the administration of the area. Under this plan the executive administration of the area will be placed under a Headquarters staffed by Emilia Region. This administrative Headquarters will be directly responsible to the SCAO.

8. The purpose of the plan is to provide the specialist staff not normally present with Army and to make an earlier start on measures of rehabilitation than would otherwise be possible. The scheme has been approved by Headquarters Allied Commission and will come into operation when the SCAO considers the position has become sufficiently static. \* \* \*

#### FIFTH ARMY AMG ELIMINATES INTERPROVINCIAL TRADE BARRIERS

[Memo, Gen Hume, SCAO, Fifth Army, for Hq AC, 3 Jan 45, ACC files, 10700/154/1]

1. During the past several months there has grown up a practice under which the provinces

<sup>26</sup> GO 35 had been devised originally for Northern Italy but it was decided to apply it, at the discretion of the regional commissioner, to all provinces in which epuration was going slowly due to delay in setting up the Government machinery for DLL No. 159. The order continues with a statement of the sequence in which various categories of the Italian civil service were to be taken up in the investigation of records of Fascist activity.

of Tuscany have established what amounts to effective trade barriers against certain other provinces. While the reason is, of course, a wish to protect certain provinces from the loss of commodities, chiefly food, there has resulted a situation that is believed to be harmful to the public good.

3. As a principle it is believed that as little restriction and artificial control as possible should be placed on the economic life of Occupied Italy. It is a growing feeling that the black market itself would be less serious a problem if we re-

duced almost to the vanishing point the existing restrictions on trade.

4. It is proposed to issue instructions that there will be no interprovincial trade restrictions within the area of the Fifth Army but obviously this will not entirely solve the problem if there are trade restrictions in the territory of the several regions into which the Fifth Army will pass. Thus the problem does not merely concern the Eighth Region in which the Fifth Army is now located. It will be perhaps even more serious as we go north. \* \* \*

## 8. CAN THIS BE THE TURNING POINT IN DIRECTION OF CIVILIANIZATION?

### WAR DEPARTMENT FAVORS EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN AGENCY CONTROL

[Min, 38th Mtg of CCAC, 27 Jul 44, CCAC files, CCAC-112]

\* \* \* General Hilldring stated that he agreed with the British paper before the committee that there is no alternative to the continuance of the Allied Control Commission for the present. He pointed out, however, that CCAC policy was that the administration of civil affairs should be delegated to the appropriate civilian departments and agencies as soon as the military situation permits. \* \* \*

Colonel Megaw [British member] asked if it were the U.S. view that the transfer of ACC to civilian control should take place while fighting was still going on in Italy. General Hilldring said yes. He indicated that it would of course not be possible to operate ACC and AMG control sections in Italy completely autonomously. The two organizations would have to work closely together. The military, he stated, must have certain absolute rights.<sup>27</sup>

### STATE DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR GRADUAL CIVILIANIZATION

[Memo, OEA, Dept of State, for Hilldring, 31 Jul 44, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 2]

With reference to our meeting with Messrs Grady and Reber in your office 28 July, there is inclosed for dispatch to AFHQ a draft formula for a revision of allied control machinery in Italy. \* \* \*

<sup>27</sup> For fuller statement of the British view, see Memo, Lush to Chief Commissioner, 29 July 1944, below.

With the liberation of Rome and the establishment of Italian government, ACC and Advisory Council for Italy in the Italian Capital the present is considered an appropriate time to re-examine the organization of allied control machinery in Italy and the relationship of the various allied bodies in that country. . . .

It is recognized that the time has arisen for the "demilitarization" of the Control Commission. This should be accompanied by the gradual infiltration of allied civilian officers and employees into the organization and the general withdrawal of military personnel or their release from military duty.

In line with this policy it is recommended that the office of the Chief Commissioner of ACC be filled by a civilian. He would act as the Deputy of the C-in-C allied armies in Italy, who was Acting President of the ACC and Military Governor of Italy.

This recommendation does not involve any alterations of the line of authorities stemming from Supreme Allied Commander. \* \* \*

### ACC REJECTS SUGGESTIONS FOR CIVILIAN AGENCY CONTROL OF SOUTHERN ITALY

[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, ACC, for Chief Cmsr, ACC, 29 Jul 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, 387.4-1]

8. Suggestions have been made that the Allied Control Commission should divest itself of certain responsibilities and functions in specific areas of this territory which are no longer of military interest to the Allied Forces; that there should be a dividing line on one side of which civilian or other agencies should operate, leaving to the Allied Control Commission responsibility only in areas relatively close to the scene of operations.

9. From the point of view of distribution of military personnel these proposals are attractive but whatever the reasons may be outside this theater they would appear to be unsound from the point of view of the proper administration, related always to military necessity, of the population in this theater of war.

10. It is vitally necessary from the political point of view that the Italian Government should take the maximum responsibility in the government of the territory handed over to it. So long, however, as this is a theater of war and so long as the Italians have the status of cobelligerents, the Government can look to but one Allied authority for direction, control and advice. That authority should be the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, the agency created by the long terms of the Armistice for this purpose. . . . In order that the Chief Commissioner may be in a position to exercise direction and control and furnish advice he must have representatives, however thinly distributed, in all parts of the territory. He cannot in the present state of instability in this country rely on information furnished by the Italians alone, nor can he carry out his responsibilities by exercising remote control and by making use of "trouble shooters". Moreover, . . . the presence of resident Allied Civil Affairs Officers . . . is necessary to facilitate the functions of the military authorities and to promote good relations between the civilian population and military forces without which the maximum resources of the country cannot properly be employed. There still exist in Sicily, Sardinia, and many places in Southern Italy, Allied installations and Allied forces.

11. Again, reports from the Southern areas show that the country has not reached a stage of stability which would justify complete abandonment of large areas without the presence of a few Allied officers. The standard of administration shown by heads of local government, the numbers and degree of efficiency of the Carabinieri and other police agencies, are not sufficient to insure that stability which is necessary, not only where Allied installations exist, but throughout the country, so long as this country is a theater of war. However much we may wish to compel the Italian local government to stand on their own feet and to take full responsibility, it must be remembered that the presence of one Allied officer in an advisory capacity may make all the difference between order and disorder and is probably worth many hundreds of Carabinieri or troops in the enforcement of law and the maintenance of stability. \* \* \*

## STUDIES AT AFHQ CONCLUDE THAT SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS CANNOT PASS TO CIVILIAN CONTROL

[Memo prepared by Maj H. C. Ellis, WO [War Office], and Maj Allen L. Keyes, WD, With the Co-operation of Dallas Dort, Dept of State, and B. A. Workman, Ministry of Supply, for G-5, AFHQ, Aug. 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 2, app. to CCAC 112-4]<sup>28</sup>

1. The first question is whether the responsibilities of the ACC for supply of civil relief and economic matters should be detached from its other activities in order to be controlled directly by a combined civilian agency independent of the CCS. Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Italy such action would not seem desirable for the following reasons:

(a) The quantity of supplies required to be imported for civil relief is affected both by the rations fixed for the Italian people and by the amount of local Italian resources which are not used by the military. Maximum control over local resources (e.g. the amassment of the harvest) can be achieved only by the full co-operation of various parts of the ACC. Many of the subcommissions of the ACC do not come under the Economic Section and are not appropriate . . . for transfer to civilian personnel. Prices have to be controlled, decrees issued and enforced, black market operations suppressed and local labour fully utilized. These tasks entail directing the Italian Government on agricultural policy, on the drafting and issue of decrees, and on the employment of the Carabinieri and the enforcement of regulations. They further require, while the Italian Government remains as weak as it is at present, local supervision in the provinces through the regional organization of the ACC.

(b) The handling of imported supplies is dependent on shipping, port facilities, road and rail transport and warehousing accommodations. So long as hostilities continue these will, with unimportant exceptions, be controlled ultimately by AFHQ. If economic and supply responsibilities were to be transferred to a civilian agency with which AFHQ presumably would have no connection, difficulties might easily arise over the provision of transportation and warehousing facilities.

(c) The Allied Commander in Chief in enforcing the terms of the Armistice acts through the ACC, which is the body through which all

<sup>28</sup> On 2 July, CCAC notified the theater that the War Department was assigning an officer to G-5, AFHQ, to study the problems of transferring supply functions to civilian agencies. This officer was joined in his studies by other outside experts, and they produced a report the conclusions of which are reproduced in this document.

dealings with the Italian Government are conducted. For a body responsible not to him but to a combined civilian agency independent of the CCS to be dealing also with the Italian Government, during hostilities, might lead to dualism in policy and would invite confusion.

(d) While hostilities continue, all Italian activities both military and civilian must be fully mobilised and coordinated as a part of the Allied military effort. Any attempt to divide responsibilities might detract from such full mobilisation.

(e) ACC frequently derives advantage from military facilities available in the Theater. Thus various needs for stores of a technical character may well be met from military stocks in the Theater. . . . Furthermore, technical advice is available to ACC through the military services (e.g. Medical, Engineers, Signals). Although by special arrangement an independent combined civilian agency might obtain the advantages of these facilities, it seems probable that they would not get them regularly or of right as does a body which is part of the military organisation.

2. The second question is whether the responsibilities of the ACC for supply of civil relief and economic matters should be transferred to a combined civilian agency for any particular parts of Italy.

Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Italy such action would also seem undesirable. The evils of divided administration were clearly demonstrated during the few months when liberated Italy was under the control of independent AMG and ACC authorities. . . . Moreover, it is important politically that the same treatment should be given to all parts of Italy, or at least to all parts returned to the administration of the Italian Government.<sup>29</sup>

#### BUT AFHQ WANTS CIVILIAN AGENCY ASSISTANCE ON ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE

[Memo, Gen John Clark, CAO, AFHQ, for CCS, 24 Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

#### 2. Problems connected with Italy's foreign trade, and the work of arranging export and import

<sup>29</sup> The second question raised in the report had apparently been prompted by negotiations which the War Department began in March with FEA aimed at prevailing upon this agency to take over the supply responsibility for Sicily and Southern Italy. By the time the report had been completed the negotiations had failed. Transfer of supply responsibility did not materialize until much later when, in 1945, the supply program was broadened to include rehabilitation supplies. The War Department continued until August 1945 to be responsible for supplies required by military necessity.

transactions, have been increasing steadily in recent months. Neither the Allied Control Commission nor AFHQ possesses the organization or personnel adequate to perform this work, nor is either staffed to give to the development of this aspect of Italy's economic life the attention which it needs. \* \* \*

4. Machinery is also required by the ACC to handle the commercial details of exporting and importing, and a similar need is felt by AFHQ to assist it in conducting foreign trade transactions throughout the Mediterranean Theatre. AFHQ, G-5, is not a commercial organization and is not staffed to handle business details of foreign trade transactions. At present G-5 is using the UKCC in conducting trade between Italy and French North Africa and between Italy and the Mideast, but G-5 has no agreement with the UKCC other than an oral understanding. It is felt, with increased trade opportunities throughout the Mediterranean in prospect, that the time has come to formalize this situation and to bring in the USCC<sup>30</sup> as well as the UKCC. Such an organization would be of great assistance in handling the external work connected with the development of Italy's foreign trade. Together with the proposed Ministry of Commerce it could relieve the military personnel of AFHQ and the ACC of attending to many of the business details connected with the making of exports and imports. \* \* \*

#### VOLUNTARY CIVILIAN RELIEF AGENCIES IN ITALY ARE ALSO WELCOME BUT REQUIRE CO-ORDINATION

[Col Spofford, ACofS G-5, AFHQ, Min of Remarks at a Mtg Held at AFHQ, 2 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/105/569]

5. . . .

a. Supreme Allied Commander was responsible in this Theater for, among other things, the rescue, administration, maintenance, repatriation, or settlement of refugees and displaced persons. There were already in the Theater a number of Agencies—some sponsored by the Allied Governments, others representing various interests.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> United States Commercial Company and United Kingdom Commercial Corporation—government agencies for certain functions of international trade carried on during the war.

<sup>31</sup> They included the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees, Red Cross Societies, and private philanthropic societies. Another type of civilian assistance considered practicable was that of technical experts from government departments willing to lend the services of their employees to the theater. In both cases civilians would work completely within the military framework and be subject to military control. Here there was no difficulty except that,

The help given by these agencies in the solution of the problems was welcome. It was, however, obvious that the activities of all such agencies should be co-ordinated. It has been considered that there was need for an agency to act in an advisory capacity to AFHQ, and, particularly, to advise the Allied Commander on the contributions which could be made by civilian relief and welfare organizations in the solution of the problems. No such body now existed. . . . \* \* \*

#### INDIVIDUAL CIVILIAN EXPERTS ARE WELCOME IF THEY COME WITHOUT STRINGS ATTACHED

[Memo, CAO, AFHQ, for CCS, 11 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 3]

4. It has been observed that in the case of civilians already sent over from the United States, . . . the instructions issued to them do not coincide with the principles laid down in TAM 261. The cases of Mr. Michael J. Grosetto and Mr. Charles R. Ryan, both of the Foreign Economic Administration, may be cited as examples. These gentlemen both arrived with letters from the FEA accompanied by "Instructions to FEA Employees serving in Foreign Countries." Copies of the letters and of the instructions are attached. It will seem that specific duties for these gentlemen are laid down and channels of communications are envisaged outside the normal channels under which ACC functions.

5. Other civilian employees have arrived from the United States bearing letters assigning them to specific duties with ACC which in many cases are not applicable to the duties which ACC require them to carry out. \* \* \*

#### SOME MEASURES OF CIVILIANIZATION SEEM FEASIBLE TO AFHQ IMMEDIATELY

[Note, Col Spofford for SACMED's Political Comm., 12 Sep 44]

2. . . .

The following several changes in the direction of civilian control may be made during this present period [of active hostilities]:—

(a) Military personnel in the Economic Section and in certain other parts of the Control Commission may be replaced by civilians.

(b) Civilians may be associated with the officers having to do with supply, particularly

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as will be seen, too little of such assistance could be obtained, and the sphere within which it could be used was limited to the functions which the Army could safely delegate. See also Chapter XVII, Section 10.

movements and transport, in G-5, AFHQ, so that the machinery and operative problems can become known to them.

(c) Civil supply requisitions for Sicily, Sardinia, Southern Italy, and possibly other parts of Italy could be so identified that decisions regarding them and financial responsibility for them in Washington and London might if desired be taken by civilian agencies. \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO CLAMOR FOR CIVILIANS IN ACC

[Remarks of Hilldring in Telecon With Wickersham, U.S. Mil Adviser, EAC, 15 Sep 44, CAD Msg files, WD-TC 972]<sup>22</sup>

\* \* \* Instead of following the line that we would keep the military in this business the shortest possible time consistent with military considerations, the absence of civilians from the Allied Control Council in Italy has been the principal factor in keeping us in this business the longest possible time. It's hard to make the transition if you lack continuity, which you will get if you go in initially with a number of civilians. You mentioned the political side and the OWI side, I think there's one other section where it is vitally important to get civilians in early, and that's in the economic side, which will be our principal headache. There is another advantage to getting civilians into your economic set-up, and that is that we get on the ground, from our point of view, representatives of the agencies that are primarily responsible for the economic picture, and I think that deserves a great deal of consideration. We started in the other way in Italy. There were no civilians at all in the economic set-up, and everybody in the Italian picture will now agree that that was a very great mistake. \* \* \*

[Memo, Hilldring for Lt Col [Paul H.] Davis, CAD, 16 Sep. 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

3. There has been considerable conversation and correspondence with regard to the demilitarization of ACC. This started last November when a civilian, Mr. Henry Grady, was placed in charge of the Economic Section of ACC, and the War Department has been hammering ever since to get the civilian agencies to send their people to the Commission. \* \* \*

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<sup>22</sup> The remarks were made in connection with a discussion of the place of civilians in the Control Council for Germany. It is interesting how frequently the Italian experience was referred to in planning for the European Theater—most often as an illustration of mistakes which should not be made again.

**THE TROUBLE IS THE BEST CIVILIANS ARE EITHER  
IN KEY JOBS OR IN UNIFORM**

[Ltr, Lush, to Chief Cmsr, AC, 19 Nov 44, ACC files,  
10000/136/68]

1. The principle with regard to infiltration of British civilian officials into the Allied Commission agreed upon in London was that as suitable vacancies occurred civilians should be sought to fill them: only if wholly adequate civilians could be found should they be selected. It was agreed that

(1) that the number of vacancies occurring would be few

(2) the possibility of finding civilians of sufficient ability and experience was remote

(3) quality and not quantity was the criterion. \* \* \*

7. I found here that the warning given to me on all sides that the best civilians were either in uniform or in key jobs was true and I was unable to find a civilian capable of fulfilling the appointment. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XVII

# A New Deal for Italy

On 26 September 1944 the President and the Prime Minister announced a new policy toward Italy—it was gradually to receive a greater measure of control in order to speed the day when it could again assume its “proper place in the great family of free nations.” The policy was decided upon with the best of intentions, and eventually it was implemented with worthwhile results; earlier efforts, however, had in certain respects miscarried. The basic cause was disagreement among the United States, Great Britain, and Italy as to the extent of change in Allied policy which was desirable and practicable. The more immediate cause was that the President had proceeded in a series of unilateral announcements—undoubtedly willful but not, as will be seen, irresponsible—to broaden the new policy toward Italy into what the journalists could well call the New Deal for Italy. Whereas his joint announcement with Churchill indicated nothing more definite in the way of aid than support of an eventual UNRRA program, President Roosevelt supplemented the Allied political dispensation with an Allied economic dispensation, in particular an increased bread ration. When, owing to CCS apprehensions of a shipping shortage, months passed without appearance of any of the promised supplies, Italians felt very much let down and the British, who had had nothing to do with raising their hopes, but had to share the blame, felt somewhat put out.

If the President’s New Deal started out wrong, so too, for that matter, did the new Anglo-American policy, for it was long delayed by the difficulty of deciding upon the precise details of implementation. But on the principle of relaxation of controls, there was no disagreement as this had by now become a matter of Allied as well as Italian interest as a result of several major developments. The first year of Allied hegemony over Italy was marked by close control because of military considerations, for all liberated Italy was in or near the battle zone. But with the freeing of Rome and central Italy the main strategic objectives of the Mediterranean campaign had been achieved and about half the country could be restored to the Italian Government. Since the liberation of the remainder might be a slow process it seemed especially logical to turn over more responsibility to that government. Further, the Italians themselves were beginning to bridle under Allied tutelage and were demanding more freedom of action. To have withheld this would have prejudiced the Allied postwar aim of close relations with a free Italy. Finally, Italy’s contribution to the war effort and her return to liberal political principles led both British and American opinion to favor an improvement in her status and treatment. The British were perhaps slower to relent because they had been direct victims of Mussolini’s perfidy, but Mr. Churchill, after visiting Italy in the summer of 1944, issued a statement to

the effect that he was disposed to forgive if not to forget.

A month later the Prime Minister and the President conferred together in the United States and issued the Hyde Park declaration on 26 September. An increasing measure of responsibility was to be extended to the Italian administration and, as an earnest of good intentions, the name of the Allied Control Commission was changed to Allied Commission. But SACMED could do nothing without a formal directive, and agreement on one was difficult to obtain because the United States saw more merit than did Great Britain in a preliminary peace treaty with Italy. In the meantime, some Allied authorities, despite Italian pressure for greater freedom, wished to maintain the *status quo*, even on issues unaffected by military necessity. They were so engrossed with questions of efficiency that they could not see the forest for the trees; administrative paternalism had become so ingrained that they tended to look upon their wards as helpless souls who would succumb to every peril if freed from restraint. Fortunately, in November the two governments decided to have the problem surveyed by a man who believed that the time for at least needless paternalism was over—Harold Macmillan, British Resident Minister, who to fulfil the new policy was now also made Acting President of the Allied Commission.

At the moment, however, the most difficult Allied problem was how to handle the Italian hue and cry for implementation in consequence of the President's unilateral announcements of October 1944 casting the United States in the role of Lord Bountiful. The first of these promised the Italians steps to increase the bread ration in areas deficient in food supplies, together with 1,700 trucks and electricity generating equipment; the second announced that the dollar equivalent of all lira issued as

pay to American troops would be credited to the Italian Government to purchase civilian rehabilitation supplies. On 20 October the President wrote the Secretary of War that he wished to see established a 300-gram bread ration, thus far in effect only in southern Italy, for all liberated territory. Italian newspapers jubilantly reported the stories of American generosity in headlines. SACMED, having received no official communication, could only ask the CCS whether the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) intelligence reports that had reached him actually represented what he was expected to accomplish, and if so, with what resources. Because the British members of the CCS Supply Subcommittee considered that extra shipping could not be provided, the CCS could not translate the President's desires into military orders. Far from improving, the shortages of bread and other foods, particularly in the area north of the Garigliano, became more serious and both General Wilson and Field Marshal Alexander, who succeeded General Wilson as SACMED on 26 November, repeatedly warned the CCS of rapidly deteriorating civilian morale.

The Prime Minister, as soon as he read about the President's letter to Stimson, cabled Roosevelt that he hoped he did not mind his saying he thought he had "jumped a good many fences." There is no doubt he had, and it is interesting to speculate whether he had acted impulsively or in the knowledge that Churchill as well as himself would thereby be committed to increased aid for Italy. For if anything was clear it was that once the Italians read of Roosevelt's proposed ration increase, their clamor for getting it could scarcely have been resisted indefinitely by the Allies. If these suppositions impute to the President a certain deviousness, it must be borne in mind not only that his motives were hu-

manitarian but also that the supply program for Italy was primarily an American responsibility.

Something still remains to be said on the question of whether the President acted imprudently in announcing increased supply assistance before confirming that there was sufficient shipping to support it. In the first place, he at no time stipulated when the promises would be fulfilled. In the second place, even if the Italians were disappointed by the delay this does not mean that they would not have felt desperate if they had been given nothing to look forward to. It later transpired that SACMED did in fact have available the shipping to support the ration increase, but even before this discovery British authorities felt it advisable to modify any immediate condemnation of the President's actions.

That things were heading the way the President wanted them to first became clear when Mr. Macmillan completed and distributed his long Note on Allied Policy Toward Italy. This note is reproduced herein almost in entirety because it is the most influential and probably the most memorable piece of writing in at least the latter phase of the occupation. Mr. Macmillan was certainly more interested in lessening than in increasing Allied burdens, but he also had a deep sense of responsibility to the Italians, and neither in good logic nor in good conscience did he feel able to recommend untying them from Allied apron strings without also giving them the means to walk alone. In general Mr. Macmillan felt that controls should be waived wherever not essential to military needs. This meant that the emphasis should be shifted from control to advice, and even in matters of advice a distinction should be made between the essential and peripheral interests of the Allies. Advice might be given on matters relating to justice, education, and fine arts,

but the AC should raise no objection if the Italians ignored it. In the more pertinent spheres of finance, labor legislation, and wage negotiations the Allies should urge more strongly their views but even here the final decision should be left to the Italians. In the concluding portions of his note Mr. Macmillan strongly advocated both liberalizing the military supply program and adding a program of rehabilitation supplies.

When Mr. Macmillan's views, as translated into a draft directive, came before the CCAC the Americans accepted most of his recommendations but felt in general that he had not gone far enough in relaxing control. In fact the American members proposed a preliminary peace treaty on the understanding that territorial and financial matters be reserved for later discussion. The British, however, were opposed since the signing of a peace treaty would bring up the questions of the disposal of the Italian colonies and fleet. By way of compromise the British accepted certain amendments proposed by the Americans and the CCS sent SACMED a new directive on 30 January 1945.

The Italians did not get everything they wanted but they were gratified that the new policy had at long last been put into effect. Adding to their satisfaction was the fact that this policy, as finally developed, included all the supply ameliorations that President Roosevelt had espoused on his own. The military concept of disease and unrest was liberalized to include also "those supplies, such as fertilizer, raw material, machinery and equipment, the import of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies" needed to prevent disease and unrest, as well as supplies necessary for restoring power systems and transport and communication facilities needed in the military effort. This was a signal development in interpretation of the military sup-

ply responsibility, but in addition the CCS authorized requests for industrial rehabilitation supplies, to be transmitted by AC to CCAC and thence to the civilian Combined Liberated Areas Committee (CLAC). Finally, the President had his way on the extension of the 300-gram bread ration to all liberated Italy, through a typically Rooseveltian stroke of good luck. After all the dither over the conclusion that it would be impossible to provide additional shipping, the U.S. Quartermaster General discovered that SACMED's experts had overestimated the shipping needs by 500,000 tons and that the

additional wheat could be sent within the current shipping allocation. The CCS authorized the ration increase on 18 January.

In accordance with the new directive, controls were quickly relaxed, with the general effect that the staff of AC Headquarters was henceforth occupied primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels. Italian opinion, as reflected in press comment, interpreted the New Policy as an expression of Allied confidence and of recognition that the best way to help Italy was to let Italy help itself.

## 1. IT IS HARD FOR ITALIANS TO REMAIN IN TUTELAGE

### ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO CLAIM MORE FOR ITSELF

[Memo, Council of Ministers Transmitted by Badoglio to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 13 Apr 44, ACC files, 10000/105/609]

#### 2. *Appointments and movements of Prefects.*

In some provinces as, for instance, in Sicily, in Cosenza, in Matera and in Reggio Calabria, the occupying Allied authorities have proceeded to remove the Prefects in charge, substituting for them local elements or functionaries of low rank with little experience or administrative ability.

In view of the importance of the position and of their functions it would be desirable for the Allied authorities to request the opinion of the Ministry of the Interior before adopting, in the territories under Allied control, provisions calling for the appointment, recall and transfer of Prefects. The opportunity could be taken to proceed in agreement with the Allied authorities, to review the appointments already made.

#### 3. *Appointments, promotions and dismissals of personnel.*

In the territories controlled by them, the Allied authorities have similarly disposed of appointments and public positions, promotions in the administrative posts and dismissals without any attention to the Italian administrative set-up.

The Italian authorities are, therefore, now at a loss as regards the regularization of these appointments which also alter the classification and lists of the personnel and cause damage to the interests of many categories of employees.

It seems desirable in this connection that:

The Allied authorities should always request the personnel needed in the territories controlled by them from the appropriate Ministries which might have an overstrength of personnel.

In case of necessity only temporary or special personnel, and always with initial rank, should always be employed.

The Allied authorities should refrain from granting promotions to State and Public Administration personnel, limiting themselves to the grant, in very particular cases, of promotions to a grade immediately above that previously held by the employee.

The Allied authorities should request, at least, the opinion of the Ministries concerned before adopting any provision concerning personnel.

### BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT ASKS FOR MORE FREEDOM IN APPOINTMENTS

[Ltr, Badoglio to Mason-MacFarlane, Chief Cmsr, ACC, 16 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

\* \* \* My surprise, dear General, finds justification in the circumstance that the agreement entered into between you and myself [March 1944, See Chapter XI, Section 5] in regards to appointments referred only to public posts and to *high officials*, with the obvious consideration that control reserved to the Allies is largely guaranteed with intervention in the selection of persons in whom rests the effective direction and therefore the full responsibility for offices and services. On

the other hand, in the listing made by Colonel Spicer there are indicated from the first Secretaries to the Vice Prefects inclusive—officials who, even though having directing functions, must nevertheless be considered merely as executors of directives issued by the Prefect in the Province and by the Minister or by the General Director within the Central Administration. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Mason-MacFarlane to Badoglio, 26 May 44, ACC files, 10000/136/93]

\* \* \* I do not feel that it is asking too much to include in the category of high officials all officers down to and including the rank of Vice-Prefect, and if you will arrange for the Allied Control Commission to be consulted before any appointments are made to those positions I feel that all misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties will be avoided. I am agreeable that the remaining categories may in the future be left to the Italian Government.

#### ITALIAN PEOPLE WISH MORE FREEDOM AND LESS BURDEN

[Ltr, Prime Minister Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, ACC, 22 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/117]

3. The Italian people feel themselves at the moment to be in quarantine, shut in as if hermetically isolated. They should be allowed back again into that free circulation of ideas and of international events which is one of the fundamental conditions for the resumption and the progressive development of free democratic institutions. Up until now any initiative in this sense has been precluded to us. For instance:

a. the request for Italian adhesion to the Atlantic Charter was never answered;

b. the request for Italian participation in the International Labour Office was put off to an undeterminate date;

c. the request for participation in the Monetary Conference was not welcomed.

4. The costs of occupation; the enormous, un-

told mess of notes issued by the Allies; the high rate of exchange fixed between the pound sterling, the dollar and the lira etc; these cut deeply into the exhausted resources of Italy. There is talk of U.N.R.R.A., of the Relief Committee for Italy, etc. These are excellent beginnings, but they are for the future. The Italian people in the meantime are being bled. It is necessary that the [initiatives in the above-cited cases] should become active and operative, that they should lighten the economic burdens which the armistice has placed on a country already poor and exhausted and which prevent any possibility of recovery. Italy asks to be placed in a position where she will have to rely as little as possible on the resources of the Allies, especially in this crucial moment of the war. Her economic rehabilitation is consequently in her own and the common interest. Italian experts and technicians should be authorized to discuss the most urgent and serious problems in London and in Washington directly with the competent authorities. These are technical and not political problems. The inclusion of Italy in the Lend-Lease Law would undoubtedly constitute a step forward in the right direction.

5. The Allied Control Commission should be relieved progressively of at least three quarters of its duties and directed towards a system at once less oppressive and less patently indicative of interference and intervention in all sectors of Italian life. There are already organizations in Italy ready to take on its heritage—for example, the High Commissions, which could in their turn be changed into something like the Ambassadors' Conferences which have in the past given proof of their capability and efficiency. The present situation should in any case be liquidated. It is not possible for a country to carry on for long without serious risk under the administration of two Governments. It is equally impossible for a highly civilized people such as the Italian to be indefinitely subjected to a state of tutelage and minority. \* \* \*

## 2. IT IS HARD TO STAY ANGRY WITH ITALIANS

#### ITALIANS HAVE EARNED RIGHT TO GOOD WILL AND CONSIDERATION

[Statement by Gen Alexander, GOC, for AAI, 11 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/136/192]

When Allied troops invaded Italy in September 1943, I issued a directive regarding their behaviour towards the Italians. In brief, I said that

their attitude should be correct but not familiar, as befitted the soldiers of a victorious Army entering a conquered country.

The time has come when I consider it desirable to modify this directive.

During the past eight months we have had valuable and sincere co-operation from the Italian armed forces and population in occupied Italy.

The people have had a hard time and have borne their lot well. Their combat troops have acquitted themselves well in the line, others have done good work in our bases and ports. Their Navy and Air Force have given important assistance. \* \* \*

In brief, while the Italian Government, troops and people co-operate with us in the defeat of Germany, I consider it to be proper and expedient that we should show them good-will without familiarity and consideration without weakness. \* \* \*

#### STATE DEPARTMENT IS INCLINED TO END HARSH ARMISTICE REGIME

[Memo, Dunn, Dir, OEA, Dept of State, for Hilldring, 6 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 Italy (1-25-43)(1), sec 6]

\* \* \* After the formation of the first broad-based Government in Italy in April last, Marshal Badoglio sent a personal letter to the President asking for allied status for Italy as a means of supporting her new representative Government. He addressed similar urgent appeals for support to the British and Soviets. A solution to the Italian political crisis last April was welcomed by the Allies as bringing the anti-Fascist parties into active co-operation with the Government and creating a more stable political condition within the country, thereby contributing to the military campaign.

While the British and American Governments were of the opinion that Italy was not ready for full allied status, it was agreed desirable to make some concrete gesture to the newly-formed, liberal and friendly Italian Government which would express Allied sympathy for it and have the effect of strengthening and supporting it in the eyes of the Italian people.

The most recent Government, even more representative of the major political parties in Italy, was formed after the liberation of Rome. It is anti-Fascist, pro-United Nations and democratic. It is representative of the kind of elements we would like to see emerge in the future political life of Italy. For military as well as political reasons, it would appear desirable to support and strengthen it in such manner as may be feasible.

In order to end the technical state of war which will exist until some kind of peace treaty is signed between the United States and Italy, we are favorably inclined toward the British proposal of a preliminary peace treaty to replace the present armistice regime. The armistice regime and a continuing technical state of war between Italy and the other United Nations are inconsistent with her recognized status of a co-belligerent in

the war against Germany. Our willingness to return to a basis of peace with Italy would be well received not only by the Italian people but by the peoples of the enemy satellite countries as well.

In general, it may be said that we are entering the post-war period in our political relations with Italy. The wide-spread sympathy of the Italian people for the Allies and the Allied cause, the early surrender of Italy, and Allied military successes in Italy have all combined to redeem the Italian nation and separate her from her former Axis partners long before the period of armistice and negotiation with the rest of our enemies is possible. Events have therefore made it desirable, if not imperative, to deal with the Italian situation separately and prior to our consideration of other Axis relationships.<sup>1</sup>

#### CHURCHILL BEGINS TO FORGIVE IF NOT TO FORGET

[Msg, Churchill to the Italian People on Leaving Italy, Aug 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

. . . I was most deeply touched by the extraordinary kindness with which I was welcomed in all the villages and small towns through which I have driven in traversing the entire front. There is no doubt that in the Zone of the Armies the relations of the Italians with the British, American and other Allies are of the most friendly and co-operative character. The same is true of all the rest of the liberated territory. Of course, owing to the hard conditions of war, the disorganization caused by the demolitions of the enemy, the shortage of transport, much hardship may arise in particular places. I have given directions to the British representatives in the various international bodies concerned to do their utmost, in harmony with their colleagues, to meet these difficulties. When a Nation has allowed itself to fall under a tyrannical regime, it cannot be absolved from the penalties due to the crimes of that regime, and naturally we cannot forget the circumstances of Mussolini's attack on France and Great Britain when we were at our weakest. . . . But in the main . . . I believe that the British Nation will be happy to see the day when

<sup>1</sup> The question of a preliminary peace treaty was discussed further but made little progress. It was felt that it would be necessary to include the Soviet Union, and it was also difficult to reach Anglo-American agreement as to the time when political and military conditions would be ripe. In December 1944, in connection with discussions of the so-called New Policy toward Italy, U.S. members of the CCAC took the position that the time had arrived for a revision of the Armistice regime but the British members did not agree. (Sec. 8.)

Italy, once again free and progressive, takes a place among the peace-loving nations. \* \* \*

#### PROCLAMATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT MADE LESS UNGRACIOUS

[AMG Proclamation 1 (Rev), 7 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/142/263 to the People of Italy]

In the course of their war against the Axis powers the Allied Forces under my command are freeing the territory of Italy from German domination.

Much of this territory has already been restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and it is the intention that all territory freed from German domination shall be restored as soon as possible. . . .

This restoration and the complete expulsion of the German Forces from the whole of Italy will be achieved more quickly if you display the same courage, determination and discipline in co-operation with the Allied Forces that you displayed in resistance to the German Forces when they were in occupation.

In order to hasten the date of this restoration and of final victory steps must be taken to ensure the reconstitution and continuance of the administration of the country which the German Forces have attempted to disrupt and to provide for the safety and welfare of yourselves and of the Allied Forces and to preserve the law and order which are essential to military operations. \* \* \*

#### GENERAL O'DWYER TELLS PRESIDENT ITALIANS HAVE SERIOUS NEEDS

[Rpt, O'Dwyer, to Roosevelt, Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43)]

I. The plight of the Italian people is serious as a result of Nazi and Fascist rule and battle destruction on its soil. . . . From available information, including official Allied government medical opinion, the general health condition of the people seems to be bad. . . . Low resistance of the people seems to be the result of continuous low consumption under Fascist occupation. . . . Increased food supply is prescribed by the Allied Control Commission Health Subcommittee. . . . In view of the responsibility of the Allied governments, the present policy should be amended to include adequate shipping allocations immediately.

II. *Italian Unemployment.* Universal unemployment is foreseen for the coming winter, mainly due to the thoroughness of demolition of power plants by enemy forces. Next in importance to increasing food supplies will be a partial restoration of power. . . . Without these two

basic aids the Italian people and government will be in a desperate plight. . . .

III. *Inland Transportation.* The present condition of transportation is haphazard and grossly inadequate. Any plan to maintain a food supply and to put Italian people in a position where they can help themselves must include adequate transportation. . . .

IV. *Relationship of the Allied Control Commission and Italian Cobelligerent Status to the Supply and Economic Situation in Italy.* It is desirable to take every step necessary to develop the initiative of the Italian people.

The Italian mind is friendly toward the Allies but confused. The difficulties arise from an inability to understand the distinction between the status of defeated enemy as against the status of a co-belligerent. Despite the fact that there are Italian divisions fighting side by side with allies, and despite the fact that there is unrestricted use of Italian resources to serve allied military needs, there are still Italians held as prisoners of war.

It is generally believed that the government responsibility in liberated Italy might well be placed without any major restrictions in the hands of the Italian government, that a formal state of war between the allies and Italy should be discontinued, and that Allied Control Commission in liberated Italy should be abolished and its functions placed in hands of civilian experts.

#### PRESIDENT TELLS STIMSON HE SHOULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT SUPPLIES FOR ITALY

[Memo, Roosevelt for Stimson, 8 Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 9]

As a result of years of Fascist and Nazi rule and the destruction resulting from the battles on its soil, I understand that the supply situation in Italy is critical.

This situation should be corrected as effectively and as quickly as possible.

The War Department should, therefore, take immediate action to make available the additional essential civilian supplies and shipping necessary to remedy this condition.

#### STIMSON INTIMATES THAT THE TROUBLE LIES OUTSIDE HIS CONTROL

[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 15 Sep 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 9]

\* \* \* To date the distribution of relief supplies in Italy has been the responsibility of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff. By directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Theater Commander is charged with the responsibility of making available the minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary and other essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, to preserve public order, and to maintain lines of communication. In short, the Theater Commander has been directed to call forward and make available to the Italian people sufficient supplies to prevent

disease and unrest. Responsibility for the determination of the amount of such supplies required at any time has been placed upon the Theater Commander as he is in position to determine the extent of actual need.

. . . Subject only to the limitation of supply availability, the War Department has provided all such supplies requested by the Theater Commander the furnishing of which has been determined to be a United States responsibility. \* \* \*

### 3. AN ANGLO-AMERICAN NEW POLICY AND A ROOSEVELTIAN NEW DEAL

#### PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCE A NEW POLICY OF RELAXING CONTROLS

[Joint Statement to the Press by Roosevelt and Churchill, 26 Sep 44]

\* \* \* The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies. \* \* \*

An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To make this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed "The Allied Commission."

The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA Conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.

<sup>2</sup>In August 1944 the UNRRA Council adopted a resolution which exempted Italy from the provision calling for initial probationary supply operations in enemy or ex-enemy countries. It authorized a maximum expenditure in Italy of \$50,000,000 for medical and sanitary supplies, supplies for displaced persons, and food for children and for nursing and expectant mothers. Because of the shipping shortage UNRRA could not begin to implement this program until February 1945. For the portion of the Roosevelt-Churchill announcement omitted here and the statement in connection with civil disorders over the Roatta case, see Chapter XVI, Section 6. The position was taken that the disorders, however regrettable, should not deter the two governments from transferring more responsibility to the Italian Government.

We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations.

**PRIME MINISTER BONOMI IS APPRECIATIVE BUT WANTS TO KNOW HOW THE PROMISES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED**

[Paraphrase of Msg, Kirk, U.S. Political Adviser, to Dept of State, 30 Sep 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

Bonomi, when I called on him at his request this evening, expressed cordial appreciation of the Roosevelt-Churchill statement concerning Italy. He described it as not only proving the President's understanding of the problems Italy faces but also as promising in the future treatment of this country concrete manifestations of such understanding. \* \* \*

. . . Referring briefly to the financial and economic situation, Bonomi expressed strong anxiety over the situation during the coming winter as concerns adequate shelter and food for the people.

Returning to the question of the President's statement, Premier Bonomi expressed hope that I would furnish him additional information as to how the statement would be implemented. More than to any other country, he added, Italy looked to the United States for guidance. It was . . . [inferred] from his conversation that, while acknowledging the responsibility of the Government and people of Italy for their own salvation, there is essential need for outside help, especially from U.S., and that the effect of the Anglo-American statement will be destructive, not constructive, if there is not at least partial realization of the hopes it raises in the near future.

**PRESIDENT UNILATERALLY HOLDS OUT HOPE FOR GREATER AID**

[Statement by Roosevelt, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

\* \* \* In accordance with the policies with respect to Italy which were outlined jointly by Prime Minister Churchill and me, in a statement issued to the press on 26 September, measures are now being taken to provide Italy with supplies necessary to prevent civilian hunger, sickness, and fear during the forthcoming winter. Steps are also being taken to restore the damaged trans-

portation and electrical generating facilities of Italy to the extent necessary to enable the Italian people to throw their full resources into the fight against Germany and Japan.

A delegation of supply officers has been called from Italy to Washington to review the needs and requirements of the Italian civilian population.

In addition to the substantial quantities of food and clothing which are now being shipped and have for some time been shipped into Italy, 150,000 tons of wheat and flour are now scheduled for shipment.

Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas of Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency. \* \* \*

The distribution of food and essential supplies within the country has been seriously impeded by the damage done to the transportation system and by the wholesale commandeering of trucks by the enemy.

To meet this emergency, it is planned to send 1,700 additional trucks to Italy.

In addition, preparations are under way to supply substantial quantities of generating equipment, including temporary power facilities, to furnish electricity to essential industries and public utilities in central Italy which have been brought to a standstill by the almost complete destruction by the Germans of the power plants. \* \* \*

**HE LATER ADDS THAT ITALY WILL BE GIVEN MEANS TO PAY FOR REHABILITATION SUPPLIES**

[Statement by Roosevelt, 10 Oct 44, Dept of State Bull (15 Oct 44), p. 403]

I have today approved the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and War, and of the Foreign Economic Administrator, that the United States Government currently make available to the Italian Government the dollars equivalent to the Italian lire issued up to now and hereafter as pay to United States troops in Italy.

The dollar proceeds of remittances made by individuals in this country to friends and relatives in Italy are also being made available to the Italian Government as are the dollar proceeds of any products exported by Italy to this country.

It has been our intention to make available to the friendly western European countries dollars equivalent to the local currency issued as pay to American troops in their territory. This policy differs from that to be applied in the case of Italy since in the latter case it is subject to special restrictions reserved to the United States in connection with the final peace settlement.

The dollars made available to Italy will be used by the Italian Government to pay for essential civilian supplies purchased in this country for use in liberated Italy. The United States Army has supplied substantial amounts of certain essential civilian goods such as food, clothing, and medical supplies as a necessary part of military operations in Italy. The funds which I am now making available will enable the Italian Government under control of appropriate Allied authorities to obtain in this country other essential civilian supplies and to continue to obtain essential civilian supplies and to continue to obtain essential supplies after the United States Army program ceases. \* \* \*

#### PRESIDENT WANTS A HIGHER BREAD RATION IN ITALY

[Ltr, Roosevelt to Stimson, 31 Oct 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43) (1), sec. 11]

I have had before me the shipping difficulties in getting supplies for the civilian population of Italy and I note that we have been building up some reserves for use when northern Italy collapses. In the meantime, it seems to me that the situation is so acute, from the point of view particularly of food, in southern Italy, that some risks must be taken regarding supplies at the time of the collapse in northern Italy. That collapse may well not come until Germany herself collapses, in which case the shipping situation will be much less acute.

Under any circumstances, I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General

Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people.

I wish, too, that every effort would be made to get additional relief supplies which the Allied Control Commission has indicated are necessary. It seems to me, however, that food is the most important and should take preference over other additional relief supplies which may be sent.

#### CHURCHILL TELLS PRESIDENT HE HAS JUMPED MANY FENCES

[Msg, Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 Nov 44, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 11]

I hope that you won't mind my saying that you have jumped a good many fences in your directive of 1 November [*sic*] to your Secretary of War [above] about the Italian ration of grain, which I have just read. I hope your people will consider that it will be difficult to give more to our ex-enemies in Italy than to our Greek and Yugoslavian Allies.

Commitments of this sort are bound to tie up a great deal of shipping, and because of this you will understand why I am rather anxious. We can not provide the additional required tonnage, and I trust that your War Department will adopt measures to carry the increased supplies. \* \* \*

#### 4. NO WAY TO SHIP FLOUR WITHOUT SHIPS

##### PRESIDENT'S PROMISES OF MORE FOOD GET INTO ITALIAN NEWSPAPERS

[Msg, Hq AMG, Fifth Army, to Hq ACC, 7 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/143/19]

On 6 October demonstration of some hundreds of Florentines mostly women took place before Prefettura to protest against insufficiency of food, in particular bread. Gathering was apparently spontaneous and was eventually dispersed peacefully. Florence has been receiving 200 grams of bread daily and full ration scale of miscellaneous items except olive oil was issued for October. In order to help alleviate undoubted hardship that exists trucks are being diverted from building up grain reserve to bringing in more fruit and

vegetables. It is recommended that issue of pasta ration minimum of 500 grams weekly be considered without delay. Draw your attention to lack of harmony between facts described and announcement in Stars and Stripes of same date that substantial increases in food for Italy are promised by President Roosevelt [above]. This will undoubtedly, as usual be made subject of German radio propaganda. \* \* \*

[Msg, Econ Sec, AC, to G-5, AFHQ, 6 Nov 44, MTO HS files, G-5, AFHQ, 43-1781 Food]

President's letter to War Department [31 October, above] has been released by PWB and all Italian papers carried it. This places us in an impossible position unless you immediately sanc-

tion 300 gram ration at earliest possible date. \* \* \*

### SACMED ASKS WHETHER PRESS REPORTS ARE CORRECT

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 19 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. Recent public announcements, which have been given wide circulation in Italy by the press, are interpreted by me to mean that the policy is to provide a 300 gram bread ration immediately; this ration to be nation wide on liberation of the north.

2. Confirmation is requested that my understanding in paragraph 1 is correct and that you wish me to implement this policy.

3. This policy cannot be implemented without increased imports since the import program authorized for the months of November and December is below the monthly scale of imports indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter of 24th September. From a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

4. If I am to establish a 300 gram bread ration, there are 2 alternatives:

a. Step up monthly shipments to the level required to produce total imports of 1,500,000 tons during the harvest year. This would mean a monthly program based on all Italy estimated at 165,000 tons from January through June 1945, or beginning December if possible.

b. Use existing stocks, together with imports under the existing program. The effect of this plan would be to exhaust the amassed grain by 1st March assuming inland transport not a limiting factor. I can only undertake this procedure under an absolute guarantee that stocks so used will be replaced in full to permit continuance of the 300 gram ration until the next harvest season. Without such guarantee I can see nothing but trouble ahead.

5. I recommend the first alternative. However even if approved, I would be unable to announce such a plan prior to the approval of a shipping program to meet it.

6. Your instructions are requested. In the meantime and in any event ACC will step up its efforts to realize maximum local production, particularly in products which might be substituted for wheat, and will continue to tighten up the administration of cereals wherever possible. \* \* \*

### AC STATES 300-GRAM BREAD RATION IS IRREDUCIBLE MINIMUM

[Memo, Food Ration Scales in Italy, by Commodore Stone, Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 21 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/109/732]

1. The 300 gram bread ration is in the opinion of this Commission the irreducible minimum and any scale below that figure, except for short periods in operational areas, is contrary to Allied military and political interests and announced aims.

2. In stating our reasons for this opinion it must be remembered that Italy is fundamentally a bread-eating country and that flour, in one form or another must always be the basic ration together with sugar, and that other commodities are ancillary thereto. These reasons are four (a) medical, (b) control of Black Market, (c) maintenance of law and order and (d) grain collection campaign.

3. *Medical.* If the ration is not maintained at a minimum of a 300 gram bread ration the health of the nation will in our opinion be permanently impaired. The present scale of 300 grams of bread and 4.15 grams of sugar which is the ration in the south of Italy produces only a calorific content of 763 calories. This is supplemented in urban districts of over 50,000 inhabitants by meat and vegetables producing an additional calorific value of 143 calories, making a total of 906 calories. The Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936 advised that the daily average calorific intake for a man or woman living in a temperate climate and not engaged in manual labour should be 2,400 calories per day, and if engaged on moderate muscular work an additional 600 calories per day should be allowed. . . .

4. *Control of Black Market.* A large section of the populace in fact make up its rations by purchases on the Black Market. . . . All that can be done is to limit its extent and from experience an increase in the ration to 300 grams throughout Italy will have this effect. \* \* \*

5. *Maintenance of Law and Order.* It is the opinion of this Commission that the maintenance of law and order cannot be assured unless a minimum ration of 300 grams is maintained throughout liberated Italy. With an uncontrolled Black Market and a wholly inadequate bread ration, dissatisfaction, riots and industrial unrest generally are to be expected in many of the more important centres this winter. Such a situation must seriously affect the Allied war effort in

Italy. . . [A copy of a signal dated 19 October to General Alexander from General Mark Clark on the food situation in the Fifth Army area is attached.]

6. Nor can the political effect be overlooked. Rightly or wrongly the government is blamed at present for the failure to produce food and if it cannot be established on a uniform basis at a level of (about) 300 grams it is to be feared that the consequential social unrest may well affect the stability of the Government. In present circumstances this would be undesirable not only for the country as a whole but in particular for the Allied war effort in Italy. In considering this aspect it should not be overlooked that it would be impossible through lack of personnel to re-establish Military Government and the situation in the country might indeed become precarious.

7. *Grain Collection Campaign.* The questioning of rationing plays an extremely important part in the programme of amassing. With say a 250 grams bread ration a tendency to refuse to amass in order to hoard grain and later sell it in the Black Market at fantastic prices is such that it becomes an important factor in the amount amassed. It is thought that, if the ration can be established throughout at 300 grams, the incentive to refuse to amass, though not extinguished will be substantially reduced. This in turn will reduce import requirements and save shipping. \* \* \*

#### APPARENTLY NOT ENOUGH SHIPPING FOR AN INCREASED RATION

[Comments on SACMED's Justification, Incl B to Interim Rpt, CCAC 105/2, 23 Oct 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ]

5. The U.S. shipping authorities advise that the maximum shipping now foreseeable for the movement of wheat to Italy will provide 1,010,000 tons during the harvest year, and that the maximum rate at which such shipping can be provided beginning 1 January 1945 will be approximately 107,000 tons per month. They emphasize that even this rate may not be met in the light of overall shipping shortages. Obviously if SACMED's estimate [1,500,000 tons] of the imports necessary to maintain the 300 gram bread ration is correct, and if the U.S. shipping authorities appraisal of the shipping potential is accurate, the desired ration cannot be maintained unless a greater contribution to

the maintenance of the ration can be obtained from indigenous sources than SACMED now anticipates.

#### STIMSON CAN ONLY REFER PRESIDENT'S REQUEST TO LONDON FOR CONCURRENCE

[Ltr, Stimson to Roosevelt, 7 Nov 44, OPD files, 014-I, sec. 5]

Immediately upon receipt of your instructions of 31 October 1944 [section 3 above] concerning civilian supplies for Italy, the War Department has recommended to the British War Office that instructions be issued in the name of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson approving an increase in the bread ration to 300 grams throughout all of Italy occupied by Allied Forces. Your instructions have been referred to London where it is understood British concurrence is under urgent review by the Cabinet.

A review is being made of the additional supplies requested by the Allied Control Commission. Final action on this matter also awaits concurrence by the British authorities. \* \* \*

#### SACMED REPORTS THE SITUATION IS DETERIORATING OWING TO FOOD SHORTAGE

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 30 Nov 44, OPD Msg files, NAF-821]

1. The situation in Central Italy, particularly in Rome, Florence, and Pisa, is deteriorating due primarily to the food situation. My intelligence reports indicate the possibilities of disturbance in the cities during coming weeks, and I have found it necessary to take certain precautionary measures.

2. Also, the Chief Commissioner AC has advised me that with the winter months upon us, he cannot much longer hold the population in line under the existing 200 gram ration and shortage of other foods.

3. Concurrently the Italian Government has advised AC of its decision to raise the price of bread from its present subsidized figure of five lire per kilo to eight lire per kilo. This is a measure which AC approves as tending to cast down the substantial and uneconomic government deficit arising from the bread subsidy, but it feels that the price increase unaccompanied by a ration increase is more than likely to have unfortunate consequences. AC has therefore asked the Italian Govt to defer its announcement until 1 December.

5. I feel it is imperative that I be in a position to make an announcement on or prior to 1 December. I request instructions accordingly.

**SACMED TOLD THERE IS NO EXTRA SHIPPING FOR INCREASED RATION**

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 8 Dec 44, OPD Msg files, FAN-465]

Urgency of problems in Italy including bread is thoroughly understood here. Shipping situation is so acute that all theaters are currently accepting deficits in requirements of operational character as well as those for essential civilian supplies. This situation is under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. Meanwhile you should take no steps to establish or maintain any bread ration in Italy except such as you can support within shipping allocated to you under priorities which you are willing to establish in the light of your overall military responsibilities in the theater.

**ITALIAN DEMONSTRATORS PROD AC/AMG FOR INCREASED RATION**

[Msg, Hq AAI, to AFHQ, 12 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 10107]

Following message received from Fifth Army \* \* \* Chronic undernourishment is giving rise to unrest. There have been recent demonstrations demanding a minimum of 300 grams daily per person. That amount is now being distributed in the South of Italy a fact well known to the public in the Fifth Army Area. \* \* \*

**ALLIED COMMISSION PRODS SACMED FOR INCREASED RATION**

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for SAC, AFHQ, 12 Dec. 44, MTO, HS files, AC Ltr Requisition 4807/79/CofS, par. 10]

10. I cannot conceal from you the serious situation which must be [inferred] from the recommendation which I am forced to make. The political reactions against the newly formed Government and against the Allies in Southern Italy where the ration must be cut, and in Central Italy where the ration will not attain to that impliedly promised by the Allied Governments, must be

grave. The Italian Government and people undoubtedly regard the fulfillment of the 300 gram ration backed by the message of the President and Prime Minister as a pledge which will not be broken. We must expect disease arising from malnutrition, and acceleration in inflation and the activities of the black market, a decrease in morale leading to an increase in crime and prostitution, disorders and the food riots which the Prime Minister, during his visit here, directed must be avoided. I would, however, rather face these admittedly serious difficulties with the knowledge that such a plan for feeding the population could be guaranteed and that the present disparity between North and South would disappear. The present uncertainty makes it virtually impossible to carry out a proper distribution of food and is most deleterious to the morale of the people.

**SACMED AGAIN PRODS THE CCS**

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 21 Dec. 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 7699]

8. . . . If you find it impossible when you make your monthly allocations of shipping to meet the request put forward herein for additional wheat without some contribution from or deferment of operational maintenance we will undertake to make the necessary contribution at the expense of military requirements if operationally possible to do so. We can only do this period by period after receiving from you the form allocation for military imports during the period involved.

9. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many Theaters of war. It is my duty however to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot administer those parts of Italy under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians unless I am regularly provided with the means to do so. The alternative is an Italy embittered by unfulfilled promises, by hunger and distress. This I believe would be a grave handicap to our immediate war effort and a lamentable example to other nations of the justice of Allied dealing.

## 5. NO WAY TO BROADEN SUPPLY POLICY UNTIL RESOURCES ARE MORE PLENTIFUL

### A WAR DEPARTMENT AUTHORITY AGREES WITH SACMED'S ARGUMENT FOR BROADER CRITERION THAN MILITARY NECESSITY

[Memo, Maj Gen Glen M. Edgerton, Dir, ID, for CG, ASF, 4 Oct 44, ASF, ID, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-357]

\* \* \* Concern over the Italian situation is justified in view of the absence of a long term policy on behalf of our government as to the provision to be made to solve Italy's basic problems and in view of the absence of any funds by means of which such policies could be implemented. Italy is faced with a serious problem of inflation. Sudden stoppage of war industries is leading to wide-spread unemployment. A failure of its internal administration is accompanied by inequitable and faulty distribution of its own rather plentiful supplies of food. Unless some long term policy of reconstruction is applied to Italy, there may be a very serious situation. The theater commander has pointed out this problem in a cable of 13 September, wherein he states that the measures required by military necessity leaves untouched the problem of creating a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. \* \* \*

### SACMED WILL ASSUME THE NEW POLICY PERMITS LIBERALIZATION OF SUPPLY CRITERION

[Msg, NAF-810, Gen Wilson to CCS, 1 Nov 44, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 111]

\* \* \* In view of the public statements of the President and the Prime Minister, I am proposing to take the following steps.

1. I am arranging for all current requisitions for basic civilian supplies to be reviewed on two assumptions:

First, that they will be provided and financed as heretofore;

Second, that they would be framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula.

2. In addition and in conformity with the joint statement of 26th September and the President's statement of 10th October, I have instructed the Allied Commission to draw up a programme of industrial first-aid. This will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

3. I am assuming that the necessary finance for (1) will be provided so long as Italy is a Theater of or Base for Military Operations and for a period of 6 months thereafter.

4. For planning purposes for (2) I am assuming an expenditure commensurate with the sources of new finance outside military responsibility mentioned in the President's statement, to be spent over a period of 12 months.

I hope this will meet with your approval as I am convinced that this is the right course to pursue.

### THE CCS DECLINES TO AUTHORIZE LIBERALIZATION OF SUPPLY POLICY

[Msg, FAN-450 CCS to Gen Wilson, 13 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

\* \* \* Pending issuance of instructions to you by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, you will take no steps to change the basis on which your Headquarters approves for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requirements for essential civilian supplies as being within military responsibility.

### SACMED REMINDS THE CCS POLITICAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ALREADY LIBERALIZED POLICY

[Msg, NAF-814, Gen Wilson to CCS, 17 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/732]

\* \* \* 1. The shipping allocated from producer countries to MTO has hitherto been determined on the basis of operational requirements including civilian needs, screened as within the disease and unrest formula.

2. This basis of allocation will no longer satisfactorily meet civilian needs. There are already several major projects under consideration or actually programmed that together involve heavy shipping requirements. For example:

(A) You have before you my request for authorization of 300-gram ration and for the import of supplies to meet it. This ration is in line with the statements of the President and Prime Minister of the new policy towards Italy, particularly in respect of the food ration.

(B) Substantial dollar credits have been promised to support an immediate industrial rehabilitation program in occupied Italy.

(C) Decision has been taken at highest levels to commence an UNRRA program of supplementary relief in Italy.

All of these projects are over and above the measure of civilian relief which has been granted under the directives applicable thus far

and all will involve increased tonnage for the Theater. \* \* \*

#### THE CCS REPEATS ITS PROHIBITION OF NEW COMMITMENTS

[Msg, CCS to Gen Wilson, 9 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 8205, FAN-466]

\* \* \* Questions raised by you involve political and economic problems which must now be considered in the light of acute overall shipping shortage. Pending receipt of Combined Chiefs of Staff instructions, you should insure that NO commitment is made either to the Italian government or to UNRRA on projects programmed

or contemplated along lines of NAF 814 [above], particularly avoiding commitments either as to shipping tonnages or as to definite dates or periods as of which the Italians or UNRRA may bid for shipping independent of the military authorities.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Early in 1945 UNRRA submitted a program for shipment of supplies to Italy during the first six months of the year. SACMED endorsed the program, provided that the implementation thereof did not affect his ability to meet operational and basic civil affairs requirements. Under the terms of the Hopkins-Law Agreement, 31 January 1945 (Chapter XXXII, Section 3), one ship was allocated for February and one for March, subject to military necessity. Incl to CCS 746/8, 31 Jan 45 in CCAC 560 (9-30-44), sec. 1.

## 6. FOR THE TIME BEING DISAPPEARANCE OF CONTROL IS ONLY NOMINAL

#### ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH MERE OMISSION OF WORD CONTROL

[Transl of Memo by the Italian Under Secy of State for Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 4 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/285]

\* \* \* 1. The words of the statement [of the President and the Prime Minister on 26 September 1944 in Section 3, above] imply therefore a limitation and change in the nature of the duties carried out until now by the Allied Control Commission. The omission of the word control, if it has, as it must have, special significance should not only coincide with the suppression of a certain number of functions exercised until now by the Commission but also with a different outlook and conception of those which the said Commission will continue to carry out; a limitation of duties therefore on the one hand, and a different spirit and outlook on the other.

2. This different spirit, in the opinion of the Italian Government, ought to be expressed not in terms of tuition and authoritative control, but in terms of co-operation on the basis of solutions discussed and agreed upon between the parties. The best and perhaps the only way of realizing such a collaboration is that of consenting to the appointment of an Italian member both on the Central Commission and on various subcommittees.

6. Summing up, the Italian Government suggest:

a. That the Commission should continue to exercise only those functions which have close and immediate connection with the war effort

and those in which Allied assistance is carried out in a substantial direct and concrete form and that all other attributions be transferred to the Italian Government.

b. That the exercise of those functions which will continue to appertain to the Commission should reflect a spirit not of imposition but of collaboration realized by means of an Italian participation to the central and local activities of the Commission.

c. A prompt suppression of Subcommittees and Offices depending from the Allied Commission.

d. An exam[ination] carried out on equal basis of all the questions concerning the transformation of the Commission with a view to reaching a solution agreed upon between the two sides.

e. The submission to the examination of the Allied Authorities of all the evidence concerning the interferences and interventions which now hinder in the different Administrations the normal activities of the Italian Administration.

#### SACMED WILL DO NOTHING BEFORE A DIRECTIVE

[Msg, Gen Wilson to CCS, 4 Oct 44, OPD Msg files, NAF 796]

1. Joint statement on Italy by the President and the Prime Minister issued to the press on 26 September, which has been given wide publicity in Italy, has naturally occasioned many inquiries from Allied as well as Italian sources. In the absence of directives from you as to the time and

manner of implementation of the policies laid down, I am instructing the Chief Commissioner that specific action is to be withheld.

2. In order to enable me satisfactorily to answer these inquiries and to cut short the present period of speculation, I request that I may be given directives as soon as practicable. I hope these may cover the matters directly raised by the announcement, most important of which is taken here to be the naming of direct Italian representatives to the two governments, as well as matters necessarily raised by implication, as for example, any modification in the relations between other United Nations and Italy.

3. . . . I wish that there may be avoided any situation such as recently arose through an important direct communication, the fact and contents of which were generally known in Italian circles but were unknown to the senior officers of Allied Control Commission or Allied Forces Headquarters until reported by the Office of Strategic Services on NY Intelligence basis.

4. If there is implied in the statement a forthcoming reorientation of the functions of Allied Control Commission, I request that the Allied Control Commission and this Headquarters may be given an opportunity to comment. . . .

#### "CONTROL" DISAPPEARS FROM NAME OF ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

[Memo, G-5 AFHQ for Hq ACC, 24 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

1. It is notified that by direction of CCS the Allied Control Commission will henceforth be addressed as the Allied Commission.

2. It is requested that this should be notified in these terms to the Italian Government by letter simply stating the fact without elaboration, explanation or implication. In order that the matter may not appear to be of outstanding importance it should be notified by a routine communication, not signed by yourself, to an official of the Italian Government such as the Secretary to the Council of Ministers. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSAL FOR GREATER FREEDOM IN APPOINTMENTS NOT APPROVED

[Ltr, Upjohn, CA Sec, for Actg Chief Cmsr, AC, 18 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

2. Shortly after the first handover of territory to the Italian Government which took place on 11 February 1944, there was an exchange of letters between the then Chief Commissioner, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel Mason-MacFarlane and the then Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio. . . . In

effect by these letters it was agreed that all senior Government appointments would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission.

4. The arrangements so made have worked quite smoothly in practice. It is fair to say that in the vast majority of cases no difficulty has arisen and appointments have been approved almost as a matter of course, but the right of approval has proved useful in practice, and occasionally approval for good reason has been withheld and the Italian Government has been required to submit another appointee for the office.

5. Recently, and in view of the change of name of the Commission, the Italian Government has requested that the practice be revised and they have submitted a very short list of offices which they suggest should be submitted to the Commission for approval. . . .

6. It appears to be a matter of overall policy as to whether or not the Commission should agree to the revised list. It is the opinion of the Civil Affairs Section that the list is too short, and that at any rate the names of directors of personnel in each Ministry should be submitted to the Commission for approval. The main reason for this is that appointments in Allied Military Government territory are always made by the Allied Commission, but in practice the Italian Government is normally consulted over such appointments, and it seems desirable that the Director of personnel should be the person approved by the Commission. \* \* \*

#### SUBCOMMISSIONS DON'T WANT THEIR FUNCTIONS TO BE CURTAILED

[Memo, Actg Dir, Labor Subcom, AC, for Econ Sec, AC, 22 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/146/18]

1 . . . (a) No functions of A.C. should be discontinued in Italian Government territory. Representation is needed in every region for liaison on labor policy and in the interests of Army and Navy installations. \* \* \*

#### BRITISH WILL NOT GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO APPROVE ANY NEW GOVERNMENT

[Min of SACMED's Political Conf, 10 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/118]

\* \* \* The Supreme Allied Commander inquired what was the position regarding the submission of the names of the New Italian Government for approval by the Allied authorities, with particular reference to the precedent set at the time of the last change of government.

. . . Mr. Kirk observed that the United States

Government now took the position that the composition of the Italian Government was entirely a matter for the Italians themselves, although any new government must subscribe to the same commitments towards the Allies as had been undertaken by the previous government, and the Supreme Allied Commander might, if necessary

for military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries. \* \* \*

Mr. [P.] Broad said that H.M. Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval.

## 7. HAROLD MACMILLAN ARGUES ASTUTELY FOR A NEW DIRECTIVE

### MACMILLAN APPOINTED ACTING AC PRESIDENT TO WORK OUT THE NEW POLICY

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCAC, 23 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 6037-A]

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, as already announced, recently reviewed the situation in Italy and agreed upon a general policy for meeting the numerous economic and other difficulties of that country.

To facilitate the task they have decided that the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan, MP, British Resident Minister at Allied Force Headquarters Mediterranean, should, in addition to his present position, become the responsible head of the Allied Commission. In order to effect this change, General Wilson will delegate his functions as President of the Commission to Mr. Macmillan.<sup>4</sup>

### APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADORS ALSO INDICATES DESIRE TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW POLICY

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/171]

1. As the joint statement of the President and Prime Minister on policy toward Italy announced, U.K. and U.S. have decided to enter into direct relations with the Italian Government. They have informed the Italian Government of this decision through the U.K. High Commissioner and the U.S. Representative respectively. Sir Noel Charles will be the U.K. representative to the Italian Government with the personal rank of ambassador. Mr. Kirk will be accredited for-

<sup>4</sup>This change in status, which enabled Mr. Macmillan to study more closely the problem of the new policy, was effected in the theater by AFHQ General Order 27, 18 November 1944. The same order announced the appointment of Commodore Stone, formerly in temporary capacity, as Deputy President of the Allied Commission, and in addition as Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission and CCAO of occupied territory under AMG.

mally as U.S. ambassador to the Italian Government. It is considered that the nature of the relations of other United Nations with the Italian Government should be worked out between the respective governments and the Italian Government. For your information it is understood that formal diplomatic relations with Italy are being reestablished by the other American republics and the U.S.S.R.

2. However, the U.S. and U.K. Governments intend, in general, that their two representatives should for the present handle only political questions which are of specific interest to their respective governments, while Allied Commission should continue to handle economic and administrative matters together with questions arising out of the terms of armistice.

### EXERCISE CONTROL ONLY WHERE MILITARY NEEDS REQUIRE

[Macmillan, Actg President, AC, Note, Allied Policy Toward Italy, Circulated in AFHQ, AC, and in British Govt Depts, undated, probably Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

\* \* \* We must now, I think, take the line that the recent formal change of name from Allied Control Commission to Allied Commission has a real meaning. It should be our purpose only to exercise control where our military needs require. Whenever possible the function of the Commission should be that of a mission of experts offering advice. If our advice is not accepted, we must shrug our shoulders and allow affairs to take their course. Only in this way can we bring a sense of reality and responsibility to the Italian authorities.

We should now inform the Italian Government that while we propose to hold absolutely to all our rights under the Armistice, and do not intend to discuss any settlement of purely post-war problems (for instance, territorial and colonial arrangements), yet, subject to the overriding military needs for the conduct of the campaign, we shall hold these rights largely in

reserve. We shall make the transfer of authority to the Italian Government as great a reality as possible. In consultation with them we shall provide, if they require it, expert advice on such questions as justice, education, fine arts, and the like. If they prefer to do without these experts in their territory, we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians to do for themselves, that is, regulation of their internal political and economic life, we shall play the role of advisers, except to the extent that the military authorities require to control specific functions or to take over particular properties.

There are, however, two stern warnings which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied imports depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help—within the physical possibilities of their present situation—in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reimpose military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisos, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be far reaching and sincere. \* \* \*

It will be seen from the foregoing that the task of those who have to plan for the needs of the Italian people is no easy one. It reminds one of those ingenious puzzles that torture young or old who fall beneath their spell, where it is necessary to entice four mercury balls in a small cardboard box to fall into their respective or appropriate holes. Two may easily be done at once, three often, but the whole four present a formidable test of patience and determination. In this case the four balls are availability of supply, finance, shipping and port acceptability. It has seldom been possible to obtain clearance on all these at once. Yet without some near miracle of concurrent agreement, reasonable planning for the future becomes impossible. Of course it may be urged that there is no reason to worry ourselves unduly about the unhappy position in which the Italians find themselves. Their disasters are their own fault. But this policy, harsh though it might be, would at least have been

practicable had it not been for the recent declarations formally made on behalf of the two Allied Governments. To turn now from the path of generosity there marked out is unthinkable. In addition, this more lenient mood seems to me greatly in the interests of the work in general. Whatever may be the post-war policy towards Germany, we have accepted Italy into a position different from that of a beaten enemy; we have invented and, to some extent, benefited by the doctrine of co-belligerency; and, from the larger aspect, prosperity like peace is indivisible. . . . It will need all the patience, courage and devotion that British and American administrators can give if we are to preserve Italy and her 45 millions of people from collapse into despair, anarchy and revolution. To fail to make the effort because of our grievances against Italy, however justified, may be to have won the war and lost the peace.

#### MACMILLAN SPECIFIES CONTROLS WHICH CAN BE WAIVED OR MODIFIED

[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

#### I. *I propose that the Political Section of the Commission be abolished.*

This Section, which is managed by an American and British Vice-President of equal rank, belongs to the early post-Armistice period. . . .

Since that time policy has developed. The Italians have received in Rome an American and a British Ambassador. They are sending their Ambassadors in return to Washington and London. . . .

Moreover, the Italians are now themselves in direct relations with United Nations and neutral Powers. Interchange of Ambassadors and Ministers is going on at an ever increasing pace, the Latin republics of South America being particularly prominent in this diplomatic pilgrimage to Rome.

In theory all formal communications between the representatives of other Powers and the Italian Government should pass through the Commission, there being no objection to informal and unofficial contacts. This has not applied to Russia; and the United States and British representatives have now notified the Commission of the resumption of direct relations between their Government and the Italian Government. It would seem, therefore, that to maintain in theory a rule which was never in practice enforced or even capable of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. *I propose that we should*

confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged. \* \* \*

The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council has proposed that the Italian representative in Moscow be given his own cypher. It seems difficult to refuse this request. The question of the provision of independent cyphers for the Italian representatives in London and Washington has been raised by the Italians. It has been referred by the Commission to Allied Headquarters and by them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

*I propose that this request should be granted.*

*I propose that this privilege should be extended to their representatives in other countries.* \* \* \*

If these concessions are made, there is no need for the Political Section as such to continue. The function of giving political advice to the Commission can be undertaken by the British and American Embassies. In order to effect this, I have worked out a plan . . . with the British and American Ambassadors in Rome and it has their approval. *I propose that it should be put into effect forthwith.*

## II. *I propose that we surrender the control over Italian legislation in Italian territory.*

In point of fact, nothing in the Armistice terms gives the Commission any right to be consulted on all decrees of the Italian Government. In practice a large proportion of decrees proposed are sent for study and advice by the appropriate Subcommission. Sometimes, as in the case of a recent decree raising wage rates, the Council of Ministers approved the decree without prior and detailed approval from the Commission. (I am bound to observe that in this instance my sympathies were with the Italian Government, who as sometimes happens with Governments, could not withstand powerful political pressure fortified only by the theoretical arguments of civil servants and statisticians.) The formal claim to approve decrees is difficult to enforce—as has been proved—since the only remedy would involve the removal of the Minister or the fall of the Ministry. It is wise, in the new conditions, to rely on moral persuasion and even, when required, pressure; and to develop a normal habit of consultation on matters particularly economic, when our joint interests are involved or when action taken in Italian Italy must, in fact, be followed in Allied Italy. The formal renuncia-

tion of this right to approve decrees would certainly be welcomed by the Italians.

## III. *Similarly, I propose that the control of Italian appointments in Italian Italy be modified or surrendered.*

Again, it is doubtful whether we have a right to this control under the Armistice terms. But shortly after the first transfer of territory (11 February 1944) there was an exchange of letters between General Mason MacFarlane and Marshal Badoglio. In effect, by these letters it was agreed that all appointments to the Government and all senior appointments by the Government would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. . . .

The Italian Government has recently requested that the position be revised. They have submitted a very short list of offices to which this right should apply. It includes Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Government, the heads of the fighting services and so forth. . . .

So far as the approval of [certain] officials . . .<sup>5</sup> is concerned, I take it that the chief object was to secure “defascistization” rather than to guarantee efficiency. Indeed, after a country has been for a generation under a Fascist regime, these two purposes may well be contradictory rather than complimentary. While the right of approval has certainly helped to achieve the first purpose, I think it no longer necessary. Public opinion does not need stimulating on this issue. On the contrary, epuration in Italy (as in other countries) may be pushed dangerously far.<sup>6</sup>

In practice, Italian nominations are approved almost as a matter of course. \* \* \*

*I therefore urge that we waive the right of approval altogether—with one exception.*

A short list should be agreed of Service chiefs—to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. In their case it would perhaps be wiser to ask that the approval should be obtained of the Supreme Allied Commander or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

If this recommendation is approved, certain consequential changes will have to be made in the legal documents of transfer of successive provinces from Military Government to Italian

<sup>5</sup>In an appendix, Macmillan listed certain Italian positions the appointments to which the Italian Government had requested permission to make without prior Allied approval.

<sup>6</sup>Lest this observation be misconstrued as reactionary, it should be noted that Count Sforza and many other Italian liberals were of the same opinion.

Government, since it has been the practice to include in these a clause preventing the removal of any Italian appointed by Military Government authority to posts within the territories concerned.

This is a mere formality.

IV. *I propose that local officers of the Allied Commission should be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy.*

One of the features of the control which is most apparent to, and therefore to some extent, resented by the Italians is the presence of local Allied officers in all the regions handed back to Italian control. Since, in many cases, they are the same officers who were functioning during the period of military government, the change from "direct" to "indirect rule" is correspondingly obscured.

The Commission itself, under the two main Sections of General Administration and Economic Affairs, is organized into some twenty Sub-commissions, corresponding to the various Italian Ministries. In the regions are Regional officers, with specialists from one or other of those Sub-commissions to assist them. Although a very drastic reduction has taken place recently in the total so employed, this only strengthens the argument for their total elimination. They are now insufficient to govern, but sufficient to interfere. And their presence tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the Italians themselves.

For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. We had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. And the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the congenial plan of throwing upon us—in the public opinion of the world—a responsibility which belongs to themselves.

It is true that there must be local contacts between the Allied Military and Naval authorities in Italian governed Italy, especially in places where there are still Allied installations. But this function could well be performed by Liaison Officers attached to the various Military Area and District Commanders. Where matters were incapable of local adjustment or when technical advice was required (for instance, on transportation and public utilities) special "trouble shooters" could be summoned from the Commission at Rome or, at the request of the Italians, specialist officers made available to them for special duties. \* \* \*

Undoubtedly, the more the contacts and, where necessary, pressure—between the Allies and the Italian Government can be confined to the centre and at a high level, the better relations will be. Italian Ministers resent the appearance rather than the reality of control. And the withdrawal of officers from the field would enormously enhance the prestige of the Government.

V. *Certain central, as well as local, functions of the Allied Commission in Italian Government Italy should be abandoned altogether.*

There are a number of functions of sub-commissions organized to carry them out which can well be surrendered. This does not, I regret, mean that any of these sub-commissions can be liquidated. They must remain for the work in Allied Italy and to prepare the work in Kesselring's Italy. Such are, in the administrative field, Monuments and Fine Arts, Education, Local Government. In the economic field, arrangements are already being made to hand over to the Italians (subject only to inspection) the distribution of food and other supplies in Italian territory.

#### DEMILITARIZATION IS HELD POSSIBLE ONLY AT AC HEADQUARTERS

[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

\* \* \* VI. *Changes in the Commission itself* have been suggested as likely to emphasize the sincerity of the new policy embodied in recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister. "Demilitarization" has been put forward on this as well as other grounds. . . . In view of the importance of the military government aspect of the Commission's work, there is a very definite limit to what can be achieved by this method. But, in general, both by the issue of a new and clear directive, and by a statement publicly and with great precision of Allied Policy towards Italy, the whole conception of the Commission's new purposes and functions in Italian territory can be made effective. We are to be advisers, not controllers; elder brothers to our weak and errant juniors. \* \* \*

#### PART III

I. I cannot believe that those who propose rapid or wholesale demilitarisation have understood that three-quarters of the effort of the Commission is necessarily concentrated on those parts of Italy occupied or about to be occupied by Allied armies—that is, what I have called, Allied Italy and Kesselring's Italy.

In Allied Military Government territory it is really quite impracticable for the organization to function except with officers in uniform. This will apply until the final stages of the operation. When the enemy has been driven from all Italian territory and when the first shock has been taken by the A.M.G. organization in the rear of our advancing armies, all Italy (except perhaps certain disputed provinces, such as Venezia Giulia), will in due course be returned to Italian control. The Commission can then be almost wholly demilitarized because its sole function will then be to give expert advice to the Italians and to protect our long-term interests under the Armistice. \* \* \*

"Demilitarization" is only possible in the Headquarters of the Commission, not in the field. In Headquarters this is already being done to a considerable extent. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM SHOULD BE LIBERALIZED

[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

. . . civilian imports into both sections of liberated Italy have up to now been regarded as a legitimate war expenditure and carried on the military budget. Their scale has been regulated by the so-called "disease and unrest" formula; that is to say, the Supreme Allied Commander has been required to certify that his requisitions in this field are necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of either one or the other in a manner likely to incommode military operations.

It is believed that the War Department has recently reached the conclusion that even on this scale there was no justification for carrying such expenditure in respect of "Southern Italy" on their budget. This is quite illogical. As already stated, Italy must be treated as a whole. Products must be moved from surplus to deficiency areas without regard to the exact geographical line dividing Allied Controlled Italy from Italian controlled Italy. Moreover, the lines of communication still to some extent traverse the latter territory. It is for this reason that the Commune of Naples is still kept under military government although geographically in a transferred area. In any case, whether these supplies are carried upon a military budget or not, they must be introduced into the country at the expense of the American and British taxpayer. Since they must be requisitioned as a military priority, called forward by military authorities and shipped by

the military, it would seem more satisfactory that they should continue to be dealt with on the military account. It is absolutely essential from a practical point of view if we are to be [assured of] delivery.

*It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilians needs in Italy.* Moreover, since some continuity of planning is necessary for efficiency, *they should be so provided as long as Italy is a theater of or base for military operations and for a period of say six months thereafter.* In addition, the scale of these should be regulated by a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula, and this for two reasons. First, because another year of shortage has greatly increased the need of the people; second, because it is equitable that having regard to the fact that many Italians are actively engaged in military, air and naval operations in support of our arms, a standard of life for the civilian population, many of them dependents of the fighting men, should be regulated at a somewhat higher level than that suitable to a conquered but non-co-operative nation. \* \* \*

*The normal requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the agreed percentage according to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.*

#### INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION SUPPLIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED

[Macmillan Note, Dec 44]

In addition to supplies on this [Military] account, the declarations by the heads of the two Governments have led us to believe that further deliveries would be made available to meet the needs not only of the present but of the immediate future. These were to be provided, so far as the United States were concerned, by various sources of finance outside military responsibility, such as value of the American troop pay in Italy, remittances from American citizens to Italy, and various other items. It was not clear what the total would be. Various calculations have been made ranging from 150 to 250 million dollars. In any event, *I trust that his Majesty's*

*Government will contribute a percentage of whatever the sum may prove to be in the usual proportion.*

Nevertheless, in spite [of] every effort by General Wilson to get some indication from Washington of how the declarations made in September and October are to be translated into reality, so far no reply of any kind has been received except of a negative and dilatory character. On the assumption, however, that this is merely due to the long technical procedure of the C.C.S. and C.C.A.C., General Wilson has given instructions for planning to proceed. . . . A programme of industrial first-aid is being drawn up to range somewhere within the figures believed likely to be available. . . . This is being drawn up for the immediate needs of Southern and Central Italy and making some allowance for the future requirements of Northern Italy. A preliminary detailed programme has already been sent to the C.C.A.C. . . . All that remains is to secure official approval. Meanwhile some doubt, which I can hardly believe to be well-based, has crept into the more sceptical minds on the Commission. It is suggested that the new sources (Troop Pay, remittances, etc.) are to be *in substitution* not in *addition* to, the present expenditure for normal civilian needs; in other words, that these sources of income must be used not to introduce any form of rehabilitation of transport and power, but to provide the meanest necessities of life—food and clothing, which are at present carried on the military budget. Should this prove to be the case, the standard of life of the Italian people would fall to a figure which would be hardly possible to calculate. \* \* \*

MACMILLAN AND DOUBTING THOMASES OF THE PRESS

[Summary of Macmillan's Off the Record Remarks to American and British Correspondents in Rome, Dec 44, MTO, HS files, CAD, 091.1, Italy]

\* \* \* BRACKER: Asked what exactly is planned.

Mr. Macmillan replied that we are seeking a middle way. We are seeking and proposing a directive.

NORGAARD: Said he had been shocked by the corruption of the present Italian Government for which the Allies are being blamed. Does the Commission think it wise to turn over to a corrupt Government?

Mr. Macmillan replied that we place the responsibility where it belongs, that is, on the Italians. He would not commit himself to say that self government is necessarily good government. (Laughter)

NORGAARD. But we are not convincing the Italian people.

Mr. Macmillan replied that as we are not remaining here permanently we should build up the responsibility of the Italian Government.

NORGAARD. Said he thought the same things were happening in Italy as in France. In the latter country we came as "heroes" and left as tramps.

Mr. Macmillan replied that these were the misfortunes which come to all who carried burdens. One must do what is right. We must give the Italian people what is their own responsibility. What goes wrong is their own affair. Everybody who carried responsibility would be blamed. He had even heard the British Colonial Empire criticized. \* \* \*

## 8. ANGLO-AMERICAN DISAGREEMENTS ARE COMPROMISED IN A NEW DIRECTIVE

### THE DELAY IN A DIRECTIVE HAS EMBARRASSED THE ALLIED COMMISSION

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen Wilson to CCAC, 23 Dec 44, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 6037-A]

\* \* \* Because of the publicity which the Italian Government has given [to granting a cost-of-living indemnity disapproved by the Allied Commission] and the resulting expectation of Italians that the increases would be put into effect, it was felt that in the circumstances it was impossible to veto the Italian decree. This *was* decided despite the inflationary results likely to follow and the great difficulties which the Allied forces will meet in establishing new wage scales for labour employed by the military.

The entirely unsatisfactory attitude of the Government can be traced to the weak position in which ACC finds itself in consequence of the public statements made by the Prime Minister and President without instructions being received here for guidance of those on the spot in respect to interpretation and implementation. Such directives are still being awaited.

### BRITISH AND AMERICAN MEMBERS OF CCAC DISAGREE ON MACMILLAN'S PROPOSALS

[Min, 46th Mtg of CCAC, 15 Dec 44, ABC files, 334, CCAC, Min (8-9-43)]

\* \* \* Mr. Makins [British member] said that the paper [CCAC-155] represented the

views of Mr. Macmillan, which he understood were endorsed by SACMED. The basic intention was that subject to the overriding requirements of the campaign in Italy and to our rights under the Armistice, the Italian Government should be given a greater measure of responsibility and control, that is to give effect to the statement issued by the President and Prime Minister.

Mr. McCloy said that the United States members were in general agreement with Mr. Macmillan's proposals and considered that, if anything, they should go further in the direction suggested than has been proposed in the paper. \* \* \*

Mr. McCloy pointed out that paragraph 5 raises the question of the present ambiguity in the status of Italy vis-à-vis the Allies. He said that this situation might be clarified by the conclusion of an interim convention terminating the state of war. . . .

General Spofford said that the anomalous position of Italy, vis-à-vis the Allies, might well be clarified by the signing of an interim peace treaty as a step forward and possibly as a step backward.

Lord Halifax said that the signing of a peace treaty would bring up considerations such as the disposal of the Italian colonies and fleet. While much could be done in the direction of giving the Italian Government the outward appearance of complete independence, as he understood it the British Government attached importance to our retaining the right of reentry if our confidence in the Italian Government turned out to be misplaced. Mr. Macmillan's proposal envisaged the suspension but not the abrogation of our rights. \* \* \*

Mr. McCloy questioned, on psychological grounds, the necessity for requiring ministers on appointment to state specifically that they accepted the conditions of the Armistice.

Mr. Makins said that the British Government attached considerable importance to this point. \* \* \*

#### U.S. MEMBERS OF CCAC RECORD THEIR VIEW THAT MORE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE FOR ITALY

[Statement of U.S. Members at 50th Mtg of CCAC, 22 Jan 45, ABC files, CCAC Min (8-9-43)]

The United States Members are voting affirmatively on the Italian directive, but I am instructed on their behalf to make a statement of the views of our Government.

We are strongly of the view that increased freedom of political and economic action on the part of the Italian Government is desirable.

We are not unmindful of the fact that Italy was recently an enemy, but we view such steps as being in keeping with and, to a large extent, dictated by the military considerations which obtain in the area. We therefore welcome Mr. Macmillan's proposal as a step in the right direction but the directive as now written falls so far short of what we believe could reasonably be done at this time that we feel it amounts only to a relatively feeble gesture of no permanent or significant value. We support it only on the basis that it does provide certain minimum improvements in Allied relationships with the Italian Government.

The U.S. Members have strongly urged further actions which we believe should be adopted at the present time, and concerning these we make the following comments:

Our Government desires that in concert with the British Government, we should begin the negotiation of a Preliminary Treaty of Peace with the Italian Government and with the concurrence of the Soviet Government to substitute such a treaty for the present surrender terms. The treaty would, of course, reserve territorial and financial settlement for later discussion, and would be accompanied by appropriate military and civil affairs agreements reserving to the Allies necessary rights in Italian territory. It would, however, recognize the Government's efforts to cooperate with us in the war and as such would have the great psychological advantage of altering the status of Italy and removing her from the mere character of a surrendered enemy. This we believe to be desirable considering the objectives we seek to obtain, namely, a better and particularly a more self-reliant spirit on the part of the people behind the lines.

Quite apart from any commitments the two countries have made or are considered to have made toward Italy, we strongly believe that failure to take such steps as those we recommend are quite as apt to induce unrest and costly disturbances behind the lines as are inadequate rations.

Moreover, it is generally conceded that the surrender terms contain many outmoded provisions. Some of these have never been enforced, and others have fallen into discard. The surrender instrument is not a realistic document, and does not accurately describe the present relationship between the Allies and the Italian Government. The Italian people as a whole have demonstrated their willingness to help us get along with the war, to strive toward a more democratic government. Their troops are now fighting alongside

ours. Accordingly, it has seemed to the U.S. members that any major restatement of Allied policy toward Italy must deal with the increasingly anomalous position which the continuing state of war with Italy involves.

For these reasons, the provision of the present directive which would request any new Italian Government rather pointedly to confirm their future adherence to the terms of surrender seems unnecessary and undesirable to the U.S. members, who agree to the inclusion of this provision only because the British members have made its inclusion a condition of their approval of the document as a whole.

The U.S. members, desiring to give the Italian Government a greater degree of responsibility in financial matters, have proposed a financial section to the directive. This would have instructed the Theater Commander to take steps which would include (1) the suspension of control on Italian financial transactions abroad, (2) the establishment of a lira account by the Italian Government to be utilized by the Allied Forces in payment for supplies, services and facilities where recourse to Italian procurement agencies is impracticable, (3) transfer of the issuance of lira from the Allied financial agency to the Italian Government or its agencies, and (4) arrangements with the Italian Government for the supply of an adequate volume of lira currency and credits to meet the needs of the Allied forces and to supplement the requisition procedures of the Italian authorities in purchasing supplies and services for the Allied forces in Italy.

The counter suggestion offered by the U.K. Members is not, in our opinion, adequate to the situation. The negotiation of financial arrangements are intricate and apt to be lengthy, but a specific statement of our willingness to open negotiations leading to desirable objectives should, we think, be made. Here again we agree to its inclusion only because it appears to be the maximum extent to which the U.K. members feel they can go in this direction at the present time.

#### DIRECTIVE FOR A NEW POLICY

[Msg, FAN-487, CCS to AFHQ, 30 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September 1944, the U.S. and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender

instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

In the light of this agreed U.S.-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

#### *Political Section*

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the U.S. and UK Ambassadors in Rome. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.

(b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.

(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.

(d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.

(e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.

(f) The U.S. and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be ad-

vised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between Italy and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between Italy and the United Nations.

(g) The U.S. and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the Moscow declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.

(h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in Italy other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be determined by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

*Administrative Section*

3. The internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganization of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:

(a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.

(b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government. Control should *not* be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

(c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianized to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).

(d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are *not* met, the Allied authorities will *not* hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.

5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined U.S.-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:

(a) Those quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.

(b) Those supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. As the time when combined military responsibility will terminate will *not* be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will *not* be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may *not* be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.

(c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and Italy must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will *not* be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the

Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the United States<sup>7</sup> and British Governments. The United States and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of NAF 778 are answered as follows:

(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in Italy, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.

(b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorized to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except for those industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other Theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.

(c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into Italy is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have *no* responsibility for the importation of supplies into Italy.

(d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports

are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these reports and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.

8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into Italy must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

#### *Financial Section*

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

#### ANOTHER DIRECTIVE RELAXES PRICE AND MARKET CONTROLS ON ITALIAN EXPORTS

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCAC to AFHQ, 9 Feb 45,<sup>8</sup> OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 34894]

\* \* \* The classification of Italian exports will be as follows: (a) Goods exported on the grounds of supply. (b) Goods exported on commercial grounds. Included in category (a) will be products on the reserve commodities list necessitating allocation on the part of combined boards, plus other products which U.K., U.S. and Canada agree upon in advance to be essential to the war effort of the country making the purchases and which, for reason of shipping should be procured from Italy. All other products are included in category (b).

Merchandise comprised in category (a) will be sold in such markets and in such quantities as the appropriate combined Allied Agency may determine. The fixing of prices will be effected by negotiations between the purchaser and the Italians. Should the Allies fail to agree the merchandise will be exported and there will be paid to the Italians as a minimum the ceiling price in the country making the purchases, minus expenses. If such price should not be satisfactory, and if it is less than production cost, a request may be made by the Italians for a combined determination of the price by A.C., or, through appeal, by CCAC or CLAC.

<sup>8</sup> The basic directive of 30 January was followed by supplementary directives. This one is given here because it was issued soon after the 30 January directive. Others will be found on pages 640-41.

<sup>7</sup> Civilian economic and supply agencies.

The Italians may offer for sale products in category (b) in whatever market they may choose and prices will be determined by their negotiations with the prospective purchasers. A.C. would recommend to the Italian Government, however, that a policy be adopted by the latter whereby such products would not be offered for sale at a price less than the purchase price in Italy in Lire plus cost of transportation and other costs except as special circumstances derived from the conditions of war may justify.

There should be turned over as rapidly as possible to the Italians the responsibility for obtaining products for export or making such other arrangements as are required for the stimulation of export trade. Also there should be turned over to the Italians as rapidly as possible the responsibility for fixing prices of export goods. The activities of A.C. would be confined to the exercise of such supervision with regard to ex-

ports as is essential to ensure the carrying out of policies established by the CCS.

The Government of Italy should be informed that prompt restoration of private trade is the objective of our policy and that the problems involved should be examined by A.C. with the Italian Government and that A.C. should make such recommendations then for modifications in procedures now existing as will be most conducive to the accomplishment of this end. In the absence of other arrangements and pending the re-establishment of trade on a private basis, USCC and UKCC would offer to the Italian Government their services in conducting on an agency basis the sale abroad of Italian goods. They would operate, in case the offer should be accepted, under the limitations above referred to and in harmony with arrangements worked out between the corporations and the Italian Government.

## 9. AT LONG LAST THE BREAD RATION IS INCREASED

### HOW THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER WAS HANDLED IN THE FACE OF BRITISH DISSENT

[Memo, Brig Gen George A. Lincoln, Chief, Strategy and Policy Gp, OPD, for Asst Sec, WDGS, 16 Jan 45, ABC files, 430, sec. 1, CCS 602/5]

\* \* \* In view of critical shipping situation the British will not agree to directing General Wilson to increase ration to 300 grams unless at same time necessary additional shipping can be assured. SACMED cannot be promised additional shipping until completion of current examination of world shipping. Therefore message proposed in this paper merely *authorizes* SACMED to increase ration up to maximum of 300 grams per day to extent possible under currently approved shipping program. *Such action may or may not comply with President's desire to increase ration to 300 grams but is best compromise possible in view of shipping situation.*

### HALF A LOAF IS BETTER THAN NONE

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 18 Jan 45, FAN-478]

1. Critical food situation in presently occupied Italy and urgency of establishing a basis for supply planning for Northern Italy is fully appreciated here. However, in view of the extensive shipping commitments involved it will be impossible to give you a reply on your recommenda-

tion as to the basic ration to be established in areas now occupied by the Germans until completion of the current over-all examination of the world shipping situation now being conducted in Washington.

2. Meanwhile you are authorized to establish with that part of Italy which has now been liberated from German control the maximum basic ration you decide is practicable in light of the currently approved shipping programme up to a maximum of 300 grams of bread (or equivalent) per person per day.<sup>9</sup>

3. As to German-occupied Italy, it is recognized that because of limited shipping you may be unable to stockpile reserves of wheat/flour in advance of liberation and that unless additional shipping can be provided you may be unable to establish and maintain in areas now occupied by the Germans a ration on the same scale as that which you are authorized to establish in areas now liberated. However, . . . your recommendation with respect to the desirability of a ration

<sup>9</sup>The Quartermaster General had calculated that SACMED's estimate of the tonnage necessary to maintain a 300-gram bread ration in all of liberated Italy was too high by about 500,000 tons. It was this fact, together with its belief that the current shipping rate might be maintained, which led the CCS to conclude that SACMED could sustain the increase which it authorized.

up to 300 grams in areas now occupied by the Germans, once they have been liberated, will be given urgent consideration in the current over-all examination of the world shipping situation. . . .

#### AUTHORITY FOR INCREASE WILL BE USED—WHEN THE WHEAT ARRIVES

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander, SACMED, to CCS, 26 Jan 45, OPD files, MC-OUT 9132]

1. I appreciate the authority contained in your FAN 478 to issue 300 grams of bread per person per day in all presently liberated Italy and am anxious to use that authority as early as possible.
2. My present stock position and my advices of shipments for January and February make it impracticable to order the increased issue at an early date. \* \* \*

#### REASONS FOR LONG DELAY IN THE 300-GRAM BREAD RATION

[Disposition Form, Hilldring for SW Stimson, 8 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

3. On 6 November 1944 U.S. members of CCAC Supply Subcommittee pursuant to direction of the President presented to the Supply Subcommittee a proposed cable directing SACMED to establish the 300 gram bread ration in that portion of Italy now under Allied control. . . . the Prime Minister by cable advised the President of his non-concurrence in the proposed directive to the theater.
4. The question of whether the theater commander should be directed to establish 300 gram bread ration in Italy was under discussion between British and American Governments from November 1944 to January 1945. . . .

[Ltr, SW Stimson to Congressman Vito Marcantonio, 27 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

\* \* \* The inability to increase the bread ration in Italy does not result from a shortage of food because up to date the world supply of wheat has been adequate to meet the requirements which the theater commander has estimated as necessary to accomplish 300 grams a day bread ration. The problem has, at all times, since the receipt of the President's letter been one of assuring sufficient shipment to transport the wheat to Italy. . . .

#### GIVING AND MISGIVING

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 16 Feb 45, NAF-865]

1. Consequent upon shipments of wheat in sight for February arrival and scheduled for succeeding months I have authorized extension of a 300 gram bread ration for all liberated Italy effective 1 March 1945.
2. Reference joint announcement proposed in your FAN 478 and W-22519 of 18 January view held here is that it is not desirable to give undue prominence to this increased ration because firstly unforeseen circumstances might later make it necessary to reduce the ration; secondly it will not be possible to give this ration in Northern Italy when liberated for some considerable period on account of transportation difficulties; thirdly the intention to increase the ration was made known sometime ago and an announcement that we are now fulfilling this intention might appear belated. For these reasons suggest matter should be not treated as if it were some new step but merely as the natural outcome of previous announcements. . . .

## 10. CONTROLS ARE FINALLY RELAXED

#### CHIEF COMMISSIONER MAKES CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON RELAXING CONTROLS

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 19 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

(c) *Para 2(C)* [of the CCS directive on the New Policy, p. 515, above]. . . .

(i) . . . Certain Italian decrees may affect Allied Military Government Territory and since it is considered desirable to coordinate policy in territory which will be ultimately transferred, I

shall cause informal consultations to be continued between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government, particularly in relation to economic decrees.

(ii) I shall also interpret this clause, to vest in SACMED the right, when necessary, to exercise control in any decree affecting military needs and the requirements of the campaign.

(d). *Para 2(D)* . . . All Service Sub-Commissions desire to retain the right of vetoing military appointments. The technical posts of Direc-

tors of Telecommunications and Railroads will be considered military appointments as hitherto.<sup>10</sup>

#### ONLY WAY TO WITHDRAW IS TO WITHDRAW

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 19 Feb 45]

(ii) . . . There will be great temptation on the part of military formations and services, Italian local authorities and Allied Commission officers to regret the departure of Allied Commission officers and to retain a "small" number which will gradually grow and will lead us to fall between the two stools of (a) control, which necessitates many officers, and (b) decontrol, which should need none. It is essential that military formations and services should be instructed not to ask for the retention of Allied Commission officers but to take their share in some of the difficulties which will have to be faced by Allies and Italians alike as a result of the CCS directive. The Allied Commission will be compelled to give up responsibilities and duties which have been of value to the Allied military formations: Allied officers who have been the proper media between Allied military authorities and the Italian local Governments will disappear. I would ask that a direction be issued to military formations and services on this and other matters arising out of the directive. \* \* \*

#### THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS TOLD OF THE NEW POLICY

[*Aide-mémoire* for Communication to the Italian Govt by Actg President AC, 24 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain jointly declared on September 26, 1944 that, subject to effective maintenance of law and order as well as the regular administration of justice, an increasing measure of control should be handed over to the Italian Government. In order to implement this declaration, the Allied Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the Armistice and surrender instrument in the matter of day to day administration and only to exercise such control when Allied military interests require.

3. The Political Section of the Allied Commission is being abolished as of 1 March 1945.

<sup>10</sup> These recommendations seemed to the Chief Commissioner to be warranted by the CCS directive and he was sustained in this position by higher authority.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will thus have no direct counterpart in the Commission. It will deal with the Chief Commissioner on matters of major policy, and on matters of minor policy and routine business it will address itself to whatever section<sup>11</sup> (Economic or Civil Affairs) of the Commission [as] may be appropriate to the subject involved. Matters involving the travel of diplomatic and other public officials will hereafter be dealt with on behalf of the Commission by the Office of the Executive Commissioner.

4. The Italian Government will continue, as at present, to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal. It is necessary, however, that the Allied Commission be kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other Governments. It is agreed in principle that facilities for the use of secret bags will be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their diplomatic representatives abroad. Undeposited cypher facilities cannot be allowed.

Insofar as these negotiations have to do with economic and financial matters, this requirement will be met by keeping the Economic Section and its Finance Sub-Commission informed of the progress of such negotiations. . . .

An arrangement can also be made whereby the Italian Government furnish a periodic summary of negotiations completed or pending with other Governments.

7. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission for decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

It is, however, desirable to work out with the Italian Government a procedure for ensuring that the Allied Commission is informed of proposed decrees some time before their enactment, in order to enable the Chief Commissioner to consult with the Italian Government as to their application to territory under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government (AMG), and to lay plans for their effective implementation in such territory when appropriate.

9. The Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be withdrawn as soon as possible. Representatives of the Allied

<sup>11</sup> The Administrative Section had by this time been replaced by a Civil Affairs Section which comprised all the subcommissions which were not of an economic character or independent of the sections.

Commission will, however, be sent into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government when it considers such action necessary and certain specialist officers with economic functions will remain in such territory for a limited period.

In implementation of this policy, it is intended to abolish by April 1, 1945, the Regional Offices of the Allied Commission for Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern and Lazio-Umbria Regions. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS SEEM HAPPIER

[Rome Despatch to *Stars and Stripes*, 27 Feb 45, Microfilm, *Stars and Stripes*]

The announcement by Harold Macmillan, acting President of the Allied Commission, that greater autonomy has been restored to the Italian Government was hailed with satisfaction by the press here today.

. . . Though some journals had reservations, the general tone was approval.

Riconstruzione, organ of the Labor Democratic Party, said, ". . . we must recognize that the autonomy of which the Italian Government can today avail itself is the maximum to be allowed under war circumstances."

Il Globo, financial paper, called the latest decision a substantial step forward. It declared that "the best way to help Italy is to let Italy help herself. A corpse is always an embarrassing object." \* \* \*

Il Lavoro, organ of the General Confederation of Labor suggested that gratified press comment had gone beyond reality. It said Italians must avoid illusions, without belittling the importance of what had been done.

Il Populo, Christian Democrat newspaper, said the change was "a gesture of confidence toward our government and our people alike." \* \* \*

#### LIAISON OFFICERS FOR GOVERNMENT TERRITORY

[Hq AC, Directive, 24 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

1. The first duty of Allied Commission liaison officers will be to keep themselves, at all times, informed of the situation in the areas with which they are concerned. . . .

3. Liaison officers will keep close touch with the senior military formation, American and British, in their areas. They will endeavour at all times to assist military formations in their relations with Italian Government departments and agencies. They must, however, remember that they are liaison officers and not executive officers and will not be able to carry out many of the functions of Provincial Commissioners.

Points which may require special attention are:  
a. Law cases affecting Allied personnel or property.

b. Epidemics endangering Allied personnel.

c. Requisitioning and derequisitioning.

d. Relations between Allied and Italian police forces. \* \* \*

#### AC OFFICIALS WILL HAVE TO TREAT THE GOVERNMENT SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to AC Secs, 27 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/90]

1. Vice Presidents will impress upon the Directors of their Sub-Commissions, and Directors of independent Sub-Commissions upon their officers, the necessity of implementing the policy of the CCS directive defining the new relations of the Allied Commission with the Italian Government, especially with respect to the following paragraph:

"The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels."

2. Experience during the last six months has shown that whereas officers in the field have been careful to avoid executive action or speech with officials with the Provincial governments, there has been a tendency at HQ of officers in the Sub-Commissions to forget that the dropping of the "C" from A.C.C. was intended to convert the relations between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government to those of adviser (and provider of supplies) on the one hand and of a sovereign government on the other. I have heard reports of discussions and conferences which lead me to think that more forceful measures than advice have been used to persuade—if indeed not to compel—the Italian Government to accept the views of the Allied Commission and come into line. . . .

In future . . . Vice Presidents and Directors of Sub-Commissions will ensure that such formal advice as it may be necessary to convey to the Italian Government is given by Vice Presidents or their Deputies or by Directors of Sub-Commissions, to Ministers or Under-Secretaries.

#### AFHQ GIVES UP CONTROL OF INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 29 Mar 45, OPD Msg files, NAF-903]

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN

487 [CCS Directive, 30 January, Section 8, p. 517, above], PWB now:

(A) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign.<sup>12</sup>

(B) Relinquished control of Italian radio network which is now operated by Italian radio agency.

(D) Handed over as appropriate informational activities in connection with books, plays, copyrights, news features and photographic services to Allied Commission, OWI, MOI [Ministry of Information (British)] and British and United States embassies.

Similar action will be taken in respect of areas further north as soon as convenient after their liberation. \* \* \*

#### CIVILIANIZATION OF AC DOES NOT MEAN LOSS OF MILITARY CONTROL

[Ltr, Brig Gen Edward B. McKinley, Deputy Vice President, Econ Sec, AC, to Hilldring, 4 Apr 45, CAD files, 334, ACC (9-17-43), sec. 3]

\* \* \* The fact that all FEA employees are concentrated in Economic Section has caused the organization to have a FEA "underground" which communicates directly with Crowley [Administrator FEA] and feels a loyalty only to him. He sends them over and calls them back regardless of whether they can be spared, much to the consternation of Admiral Stone. Also they act upon instructions in personnel matters which are communicated directly and do not come through the proper channels.

This is still decidedly a military show and will be for a long time to come—until we go into the North and all AMG is finally being moved from the North. As long as it remains a military show the channels and loyalties must remain military. Don't think that all plans aren't being made to replace the military with civilians as rapidly as possible, but this must be done from the bottom up, not from the top down. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Hilldring to McKinley, 18 Apr 45]

\* \* \* The agreement whereby civilian agency furnish civilian experts for duty overseas

<sup>12</sup> This was only one of numerous transfers of authority made by the theater on its own initiative. In January, for example, the Allied Publications Board (A.P.B.) had delegated to the Italian Press Commission all powers regarding the granting or revocation of licenses in territory under Italian jurisdiction. P.W.B.-controlled papers remained exempt from this control and A.P.B. reserved the right of intervention on questions of military security or undemocratic practices. ACC files, 10000/101/502.

provides that these civilians are to be integrated at the control level of the council under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the theater commander. Therefore, there is no excuse for "back door" correspondence by any civilian on official matters about which the theater commander should be informed. If in spite of the agreement, civilian personnel in Allied commission continues to circumvent . . . I will take this matter up with appropriate civilian authorities. \* \* \*

#### OFFICERS MAY BE CIVILIANIZED IF THEY SO DESIRE

[Memo, AC Hq to U.S. Army Officers Assigned to AC, 4 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/74]

1. There is in the process of development a procedure which will enable U.S. Army officers who have evidenced their desire to do so, and who are found to be qualified, to be relieved from active duty from the Army of the United States and immediately re-employed in this headquarters for a position with the appropriate U.S. Government civilian agency. \* \* \*

#### SURVEY OF PROGRESS AND DELAY IN RELAXING CONTROLS

[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for CCS, 11 May 45, MTO, HS files, AC-387.4/079, G-EG-O, AFHQ Papers]

\* \* \* The Political Section of the Allied Commission was abolished 1 March [See par. 3, *Aide-mémoire*, above] and the Allied Commission has since received political guidance from the U.S. and UK ambassadors in Rome. For day to day advice and in order that specific Embassy officials may be readily available to the Commission, particularly in the absence of the ambassadors, the U.S. and UK ambassadors have nominated representatives from their staffs to act as Political Advisors to the Chief Commissioner. These are stationed at Headquarters Allied Commission and comprise one Second Secretary and one Third Secretary on the American side, and one official with the rank of Minister and a Second Secretary on the British side. \* \* \*

b. (1) . . . The Italian Government has given oral assurance to the Chief Commissioner to keep the Commission advised of any negotiations in which it may engage with other governments. The Chief Commissioner, however, reports he is not wholly satisfied that the Commission is, in fact, being fully informed of such

negotiations and is taking steps with the Prime Minister to correct the situation.

(4) . . . Permission has been given for the Italian Government to communicate with their representatives by means of uncensored sealed bag facilities. It has not, however, been considered possible to permit them undeposited cipher facilities. . . .<sup>13</sup>

e. . . . As reported . . . general withdrawal of Allied Commission officers from Italian Government territory took place 1 April. In the Allied military interest it was considered necessary to retain certain liaison and specialist officers in such territory. \* \* \*

f. (2) The Italian Minister of Public Instruction has expressed himself as most anxious to promote interchange of knowledge and learning between Italy and the United Nations, and has set up the following committees to formulate plans to place before the Allied Commission:

(A) Two committees to consider the interchange of professors and students, the facilities available in Italy and those facilities they would like to receive from the United Nations.

(b) One committee to consider the exchange of books and periodicals. This committee is to concentrate in the first place on those of a scholarly nature published during the war years. This committee will also prepare lists of former subscribers to periodicals and lists of Italian bodies which formerly subscribed to United Nations publications.

(3) The Italian Government is also considering making proposals for interchange of scientific journals and of medical representatives.

(4) Contact has already been established with the International British and American Scout Organizations.

(5) This headquarters has had meetings with a view to putting forward proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for relaxing travel control to permit (*inter alia*) the above categories of persons to move into and out of Italy and these will be submitted separately. \* \* \*

g. . . . Provision for the compilation of electoral lists was made by the Italian Government by Decree-Law of 28 September 1944 and a Ministerial Decree of 18 October 1944. The preparation of the lists is proceeding and it is hoped to complete them by mid-May. The Italian Government is preparing a decree to regulate the conduct of local elections and intend to review

<sup>13</sup> AFHQ in MAT-469, 19 December 1944, had represented to CCAC that granting of these facilities was not practicable.

the pre-Fascist Law in that connection. Advice is being tendered to the Italian Government by the Commission on aspects of the draft decree with a view to ensuring freedom and secrecy of voting.

h. . . . Proposals submitted by the Italian Government and the Allied Commission for changing the status of prisoners of war serving with the Allies in Italy were considered here. They were unacceptable but counter proposals submitted by this headquarters proved acceptable to the Italian Government and have been submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval in NAF 951.<sup>14</sup> \* \* \*

k. . . . (2) . . . On 2 April 1945 the total of Allied civilians employed by the Commission was 91 (60 U.S. and 31 British). . . . The total number of officers of military status then employed by the Commission on AC AMG work was 1409.

(3) . . . The plans prepared by the Allied Commission for further civilian infiltration envisaged that by the time the liberation of northern Italy is reached, it will have been possible to employ a total of 115 Allied civilians and to reduce the number of officers of military status to 1300. Allied Commission states that in their view, still further civilianization will depend on the rate at which it is possible to hand territory back to the Italian Government. The matter is under further study by Allied Commission headquarters with a view to more precise plans being formulated.

l. (1) . . . The segregation of officers dealing with AMG functions from those dealing only with Allied Commission functions will be carried out as far as practicable. It is pointed out, however, that there are difficulties in carrying out such segregation, particularly with respect to duplication of personnel which may well be necessary if headquarters are separated. In an endeavor to achieve the object desired, Headquarters Allied Commission have given particular consideration to locating the Local Government, Labor, Monument Fine Arts & Education Sub-Commissions at places other than Rome on the ground that those sub-commissions are most closely concerned with problems arising out of AMG territory. . . .

<sup>14</sup> The agreement provided that all "Co-operatives" (i.e., prisoners of war working for the Allied forces voluntarily in Italy) would be released to the Italian Government 1 July. The Government agreed automatically to retain the personnel and to form them into units similar to those to which POW's previously belonged. Such personnel would automatically become subject to Italian Military law.

(2) . . . On the general question, however, Allied Commission will establish as operations permit, an advance headquarters in Military Government territory where all matters affecting

military government will be dealt with except those requiring close consultation with the Italian Government or with the Commission itself. \* \* \*

## II. REHABILITATION PROGRAM MUST WAIT FOR PEACE AND UNRRA

### PURPOSES OF THE PROGRAM FOR REHABILITATION SUPPLIES ARE OUTLINED

[Program of Essential Italian Imports 1945, Prepared by the Italian Govt in Collaboration With AC, Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/364]

2. In general, what the Allies have been doing so far is to spoonfeed Italy with finished products. Partly, of course, this policy resulted from the fact that the original military program for Italian supplies contemplated military responsibility for only six months; . . . Moreover, of course, the destruction of Italian industry by the Germans, and the crippling effect of power and transportation shortages, have made the reactivation of plant and equipment most difficult during the past months.

3. . . . the time has now come for the Italian economy to begin pulling its own weight in the boat. It is possible for Italy to do this now for the first time—because the Italian Government is now developing administrative machinery which can plan and carry through a production program, and because essential first steps have been taken by the military forces and the Italians to organize the economy for production.

4. The limiting factors on production are now three:

a. Transportation

b. Electric Power

c. Imported production materials and equipment.

The presentation of the Program of Essential Italian Imports, 1945, reflects the attack on these three limiting factors. In the following paragraphs the standard and levels of economic life implied in this Program are summarized and briefly discussed.

#### 5. *Transportation* . . .

a. In general, the purpose of the import program for transportation is to place the Italian economy in a position where it can transport a minimum ration of food and have left over the

minimum amount of transportation necessary to implement a program of agricultural, mineral and industrial production in Liberated Italy. \* \* \*

#### 6. *Electric Power* . . .

b. The above program leaves entirely out of account the major reconstruction of many large generating plants which are now so badly destroyed that whole new installations will have to be built from the ground up. The purpose of the present Program is merely to provide the replacement, maintenance and repair supplies to transmit and efficiently utilize the limited quantities of power likely to become available. \* \* \*

#### 7. *Agriculture* . . .

a. The clear purpose of the agricultural section of this Program is to maximize production of food both in Liberated Italy and in northern Italy after liberation. . . .

14. Italy and the Italians are ready to go to work. The will, the skill and the manpower are there but the tools have been destroyed and the materials are lacking. To the extent they can be supplied and shipped, the Italians will be enabled to dig themselves out of the hole in which Fascism has left their country; and, to the extent of their success, they will cease to be a continuing charge on the economies of the United Nations. \* \* \*

### FEA AND WAR DEPARTMENT WILL COMBINE MILITARY AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

[Ltr, Arthur Paul, Exec Dir, Bur of Areas, OLLA, to McCloy, 15 Mar 45, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Italy]

\* \* \* In view of the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister which was issued on September 26, 1944 and the desire of this government to further the contribution of Italy to the war and to minimize interferences with the war, it seems clear that the supplies to

be provided to Italy should include more than those commonly provided under the so-called disease and unrest formula applied by the Army. Experience has shown that this formula is not the one best adapted to serve our military and national interests in respect to Italy. I understand, however, that the War Department feels that it would be inadvisable on its part to include in its appropriation request essential civilian supplies of a type falling outside this formula.

It is proposed, therefore, that for the fiscal year 1946 the War Department and the FEA shall agree on an essential supply program for Italy which will carry out the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister, and which will include both the types of supplies previously supplied by the Army and other types contemplated by the joint statement. The FEA will include the funds necessary for this program in its lend-lease appropriation estimate and will inform the Congress that these funds are to be used for the purchase of goods to be transferred to the War Department, or in other words, for the financing of requirements certified by the War Department to the FEA. While the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister go beyond the customary War Department formula for essential civilian supplies, it is definitely linked to the war effort in that its principal objective is most effectively to place the resources of Italy in the war. This broader aim is one which the War Department will support in the Congressional hearing as one of military value.<sup>15</sup> \* \* \*

#### SHIPPING REMAINS A LIMITING FACTOR

[Memo, ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, for Actg President, AC, 29 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/109/734]

\* \* \* 1. Until the final cessation of hostilities with both Germany and Japan inadequate shipping can be expected to be a limiting factor. Currently it is a *critical* factor. All plans and programs, therefore, must be prepared with a view to minimizing shipping requirements during the continuation of military responsibility.

2. There must be maximum development and use of local resources of food and supplies of the nature now being imported. This is necessary not only because of the saving thus effected in shipping, but also because the resources available to the United Nations are being taxed severely to provide relief for the rapidly expanding liberated areas in all theaters of war. \* \* \*

<sup>15</sup> This letter was written to confirm the understanding reached by FEA with the War Department at meeting of representatives on 13 March 1945.

#### LIBERATION OF NORTHERN ITALY REQUIRES REVISION OF REHABILITATION PROGRAM

[Ltr, Bonomi to the Chief Cmsr, AC, 30 May 45, ASF, ID files, Basic Policy-Italy]

2. When the first [rehabilitation] program was prepared it was impossible to foresee how long the war in Italy would last and what destruction and looting the Germans would do to the economic resources of Northern Italy, during the last phases of the war. Therefore only the productive capacity and industrial plants of the regions that had so far been liberated were considered.

3. Most luckily the liberation of the North happened so rapidly that the industrial plants and the transportation system suffered only very light damage. However, they are practically idle owing to the lack of coal and certain raw materials.

5. One of the aspects of the new situation that must be most seriously considered is the problem of employment of the specialized labor located in the densely populated and highly industrialized regions of the North. . . . Every person that observes the conditions of the working classes in the North agrees on the absolute urgency to put them back to work at once, because it is feared that if this does not happen there will be a most serious agitation.

6. For this reason it is necessary, following the liberation of Northern Italy, to coordinate and integrate the "Program of Essential Italian Imports-1945" by increasing the quantities of raw materials in respect to finished products. \* \* \*

#### AFTER THE WAR THE ARMY TURNS OVER REHABILITATION SUPPLY PROGRAM TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Ltr, McCloy to William L. Clayton, Chairman, Liberated Areas Comm., 2 Jun 45, ASF, ID files, Hist of Civ Sup, DS-361]

\* \* \* Because requirements . . . have just been received in the War Department, up to this time no supplies have been furnished to Italy above those necessary to avoid disease and unrest. Since the broadened policy can no longer find support on military basis, no supplies will be furnished by the War Department to implement such policy.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> FEA took over the military program for the period September-December 1945 while the rehabilitation program to which McCloy referred became the basis of the UNRRA supply program scheduled to begin in January 1946. (See below, Chapter XXI, Section 3.)

## SACMED and the Partisans—Alliance or Misalliance?

All Allied policy in Italy was influenced by two aims—eliciting of maximum Italian contribution to the war effort, and development of an Italy which would be friendly to the Allies in the years after the war. The New Policy, just reviewed, offered Italians dispensations which promoted both aims but to a large extent it fell short, especially in respect to the more immediate aim. The reason was that, though the New Policy was addressed to all Italy, in fact there were two Italys of which one could derive from this policy no immediate benefit. There was the Italy behind Allied lines, wherein the regular Italian Army helped in proportion to its gradual rehabilitation; there was also the more extensive and populous Italy behind enemy lines, wherein numerous partisan bands helped no less valuably through sabotage and other means. The partisans of the north could be given further incentive only by a different sort of New Deal, and their underground organization sent secret emissaries who specified partisan expectations. They asked not only for more funds but for Allied formal recognition as agent of the Italian Government. The virtual alliance which they sought with SACMED would be mutually beneficial militarily, especially upon invasion of the north, but, in the light of reports that partisan leadership and membership were largely communistic, the proposed alliance posed serious problems politically for the postwar future if not also the present.

Already, in the advance in central Italy, it had been necessary to decide whether order would be better served by disarming the guerrilla fighters as they came within Allied lines, or by incorporating them as units within the Italian Army. The problem was much more difficult, and military and political interests more in conflict, as it became necessary to plan for the occupation of northern Italy. Here it was necessary to choose between the military advantages of co-operating with the strongly organized CLN's to the north and the political dangers of building up forces which might eventually challenge the authority of the Italian Government. AFHQ and combat commanders were concerned with deriving maximum military advantages from the resistance movement while the control commission was intent on minimizing political and social disorders and avoiding any challenge to the Italian Government. Policy therefore wavered: in the earlier stage of deliberations the resistance movement was fostered and encouraged; in a later stage, when enemy collapse appeared imminent, the emphasis was on playing down and controlling the movement.

Clarity and consistency of policy were made difficult not only by the conflicting goals of the Allies but also by the variegated character of the movement itself. The nucleus of the resistance consisted of the old anti-Fascist parties augmented,

after the armistice, by those who were inspired as much by hatred of the Germans as by opposition to Fascism. Included also were remnants of the dispersed army, fugitives from the German labor camps, and Allied prisoners of war including some Yugoslavs and Russians. Besides those who rendered genuine and valuable service to Allied arms there were large numbers of Johnny-Come-Latelies seeking plunder and favors. Political coloration varied, but amongst the most energetic and capable were the Communists who saw in the movement a means of influencing and perhaps controlling postwar Italy. Relatively small groups of guerrilla fighters were encountered south of Rome, but north of the capital the movement was fairly widespread, and its most efficient organization was in the north, in Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venetia.

During the period of the advance on Rome it was the policy of SACMED to encourage the activities of the partisans by appointing liaison officers and dropping supplies and radio transmitters. After the partisan groups were overtaken by the advance they became the responsibility of AMG, which disarmed the guerrillas, furnished them temporary care, and saw that they were given a chance for employment on a priority basis. In an attempt to distinguish genuine partisans who had rendered significant military service from opportunists who had flocked to the colors at the eleventh hour, investigations were conducted and certificates of merits issued to bona fide claimants.

The efforts to civilianize and rehabilitate the partisans were not an unqualified success. Posters and certificates were all right in their way but the men were more interested in food and cigarettes. Many wanted to continue the fight against the enemy. Enlistment of individuals in the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment was allowed, but since the

partisans generally preferred to serve in their own units and under their own leaders this policy met with little success. Although there were valid objections to forming special nuclei within the Army, these were overridden and a modified program was adopted whereby one reconnaissance group (of an approximate strength of 500) "comprising their own bands under their own officers" was authorized to operate with each of the five Italian Gruppi.

This modification was made in accordance with the policy of making maximum use of the resistance in liberating the north. In Milan a coalition of resistance parties, the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale l'Alta Italia (CLNAI) had been formed. In November 1944 leaders of CLNAI came to Rome to report the exhaustion of their funds and to ask to be recognized as agents of the Italian Government in northern Italy. Although some members of AC feared an independent government might be set up as in Greece, Mr. Macmillan felt that the military advantages of recognition outweighed possible political embarrassments. It was therefore decided that the AC should invite the Italian Government to enter into a tripartite agreement between the Allied authorities, the Italian Government, and CLNAI. Soon after this action was taken, however, a cabinet crisis arose which made a tripartite agreement impossible. AFHQ, believing that the enemy might evacuate northwestern Italy in December, was extremely anxious to utilize the resistance in antiscorch measures. Consequently on 7 December a bipartite agreement was concluded whereby CLNAI agreed to carry out all instructions of the Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, in exchange for a monthly contribution of 160 million lire. It might be added that financial assistance was nothing new. Since its formation in April 1944, CLNAI had been given aid

by OSS and British Special Operations (SOE) which up to the date of the agreement amounted to a substantial sum. After the formation of a new Italian cabinet a political agreement was signed between CLNAI and the Government.

All these actions were taken on the premise that the partisans would be of primary importance in the liberation of northern Italy. But by the winter of 1945 the German armies in Italy, as elsewhere, appeared on the point of collapse. Reports from the field indicated that organized bands were disregarding the agreements and that the Communists were planning to seize power by force when the Germans were expelled. Furthermore, AFHQ concluded that it was too late to build up a partisan army of major military value. These developments produced a shift

whereby the principal consideration became the peaceful and orderly occupation of northern Italy by Allied forces. Military aid to partisans was curtailed and the chief emphasis was put upon such preparations for help and reward as would dispose them to lay down their arms and co-operate with both AMG and the Italian Government. But there could be no assurance that the members of an organization so largely led by Communists and so oriented toward political goals would be satisfied with these limited and purely individual rewards for past services. A not inconsiderable suspense thus prevailed over the outcome as the Allied armies prepared to launch the offensive that was to bring them to the northern areas where the CLN's would be encountered in great numbers.

## I. SOMEWHAT PUZZLING COBELLIGERENTS BEHIND ENEMY'S LINES

### ITALIAN PATRIOTS: ANTI-FASCISTS WHO FOUGHT AS GUERRILLAS

[Memo, Patriot Bands in Central Italy, by Patriots Branch, ACC, ca. Jul 44, Encl, to Memo, Patriots Branch, 24 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

#### I. *Origin of the Bands*

The Patriot Movement does not represent something completely new in Italian life; it can be considered a new and wider development of the struggle carried out during the last twenty years by several underground organizations against the Fascist regime.<sup>1</sup> The activities of these underground organizations had a direct influence in creating the conditions which made possible the *coup-d'état* of July 25, 1943.

After the *coup-d'état*, leaders and members of the underground organizations came out into the open. With the re-establishment of the Fascist regime (25 Sept. 1943), it became imperative for anti-fascists in enemy occupied territory to go into hiding. The same was done by many

other people who had not taken part in the anti-fascist activities before July 25th; and who after that date had shown sympathy for the new regime and for the Allied cause.

As a result of the armistice, most of the Italian Army disbanded. Officers and soldiers went home or tried to reach home hoping that the Allies would soon arrive. When the new Fascist Government was re-established and it became evident that the enemy was going to occupy parts of the country for a certain while, officers and soldiers who did not want to join the new Fascist Army or were afraid of being sent to Germany to work, went into hiding.

Among the hundreds of thousands who went into hiding during the months of September and tions absorbed many of the people willing to engage in anti-fascist and all anti-German activities. In the towns the old anti-fascist organizations absorbed many of the people willing to act against the enemy. New groups were formed mainly by former officers in the Italian Armed Forces. In the rural districts a separation was soon established between members of bands and those who were simply waiting for the arrival of the Allies. Also in the rural districts, members of the former anti-fascist organizations succeeded

<sup>1</sup>The Italian bands outside the Italian Army who fought against the Germans and Fascists were sometimes called Patriots and sometimes Partisans. In Central Italy, where, in the summer of 1944, they were first met in considerable numbers, they were most often known as Patriots.

in establishing some kind of authority over the bands, except for those bands which were formed by officers and men of the disbanded Italian Army. \* \* \*

#### PARTISANS OF CENTRAL ITALY ARE ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED MORE FOR FIGHTING THAN FOR POLITICS

[Capt R. W. Buckley, ACC, Rpt, 30 Jun 44, Considered at Meeting at Advance Headquarters, ACC, 3 July 1944, to Discuss Policy Toward Partisans, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

I. . . . Partisans are of three kinds:

(1) Foreign guerillas, i.e., British POW escaped, Jugo Slavs, Russians who mix freely with Italians and usually lead.

(2) Italian Patriots who have lost homes or families or are prepared to sacrifice themselves mostly non-political.

(3) Mock patriots, i.e., last minute converts, political turn-coats and job seekers. These are most numerous on our side of the line. Their worthlessness in no way minimises the fine work of the first two.

3. (2) Lt. "Monti"<sup>2</sup> is in charge of TAC Partisans Headquarters, reporting direct for operations with G-1 8th Army and working closely with G-2. He organizes the partisans behind the lines and utilizes those in newly acquired territory. . . . He had plenty of material, including captured German Orders showing how important the partisans work had been in harrying the German War Effort. Even while I was talking to him in his headquarters, two partisans brought in a pin pointed location of the enemy battery which was making itself a nuisance in the town (and within two hours it was silenced).

As part of his job is to co-ordinate the work of partisans on both sides of the front, and bring about contacts, both for his "staffette" and organizers, it is highly important that visitors from unliberated Italy should not obtain the impression that partisans are not justly treated once their work is finished. Lieutenant Monti had . . . arranged an "intimate tea" at which the CAO's, partisans from both sides of the line and local rich men, could get an insight into the work. He wanted from the first their good will and patience, from the second their devotion and lives, and from the third, money. He insisted that the bulk of partisan activity had been done by Jugoslavs and Russians . . . and that for the most part the movement was military and not political. There were communists and groups of

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<sup>2</sup> Lt Monti was a Communist partisan and was frequently referred to as one of Group Capt. Benson's spear-head CAO's.

politically, even monarchists, but they had combined for fighting. Feri, a youthful leader of Rome Central Committee of Liberation, was a partisan from hatred of Germans, who had killed and tortured various members of his family. He said there was no political activity only military; they were organized in five big groups (Florence, Rome, etc.) without any central co-ordination. Their orders were received direct from Allied Command, through Monti, or his staffette. He desired the organization of partisans into battalions for regular or irregular fighting (Ardite) or as labor battalions. \* \* \*

#### PARTISANS OF NORTHERN ITALY HAVE AN ORGAN OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP—THE CLNAI

[Extract from Transl of Pamphlet Issued by the CLNAI, undated, ACC files, 10000/105/641]

\* \* \* The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI), is the body of united political leadership for the movement of liberation in Northern Italy. This leadership expresses itself, in the military field, through the general headquarters of the Volontari della Liberta Corps and its attached regional and zone headquarters; in the political field, through the regional, provincial, communal CLN's, those of the village, section, factory, and concern. \* \* \*

The CLNAI has arisen through the initiative of anti-fascist parties which have incessantly expressed the desire of the Italian people for freedom and independence from fascism. It has sprung from the need and desire to give the movement of liberation and national insurrection a united political leadership. The insurrection is not, nor can it be, the task of a single party or class, but of the entire people struggling for its independence and freedom against the German and his fascist henchmen. \* \* \*

The CLNAI has arisen as a collective body formed by the delegates of the five major parties which have fostered and organized in occupied Italy the movement of national liberation and the anti fascist struggle of the masses for the suppression of Mussolini's regime. These are the Communist, the Socialist, the Action, the Christian Democratic and the Liberal Parties. An essential member of the CLNAI is the General Headquarters of the Volontari della Liberta' Corps which maintains liaison with our heroic and gallant fighters and represents their needs, aspirations and desires. In order to insure a more efficacious and democratic leadership for the movement of national liberation, the CLNAI has answered the need to expand by admitting in

its midst representatives of those people's organizations which have contributed to the struggle for liberation; so that today the representatives of the Fronte della Gioventu' per l'Indipendenza Nazionale e la Liberta' and those of the Gruppi di Difesa della Donna—organizations adhering to and recognized by the CLNAI and which are enrolling and leading tens of thousands of young men and women, participate by right in the activities of the CLNAI.

Moreover, the CLNAI has recognized the national function of the Committees of Agitation which foster and direct the fight of the working class against the occupying force, collaborating bosses, deportations and for the general insurrectional strike; it has insured a close contact with these Committees as well as with the Committees for the Defense of Farmers, through its central bodies and local sections.

Other parties and organizations, besides the original components of the CLNAI or those which participate in it by virtue of their national and united character, have proclaimed their adherence to the principles and discipline of the Committee of Liberation. For example, the Democratic Workers' Party (Partio della Democrazia del Lavoro), the Republican Party, the Catholic Communist Movement, are represented in the regional, provincial and local sections of the CLNAI wherever these parties or movements have organized forces.

The regional, provincial, communal CLN's, those of borough and village, factory or business organization . . . form an integral part of the CLNAI and accept its principles and discipline: such are for example Association of Teachers, Doctors, Lawyers, Magistrates, etc. Thus it is safe to say that all the forces of occupied Italy, all the forces contributing to the fight for liberation, find in the CLNAI their spokesmen and recognize its united leadership. \* \* \*

#### THE ALLIES EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITHOUT FORMAL RECOGNITION

[Patriots Branch, ACC, Report, Internal Organization of the Partisan Movement in Italy, 25 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

5. When it became clear that the CLN in Milan had achieved a real authority over this complex movement, and had in fact been recognized by the Italian Government, it was decided to send a distinguished Italian officer, with an unexceptionable democratic background, as a representative of A.A.I. to the CLN. . . . What follows is based in the main on reports from this officer.

7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of co-operation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in passing it is pointed out that where communications consist chiefly of couriers on foot, bicycle, or occasionally motor car, liaison duties assume a very great significance.

8. The lack of communications and the clandestine nature of the organization have made close control of military operations particularly, in the case of distant bands, out of the question. The Committee therefore contents itself with broad operational policy and concentrates mainly on organization. A.A.I. therefore maintain their direct operational control of the bands by means of an increasing network of British, American and Italian liaison officers, and a considerable wireless organization.

9. The CLN has under its direct command the Milan city command and has divided the remainder of enemy occupied Italy into five regional commands. Each of these regional commands has a number of zones, that of Piedmont having the Turin town command in addition. The bands acknowledging the CLN come directly under the respective zones.

The present position is considered to be satisfactory from the point of view of the Allied Armies, in that while the CLN achieves a large measure of political unity and common policy, the control of operations remains with HQ AAI, acting through its British and American operating agencies. . . .

#### ITALIAN OFFICIAL URGES RECOGNIZING PATRIOTS AS SOLDIERS OF ITALIAN ARMY

[Rpt of an Interv by a PWB Representative With Mario Palermo, USW, Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

\* \* \* The project might be summarized as follows: the government would publicly recognize as soldiers of the Italian army all Italians fighting the Germans and Fascists in occupied Italy. The government would appoint a general who would direct and co-ordinate the military efforts of the partisans from this side. . . .

The Italian Government was, Palermo said, most anxious to increase Italy's contribution to the war effort. . . . He felt . . . that it was the duty of the Italian Government directly to encourage in every way possible Italian resistance in Central and Northern Italy. He was passionately interested in the resistance movement and

felt that this movement should be sponsored by the Italian Government. He hoped the Allies would allow the Italian Government to take a direct interest in the movement of resistance, though naturally the final control would rest with the Allies. Although he was a Communist, he did not look at this problem from a Party point of view, but from a national point of view. He believed that at this moment everything should be subordinated to winning the war \* \* \*

#### AN ALLIED OFFICIAL ALSO BELIEVES PATRIOTS NEED A LEAD FROM THE GOVERNMENT

[Col C. D. McCarthy, Dir, Patriots Branch, ACC, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

3. . . . After speaking to a large number of patriots in various corners of the country I personally feel that in the great majority of cases these men have been fighting first to defeat the Germans, second to destroy Fascism and third, in the case of some of them, to build up a new Italy. Most of them have at this stage of the war very little idea of the aims and ambitions of the six political parties in Italy but they are keenly alive to the fact that something drastic must be done about politics in the very near future and, being mostly young and active men, they are keenly susceptible to influence and require a lead from the Italian Government. \* \* \*

#### BUT THE ARMY WANTS TO DIRECT PARTISAN OPERATIONS ITSELF

[Memo, Lt Gen A. F. Harding, CofS, AAI, for Chief Cmsr, ACC, 25 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

1. From unofficial reports received at this Headquarters it is apparent that the Italian Government are endeavouring to control Patriot activities in enemy occupied Italy. The Commander-in-Chief wishes to make it quite clear that under existing circumstances this cannot be tolerated.

2. The Commander-in-Chief reserves the right exclusively to direct their operations as hitherto in order to further his campaign.

3. Amongst the Partisans in Italy there is no unified command which takes its orders direct from the Commander-in-Chief. Resistance Groups have been built up either around members of the Italian Army who found themselves in Northern Italy at the time of the Armistice or around active members of various political parties.

4. All Resistance Groups have the common desire to hasten the liberation of their country,

and the Allies have provided arms, ammunition and equipment that has been available to enable the groups to play an active part.

7. If the Italian Government wish to identify and concern themselves more fully with the Italian Patriots, it is suggested that they concentrate upon the difficult task of moulding the Patriots aspiration into good citizenship so that they may plan an active part in the new Italy. It is suggested that this matter falls within the Province of the Minister of the Interior and not of the Minister for War unless the Patriots are absorbed into the Armed Forces.<sup>3</sup>

#### PWB DECIDES ALLIED PROPAGANDA SHOULD NOW PLAY DOWN PARTISAN SERVICES

[Directive, PWB, I&C Sec, AFHQ, 13 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

1. The campaign has reached a stage where a reaffirmation of our directive for propaganda to the patriots in Northern Italy is necessary. The purpose of this directive is to put the patriot activities into the proper perspective vis-à-vis the Allied armies in Italy and the Italian Regular Army.

2. It is necessary not only because of the emergence of a new stage in the campaign but also because publicity given the patriots has imperceptibly grown to a point where it is out of proportion to the war effort in Italy not only of the Allies but also the Italian Army.

3. A further reason is that there is evidence that certain elements in Italy are likely to make and indeed already to some extent have been making political capital out of the activities of the patriots, using as their basis Allied publicity.

7. It is incorrect . . . to speak of the patriots as liberating any particular area; if they are in control of any one place it is because the Germans have withdrawn from that place and are for the moment not taking action. We should remember that it is the Allies who are liberating Italy with the help of the patriots. The patriots are unable to liberate of their own accord.

9. The foregoing is background to the recent directive to play down very gradually the activities of patriots to liberated Italy and to the rest

<sup>3</sup> With approval of the Acting Chief Commissioner and the Patriots Branch, ACC, the Italian Government set up an Italian Committee under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Bonomi to function in close co-operation with the Allied Control Commission. This committee had no authority north of the rear Army boundaries, which was under absolute control of Headquarters, AAI. See also ACC Instructions on Administration of Patriots, sec. 2, below.

of the world. It is essential that the qualification "very gradually" should be observed in order that there be no appearance of a new directive

to this effect. We are fully aware of the part played by the patriots, for which they should have full credit.

## 2. LIBERATED PARTISANS PREFER THEIR SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES

### PARTISANS WHO DO NOT KNOW AMG DO NOT DEFER TO IT

[Benson, SCAO, AMG, Eighth Army, Rpt, 10 Jun 44, ACC files, 10000/205/564]

4. There has been considerable trouble with partisans. There would appear to be two lots of partisans, one lot (those whom we are meeting now) who have not been officially helped by the Armies in the form of dropping supplies and arms, and the other who have. These latter we have not yet come in contact with. The attitude of the partisans is that they are both military and political. We have met them particularly in Fiuggi, Tivoli, and Anagni. Wherever they have been met we have found that they have set up their own administration and claim that these have been elected by them as representing the people. They have no knowledge of A.M.G. and are usually disinclined to accept its authority. In many cases they have arrested a considerable number of people not always at great discrimination and in some cases these people have only been saved from summary shooting by the arrival of a C.A.O. In Fiuggi they claim that their administration is recognized by the fact that Badoglio in his broadcast about the formation of a new Government asked all the existing administrations in occupied territory to carry on with their work pending formation of new Government. The position about these Partisans is also aggravated in that, owing to the present rate of advance, towns are being left with no military in them at all, and as the partisans are armed it requires great tact on the part of C.A.O.'s to handle them. Instructions have been given from Eighth Army that all these partisans are to be disarmed.

The problem is a novel one and is bound to be met with in further intensity the further north the advance goes. At the present time instructions have been given that these partisans are to be disarmed and to be told that the administration they set up is not valid and that A.M.G. is the ruling authority. They are being told that they have done very good work but that now that the Allies have occupied the country they must lay down their arms in conformity with the Proclamation to this effect, but that their

arms will be kept separate and ready in case of need or should it be decided to employ them in the Italian Army. The question of disarming partisans is strictly speaking not an AMG affair, but owing to lack of troops we have attempted to deal with it and up to date the situation is in hand. . . .

5. It is essential in my opinion that some directive be given on the whole question of political activities of the partisans, but it is more important that this directive be in some way given to them so that in the future as and when they are met they will have some knowledge of the work that AMG performs, and the fact that their political activities are not recognized and their nominees are not necessarily going to be accepted. [See below.] It is suggested that if possible some broadcasts could be made to this effect.

6. Another suggestion I would like to make is that AAI should be asked to provide a body of responsible Italian officers who could be made immediately available to deal with the partisans as they are met, to look after the disarming and generally explain the position to them.

7. It must be borne in mind that with the rapid rate of advance it is impossible for AMG Eighth Army officers to be kept in these towns and with the small number of officers available to the provinces there is a very serious risk of trouble breaking out when the AMG Eighth Army CAO's leave, owing to the inability of the provinces to put CAO's in themselves.

8. I consider that action must be taken to clear up the position of the partisan urgently, both in the interests of preventing trouble once the Army has passed through and also difficulties from the political aspect.

### THIS SIDE THE LINE THEY SEEM NUISANCES TO SOME CAO'S

[Buckley, Rpt, 30 Jun 44]

7. *Lieutenant Simpson*, 8th Army CAPO at Perugia thought the partisans nuisances. They interfered with his work (1) by not delivering arms (2) by disobeying other orders (3) by wishing to impose their own authority and

nominees. He had formed the opinion that most of these so-called partisans were glib converts from fascism, when they are not actually communists. As he had to organize rapidly and see his orders carried out, he dealt summarily with any interference—in one case by refusing to listen to an Italian ex-General who was recognized by the locals and G-1 as a most valuable partisan leader—leaving FSS and Monti to clean up after him. The patriots feel they deserve some recognition and Monti points out that summary treatment does not make for smooth working in his military machine or good propaganda on the other side of the lines. He had in fact, seen Simpson and asked him to be patient.

8. In general, *Major Steele*, 6th Armored Division AMG.

*Captain Palatte*, 8th Army CAO.  
*Captain [David G.] Erskine*,  
8th India Division.

*Lieutenant Garigue*, 8th Army CAO.

*Major [T. D.] Bullock*, 8th Army Headquarters.

agreed that whereas the partisans had done good work behind the lines, they were now becoming a problem requiring a separate organization to deal with them. Notable in this connection, Group Captain Benson was in favor of having some Italian Officers serving for this purpose. They could sublimate the energies of a few by appointing them as CCRR and, when asked, provide labor gangs, clerks etc. But the greater number remained unabsorbed. They [the CAO's] had the unconfirmed feeling that many were political opportunists, mostly communists, seizing this opportunity for power and authority.

9. *Captain Bennett*, CAO Region IV had authoritarian views of his own. He forbade the partisans to exert power, where they had set up their own councils, but invited one nominee on his juntas. In his main town, Foligno, he was receiving the active assistance of the CNL, operating its own office. He issued them a number of passes and created CCRR from their strength to patrol the streets. . . . While using them in this way and with labor and demolition gang, he allowed them no authority and sacked the mayor they had themselves elected in favor of the owner of a printing work. He himself nominated the giunta. (It must be pointed out that as the town was largely evacuated, the partisans made the bulk of the population). Speaking no Italian, not listening to anything the locals have to say, he will probably encounter or make trouble.

10. *Captain Godbold*, CAPO Region IV Foligno had accepted ready made the giunta and Sindaco set up by the partisans in one of his towns but generally regarded them as people to be ignored if they could not be used. His chief concern was to get their arms from them. \* \* \*

#### PERHAPS A SPECIAL ORGANIZATION CAN HANDLE THEM

[Patriots Branch, ACC, Rpt for Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/125/84]

1. . . . The Patriots Branch of A.C.C. was formed early in July as a result of an instruction from A.A.I. and is responsible for all dealings with Resistance Groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops.

3. A pool of Italian patriot representatives has been formed to assist Allied officers who are concerned in identifying patriots and in handling patriot problems. Nine pairs of representatives (one each representing the C.L.N. Group and the Military Center Group) have been dispatched to Army areas and further teams are being organized for Regions.

4. It is the task of the Patriots Branch to direct the rehabilitation of all Patriots in liberated territory and to co-ordinate the policy of Headquarters's A.A.I. and A.C.C. with regard to future operations in enemy territory. \* \* \*

#### TACT, POSTERS, AND CERTIFICATES MAY MAKE PATRIOTS GOOD CITIZENS

[ACC Instr for All Concerned on Administration of Patriots in MG Territory, 18 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

4. On liberation of territory patriots must revert from their quasi-military status and become good citizens. To this end a message in poster form signed by General Alexander has been prepared and will be widely published.

5. Patriots come under the aegis of AMG officers whose duty it is to see that the metamorphosis from military to civilian status takes place with the minimum of disillusionment. To this end representatives of patriot organizations have been sent to the Army AMG's and Italian committees with strong patriot representation will be set up in the local governments of liberated territory. It is extremely important that while order is to be maintained and arms have to be surrendered, patriots should be treated with great tact and sympathy in order to avoid antagonism and discouragement which would

become known and have an adverse effect upon patriots still operating against the enemy. Leaders of patriot groups should be thanked by AMG officers for the assistance which they have rendered to the Allies and told to convey to their groups the Allied appreciation of their efforts.

6. While the patriots are not a political organization and must be dissuaded from setting up purely patriot local governments, it must be remembered that by virtue of their military aid they have a right to strong representation in the local government. Italian local government officials must be made to realise and show appreciation of their value and their right to be represented in government.

7. Patriots will be unwilling to hand in arms but the preservation of law and order precludes the existence of irregular armed bands in liberated territory: the law demands their surrender and they must therefore be tactfully told to obey the law.

8. After months of guerilla warfare it will be hard for patriots to settle down to normal life. To encourage rapid return to their ordinary vocations will be one of the most difficult duties of the local committees who, like AMG officers and Italian officials, must deal with the patriots not as a nuisance but with sympathy and gratitude. It should at all times be remembered that an unemployed patriot is not only a disgrace to the community but a menace.

9. While it is desirable to leave the rehabilitation of patriots to the Italians themselves, in the form of local committees, CAO's and especially Provincial Officers in the later period of occupation, remembering that they have fought for the Allies, should ensure that they are given a square deal.

10. 20,000 posters have been sent to AMG 5 Army and 30,000 to AMG 8 Army. These should be displayed immediately after liberation of territory and the attention of all patriots drawn to them. The contents of the poster will also be broadcast locally by PWB and will be published in Italian newspapers.

11. In order to show appreciation of individual effort certificates of merit have been prepared for issue to every individual patriot vouched for by the local patriot leader. Certificates will be endorsed by the recognised patriot leader and by an Allied officer (e.g., the CAO). \* \* \*

#### SOME ARE RELIABLE PEOPLE

[Doherty, Chief, Public Safety Div, Rpt for Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/143/320]

\* \* \* It is of note that in some places Partisans have been met who are reliable people, such

as were met in Livorno. They have assisted in the early government of communes and the surrender of arms has been more readily effected. \* \* \*

#### OTHERS ROB AND PLUNDER

[Public Safety Sub-Com, Rpt for Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/143/450]

\* \* \* A good deal of the time of Public Safety Officers in forward areas has been occupied in dealing with patriots. The difficulty has been to distinguish between genuine partisans and undesirable characters who seize the opportunity to form themselves into armed bands, robbing and plundering the countryside. By constituting the CCRR as the law enforcing authority and withdrawing weapons from the patriots, the situation has been kept well in hand. \* \* \*

#### LEGAL OFFICER RUNS INTO THORNY PROBLEM

[Memo, Legal Officer, Macerata Province, for LO, Rgn V, AMG, 10 Aug 44, ACC files, 10500/115/178]

1. There have been a large number of *processi verbali* transmitted to the Procuratore del Regno of Macerata and the Procuratore del Regno of Camerino, involving acts committed by known and unknown patriots against Fascists in the days preceding the occupation of this area by the Allies. I have directed that these cases be temporarily suspended until a ruling is received from higher headquarters. Most of these cases involve assaults, murder of well known Fascists, committed by members of organised bands of Patriots. Public sentiment regards these acts as justifiable under war conditions, and favours the termination of such court proceedings.

2. Request advice as to the procedure to be followed in the disposition of these cases.

#### THEY MUST LEARN THAT WHAT'S RIGHT ON THAT SIDE OF THE LINE IS WRONG THIS SIDE

[Maj Gen L. Browning, Min of Remarks at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/443]

b. We wish to encourage the patriots, who are doing valuable work in enemy occupied territory. On the other hand, we cannot countenance the existence, as formed fighting units, of patriot bands who are overpassed by us in our advance. We cannot keep within our lines "private armies" of patriots of diverse political color and aspirations. One thinks of the troubles of Yugoslavia and Greece in this connection. This has obviously a post-war as well as a present aspect, particularly as in the North numbers are said to be large. \* \* \*

## THEY MUST NOT EXPECT LONG VACATIONS BEFORE STARTING WORK

[Memo, Lt Col Earnest Bye, Patriots Sec, AMG, Fifth Army, for SCAO, AMG, City of Florence, 11 Sep 44, ACC files, 10700/133/43]

10. Immediately the fighting ceased in Florence and prior to the inspection ceremony, the Patriots were told through their leaders that every effort would be made to assist those desiring to work or to return to their homes outside Florence. Very few took advantage of this offer.

11. As an example of their lack of enthusiasm to work—on the 4th September 1944 one hundred men were required urgently to clean out a school earmarked to accommodate refugees. I saw all the Brigade leaders and asked for the men, informing them at the same time that they would be paid and given a midday meal. They consulted together and then they told me that their men had fought in Florence during the past month and that they now needed a month's rest to recuperate. Not one man presented himself for the work. \* \* \*

## A FIRMER ATTITUDE MUST BE ADOPTED ON WEAPONS

[Hq AMG, Fifth Army, Directive to CAO's, 2 Oct 44, ACC files, 11100/101/140]

### 2. *Handing in of Arms*

Although results vary widely this is in general very unsatisfactory; there are many instances in which the number of weapons handed in is but a small fraction of the quantity which the Partisans themselves admit to possessing. Moreover there

is evidence that partisans are being advised by political organisations to retain their arms and the presence of armed hooligans throughout the country is causing grave concern to the Italian Government and Allied Authorities.

For these reasons a firmer attitude must be adopted. All persons who have wilfully concealed weapons will be charged under the terms of Proclamation Number 1. . . .

## PARTISAN BRIGADE SURRENDERS ITS ARMS

[Memo CofS, AMG, Fifth Army, for Patriots Branch, ACC, 6 Oct 44, ACC files, 10700/133/42]

\* \* \* This Brigade [36 "Garibaldi" Brigade-Alessandro Bianconcini] originally consisted of 1500 members. 330 of the members, including two women members, came into the lines of the 88th Division, near Castel del Rio, and were disarmed by AMG, and brought to Scarperia, where they have been housed and fed. The SCAO expressed the appreciation and thanks of the Allied Military Government to them, explained why they should surrender their arms, which they readily surrendered, and requested that the officers commanding certify a list of officers and men who had distinguished themselves in fighting the enemy, to whom certificates of merit would have been issued. The officers expressed their great appreciation, but said that such an act would cause bad feeling among the personnel and they preferred that it not be done. The SCAO suggested that one certificate of merit be given the 36 Brigade, and they were very pleased with this and such certificate was issued.

## 3. PARTISAN UNITS TO BE ACCEPTED IN THE ITALIAN ARMY

### ITALIAN OFFICIAL SUGGESTS ALTERNATIVE TO DISARMAMENT

[Transl of Memo (Unsigned) from an Italian Govt Official for Chief Cmsr, AC, 11 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

\* \* \* When carried into effect, the disarmament of the patriots causes great bitterness and resentment among them; they think that their work is neither acknowledged nor appreciated. The true patriots give up their arms reluctantly and the more restless elements hide them.

Great advantage would be derived from keeping the bands going for a certain length of time; their discontent wouldn't be aroused, it would

be easier to judge the activity and merits of everyone in particular, and make correct lists of all true patriots, this without mentioning the fundamental advantage of being able to make use of them as an organization for a certain length of time. \* \* \*

### PATRIOTS HAVE GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT

[Memo, Rolph, PC, Florence Province, for SCAO, Fifth Army, 12 Oct 44, ACC files, 10700/133/40]

1. The object of this letter is to bring your attention the treatment of transient and wounded Patriots in Allied areas. By transient is meant those, on this side of the line, waiting to return

to their homes on the other side of the line, or those returning to their homes in Allied territory.

2. At the moment all possible is done to make them comfortable externally. Attempts are made to provide billets, baths, bedding and the like. The crowded conditions of near-front towns do not make this too easy and generally speaking the patriot is just considered a nuisance to all who are requested to assist.

3. Much worse, however, is the position regarding food. No substantial rations are available for them and there are no cigarettes. Civilian supplies, even stretched, are regarded as completely inadequate. These remarks apply equally to the wounded.

4. The reward for service rendered intimated in 2 and 3 above, is of great disappointment and discouragement to the patriots, especially in the light of Allied Propaganda and it is considered that news of this treatment seeping through the lines, does not encourage the patriots still fighting.

5. I consider that the minimum that should be done to fulfill our own promises to patriots and compensate those who have actively assisted in the Allied cause is:

(a) to provide the wounded with Allied Army rations and cigarettes, Italian scale, for a period related to the extent of the injuries;

(b) to provide patriots coming out of the line with similar rations, to cover the period necessary for them to return to their homes. \* \* \*

[AMG, Fifth Army, Rpt, for Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/132/11]

### (iii) *Partisans*

Reception Centers for homeless partisans who have come through the line have been established at Florence and Lucca. Several hundred have had to be handled in this way. So far there has been no source of supply from which clothing can be drawn for them and their treatment has perforce not been all that might be desired. More complex is the problem of absorbing them into the Community and finding work for them; although the Army wants labor it cannot provide shelter, clothing, food and organization on a large scale. One group was formed into a labour gang designated No. 1 Appenine Civil Labour Force, equipped with salvaged materials and put to work on the roads under their own

leaders and directed by British Engineers. This experiment has been successful so far and the men are very happy, but it must be emphasized that the supplies necessary for equipping other groups in the same way do not exist at the present time. \* \* \*

### PATRIOTS WILL RECEIVE SAME TREATMENT AS ITALIAN SOLDIERS

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to Hq AC 28 Dec 44, ACC files, 10700/133/40]

Treatment like that afforded the Italian Army will be accorded to Patriots coming through our lines. You are authorized, pending receipt of detailed instructions, to issue rations on the same scale as is issued to Italian Army and also clothing and equipment. . . .

### CHIEF COMMISSIONER PROPOSES ACCEPTANCE OF PARTISAN UNITS IN ITALIAN ARMY

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for SACMED, 16 Jan 44, ACC files, 1000/136/339]

1. The disposal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and indeed anxiety, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements made to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of Special Force and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful: a new approach must now be made.

2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians: to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations: to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment: to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible: to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army: and to repatriate them to their homes if they are not found to be locals. Finally, our policy has been to disarm them.

3. Our reports from Allied Military Government officers, however, have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. Those that have really fought in bands and companies have expressed their desire to continue the fight in the same formations. The meagre supplies of food and clothing that we have been able to give do not, in their opinion, fulfill the promises made to them by the Allied missions with whom they have been operating. The order to disarm is the

final straw: they resent it and the majority of them disobey it. True, we have found no serious trouble so far but, in my opinion, a fundamentally different situation will arise when we get to the North with its more virile population and (estimated) 100,000 patriots in well organised bands.

4. The experiences of the Allied Nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily affected and enrolled into political organisations the object of which is to usurp the power of the legitimate government and to set up a government by force rather than through elective processes.

5. We must, therefore, in this country endeavour to avoid the misuse of those bands of partisans who, armed with Allied rifles and equipment, provided with Allied food and money, encouraged by Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Disrupted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and thus become an easy prey to the forces of anarchy.

6. I believe that with patience and understanding we can overcome many of the material causes of disillusionment but attempts at wholesale disarmament will ever be a source of resentment and of resistance for a portion of these persons.

7. The offers to enlist individuals into the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment for that Army, intended to meet the desires of those who wish to carry on the fight, have met with little success. From many Italian sources, from the patriots themselves and from members of the Italian Government, have come requests that they should be recruited into the fighting element of the Army in their patriot bands under their patriot officers so that the comradeship and loyalty displayed behind the lines may not be lost after liberation. I am now convinced that whether in fact they will join the Army in these circumstances or not, we must give them the opportunity to do so.

8. The technical objections to this course are well understood. In the very difficult task of reorganising the Italian Army, the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission, naturally dislikes the idea of forming special nuclei within that Army which might become political formations and which would be of doubtful value militarily. He must object to accepting men into the Italian Army on their own terms: he must resist the breaking up of existing Army units in order to fit in special bands.<sup>4</sup>

9. I submit that we must consider accepting the principle of taking into the Italian Army patriot bands as units, in numbers not exceeding say that of a company, under their own existing officers. In my opinion the political, and indeed, administrative advantages, must outweigh the military objections, for by doing so we shall be going a long way to ensure the preservation of law and order in the North and the avoidance of political and civil strife. I would ask, therefore, for your earnest and urgent consideration that the principle be approved. \* \* \*

#### PATRIOT UNITS WILL BE ACCEPTED IN ITALIAN ARMY

[Ltr, AG, AFHQ, to President, AC, 22 Feb 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, AG-091.711/083, GCT-O]

2. A general policy is hereby established for the *induction of Italian Patriots* into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the 48,000 deficiency under the present ceiling.

3. In order, however, to make the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots and with the object of preserving to the greatest possible extent the esprit-de-corps which is so outstanding a feature of the Patriot bands, the present organization of the Italian Army will be adjusted to permit the formation of further combat forces in the form of Reconnaissance Companies to operate, one with each of the five Italian Gruppi. It is suggested that these Reconnaissance Companies should have an approximate strength of 500 and should be formed of Patriots comprising their own bands under their own officers. \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup> For Browning's objections, see remarks at Conference of Regional Commissioners, 22 August 1944, section 2 above.

#### 4. WAR MAKES STRANGE ALLIANCES

##### WHAT POLICY WILL OBIVIATE POLITICAL DISORDER AMONG CLN'S AND PARTIES IN THE NORTH

[Memo, Gen Alexander, CinC, AAI, for SACMED, 11 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western Italy. . . .

6. There is one other matter . . . on which it seems to me that a decision of policy is required now if serious disorders are to be avoided. It is the question of the attitude to be adopted by officers of the Allied Military Government to the various Italian Political parties in Western Italy. According to my information there are three main parties, viz: The Army Patriots (Monarchists), the Action Party (Republicans) and the Communists who are numerically the strongest and almost certainly the best organized. There is also the Committee of National Liberation to whom many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions . . . are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political functions. [See below, Harding's Memo, 29 Sep.] \* \* \*

##### PARTISANS ARE GIVEN THREE DUTIES BUT NO COMMITMENTS

[Instrs of No. 1 Spec Force, CMF, to SOE Officer in the Fld, 22 Sep 44,<sup>5</sup> ACC files, 10000/109/173]

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should so inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.

3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out

<sup>5</sup>No. 1 Special Force was the main component of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (SOMTO). CMF had by this time replaced AAI. SOE is an abbreviation for a Special Operations Executive officer.

the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be so far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied Military Government is established.

4. . . . The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities from destruction and in preserving law and order will not, however, entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National Liberation in Milan. . . .

##### PARTISANS TO BE ASKED TO PRESERVE LAW AND ORDER IN PARTISAN AREAS

[Memo, Capt Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, to AAI, Adv Hq, 29 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/109/173]

\* \* \* In consultation with BGS [British General Staff] (Ops) plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have, however, been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee at Milan, whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

##### BUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE UPHELD

[Memo, Harding, Chief of GS, AAI, for Chief Cmsr, ACC, 29 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/109/173]

2. As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the Government of Signor Bonomi which includes

representatives of the six principal parties in the State. The Allies are supporting this Government because it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort, and in internal affairs is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. \* \* \*

#### NORTHERN PARTISANS NEED AND SOLICIT HELP THEMSELVES

[Transl of Ltr from Prime Minister Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, AC, 15 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

\* \* \* 1. With scanty means and in difficult conditions, the Italian patriots operated during the whole summer, being always ready for a general insurrection against the Germans and the Fascists. Now . . . they are faced with the prospect of another winter of war, for which they are not at all prepared. . . . The Patriots communicate that, with their present means, they cannot operate in the plains any more, and their leaders let it be clearly understood that, if they are not put in a condition to live and work in the mountains, their men will have to choose between collaboration with the Germans, or being all cruelly punished and hung.

2. The rarefying [less frequently sending] of the weapons and foodstuffs supplies for the Patriots, and of the parachutists, began in the first days of the summer. It was due to various causes . . . [largely logistical]. To my mind, to save the situation, it is necessary to put to execution a large program of supplies and arms, to which the Government is ready to give all the help it can give. \* \* \*

[Historical Note of Political Sec, AC, 12 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

1. Shortly before the fall of the first Bonomi Government a group of emissaries from the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy arrived in Rome. Their object was to secure the recognition by the Allied Military authorities and the Italian Government of the CLNAI as the agent of the Italian Government in the north and a large measure of financial and material assistance. The CLNAI had already in August last been accorded by the Italian Government a limited degree of recognition as the co-ordinating body for resistance activities in Northern Italy. The Allied military authorities, however, had previously refused to accord any form of recognition to the CLNAI as it was generally held that to do so would tend to render more difficult the establishment of Allied Military Government when the territories in due course came to be liberated.

2. Since that time the CLNAI in the cities of

the north had been playing an increasingly powerful role and through their access to funds and to support of the Allied officers serving in occupied territories they had succeeded in acquiring control of a large number of the bands of patriots engaged in fighting the enemy. There is a considerable body of evidence to show that their ambition has been to play an active role in the administration of Italian territory as and when it is freed from the enemy. It is known positively that in Turin for example the local Committee intended to assume legislative functions by means of issuing decrees and to exercise other attributes of Government such as the requisitioning of buildings and the arrest of Fascists.

3. When, therefore, the emissaries of the CLNAI came forward with the request for formal recognition by the Allied military authorities and the Italian Government it was obviously necessary to proceed with great caution. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY PROPOSAL FOR GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AROUSES FEARS IN AC

[Notes on a Mtg With Maj Gen W. A. M. Stawell, Comdr, SOMTO, and Comdr G. R. Holdsworth, CO, No. 1 Spec Force, 18 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

1. Commander Holdsworth told Commodore Stone that it had been decided to continue full and in fact increased support materially to the Patriot Movement in Northern Italy throughout the Winter so as to avoid a wide scale "Warsaw." This material assistance was to be effected by increased air lift.

2. No. 1 Special Force believed that the time was now ripe for the Italian Government to recognize the National Committee of Liberation as their agents in Northern Italy, and also stated that the financial needs of the patriots would be one million lire a month. . . .

4. Commodore Stone said that he was opposed to tying up the recognition of the CLNAI by the Italian Government with the problem of the supply and maintenance of the organization during the Winter. They seemed to him quite different problems to be handled separately. Why should the Italian Government not make available these funds to the CLNAI, letting it be known in the North that they were giving this support to their fellow countrymen, without taking the grave step of giving them uncontrolled agency? Commander Holdsworth said that the CLNAI was now so powerful that if the present Italian Government did not now recognize them and grant them authority to act in the North on their behalf, it would antagonize the CLNAI with disastrous results to the future unity of this country. It was the urgent wish of the CLNAI to be recognized.

Commodore Stone said that this was a matter for the Italian Government to decide for themselves. On no account was it a decision which should be imposed upon them by the Allies, and that if he were the Prime Minister he would be reluctant to delegate broad, unrestricted powers to the CLNAI, in view of the experience of similar movements in other countries. Non-recognition of the CLNAI would at least give Bonomi the possibility to "trade." \* \* \*

#### AC HAS POLITICAL OBJECTIONS TO RECOGNITION

[Memo, Lush, CofS, AC, 20 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/109/173]

5. In the first place it is open to doubt whether the Committee of Liberation does really represent the bulk of the population in Northern Italy. Its representatives affirm that they do but there is little evidence except from patriot sources to confirm this. It may be an advantage from the military point of view that the activities of the patriots should be coordinated into one Committee but to commit both the Allied and the Italian Government to recognize this body as the prototype of AMG and the representative of the Italian Government would appear to be, from the political point of view, a most dangerous move. What, for instance, would be the position if the Italian Government were to change before Northern Italy were liberated if the Committee of National Liberation were not to recognize the succeeding Italian Government. We should have then set up in Northern Italy the very organization which we must at all events try to avoid, that is, a separate independent Government.

6. Whereas, therefore, it may be necessary to constitute some unified military authority to command the patriots in Northern Italy and coordinate their activities from the operational point of view, it would seem unwise to give this organization the permanent political character recommended by S.O.M. [SOMTO]. We must allow both AMG and the Italian Government absolute freedom of administrative and political action on the liberation of this area.

#### SACMED DECIDES THAT MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF RECOGNITION OUTWEIGH POLITICAL RISKS

[Min of SACMED's Political Comm., 22 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

\* \* \* Major General Stawell . . . stated that representatives of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy were at present in Rome and had had preliminary discussions with the Italian Government and himself. They felt

that recognition would give them a greater measure of control over the various sub-committees in the North and would increase their influence with industrialists which they deemed to be particularly desirable in view of the anti-scorch policy now being pursued. They also believed that recognition would give them greater protection from reprisals from the Fascists, whom they feared more than the Germans.

Mr. Macmillan pointed out that, although past experience in other countries had shown that the recognition of liberation movements entailed dangerous political consequences, the military advantages in this instance appeared to dictate it. It might be more logical for the proposed agreement to be entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy but such a procedure would involve the practical difficulty of supplying 100 million metropolitan lire monthly, since the currency in use in liberated Italy was valueless on the enemy side of the line. \* \* \*

Lieutenant General [J.A.H.] Gammell observed that it might be more desirable to enter into a tri-partite agreement.

Mr. Kirk [U.S. Political Adviser] concurred in Lieutenant General Gammell's suggestion but suggested that no compulsion be used and that the Italian Government merely be invited to be a party to the agreement. \* \* \*

The Supreme Allied Commander:

(a) Directed that the Allied Commission invite the Italian Government to furnish to the Allied Military authorities for payment of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy some 100 million metropolitan lire a month in exchange for the equivalent in Allied military currency and to join in a tripartite agreement, reporting to the next meeting of the Political Committee as to the Italian Government's reactions.<sup>6</sup>

#### FOR TIME BEING A BILATERAL RATHER THAN TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

[Note by Secy, SACMED's Political Comm., Relations With Italian Partisans, 5 Dec 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC(44)-144, Annexure]

1. . . . It would now appear . . . that there is likely to be some delay before the proposal for

<sup>6</sup>On the next day General Wilson, SACMED, had a conference with Signor Longhi [alias for Dr. Alfredo Pizzoni], President of the CLNAI. In reply to the latter's appeal for official recognition, General Wilson stated that ACC would shortly be suggesting to the Italian Government that the time was now ripe for recognition. MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC(44)-141, 23 Nov 44.

the recognition of the CLNAI can be submitted to the new [Italian] government when formed.<sup>7</sup>

2. G-2 in a recent appreciation gave the opinion that the enemy may evacuate Northwest Italy this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time should be lost if plans for anti-scorch and other measures of resistance in Northwest Italy are to be effective.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly directed that Commander, SOM [SOMTO]:

(a) Bring the delegation to AFHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bilateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC-(44)-144 dated 30 November 1944.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern Italy at times and by means dictated by security. . . .

5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object of their visit, namely, recognition by the Italian Government, has not been so far achieved, but they hope that this may materialise in the near future. \* \* \*

#### AN UNUSUAL AGREEMENT FOR ALLIANCE

[Memo of Agreement Between SACMED and the CLNAI, 7 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

1. The Supreme Allied Commander wishes the utmost military co-operation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CLNAI will establish and maintain such co-operation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CLNAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

2. During the period of enemy occupation the General Command of The Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLNAI) will, on behalf of the CLNAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the Supreme Allied Commander that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

3. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CLNAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief,

AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CLNAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CLNAI will recognize Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation in Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the CLNAI in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLNAI and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:

Liguria	20
Piedmonte [ <i>sic</i> ]	60
Lombardia	25
Emilia	20
Veneto	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied Missions attached to the CLNAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the mission

<sup>7</sup> The delay was due to a Cabinet crisis of the Bonomi government.

concerned will be carried out by CLNAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

#### OUR ARMIES MAY BE SORRY FOR THIS

[Memo, Actg Vice President, Political Sec, AC for Exec Cmsr, AC, 7 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/132/468]

2. . . . With the financing and equipping of patriots in the North and the possibility of a Ger-

man withdrawal from North-west Italy too rapid to allow of Allied troops arriving on the spot within a matter of days or even weeks, I think that it is quite possible that when our Armies do get there they may find themselves faced with a situation not unlike that which exists in Greece today. If the Government then in power in Rome is not based on and not fully in harmony with the CNL in the North, the situation will be further aggravated.

## 5. THE GOVERNMENT TRIES TO PROTECT ITS OWN FENCES

### AT FIRST IT IS HOPED THE GOVERNMENT WILL ENTER THE AGREEMENT

[Min of Mtg of SACMED's Political Comm., 9 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

8. The Committee had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been drawn up a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the omission of certain passages, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay that would be necessary before the new Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the delegation. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a latter date. \* \* \*

### BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE THREATENS TO RECONSIDER PARTISAN POLICY

[Draft Statement for the Chief Cmsr, AC, Prepared by H. L. d'A. Hopkinson, Political Adviser, AC, 18 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

7. . . . the CLNAI were asked to concur in a clause in which they fully accepted the Italian Government as the legitimate Government in that part of Italy not under Allied Military Government. The draft was so worded as to bind them also to the acceptance of the terms of the

Armistice. The CLNAI representatives indicated that they were unwilling to accept such an undertaking and I understand that that is their position today. The British Ambassador has informed me that the British Foreign Office have stated that if the CLNAI will not agree to any such provision it will be necessary to reconsider the whole British policy towards them. \* \* \*

### SACMED DECIDES NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY GOVERNMENT-PARTISAN ENTANGLEMENTS

[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC to SACMED, 20 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

Met with Bonomi this afternoon and explained that SACMED had decided not to make tripartite agreement with CLNAI and Government but that existing military agreement between SACMED and CLNAI would stand and any political agreement should be made between Italian Government and CLNAI.

Such a political agreement, because of its possible bearing on military operations must be subject to SACMED's approval. Bonomi was in full agreement with SACMED's decision. He will open discussion immediately and will submit to me for transmittal to you whatever form of political agreement is tentatively agreed upon.

### BONOMI PREPARES FORMULA WHICH SHOULD KEEP CLNAI IN ITS PLACE

[Ltr, Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, AC, 23 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

This is the formula I have prepared.

The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy implicitly recognizes the Italian Government inasmuch as it accepts it to be its representative and delegate. But—and this is the advantage of my formula—the Committee remains in a subordinate position and does not

have the least character of a de facto Government.

#### GOVERNMENT ENTERS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH CLNAI

[Transl of Terms of Agreement Between Italian Govt and CLNAI, 26 Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/338]

\* \* \* (1) The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government designates the C.L.N.A.I. as its representative in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and Germans in that part of Italy not yet liberated.

(3) The C.L.N.A.I. agrees to act towards this end and the delegates of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the government which signed the Armistice and is the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has already been or will later on be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.<sup>8</sup>

#### WHEN THE GOVERNMENT ALSO INSTRUCTS PARTISANS, THREE'S A CROWD

[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC to Bonomi, 9 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

It has been reported to me that the new Ministry for Occupied Italy already has been organized physically, at least in part, and that it has begun some activity. Included in this, it is said, there is the reception of Partisans arriving from the North who had been told to report to the Ministry upon their arrival in Rome where they are interviewed and given instructions before returning to the North. Should this be the case, I wish to state that it is an irregular procedure inasmuch as Partisans from German-occupied Italy are under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Alexander. They should therefore not be instructed by the Italian Government.<sup>9</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>8</sup> The agreement was approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Chief Commissioner, AC, was directed to inform the Italian Government and the CLNAI of such approval. ACC files, 10000/136/338.

<sup>9</sup> In early March the Italian Government inquired whether it might send Signor Medici Tornaquinci, Under Secretary of the Ministry for Occupied Italy, to visit the CLNAI in order to prepare the ground for liberation. Upon the recommendation of Admiral Stone and the two Ambassadors, AFHQ approved. On 29 March, Tornaquinci signed an agreement with the CLNAI covering local administration by the CLNAI during the period be-

#### BONOMI WORRIES OVER HOW THE GOVERNMENT WILL COME OUT

[AC Notes on a Mtg Between Bonomi, President of the Council of Ministers, and Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, 26 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/612]

Brigadier Upjohn referred to His Excellency's Meeting with Admiral Stone and himself on Tuesday morning when His Excellency asked the Allied Commission to appoint Italian Government Nominees to the position of Prefect and Questore in provinces in North Italy when liberated. \* \* \*

Brigadier Upjohn pointed out that the Allied Commission felt it was fundamental that the appointment of Prefect and Questore was one which must ultimately be left in the hands of the Allied Military Government. . . .

Brigadier Upjohn then stated that the Allied Commission appreciated the position of the Government in the matter. The Commission realized that the Government must have its say in any appointments made.

The Commission therefore proposed that the Government should submit the names of persons to fill the appointment of Prefect and Questore for each of the Provinces to be liberated. These names would be signalled to forward areas to the Allied Military Government officer concerned for his consideration.

It must be appreciated that the Allied Military Government officer would undoubtedly have other nominations before him; for instance, the Provincial CLN would no doubt have a nominee; the AMG officer might consult other sources of advice, e.g. the local Archbishop. It would therefore be a great advantage if the Government would nominate a local man who would be likely to be acceptable to local interests, for the AMG officer could not be expected to appoint somebody who was not acceptable to local interests or the administration of the province, which was ultimately the responsibility of the AMG officer concerned, might become a matter of much difficulty. \* \* \*

Brigadier Upjohn continued that the ultimate choice out of the various names put before him must remain with the AMG officer concerned.

His Excellency said that he entirely agreed, but the important thing from the point of view of the Government was that the local CLN's must not be allowed to think that they had the right to make the appointments. [See directive, Section 7, below.] \* \* \*

tween a German collapse and the establishment of AMG. However, Bonomi continued to be very uneasy. His attitude is reflected in the next document.

## 6. AFTER CONTRACT IS SIGNED—MISGIVINGS AND CURTAILMENT OF AID

### THE POLITICAL ADVISERS URGES CARE FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY

[Min From the Offices of U.S. Political Adviser and Br Resident Minister, 29 Jan 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, 503, CofS]

\* \* \* Our first thoughts should be the conditions which will probably exist when the Germans leave the territory in which CLNAI is operating now as delegate of the Italian Government, in accordance with the Agreement recently concluded. . . .

The Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command shall be to support the policies of the Bonomi Government, which has pledged itself to maintain national unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. Therefore no action must be taken in these areas which might tend to weaken the authority of the central Government. Speed in getting ourselves firmly established is the essential factor: without this there is real danger of extreme Communist elements taking control regardless of Allied Military Government or the Italian Government.

It should be made clear to the various political elements (there are at least six different political parties represented with CLNAI) which we may find in North-western Italy that it is their duty to co-operate to the fullest extent with Allied Military Government officers who will seek to restore public administration and public services, and that they will be expected to refrain from any political actions which might hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government. \* \* \*

### COMMUNIST PARTISANS REPORTED PREPARING TO SEIZE POLITICAL POWER

[Summary by Political Sec, AC, of a Rpt by No. 1 Spec Force, CMF, Issued by CofS, AC, 31 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

1. From . . . information . . . received from British missions in Northern Italy during the last few months, Headquarters, No. 1, Special Force, C.M.F., felt impelled on January 15, 1945 to report to 15th Army Group that there is left to it "no doubt that those who control Communist bands are preparing to seize power by force when the Germans are expelled by the Allies." . . .

7. An estimate of the situation was afforded No. 1 Special Force by General [Rafaele] Ca-

dorna, a non-political Italian General who was infiltrated to the CLNAI on the instructions of SACMED, and who established himself as head of the military command of the CLNAI. He wrote in mid-December 1944, as follows:

"It appears that the Allies continue to consider the partisan war as a normal military campaign, refusing to recognize its predominant political character. It must be stated very clearly that the resistance movement could not have existed without the political organization and that in this partisan warfare the Communist Party is predominant. The encroachment of political factors do not disappear by ignoring them. It is better to give them due consideration.

The Communist Party, which gives the lead, does not try in the least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern Italy (Italo, Mare, Monti, etc.) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in Spain and with Bolshevism in France.

They declare openly that they wish to lean upon Russia and Tito and will rebel rather than submit to the orders of the Western Allies."

9. In the 15 months existence of the partisan movement it has become apparent that politics plays in it a role equally important to that of the military. The partisan formations depend politically upon one or another of anti-Fascist parties represented in the CLNAI. The latter, as a rallying point for anti-Fascist supporters, is a unifying body and a secret organization for maintaining the partisans by financing and feeding the bands. As such, it enjoys a limited measure of authority but it has not been able to exercise operational control through its military command, and it has not been able to prevent the several political parties from retaining their identity and continuing their separate activities which include the conduct of party warfare. As a result, "the partisan movement can be considered to be no more or less in its structure than a series of armed political elements fighting for different aims." The aim of the Communist is considered to be not patriotic but for the eradication of all traces of Fascism and for the "elimination of all elements who actively oppose their intention toward a finally liberated Italy." Those not Communists are inspired by patriotic motives and also with the destruction of Fascism, but lately

they have shown themselves to be opposed to the growing Communist power.

10. The Communists are numerically strong. They are well organised and have fought well under fanatical commanders and political commissioners. They are a force to be reckoned by any foe, be he Fascist or Allied. Their Party is the oldest active anti-Fascist organisation. It pays lip service to the CLNAI because the latter is a source of finance and supply, because it thereby retains Allied sympathy, because it therefore is afforded a respectable facade behind which to pursue its activities within a strong programme—while, at the same time, it disregards the general directives of the CLNAI and makes little effort to hide its aims and objectives. The report states that:

“Certain of their less discreet leaders have made damaging references to the Allies, whom they branded as enemies of a new socially reconstructed Italy. Against this, they pour praises on the Russians whom they recognise as the true friends of the future Italy. Manifestos issued by the Communist Party organisation are becoming more and more violent in their approach to the people and throughout the text there can be seen a reflection of antipathy towards the efforts of the Allies in Italy.”

11. In view of the above-described situation, No. 1 Special Force queries the desirability of re-considering the future policy to be adopted towards the partisans as regards their military supply by the Allies to obtain for them the greatest measure of assistance during the course of military operations, with a minimum of disorder after the total liberation of the country. It is recommended that there be abandoned the hope of using guerrilla bands in a tactical support of the Allied Armies and that the partisans (including the Communists, since any attempt to discriminate against them would precipitate the hostile reactions already evidenced by them against the Allies) be instructed to limit their activities to sabotage and anti-scorch.<sup>10</sup> There would be ended the delivery of arms which eventually might be turned against the Allies and a concentration made on the provision of explosives, incendiaries, boots, clothing and foodstuffs, and protective arms only.

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<sup>10</sup> This recommendation was based partly on purely military grounds. A part of the report not quoted tells how the German forces early in the winter drove the partisans to the hills, where, after a few hard months of winter, their numbers and resources became so reduced that they were no longer capable of any military action but were operating in small and scattered bands.

#### SOME LIBERALS THINK RED HERRINGS ARE BEING INVENTED

[Albert Spaulding, OWI Member of PWB, AFHQ, Rpt (Undated, probably late 1944), Forwarded by G-2, WDGS, to CAD, 3 Feb 45, CAD files, 000.7 (3-16-43) (1), sec. 3]

The failure on the part of the Allies to appreciate the significance of the Underground resistance is a deep-seated one. It springs, in my opinion, from political rather than from military sources, and it is based on the fear of left-wing activity and the problems that this will create in a Mediterranean world, which, for one reason or another, must apparently be made “safe for Monarchy.” \* \* \*

The Allied attitude toward, and opposition of the Patriot movement in Italy expressed itself in curious terms. Directives emanating from the Allied Council instructed us for instance “to play up Patriot activity that side (the enemy side) of the lines—and to play it down on this side of the lines.” We were cautioned against using the term “Garibaldi” brigades. The very name of Garibaldi had become synonymous with the Communist propaganda. If one mildly tried to point out that Garibaldi was a great historic figure in the history of Italian liberation you were blandly told that Garibaldians wore red shirts—therefore they were “Reds”—and as such!!! \* \* \*

The moving force behind this policy has been the British Foreign Office. But Americans cannot easily escape their responsibility in this matter. We are guilty of not having pulled our weight with the oars. Why? Is it from lack of experience? Is it for fear of making a mistake? Whatever the cause there has been a lamentable lack of an articulate expression of American opinion at the times, and on the levels where it could and should count.

#### AID TO PARTISANS IS CURTAILED

[Mediterranean Jt Plng Staff, AFHQ, Report on Measures to Deal With Patriot Problems in Northern Italy, 18 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

\* \* \* Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern Italy were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.

b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks. \* \* \*

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS URGE A CLOSE WATCH

[Paraphrase of Msg (FAN-497) From CCS to AFHQ, 28 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

\* \* \* A close watch should be kept on developments regarding any attempt by Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy to set itself up in opposition to Italian Government in Rome on the strength of powers conferred on CLNAI by military agreement with SACMED and political agreement with Italian Government on 7th and 26th December 1944 respectively. Any indications of such a tendency on part of the

Committee should be immediately communicated to CCS.

It is suggested that a Staff Officer from SACMED should be attached to the CLNAI as his representative for the purpose of reporting direct in a purely military capacity on the activities of the Committee.

It may become necessary for CCS to instruct SACMED, as a party to the military agreement with the Committee, to denounce this agreement, should it become apparent that the Committee is attempting to set itself up in opposition to the Italian Government in Rome. \* \* \*

## 7. TREAT PARTISANS RIGHT AND THEY'LL BEHAVE—PERHAPS <sup>11</sup>

### SACMED DECIDES UPON CAUTIOUS BUT GENEROUS TREATMENT AFTER OCCUPATION

[Paraphrase of Msg From AFHQ to 15th AGp, 16 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy in dealing with the Partisans is proposed by SACMED. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Unless and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not . . . be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering suitability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering reception area.<sup>12</sup> \* \* \*

### MEANWHILE THE LONG DELAY IN DEMANDING PW STATUS MUST BE ENDED

[Memo, 1st Lt A. M. Bullowa, G-5, AFHQ, for ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 4 Mar 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

#### I. Outline of action at AFHQ to date

1. FAN 434 [Message from CCS to AFHQ, MC-IN 5152, 4 October 1944] suggested that if the Italian Partisans fulfill the conditions of the

annex to the Hague Convention defining the qualifications of belligerents it would be desirable for the Italian Government to issue a declaration to that effect, and to demand treatment as Prisoners of War in case of capture by the Germans. The Supreme Allied Commander was authorized to make a supporting statement as Theater Commander.

4. . . . On 21 October the AC stated there were three [*sic*] principal difficulties: 1) that the Partisans did not fulfill the conditions of the Hague Convention as to uniform; 2) that if steps were taken to remedy this situation there was danger of building up the Patriot movement into a military organization, which might be difficult to handle under a later Military Government. The Allied Commission was not in favor of pursuing FAN 434, and stated that on a previous occasion AAI expressed disapproval of a suggestion from the Italian Government along the same lines.

5. This Headquarters replied that if the Italian Government desired to make a statement on this subject, and the CCS desired to have it made, the position of the AC in not facilitating the making of such a statement was not understood.

9. AAI was instructed to direct Partisans to wear distinctive insignia wherever possible, and immediately replied requesting delay pending decision on the Volkssturm status, and the possibility of measures to prevent savage German reprisals against innocent inhabitants near Partisan

<sup>11</sup> This chapter considers only that part of the planning for northern Italy which concerns the partisans. Other features will be found in the following chapters under the relevant category.

<sup>12</sup> In his message to the CCS of 15 February SACMED, requesting that the two governments provide a portion of the food and clothing required in care for the partisans,

pointed out that it was essential that some inducement be made to the partisans to surrender their arms and return to their peacetime ways of life. He expressed the fear that otherwise they might become a considerable embarrassment to the Allied occupational forces. AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 5696.

activities. Accordingly the SAC's directive was temporarily postponed. \* \* \*

### III. Recommendations

1. On military grounds, on humanitarian grounds, and because any other action is contrary to the spirit of SAC agreement with CLNAI it is suggested that the SAC directive . . . respecting the wearing of distinctive insignia be put into effect.

2. It is further recommended that the Italian Government be requested to prepare a statement in accordance with FAN 434.<sup>13</sup> \* \* \*

### PARTISANS WILL BE GIVEN CIVIL EMPLOYMENT

[Memo, Exec Cmsr, AC, to Rgnl Cmsr, 20 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/146/37]

1. This memorandum deals with the civil employment of Patriots, following liberation of Northern territory, in pursuance of the primary object of Patriot policy to return these men to normal civil life as early as possible.

2. Patriots should be placed in employment at the earliest possible moment. The employment should be of a long-term character and regard should be paid to the industrial background and skill of individual Patriots so that the employment should be suited to their qualifications. It will be recognized that if Patriots are placed in casual employment lasting a few days only, the problem of re-establishing them in civil employment will be continually recurrent. Equally, employing units should not discharge known partisans without sufficient reason and without informing at an early date, and if possible before discharge, a responsible representative of the Regional Commissioner, e.g., the Provincial Patriots Officer. \* \* \*

### VIGOROUS EPURATION PROGRAM TO REASSURE CLN's

[Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, Rpt to the Advisory Council for Italy, 6 Apr 45, p. 8, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

\* \* \* It is hoped that within a relatively short time North Italy may be liberated. It may be desirable therefore that I should refer to the special conditions which we may find there and what arrangements we have to make to meet them. First of all the local Committees of Liberation are in being and actively at work. It is desirable that they should have some share in whatever may be done to remove or punish fascists

<sup>13</sup> Before anything could be done, the war was over.

against whom they have been so long and bitterly struggling and at whose hands they have suffered so much.

To consider first the Fascist crimes. The draft decree which I have mentioned provides for the setting up of special courts of justice presided over by a judge with 4 lay assessors. It is proposed that these courts shall deal only with crimes of collaboration since 8 Sep 43 and that in each province the Committee of Liberation shall be asked to form panels of 200 local persons of repute, men and women, suitable to act as lay assessors and that the President of the Tribunal shall select from these 200 names, 20 persons to act in rotation as 4 lay assessors.

It is hoped that these courts will be formed and will commence operations within two or three days of liberation.

So far as epuration is concerned, it is felt that it would take the Italian Government rather too long to appoint its delegates and Commissions (especially having in view its lack of transport facilities) so that Allied Military Government proposes to undertake the first phase of epuration. It proposes to act firstly by Executive Memorandum 67. [Ch. XIV, sec. 2.] \* \* \*

### PATRIOT CENTERS WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR IMMEDIATE HELP

[Administration of Patriot Centers, app. A to Plan of Hq AC, 7 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/564]

1. *Location.* Centres will be established by the RPO [Regional Patriots Officer], when necessary near concentrations of patriots. It will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility to establish, equip and maintain these centres. This responsibility will be discharged through Provincial Patriot Officers.

2. *Command.* The Patriot Officer, assisted by the Italian Patriot Representative, will control and supervise the administration of the Centres.

3. *Staff.* Staff for the Centre will be enlisted from Patriots. A Camp Commandant (Band Commander), a Doctor, a hairdresser, cooks, cleaners and guards will be required. Payment on scale approved by the MOI (Minister of Occupied Italy) will be made by the Military Patriot Representative.

4. *Policy.* Patriots may remain in Centres for a Maximum period of 90 days. Within that time it is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are either enlisted into the Italian Army, found civil work or returned to their homes. Three weeks should normally be adequate and Patriots should be kept for longer periods only in exceptional circumstances.

5. *Screening.* The Patriot Officer with the Allies (if available) and leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that so far as possible only genuine patriots are admitted.

6. *Hygiene.* Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectors will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfested. Latrine and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.

7. *Clothing.* Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, and if available.

8. *Accommodation stores.* Accommodation stores will be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtainable from the Italian Army.

9. *Rations.* Rations will be drawn on the Italian Army Ration scale from DID's and QM Stores. The money element of the Italian Army Ration Scale for local purchases of vegetables, fruits, and wine, will be drawn from the local Prefect by the Italian Patriot Representative, who will be responsible for buying this part of the ration and accounting for the funds. \* \* \*

#### DISARMAMENT WILL BE TACTFUL

[15th AGp Opns Instrs No. 5, 12 Apr 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, app. 1 to Ltr, 24 Apr 45]

#### 2. *Disarmament of Partisans*

a. It will be the responsibility of Headquarters 5th and 8th Armies and/or IV Corps to carry out the disarmament of Partisans as soon as this can tactfully and appropriately be accomplished.

b. The local responsibility for making the necessary arrangements for disarmament will normally rest with AMG, with whom local military commanders will be required to co-operate. . . .

c. It is not considered that the standard AMG proclamation governing possession of arms by the civilian population should apply to the Partisans in the initial stages. Every effort will be made to secure the confidence of the Partisan commanders and conduct disarmament through them. . . .

f. Every encouragement will be given to the holding of ceremonial stand-down parades by Partisans. It is preferable that these should not appear as held by Allied order but rather as the expression of the Partisans' own wishes. If the principle of a parade is acceptable to the Partisans it will afford the best opportunity for disarmament.

g. The parade should be conducted with as much ceremony as possible—advance publicity,

flags, band and speakers will all add to its effect. . . .

h. The Commanding Officer of the nearest Allied unit or formation should be present at the parade to take the salute and to supervise the collection of arms. The Partisans should participate in making the arrangements and at the conclusion of the parade should march, preferably by sub-units, to an appointed dumping place where their arms will be handed over. At the same time arrangements should be made for the collection at convenient points of all ammunition, explosives and heavy weapons.

i. The handing in of arms may prove a convenient occasion for the simultaneous distribution of Patriot Certificates on the basis of exchange; one certificate to each Patriot surrendering his personal weapon. \* \* \*

#### CONSIDERATION FOR CLN'S SO FAR AS CONSISTENT WITH PRIMARY OBLIGATIONS

[Directive, Admiral Stone, CCAO, 15th AGp, to AMG Officers, 27 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/641]

\* \* \* 1. This directive lays down the policy which will govern the actions of all Officers of Allied Military Government in their relations with the Committees of National Liberation (CLN—"Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale") in Northern Italy.

2. CLN's have been organized on a communal provincial and regional basis throughout German Occupied Territory, . . .

Intelligence reports from the North show that the various Committees of National Liberation have learned a good deal about the art of government in the year-long struggle against the Fascist, and the Germans. In many districts, "shadow" Governments have been set up, and the various portfolios have been distributed amongst the leaders of the different parties. . . . These Committees have been assisted in their Military operations by the Allied authorities and the giving of such assistance necessarily implies a degree of recognition of their position.

5. *Relations with the Italian Government.*—The recognition of the CLN's as the representatives of the Government *in the struggle against the enemy* does not affect the Allies, who are not parties to the arrangement. Moreover, the Italian Government has no authority of any kind in Military Government Territory. Its arrangements with the CLNAI are not operative in Military Government Territory and do not affect the relations between AMG and the CLN.

6. The problem facing AMG is to reconcile

the military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the political leaders of the CLN's to self-government, at the same time supporting the authority of the Italian Government in Rome in order that it may be able to administer the Northern Territories once AMG is withdrawn. The solution of this problem may well be found to lie in the absorption at a very early date of CLN nominees into the civil administration. If Allied Officers arrive in the North and bluntly inform the CLN's that their task is accomplished and that they may now disperse and if, after that, Sindaci and other administrative officers are appointed without the views of CLN's being considered, the antagonism will be great and may well be disastrous. The danger of setting up local administrations composed of Italians who are not acceptable to the Patriot organizations cannot be over emphasized. AMG officers are not bound to accept the first suggestions of the CLN, who can always be instructed to submit alternative names. If, however, this principle is followed out, many of the problems of maintaining law and order will never arise. It will be easier to exploit the local resources of the country in the work of reconstruction and in the work of feeding the population. It will be easier to bring together the former Patriot organizations and the Italian Government, and it will be easier to prepare the ground against the time when the Government in Rome can take over the administration.

7. While the foregoing paragraph lays down a principle which is calculated to reconcile the Military arrangements of the Supreme Allied Commander with the aspirations of the CLN's, there are special considerations in regard to the office of Prefect and Questore.

Prefects, as the official representatives of the Government, are normally appointed by the Government from career officials. Even in the present situation this practice has generally been followed. Similarly the Questori have normally been appointed from Public Safety personnel by the Central Government. Other appointments, such as the Sindaco, etc., are normally local choice.

For obvious reasons the Italian Government wishes to continue the customary practice in regard to Prefects and Questore, and have raised it again very recently.

It is the policy of the Allied Commission to support the Government and it would be unwise to depart, entirely, from the normal practice. The Italian Government has, therefore, been advised

that any specific nominee whom they put forward for appointment to the post of Prefect or Questore by AMG will receive consideration. At the same time it has been pointed out that it would be quite useless to appoint any nominee who is not acceptable in the locality.

SCAO's and RC's will not, by this arrangement, lose any of the powers delegated to them. It is their duty, however, in implementing the policy of this Commission, to use their best efforts to obtain local acceptance for the Government nominee, endeavoring to reconcile the views of the CLN with those of the Italian Government. This must be the principle although the practice will always depend finally on the judgment of the SCAO or RC. \* \* \*

9. The CLN's must be treated with the courtesy due to their political position and their past labours. They should be received regularly by the PC [Provincial Commissioner] and given the opportunity of expressing their views. They are at liberty to make representations to the PC or the Prefect, both of whom should seek the advice and views of the CLN whenever they think it opportune. It is however entirely a matter for the PC to consider whether, in any particular case, the advice of the CLN is to be followed or rejected. It would of course be in keeping with this directive to accept such advice except where it is in conflict with the Policy of AMG.

10. It should be added that, when a member of a CLN is appointed to an administrative position, it is better that he should resign from the CLN. There may be objections to this in individual cases and it is left to the discretion of the RC concerned. . . .

11. It must be made plain to the Prefect and to other officials that they are the servants of AMG and can take no orders from the CLN. On the other hand, the PC must give his full support to the Prefect and the official administrators. . . .

12. There is some evidence that in parts of German Occupied Territory, where the enemy's control is slight, the CLN's have set up governing bodies in each commune, elected on an informal system of universal suffrage. Such popularly elected bodies may also be met at other levels. These bodies will not be given official recognition and the official local authorities prescribed by former directives will be established as soon as possible. But every effort will be made to absorb into membership of the official authorities the nominees of such an elected body at the same level. \* \* \*

## Liberation of the North and Problems Not Settled by Victory

Planning for northern Italy, because it was a task of the greatest magnitude, began early—just about the time, October 1944, when 15th Army Group settled down to a winter of virtual stalemate at a line within fifteen miles of Bologna. About the same time, the Allies announced the new policy toward Italy, which gave heightened importance to long-term political objectives in that country and made it necessary to plan for the north in the light of these as well as other objectives. Integral parts of planning for the north, but parts where the problems were so distinctive as to warrant separate treatment here, centered about the relationship with partisan CLN's (ch. XVIII) and the question of Venezia Giulia (ch. XX). The thorny problem of the partisans, as has been seen, brought into focus the Allied aim of protecting the authority of the moderate and friendly Italian Government against any challenge which the Communist partisans might raise against it after liberation. The issue of Venezia Giulia, together with the question, herein treated, of other northeastern frontier areas such as Bolzano, highlights the extent to which planning for northern Italy also had to concern itself with the objective of maintaining AMG in areas of international dispute until the peace treaty could settle matters. But as the documents on planning indicate, in addition to these special and more political type of questions,

there were quite difficult administrative and economic problems. As the main Allied offensive was to be in the northeast, northwest Italy would be a hiatus area in the sense that it would not have the usual number of military agencies. In consequence AFHQ would be required to help AMG in the first phase of operations; moreover, the plan was for AC with its regional teams to take over quickly from AMG in Phase II. Civilian supply also presented a serious problem in that if railroads and ports were severely damaged by scorching, initial distribution of civilian supply would have to be made in long hauls by trucks, unfortunately still in short supply. Further, there were long-term economic problems on the solution of which—since northern Italy had the great bulk of Italian industry—depended the whole question of whether Italy after complete liberation would be economically viable. The problems included repair and provisioning of industrial plants, protection of the north's distinctive price and wage structure by controls and an "economic barrier," and the enlistment of the aid both of management and labor in economic rehabilitation.

If military victory would leave most of ACC/AMG's problems still unsolved, certainly the character of the campaign would have a great effect for better or worse on their task. Just as the long delay in capturing Rome had disrupted all civil affairs

initial plans for the south, so a bitter contest in northern Italy, where the Germans would have time for extensive scorching, would make rehabilitation of civilian life very difficult indeed. Soon after the beginning of the Allied offensive on 9 April it became apparent that this time luck was on the side of the Allies. The British Eighth Army, which began the offensive, advanced rapidly along the Adriatic coast. Five days later the American Fifth Army launched its drive on the key enemy position at Bologna. Though putting up a strong defense initially the German lines cracked, and highly mobile columns pursued them across the Po valley. The Eighth Army drove northeast toward Trieste and Austria, American II Corps raced northward toward the Brenner Pass, and American IV Corps fanned out over northwestern Italy. By 2 May the race was over and roughly twenty months after the first Allied landing on the Italian heel, the German armies in Italy surrendered. For the first time in history, Italy had been conquered by an invader moving from south to north.

The end of fighting had come with surprising suddenness. Problems of the most varied character remained, and perhaps the only generalization possible about the occupation is that it too was characterized for the most part by surprises. Devastation and economic disruption had been expected as in southern Italy, but the liberation of the north saw little destruction, except from Allied bombing, and no breakdown of industry. It had been feared that civilian supply would be very difficult, but because damage to transport facilities was relatively small there were few problems in feeding the population. The CLN's were found everywhere in effective control, and instead of having to build up local government from scratch AMG faced the novel problem of tactfully taking over the reins from an existing organization. All

this created an initial hopefulness, but before long AMG found its optimism had been much greater than was warranted.

First, not only individual partisans but various CLN's began to give trouble. The former created a most pressing problem of public safety. In addition to the regular and well-disciplined partisan bands there were a large number of last-minute patriots who had seized abandoned German and neo-Fascist arms which they used to good effect against their enemies, public and private. A certain amount of vengeance was to be expected in any event but the vast area uncovered and the thin dispersion of AMG officers gave the terrorists a broader scope than might otherwise have been the case. As for the local CLN's, they never openly defied military government but they did tend simply to ignore its decrees and those of their own central authority. As the Allied armies consolidated their positions they tried to deal tactfully with CLN's but it soon became evident that firmness was also needed. The Fifth Army invalidated all CLN orders and decrees as of 29 May but allowed CLN's to continue functioning as "advisory bodies to Allied Military Government with respect to the problems affecting the government, economy and reconstruction of the region." With regard to disarmament, again there was no open defiance but oft-times only partial compliance.

The liberation of the north had been expected to give rise to delicate international situations in disputed frontier areas, but the most troublesome of these (aside from Venezia Giulia) was in an area where difficulty, though foreseen as a possibility, was least expected to be serious. This was the trouble which arose with French armed forces in a northwest frontier area considered undisputed Italian territory. A few facts by way of background help clarify the nature of the problem. The Aosta Valley had certain historic associa-

tions with France and included along the border some French-speaking people. Rumors of French plans to annex the area began to reach AFHQ and the Italian Government in Rome in the autumn and winter of 1944-45. When he was planning the spring offensive Field Marshal Alexander had to consider that his forces possessed but small superiority over the two German divisions in the area. In spite of misgivings on the part of both the American and British ambassadors, Field Marshal Alexander decided that the military advantages of French help outweighed possible political risks. In March therefore he arranged with SHAEF for French troops along the border to carry out "limited operations designed to contain two German divisions." Field Marshal Alexander had cause to regret his action. By the end of April the German withdrawal became a rout and the French penetrated much deeper into Italian territory than planned. On orders from SHAEF Lt. Gen. Paul Doyen halted his advance but refused to withdraw except on orders from his government.

In spite of the presence of French troops AFHQ ordered 15th Army Group to occupy the area and there resulted an intermingling of French and American troops with conflicting orders—a situation obviously inviting clashes. During May French civilians were infiltrated in the Val D'Aosta, propaganda for annexing a border strip to France was distributed, petitions for a plebiscite were circulated, and attempts were made to establish French military government. At the end of May General Doyen refused to allow AMG officers to post proclamations in the town of Imperia and on 4 June he stated that he had been ordered by his government to occupy Cuneo Province. Occupied with similar difficulties in Venezia Giulia, Field Marshal Alexander requested the CCS to authorize him to use force if necessary to

establish military government in the disputed areas. The explanation for this extraordinary incident is probably to be found in General de Gaulle's conception of French honor. The American ambassador in Paris made strong representations, and President Truman ordered the cessation of all supply except rations for the French Army. The French thereupon agreed to withdraw their forces from Italian territory provided withdrawal should have merely the appearance of normal relief.

On the northeastern frontier of Italy there were areas where self-determination had some color of validity but here less difficulty was experienced by AMG than had been expected. The South Tyrolean provinces of Belluno, Trento, and Bolzano had been ceded by Austria to Italy as late as 1919, and when the Germans invaded Yugoslavia in World War II they annexed these provinces to the Reich. In planning for the liberation, AMG officers foresaw no special problems in Belluno and Trento since they contained only small Austrian minorities. Bolzano, on the other hand, had a German-speaking population of from 65 to 80 percent. Allied authorities assumed that Belluno and Trento would probably be restored to the Italian Government at an early date but that military government might be required in Bolzano until the signing of a peace treaty which would make provision for national minority rights. When the Allies liberated the South Tyrol early in May they found that the local CLN's were effectively in charge here as elsewhere and that the national minority problem was not serious except in the northern part of Bolzano. The Italian composition of the CLN's facilitated the Allied policy of restoring Italian administration in name and form even if not, in predominantly Austrian areas, the substance. In Bolzano a South-Tyrolese party seeking self-determination was allowed to function, and in other respects as

well AMG at first tread very cautiously where local institutions reflected minority nationality. In early June, however, Headquarters AC laid down the policy of making Italian the major language in all schools and of firmly discouraging any separatism. It was with considerable surprise, therefore, that the Chief Commissioner learned four months later that Secretary of State Byrnes had developed toward Bolzano's fate an uncertainty which Admiral Stone had assured the Italian Government did not exist.

While AMG was asserting its authority in areas of international tension, it was also engaged, together with ACC, in the great problem of economic rehabilitation that on second view appeared more serious than in the first moments of gratification over the slight extent of damage to industry. Even when intact, the industrial plants were of no immediate usefulness because coal and raw materials were lacking. Before embarking on a large program of imports the economists in AC felt that certain controls were desirable. Some manufacturers, compelled to pay idle workers, were being driven into bankruptcy; others were producing luxury items instead of essential goods; still others were producing for export items needed in Italy. Drawing on American experience, AC in April 1945 had proposed an Industrial Production Board, comparable to the U.S. War Production Board, to be composed of an equal number of Allied and Italian members. AFHQ objected to this plan on the ground that it would involve the Allies in the Italian economy for the indefinite future. Other expedients were suggested but AC was unable to obtain CCS approval for any plan involving Allied control. Finally an Italian plan of "self discipline and voluntary co-operation" was put into effect. Not only in this respect, but also in the early abandonment of the economic barrier as unworkable, occupation of the north

showed how initial plans must often be changed in the light of experience or second thought.

For the most part, inadequacy of initial plans was due to developments which could not have been foreseen. Allied officers had foreseen that the liberation of the north would produce a refugee and displaced-person problem of unprecedented proportions. A reception-camp, care, and transport program had been carefully prepared, but it could not have been anticipated that the flow of expatriates home would begin before facilities were ready—as soon as hostilities in Europe came to their sudden end. To expedite the flow of persons from Italy a Joint AFHQ-SHAEP Committee for Inter-Theater Repatriation Movement Coordination was established in July 1945. The goal of this committee was to have all Italians home by September, before snow in the Alpine passes would hamper movement. By the end of November nearly a million Italians had been repatriated.

The problem of evacuating non-Italians from Italy was even more difficult. Approximately 170,000 prisoners of war, chiefly German, were returned to their homes but as of 30 September about 75,000 displaced persons, mostly "stateless persons," remained. These stateless persons consisted of Yugoslav royalists who did not wish to return to Communist Yugoslavia, Polish patriots who did not desire to return to Communist Poland, persons from eastern Poland and the Baltic states under Soviet rule, and homeless Jews. Among the humanitarian decisions of military authorities was that of SACMED and the CCS in June 1945 to use no force in returning to Russia, or any of the territories incorporated by the Soviet Union, displaced persons who did not wish to return and did not claim Soviet citizenship. Because of the shortage of personnel and delay in negotiating certain agreements the transfer of

all displaced-person operations to UNRRA was delayed for a considerable time (see ch. XXI, Section 8).

Another of the many discrepancies between plan and implementation was the inability to effect an early transition from Army AMG control over northern Italy to control by AC with its regional teams. As the concluding section of documents indicates, AC was desirous of putting this plan into effect at the end of May and believed it would relieve Army AMG of a burden which it was in no wise prepared to cope with for any long period. However, the disarming of the partisans and the keeping of careful watch until French forces had withdrawn from the Aosta Valley were problems which seemed to 15th Army Group to require military handling, and as long as it was needed for such problems it wished to retain authority over military government. After the settlement of the dispute with the French in mid-June, AFHQ directed the Fifth Army to transfer its responsibility to AC, but once again, due to reports of unrest in certain provinces,

there was a delay. By 4 August AC had assumed responsibility for all territory previously under Army AMG. Still more noteworthy was the degree to which international complications delayed return of northern Italy to the Italian Government. By July AMG had so far restored normal conditions that the Assistant Chief of Staff of G-5 AFHQ believed the area should be transferred, and SACMED on 6 September proposed the transfer to the CCS, excluding only Venezia Giulia and Udine Province—the latter because it gave access to Venezia. The CCS long delayed its approval because of the State Department's concern lest transfer of Bolzano prejudice its ultimate disposal—a concern which also affected return of all northern Italy since to withhold only Bolzano would create an issue with the Italian Government. Not until 8 December did the impatient Italian Government receive back an area which, except as concerned involvement of international complications, had been ready for its administration long before (see also ch. XXI, sec. 6).

## I. A TASK OF UNPRECEDENTED MAGNITUDE CALLING FOR NOVEL METHODS

### AMG MUST BE SET UP IN AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE AND TENSION

[Ltr, Capt Stone, USNR, Actg Chief Cmsr, ACC, to Italian Undersecy of State for Foreign Affairs, 11 Sep 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and

the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.<sup>1</sup>

[Min From Offices of U.S. Political Adviser and Br Resident Minister, 29 Jan 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, 503, CofS]

\* \* \* In connection with the occupation of Northern Italy, it would seem desirable to give consideration to the division of that part of the country into two areas: North-western Italy and North-eastern Italy. This is necessary because, in the case of the latter, other interests, particularly Yugoslav, are involved, whereas in the case

<sup>1</sup> This assurance was confirmed by the CCS on 28 April 1945 in a message to AFHQ, FAN-536 (Chapter XX, Section 2).

of the former we need only take Italian interest into consideration. \* \* \*

In North-eastern Italy the situation is complicated by the fact that there are Yugoslav claims to territory hitherto recognized as Italian. For some time past the Yugoslav Partisans have been building up an organization in this area with the obvious intention of staking out a claim as soon as the moment is convenient. If, therefore, Allied Military Government is to function in these areas, it is essential that it should not come into conflict with these Partisan elements, which are particularly strong in the country as opposed to the towns. It follows that some degree of understanding must be established in advance with Marshal Tito. This should not prove impossible, if, as now seems likely, a united Yugoslav Government is established in the very near future. There is no suggestion that a formal agreement should be concluded with Tito on this subject, but it is submitted that Tito should be informed, well in advance, of our intentions.

#### IN THREE NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES AN ANARCHICAL SITUATION LIKELY

[Memo, Commodore Stone, Acting Chief Cmsr, AC, for AFHQ, 29 Oct 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

\* \* \* 1. . . . I wish to bring to your notice certain . . . considerations in respect of the three Provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno.

2. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of these three provinces has been taken over by Germany. The phrase used by one of our informants is that these three Provinces have been "administratively annexed to the Reich."

3. Therefore, it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The holders of office under the German regime may have fled taking with them all available records.

9. In the case of the Province of Bolzano there are special considerations. Over 80% of the population is German speaking. Most of them are passionately attached to Austrian tradition and their recent period of administrative incorporation in the Reich may well have revived aspirations of union with a new Austria. \* \* \*

#### IN NORTHWEST ITALY THE MILITARY FORCES WILL BE UNABLE TO HELP IN CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[AFHQ Paper, Appreciation of the Military and Civil Commitments in N.W. Italy, 29 Nov 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, Log p. 164]

5. This area [Compartimenti Liguria, Piedmont, and Lombardy] is one of dense population (ap-

proximately 12 million) the majority of which is concentrated in a few large urban centres. The population, containing certain Fascist elements and a fair number of armed partisans, whose attitude to the Italian Government is uncertain, is liable to be easily disaffected. The prompt introduction after German withdrawal of civil supply into N.W. Italy to the minimum scale necessary to prevent unrest and disease will, therefore, be a primary consideration if a major internal security commitment is to be avoided.

7. So far in Italy the introduction of civil supplies has followed the course of military operations and the movement of the supplies has been achieved largely by military motor transport, and by means of the facilities (ports and railways) already rehabilitated and controlled by the military. Further, the relatively slow rate at which Italy has been liberated has enabled communications to be developed more or less concurrently with the speed of the advance.

8. N.W. Italy, on the other hand, is likely to be a hiatus area which will be deliberately evacuated by the enemy over a relatively short period. The communications are likely to be subject to systematic destruction on a scale far greater than that hitherto encountered in Italy. The damage to communications in N.W. Italy may, however, be reduced in extent if the partisans pursue an anti-scorch policy and if bombing targets are so selected as to spare those communications.

9. The support of operations against the enemy only indirectly requires the development of communications in N.W. Italy. These communications are required to meet the civil commitment in the area. \* \* \*

#### AC MUST ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IN DEVELOPING NORTHWEST ITALY

[AFHQ Paper, Appreciation of the Mil and Civil Commitments in N.W. Italy, 29 Nov 44]

24. The following main factors affect the determination of responsibility for the N.W. Italy commitment:—

a. Hq AAI is charged with responsibility for operations in Italy and as such will be responsible for clearing N.W. Italy of the enemy and for the establishment of AMG.

b. N.W. Italy is likely to become a hiatus area not directly connected with AAI's main operations against the German forces remaining in N.E. Italy. In previous cases the solution of civil problems has been in large measure assisted by the existence of military agencies for military purposes in the area involved. In N.W. Italy mili-

tary agencies for purely military purposes will be less strongly represented and the direct military interest in the area smaller. This will throw a greater burden of responsibility on the civil organization.

c. Any military administrative resources required for civil purposes in N.W. Italy will largely have to be provided from resources now controlled by AAI.

25. It is concluded that AC should be made primarily responsible for the development of N.W. Italy and that they should work in close conjunction with AAI who will be responsible for the initial occupation and maintenance of law and order in the area. The development of N.W. Italy is only indirectly connected with the operational task of AAI, and for this reason AAI should be relieved of responsibility for this area by AFHQ as early as possible.

#### KEEPING ALIVE LARGE WORKING POPULATION WILL BE A PROBLEM

[Note, Macmillan, Actg President, AC, undated, presumably Dec 44, ACC files, 10000/136/68]

\* \* \* When we reach the North we shall find large working class populations in Turin and Milan. It will test all our efforts to keep them alive. They will be the first large urban populations in our care situated inland and not upon the seaboard. To bring them food without railways or trucks will present a formidable problem to Allied Military Government. At present, slaves although they may be of German occupation, the factories are running and the people are largely employed. When they are "liberated" the power will probably be destroyed, the factories largely dismantled, the machine tools wrecked or taken to Germany, and the raw materials not available. \* \* \*

#### TASK OF SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION ALL BUT UNMANAGEABLE

[Memo, Col James E. Butterworth, Chief of Econ and Sup Div, G-5, AFHQ, for ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 19 Dec. 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, p. 381-34]

1. In studying the Log Plans appreciation for Northwest Italy, and in studying some of the problems that will result from the area becoming an hiatus area, together with the additional plans that will be required for the balance of Northern Italy, it has become apparent that we are faced with a task that is beyond the present means of the Allied Commission assisting the Italian Government to perform. Northern Italy beyond our present operational frontlines has a population of

approximately 20 million, of which 14 million are in the industrial Northwest. The following remarks are confined to the Northwest area:

a. The withdrawal of enemy formations from the Northwest for whatever reason will make it necessary for the Italian Government to ensure the equitable distribution of food supplies to the population. To do this it will be necessary to supplement the local resources, most of which come from the Lower Po Valley, by imported wheat and other supplies. The port of Genoa will have to be reopened (Navy).

b. The rail line from Genoa to Alessandria and beyond will have to be repaired. We are faced with destroyed tunnels and bridges, making it at least four months before any rail can possibly be made available. This throws the burden on trucks.

c. The present truck situation of the Italian Government implemented by War Department vehicles operated by the A.C. is insufficient to care for our present liberated areas of Italy. Additional trucks (1700 capacity 1½ tons each) have been notified as being approved. Their arrival cannot be anticipated prior to February and March. The required lift to service Northwest Italy is approximately that of 3000 3-ton trucks operating on two shifts daily. In addition to this it is anticipated that between 1500 and 2000 local trucks may be found to pick up local supplies and to aid in the distribution from established centers.

d. Coal. It is not anticipated that coal can be shipped prior to the availability of rail service.

e. Petroleum. Plans call for a short pipeline from the port inland, but all of the packaged stores and petrol and fuel oil from the end of the pipeline must be carried by trucks (the same trucks that are supposed to carry food).

2. The occupation of Northeast Italy will increase proportionately the problems enumerated above.

3. Northwest Italy is the manufacturing center of the nation. It is not agricultural to a self-supporting degree. If we acquire this territory before we have the means to distribute the local foodstuffs or to import and distribute supplementary foodstuffs it is almost certain that a chaotic condition will soon develop that may threaten the operational plans of the military. It will be impossible to avoid serious unrest if there is no employment and no food.

4. Recent intelligence reports both from G-2 and OSS sources indicate that the Germans are pursuing a systematic plan for immobilizing all of the industries of Northwest Italy. They have planned for the destruction of highway bridges, the complete removal of all trucks for at least 50

miles in the low country where no other destruction is possible; for the dynamiting of tunnels both for rail and highway traffic. They have arranged for the destruction of the vital hydroelectric plants, and in agreement with Italian industrialists who have requested that their buildings be not destroyed, they have agreed to immobilize these industries by removing vital parts of the machinery without which no operation can take place. At the same time while these plants are being used for German production, the raw materials available are being kept to the minimum so that Allied liberation will find these plants with no raw materials on which to work. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ WILL HAVE TO HELP AC IN SO HUGE A TASK

[Lt Gen Sir Brian H. Robertson, CAO, Remarks in Min of Mtg at Hq AC, 23 Dec 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, Log p. 164]

2. CAO stated that the policy suggested . . . 29 November had been revised. . . . It was now proposed to offer to Allied Commission certain definite military assistance which they could assume as a firm basis for their planning. \* \* \* [See Directive No. 1, below.]

3. It was emphasized that military personnel were not available to meet completely the above commitments and that the maximum use of civil resources would be required by the military.

#### 5. Road Transport

The main problem was to move civil supplies to N.W. Italy in the initial stages of the occupation during the period prior to Genoa being developed. The CAO stated that he was prepared to move, under military arrangements, a certain daily tonnage of civil supplies from existing stockpiles to some point between Bologna and Piacenza, from which point on carriage would be an AC responsibility. . . .

It was agreed that drivers for these additional vehicles should be Italian military personnel. AFHQ would assist in their training, but the responsibility for their raising would rest with the Allied Commission. \* \* \*

#### PRECISE ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR OCCUPATION OF NORTHWEST ITALY

[15th AGp Admin Directive No. 1, 19 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/105/486]

3. *Operations.* As stated in Operation Instruction No. 3, Headquarters, 15th Army Group, the occupation of Northwest Italy is to be conducted in two (2) phases:

a. *Phase I*—Military occupation and the

elimination of any remaining German or Fascist Italian formations, and the reestablishment of law and order among the civilian population, terminating in the establishment of Allied Military Government.

b. *Phase II*—The assumption of responsibility for military administration and Allied Military Government by AFHQ.

#### 4. Administrative Responsibilities—Phase I

a. As set forth in letter, AFHQ, dated 25 January 1945, file AG 323/061 GDS-O, Subject: "Occupation of NW Italy," *AFHQ will be responsible for:*

(1) Opening and operating the Port of Genoa

(2) Repair of the following railways:

Bologna-Alessandria  
Alessandria-Turin  
The easiest route to Milan  
Genoa-Alessandria

(Priority of repair contingent upon state of demolition found to have been carried out by the enemy when the area has been entered.)

(3) Construction and operation of petrol pipelines and bulk storage facilities from Genoa to Alessandria

(4) Co-ordination of the repair of the main State Cable routes, operating through L/C Signals, Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

(5) Training of Italian drivers for vehicles under the control of Headquarters, Allied Commission for the delivery and distribution of civil supplies.

(6) Supply sufficient motor transport to IV Corps to lift civil supplies at and forward of rail-head. Units concerned with the above tasks will be under IV Corps for local administration.

b. *Fifth Army will be responsible for the supply and administration of all troops operating under, or administered by, IV Corps.*

c. *IV Corps, assisted by Headquarters, No. 2 District, will be responsible for:*

(1) The establishment of Allied Military government.

(2) The initiation of civil relief measures.

(3) The initiation of the following:

(a) Repair of the following roads:

(i) Genoa-Alessandria  
(ii) Piacenza-Alessandria-Turin  
(iii) Piacenza-Milan

(Subject to physical reconnaissance and military requirements, priority for repair will be in the order given above.)

(4) Traffic control on the main arteries of military supplies.

(5) Co-ordination of the rehabilitation of electric power and water systems at Genoa and such other places as may be notified.

(6) The initiation of the mobilization of civil resources. (to be co-ordinated with Headquarters, Allied Commission, through Headquarters, 15th Army Group.)

5. *Administrative Responsibilities—Phase II.*

a. During this phase, responsibility for administration of Northwest Italy will pass from IV Corps to AFHQ. Headquarters, No. 2 District, will be the local AFHQ agency responsible for continued British military administration and Headquarters, Allied Commission for civil administration. MTOUSA will be responsible for the supply and administration of any U.S. forces remaining in Northwest Italy.

b. IV Corps, after co-ordinating with No. 2 District, will recommend to Headquarters, 15th Army Group when administrative responsibility for all, or any part of, Northwest Italy should pass from IV Corps to AFHQ.

10. *Responsibility of Headquarters, Allied Commission.*

a. AFHQ has defined the long-term responsibility of Allied Commission in Northwest Italy as follows:

(1) Generally insuring that as the first consideration unrest and disease are prevented, and as the second essential that industry is rehabilitated and opened.

(2) The provision of civilian manpower and materials to assist the military in the execution of the tasks detailed in paragraph 4, above.

(3) The economic development and rehabilitation of Northwest Italy, and the provision of civil resources for this purpose, within the limits of such policies as may be established by AFHQ. The following matters will have priority, subject to requirements under paragraph 10a(2), above, in the allocation of civil resources:

(a) Provision of drivers to operate vehicles for the movement of civil supplies.

(b) Mobilization of workshop facilities for the rehabilitation of Italian vehicles found in the area.

(c) Maintenance and repair of all Allied Commission vehicles used for the transportation of civil supplies.

(d) Mobilization of local engineer resources in labor and materials for reconstruction and repair of:

Bridges  
Roads  
Railways

other than those set out in paragraph 4 c, above.

(e) Provision of dock labor for handling port discharge tonnages in excess of that which is a military responsibility. \* \* \*

WAGE CEILINGS BUT PROVISION FOR COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES

[Directive, Labour Subcom, Hq AC, to All Concerned, 14 Apr, Issued 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/978]

2. . . . (a) Wages in private industry will be fixed at 3 April rates. . . .

(b) Nevertheless, it will be lawful for employees and employers to negotiate for and agree upon proposed wage increases.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, Article 4 of General Order No. 41 provides that negotiations for wage increases will be permitted between employers and employees. Any agreement reached as the result of such negotiations will be submitted through the local Ufficio del Lavoro to AMG and will be valid only upon receipt of AMG approval in writing.

(c) It will be the policy not to approve increases as long as the price level remains substantially constant. Where, however, there has been a substantial increase in the cost-of-living, such agreements may be approved to the extent deemed appropriate under the circumstances, after regard has been paid to the recommendation of the Regional Italian Joint Advisory Committee in each case. \* \* \*

ITALIAN JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEES FOR WAGE AND INDUSTRIAL QUESTIONS

[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Bonomi, 16 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/202]

\* \* \* It has been decided to appoint Joint Advisory Committees comprising representatives of the Italian Government, Italian industry and Italian workers to be attached to each Regional Commissioner in AMG territory for the purpose of advising on labour and industrial questions. The functions of the Regional Joint Advisory Committee are:

(1) To advise upon proposals for wage changes reaching the Regional Commissioners from negotiating bodies through Ufficio del Lavoro with the comments and recommendations of the latter.

(2) To consider and advise upon matters leading to industrial unrest and, where neces-

<sup>2</sup>In planning for Sicily and southern Italy no such provision had been made for the initial stage. The working class population was much larger and more powerful in the north, and the opening of the door to negotiated wage increases was a necessary safety valve.

sary, to take a personal part in the negotiations upon such matters.

(3) Generally to advise on questions that may be referred regarding the establishment, staffing and operation of government offices dealing with labour, such as Ufficio del Lavoro.

(4) To identify at the earliest possible moment industrial establishments which should be safe-guarded from requisition or deterioration.

(5) Similarly to identify industrial establishments which should be re-activated at the earliest possible moment in the general interests and to prevent unemployment. \* \* \*

#### THE NORTH'S ECONOMY WILL BE PROTECTED BY AN ECONOMIC BOUNDARY LINE

[Paraphrase of Msg, G-5, AFHQ, to All Concerned, 22 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/154/333]

\* \* \* 1. It has been decided, because of wide divergences between wage and price scales in southern Italy and those reported from Northern Italy, to maintain the reportedly lower rates and prices in the north and, for an initial period, to separate the two economies.<sup>3</sup> Economic boundary line will be as follows: northern boundaries of Lucca, Pistoia, Firenze and Ravenna provinces, and the western and northern boundaries of province of Apuania.

2. Price differentials will probably make smuggling and black market over the economic boundary line profitable for both military and civilian vehicles (Italian and Allied).

3. Police road blocks will be established as check posts on all roads crossing the boundary indicated in paragraph 1, in order to examine for illegal cargo both southbound and northbound traffic. Military police (to search military vehicles) and Carabinieri or Guardia di Finanze (to search civilian vehicles) will staff the road blocks jointly....

4. Through AC/AMG channels you will be notified of the types of cargo which should be made the subject of search. \* \* \*

#### FOOD STOCKPILES SUFFICIENT BUT ADEQUACY OF TRANSPORT UNCERTAIN

[Memo, AC Hq, for G-5 AFHQ, 26 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/273]

\* \* \* 1. (a) *Food*

Stockpiles are available ready for imme-

<sup>3</sup> Inflation had not reached the same heights in northern Italy as in the south.

diate movement into the North to provide an impact ration on the following scale:

Wheat/flour.....	100	grams of bread	per capita	per day
		(except Liguria—200 grams)		
Sugar.....	125	grams per capita	per month	
Fats.....	200	" " " "	" "	" "
Salt.....	100	" " " "	" "	" "

Food stocks found locally in the North will be used to supplement this scale.

#### (b) *Transport.*

In the event of full occupation taking place over a period of two months, Allied Commission will be unable fully to meet its commitments in the movement of civil supplies which are planned to be imported. If the full occupation takes three months or longer, transportation available will probably be sufficient to meet minimum requirements. The situation would be completely changed if the Germans capitulate. In this case it is anticipated that port facilities and railways would be available for use after a short period.

#### (c) *Distribution.*

Distribution will be made down to provincial centres by military transport already allocated. Below these centres distribution will be made under Allied control through the media of the Consorzi Agrari and the existing Sepral (Sezione Provinciale Alimentazione) using indigenous transport.

#### CLN'S ALSO CAUSE APPREHENSIONS

[Directive, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, and CCAO, 15th AGp, to AMG Officers, 27 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/641]

\* \* \* It is in the interest of the Allies that there should be a stable Government in Italy and the Allied policy is to strengthen the legitimate Italian Government in every way possible. The Italian Government in Rome may not have the entire confidence of the CLN's in the North and, at best, their influence there may be subject to fluctuation. . . . The Government has succeeded in exacting a certain measure of recognition from the CLN's in the North, but the possibility cannot be overlooked that they, or their component political parties, may not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favorable for a political upheaval.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Arrangements with and planning concerning the CLN's of northern Italy are treated in Chapter XVIII, above.

## 2. WHIRLWIND OCCUPATIONS AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS <sup>5</sup>

### FIFTH ARMY AMG'S JURISDICTION SUDDENLY EXPANDS

[Hq AC, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

\* \* \* I. 1. The Month of April falls into two clearly marked periods of AMG activity. During the first of these the calm and routine administration of the small area of Italy lying within the Army boundary was carried on, while at the same time preparations were diligently made for the commencement of military government in the large areas which it was expected the Army would occupy during the coming advance. Food was stockpiled at Florence, Viareggio and Forlì. An advance food depot was established at Porretta Terme. The Provincial and Regional teams, particularly those in the nearest provinces and regions, were prepared for early movement. On 11 and 12 April the 92d Division took Massa-Carrara and the first of the new territories to be liberated was entered by AMG officers. Shortly after the middle of April the attack on Bologna began and that city fell on 21 April. Modena was entered on 23 April, Mantova on 26 April. On 28 April the city of Milan, which had previously been the scene of a Partisan uprising, was entered by IV Corps. By the end of the month the greater part of North Italy had been occupied and rumour of an impending surrender was already current. . . . Within a period of ten days, the zone of Allied Military Government under the Fifth Army had been expanded from a little more than three provinces, Firenze, Lucca and Pistoia, to thirty provinces covering a far greater expanse of territory, population, wealth and industry than had ever been subjected to Allied Military Government in Italy at any one time before.

### CLN'S ARE FOUND IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

4. A new and important situation that confronted AMG during the month lay in the character and strength of the CLN's encountered in every province and almost every commune. While the position of the CLN's found in Tuscany last summer and fall had been strong, especially in Florence

where they had actually governed the city for several days before any AMG officers were allowed to cross the Arno, the position of the CLN's in Northern Italy was much fortified by the encouragement they had been given by the Italian Government in Rome during the winter months, and also by the central direction which had been created in Milan. \* \* \*

[Col H. T. Walker, CofS, G-5, IV Corps, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

\* \* \* 1. a. The first of May found civil authority in much confusion. Partisans were in control of towns and cities which had been by-passed by the Allied forces. The local Committees of National Liberation were in full operation and had selected the various governmental officers. Decrees were being issued by the CLN without reference to AMG. . . .

b. The CLN of north Italy and its correspondent committees of National Liberation in the regions and provinces had prepared plans long in advance of liberation as to officers, economics, finance, in fact, on all of the problems which would confront the governmental authorities in the area. Most of these were found to be sensible and the appointments well chosen. \* \* \*

### AMG DEEMS IT BEST TO ACQUIESCE IN CLN APPOINTMENTS

[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

4. . . . The CLN's had been recognized by Rome as the legal governments of Northern Italy during the period of German occupation and, while it was understood that they were to step aside when AMG came in, nevertheless their actions during the occupation acquired a certain validity which otherwise they would not have had. In practically all instances, for example, the CLN had actually designated Prefects. These men had taken possession of their offices by the time AMG officers arrived. AMG could remove them if they were considered unsatisfactory. But it may be doubted that it was legally necessary for AMG to "appoint" them, if it desired to continue to use their services, as they had already been appointed by bodies recognized by Rome as having the right to govern the regions; and this being the case it also became a rather futile gesture to consult the local CLN as to whether

<sup>5</sup>This section deals only with northwest Italy; for northeast Italy, see below, this chapter and Chapter XX.

someone on a list previously made up in Rome should not be appointed Prefect. The answer was obvious: What is the matter with the existing Prefect: i.e. the one recently appointed by the CLN and unless an answer could be found to that inquiry there was no use bringing the matter up.

. . . Their nominees for office were generally retained by AMG. . . .

#### CLN'S PRESENT A NOVEL PROBLEM FOR AMG

[Hq AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

1. Operations in May were a continuation of the Allied Armies swift breakthrough of the German winter line during April, culminating in the surrender of the German Armies in Italy on 2 May and finally in the total surrender of Germany on 8 May.

2. Shortly after the first of May a new phase of AMG began; this was due to the establishment of military government in cities and communities which had not experienced the ravages of war and which saw a victorious army sweep past hard on the heels of a flying enemy. Enormous areas had to be covered by AMG teams who, prepared to find chaotic conditions, found instead outstanding normality. Trains were running in every provincial capital in the North of Italy, electric light and water were functioning in most large cities and shops were well stocked. The Committees of National Liberation were conducting Provincial and Communal administration with efficiency, and AMG was therefore faced with the entirely novel problem of tactfully taking over the reins from an existing organization, in contrast to its experience further South where no such organization was functioning at the time of liberation. \* \* \*

#### AC DECLARES A LIGHT THOUGH FIRM REIN THE ORDER OF THE DAY

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for AMG Officials, 1 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

3. The outstanding successes of the patriots in liberating their towns from Nazis and Fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the CLN's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.

4. The greatest delegation possible should be made to the Italian authorities who will, in many

cases, be members of the CLN's. At the same time every effort should be made to impress upon the people and the authorities that Allied Military Government is the temporary forerunner of the Italian Government, and that Allied Military Government is working in the closest co-operation with that Government at the Headquarters of this Commission.

7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest tact, the greatest patience will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military government in circumstances prevailing now is necessary only for the protection of Allied troops and installations. A light rein with a firm hand should be the order of the day.

8. Above all, we must remember that it is our duty to administer rather than to intervene in the political future of Italy.

#### INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES CAN BE USED IF ENOUGH COAL IS MADE AVAILABLE

[Paraphrase of Msg, Hq AC to G-5, AFHQ, 8 May 45, G-5, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 5820]

North Italy preliminary reports indicate such an economic situation that Northern Italy industries might well be used for Allied war effort at once if coal were made available in sufficient quantities. Were there to be utilisation of industry it would greatly benefit Italian labour and would do much to help in the economic and political crisis which is ahead. \* \* \*

#### HOW THE CAO FOUND CONDITIONS IN GENOA

[Capt Charles I. Dunn, CAO, Commune of Genova, Rpt, 24 May 45, ACC files, 11002/105/1]

1. On 2 May 1945 this officer took over the duties of C.A.O. Commune of Genova. He found the communal administration functioning in a remarkable manner, taking into consideration that all high communal officials had been in office not longer than ten days from the above date.

3. *Public Works and Utilities.* This officer found all public utilities operating with the exception of the gas plant which was undamaged but inoperative due to lack of coal. However, street barricades and rubble were wide spread throughout the city, a definite hazard to army traffic.

4. *Public Health and Sanitation* was excellent. Two of the largest hospitals, San Martino and Pammatone were badly damaged or destroyed,

causing congestion in the others. In addition, many German wounded were found in hospitals throughout the city but were quickly removed by the Military. Sanitary conditions within the commune were good.

5. *Refugee Camps.* Even at this early date refugees from outside the commune were arriving in Genova. The Sindaco set up a refugee camp run by E.C.A. [Ente Comunale d'Assistenza] at the school Duca degli Abruzzi caring for approximately 300 persons. A soup kitchen was also operated in the above connection at Albergo dei Poveri Salita Carbonara 2.

6. *Public Safety* was in rather chaotic state. All the royal Carabinieri were removed from their posts and armed Partisans were patrolling the commune. The shooting of civilians was wide spread and public order at a low ebb. \* \* \*

7. *Finance.* All banks and the stock exchange were closed. Financial transactions were at a stand still.

8. *Public Relations* were seemingly excellent, the Municipal authorities were friendly and anxious to assist in any way possible. \* \* \*

#### FOOD SITUATION SEEMS ENCOURAGING

[Food Sub-Com, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/159/671]

2. A.C. stockpiles on Eastern and Western coasts were more than adequate to cope with the demands of the Northern provinces. Transport of food supplies from stockpiles and warehouses was the controlling factor in determining the amount of food that could be made available. After an initial difficult fortnight, shipment has improved considerably—by the end of the month, a total of over 19 thousand tons of food has been issued from warehouses on the east side, distributed over the whole of the Po Valley, and over 5 thousand tons from the warehouses on the west side to the Ligurian coast.

3. Investigations were continued during the month as to the stocks of indigenous foodstuffs throughout the North. The results, to date, have been encouraging; considerable stocks of grain, rice, sugar, and cheese have been declared and these will be incorporated in plans for the provisioning of the North.

4. Working organizations of food rationing, food control, and distribution, have been discovered in the North and every effort is being made to utilize these, so that the minimum interference in the food economy of North Italy will be made. \* \* \*

[Food Sub-Com, AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/159/671]

2. Considerable attention was given to the linking up the food organizations found to be existing in Northern Italy upon our entry there with the Italian Ministry of Food. Agreement was reached as a result of several conferences, and now there is a complete Italian food organization in Northern Italy which is linked up with that in Rome. \* \* \*

#### TRANSPORT IS THE ONLY LIMITING FACTOR

[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

II. d. Transportation has been the limiting factor in the supplying of food and movement of personnel. Fifth Army Transportation Section took over control of all transportation and by the end of the month movement of supplies was built up to 2500 tons per day and [is] still increasing. Over 3,100 carabinieri and their equipment were transported from Florence to their provinces requiring as much as a six-day turnabout in some cases. Regional and Provincial teams were aided in their moves to their various capitals by this transportation. Refugees are being transported by backlog of trucks as far as possible.

In order to best utilize additional trucks, other than Allied Commission trucks, from Fifth Army and Peninsular Base Section a large warehouse was established in Modena on 26 May. This warehouse is stocked with the extra Allied Commission trucks over and above those necessary for the minimum 450 tons per day commitment for Milan and Turin and by Army and Peninsular Base Section trucks on backhauls of Prisoners of War. \* \* \*

#### HONEST VILLAGERS

[Diary, Lt Col S. H. White, 15th AGp Liaison Mission, May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

\* \* \* *Thursday, 10 May.* At about 2230 evening 9 May I received message that persons were at Headquarters who wished to see me. I found there two peasants and a priest; they told me that some days ago a German vehicle had been shot up and they had obtained a chest of money; they asked that the Allies should take charge. I phoned 88 Div. who said the location was outside their area and suggested 10 Mtn. Div. to which I replied that I did not think the latter had any unit in the vicinity. I then rang 2 Corps who were sceptical of the story but said they

would attend to it. I asked when and was met rather evasively. I said I could myself arrange to get the money in.

I left next morning at 9 and arrived at Cloz about 10 to find whole village in church. Waited until 11 conclusion of High Mass (Ascension day) and then went to the Priest's House who produced wooden crate for which I handed over order in name of GOC and receipt. Returned to Bolzano when I knocked up Bank Italia it being a holiday and requested them take in money located Lt. Paquette and returned to Bank of Italia [*sic*]. Money counted; 8½ million lire in notes and 11½ million lire in bankers orders, obtained receipts from Lt. Paquette. . . .

Spoke General Hume and Colonel [Joseph R.] Burrill who approved suggestion of reward to village. (Letter to GOC 15 Army Group sent by Colonel Burrill.) \* \* \*

#### THE ARMY GOES ON A TREASURE HUNT

[Finance Div, AMG Fifth Army, Final Rpt, Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

\* \* \* In a dry report like this, all the romance will be squeezed out, and just the final results will be given, and we leave it to your imagination or if you wish to your postwar time to tell you of the thrilling chases over the mountain passes and into dark caves, and searching through safes, etc., etc., for the treasure of the Nazi and the Fascist! \* \* \*

One of our latest caches was from several cases of German SS uniforms in a warehouse which were found to have large sums of Italian lire in the pockets—completely equipped. \* \* \*

So the treasure hunt goes on over the Dolomites—the Brenner—the Bergamo and the Carnic Alps—up and down the lakes—in caves. The score rolls up and up and it is billions we talk of now—not millions—and platinum and gold and jewels and moneys of every country—not the paper money either—gold sovereigns—double eagles—napoleons—gold marks—and even barrels of silver which may go to make silver nitrate for the Medical Department or some other prosaic task! \* \* \*

#### IF NOT TRUTH, A MASTERPIECE OF CURIOUS INVENTION—MUSSOLINI'S LAST POLITICAL TESTAMENT

[Ltr, The Spec Cmsr for Social-Fascism (Signature Illegible), to U.S. Ambassador to Italy, 28 Oct 45, Transmitted by David McK. Key, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires ad Interim, to Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 16 Nov 45, ACC files, 10000/136/123]

\* \* \* I have the honor of transmitting to you a circular that I have sent out to Fascists and sympathizers on occasion of October 28 [anniversary date of the Fascist march on Rome].

We intend to re-enter the political life of our country, ready to give loyal and sincere collaboration to our enemies of yesterday, for the good of today and of tomorrow of the Italian people. \* \* \*

[Circular addressed to the Italian Social-Fascist Party of Action reads in part as follows]

Comrades! Italians in good faith!

On April 25, 1945, at the Prefecture of Milan, the Duce in a long conversation with me told me what I am going to repeat here below:

“(2) Italy, having lost a war, will be subjected to the Victors for a very long period. It is not improbable that Hitler is right and that at a certain moment the Anglo-Americans will find it necessary to wage war against the USSR. In such a case, the Fascist must side with the Allies.

“If Germany had won this war, we must remember that a defeated England would have had a second place in Europe just the same and Italy the third place because at the bottom, Hitler had a higher esteem for the English than for the Italians. Instead, having lost a war, Germany will disappear from the role of important nations for an indefinite period and in such a case, Fascists must give their support to Great Britain until it overthrows Russia and takes over again the reins of Europe in her hands.” \* \* \*

These were the words of the Duce, pronounced a few hours before he was assassinated. Now you know how to comport yourselves. Remember: your immediate duty is that of fighting against that type of constitution which the despotic government of the so-called C.L.N. wants to impose upon you. \* \* \*

### 3. THE CLN'S GET TEMPORARILY OUT OF HAND

#### PARTISAN KILLINGS <sup>6</sup> HAVE BEEN A BIG PROBLEM FROM THE FIRST

[G-5, Fifth Army Rpt for Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/436]

3. The first great problem that confronted AMG in all the new territory was the Partisan situation. In every province there were found to be thousands of Partisans, armed to the teeth, many of them with excellent fighting records but many also who had picked up arms only as the Germans withdrew, all ready to tell the world (and many genuinely believing) that they themselves and their comrades had driven out the Germans and liberated their cities, substantially unassisted by the Allied Armies, and most of them toughened by months of rough living in the mountains and, it was feared, little disposed to convert their swords into ploughshares and return to the quiet walks of peace. Edward Burke said that one could not indict a nation and so one cannot indict the Partisans. They came from every walk of Italian life and included the noblest and most high-minded of Italian youth, men and women, as well as much of the material out of which our American city gangsters are made. It is this latter element that has given trouble.

From the first entry into Bologna the problem of Partisan murders raised its ugly head. It continued unabated. These murders take two forms, first the unorganized casual killing of a single individual, presumably, in most cases, by an individual or small group and presumably also in such cases largely for personal revenge, possibly revenge for some injustice committed by the individual under Fascist authority; and second, the more or less organized shooting of Fascists by Partisans at the direction of their leaders, possibly after some form of so-called trial, such as is alleged to have been given Mussolini and the others arrested with him. In some provinces one form of lawlessness predominates; in others, another. For example in Bologna the individual private murder has been the rule while in Verona the killings, as far as is known, were all of the pseudo-legal variety. \* \* \*

AMG response to this situation during April was of two kinds. First great efforts were made to disarm the Partisans and with astonishing

success during this period. Parades were held during April in Bologna and Modena and by the end of the month preparations for parades in Verona, Vicenza and other cities were well under way. At these parades the Partisans passed in review, fully armed and under their own leaders, before General officers of the Fifth Army, and at the conclusion of the parades surrendered their arms. Bands played, bugles trumpeted, drums beat and flags were unfurled in the soft April breezes. After the arms were surrendered speeches were made and Partisan Certificates were presented to the leaders. [See Chapter XVIII, Section 2.] At Bologna 3,500 Partisans surrendered their arms and at Modena more than 14,000. Dozens of truckloads of rifles, ammunition and all sorts of small arms were collected. The lot included a few light pieces and, at Modena, two tanks. However it was noted that the number of pistols and machine guns turned in was surprisingly small.

The other effort to bring the killings under control was through appeals to the sense of responsibility of the better elements in the community. Appeals were made privately and by public proclamation by AMG officers, by the CLN's, by the new Prefects and Mayors, by church officials and by Partisiani leaders themselves. That these appeals had some good effect cannot be doubted. Nevertheless the situation remained grave at the end of the month and, while Carabinieri had been ordered to do everything possible to prevent the commission of such crimes, no serious effort had been made up to the end of the month to punish any of the perpetrators thereof. \* \* \*

CLN's HAVE ALSO UPSET INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS [Memo, Braine, Dir, Labor Subcom, for Hq, AC, 21 May 45 (Written after a visit to the North, 6-19 May), ACC files, 10000/146/37]

10. A public pronouncement should immediately be made regarding

(a) The appointment of Works Management Councils. . . .;

(b) The payment of Liberation Bonus to workers. . . .;

(c) The appointment of Commissioners and Vice-Commissioners in replacements of compromised or missing managements.

The first depends upon a so-called Decree of the Committee of National Liberation for Upper Italy, dated 17th April 1945, which abolished the Fascist "socialization" decree but applied, to establishments with capital of one million lire and

<sup>6</sup> This type of killing took place soon after the occupation of Rome. (See above, pp. 478, 534.) The hope had been that by placing more responsibility on the Italian Government, recurrence could be avoided.

above which had been liable to socialization, provisions for managements councils containing 50 p.c. representation of workers.

The second rests upon an alleged agreement between representatives of industry and of workers in the CLN, and required payment of the bonus to industrial workers to be completed by 31st May. It was later extended to employees in commerce, to be paid by 31st August. Any number from four to six million workers would be affected and as the average payment would be in the neighborhood of 3,500 lire per worker, the inflationary effect and other results would be serious if the payments were made.

The third started as the nomination by local CLN's of interim managers to keep businesses going when the managers disappeared, but has been interpreted as the right to substitute nominees at the instigation of such Committees. The demand is made that a worker should be appointed if capable; otherwise, that a worker should be appointed Vice-Commissioner.

11. In fact, the three questions were not heard of in Bologna, Venezia, Padova, and were not much in evidence in Genoa. They are being developed most in the Milan area and also in Turin. Threats of personal violence are being made in the Milan area and also in Turin. In the Turin area some employers made the theatrical gesture of offering the keys of their establishments to the workers when they were asked for the bonus, which they said would mean the closing of their businesses.

I gathered the impression in Milan, Turin and Genoa that the workers' representatives in the various Camere del Lavoro were themselves fearful of the consequences of pursuing these issues, with the exception of the Communist secretary of the Camera at Milan.

12. . . . On the first two issues it is recommended that a decision should be taken to suspend action until the Italian Government has fully considered all the implications. On the third issue it is recommended that commissioners or receivers should be appointed by AMG or the Italian Government, in substitution where advisable, of those appointed by CLN, and that orders should be issued that there should be no arbitrary replacement of existing managements. \* \* \*

A SEPARATE TAX SYSTEM FOR CLNAI'S COFFERS  
[Min, Mtg of SACMED's Econ Comm., 22 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

\* \* \* Mr. Antolini [Vice President, Econ Sec.] reported that the CLNAI had established in Northern Italy a retribution bonus system to be supported by all industrial workers. Collections

are being enforced by industrial unions and similar organizations. . . . General Spofford pointed out that CLNAI decrees in AMG territory are not legal or enforceable, and as a consequence this is a matter to be dealt with by AMG. . . .

#### PRIME MINISTER BONOMI RECEIVES REPORTS OF A DUAL GOVERNMENT

[An Italian's Rpt Sent by Bonomi to Chief Cmsr, AC, 28 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

The political and economic situation in North Italy is most ambiguous; while there is an Allied Military Government, the C.L.N.A.I. is carrying on because of the full powers given to it by the Rome Government, and has installed itself like a real civilian government, with commissions and commissioners acting as ministers.<sup>7</sup>

The decrees and regulations which they issue do not always correspond with those of the Allied Government or of the National Government.

While the military organization of the partisans was perfect, the civilian may not be prepared for the grave problems of the present items; this creates a state of confusion which might seriously harm the political and economic future of North Italy and of the whole nation as well.

Extremist elements follow systems which are not very different from the demagogic systems of the past regime; others aim at getting hold of the leading posts of command through a rash and personal work of epuration, considering the fact of belonging to this or that partisan formation to be an essential condition, and overlooking all other technical or experience requisites.

Worked up by the programs of leftist men or parties, the working masses feel disappointed for they find that the regulations against the leading classes are never drastic enough; faced with more and more numerous demagogic acts, the latter feel no less disappointed, and are preoccupied by the lack of organization and logical consequences in the regulations which are being issued; \* \* \*

#### AMG HAS TO SET A DEADLINE FOR THE SURRENDER OF ARMS

[Directive, Poletti, Rgnl Cmsr, Lombardia Rgn, to Provincial Cmsrs, 22 May 45, ACC files, 11100/101/140]

On and after June 7, 1945, there are to be no armed partisans operating as partisans in your

<sup>7</sup> The striking feature of the CLNAI pseudo government was that instead of denying the authority of AMG—in traditional revolutionary fashion—it simply ignored this authority as far as was convenient. The local CLN's also ignored their own central authority.

province. In other words, from that day on no armed partisans are to be used even to guard their own CP's, warehouses, railroads or other installations. The groups of a thousand partisans for Milan City and 500 each for each province, which have been heretofore authorized on the condition that such partisans wore a serially numbered arm band and carried an identity card, are to be dissolved by June 7th. Until that date you are permitted to use these especially authorized partisans for the guarding of their CPs, warehouses, etc., but they are not to be permitted to roam the streets generally with arms. \* \* \*

[G-5 Sec, Fifth Army, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/100/436]

2. . . . In those areas where the Army swept through and quickly demonstrated power, the Partisans responded at once to the order to disarm and return to civil life. The war had passed them and there was no real need for them to fight to protect their land. Partisans of Bologna, Modena, Mantova and Verona were examples of this favorable reaction.

In other sectors in which complete liberation was slower there was another and more difficult problem. The Partisans were loath to surrender their weapons until the surrendered German troops were disarmed and removed from such areas. Also there were Fascist groups organized for resistance and until they were tracked down the Partisans were disinclined to part with their arms. Milan, Turin, Trento, and Bolzano provinces were examples of this problem.

There was accordingly issued by the Commanding General, IV Corps, in collaboration with the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, an order that Partisans should be disarmed and their weapons turned in on or before the 7th of June. This order was in general well obeyed. By the end of May a steady stream of weapons—mostly rifles—was coming in from the Partisans to the collection centers. \* \* \*

#### LOCAL CLN'S CANNOT BE CONTROLLED

[Ltr, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, to G-5, AFHQ, 1 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

\* \* \* The CLNAI on the whole has lived up to the agreements made prior to occupation and has cooperated insofar as possible under the pressure exerted by the various political parties within the Committee. \* \* \*

There are now disturbing reports from the Provinces. There have been desires on the part

of local CLN's to issue decrees of their own and a few have attempted this. To end this matter permission is being sought through channels for the publication of General Wilson's agreement with the CLNAI to establish the fact that Allied Military Government was to take over. In addition a letter has been written by the President of the CLNAI to all local CLN's again reiterating that they now become consultative rather than governing bodies. This has been given wide publicity. \* \* \*

#### AMG FIFTH ARMY INVALIDATES CLN ORDERS AND APPOINTMENTS

[Gen Hume, ACofS, G-5, to All Concerned, undated, probably late May, ACC files, 11100/101/5]

After consultation with the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy and with its approval, and in accordance with the agreement made with the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre and the said Committee

It is ordered that with respect to all territory occupied by the Fifth Army:

1. All decrees and orders heretofore made by the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy, the Regional Committee of Liberation, Provincial and Communal Committees of Liberation, or any economic, financial, industrial, or other committees or agencies of the said Committees of Liberation, shall cease to have any legal effect as of 28 May 1945, unless specifically ratified by Allied Military Government.

2. All appointments to offices of whatever nature heretofore made by the said committees are not valid until legalized by Allied Military Government.

3. Any decrees, orders or appointments purporting to be made by said committees after the publication of this order shall be null and void.

4. Allied Military Government acting for and by authority of the Commanding General, Fifth Army is the only authority empowered to issue decrees and orders and to make appointments to a public or other office. This authority wherever practical is delegated to the duly constituted Italian Officials previously appointed by Allied Military Government such as the Prefect, Questore, and the Mayor of a city. All orders issued by public officials affecting the civilian population will be issued only with the written approval of the appropriate officer of Allied Military Government.

5. The said Committees of Liberation and Committees and other agencies thereof will operate only as advisory bodies to Allied Military

Government with respect to the problems affecting the government, economy and reconstruction of the region. Allied Military Government has in the past and will continue to collaborate closely with the said committees of Liberation.

6. This order shall apply and be effective in all territory now occupied by the Fifth Army.<sup>8</sup>

#### PARTIES AGREE THAT LOCAL CLN's SHOULD ABANDON THEIR USURPED POWERS

[Political Review of Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, at 38th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 15 June 45, ACC files, 10000/136/229]

3. . . . On June 1st, Colonel Poletti, the Deputy Senior Civil Affairs Officer at Milan, published an order to the effect that the decrees and orders issued by the CLNAI were to be considered henceforth as having no legal validity. They would be replaced by decrees and orders of AMG. This statement no doubt had its effect on the discussions in Rome. On June 2d, the six parties met together and as a result of their deliberations were able to issue a declaration of complete agreement on this subject. Briefly, it was agreed that:

(1) the provincial and communal Committees of National Liberation should continue to carry out consultative functions alongside the prefects until such time as the normal organs of local administration should be reestablished after democratic elections;

(2) that the other committees of national liberation not covered by the preceding paragraph should return to their exclusively political character and

(3) the committees in factories and industries should be transformed into technical and trades union organizations according to the production needs or social requirements of the factory or plant in question. \* \* \*

#### UNCONTROLLED EPURATION IN PRIVATE BUSINESS WILL BE STOPPED

[Memo (unsigned) for Chief Cmsr, AC, Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/810]

1. . . . General Order No. 46 provides a system of epuration in private industry.

2. At the present time in the north, and particularly in Milan, large numbers of employees in private industry are being thrown out of employment on the alleged ground that they have

<sup>8</sup> The order provoked from the northern Italy political leader Randolpho Pacciardi the bitter remark, "Thus ends the revolution of the North." *AC Weekly Bull*, 8 Jun 45.

been fascists. In many cases the real purpose is to enable some other employee to pay off an old score or to take over the position of the dismissed employee.

3. It is the considered view of the CLN, Lombardia Region, AMG, and CA Sec that the only way to check this is to provide a system of epuration for private industry under which all complaints of fascist activity against an employee are investigated by an impartial commission.

4. This order provides for this and establishes the necessary machinery. It is approved by the CLN, the Regional Commissioner, and the High Commissioner for Epuration in Rome.

#### LOCAL CLN's STILL AROUSE MISGIVINGS

[Memo, Brig John K. Dunlop, RC, Venezia Region, Hq AC, 23 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

3. I do not expect any difficult developments so long as A.M.G. remains in existence. Our close link throughout the Region and the independent position of Provincial Commissioners give, I think, sufficient guarantee. I do, however, anticipate that when A.M.G. ceases one or two things will happen. Either the Prefects will become the mere tools of the Provincial Cs.L.N., or else there will be considerable friction between them. This, as I see it, can only be avoided by some definite decision now on the part of the Italian Government as to the policy they propose to adopt with regard to Cs.L.N.

6. A very important question centers around the provision of finance. In the resistance days the various Cs.L.N. received financial grants from the C.L.N.A.I. With these grants they paid their staff and probably paid the members of the C.L.N. Now that the grants have ceased, the Cs.L.N. are beginning to find themselves in financial difficulties and the only way in which they can continue an administrative existence is by raising contributions from the public. In far too many cases these contributions resemble all too closely forced subscriptions. If it is the intention that Cs.L.N. exist in future in Italy then their composition and organization must be laid down and government funds be made available for their proper maintenance.

7. Otherwise I believe that there is real danger that they will degenerate into party bodies maintained by graft and they will lose a great measure of public sympathy and support. You have no doubt already heard the cynical public exposition of the meaning of their initials, "*Come loro noi.*"

## BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE HANDLED DICTATORIALLY

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Rgnl Cmsr, Lombardia Rgn, 27 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/399]

1. I am sure that the P. C., Cremona, was activated by the best motives to ensure the subordination of the activities and authority of the CLN to good and just administration. I am equally sure that the procedure he adopted defeated his ends and laid himself, AMG, and Allied policy

open to just criticism to the effect that AMG was about as dictatorial a regime as can be imagined.

2. The CLN's sprang from the people, or a section of the people, who were prepared to fight the Germans and fascism. Whatever their subsequent defects—including usurpation of powers of government—they cannot and should not be put in their place by orders, issued in the form of an open letter, carrying such dictatorial instructions as are those contained in paras 5-8 of the letter. \* \* \*

## 4. FRENCH FORCES REMAIN TOO LONG IN AOSTA VALLEY

### AMG TO BE SET UP REGARDLESS OF FRENCH PRIOR OCCUPATION

[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Maj Gen Willis D. Crittenger, CG, IV Corps, 3 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/282]

SACMED has directed that Allied Military Government will be set up in all territory under his command, that is to say all Italy. If therefore French are found in occupation AMG will be set up in the usual manner. If French Military Government has been set up AMG will replace it.

### A CRITICAL SITUATION ARISES AFTER FRENCH REFUSE TO WITHDRAW

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 13 May 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 4012]

1. A critical situation has arisen in N.W. Italy due to continued presence in that area of French troops. The events which have led up to this are as follows:

2. In March I appreciated that as Fifteenth Army Group had only a small superiority in divisions over the enemy the holding of the 2 German Divisions on the Franco-Italian border would very materially assist the offensive in April. I arranged therefore with SHAEF for French troops along the border to carry out limited operations designed to contain those German Divisions. . . .

3. The operations of the French troops were most successful in attaining the desired end, but resulted in certain French units crossing the border into Italy. As soon as the military necessity for French operations along the border had passed, SHAEF was requested to order the withdrawal of all French troops into France. [Lt.]

General [Paul] Doyen's reply to this order stated that he could not withdraw without previous agreement of his Government. He also stated that the arrival of troops of Fifteenth Army Group at Susa, i.e., behind his forward positions, was "a serious and unfriendly act." As a result of a request from me that the French General Staff be pressed to order withdrawal SHAEF replied on 7th May that General Doyen was being asked to coordinate withdrawal of his troops into France with arrival of my forces on the Italian border. SHAEF further stated they had stressed importance of enabling this Theater to establish frontier control on Italian side as already agreed between SHAEF and the French. SHAEF recommended as best means of insuring French withdrawal that my forces proceed to border control. Accordingly I instructed my troops to complete the occupation, including establishment of AMG, but emphasized that armed clashes with the French should be avoided. The attitude I have ordered them to adopt is that this action is as agreed between SHAEF, AFHQ and the French.

4. On 11th May CG Fifteenth Army Group reported to me that a Fifth Army Staff Officer had been in touch with General Doyen and that the latter acknowledges receipt of order to withdraw but is awaiting confirmation from the French Government before complying. Doyen proposed an interim solution that either we advance to line now occupied by French leading elements or that we advance to the frontier leaving French troops *in situ*. Doyen's Chief of Staff on 9th May proposed an Allied ceremony in Turin with French participation, this to erase stigma of French having to go to Turin in 1940 to sign capitulation. This will not be permitted.

5. Meanwhile the French since their entry into the country have adopted a truculent and pro-

vocative attitude towards the Italians and in consequence Italian Partisans have not surrendered their arms and I consider an immediate clash between French and Italians very likely. . . .

7. Fifth Army has been ordered to continue to advance as rapidly as possible to the frontier, taking all practicable steps to encourage the French to withdraw but in any case to establish Allied frontier control. If hostilities are threatened by this action troops will stand fast and I shall decide the action to be taken.

8. While French troops on the ground are extremely cordial to our troops progress is not satisfactory because of French passive interference in the form of road blocks on key routes. Any attempt to rush matters would probably lead to unfortunate incidents.

9. It appears probable that the present French attitude in NW Italy has the support of the French Government. It thus appears most unlikely that SHAEF will be able to enforce French withdrawal without Government backing. Request therefore you take necessary action urgently to provide this.

#### GENERAL CLARK FEARS INCIDENTS

[Msg, Gen Mark Clark, CG, 15th AGp, to Field Marshal Alexander, 19 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/282, MC-IN 14294]

\* \* \* General Doyen, Commanding French Army of Alps, visited me here today. He explained that French troops were seriously disappointed when required to stop advance in Italy just as they were about to exploit victory. He stated that prestige and honour of French Army requires that French not be required to withdraw from Italy at this time. He said that he felt quite certain that no question of annexation of Italian Territory was involved. At one stage he suggested that instead of having French troops withdraw, he felt that American troops should give way to permit French to occupy larger area. I told him I was certain this would never be agreed to.

It is perfectly apparent to me that French troops will remain generally in their present positions in Italy for some time while the situation is being discussed on Governmental levels. Meanwhile, with two Commanders in the same area and troops thoroughly mixed, the set up is unsatisfactory. In spite of drastic orders issued by all Commanders concerned to prevent incidents, some are liable to take place, particularly in view of an inflammable Franco-Italian relationship. \* \* \*

#### GENERAL DOYEN THREATENS TO PREVENT SETTING UP OF AMG

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander, to CCS, 5 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/282]

1. Following events have taken place:

A. On 29 May Deputy Regional Commissioner of Liguria was refused permission by French local commander to post Allied Proclamations in western Imperia establishing AMG and was advised that General Doyen, Commanding French Army of Alps, was unable to envisage a change in administration in western Imperia at this juncture as any such change would appear to Italians as retreat on the part of France.

B. On 30 May General Doyen sent a letter to General Crittenberger, Commanding IV Corps, referring to the action of the Deputy Regional Commissioner Piemonte in his attempts to establish military government in province of *Cuneo*. The letter outlines French justification for occupying northwest Italy. . . .<sup>9</sup>

C. Following radio message was received by GG IV CORPS on night 2/3 from General Doyen:

I have sent to General Juin a copy of the letter I asked Major Rogers to deliver to you. I beg to let you know that I have just been notified of the full approval given by the Chief of the Provisional Govt of the French Republic. General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of AMG in the territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception.

3. My comments are:

A. General Doyen's message in para 1C above discloses a complete change in French policy in N.W. Italy. He now states that he has been ordered by de Gaulle to prevent me from setting up Allied Military Government in disputed areas by force if necessary.

B. Apart from wider considerations, our position in Italy and vis-à-vis Tito will be greatly prejudiced if we accept this ultimatum.

4. I recommend:

A. That I be directed by you to complete the occupation of N.W. Italy and to establish Allied Military Government there, using force if necessary.

B. That I be authorized to publish to all troops under my command and to press a statement of the facts.

<sup>9</sup> The letter is quoted in President Truman's communication below.

5. I consider that the French would be unlikely to oppose the establishment of Allied Military Government if strong U.S. and British forces, especially armored forces in which the French are lacking in this area, are despatched in support, with orders to use force if necessary.

#### PRESIDENT APPEALS TO GENERAL DE GAULLE

[Ltr, President Harry S Truman to De Gaulle, 6 Jun 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-B]

You have by this time no doubt seen the message from this Government which was communicated to your Foreign Minister yesterday. I wish to appeal to you directly in this matter and to notify you with what great concern and how seriously I view the action of the First French Army in the Province of Cuneo in northwest Italy.

This Army, under the command of General Eisenhower . . . ignored orders issued to it to withdraw to the frontier in keeping with the arrangements for the occupation and organization of Allied Military Government in Italy under Field Marshal Alexander, the Allied Commander in Italy. More recently the following events have taken place: On May 30 General Doyen, commanding the French Army in the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenger, commanding the United States Fourth Corps in Northwest Italy, referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the Province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph:

"France cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security. I have been ordered by the provisional government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of an Allied Military agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character and could have grave consequences." \* \* \*

This constitutes a very blunt statement of the intention of the French Government to maintain its forces contrary to the order of the Allied Supreme Commander and in direct contravention of the principles which I accept, and I know you will agree, as representing the best interests of all allied governments in preserving a hard won peace, namely the avoidance of military action to accomplish political ends. \* \* \*

While this threat by the French Government is outstanding against American soldiers, I regret that I have no alternative but to issue instructions

that no further issues of military equipment or munitions can be made to French troops. Rations will continue to be supplied.

#### GENERAL JUIN DEPLORES THE MISUNDERSTANDING

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 9 Jun 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 3062]

General Juin arrived my headquarters this morning. Following reports interview.

1. Juin began by deploring misunderstanding which had arisen over French occupation of N.W. Italy and stated he had come to clear up this unfortunate matter. Except for one or two minor frontier adjustments, France had no territorial claims in this area. She was merely concerned in protecting local inhabitants on Italian side of frontier who were French by race, sentiment and language. Juin then asked whether the French Government already established might continue in this area and whether French troops might remain in occupation under my command. I replied that my instructions on this matter from the US and British Governments are clear and give me no power or discretion to agree to such arrangements.

2. Juin then stated that he saw no objection to early withdrawal of French troops now in Val D'Aosta and the Susa area, but that withdrawal from Tenda area was another matter. General de Gaulle had not given him authority to withdraw these troops and in any event a hasty withdrawal would be most hurting to French *amour propre*. When questioned he stated that a month might be adequate time for withdrawal. I replied that if withdrawal commenced at once and was completed by end of June it would be acceptable to me personally.

3. After considerable further discussion I suggested that Juin agree that he should return to France immediately to explain whole situation to de Gaulle and obtain decision. He accordingly left Naples by special aircraft at 1300 hours and a message was despatched to Paris requesting an immediate interview with de Gaulle on his arrival. \* \* \*

#### GENERAL DE GAULLE AGREES TO FRENCH BEING RELIEVED

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 10 Jun 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 3313]

1. French Mission at my Headquarters received message from General Juin this morning 10th June stating that General de Gaulle agrees to withdrawal of French troops west of 1939 Italo-Franco frontier.

2. General Juin's message further states that a French delegation comprising General Carpenter [Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpentier], General Lorbort (Chief of Staff to General Doyen) and a Staff Officer from General Juin's Headquarters are arriving at Naples this evening 10th June to settle details for a progressive withdrawal of French forces from Italy. \* \* \*

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45, NAF-1009]

1. . . . Following arrangements were agreed:

a. Relief of all French troops in N.W. Italy will be carried out progressively and will be completed by 10 July. Details will be settled by local Commanders.

b. In Val D'Aosta and Susa areas AMG will be established immediately. In Tenda area, where French military administration is now function-

ing, handover to AMG will be done progressively under local arrangements. There should be no difficulty or delay since AMG officers are already located generally throughout area.

c. Relief will be carried out by U.S. and British troops. For so long as Anglo-American troops are available in N.W. Italy, Italian troops will not be stationed on Franco-Italian Frontier.

2. It was agreed that no publicity would be given to these arrangements and that no communiqué would be issued by this or any military Headquarters concerned. Emphasis is to be laid on the operation being a normal military relief and use of the word "withdrawal" is to be avoided. An undertaking was given to the French representatives that the U.S. and British Governments would be requested to conform to the same policy and to avoid making any public statements. \* \* \*

## 5. THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM IN BOLZANO

### RECREATE THE ITALIAN SYSTEM IN NAME AND FORM BUT NOT NECESSARILY IN SUBSTANCE

[Memo, G-5, AFHQ, for Hq AC, 8 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

5. The following considerations are set out as being pertinent in the case of planning in Bolzano:

a. It may be assumed that the province will *not* be detached from Italy notwithstanding the case which can be put forward on historical or ethnical grounds. Nor is the policy of forced emigration along the lines of the Italo-German agreement of 1939 likely to be pursued after the war. On the other hand, it may be assumed that provision for the protection of the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol (as a minority within the Italian State) will be included in the final settlement with Italy.

b. Direct control by AMG methods will probably be continued until permanent provision for the minority protection envisaged under a. above is assured.

c. The AMG policy, in the light of the above, should not encourage separatist hopes or the creation of local government institutions which cannot be expected to survive the return to Italian rule. On the other hand, while reconstituting the Italian system of local government in name and form, AMG policy should encourage the substance of local self-government. As proposed by you, only indigenous officials should be employed

and emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connection of candidates should be avoided.

d. The use of Italian troops and Carabinieri should be avoided but if a special police force cannot be recruited locally which is free of Nazi taint then they may be employed. \* \* \*

### AN ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION UNTIL THE TYROLESE AREA IS REACHED

[Dunlop, Rgnl Cmsr, Venezia Region, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/105/248]

\* \* \* As a result of the complete Allied victory effected by the 2nd of May, very little fighting took place within the Region of Venezia, and the Allied advance through the Region was rapid until the northern and eastern frontiers of Udine, Belluno and Bolzano were reached by Allied troops.

The reception of the Allied troops by the population was enthusiastic, except perhaps in the northern part of Bolzano where the Tyrolese were inclined to be pro-German in their sympathies. Committees of National Liberation were found to be functioning everywhere and there was in Venice a strong Regional Committee which had already carried out much preliminary work. There were numerous bands of armed patriots throughout the Region, with the strongest best organized operating in Treviso, Belluno and Udine. Although there was probably some disappointment on the part of the local C.L.N.'s that

they were not left in a position of absolute power, surprisingly little difficulty was found in persuading them that the control of the country had to pass to AMG. \* \* \*

#### A SOUTH TYROLESE PARTY PROMOTING SELF-DETERMINATION IS FOUNDED

[Memo on the Formation of the Party of the South Tyrolese People, Apparently Prepared by the Party Leader, Erich Amonn, 7 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. The spokesmen of the South Tyrolese people founded the "Party of the South Tyrolese People" on the 7th May at Bozen with the object of uniting in this party all of the South Tyrolese people with the exception of Fascist and Nazi elements.

2. The programme of this party is as follows:

(i) To defend the rights of the South Tyrolese people as regards their culture, language and economy on a basis of democratic principles after 25 years of Fascist and Nazi suppression.

(ii) To assist in maintaining peace and order in the country.

(iii) To authorise its representatives to lay before the Allied Governments in a legal manner the claim of the South Tyrolese people to the right of self-determination. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS ARE BEING APPOINTED TO THE OFFICES

[Maj D. R. B. Mynors, Report on Political Conditions in Bolzano to SCAO, Fifth Army, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

2. In general it may be said that the population of Bolzano is largely Italian in sympathy but that the country districts definitely do not want to be incorporated in the Italian State. . . . The Committee of Liberation in Bolzano is an entirely Italian affair containing representatives of the usual parties but contains two persons to represent the Austrian interests; these two men are pledged not to raise the international question at the present time and say that personally they favour an independent republic of Bolzano.

3. In Bolzano the CLN have nominated Bruno de Angelis for Prefect who is stated by all who have business with him to be an outstandingly able and pleasant person. The administration has been reorganized and appears to be working as smoothly as is possible at the present time, in view of the number of German troops still walking about the city armed. In the Brunick area the population have proposed well known German collaborators for the office of Sindaco. CAO's are in every case appointing Italians for the time being. \* \* \*

#### BOLZANO ITALIANS FAVOR MINORITY RIGHTS BUT DISALLOW SEPARATISM

[Statement Addressed to the CLNAI by the Bolzano CLN, Signed by Bruno de Angelis and Ferdinando Visco Gilardi, 13 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. *Alto Adige*: The fundamental premise for the study of the position is that the Brenner Frontier is not a matter for discussion by the Governments of the United Nations.

2. In Alto Adige the CLN of Bolzano has at the present time achieved the status of provisional government as a result of the military (Partisan) activities of the clandestine liberation movement.

3. The composition of the population which now consists of two South Tyrolese to every one Italian is a determining factor in the policy which the Bolzano CLN has adopted from the beginning and is now submitted for approval to the CLNAI.

4. It should be borne in mind that the South Tyrolese and Italian elements have not yet elaborated the organic form of an agreed democratic action. Both retain their respective positions as opposing nationalities only now obliged to work in common under the orders of the Allied authorities within the limits of the economic and administrative needs of the areas. After the centuries old rule of the Hapsburgs and the 20 years of Fascist oppression and Nazi reaction, the temper of the inhabitants is still too high to permit the consideration of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta decisions as the sole real basis of the Europe of tomorrow.

5. The Bolzano CLN proposes to lead the Alto Adige Region through the difficulties arising from the co-existence of these two nationalities in a territory embittered by the excesses and the sufferings of war towards a democratisation of both the Italian and South Tyrolese groups in a strictly European sense.

6. The Bolzano CLN is convinced that it is the strict duty of every truly democratic organisation of Government to approach and solve the problem of German minorities not on the basis of national compromises but by a juridical regime which will assure all European minorities absolute equality of rights and obligations under the control of formal international guarantees. \* \* \*

#### COMPLAINTS OF THE SOUTH TYROLESE PARTY AGAINST ITALIANS

[Ltr, Amonn, Leader of the South Tyrolese Party, to AMG, Bozen, 19 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

The status of the South Tyrolese at present has been defined by Colonel [Francis M.] Wray in-

dicating that the South Tyrolese should form a party having equal prerogatives and duties for both sides and with no ascendancy of one group over the other.

This principle is being continually disregarded by the Italians. . . . South Tyrolese officials are being removed without further ado from public and private offices and are being replaced by Italians without the least regard being given to their specific knowledge of the branch of business concerned.

This is the case in banks, provincial and communal offices, public and economic administrations and enterprises such as the Electricity Works of Bozen and Meran. The same situation obtains in the juridical authorities. Italians today are found holding offices of practically all the branches of public life. . . .

The promise of the right to use both languages in this province is not being kept in any branch of public life. People who speak our language in the street, in shops or in trams are continually being insulted by Italians. CLN people threaten businessmen with violence and arrest if bilingual-public notices are not immediately removed. \* \* \*

For the same reason hundreds of Italians are poured into the province from the South, in an attempt to outnumber the local population. \* \* \*

#### WISE STATESMANSHIP IS NEEDED ON GERMAN MINORITY PROBLEM

[Paraphrase of Msg, G-5, Fifth Army Hq, to Hq AC, 20 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

Many problems are arising in re-Italianization of Bolzano and portions of Trento Provinces which call for decisions on highest level because of possible future international repercussions. Would emphasize importance from outset of wise statesmanship in meeting such problems of which following examples are given:

1. During last few years German language was compulsorily taught in all schools. We understand Italian was compulsory previously. Reopening of schools is urgently desired but decision on language question is needed first.

2. What disposition should be made of German nationals who before 1939 were not resident in the area.

4. Bolzano Provincial Commissioner has been given tentative directive by this Headquarters to proceed on following scale of priorities:

a. Administrative efficiency.

b. Maximum conformity to normal Italian forms.

c. Reasonable protection for interests of minorities. \* \* \*

#### THE POLICIES OF AMG TOWARD NON-ITALIANS ARE LIBERAL

[H. L. d'A. Hopkinson, Br Political Adviser, AC, Report on a Visit to Bolzano and Trento, 2 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/291]

##### *Bolzano*

1. The Province of Bolzano . . . contains about 310,000 inhabitants. . . . Of this figure it is estimated that about two-thirds are of German stock; the remainder are Italian. The country folk are mostly of German race and language. . . . Bolzano city itself contains a large majority of Italians and the Italian flag is prominently displayed. . . .

5. On the liberation of the territory, the first duty of Allied Military Government was to replace the existing Nazi gauleiter, majors and other functionaries by Italians and non-Nazi Germans. This was accomplished fairly rapidly in the case of the higher posts, but took some time in the lower grades. The Prefect, Colonel de Angelis, had been selected by the CLNAI Milan to approach the difficult problem of German and Italian relations in the Province in a wise and liberal manner. A German-speaking sub-Prefect was appointed, and on 24th May when I visited Bolzano the Prefect handed in to the Provincial Commissioner a list of appointees for subordinate posts in the Province. Over 50 percent of the appointees were German-speaking. The Provincial Commissioner and the Prefect sanctioned the appearance of a German newspaper "Dolomiten" alongside of the Italian paper run by the five Italian parties of the CLN. Authority was given for the re-opening of German language schools and it was laid down that signs should be posted in both German and Italian languages. In Bolzano city itself a large number of the streets were changed back to Italian names but I noticed that in most of smaller towns the German names were allowed to remain. The Prefect informed me that in his opinion this policy was the only means of preserving Bolzano Province for Italy.

7. According to reports received the majority of the German-speaking inhabitants desire the re-union of the Province with Austria, but part of them would be prepared to remain under some form of local autonomy in a democratic Italy. The Italians naturally wish to retain the Italian connection. Considering the dangers inherent in the situation there have been remarkably few clashes between Germans and Italians though there was some trouble with local Italian partisans

in the early stages who resented what they regarded as being the too favourable treatment accorded to the German forces. . . . Since that date two representatives of the South Tyrolese People's Party have been added to the Committee. I enclosed a copy of a memorandum addressed to the Provincial Commissioner by the Head of the party setting forth their views on the situation [above]. I believe the situation described therein, insofar as it concerns the measures said to have been taken by the local Italian authorities against the German-speaking members of the population, to have been to a great extent remedied by the action taken by the Prefect in consultation with the whole CLN referred to in paragraph 5 above. . . .

### *Trento*

The position in Trento is entirely different. Except for ten German-speaking Communes which since 1936 have been administered as part of Bolzano province, the vast majority of the 400,000 inhabitants are Italian. The Provincial Commissioner, Major [Fred O.] Mavis, informed me that he had had no racial problems. The CLN, which consists of the usual five parties under a locally selected Prefect, is functioning satisfactorily and except for a tendency to continue to issue orders, which he is tactfully discouraging, they have cooperated very satisfactorily. Communism in both Trento and Bolzano Provinces appears to be weak.

### INCIDENTS INVOLVING ITALIAN TROOPS

[Msg, Hopkinson to Hq AC, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

Col. Fiske reports that there have been minor incidents between troops of Folgore Gruppo who were recently moved into Bolzano Province and German speaking population. Although it appears to be nothing serious at present I think it is a good instance of a case in which Allied Commission ought to have been consulted by Allied command before and on political aspects of movement of Italian troops. You may care to take up question of principle using above as example.

### A POLICY OF ITALIANIZATION IS LAID DOWN

[Msg, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, to Fifth Army, 12 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

2. As interim policy, consider we should adopt following measures: Italian should be first language in all schools. German may be used if asked

for by local authorities as an additional language. . . .

3. The indigenous inhabitants should be treated as Italian citizens and all question of separatism and change of nationality should be firmly suppressed. . . .

### LOCAL AMG FEARS MOST AUSTRIANS WOULD RESIST RETURN TO ITALY

[Memo on Recent Trip to Northern Italy, Gen Spoford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ papers]

5. . . .

b. Bolzano province, which has a population of some 65 to 80% Austrian origin, is outwardly quiet but essentially presents the same problem as Venezia Giulia [Ch. XX] minus the outside influence which complicates the latter. AMG administration is in good shape and has so far kept the situation well in hand. The officers on the ground, however, are convinced that the Austrian population will resist strongly a return to the pre-war conditions. The overwhelming majority undoubtedly prefer to be attached to Austria. If this is not possible some form of local autonomy with rights guaranteed to the Tyrolese minority is probably essential. AMG officers emphasized there, as they have in Trieste, the fact that the pressure will probably increase rather than decrease as time goes on and are strongly of the view that it is highly desirable to obtain a decision on the ultimate disposition of the area as soon as practicable. This will avoid a long period of political tension and will also stimulate economic recovery which will obviously not take place until it is known to which side the territory will be assigned. \* \* \*

### AMG NONETHELESS CARRIES OUT ORDERS TO SUPPRESS SEPARATISM

[Memo, G-5, Fifth Army, for Provincial Cmsr of Bolzano Province, 18 July 45, ACC files, 10000/109/291]

1. In your weekly report dated 12 July 1945, paragraph 1, you state that "until a decision is made as to the political geographic disposition of this province the South Tyroleans will agitate to separate from Italy. If a definite decision is made that the province is to remain Italian.

2. As far as our policy is concerned it should be considered a definite decision has been made that the province is to remain Italian. \* \* \*

## THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER FEARS ITALIAN RESENTMENT OVER WITHHOLDING OF BOLZANO

[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to SACMED, 1 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

I have just learned . . . U.S. Government now considers that Bolzano Province should not be returned to the Italian Government at an early date together with the other northern provinces excluding Udine.

I am very much concerned at his reversal of policy and would point out the following: A. In an unclassified letter dated 20 August I was advised by the American Ambassador that the Department of State would not object to the return of Bolzano if the Allied Commission and AFHQ consider the retention there no longer necessary. The letter added that if it is decided to return Bolzano, the Italian Government should be informed that return would be without prejudice to final disposition . . . by Peace Treaty. B. . . on 20 August I reported to you that I had advised Parri of my recommendation with regard

to both Bolzano and Udine. As instructed by SACMED . . . 27 September . . . I informed the Prime Minister that SACMED considered that Udine, for military reasons, would be retained under AMG but would be returned to Italian administration when such reasons no longer existed. [Ferruccio] Parri, therefore, understood that Bolzano would be returned but without prejudice to final disposition.<sup>10</sup>

If U.S. Government now reverses position set forth in Ambassador's letter . . . I consider that political effect on Prime Minister, his Government, and the general public will be most unfortunate. . . .

[Msg, AFHQ to Allied Com, 2 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

Information just received that U.S. position will not be firmed until return Secretary of State to Washington. No action proposed on your message at this time. \* \* \*

<sup>10</sup> See also Section 8 below for context of this message.

## 6. ITALY'S MOST PRODUCTIVE REGION IS IN DANGER OF ECONOMIC STAGNATION

### INITIAL ITALIAN OPTIMISM BEGINS TO SEEM DANGEROUS

[Memo, Braine, Dir, Labour Subcom, AC, for Hq AC, 21 May 45, ACC files, 10000/146/37]

1. The following memorandum is based upon impression gathered during a rapid tour of North Italy with a mission from Economic Section of Headquarters, A.C., Italy, which left Rome on 6 May and returned on 19 May 1945. During this period visits were paid to Bologna, Padova, Venice, Milan, Turin and Genoa.

2. The main impressions are:

(i) The unexpectedly favorable state of industrial establishments, plant, power, trains, etc.

(ii) The optimism on the part of the Italians.

(iii) The hard fact that owing to the prospects of supply of coal there will inevitably be mass unemployment.

(iv) The necessity of providing alternative work schemes.

(v) The necessity equally of providing state relief in cash and in kind, including feeding in popular kitchens, on a scale superior to the present system.

(vi) The different character and temper of the Italians of the North from those of the South; and the general recognition on the part of Allied Officers in the North that detailed administration and control as in the South is not necessary and would be resented.

(vii) The fact that however efficient the Italian machinery of administration, there must be formulation of policy and direction from above to guide the machinery; and that the Committee of National Liberation is not in itself able to provide this, although it has assumed a position of authority which rivals or even challenges AMG control.

(viii) The necessity of arranging for the Italian Government to administer relief schemes, public assistance, feeding, etc., through the efficient machinery to which Allied officers pay tribute—instead of trying to build up from scratch an Allied administered system. This is without prejudice to any views expressed elsewhere as to the advisability of Allied control, in general or in detail, of Italian industry.

3. The most important step is perhaps to dispel the false optimism which pervades Italian circles. Having seen one miracle, viz., the preservation of

their plant, power and equipment from the deliberate destruction which ruined the center and south, they expect another, viz., the supply of coal and raw material on a scale which will enable them to resume full production. \* \* \*

#### ARMY AUTHORITIES ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE ECONOMIC BARRIER

[Note, Gen. Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, Report on Current Status of Economic Barrier Between North and South Italy, 15 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

1. On 22 April, at the request of the Allied Commission, this Headquarters directed the Allied Military authorities in the North to establish police road blocks as a means of assisting in maintaining, for at least an interim period, an economic barrier between Northern and Southern Italy. The purpose was to maintain the reportedly lower prices and wages in Northern Italy. . . . On 26 April the 15th Army Group expressed the belief that the above wage policy was based on a false premise, and urged that normal discretionary powers be given to keep wages and prices as low as possible, having in mind operational necessities. . . .

2. *As to prices*, the Director of Labor (British) stated in a phone conversation from the North to his Headquarters that prices are rising rapidly in the North and controls are not effective.

3. *As to wages*, Fifth Army urges that authority be granted to add 50% of the cost-of-living bonus to the A.F. [Allied Force] basic wage scale in the North (but not the bread bonus), and states that the A.F. basic wage rates have caused dissension in Bologna. \* \* \*

#### THE ECONOMIC BARRIER IS ABANDONED

[Min of the Mtg of SACMED's Econ Subcomm., 22 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

\* \* \* Admiral Stone recommended that the barrier be abolished on 28 May. He requested that the existing instructions respecting prices and wages in the North remain in effect. . . .<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Antolini, recently returned from an inspection of North Italy, reported that in general supplies are more abundant and wages and prices are lower than in the South. The barrier has served its intended purpose, largely through its psychological effect, which was to prevent speculation and rapid inflation. Wages and prices will be raised as circumstances require, with es-

<sup>11</sup> This recommendation was approved. While wage and price regulations were continued, the road blocks were abandoned on 28 May.

tablished military controls acting as a retarding factor. It is anticipated that a certain inflation will take place in the North with a somewhat opposite deflationary effect in the South, as a consequence of the draining from the North of goods and services. \* \* \*

#### NEED FOR COAL IN THE NORTH

[Paraphrase of Msg From AFHQ to Liberated Areas Comm., 31 May 45, OPD Msg files, MC-OUT 10864]

1. Social and political conditions found in Northern Italy indicate that even if full program [of civilian supply] already submitted is supplied precarious unemployment will remain.

3. Principal limiting factor in development of Italian economy is coal. Therefore necessary that economic plans and requisitions be related to maximum availability. Accordingly request your reply as soon as possible to LAC 1148 asking information on availability.

#### TO ORGANIZE THEIR INDUSTRY ITALIANS NEED ALLIED AID

[Min of SACMED's Political Conf, 31 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

6. The Conference had before them a paper recommending the eventual establishment, under Italian Government Auspices, of a Production Advisory Board with Allied advisory representatives.<sup>12</sup> \* \* \*

Rear Admiral Stone . . . , said that the main problem was that of large scale unemployment in Northern Italy. The factories there were at present working, but their stocks of coal were very limited, and if proper control was not exercised, there was a likelihood of up to four or five million Italian workers becoming unemployed. While substantial Allied forces remained in Italy awaiting redeployment, it would not be possible to ignore the political unrest resulting from large scale unemployment. This might involve the maintenance of Allied forces in Italy for a longer period than would otherwise be necessary. He felt the problem could not be tackled piece-meal, and that an overall plan, coordinated with the import programme, was required. The control should also be directed so as to fuse the two economies of the North and South. . . .

<sup>12</sup> This discussion is notable less for any results than for its analysis of the economic situation and its needs. The CCS did not wish to sanction any measures contrary to the spirit of the New Policy, and thus was unwilling to approve even Allied advisory representation on the proposed Board. As an alternative, ACC turned to the plan set forth in the following document.

Lieutenant General Robertson agreed with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and added that it was not entirely possible for the Italians to organize their industry on a sound basis without help from the Allied military authorities, as the latter controlled the supplies of coal and certain other essential raw materials. Under the organization now proposed the military authorities would be in an advisory position only and could step out without difficulty as soon as the Italians were in a position to carry on unaided. He felt sure that without some organization, industries would lie fallow and severe unemployment would result. He had discussed the matter on a recent visit to London where, although the initial War Office reaction had been that the Allies should not become involved in what appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government, the proposals had finally been viewed with sympathy. \* \* \*

#### ACC ESTABLISHES MACHINERY FOR CO-ORDINATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY

[Directive of Hq AC to All Concerned, 9 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/154/347]

1. The Plan for the Control of the Manufacture and Sale of Industrial Products of Northern Italy attached hereto . . . will be implemented at once.

2. This plan was developed by the industry of northern Italy to provide through cooperation and self-discipline a means for re-establishing an orderly economy subsequent to the impact of liberation. The Italian Government has approved the plan and will participate therein through its established AC/AMG contact for that part which pertains to territory still under Allied Military Government. The presence of members of the Italian Government on the North Italy Industrial Council and the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board assures the fact that the Government is always informed.

3. Since the plan affects primarily the industry of northern Italy, with the seat of control at Milan, the plan must be implemented under the full authority of Allied Military Government. The plan embraces the entire north with the exception of Venezia Giulia and must be administered uniformly without regard to regional boundaries with the exception above noted. Therefore, the plan will be administered by the Allied Commission through its forward office in Milan. Regional Commissioners will be called upon extensively for advice and cooperation, and for local administration.

5. The organization of the committees listed in

the plan will be completed without delay. As the occasion may demand, committees covering additional fields of industrial endeavor may become necessary. The proposed organization and plan of operations of such new committees must be transmitted to the Allied Commission for approval and inclusion in this order by appropriate amendment.

6. Each committee listed in . . . the Plan will submit its organization, membership and list of officers, together with its detailed plan of operation through the North Italy Industrial Council to the Allied Commission for approval. The Council will examine all plans and cause their modification and revision to fit the limitations of such general factors as coal, power and transportation availabilities, etc.; will secure the Plan's approval by the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board if price fixing is involved; and will present the plans to the Allied Commission. The Allied Commission will screen the plans for conflicts with existing plans for all of Italy and for coordination with the import program and will suggest necessary modifications, before giving final approval.

7. Once the committee organization and plan of an industry group has been approved, this approved plan will form the basis upon which the industry will operate freely with its own management and without interference by AC/AMG except when absolutely necessary. Emphasis must be placed upon permitting Italian industry and commerce to proceed under its own management and to provide for the enforcement of its own self-imposed restrictions.

8. The president of the North Italy Industrial Council will be appointed by the Italian Government. Each Regional Commissioner will transmit promptly to the Milan office of A.C. his designation for member of the council as provided in . . . the basic plan. At the same time Regional Commissioners may transmit suggestions for the selection of the labor member of the Council.

9. In its operations the Council should be permitted full exercise of its powers . . . , with only the minimum necessary limitation thereof through the overall AMG control. . . .

10. The President of the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board will be appointed by the Italian Government. Each Regional Commissioner will transmit promptly to the Milan office of A.C. a list of nominations of residents of his Region engaged in the fields of endeavor specified in . . . the basic Plan. From the lists of nominations the members of the Board will be selected to give the coverage by callings and by regions provided in the basic Plan. \* \* \*

*Plan for the Control of the Manufacture and Sale of Industrial Products of Northern Italy*

3. . . .

The functions of these industrial committees will be as follows:

(1) To survey the existing productive units within the industry and to formulate a plan for the utilization of plant capacity.

(2) To control the nature of the products to be produced and the level of production to be performed by the several plants within the industry.

(3) To recommend the closing of unproductive and uneconomical plants or parts of plants; and to recommend, where necessary, transfer of equipment between plants to effect sound economic production within the industry.

(4) To recommend the allocation of: Raw materials, obtained either by importation or from local resources, equipment, tools and operating supplies necessary to carry out a scheduled production.

(5) To supervise and control the flow of raw materials and semi-fabricated materials to and between plants within the industry.

(6) To ascertain the amounts of the finished products within the industry available for distribution and to recommend the distribution of same.

(7) To recommend which products of the industry, if any, should be subject to regulation and control in their manufacture and sale.

(8) To recommend to the North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board, the raw materials, semi-fabricated goods and finished products upon which prices should be fixed and the prices therefor.

(9) To effect the observance and enforcement of the accepted plans throughout the industry.

**POLICIES TOWARD LABOR AND WAGES**

[Labor Sub-Com, AC, Final Rpt, Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

\* \* \* The fundamental problems in the labour field in the North were, therefore, reactivation of an undamaged industrial potential, reduction of surplus labour over and above the normal balanced labour force of each in-

dustry, and the fact that such surplus labour must have an alternative source of remuneration (i.e. alternative employment) or must have the means of sustenance guaranteed either by continued receipt of wage subsidy or by unemployment benefit. The difficulties were accentuated by the inadequacy of existing social insurance provisions under which unemployment benefit for an adult male was 7 lire a day; the price of an egg was 30 lire. Equally vital was the problem of relating wages to prices and, whilst avoiding rapid inflationary developments, permitting wage rates gradually to adjust themselves to the levels pertaining in the Centre and South of Italy.

Yet another major problem at this stage was that of Allied Force wage rates. The pressure of operational necessity had now subsided and it was no longer appropriate to have regard to incentive, remuneration for risk, or results regardless of cost. The guiding factor had now to be the realisation that employment of civilians by the Allied Force would decline and eventually cease; there was a responsibility, therefore, to relate Allied Force wage rates closely to those paid by Italian industry, and to preserve a pattern that could eventually be absorbed into the Italian industrial economy without causing dislocation. \* \* \*

. . . By Decrees of 20th January and 13th February, 1945, the Fascist Republican Government in power in Northern Italy had forbidden discharge of workers in industrial establishments, had required employers to "make up" the pay of under-employed workers to the normal 48 hours per week, and had authorized refund to employers of 75% of the make-up; this refund came from the Cassa Integrazione, a contributory Government Insurance Fund. On 31st May, 1945, Labour Sub-Commission advised that the liberation of the North would result in confusion, mass unemployment and hardship, unless the existing provisions for surplus workers were continued to bridge the gap until relief measures could be prepared. The Italian Government expressed willingness to continue to subsidize through the Cassa Integrazione, and workers' and employers' representatives reaffirmed in the Milan Agreement of 8th July, 1945, the ban on discharges except in specified cases.

## 7. AN OVERWHELMING INFLUX OF REPATRIATES BEFORE FACILITIES ARE ALL READY

### A PLAN PREPARED FOR RECEIVING A MILLION REPATRIATES

[Plan of DPRSC for Northern Italy, 28 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2069]

#### 1. Area Covered

As it is impossible to divide Northern Italy into two parts either for dealing with refugees during operations or later repatriating Italians from outside the Frontiers, this plan deals with Northern Italy as a whole and concerns the five Regions of Emilia, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte and Venezia.

#### 2. General plan

This general plan is divided into two phases. The first phase being the operational phase, when the most important task is the care of war refugees. The second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have to function conjointly if North West Italy is liberated before North East Italy.

#### 3. Phase I (Operational)

Refugee Centres handled as previously in 5th and 8th Armies' areas, and in the rear of these by the three existing Groups of Centres, Allied Nationals in large towns to be cared for by Forward Representatives of D.P.R.S.C. who will accompany A.M.G. spearheads, and in addition by mobile Forward Groups, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required. As far as possible centres selected for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

#### 4. Phase II (Repatriation)

(a) *Italian.* There are approximately one million Italians to be returned to Italy from outside the Northern Italian Frontiers. . . . It is impossible at present to forecast by which route most of the Italians now in Germany will arrive—Viz:—By train through Switzerland, or from the North East.

They may consist of

(1) Former Italian Soldiers.

(2) Ex-Italian P.W.

(3) Italian workmen, including some women.

It has been agreed in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that D.P.R.S.C. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organization to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy. After the initial processing of repatriates, those who are found to be former Italian soldiers or Italian ex-P.W. will be handed

over to be dealt with by the Military Organization concerned either in part of the same centre or another centre as is convenient.

(b) *Non-Italian.* It is estimated that at present there are some 30,000 non-Italian Displaced Persons in Northern Italy who will require to be returned to their own countries. . . . The centres as proposed will deal with these, and in addition there will be centres at Genoa and Trieste from which Allied Nationals can be repatriated. These may be part of centres outlined in this plan, or separate centres according to available accommodation. Two further Allied National Centres to be selected later on.

#### 5. Organization

(a) *Advanced Repatriation Headquarters* consisting of advanced Representatives of H.Q. D.P.R.S.C. with such representatives of War Materials Disposal and Italian P.W. Sub-Commission and Land Forces Sub-Commission if required, as are considered necessary, and their opposite numbers in the Italian Government, will be set up either at Milan or in the vicinity of the Allied Military Organization concerned.

(b) *Group Headquarters* will be set up at each Allied Commission Region Headquarters, except Emilia. D.P.R.S.C. Centres in Emilia would be eventually controlled from the Group Headquarters in Liguria. It may be necessary to have a second Group Headquarters in Venezia Region.

(c) Each Group Headquarters will control several Collecting and Transit Centres, which in turn will control certain Frontier Repatriation Posts.

Collecting and Transit Centres—Capacity 5,000 persons.

Frontier Repatriation Posts—Capacity 1,000 persons.

The most suitable accommodation is ex-P.W. Camps, Barracks, Schools, Hotels, or other large buildings. Such places are essential for centres as *no* canvas is available. \* \* \*

### AN UNCONTROLLED MOVEMENT HOME BEFORE THE PLAN CAN BE EXECUTED

[DPRSC, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/514]

1. (i) The rapidity of the advance of the Armies in Italy and the conclusion of hostilities in Europe has resulted in uncontrolled movement starting before the full complement of control camps and

assembly centres could be set up. The frontier through which a large movement of able bodied Italian Refugees has come is the Austrian-Italian frontier. The movement of these refugees has been aided by the use of backloading empty Army transport. Some 80,000 Italians have returned to their homes south of the line Modena-Bologna-Forlì. Thousands have returned to their homes in North Italy. Apart from these returning Italians certain Poles and Jugoslavs, uncertain of the position of their respective countries, have moved into Italy. \* \* \*

2. (i) 11 D. P. Assembly Centres and 10 Control Camps are now completed and a large proportion of these have been sent to administer camps in Northern Italy. These units represent half of the total required. . . .

(ii) Two factors affect the control of returning refugees. These are:

a. Co-ordination.

The question of coordination is extremely difficult due to the lack of communications between the various Headquarters and the distance of these Headquarters from Rome.

b. Transportation.

Rail transportation in Italy is at present not connected between the South and the North. This resulted in a "bottleneck" at Bologna and Forlì. . . .

4. . . . The majority of those so far arrived in Italy have been men and it is anticipated that sick persons, women and children will be those that can be expected to arrive in Italy at a later date. The problem of movement of these 3 last categories is one that is of grave concern to this Sub-Commission. The attitude of the C.L.N. in Northern Italy has been extremely helpful. These Committees have approached officers of the Sub-Commission with the request that they may be told what is most urgently needed by the Refugees and they will make the necessary contribution. This helpfulness has facilitated the movement, officially and unofficially, of these many thousands of returning Italians. . . .

#### WHY CAN'T UNPROCESSED REFUGEES BE GIVEN RIDES?

[Mynors, Opns Officer, AMG, Fifth Army, Report of Trip to Brenner and Dolomite Areas, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. From Verona I proceeded up to the west side of Lake Garda to Torbole . . . thence to Rovereto . . . and north to Bolzano on Route 12. There were large numbers of refugees on the road walking home; all were fit young men and there were no carts or movement of a character to cause any disturbance to military traffic except

at the Bailey Bridges and tunnels at the north-west corner of Lake Garda. The Provost Marshal of the 10 Mountain Division stated that in order to make the movement as orderly as possible he had issued instructions for all empty trucks proceeding south in the divisional area to stop at the collecting points at cross-roads on the main supply routes and carry refugees as far south as the trucks were going. In this area there is said to be no feeding problem as individuals manage to live on what they can pick up at wayside farms and at simple communal kitchens run by the CLN's in the communes.

5. [The Headquarters which I visited] . . . universally requested that Fifth Army lift the ban on the carriage of casual civilians in returning empty trucks; apart from humanitarian reasons such a dispensation would accelerate the movement of refugees down the Brenner route and would thus keep the roads clear of stragglers. \* \* \*

#### FIFTH ARMY JURISTS MANAGE TO CIRCUMVENT THE BAN ON HITCHHIKING

[Memo, Sr Frontier Refugee Officer for All Concerned, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

1. Circular n. 13 dated 20 March 1945 from Headquarters Fifth Army forbidding military vehicles from transporting civilians (except in certain specific instances) is still in full force and effect.

2. In order legally to utilize casual vehicles for transport of refugees the following system will be put into effect:

a. In any town served by an AMG or Provincial Officer "Refugee Pick-up Points" will be set up where AMG or Provincial Officer considers refugee situation warrants it.

b. These pick-up points must:

i. Be located on main travel routes.

ii. Be set up in vacant lot or other areas where trucks can park away from the traffic for loading.

iii. Be properly signed as "Refugee Pick-Up Point" with large sign. \* \* \*

#### UNCEREMONIOUS CONCLUSIONS WHICH WILL DETERMINE A GREAT DRAMA OF REPATRIATION

[Min of Mtg of the Transportation Subcomm. at the AFHQ-SHAFF Conf at Bolzano, 15 Jun 45, app. B,<sup>13</sup> MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

1. The following are the main conclusions of the sub-committee meeting of Movements and

<sup>13</sup> The Bolzano Conference sought to co-ordinate repatriation movements between the Mediterranean and European Theater.

Transportation aspects of movement between SHAEF and AFHQ territory.

*Routes:*

2. The following routes should be used for controlled movement:

- a. Brenner Route.
- b. Route through Switzerland.

In assessing acceptance it was also necessary to take into account the southward flow of Italians along routes from Austria and North East Italy.

*Types of Movement and Acceptance:*

3. (a) *Southbound:*

Allied Commission Italy can accept forthwith in Italy 5,000 per day by controlled movement plus up to 2,500 per day that may enter Italy by controlled movement. The SHAEF-AFHQ Joint Disposal Committee should review this figure at intervals in order to increase it when possible. Allied Commission Italy require additional personnel and about 6 GT Coys [Companies] (720 trucks) in order to maintain and later increase these numbers.

(b) *Northbound:*

(i) *Germans:* SHAEF can accept forthwith German prisoners of war and surrendered personnel, but they should not be for the Russian Zone of Germany. All German personnel will move by Brenner route.

(ii) *Other Nationalities:* French, Belgian and Dutch personnel should be repatriated via Switzerland or over the Franco-Italian border. Central Europeans should move by the Brenner route. \* \* \*

**PRIORITY FOR UN DP'S AND FORMER INMATES OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS**

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 14 Jun, as Paraphrased in Directive from AMG, Fifth Army, to AMG Officials in Northern Rgns, 25 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

\* \* \* In your area, Displaced Italian Nationals will receive the same treatment in care and assembly as United States Displaced Nationals. Repatriation will be effected as rapidly as maintenance requirements of occupational forces and arrangements with Italian Government permit. Priority of movement for repatriation should, however, be given to United Nations Displaced Persons and persons freed from concentration or internment camps and other places of detention.

**FIVE THOUSAND A DAY THROUGH THE BRENNER PASS**

[G-5, Fifth Army, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/463]

9. h. The refugee centers were processing approximately 2000 refugees per day coming through from Germany and Austria in the early part of the month. At the close of the month a daily average of 5000 refugees were processed through the Brenner Pass into Italy. An additional 1000 refugees per day were processed from Switzerland through Como starting on 30 June 1945.

A new camp was established 13 Km northwest of Verona to handle the Brenner traffic. The rail lines were opened from Innsbruck to Verona and thence to the Po River. The new camp is established as a feeding and rest stop on this route. \* \* \*

**A PERHAPS OVERCRITICAL DP OFFICER TELLS HIS EXPERIENCES**

[Maj James R. Geddes, CO, Hq, AGP, DPRSC, AC, Rpt for July 1945, ACC files, 10000/164/1741]

1. *General*

. . . The problem of feeding and sorting out at Pescantina has been one of the most disheartening tasks that this group has had to tackle. Although five weeks before it was due to be required, O.C. "A" Group pointed out to G-5, Fifth Army, that some sorting place at Verona was required, nothing definite was decided on till some seven days before it was due.

Continuing this indifference, no actual help arrived on the scene till 2 days before the place was due to be used. When the pioneer Coy [Company], which was to build the camp under the guidance of a R.E. officer 5th Army, did arrive, they turned out to be only a pipe-laying coy., and had neither tools nor interest, and in fact couldn't even dig a decent hole to the required specification. The struggle to make this camp was carried on by the camp staff despite the lethargic manner and indifferent attitude of those who were supposed to help under AFHQ cable . . . dated 1 May 45. \* \* \*

4. *Refugees*

The Italian refugees passing through were, in the main, fairly strong, but a considerable number suffered from T.B., and were too sick to continue and had to be taken off at Bolzano to rest a few days before continuing.

I feel that some of these cases might be held up at the start and sent on the ambulance train. . .

#### 5. *Repatriation and Welfare*

As most of the refugees are in transit, the only welfare work which can be accomplished is of a superficial nature. At 23 AMGEC however, where the refugees are more static . . . the workshops—shoemaking, dressmaking, printing and carpentering—are being efficiently operated under the capable direction of Miss P. Nethersole, BRCS.

Refugees cross the Brenner usually about mid-day or in the afternoon, the trains running at intervals of one or two hours and arrive in Bolzano during the night, where the refugees are fed and the sick taken to hospitals. . . . They arrive in Verona during the morning, where they detrain and are fed and sorted out for South, East or West. . . .

At the station food halts, most of the welfare work is carried out by C.A.R. and the Pontifical Commission. When a train arrives, from every vantage point there swoops down on the train a horde of welfare workers who carry off their prizes, despite the efforts of the administration. . . .

The latest demand received from one priest was for a 3 tonner water wagon to deliver a kind of light refreshment to the thirsty. I decided, however, that the water wagon could be put to a better use, after I had sampled the concoction.

#### 7. *Conclusion*

Despite 5th Army and the prevailing lassitude natural after 5½ years of war, and in some cases the criminal indifference of those who have positions of importance, the flow of refugees continues unabated. At no point has "A" Group had to cry "Hold, enough."

### NO FORCIBLE REPATRIATION OF SOVIET "CITIZENS"

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 6 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. A very strong plea has been addressed to this commission on behalf of persons of Russian nationality who do not wish to be repatriated. A number of these people have been avoiding the Soviet Regime and their escape from Russia during the war has given them hope for the future. A number of others are what is known as "White Russians," that is to say, Russian citizens who escaped from Russia between 1917 and 1930.

2. Both these classes are at the present time being repatriated to Russia under the policy re-

garding the disposal of Soviet citizens as covered by HQ MTOUSA letter AG 383.7/414 A-O dated 9 March 1945 and AFHQ letter GR/3491/2/G1(Br) dated 15 March 1945.

3. In both these letters the term "Soviet Citizen" is defined as including all who claim citizenship. No mention is made of persons who do not claim citizenship, although it may be that, in fact, they held it.

4. I recommend for your urgent consideration that the sole test in applying the directives mentioned in paragraph 2 above be whether a person claims Russian citizenship and that if he or she does not do so, he or she be treated as stateless.<sup>14</sup>

[Memo, Findlay, Dir, DPRSC, AC, to Subordinate Officials, 20 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/164/2051]

1. The following ruling is given for your own information and guidance and will not be communicated to any Russian Authority. Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Poles, whose homes are East of the 1939 line of Demarcation or East of the Curzon Line will *not* be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they claim Soviet citizenship.

2. *No* force may be used to return Soviet citizens unwilling to be repatriated. The Russian Mission is aware of this fact.

### FOR STATELESS PERSONS NO EARLY SOLUTION IN SIGHT

[Memo, Brig T. R. Henn, DACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Chief Admin Office, AFHQ, 11 Jun 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

3. The question of the stateless persons has for a long time been under consideration of our governments. I do not think any solution is in sight. As a practical matter, we shall have to decide on an interim policy, assuming that AFHQ must carry out the overall planning for at least six months ahead for these people. The factors are, I think, as follows:

a. We are not likely to be able to move them en bloc to found new stateless persons colonies. North Africa is generally unsuitable.

b. Shipping resources on the scale required are not within sight.

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<sup>14</sup> Pursuant to the recommendation, SACMED on 19 June cabled the CCS that, in his opinion the transfer of some 55 reluctant Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union would almost certainly mean their death and asked for a ruling. The content of the CCS reply is indicated by the document which follows.

c. These people should not be removed further from their countries of origin than is strictly necessary; since a softening of heart, or a change of government, may lead to their partial reabsorption at no very distant date.

4. I therefore consider that the right policy is to plan for the reception of these people into permanent camps in anticipation of their remaining in this theater at least through next winter. These camps should be chosen and organized so that as many as possible of the inmates are set to some kind of productive work, and the maximum self-sufficiency achieved. They should remain under the general supervision of the Allied Commission until UNRRA is capable of taking them over. At the same time, every effort should be made to induce these people to accept repatriation. \* \* \*

#### THE DP RECORDS BUREAU PLAYS DETECTIVE IN REUNITING FAMILIES

[DPRSC, AC, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/514]

6. At the end of the month a total of 95,438 persons were recorded by the Record Bureau covering 72 nationalities. A total of 858 enquiry messages were received and processed. . . . The Records Bureau continues to handle many interesting and unique cases of bringing families or members of families together again after long periods without news of each other. An Italian woman, British by marriage, had been bombed out in England and had partially lost her memory due to shock. She wished to communicate with her mother and sisters in Rome, having completely forgotten their address except for the fact that they may have lived near a market. There were two other clues—a cousin was the proprietor of several ice cream shops in the city and an aunt once worked for Elizabeth Arden. Both mother and sister were traced and a message forwarded to the enquirer. \* \* \*

## 8. AMG MUST STAY OVERTIME

#### THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS FOR EARLY RELIEF OF ARMY AMG

[*Aide-mémoire* of Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Lt Gen Robertson, CAO, AFHQ, 5 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

It is strongly recommended that, particularly in NW Italy, the change from Phase I to Phase II

#### PROBLEMS WHICH STILL REMAIN IN SEPTEMBER

[Memo, Hq AC to All Concerned, 10 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/164/1040]

a. *Germany*—To repatriate some 100,000 Italians. Nearly ½ million have already been repatriated from Germany and Austria. At present repatriates are arriving via Brenner at an average of over 6,000 a day at Pescantina (Verona), some 2,000 a day through Switzerland (Como & Domodossola), some 1,000 a day ex-Austria and Yugoslavia.

b. *France*—Practically all Italian refugees repatriated. Some 40,000 PWs in Labour Companies still to be dealt with when demobilized.

c. *Russian Zone*—Some 23,000 Italians have already arrived in Germany and many of them have reached Italy. Some 15,000 have come through Austria. There is at present prospect of many more.

d. *Yugoslavia*—Some thousands of Italians have arrived via Trieste—many in poor shape and many have had to be hospitalized.

e. *Southern Italians in Northern Italy*—At least 1,000 per week are being moved South from Lombardia. It is hoped to increase this figure shortly.

#### f. *Other nationals*

(1) *Northern, Western Europeans*.—The bulk have been repatriated—only a few hundred remain in Camps.

(2) *Greeks, Albanians, Mediterranean Nationals*.—The numbers desiring repatriation are few—but Greeks are still in transit from Germany.

(3) *Jews*.—The total now in "Centres" number some 6,000—infiltration from Germany and Central Europe still continues but large scale movement, it is hoped, has been finally stopped.

(4) *Dissident Poles, Mixed Slavs*.—The bulk are now housed—the remainder will be housed shortly. The number of Poles who desire to go home is growing and is now about 1,400. Transportation to Poland is so far unsolved.

be effected as rapidly as possible.<sup>15</sup> It is impossible for the civil administration of N.W. and N.E. Italy to be continued in present circumstances by one AMG Headquarters at each Army. In N.E.

<sup>15</sup> In Phase II, according to the plan for northern Italy (Sec 7, above), AC with its Regional staffs was to relieve the Army AMG's. This change was to become effective 15 May 1945.

Italy this AMG Headquarters is already concerned with the advance into Austria. The Regional staffs are in position in all four Regions and it is essential for the proper functioning of civil administration that full delegation should be made by the Armies to the Regional Commissioners in order to make effective Allied Military Government by decentralisation.

#### HOPE STILL EXISTS THAT ALL NORTHERN ITALY MAY BE RETURNED IN A FEW MONTHS

[Ltr, Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, for Exec Cmsr, AC, 18 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/313]

1. This memorandum is based on the promise that the administration by the Allies of Northern Italy will be completed without any unmanageable disorders and that there will be a reasonable restoration of economic life without leaving outstanding any large problems of an economic character, such as widespread unemployment; in short, that Allied Military Government can be terminated in all the Northern areas, except Venezia Giulia, on 1 August or, at latest, 1 September 1945. \* \* \*

#### AC BELIEVES IT SHOULD NOW RELIEVE ARMY AMG

[Aide-mémoire of Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for 15th AGp Conf, 24 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/176]

1. Now that hostilities are over the problem in N.W. Italy becomes one of civil administration. It is a problem of great complexity both for the Allied Military Government and for the Italian Government which will follow. The AMG teams with 5 Army and IV Corps have handled the initial stages of military government with their customary efficiency. AMG has been set up and first aid to the civil population has been successful. But it has never been contemplated that these teams would be capable of administering after the initial occupation the very large area comprising 4 Regions with a population of 21 millions now under the military command of the Armies. Their staffs have been maintained at the lowest possible figure so as not to interfere with operational activity. I submit that the time has now come when the Regional staffs with their teams of administrative and technical experts representing all the Sub-Commissions, should take over the administration and come under the command of this HQ in order that the closest relation may be effected with the Italian Government who may be required to assume authority in a comparatively short space of time. \* \* \*

#### ARMY AMG MUST CONTROL UNTIL DANGERS ARE OVER

[Ltr, Lush, to Chief Cmsr, AC, 25 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/176]

1. I attended the conference at 15th Army Group concerning the occupation of NW Italy yesterday. The consensus of opinion was that until the partisans were disarmed and until the situation on the French frontier was liquidated, 5th Army military command must remain in NW Italy. So long as the Commanding General exercised that command he insisted, and it was agreed by the Chairman, that he must have full control including that of military government.<sup>16</sup> \* \* \*

#### PARTISANS ARE ENLISTED AS SPECIAL POLICE

[Public Safety Sub-Com, AC, Rpt for May 45, ACC files, 10000/143/450]

The liberation of the North necessitated the transfer of about 19,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy in order that the strength of 55,000 should be evenly allotted to Regions throughout the country. 5,650 were transferred as spearhead, followed by a second wave of 4,000. At this point the Italian Government protested strongly against any further withdrawals of Carabinieri from the South, and they were stopped. It was then decided to recuperate those Carabinieri found as Patriots and to employ them in the north as special police. These men wear an AMG armband and draw civil police rations as distinct from Italian Army rations. \* \* \*

[Public Safety Sub-Com, AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/143/450]

a. No one can claim that the situation is, by any manner of means, satisfactory. On the other hand the period of wholesale and daily murder has passed and the over-all picture of the North showed a big improvement by the end of the month. \* \* \*

#### TRANSPORT CONDITIONS GIVE PROMISE OF IMPROVING

[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 1 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

\* \* \* The flow of allotted foods into all provinces has been slow, due to the lack of adequate transport facilities and the long haul

<sup>16</sup> AC did not actually take charge until 4 August. The territory remained under military government but as administered by AC regional teams rather than Army AMG.

from the Forlì, AMG Food Dump. Flour has been given priority in all regions on first delivery, since bread is the most important item. Sugar, salt and milk will be delivered when an adequate stockpile of flour is delivered.

A Railhead has now been established at Cremona where the food is transported by truck from Forlì and then placed on freight cars and delivered by rail from this point to the Regions of Lombardia and Piemonte. While the railroad could handle approximately 1,000 tons daily, thus far only about 450 tons daily have been hauled by the railroad due to the lack of transport from Forlì to Cremona. However, additional truck transport is being secured by the Senior Supply Officer, AMG Fifth Army and this amount will soon be increased.

#### REPORTS FROM NORTHERN REGIONS INDICATE GENERAL IMPROVEMENT

[Hq AC, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

##### *Emilia Region*

1. The food situation is good but, although prices have dropped considerably, they are still too high for the poorer classes.

8. The number of killings and kidnappings have decreased.

##### *Liguria Region*

17. The supply of rationed food has been satisfactory but prices on the open market are extremely high.

19. Rehabilitation of the ports of Genoa, La Spezia, Imperia and Apuania is proceeding and about half of the port of Savona is in operation.

22. Communications on the whole are good and railway facilities are relieving the transportation problem to some extent. . . .

##### *Lombardia Region*

24. The economic life of the North is gradually reshaping itself in all fields where supplies exist. . . . The lack of coal continues to hamper industry generally and in particular the steel industry.

##### *Piemonte Region*

35. 13,000 tons of coal arrived during the month and have been allotted.

36. Killings and crimes of violence have decreased but it is considered that large numbers of firearms are still held by unauthorized persons for criminal purposes.

##### *Venezia Region*

45. Industry is progressing slowly towards re-

covery but acute unemployment continues owing to lack of coal and raw materials. \* \* \*

#### AMG HAS DONE AN EFFECTIVE JOB AND COULD TURN OVER NORTH TO THE GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, on Trip to North Italy, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers]

\* \* \* a. The consensus of opinion, in which I concur, is that as far as administrative factors are concerned AMG can turn the provinces in the north over to Italian administration at any time after 1 August without danger of administrative breakdown or serious loss of administrative efficiency. . . .

b. The officers with whom I talked were fairly unanimous in feeling that from the end of this month a continuation of AMG administration will probably result in diminishing returns, both administrative and political. It is agreed by all but the Italian extremists that AMG did a necessary and effective job at the time of the occupation. The first few weeks were disorderly and the political tension was high. Nearly all factions accepted AMG as an impartial stakeholder until the internal political difficulties could be settled, at least to the extent of forming satisfactory governments at the provincial and communal level. This has been done in the great majority of the provinces. The administrative personnel is concededly of a higher order and more efficient than in the south. The only impediment has been the political one which has been pushed far enough into the background so as not to be a major factor in the local administration at the moment. \* \* \*

#### SACMED PROPOSES TO RETURN ALL NORTHERN ITALY EXCEPT BOLZANO AND UDINE

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 1 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/136/323]

In accordance with general policy reaffirmed in FAN 536 [See Chapter XX, Section 2] it is proposed to hand back to Italian jurisdiction the following compartments on 30 September 45, or 21 days after receipt of orders for handover, whichever date is later: Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Venezia Tridentina (less Bolzano Province) and Venezia Propria (less Udine Province).<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> On 6 September a second cable from SACMED on the issue of restoration indicated that he now felt that Bolzano could be returned to Italian Government jurisdiction at the same time as the other Northern territories. He again made exception of Venezia Giulia, and also of Udine because of its tactical relationship to that

SACMED PROTESTS LONG DELAY IN RETURN OF  
NORTHERN ITALY

[Msg, SACMED to CCS, 19 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/  
109/583, NAF-1080]

\* \* \* 1. The delay in reply to my recom-  
mendations contained in NAF 1069 and NAF  
1071 is a matter of considerable concern to me.  
The Italian Government, which is aware that  
the proposed turnover date has passed, is greatly

area. The CCS did not communicate its approval of the  
proposed transfer. It soon appeared that the reason was  
the change in the State Department's attitude with  
regard to Bolzano. Secretary of State Byrnes had be-  
come concerned lest return of that province to Italian  
administration might prejudice settlement of the matter  
at the peace conference. By the same token, return of

embarrassed; the Italian press is openly suspicious  
of Allied intentions. . . .

2. The release schemes for both British and  
U.S. personnel are fast draining down the experi-  
enced personnel which are required if the terri-  
tory is to remain under AMG. To retain them  
at this late date or to introduce inexperienced  
personnel will not restore the full efficiency of  
military government. \* \* \*

Northern Italy without Bolzano would create agitation in  
Italy. SACMED, together with the Chief Commissioner,  
AC, was embarrassed by the long delay of CCS in  
approving return of North Italy to the Italian Govern-  
ment. On 19 October, as the following document indi-  
cates, he pressed CCS for an answer, and finally, in  
December, approval was given (see Chapter XXI, Sec-  
tion 6).

## Political Principle Versus Military Pragmatism in the Issue of Venezia Giulia

The story of Venezia Giulia—for reasons inherent in the issue and the events—forms a separate element in the history of the occupation of the north. Separated in the main from the rest of northern Italy by the Adriatic Sea, and lying in the extreme northeast at the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939, Venezia Giulia, which included the port of Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula, had once been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but had been ceded to Italy at the end of World War I. Its political past was thus like that of Bolzano and other northeastern frontier areas, but nevertheless the CCS, on 30 October 1944, gave it special mention in its directive to establish military government in all the potential areas of dispute within Italy's 1939 boundaries. The reason was that the Yugoslav forces under Marshal Tito were already operating in parts of Venezia Giulia and thus might here present AMG with a serious difficulty not foreseen elsewhere—prior occupation designed to lead to annexation.

Later, SACMED negotiated with Tito and realized that the directive to set up AMG in all Venezia Giulia could not be implemented without the use of force against an ally. The issue was so serious that it had to be re-examined by all concerned. In this re-examination SACMED

took one point of view and political authorities—in particular those of the United States—took another. It was one of the rare cases in the history of the Italian operation where military and political authorities sharply disagreed over the best course to follow. The denouement was still rarer: The judgment of the military commanders finally prevailed over that of the political authorities. This was undoubtedly because their judgment favored a pragmatic compromise whereas the cost of enforcing a solution based on abstract political principle would have been too great.

The CCS directive of October 1944 stemmed primarily from a political decision. The two governments recognized from the beginning that Tito would not only claim Venezia Giulia but might attempt to annex it to Yugoslavia unilaterally. It was primarily in order to uphold the principle of peaceful settlement of all territorial disputes that the State Department wished Allied military government to be established and maintained until the fate of the area could be settled on a governmental level. The views of the Department were apparently accepted by both the President and the Prime Minister and their Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The reasons for the Allied wish to extend AMG over Venezia Giulia were, to

be sure, military as well as political. The Allied armies wished to utilize the port facilities of the area, especially Trieste and Pola, and to safeguard their lines of communication running northward into Austria. When Prime Minister Churchill visited Italy in August 1944 he met Marshal Tito and informed him of the Allied intention to set up AMG over the whole territory. The Marshal demurred but did not refuse because he was receiving large amounts of supplies as well as air and naval support from the Allies. Later it was to become clear that the military factor weighed less than the political, and that the British were less concerned about either than were the Americans. Although the State Department's views had been accepted by the CCS and communicated to the theater commander, the British Chiefs of Staff early in 1945 asked SACMED whether AMG would be required in the whole of Venezia Giulia or "alternatively, whether his needs could be met by an agreement with the Yugoslavs for Allied military control of certain areas."<sup>1</sup> A British historian explains that "In principle the British view coincided with that held by the American State Department . . . but experience in Greece led to severe doubts as to how far such control [of disputed areas] was practical."<sup>2</sup> The doubts of the British chiefs were doubtless amplified by the successes of the Yugoslav armed forces. By early 1945 the Army of National Liberation was in control of a large part of Venezia Giulia, and Tito had made it clear that he intended to occupy still more in order to strengthen Yugoslav claims. At a meeting with Field Marshal Alexander at Belgrade on 2 February Tito nevertheless agreed to the establishment of AMG within the zone of the Allied line of communications and offered to put his

troops within that area under Allied command.

The State Department at the Yalta meeting in February 1945 again maintained that no action which would prejudice the peace settlement should be countenanced. A month later, in spite of further advances by the Yugoslav Army, the CCS instructed Field Marshal Alexander to establish AMG in all of Venezia Giulia. Early in May units of the British Eighth Army crossed the border and the province was subjected to a double occupation by Yugoslav and Allied forces. Tito made no secret of the fact that he intended not only to stay where he was but also to lay claim to the whole province at the peace conference. Field Marshal Alexander reported to the CCS that he could carry out their orders only through use of force. Since armed conflict with the Yugoslavs was obviously undesirable he proposed "a purely military agreement" for divided administration in the territory. Things had come to such a pass that the Field Marshal believed that establishment of AMG in the whole of Venezia was less important than his control of the line of communications to Austria.

Field Marshal Alexander's representative, General Morgan, who was sent to Belgrade, held three meetings, 7-9 May, during which Tito refused to relinquish any territory but suggested a joint military command. Alexander notified Tito that his proposal involved a political question that must be settled on the governmental level. After the Belgrade meetings President Truman apparently brought pressure to bear via Moscow. In any event Marshal Tito agreed on 9 June to a division of the territory for purposes of military occupation along the "Morgan line," described in the documents. Soon afterward Allied Military Government XIII Corps (later AMG Venezia Giulia) was established and placed under the operational control of Lt.

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Allied Military Administration in Italy*, p. 330.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Gen. Sir John Harding, the XIII Corps commander.

The administrative division of Venezia Giulia did violence to its economic unity but the situation was substantially corrected by a supplementary agreement which set up agencies and machinery for economic co-operation. The basic trouble for AMG was in being called upon to establish local government in an area with two nationality components, neither of which wished, either for patriotic reasons or for fear of reprisal, to co-operate with the other. Moreover, AFHQ felt it necessary to direct the restoration of the Italian system of administration after the Yugoslavs had already set up their own governmental machinery, staffed with members of their own nationality. It was true that the military agreement called for "use . . . of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily." This provision was interpreted by the Yugoslavs as requiring the retention of their administrative machinery. From the point of view of the Allies retention meant not only offending the Italian Government but also acquiescing in an inequitable system designed to perpetuate Yugoslav power in the region. The Allies did not have a very sound legal case but they rationalized that it would not be possible to make the Yugoslav system work satisfactorily in conjunction with the quite different system set up for the remainder of Italy.

When it became evident that the Yugoslavs would not co-operate under any but

their own system, AMG authorities conceived and secured approval for a system of local government which was neither Yugoslav nor, for that matter, quite Italian. Avowedly designed to bypass all existent Yugoslav agencies, it was based upon an artificial territorial unit called the "Area." This unit conformed more to the Italian province than to the Yugoslav region and to that extent the scheme complied with the directive to restore the Italian system. The Yugoslav agencies were ignored and the positions on the area level and that of its component communes were filled with Italians when Slovenes refused to accept appointment. Somehow both political and economic life were kept going until the peace treaty with Italy ended a difficult situation with a political expedient that was to prove even less manageable. Dividing up all the rest of Venezia Giulia between Yugoslavia and Italy, the powers created the Free Territory of Trieste as a framework within which Trieste served as a customs-free port for the ships of all nations. Its governor was to be selected by the U.N. Security Council and, within forty-five days after he assumed office, the Anglo-American and Yugoslav troops who were meanwhile occupying the territory in separate zones were to be released. No governor could be agreed upon within the stipulated time of ninety days. In consequence the occupation continued until October 1954, when, once more, an unnatural territorial division between Italy and Yugoslavia was effected in order to end the even more deplorable evil of international contentiousness.

## I. AMG WILL BE USED TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

### TITO'S AMBITIONS IN NORTHEAST ITALY PRESENTS THE ALLIES WITH A DIFFICULT PROBLEM

[Memo, Capt Stone, USNR, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for G-5 AFHQ, 28 Jul 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. In order that A.C.C. may issue the appropriate instructions to the A.M.G. officers concerned we shall be grateful for guidance on what provinces should be included within ACC/AMG administration on the boundaries of Italy.<sup>1</sup>

2. In the case of those areas which abut on France, Switzerland and Austria we should be glad to know whether the provinces which ACC/AMG must be prepared to administer should include all those territories up to the frontier of Italy as drawn in 1939.

3. Those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939 present what seems likely to be a more immediate and more difficult problem. There is already indication that Yugoslav forces under the control of General Tito are preparing to make a bid at the earliest possible moment to take over certain areas to the West of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939. In such circumstances various possibilities are open.

a. Allied authorities might insist that until a peace treaty has been drawn up, it is the duty of Allied military government to function in all those territories which were under Italian sovereignty at the time of the Italian declaration of war.

b. At the other extreme Allied authorities might be prepared to accept as a purely temporary and provisional arrangement Yugoslav military government over those Italian territories which Yugoslav forces had already occupied and were controlling at the time that contact was made between Allied forces and Marshal Tito's forces.

c. Various other courses could be followed, such as de facto acceptance of the Italian Eastern boundary as it existed before 1918 or negotiation with the Yugoslavian Government, or Marshal Tito as its military commander in this field, of some other arbitrary line accepted for reasons of practical convenience but without any commitment insofar as the future boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy are concerned.

4. It will be appreciated that unless some clear

<sup>1</sup> It was believed possible that northern Italy might be reached much sooner than actually proved to be the case. High-level planning for the north began about the time of this memorandum.

ruling is given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces are likely to occur. \* \* \*

### SACMED FEELS TITO OUT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF AMG IN VENEZIA GIULIA

[Memo, Field Marshal Alexander for Marshal Tito, 13 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/136/287]

1. In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern Italy, Austria or Hungary it is the Supreme Allied Commander's intention to impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. . . . It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned.

2. This direct Allied Military Government is necessary in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe.

3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be supplied through the Port of Trieste, it will be necessary for them to have secure lines of communication protected by British troops on the route through Ljubljana-Maribor-Graz.

4. Supreme Allied Commander looks to the Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest liaison with them.

### STATE DEPARTMENT WISHES AMG IN VENEZIA GIULIA TO KEEP ITS STATUS OPEN UNTIL THE PEACE CONFERENCE

[Memo, Actg Secy of State Joseph C. Grew for Hopkins, 16 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

\* \* \* Certain areas of Italy's northeastern frontier will probably be in dispute after hostilities. In order that the final disposition of these disputed areas would not be prejudiced by occupation of the Armed forces of claimant states, it is suggested that Allied Military Government be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum was presented at a meeting of Field Marshal Alexander with Tito at Caserta on 13 August. The representative of the Government-in-Exile was also present. Tito objected to AMG except in Trieste and along the lines of communication [L. of C.] to Austria. See below, AFHQ message to CCS, 23 November 1944.

within its 1939 frontiers. In the South Tyrol and the Istrian Peninsula (Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia), Allied Military Government should be maintained and these areas not restored to Italian administration (as is the present practice with respect to liberated areas in southern Italy). Allied Military Government would thus be maintained until the disputed areas are finally disposed of by peace treaty or other settlement. Any other course, such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Peninsula or Free Austrian forces occupy the South Tyrol prior to final disposition at the peace settlement, would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of these territories, cause deep resentment on the part of the Italian people and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy.

The British have already suggested a plan along these lines and would, it is believed, be willing to maintain Allied Military Government in frontier areas likely to be in dispute for the required period. . . . On our part, it would mean keeping a certain number of American Military Government officers and soldiers in Northeastern Italy. \* \* \*

[Memo, Leahy for H. Freeman Matthews, Dept of State, 19 Sep 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

The suggestion regarding extension of Allied Military Government to the South Tyrol and Istrian Peninsula contained in your memorandum dated September 16th to Mr. Hopkins has been discussed with Mr. Churchill and is approved by the President.

#### THE CCS ADD MILITARY REASONS FOR PLACING VENEZIA GIULIA UNDER AMG

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 30 Oct 44, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 7]

1. Administration of disputed areas formerly under Italian Rule. General policy is to restore Italian administration under supervision of Allied Commission in all Italian metropolitan territory up to Italy's nineteen thirty nine frontiers. There are, however, certain disputed territories formerly under Italian rule which should be treated as exceptions to this general policy. These are set out in the following paragraphs.

2. Venezia Giulia. The final disposal of this province, lying between 1914 and 1939 Italian frontiers, cannot take place until peace settlement and in meantime it is clearly undesirable that either of two main interested parties, Italy and Yugoslavia, should be left in control. Are

equally opposed at this stage to any attempt to divide province between Italy and Yugoslavia by laying down some temporary and arbitrary line, which could only lead to friction and incidents and would moreover prejudice an impartial final settlement.

3. Apart from the necessity of maintaining law and order and of preventing either claimant jumping claims, this province in which Trieste and important railways are situated, will be of great importance during the immediate post hostilities period as providing a base and lines of communication both for Allied troops of occupation in Central Europe, in particular Austria, and for relief and rehabilitation operations generally.

4. Allied Military Government should therefore be established and maintained in this province.

5. As Yugoslav Partisan forces are already present in Istria it is probable that at time of German withdrawal Marshal Tito's military and civil authorities may succeed in establishing considerable measure of control in Istria and possibly in other parts of province. It will thereafter be necessary to reach some agreement with Marshal Tito about establishment of Allied Military Government. \* \* \*

#### TITO TURNS DOWN SACMED'S PROPOSAL AND AFHQ SUGGESTS GOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS TO AVOID TROUBLE

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 23 Nov 44, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-2, Incl C]

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC's intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government in this area until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned.

Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied Military Command and control of the port of Trieste and L of C required by Allied Forces occupying Austria or Hungary.

Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is proposed that Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia follow the pattern established elsewhere in Italy but that it be made clear from the outset that control will not revert to the Italian Government as elsewhere in Italy, but will remain in Allied hands until otherwise instructed by the two governments.

Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are suggested, as follows:

A. Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav Partisan or non-Partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

B. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian Carabinieri or troops. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to Austria, Allied garrison troops will probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

C. The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslavs and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian National Legislation may be excluded from the area.

D. Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian Lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military Lire.

E. Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, with which the Allied Regional authorities could consult at their discretion might be formed.

3. Developments may be such that, unless Yugoslav agreement is secured in advance, we may find it politically and militarily difficult to impose Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia.

4. Accordingly, we invite your consideration as to the advisability of negotiations being undertaken at a governmental level with the Yugoslav authorities in this matter. \* \* \*

## 2. SACMED TRIES TO TEMPER POLITICAL PRINCIPLE WITH MILITARY PRAGMATISM

### PARTISANS, SLOVENES, AND ITALIAN COMMUNISTS ARE ALREADY MAKING TROUBLE

[Summary by Political Sec, AC, of a Rpt by No. 1 Spec Force, ACMF,<sup>3</sup> Issued by CofS, AC, 31 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

\* \* \* 1. . . . Communist controlled bands in North East Italy were soon to pursue the course [of preparing to seize power when the Germans are expelled] by:

"(a) denying their operational responsibility to SACMED and placing themselves under Tito's Slovene IX Corps;

(b) ignoring the orders of the CLNAI;

(c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to Tito;

(d) threatening not to co-operate with AMG and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated."

2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal Tito be requested to prohibit Slovene attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in 15th Army Group territory."

4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the Natisone River and they are attempting to attain a realization of their aspirations by a show of popular support through propaganda, intimidation and forced mobilization.

<sup>3</sup>The information given in the report was furnished by British secret missions in northern Italy.

5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist territorial link with the USSR through the Balkans, aid and abet the Slovenes in their activities. This reputedly is done with the agreement of the Slovene IX Corps and of the Russian Mission attached to the Corps. \* \* \*

### U.S. POLITICAL ADVISER AND AC DISAGREE WITH SACMED'S ADVOCACY OF COMPROMISE

[Min of SAC's Political Conf, 1st Mtg, 20 Feb 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

5. . . . The Supreme Allied Commander explained that there had been much discussion regarding the form of government which should be set up in Venezia Giulia at the time when the port of Trieste would be required as a base from which to maintain Allied occupational forces in Austria. It was essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal Tito, since there were Yugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal Tito wished to incorporate the area in the New Yugoslavia. During the recent conferences he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal Tito that a military boundary should be established which would run

north and south over well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration east of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal Tito to remove any Yugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain west of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station east of the boundary would come under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

Mr. Kirk said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of Italy, including Zara and the Italian islands in the Adriatic. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout Venezia Giulia. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

Rear Admiral Stone said that the Italian Government had been notified that all Venezia Giulia would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with proposals which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since the implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under

the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

The Supreme Allied Commander pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent. \* \* \*

#### SACMED'S CONFERENCE WITH TITO FAILS TO PRODUCE AGREEMENT

[Min of SAC's Political Conf, 2d Mtg, 2 Mar 45, ACC files, 10000/136/258]

5. . . . The Supreme Allied Commander said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject [Allied military control of Venezia Giulia] by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of Austria, he (Field Marshal Alexander) would require the use of the port of Trieste and road and rail communications leading from it into Austria. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently garrison the area with his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of Venezia Giulia up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in these areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern Italy east of the Isonzo. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of Istria as control of the entire area was not essential for military communication. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Yugoslav communications through Ljubljana available to the Allies. \* \* \*

**SACMED PROPOSES TO CCS YUGOSLAV PARTICIPATION IN AMG**

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 2 Mar 45,<sup>4</sup> ABC files, 387.4, Italy (2 Sep 43), sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-1]

7. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must take account are:

A. Provision for the control and security of the port of Trieste and L of C thence to Austria.

B. Avoidance of any action that would appear to prejudice the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

C. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Yugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

8. It is accepted policy that all Italy (including of course Venezia Giulia) should be subject to Allied military government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 7 A and B above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Yugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of Venezia Giulia, and Yugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Yugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in Tito's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue. In order, therefore, to meet the requirements in 7 C as well as those in 7 A and B above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the provisional Yugoslav Government—as soon as it is formed—to participate, as an Ally, in the Allied military government of Venezia Giulia. In that event, I recommend that the Joint provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to send representatives to consult with members of my staff in formulating plans for the military government of Venezia Giulia, and that it should be arranged that British or American forces occupy the L of C area and perhaps also Fiume and Pola; that the Yugoslav forces in other parts of Venezia Giulia come under the orders of the appropriate Allied commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory. \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup> The message begins by summarizing the conference with Tito, described in the preceding document.

**ANOTHER PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL: OCCUPY ONLY AREAS OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE**

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 26 Apr 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 8051-A]

\* \* \* 1. Events are moving rapidly in this Theater and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of Allied occupation of Venezia Giulia. I must therefore now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary these will be as follows:

2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to seize *those* parts of Venezia Giulia which are of importance to my military operations. The area so occupied will include Trieste, and the communications leading to this port and from it into Austria. Pola will also be required.

3. Within the above area, Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking, provided as far as possible equally from U.S. and British resources. It will work through such suitable local personnel, whether Italian or Yugoslav, as may be found in the area, and will be part of the Military Government organization which controls other areas of Italy.

4. Before the task force enters Venezia Giulia I will inform Marshal Tito of my intentions and will explain to him that if any of his forces remain in this area they must necessarily come under my command. \* \* \*

**CCS DIRECTS ALMOST FULL OCCUPATION BUT WISHES TO RECONSIDER IF TROUBLE DEVELOPS**

[Directive (FAN 536), CCS to AFHQ, 28 Apr 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 19647]

\* \* \* Administration of areas formerly under Italian rule, final disposal of which is in dispute. Combined Chiefs of Staff has approved plan hereinafter set out. Successful working of plan depends on Soviet co-operation. U.S. and U.K. Governments are now considering best method of seeking such co-operation and subsequent Yugoslav agreement to the plan. In meantime you should implement this plan if military necessity so requires before Soviet and Yugoslav agreements have been obtained.

1. General policy to restore Italian metropolitan territory to Italian administration under the supervision of Allied commission will be subject to the exceptions set forth in this message.

2. You should establish and maintain Allied Military Government in:

a. The Compartment of Venezia Giulia, including Fiume and the Quarnerolo Islands, but excluding the Province of Zara, and

b. Tarvisio and surrounding areas, which before 1919 formed part of Austrian Province of Carinthia and have since been incorporated in Italian Province of Friuli.

The U.S./U.K. military government will function through local authorities of whatever nationality still remains. In all cases civil authorities will be responsible to your Allied Military Government.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are recommending to the U.S. and U.K. Governments that the forces required to back the plan and the civil affairs officers required to work it, should be provided jointly by the U.S. and U.K. Governments.

4. Soviet concurrence will be sought to join in requesting Yugoslav Government to withdraw all Yugoslav forces from the Compartment of Venezia Giulia, as described above.

5. In case any Yugoslav forces in the area to be placed under U.S./U.K. military government fail to co-operate with the plan set forth in this message, you will communicate with the Combined Chiefs of Staff before taking action.

6. You should try to ensure that the interim administration of Zara and certain Adriatic Islands, other than those referred to in paragraph 2 above, acquired by Italy after the last war and now claimed by the Yugoslavs, is conducted in

the name of the Allies. However, in practice it may be necessary for you to permit Yugoslavs to perform the actual functions of administration.<sup>5</sup> \* \* \*

#### SACMED DELAYS ORDERING COMPLETE FULFILLMENT OF THE DIRECTIVE

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to Gen Mark Clark, CG, 15th AGP, 30 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/105/497]

4. . . . the object of your operations in Venezia Giulia for the present will be as follows:

(a) Secure Trieste and L of C through Italy leading to it.

(b) Secure L of C from Trieste to Austria via Gorizia-Tarvisio.

(c) Secure Pola, anchorages between Trieste and Pola, and the L of C between those ports.

5. Concurrently with operations indicated in para. 4 above, you will continue operations against the enemy until you have completely cleared Venezia Giulia or linked up with regular Yugoslav Armed Forces.<sup>6</sup>

6. In linking up with regular Yugoslavs, maximum care will be exercised to avoid armed clashes. \* \* \*

<sup>5</sup>In the ensuing paragraphs the CCS, among other things, call for the maintenance of AMG in Bolzano and its continuation in the islands of Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Linosa.

<sup>6</sup>That is, the areas which Tito was claiming were for the time being not to be seized unless, as in par. 5, Tito's forces were not there.

### 3. SACMED WAS RIGHT IN PREDICTING TROUBLE

#### POLITELY BUT FIRMLY TITO ANNOUNCES HIS INFRACTION OF ALLIED POLICY

[Msg, Marshal Tito to Field Marshal Alexander as Quoted in Msg, Alexander to CCS, 2 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 64T]

\* \* \* I have received and carefully considered the 5 points contained in your telegram regarding the regulations and the areas of operations of the Allied Armies and the Yugoslav Army in Istria and the Slovene Littoral.

Since our last meeting and conversation the situation has changed so much in so far as units of my 4th Army, cooperating with Slovene Units, have, with great difficulty and heavy losses, broken through the German defensive line run-

ning from Fiume to Trieste where street fighting is going on now. In addition nearly the whole of Istria, with the exception of Pola Rovigno and several other towns where street fighting is going on, has been liberated by our troops. In connection with the above I wish to give you the following information. In order to liberate Jugoslavia and round up all enemy troops in Jugoslavia as quickly as possible I have made the following plan which is already being carried out:

1. To liberate Istria, Trieste and Monfalcone as far as the Isonzo River and to advance up the Isonzo towards the Austrian frontier.

3. In accordance with our previous agreement I am prepared that you should use the ports of Trieste and Pola as well as the railway line

Trieste-Tarvisio for supplying your troops in Austria.

4. I will therefore be grateful if you will give orders to your troops to get in contact with my troops on the above mentioned line where further details regarding your cooperation can be agreed on the spot. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN PEOPLE ARE SHOCKED BY TITO'S DARING MOVE

[Msg, U.S. Ambassador Kirk to the Secy of State, 2 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just sent for me to say that the report that Tito's troops have occupied territory up to the Isonzo has made the most profound and painful impression on the Italian Government and on all the patriotic elements in Italy who have been reached by this news. . . . He said that all efforts were being made to preserve calm but that he feared that the effect, especially in the north, of the Yugoslav military occupation would be disastrous and could retard all efforts toward the unification of the country.

I see much merit in the Minister's observation and believe that the Italian Government should be immediately placed in a position to reassure the country that whatever de facto developments may occur on a purely military level such events should not be regarded as indicating a policy prejudicial to an eventual just settlement of territorial arrangements affecting Italy. . . .

#### YUGOSLAVS ARE SHOCKED BY ATTITUDE OF ITALIANS

[Literal Transl of Remarks of Yugoslav Member in Min of 35th Mtg of Advisory Council for Italy, 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/228]

\* \* \* I give my personal vote against the proposed transfer of certain territory to Italian Administration.

When the Italian Government request that Yugoslav Areas such as the Slovenian Littoral, Trieste, Istra and Reka should be occupied by British and American troops thus denying Jugoslavia the quality of an Ally, Member of the United Nations, I cannot agree that any more territory of liberated Italy be transferred to the Italian Government, as to a Representative of a Country which has lost the War, prior to settling questions as are the boundary towards Jugoslavia, the payment or reparations and extradition of re-

spective War criminals to Jugoslavia, and generally prior to signing the Peace Treaty.

The Chairman pointed out that the provinces mentioned by the Yugoslav Representative were not involved in the present proposed transfer of territory. \* \* \*

#### ALLIES ALSO ENTER TRIESTE

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to Marshal Tito as Quoted in Msg from Alexander to CCS, 4 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1129]

6. I am setting up the necessary organization in Trieste, and elsewhere in the Communications Zone, to ensure that my line of communications is brought into operation rapidly and can function efficiently, so that the battle may be carried with all possible speed into Austria against the remnants of the enemy forces.

7. Provided that your troops in the area affected are clearly informed by you as to the position, no inconvenience from the joint presence of our troops in the same area will arise. \* \* \*

#### ALEXANDER AND TITO DEBATE THE MEANING OF THEIR AGREEMENT WITH SOME ASPERITY

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 4 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1129]

\* \* \* I received at 1902B hours 3d May [the following message from Marshal Tito]:

This moment I have received a signal from my Fourth Army saying tanks and Infantry Units of the Allied Forces which are under your command, without any previous notice have entered Trieste, Gorizia and Monfalcone, the cities which have been liberated by the Yugoslav Army.

Since I do not know what was meant by this I wish you would give me your immediate explanation of the matter with expedience.

C. I have thereupon dispatched the following message to him at 1300B hours today:

1. I have received your message of 3rd May. I am astonished at your apparent failure to honor the agreement we made at Belgrade. [Sec. 2, above.]

2. The agreement was that as the Port of Trieste and the rail and road communications from Trieste to Austria via Gorizia and Tarvisio are essential to maintain my advance into Austria,

<sup>1</sup> On 3 May Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard C. Freyburg's forces entered Trieste. The Allies controlled the port area of Trieste and Tito's forces the remainder of the city. ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCAC 148-5.

I should have full control in these areas. You further offered, and I accepted, that any of your forces in these areas would be put under my command.

3. To enable you to clear the enemy from your country, I have provided you, and am still doing so, with great quantities of munitions of war, medical supplies and food. In addition, I have also given you the support of strong Air and Naval Forces. I have thus fully kept my promise to you and I still believe that you will keep yours to me.

4. So far, however, you have taken unilateral action by ordering your troops to occupy territory as far west as the Isonzo River.

5. I suggest that as this question demands an immediate solution you send your Chief of Staff to Bari, where you have a mission, to meet my Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Morgan. I feel sure that they could bring this conflict of views to a conclusion satisfactory to us both.

6. I have ordered my troops to maintain their present positions in the Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia Areas.

#### TITO'S TROOPS FORESTALL ESTABLISHMENT OF AMG IN TRIESTE AND GORIZIA

[Msg, AMG Eighth Army for G-5, 15th AGp, 4 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/594]

Subject is Trieste area and Gorizia. Both Yugoslav and Allied forces are in Trieste. Yugoslav administration had been set up by adherents Tito before arrival. Position is very delicate. AMG officers are in town but are not functioning. Position Monfalcone and District. Civil administration of Tito adherents in complete control and functioning well. . . . Large numbers Yugoslav partisans parading streets fully armed also Yugoslav Army. Well behaved demonstration in favor Tito taking place. Impossible yet assess strength of local Tito feeling or number partisans. In any case would be impossible disarm partisans unless carried out by strong military force which would be tantamount to setting off gunpowder. Position Gorizia understood to be Yugoslavs in complete control. Italian partisans are reported to have been disarmed by Yugoslavs and arrested. In view of all above and after consultation AMG 13 Corps have ordered a standstill on AMG until position examined by higher authorities coming from AFHQ tomorrow. Therefore no proclamations have been posted and no military government has been imposed anywhere in Venezia Giulia. Army commander has approved above decision in consultation with Corps commander. . . .

#### SACMED AGAIN SEEKS PERMISSION TO MAKE A MILITARY COMPROMISE

[NAF 948, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 5 May 45. AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1638]

1. I have received the following cablegram from Marshal Tito:

1. I was surprised at your readiness to express your doubts as to the respect on my part of the agreement we made in Belgrade. I am even more surprised owing to the fact that I am not only bound solidly by the military responsibilities as C-in-C but also by the responsibilities as Prime Minister who must first of all take care of the interests of his country. I am even more surprised because in my message of May 2nd I underlined that I am keeping my word given in Belgrade, namely that you may use the ports of Trieste and Pola as well as the line of communications leading towards Austria for supplying your troops.

9. My troops have been ordered to hold the whole of the occupied territory and not to impede in any way your troops on their way toward Austria along the L of C foreseen by the agreement. The port of Trieste is also at your disposal.

2. I have replied as follows:

Thank you for your telegram of 5 May. I fully appreciate your difficulties. I suggest that it would lead to a quicker and more satisfactory solution if I sent my Chief of Staff to Belgrade to discuss the whole question with you. \* \* \*

3. It is quite certain that I cannot carry out the policy laid down in FAN 536 (C.C.S. 739/2) [MC-IN 19647, 28 Apr, sec. 2 above] without use of force. I propose therefore to send my chief of staff to Belgrade to negotiate a purely military agreement on the following lines:

(1) Field Marshal Alexander requires the port of Trieste, and the railway and roads from there to Villach via Gorizia. The territory west of the line marked on the map will be under his control. All forces, whether Fifteenth Army Group or Yugoslav, or Partisan, will come under his orders at an agreed time.

(2) Field Marshal Alexander's Allied Military Government will administer this area. Full use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration already set up and working satisfactorily.

(3) To facilitate the working of 1 and 2 above, Yugoslav regular forces should gradually be withdrawn from the area under Field Marshal Alexander's control and Partisans will hand in their arms and disband.

(4) This agreement is purely military and

in no way affects long-term policy regarding these territories.

4. The line referred to in the above agreement would be such as to include the port of Trieste, space required for depots, and the road and rail communications from Trieste via Gorizia to Villach. \* \* \*

#### THE CCS AGREE PROVIDED COMPROMISE IS PURELY MILITARY

[FAN 547, CCS to Field Marshal Alexander, 7 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-3]

\* \* \* We agree paragraph 2 of NAF 948 [above]. We also agree you should negotiate on lines of your paragraph 3, but you should make it abundantly clear that this agreement is purely military and ensure that Tito understands that it does not affect the ultimate disposal of any pre-war Italian territory which will be a matter to be decided at the peace settlement.

#### A TITO COUNTERPROPOSAL WHICH IS UNSATISFACTORY BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 10 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-4]

\* \* \* I. Marshal Tito said he was sorry he could not accept Field Marshal Alexander's proposals. His reason for this was that as his troops had liberated territory which is Slovene, he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an Allied Army on account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause.

He further mentioned that at the peace conference he would claim territory to the west of Isonzo.

In view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a predominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal Alexander full use of the port of Trieste and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

D. In view of the above, I have sent the following message to Marshal Tito:

General Morgan has made his report to me. Since Paragraph 1 of your counter-proposals raises a political issue, I must now refer the whole question to the British and American governments. Meanwhile I propose to use the port of Trieste to maintain my forces in the northeast Italy and Austria. I trust you will take steps to insure that no regrettable incidents occur.

#### THERE ARE DIVERGENT OPINIONS OF THE PROPOSAL AT AFHQ

[Min of Mtg of SACMED's Political Conf, 10 May 45, ACC files, 10000/236/258]

3. . . . The Supreme Allied Commander said that the Yugoslav proposals for dual command were not militarily acceptable to him. His military requirement, to have his L of C under his own control, was a normal one for any commander. On Marshal Tito's proposals the long L of C into Austria would be dependent for its safety on the goodwill of the Yugoslavs. This could not be satisfactory in the long run, and a clear demarkation line, all forces on the west of which would be under his (Field Marshal Alexander's) command, was therefore required. \* \* \*

As an interim measure and pending receipt of further directions, he proposed, therefore, to use Trieste without any formal agreement with the Yugoslavs, acting as we had already been doing. Meanwhile, as a second priority we should also develop Venice, so as to have it available for use if required. He thought that the Yugoslavs would in fact be anxious to avoid open clash at present, and use of Trieste on this basis should work until the governments had made their decision. Meanwhile, his forces would remain deployed in the Trieste-Gorizia area as they were at present. . . .

Mr. Kirk observed the arguments now being put forward by Marshal Tito were precisely similar to those advanced by the Japanese prior to their invasion of Manchuria and by Mussolini before the invasion of Abyssinia. There was every indication, therefore, that the Yugoslavs proposed to carry out what would be the first act of postwar aggression. He considered that the issue at stake was larger than that merely affecting the territory concerned. . . .

General McNarney did not believe that public opinion in the United States would support hostilities against the Yugoslavs. In fact such hostilities would mean siding with the Italians, our enemies, in regard to territory they seized after the last war, against the Yugoslavs who were our Allies. He thought that if a plebiscite was taken in the area there was little doubt that the result would be favourable to the Slovenes. He had therefore a certain sympathy with Marshal Tito who had been fighting a long, hard war and now demanded the right to occupy a certain amount of enemy territory which his forces had won, in the same way as the French had demanded to participate in the occupation of Austria and Ger-

many. The Yugoslavs could, therefore, say that it was merely a choice as to whether the territory should be occupied by one Ally or another. \* \* \*

#### MEANWHILE A QUEER PICTURE IN VENEZIA GIULIA

[Memo, Dunlop, RC, Venezia Rgn for Exec Cmsr, AC, 13 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/312]

8. Shortly after crossing the Isonzo one commenced to meet many Yugoslav troops and the town of Monfalcone was full of them. At the same time there were, superimposed upon the Yugoslav occupation, many Allied troops, and there was a constant stream of Allied military traffic up and down the road.

11. The Corps Commander—Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding—was trying to get the Yugoslavs to withdraw all their troops to the eastern side of the Isonzo. The Corps Commander explained that the Isonzo was more or less an empirical boundary. . . .

12. His instructions to me were that I should try and form strong AMG teams west of the Isonzo and introduce effective Military Government there. East of the Isonzo I was not to introduce Military Government nor put up proclamations. I should have men available to move forward into the country east of the Isonzo should a decision be reached which would enable us to do this. . . .

15. The picture presented is certainly a queer one. Of all the possibilities for which we planned I think we did not contemplate that two armies with, at any rate different immediate aims, should be completely superimposed one on the other. Yugoslav and Allied troops are completely intermingled. . . .

19. Co-operation from the J/S [Yugoslav] authorities varied in a very remarkable way and it was Brigadier Eve's opinion that this was in a great measure due to their fear to take any action without consulting their own high command. Hence a tendency to stall. . . . Major General [Robinson E.] Duff had first come to secure an agreement as to the conditions under which we would use the port. These local negotiations had broken down and matters were proceeding on a day to day basis.

20. Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Robertson had been in Trieste the previous day, 11th May, and the plan was to go ahead with the development of the port but on a scale much reduced from the first ideas. . . . The port installations were not badly damaged and the electric cranes were working.

23. Brigadier Eve thought that the J/S had done well in getting the city going. The city services were all working and the tramways were running.

24. When the J/S first came in they locked up nearly all the influential Italians. They did not take many of them—if any—out of the city and many of them were now being released. There had been very little shooting. There had been a considerable amount of requisitioning and a good deal of looting. . . .

28. . . . In the city area round the port, Allied and J/S officers and Headquarters are completely intermingled. Heavily armed J/S patrols of from eight to ten stolid and tough looking soldiers move slowly about. There are—so far as I could see—no allied patrols, but the Allied armed sentries outside our H.Q. are very smartly turned out. A strong company of J/S troops were drilling inside the dock area with Allied lorries coming and going around them.

29. It must be said that the streets of Trieste give an impression very different from that of any other "liberated" city which I have seen lately. The banks are closed and very nearly all the shops. The people are going about quietly and there is no manifestation of enthusiasm of any sort. There are many proclamations up, and wall slogans in Slovene everywhere. There are many J/S national flags. I also saw flags in the Italian colours with a star in the place of the shield of Savoy. I had also noticed these in Monfalcone. There were also public manifestoes in the same colouring. I asked [Lt. Col.] Armstrong about these. His report was that these were issued by the Italian Communist party of Trieste. This party was now in a very disillusioned state. They had been prime cooperators with the J/S in securing control of the city from the Germans and they now found themselves completely left out in the cold. They had been described as the "Trojan horse" of Trieste. I read one of these manifestoes. It laid great stress on the fraternity between the Italian and J/S peoples and acclaimed an autonomous Trieste within the framework of a federated Jugoslavia. \* \* \*

#### AMG IS SET UP IN PORTIONS OF VENEZIA GIULIA

[Dunlop, RC, Venezia Rgn, Rpt for May 1945, p. 25, ACC files, 10000/105/248]

\* \* \* The decision had been taken by 8th Army that AMG could not be set up in Trieste, and although Lt. Col. [Joseph D.] Scholtz, Lt. Col. Armstrong and other officers entered the city

and took up residence near Miramare, they did not function as AMG. However, it was found possible to establish AMG control in certain Communes within the Provinces of Gorizia and Trieste West of the Isonzo River, and AMG officers were installed there notably in Grado, Gradisca and Cormons. In the 1st week of the month at a series of discussions with 8th Army, Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner, and with Brigadier Henn from G-5 AFHQ, plans were worked out for the eventual severance of the Venezia Giulia group from the main portion of Venezia Region.<sup>5</sup> \* \* \*

#### FOOD MUST BE WITHHELD LEST IT BE DIVERTED BY TITO'S FORCES

[NAF 965, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 13 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 4005]

1. Allied commission have urgently requested policy for feeding civil population of Venezia Giulia, if it is not to be under Allied Military Government.

2. Allied Commission state that Gorizia and Trieste Provinces are largely dependent on Po Valley for supplies; that food situation in Monfalcone and Trieste is serious and that Yugoslav raiding parties have been requisitioning very large quantities of food in Udine Province.

3. After careful consideration have concluded that relief cannot practicably be furnished by us under present conditions. Apart from Tito's assumption of full responsibility for Civil Government and his refusal to permit AMG to function, no physical facilities exist for introduction and distribution of civilian supplies. Handover to Partisan forces is only alternative. If this were done, supplies would unquestionably be diverted to Tito's Army which is itself without administration and maintenance and whose foraging has

<sup>5</sup>The plan for the combat phase envisaged Venezia Giulia as administratively a part of Venezia Region.

## 4. MILITARY PRAGMATISM PREVAILS

#### SACMED SETS FORTH A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE

[NAF 983, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 23 May 45,<sup>9</sup> AFHQ files, MC-OUT 7874]

<sup>9</sup>On 21 May the Yugoslav Government dispatched a note to the American and British Ambassadors in Belgrade stating that it would accept in principle the establishment of Allied military government on the basis of the demarcation line which SACMED's Chief of Staff had

contributed largely to present serious situation. \* \* \*

#### SHARING THE AREA IS PRECLUDED BY YUGOSLAV BEHAVIOR

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 17 May 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 5666]

5. Yugoslav behaviour both in Austria and Venezia Giulia is making a very unfavourable impression on Allied troops both US and British. Our men are obliged to look on without power to intervene whilst actions which offend their traditional sense of justice are committed. Further, our men feel that by taking no action they are condoning such behaviour. As a result feeling against Yugoslavs is now strong and is getting stronger daily.

6. It is now certain that any solution by which we shared an area with Yugoslav troops or Partisans or permitted Yugoslav administration to function would not work.

#### PENDING NEGOTIATIONS A CAUTIOUS SHOW OF FORCE

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 21 May 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 8-A, CCS 739-11]

In connection with the problem of occupying Venezia Giulia and portions of Austria, Marshal Tito's reply to our proposals is unsatisfactory, and he is being urged to reconsider his decision. Meanwhile Field Marshal Alexander is directed, with maximum practicable assistance from General Eisenhower, immediately to reinforce his troops in the disputed areas so that our preponderance of force in those areas and the firmness of our intentions will be clearly apparent to the Yugoslavs. Special precautionary measures will be taken so that an overt act, if any, will be by Tito's forces and will not be based on some local display by a few turbulent individuals.

My views on the proposals of the Yugoslav Government regarding Venezia Giulia are:

1. I could not agree to Yugoslav officers partici-

proposed in Belgrade, subject to certain minor modifications and to certain conditions. This line, known as the Morgan line, would divide the area between the Allies and the Yugoslavs. The above message of SACMED was designed to set forth his own basic requirements which were not to be compromised in the final negotiation.

pating in the Allied Military Government (AMG) of the area but I have no objection to a small mission being attached to headquarters, Eighth Army as observers.

2. I would agree to a Yugoslav regular detachment not exceeding 2000 all ranks occupying an area selected by me west of the Morgan Line. This detachment would be under my orders. To prevent any attempt to requisition local resources, it would be maintained by administrative services. Personnel would not be allowed access to the rest of the area.

3. I am prepared to allow my AMG to "Act through the civil authorities which are already set up in that area." My AMG must be empowered to use whatever civil authority they deem best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion. I would, of course, instruct them to use Yugoslav civil administrators wherever they were functioning satisfactorily.

4. An extra condition should now be made to the effect that the Yugoslavs will return all non-Yugoslav residents in the area whom they have arrested or deported and make restitution of property they have confiscated or removed.

5. The draft agreement which my chief of staff presented to Tito on 8 May [NAF 948, sec. 3, above] is still the basis of army [my] requirements subject to the considerations in 1, 2, 3, and 4 above.

6. I do not either wish or consider it desirable to take over Pola or the line of communication from Trieste to Pola. My requirements are confined to the use of the port of Pola and the anchorages on the west coast of Istria by the Allied Navies.

#### UNTIL THE PEACE TREATY VENEZIA GIULIA WILL BE DIVIDED

[Text of Belgrade Agreement on Venezia Giulia Between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister and the U.S. and British Ambassadors, 9 Jun 45, Dept of State Bull, 1945, p. 1050]

1. The portion of the territory of Venezia Giulia west of a line which includes Trieste, the railways and roads from there to Austria via Gorizia, Caporetto, and Tarvisio, Pola and the anchorages on the west coast of Istria will be under the command and control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. All naval, military, and air forces west of the line will be placed under his command from the moment at which this agreement comes into force. Yugoslav forces in the area must be limited to a detachment of regular troops not exceeding 2,000 of all ranks. These troops will be maintained by the Supreme Allied Commander's ad-

ministrative services. They will occupy a district selected by the Supreme Allied Commander west of the dividing line and will not be allowed access to the rest of the area.

3. Using an Allied Military Government, the Supreme Allied Commander will govern the areas west of the line, Pola and such other areas on the west coast of Istria as he may deem necessary. A small Yugoslav mission may be attached to the Headquarters of the Eighth Army as observers. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily. The Allied Military Government will, however, be empowered to use whatever civil authorities they deem best in any particular place and to change administrative personnel at their discretion.

4. Marshal Tito will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of Venezia Giulia west of the line by (date to be inserted) 1945. Arrangements for the retention of the Yugoslav detachment referred to in paragraph (2) will be worked out between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Yugoslav High Command.

5. Any irregular forces in this area will, according to the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander in each case, either hand in their arms to the Allied Military Authorities and disband, or withdraw from the area.

6. The Yugoslav Government will return residents of the area whom they have arrested or deported with the exception of persons who possessed Yugoslav nationality in 1939, and make restitution of property they have confiscated or removed.

7. This agreement in no way prejudices or affects the ultimate disposal of the parts of Venezia Giulia west of the line. Similarly the military occupation and administration by Yugoslavia of the parts of Venezia Giulia east of the line in no way prejudices or affects the ultimate disposal of that area.

#### A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO MINIMIZE ECONOMIC BIFURCATION OF THE AREA

[App. I of Agreement Between CoS, AFHQ, and the Yugoslav CoS, 20 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207]

1. Since the line of demarcation cuts across existing areas of civil administration and economic activity, it is agreed that mutual arrangements should be arrived at which will ensure a minimum interference with the normal life of Venezia Giulia as a whole. The specific arrangements will have to be the subject of study and negotia-

tion between experts of AMG and of the Yugoslav authorities. The more important subjects to be covered and the principles which it is proposed should govern these discussions are as follows:

(a) *Communications*—Telephone and Telegraph communications will be uncontrolled between the two areas. Mail facilities will be continued.

(b) *Transportation*—Rail communication will be continued. In order to regulate traffic and ensure equitable utilization of equipment, a joint operating committee will be established.

(c) *Commerce and Industry*—Normal economic movement across the line of demarcation is to continue subject only to control sufficient to prevent unauthorized movement of supplies. In order to work out the detailed arrangements for the interchange of power and of industrial, mineral and agricultural resources of both areas, a joint economic committee will be established.

All questions arising under the arrangements now existing between the Yugoslav authorities and industries in AMG area, including question of the continuance of such arrangements and the terms thereof, will be brought before this committee for determination.

It will be the policy to continue all such arrangements as do not prejudice the interests of the territory for which AMG is responsible and to utilize all industrial facilities in the area to the fullest extent in order to meet the needs of Yugoslav and other claimants on these facilities.

No plant or industrial facility will be moved out of Venezia Giulia during the period of this agreement. \* \* \*

#### MACHINERY FOR ECONOMIC COLLABORATION IS NOT A TROJAN HORSE

[Msg, Brig Gen Sir John Harding, GOC, XIII Corps, to AFHQ, 23 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207]

1. The concern expressed in your signal is quite unfounded. I am vigorously applying the Supreme Allied Commander's policy to G-5 as well as other matters and am *not* admitting the Yugoslavs to any participation in AMG activities West of the Morgan line.

2. The setting up of machinery to deal with the many practical problems of administration, particularly on the economic side, is not inconsistent with this policy. It is, in fact, a necessity if economic life in Trieste and the other cities in our zone is not to be paralyzed.

3. We have proposed two agencies or committees to deal with economic matters (a) *Railways*.

If trains are to continue to operate from Trieste into the Yugoslav zone, there must be working arrangements as to schedules, allocations of rolling stock, particularly with a view to insuring the return of rolling stock to AMG area, provision of fuel, priorities of traffic and other like questions.

(b) *Industry and Commerce*. Generally speaking, we control the industries and power of the area while the Yugoslavs have coal which is very important to us. Some group of experts must be convened to work out agreements by which we will, say, permit the contracts which the Yugoslavs have already made in Trieste for ship building to continue to be performed in return for allocation of the Istrian coal production. For each of the above purposes, it is planned to convene small groups of experts of AMG and the Yugoslavs to discuss procedures and negotiate agreements. I have sufficient confidence in the experts which the Allied Commission will be asked to furnish to feel sure that these committees will not operate as Trojan horses for Yugoslav infiltration into AMG. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS DO NOT LIKE THE SETTLEMENT

[ACC Hq, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

8. . . . Allied Military Government was formally set up in Trieste on 12 June and in Gorizia on 14 June.

9. . . . Reaction to . . . settlement of the Venezia Giulia question was not favourable in Italy. The Council of Ministers . . . referred to the agreement as an "unsatisfactory arrangement." The "Globe" pointed out that Italy had "lost" by the terms of the agreement "about half the national production of coal, almost all her bauxite and a good part of her mercury." A one-day general strike took place in Trieste on 26 June but there were no complications and Marshal Tito's latest speech on the possibility of Yugoslavia and Italy living in friendly relations "in an atmosphere of progressive democracy" should serve to clear the air. \* \* \*

#### A POWDER KEG BENEATH A SURFACE OF NORMALITY

[Report by Recent Visitor to Venezia Giulia, in ACC Hq, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

47. Outwardly Trieste does not strike one as being the hot spot or the powder keg of Europe, as it has been variously described. Except when there

is a general strike, a superficial air of normality abounds. The bulk of the population seems to be either in the sea, bathing alongside the Allied troops, or in the trams which take them to and from the beaches. Food does not appear to be very short and flour was being sold on the quaysides from little ships coming in from the coastal towns at 40 to 50 lire per kilo. . . .

48. But that is only on the surface. Underneath there is a complex problem of nationalism and politics, of economic distress and, at any rate in Pola and Monfalcone, the pressing problem of war damage, all of which are producing for the

AMG authorities under XIII Corps one of the most difficult tasks that has faced the Allies in Italy.

49. But one and all are tackling it quietly and efficiently and in the true spirit of AMG's position as trustees in a disputed territory. AMG is dealing with the territory as an administrative case with the one object of establishing good government without fear or favour. There is no doubt that stability is being established: it may probably be upset from time to time by forces beyond control but the effect of impartiality and firm administration is being felt; it can be seen. \* \* \*

## 5. YUGOSLAV SYSTEM REJECTED ON GOOD PRAGMATIC BUT DOUBTFUL LEGAL GROUNDS

### YUGOSLAVS HAVE ESTABLISHED THEIR COMMITTEE SYSTEM TO PERPETUATE THEIR POWER

[XIII Corps Periodical Intelligence Summary No. 3, 11 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/299]

2. On the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and administration from the coastal areas, the situation there will have been considerably modified by over a month of Yugoslav occupation. . . . Their policy has been threefold; first to conscript, to requisition and to control supplies and equipment of all sorts for their military and economic needs; secondly to establish local administrations sponsored by themselves and favourable to Yugoslav claims while at the same time eliminating or driving underground the pro-Italian factions; and thirdly to ensure that the requisite organization to keep alive pro-Slav sentiments survives the ostensible withdrawal of their influence.

4. The establishment of Yugoslav sponsored local authorities was one of the earliest measures adopted by the Yugoslavs. These authorities issue the various decrees by which the life of the people is controlled and thus give an ostensible display of popular self-government which the Yugoslavs presumably hope will survive their withdrawal. Those who serve on the various committees are not necessarily bad characters nor indeed pro-Slav; the elections, which are apparently prearranged rather than spontaneous, have resulted on several occasions in some respected member of the community such as a doctor being nominated contrary to his own wishes. The general impression given by these committees is that they comprise earnest and inexperienced persons,

with some stiffening of the fire brand agitator type. . . .

5. Corresponding to their efforts to establish administrations favourable to themselves, the Yugoslavs have suppressed or driven underground the Italian and autonomist C.L.N.'s which, however, continue propaganda activity. \* \* \*

### YUGOSLAV-DOMINATED ECONOMIC COMMITTEES SEEK TO RETAIN CONTROL

[Memo, CSO, XIII Corps, for SCAO, XIII Corps, 15 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/159/1090]

\* \* \* The Consiglio di Liberazione has seized *control* of supplies, and for the past several weeks has been issuing orders to the duly constituted Italian supply agencies. For example, the Economic Committee of the Consiglio has been dictating ration policy to Sepral, and wished to continue this function. The Petroleum Committee has seized the stocks of AGIP,<sup>10</sup> and it has been announced in the local paper that this committee would distribute POL locally. I have advised both of these committees that for the time being at least, their only capacity will be advisory. It appears to this office that both committees are dominated by Yugoslavs who are motivated by other than purely economic considerations. Indeed, it is more than probable that they are inspired by the political ambitions of Jugoslavia. \* \* \*

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<sup>10</sup>The Italian semigovernmental organization which had charge of the distribution of petroleum in Italy.

AFHQ ASKS IF IT CAN INTERPRET BELGRADE AGREEMENT AS PERMITTING DISCONTINUANCE OF YUGOSLAV SYSTEM

[NAF 1023, AFHQ to CCS, 25 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/207, MC-OUT 7853]

1. During Trieste conferences difference developed with Yugoslavs over interpretation Para 3, Belgrade agreement [Section 4, above] regarding continuance Civil Administration. Yugoslavs submitted memorandum containing proposals not acceptable to U.S. Memorandum and our comments attached to agreement forwarded to you. In view expressed attitude Yugoslavs, radio broadcasts of last few days and declaration local Slovene groups, desire confirmation our interpretation as basis for possible further discussion or action.

2. Para 3, Belgrade agreement provides that use will be made of any Yugoslav Civil Administration which is already set up and which in the view of the Supreme Allied Commander is working satisfactorily.

3. Present status of Civil Administration in our area is generally as follows:

Italian administration is functioning in part but has in part been suspended by Yugoslav action during the period of their occupation. The Prefecture staff is still on the payroll but has been relieved of any executive responsibility. Organizations such as Genio Civile, Sepral and the Consorzio are still functioning executively with Yugoslavs appointed chiefs. In place of the Prefecture staff the Yugoslavs have set up committees of liberation with sub-committees having jurisdiction in various administrative fields which up to the present have been exercising executive powers. This pattern has been followed down through the district and communal level with the regional committee exercising executive control over the whole area. Obviously, this Yugoslav committee administration is not completely or finally organized but it was the machinery which was functioning on the date of our occupation. The Yugoslavs are taking the position that the Belgrade agreement commits us to adopt this committee structure as the "existing administration."

4. We have maintained that inasmuch as the basic law of this area is and must continue to be Italian the Italian administrative system must in its essentials be continued; that it was the intention of the agreement that our commitment to continue existing administration related to per-

sonnel rather than to the system of administration itself; and that the committee system as an executive instrument of local government cannot be recognized but that committees where useful will be employed in an advisory capacity as in other parts of Italy.

5. We are convinced that above position is the proper one and the only one we can take as practical matter. Some color may be given to Yugoslav claim by wording of Para 3. You will recall that the draft which we submitted read "administrators" in place of "administration." Had this wording appeared in final agreement the position would have been perfectly clear.<sup>11</sup> We of course have in mind the qualification that the administration must in view of SAC be working satisfactorily. However we do not believe we should rely on this as we might then have the wholly anomalous situation of a committee form of government in one commune and the Italian system functioning in the adjacent locality. This would obviously be unworkable in practice.

6. Request confirmation that our interpretation is correct and any further guidance you may wish to give us.

AFHQ DIRECTS THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVERT TO AN ITALIAN MODEL

[Directive, AFHQ to Hq Eighth Army, 26 Jun 45,<sup>12</sup> ACC files, 10000/109/207]

3. *Attitude Toward Claimant Nations:* No steps will be taken which support or may appear to support or prepare for any ultimate disposition of the area to any claimant nation.

4. *Control of Line of Demarcation:* The artificial "Frontier" created by the line of demarcation [see Belgrade Agreement, Section 4, above] will not be a closed frontier. Only such controls as may from time to time be deemed necessary by you or as may be agreed with the Yugoslav authorities will be imposed.

5. *Local Government:* The local government through which you will administer the area will be based on the Italian administrative system which existed and was in effect on 8 September 1943. It is not necessary, however, that all offices and appointments be filled. You may also, if for

<sup>11</sup> Some in the theater felt that the use of the word "Administration" in the agreement made the Yugoslav legal position correct.

<sup>12</sup> Eighth Army embraced XIII Corps, the organization directly responsible for administration of Venezia Giulia.

administrative reasons it appears expedient to do so, make adjustments and modifications in the foregoing administrative system, so long as its essential structure is not changed. You will administer the area as a separate region, under your command but subject to the technical control of the Allied Commission. No civilian government official will be permitted to refer to or obtain instruction from authorities outside the area.

6. *Appointment of Officers:*

a. The appointment of prefects and all officials will be vested in Allied Military Government. You will utilize whatever civil authorities you deem best in any particular place and administrative personnel will be changed at your discretion. Subject to the above, use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which you find on entry to be already set up and which in your view is working satisfactorily. In interpreting the term "civil administration" you should consider that the term relates to personnel employed rather than the system of administration itself.

b. If you decide that it is impracticable to administer through local authorities you will resort to direct administration, calling for advice from local committees to be selected by you.

7. *Legal:*

a. The laws of the territory as established and in effect on 8 September 1943 will remain in force. All Republican Fascist legislation as well as any Yugoslav legislation will be abrogated. Italian decrees promulgated since 8 September 1943 will not be implemented. When necessary Allied Military Government orders will be issued, covering the subject matter of any such decrees.

b. You will suspend the right of appeal to Rome from decisions of the Court of Appeals in Trieste.

c. In particular, any Peoples' Court now functioning in the area will not be permitted to continue. Active Fascists, Nazis, their supporters and collaborationists will be interned pending further instructions. Local boards may be employed to advise you in this connection. You will receive a further directive on this subject in the near future.

8. *Police:* You will maintain and strengthen whatever police force is found to be functioning satisfactorily on your arrival. Carabinieri will not be introduced but may be used where found. If existing police organizations are inadequate you may in your discretion establish new organiza-

tions for the purpose. Patriots may be temporarily employed as auxiliary police at your discretion but you will effect complete disarmament as soon as practicable. The Questura system will be reinstated after the purgation of Fascist elements.

9. *Finance:*

a. Allied Military Lire and the metropolitan lire will be the only currencies accorded the status of legal tender. No other currencies will be recognized. You will use Allied Military Lire in preference to metropolitan lire wherever possible.

b. No exchange rate will be decreed other than that for the lire in relation to the dollar and pound sterling. \* \* \*

CURRENT ITALIAN LEGISLATION WILL NOT BE INTRODUCED

[Directive, Hq AC to Col Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, 3 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/495]

1. In order to avoid the appearance of introducing into Venezia Giulia current legislation passed by the Italian Government, the policy of implementing Italian Governmental and Ministerial Decrees will not be adopted in this region.

Effective legislation will therefore consist of the Proclamations of the Supreme Allied Commander and Military Governor, supplemented by such Regional or Provincial Orders as may be required.

The General Orders issued by AMG, either before or after the date of this directive will not be put into operation in Venezia Giulia as General Orders, but where applicable should be reissued as Regional Orders.

2. The absence of the Italian legislation leaves certain gaps in the legislation required for the administration of the territory and will necessitate the issue of additional Regional Orders. \* \* \*

THE PURPOSE OF THE TRUSTEESHIP CALLS FOR AN ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICE FORCE

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 18 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/105/495, CM-OUT 5051]

A special Civil Police Force of high quality is urgently required for that part of Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line. Based upon the assumption that we are holding Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line in trust for ultimate disposition at the peace table and that we should direct our action so as not to prejudice eventual delivery to either claimant, then it is believed that

this Police Force should be equipped, maintained, administered and commanded as a combined U.S.-UK commitment exercised through the military chain of command. Accordingly, approval is requested to equip and maintain a special Civil Police Force of approximately 3,500 as a combined commitment with the responsibility for providing necessary equipment and supplies to be agreed within the Theater on an equitable basis.

#### THE PRINCIPLE OF TRUSTEESHIP AND ITS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS

[Proposed Supplementary Directive, AFHQ to Hq XIII Corps and Hq AC, 29 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/159/1859]

3. The guiding principle is that laid down in paragraph 3 of the Directive:

No steps will be taken which support or may appear to support or prepare for any ultimate disposition of the area to any claimant nation.

The application of this principle involves certain modifications in the established interpretation of the words "technical control." These are considered below.

##### 4. *Political*

It is implicit in the principle quoted in paragraph 3 above that political guidance for this area should be laid down by AFHQ; subject to the condition that, when Italian interests are involved in any decision which may have long-term repercussions, Allied Commission should be consulted in order to represent the Italian case.

Commander XIII Corps is responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander for the Military Government of the Region. SCAO Venezia Giulia will be his principal staff officer and adviser in all matters pertaining to the discharge of these responsibilities. For technical and routine matters the SCAO will be responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and will deal with him under the general direction of Commander, XIII Corps.

##### 5. *Public Safety*

The recruitment, training and maintenance of the Venezia Giulia Police Force will be a joint Allied responsibility. Political considerations make it essential that it shall show no overt connection with Italian personnel or methods; Allied Commission will therefore have no responsibility in regard to this, except that AFHQ may call on Allied Commission for technical advice as to matters of policy, the operation of the Questura system, etc., and Allied Commission

may be requested to supply certain Public Safety Officers. \* \* \*

#### WHY IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO CONTINUE THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM

[Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 25 Aug 45, AFHQ files, MC-OUT 7196]

1. Reference is to following papers, paraphrases of which have reached this Hq through political advisers:

A. Yugoslav government note of 18 July to U.S. Government protesting against Allied failure to observe Para 3 of Belgrade agreement and in particular at reinstatement of Italian laws and administrative system in effect on 8 September 1943, at elimination of civil administration set up by national committees, peoples' courts and national militia, and at restraints placed on departmental National Liberation Committee and its agencies;

B. Letters of 26 July from Marshal Tito and Dr. [Ivan] Subasic [Subasic] to President Truman and Mr. Churchill, proposing that the population of Allied occupied Venezia Giulia should be permitted to elect an administration of its own choosing which would function in close collaboration with AMG.

2. SACMED's interpretation of Para 3 of Belgrade Agreement, was set out in NAF 1023 [CM-IN 7853, 25 June 1945, above].

Following is interpretation of Par 4 of NAF 1023:

A. Even prior to the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, considerable experience was gained of the so-called Yugoslav administrative machinery as Allied troops were in occupation of part of the area side by side with Yugoslav troops. After establishment of AMG, the peoples' courts, the national militia, Slovene civil agencies and departmental liberation committees or councils were eliminated one by one as incapable of functioning in practice. It is emphasized that no other course was possible if the area was to be administered impartially. Use, however, has been made where possible of Slovene and other officials appointed by the Yugoslavs. Liberation committees and councils still exist but are regarded as advisory only and not a part of the government.

B. Venezia Giulia was part of Metropolitan Italy from 1918-1943. Adoption of basic Italian civil law, with provision for elimination of Fascist elements and other changes required by military necessity was, therefore, considered to be in accordance with international law and normal military government functions. Regard-

less of any other considerations, it was and is necessary to make use of Allied commission machinery and personnel for expert advice and to conduct the day-to-day functions of military government in the area. It is unworkable and impracticable to operate a system of government which is quite different from that which is being operated in the remainder of Italy.

4. Reinstatement of basic Italian civil law was number one, which is criticised in Yugoslav note of 18th July. Proclamation accordingly promulgated in AMG proclamation specifically provided for elimination of Fascist agencies and doctrines.

5. Yugoslav note of 26 July contains suggestion that area occupied by the Allied Forces should be regarded as having been "liberated" from both German and Italian authority and that national elections should be held to choose government which will "collaborate" with AMG. This might well result in a lack of control incompatible with Allied military responsibility. \* \* \*

## 6. AMG GETS LOCAL GOVERNMENT GOING BY INDIRECTION

### AMONG OTHER COMPLICATIONS THERE ARE BOTH ITALIAN AND SLOVENE FIRE SERVICES

[Min of SCAO's Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 10 Jul 45, Reel 3169, MGF files, Venezia Giulia, 10 Jul 45-24 Jun 46]

\* \* \* Lt Col Armstrong, Area Commissioner for Trieste, reported that he had endeavored to bring various political groups together at a meeting on Monday, 9 July, for the purpose of reaching an agreement as to the formation of a joint committee for the purpose of submitting recommendations as to the reestablishment of local government but that his efforts has been unsuccessful due to the opposition of the Slovene Committee. He did expect, however, to get the Slovene Committee to participate. Further he was having difficulty in removing the Slovene Commissioner from offices he had established during the Yugoslav occupation, but pressure was being brought to bear to securing the premises concerned. . . .

Lt Col [A. G.] Simson, Area Commissioner for Gorizia, reported that he had discovered the best procedure in handling Slovene and Italian Committees was to direct them to settle, through joint action, by themselves, all details pertaining to the problems arising as a result of the occupation; that the Committees had agreed to a form

### THE CCS APPROVES INTRODUCTION OF ITALIAN SYSTEM BUT DIRECTS TACTFUL EXPEDIENTS

[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 Aug 45, ABC files, 387-4, Italy, sec. 8-B, CCS 739/23]

1. . . . You should continue to press home with the Yugoslavs the position that Allied Military Government will take no action which will prejudice the position of either of the disputing parties and that during Allied period of trusteeship the laws applicable in the territory will be Italian laws purged of all Fascist measures and supplemented by Allied Military Government proclamations and orders.

2. You should as far as possible administer the area on following lines: Yugoslav system of national committees should in general be discontinued in whole area and Italian system reinstalled. In predominantly Yugoslav towns and villages, token Yugoslav administration might be retained and national committee used in advisory capacity.

of local government within the outline of the plan which he had given them. That problems had arisen with regards to fire service. The Slovenes had matched an existing Italian Fire Service and both services were at present in operation subject to an order from him that casualties would not be replaced until the total number of firemen had been reduced to the original figure, which in effect would permit an amalgamation at a reasonable number. \* \* \*

[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

1. SCAO expressed the opinion that efforts of AMG were not receiving the willing cooperation and understanding of the people and that the time is approaching when our policy must be applied in a stronger manner. \* \* \*

[Col Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

#### 2. Local Government

In Trieste discussions have been held with the object of setting up some form of representative local government on the Area Level. . . . In the Communes some reorganization progress has been successfully accomplished. The City of Tri-

este had, of course, a special problem in the City "Council" of liberation whose leading personalities are extreme Communists (predominantly Slovenes) and would appear (though of course they deny this) to be predominantly pro-Yugoslavia. This Committee claims to, but does not in fact, carry on the government of the City and is generally uncooperative in its dealings with the Allied Military Government. . . . Steps are being taken toward the removal of . . . Yugoslav officials who hold high positions in the Harbor offices at Trieste and Monfalcone at the moment. \* \* \*

#### AMG GROPEs TOWARD A PLAN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

[Min of SCAO's Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

\* \* \* Col Henry S. Robertson stated that he and the Area Commissioners now have a firmer grip of the situation and that the main problems will be:

- a. Introduction of Local Govt System to be as tactful as possible.
- b. Appointment of Officials as fairly as possible, in proportion to population,
- c. Modifications and adjustments to convert from the Italian Govt based on Province to present area formations.
- d. Discouraging use of the term "fascist" to Italians in a general way.<sup>13</sup>

Local Italian Govt system had only two levels, and the Yugoslavs instituted four levels—Regional, District, Sub-district and Communal. We must intermix these four levels. It is obvious that the Regional level of government must be done away with due to Yugoslav influence on that level. All Chiefs of Divisions are asked not to deal with any bodies on a regional level. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNORS DON'T LOSE THEIR HEADS OVER DEMONSTRATIONS

[Min of Mtg at Hq, AMG, XIII Corps, 28 Jul 45]

\* \* \* I. . . . Re the demonstrations held in the area from time to time—SCAO expressed the opinion that they were more welcome than strikes as long as they were orderly and without incident. AMG permission is still necessary for public gathering or demonstrations, but insofar as possible such permission should be granted in a liberal manner. \* \* \*

<sup>13</sup> The Yugoslavs tended to call all non-Communist Italians "Fascists."

[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 1 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/109/320]

\* \* \* [Colonel Bowman, SCAO:] Two petitions are being circulated in the occupied territory—one enrolling members in the Communist Party; the other calling for the annexation of this area to Yugoslavia. The circulating of these petitions as such need not be stopped, but any attempts to obtain signatures by violence, threats of violence, or other forms of duress constitutes an offence, and persons guilty of such action should be apprehended wherever possible. \* \* \*

#### A UNIQUE AMG POLICE FORCE FOR A UNIQUE SITUATION

[XII Corps Admin Instrs 12, 5 Aug 45, AFHQ K-310A, CAO files, 209/7/6, vol. 1]

2. This Police Force is specially constituted to meet the particular conditions obtaining in the Allied occupation of Venezia Giulia. It is composed of both Allied military and local civilian recruited police and has been formed from the following:

- (a) From certain United States and British Army formation Provost units
- (b) Specially selected personnel from US and British non-Provost units
- (c) Specially enlisted civil personnel.

3. The Force will, within the Allied occupied area of Venezia Giulia, exercise all these police functions formerly performed by:

- (a) Formation Military Police
- (b) The Civil Police Force in existence before the Allied occupation.

The Military Police component will be responsible for both Military and Civil Police functions. The Civil Police component will be concerned with Civil Police matters only. \* \* \*

#### ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

[GO 11, Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, 11 Aug 45,<sup>14</sup> AMG Gazette No. 1]

<sup>14</sup> General Order No. 11 is an interesting example of the development of an important plan on the spot rather than at higher headquarters. Colonel Bowman found no precise solution to the problem of local government in the broad directives which had been issued, and he secured approval for a plan of his own evolved in the light of his investigation of the area and conferences with many persons therein. The "Area" was an artificial geographical unit which was superimposed on the territory in disregard of the "Region" on which the Yugoslavs had based their system of committees. It comprised more than the communes of Trieste and Gorizia proper. The Area was a counterpart of the Italian province, with certain admin-

## SECTION 1

### *Organ of Local Government*

1. The occupied Territory, for purposes of local government, is divided into the Areas of Trieste and Gorizia and into the Commune of Pola, each of which shall be composed of the Communes and fractions thereof as presently constituted.

2. Each Area shall have an Area President and Area Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

3. Each Commune shall have a Communal President and Communal Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

4. Each Area and Commune shall have such administrative and executive departments and agencies as the Allied Military Government may deem necessary for the proper carrying out of the functions of local government.

## SECTION 2

### *Area President*

1. The Area President shall be appointed and be removed by the Allied Military Government.

2. He shall be directly responsible to the Allied Military Government for the local government of the Area and shall submit all orders and decrees for its prior approval.

3. He shall be the executive and administrative head of the Area local government and shall be subject to the provisions of this General Order and all further orders which may hereafter be made by the Allied Military Government and shall possess, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Prefect of a Province and of such Provincial and Prefectural legislative, administrative and executive bodies as are conferred by the Occupied Territory in effect on 8 Sept 1943 and by any proclamation or other order of the Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territory which may change or supersede such laws.

## SECTION 3

### *Area Administrative Departments*

1. Allied Military Government shall establish such departments, divisions or agencies in the Area President's Office as may be necessary for the proper local government of the Area. \* \* \*

## SECTION 4

### *Area Council*

1. An Area Council shall be composed of a Chairman plus the following number of members for each of the Areas specified:

istrative modifications. Thus AMG did, as far as possible, conform to the directive calling for use of the essentials of the Italian system.

## Area of Trieste-17 Members

## Area of Gorizia-14 Members

all of whom shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

2. Consideration shall be given to the selection of the Chairman and Members from the leading citizens of the Area of the highest moral and political probity who shall be as far as possible, representative of all racial, political and economic groups and classes in the Area according to their respective local strength. \* \* \*

6. An Area Council shall act as an advisory and consultative body to the Area President in all matters concerning the local government of the Area referred to it by the Area President and by the latter to the Area Commissioner of A.M.G. within two days after the meeting to which it related.

## SECTION 5

### *Heads of the Communal Government*

1. The Head of a Commune shall be styled Communal President.

2. He shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

3. He shall possess in his Commune, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Mayor of a Commune and of such Communal administrative, legislative and executive bodies as are conferred by the laws referred to in Section 1, subsection (3) hereof, and shall be subject to such supervision and control by the Area President as may be provided by the said laws. The Communal President of the Commune of Pola shall, in addition to his other powers, possess all of the powers and duties of an Area President as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 2 of this General Order.

## SECTION 10<sup>15</sup>

### *Other Committees*

No committee, council or group other than those herein created and provided for, except those previously constituted by a Proclamation or Order of the Allied Military Government, shall possess any of the administrative, legislative, executive or other powers of government.

## SECTION 11

### *Control of Allied Military Government*

1. Allied Military Government is the only government in those parts of Venezia Giulia occupied by the Allied Forces and is the only authority empowered to issue orders and decrees and

<sup>15</sup> Section 10 was inserted in order to provide a legal basis for disregarding the "enactments" of the Slovene committees which had been set up before the occupation.

to make appointment to public or other office.

All of the local government bodies created by and referred to in this order shall at all times be under the direct control and supervision of the Allied Military Government.

2. The Chairman and Members of the Area and Communal Councils and District Committees shall be unpaid. Salaries of all other officials shall be determined by the Allied Military Government. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS WELCOME ORDER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUT SLOVENES ARE FURIOUS

[Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

##### 2. Local Government

The chief events of the month have centered around the publication of General Order No. 11. The Order was published on the 11 August both in the local papers and by posters.

As had been anticipated, the order was received with satisfaction, if not enthusiasm, by the Italian element, and has been rejected by the pro-Tito Slovenes and the pro-Tito Italian Communists.

The Slovenes reacted immediately with demonstrations, petitions, delegations, letters, and articles in the local Slovene and Communist papers.

The reaction, however, was not as violent as at first had been expected, and vocal reaction died down as quickly as it arose.

There is little doubt that the "average" Slovenes would be quite prepared to cooperate . . . but are afraid to do so because they have received instructions from the Regional National Liberation Committee not to submit candidates as officials or members of the different councils. \* \* \*

. . . There is every reason to believe that this Committee receives its orders from Belgrade or some higher authority on the other side of the demarcation line.

It is interesting to note that in Gorizia Area the present Acting President, a Slovene, has told the Area Commissioner that he is sorry he cannot cooperate but that he is a party man and must obey party orders. . . .

. . . The President [of the Regional National Liberation Committee] was given a week in which to make up his mind as to whether his Committee would cooperate . . . or continue in their policy of non-cooperation which will mean, of course, that the Slovene party and the Italian Communist pro-Slovene party would not be represented in any of the different offices of local government.

The attitude of the Regional National Liberation Council can be summed up as follows:

"We will willingly cooperate if the Allied Military Government will govern in accordance with our views and through our institutions, but we will not cooperate otherwise, as any other form of government is considered to be Fascist and non-democratic." \* \* \*

#### WHERE SLOVENE NOMINATIONS ARE NOT FORTHCOMING AMG WILL MAKE APPOINTMENTS REGARDLESS

[Min of Mtg at AMG Hq, XIII Corps, 1 Sep 45]

##### 2. Local Government Committee (Col Robertson)

It is believed we have arrived at the stage where fruitless discussions must cease and action must be taken by Allied Military Government to appoint the necessary officials to implement Local Government General Order No. 11. As a result of discussion with Mr. France Bevk, President of CLN, it was learned that he was sending instructions to opposition elements to oppose the Local Government General Order, but he stated he accepted full responsibility for this opposition, and claimed to receive no orders from "across the line." President is ready for appointment in Gorizia Area, but says he is under orders not to accept the position.

SCAO stated that he had replied to formal note of protest from CLN to our General Order No. 11, and once more requested them to cooperate and make recommendations and nominations to Allied Military Government authorities. If this "passive resistance" continues until next Saturday, 8 September, we will go ahead without recommendations. Meanwhile, we must continue to exercise patience and make repeated offers to consider nominations. \* \* \*

[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 8 Sep 45, Reel 3167, MGD files]

##### 2. Local Government Committee (Col Robertson)

Conference yesterday with Mr. Bevk, President of the Consiglio di Liberazioni di Trieste ("Italo-Slovene") failed to produce any cooperation from that quarter. We are now going ahead with appointment of officials and formation of councils without recommendations from this advisory Committee. In those villages which are completely Slovene, CAO's will have to carry on for a time and await developments. An opening was still left to Mr. Bevk in that we said we might reshuffle our councils later on if his constituents changed their minds and decided to cooperate.

SCAO stated that we might have to resort to direct Military Government in some places, but this would be delayed, and avoided if possible; such an administration would be instituted only if we are unable to obtain local civilian officials. \* \* \*

#### BUT THE ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE FORCED

[Min of Mtg at Hq AMG, XIII Corps, 8 Sep 45]

#### 3. Lt Col Armstrong, Area Commissioner for Trieste Area

In the Cesana area it will be quite impossible to implement Local Government General Order No. 11 in any way. The community is predominantly Slovene and if we try to introduce a Communal Council as such, all civil officials will quit and no one will be available to perform their duties. It is believed this situation will also prevail in four Slovene Communes in the Monfalcone district.

SCAO remarked that while we shall eventually have to comply with the letter as well as the spirit . . . of our directives, it is assumed that higher headquarters do not want us to force this issue too precipitately. General Order No. 11, wherever it can, will be implemented now and we shall force the errant children into the mold later. Our first job is to keep the peace and feed the people. \* \* \*

#### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS MAKING PROGRESS

[Bowman, SCAO, XIII Corps, Rpt for Sep 45, p. 2, ACC files, 10000/109/472]

\* \* \* The situation at the end of the month was as follows:

(a) All three Areas have Area Presidents and Councils functioning in accordance with General Order No. 11.

(b) Eighteen out of the thirty-seven Communes have Commune Presidents and councils functioning in accordance with General Order No. 11.

(c) Nineteen Communes have refused to nominate any officials and are either operating under the local CAO or have retained their original Committees which are operating under the supervision of the local CAO.

(d) The nineteen Communes which come under the heading of (c) above, represent approximately only 15% of the population of occupied Venezia Giulia. In fact no Commune with a population over 10,000 comes under this heading. . . . It is interesting to note that amongst the nineteen Communes which are refusing to

cooperate there are four Communes whose populations are over 90% Italian. In each case the people of these Communes are either extremely Communistic or completely overawed by the Communist elements. \* \* \*

#### FOOD AND POLITICS

[Memo, Lt Gen Sir John Harding, CG, XIII Corps, for G-5, AFHQ, 14 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/159/800]

1. The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, 13 Corps has represented that there should be an increase in the ration of the civil population in his area. . . .

2. The S.C.A.O.'s reasons for proposing an increase . . . may be summarized as follows:

a. Strong influences are at work in an attempt to discredit the military government of Venezia Giulia. A shortage of food would almost certainly be exploited in this connection and would be likely to lead to grave disorders.

b. The Chief Public Health Officer reports that the present ration is utterly insufficient to maintain health when it can no longer be supplemented by fruit and vegetables.

c. Venezia Giulia suffers under certain disadvantages inherent in its present autonomy in that it is economically weakened by the Morgan line and that only an unimportant quantity of food does, in practice, come in from the remainder of Italy. It is therefore likely to be less well fed than its neighbours in Jugo-Slavia and the remainder of Italy.

3. It is requested that the situation should be examined as a matter of urgency and that, if the ration is found, as stated by the Chief Public Health Officer, to be inadequate, an increased ration be authorised in view of the important political implications outlined above.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> On 29 September G-5, AFHQ, disapproved the request on the ground that the Allies could not establish a higher ration in Venezia Giulia than elsewhere in Italy without incurring the charge of unfairness from Italians. However, G-5 directed AC to take measures to put an end to the interferences with the normal flow of supplies from metropolitan Italy to Yugoslavia. (Komer, *op. cit.*, II, 309.) While the problem continued to be serious, in general the authorities in Northern Italy co-operated well, and economic incentives were sufficient to induce both Italians and Yugoslavs to provide much extra-ration food. Nor did the supply of imported rationed food ever completely fail during the occupation, although certain emergencies compelled AMG to appeal to AFHQ, and on occasion it was necessary to reroute a ship at the last critical moment or to borrow against future deliveries from Peninsular Base Section or from 88th Division, the American garrison. Serious poverty in the area, which might well have resulted from disruption of the normal channels of trade, was prevented by an extensive public works program financed in Italian lire through the Bank of Italy.

## SLOVENES WILL FOR THE MOST PART NOT WORK WITH ITALIANS

[Remarks, Armstrong, Area Cmsr for Trieste, in Min of Mtg at Hq, AMG, XIII Corps, 21 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/109/321]

\* \* \* In those communes where communal councils have been appointed, Local Government is functioning satisfactorily. Where direct rule has been implemented the CAO's are doing excellent work, in spite of many difficulties. It may soon be possible to appoint a communal council at Aurisina where there is a predominantly Slovene population (approximately 80%).

The members of such councils will of course be pro-Yugoslav but, although they object to making contact with the "fascist" officials at Provincial Headquarters [Italians], they seem willing to cooperate with Allied Military Government. This situation can be overcome by getting CAO's to act as "go betweens" until there is a change of heart. As a matter of experience they will eventually start doing business in the normal way.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> By and large, attempts to secure Slovene representatives for the communal councils proved unsuccessful, owing to the fear of retaliation against Slovenes guilty of "collaboration."

## 7. WE EXPECT RELEASE IN SEVEN MONTHS BUT MUST STAY SEVEN YEARS

### MOST OF VENEZIA GIULIA IS GIVEN TO YUGOSLAVIA BUT THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE IS CREATED<sup>18</sup>

[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, 10 February 1947, Dept of State Publication 2743, European Series 21, Annex VI, pp. 60-61]

#### *Article 2. Integrity and Independence*

The integrity and independence of the Free Territory shall be assured by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. This responsibility implies that the Council shall:

- (a) ensure the observance of the present Statute and in particular the protection of the basic human rights of the inhabitants.
- (b) ensure the maintenance of public order and security in the Free Territory.

#### *Article 3. Demilitarization and Neutrality*

1. The Free Territory shall be demilitarized and declared neutral.

#### *Article 9. Organs of Government*

For the government of the Free Territory there shall be a Governor, a Council of Government, a popular Assembly elected by the people of the Free Territory and a Judiciary, whose respective powers shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute and of the Constitution of the Free Territory.

<sup>18</sup> Annex VIII of the Peace Treaty provided for creation of the Free Port of Trieste, wherein all nations would enjoy freedom of transit and be exempt from customs charges.

#### *Article 11. Appointment of the Governor*

The Governor shall be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy. He shall not be a citizen of Yugoslavia or Italy or of the Free Territory. He shall be appointed for five years and may be reappointed. His salary and allowances shall be borne by the United Nations. \* \* \*

#### OCCUPATION FORCES TO WITHDRAW WITHIN 45 DAYS AFTER GOVERNOR ASSUMES OFFICE

[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, Italy, 10 Feb 47, Dept of State 2743, European Series 21, Annex VII, pp. 71-72]

The present provisions shall apply to the administration of the Free Territory of Trieste pending the coming into force of the Permanent Statute.

#### *Article 1*

The Governor shall assume office in the Free Territory at the earliest possible moment after the coming into force of the present Treaty. Pending assumption of office by the Governor, the Free Territory shall continue to be administered by the Allied military commands within their respective zones.

#### *Article 5*

(a) From the coming into force of the present Treaty, troops stationed in the Free Territory shall not exceed 5,000 men for the United Kingdom, 5,000 men for the United States of America and 5,000 men for Yugoslavia.

(b) These troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor for a period of 90 days after his

assumption of office in the Free Territory. As from the end of that period, they will cease to be at the disposal of the Governor and will be withdrawn from the Territory within a further period of 45 days, unless the Governor advises the Security Council that, in the interests of the Territory, some or all of them should not, in his view, be withdrawn. \* \* \*

#### THIS PURELY POLITICAL SOLUTION MIGHT WORK BUT—

[Bowman, SCAO, Venezia Giulia, Rpt for Feb 47, Reel 3167, MGD files]

At long last, on 10 February 1947, in Paris, the Treaty of Peace with Italy was signed, as a result of which the Free Territory of Trieste will, after ratification, come into existence.

As far as the world is concerned, the Trieste problem has been solved. Only those who understand the real implications of Annex VII of this Treaty, an avowedly political and ideological solution to a largely economic problem, are uneasy, shaking their heads, saying: "Well, there it is! It *may* work, but. . . . At any rate, we've got to try."

One could be much more optimistic about the future if both pro-Italians and pro-Yugoslav were determined to make the best of the business. Unfortunately neither group is in the least satisfied. Foreign Minister Stanoye Simic, who signed for Yugoslavia, later publicly proclaimed: "The signature of the Italian Peace Treaty does not mean that Yugoslavia gives up her claims to territories which are ethnically a part of our country. Yugoslavia will not cease to claim her rights to these territories." The Italian plenipotentiary, Sig. Lupi di Soragna, signed in silence, but later, about 26 February, following a two weeks debate on the new Government programme, the Italian Constituent Assembly resolved to serve notice on the United Nations Assembly that it would consider the Peace Treaty invalid without ratification by it (the Assembly)—a decision which was immediately followed by a vote of confidence in Sig. [Alcide] De Gasperi's new Government. \* \* \*

The exodus from Pola continues. Anti-Tito Slovenes are still trekking westwards to a country which will probably be a little less unsympathetic to them than that which they are fleeing.

These are the losers, who can do nothing but cut their losses and go. There are, of course, winners too. Already in Gorizia, pro-Slav—and even strictly impartial—Italians are being forced by intimidating letters from various exuberant Italian bodies to pack up and leave. In Monfalcone, the Italians are for the moment on top and busily repaying in kind past outrages by the pro-Slavs. It is only reasonable, however disheartening, to suppose that this "paying-off" of old scores will continue for some time to come, and it can only be hoped that the common frontier between Yugoslavia and Italy will not be the storm-centre it shows at present every sign of becoming. \* \* \*

#### U.S. RESPONSIBILITY IN VENEZIA GIULIA BECOMES EVEN HEAVIER

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 17 Jul 47, AFHQ files, MC-IN 595]

\* \* \* 1. The agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States concerning supply of civilian relief ended 30 June 1947. The United States has been informed by the United Kingdom that it can no longer contribute to the financing of these supplies but that it will still take part in the administration of the areas and in the distribution of the supplies which the United States furnishes.

2. After 30 June 1947 relief supplies will be provided by the United States and bought with funds which have been appropriated for relief assistance to the population of war-devastated countries in accordance with the authorization of Public Law 84-80th Congress.<sup>19</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>19</sup> The Free Territory of Trieste from the outset was a bone of contention in international politics and it did not even prove possible for the U.N. Security Council to agree upon a governor. The Allied Powers and Italy long found themselves at odds on every issue with Yugoslavia, which was supported, until the deterioration of relations between the two communist powers, by the Soviet Union. When it became clear that the original plan would not work, the United States and Great Britain sought unsuccessfully to obtain agreement for the return of the Free Territory to Italy. Finally, on 5 October 1954, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, and Yugoslavia signed an agreement whereby Zone B (garrisoned by the Yugoslav troops) and a small section of Zone A (the Anglo-American zone) were ceded to Yugoslavia, and the remainder of Zone A, including the city of Trieste, was given to Italy.

## Interdependence Precludes an Easy Way Out

The posthostilities occupation of Italy lasted more than two and a half years—longer than the military campaign itself. No one, least of all the military commanders, foresaw or desired that the Allies would be forced to delay their exit so long. The explanation of the delay involves a factor more political than military. Clearly, it was impossible for the Allies to withdraw from Italy until the victors had agreed among themselves on the terms of peace. It is also clear that by the end of the war both the United States and Great Britain had a keen sense of what Assistant Secretary of War McCloy termed “a long-term interest” in Italy, or a recognition of interdependence between Italy and the Allies in the now emerging conflict between the West and the police states. This development made it seem inadvisable to agree forthwith to the very severe terms which both the Soviet and Yugoslavia soon showed it was their intention to impose upon Italy. Not to have tried hard and long to mitigate the severity would have alienated Italy. To be sure, as regards the main issue, the disposition of Venezia Giulia, the Yugoslavs had the upper hand by reason of already occupying much of the area with not unformidable military resources. But the Italians, keenly sensitive in their national pride and desire for equitable treatment, felt that they had done too much for the Allied war effort to be

dealt with at the peace settlement as an enemy country. Not only was it evident that such treatment would alienate them from the Allies, it would also, though quite illogically, make the Italians susceptible to the contention by radical politicians that they would henceforth have more to gain if they aligned themselves with the very countries which had made the harshest demands. Prospects for the success of such appeals were further increased by the bitter experience of the preceding years, which had not only fertilized the soil of Italy for the growth of communism but had already brought it extensively into being.

Such, then, were the serious difficulties confronting the Allies when they began the first of their abortive peace conferences with the other major belligerents, a few months after the end of hostilities. But one must go on to note that the Allies themselves seem to have contributed to the coming into existence of these difficulties by wartime decisions which served immediate expediency rather than long-term Allied or Italian interests. The need for a long-term Allied policy toward Italy was the theme of a lengthy memorandum by the Chief Commissioner of ACC, which he circulated, shortly after the fighting ceased, for the purpose of evoking announcement on high levels of the content of such policy. Admiral Stone's main contention was that while the Allies' long-term interest lay in active aid to Italy to

prevent its communist orientation, no long-term policy toward Italy had as yet been either acted upon or formulated. He did not attempt to illustrate this by references to the past, but had not diplomacy forbidden, he could have pointed out that in several crucial issues Allied authorities had gone counter to the advice of AC as to long-term interest, with consequences which had led to the difficulties of the current situation. If Yugoslavia already had a broad foothold in Venezia Giulia it was because the Allies had decided at the last moment to avoid a military showdown with Tito and had thus sacrificed the political principle of negotiated boundaries which AC favored. If Italian national pride was now so injured that it had unreasonable expectations of the Allies at the peace conference, it was largely because the Allies had not, as AC and the Americans suggested, included in the New Policy, as replacement of the harsh Armistice, a preliminary peace treaty which would both have appeased Italian pride and given the Italians the sense of being more on their own. If the extreme left parties now had the ear of the masses, it was partly because the Allies, despite AC warnings about communist leadership of the Northern CLNAI, had allowed SACMED to enter into a virtual alliance with the committee, thereby forcing the Government itself to overcome its hesitations and enter a relationship which further built up the CLNAI's political importance.

Evaluation of these decisions with the benefit of hindsight is hardly fair—the point is that following a policy based on short-term expediency had led to unfortunate consequences. These consequences could not have been overlooked by the Chief Commissioner, and in fact he wrote his memorandum against the immediate background of a political crisis which had just been forced by the CLNAI. Bonomi, on realizing that he would have to yield

to a more radical government, avowed to Admiral Stone his fear that if the immediately succeeding government was headed by a Socialist the government after that would be communist. In fact Bonomi yielded his office not to a Socialist but to a member of the most moderate of the three left-wing CLNAI parties, the Action Party. But Ferruccio Parri, the new Prime Minister, leaned sufficiently to the left to be acceptable to the Communists and Socialists as well as to the more moderate parties represented in his cabinet, and in his first public statement after taking office he acknowledged by clear implication the ascendancy of the CLNAI political forces.

Although it could well have seemed too late to remedy a bad situation with such deep roots in the past, the Chief Commissioner still had hopes for the future provided the Allies now adopted a policy of broad and active aid to Italy and implemented it by specific military, economic, and political measures which he outlined. His memorandum was either sent, or taken by Acting SACMED (on a trip to the United States), to numerous influential quarters. Nearly four months later the Chief Commissioner recorded his feeling that he was still in the dark on Allied policy. He could have added that none of his proposed measures had been adopted.

A fair appraisal of the situation, however, must note that Allied authorities in fact now shared Admiral Stone's main objectives and had indicated this in emphatic even if vague public statements. They had, moreover, already initiated measures for aiding Italy which seemed more practicable than those which the Chief Commissioner had suggested. But in considering what was done for or about Italy from the close of hostilities to the end of the occupation, one will have to study the documentation alertly with the aim of noting its explicit or implicit indication of two points of view almost throughout. Although both

points of view envisaged aid to Italy as a long-term Allied interest, one tended toward the all-out aid favored by the Chief Commissioner, the other inclined toward the older view that Italy could be helped sufficiently by a degree of aid which did not exceed the limits of short-term expediency. The latter view was supported by strong considerations—the fact that the war with Japan was still on, that both the United States and Great Britain were war-weary and strained after victory over Japan had been won, and the fact that Italy was only one and by no means the most vital of the props needed in support of Allied postwar aims.

For the first illustration of the continuing dilemma one may turn briefly to the question of Allied security measures for Italy. All concerned agreed that adequate military forces were needed if both the government and AMG were to have unchallenged authority, but the question of what should be provided received conflicting answers according to whether the focus was on Italy alone or on all Allied needs. Admiral Stone had recommended five Allied divisions (exclusive of Venezia Giulia) but SACMED, who doubtless knew better what he was likely to get, asked only for a minimum of two divisions for Venezia Giulia, a mobile reserve to be drawn on if needed in Italy, and higher ceilings for the Italian Army and Carabinieri. The CCS did not feel able to grant him a mobile reserve specifically set aside for Italy. Neither the government nor AMG rested easy but the Yugoslavs were reassured because they could press territorial demands without the deterrent of a nearby large Allied force.

Nor could anything better be managed in the equally important question of economic aid to prevent civilian unrest. The Chief Commissioner had asked for an economic advisory organization, an annual quota of coal sufficient for all Italian in-

dustry, and increased credits for Italian purchases. Soon afterward it was uncertain how Italy would continue to get even the limited aid it had been receiving under the military supply program. Linked by American policy entirely to military operations, the program was to be closed with August loadings on the assumption that UNRRA should take over. But UNRRA actually was not ready to take over, and at the last moment FEA had to fill in the breach. When UNRRA did start, in 1946, it was only with a program more limited even than that of the military, and the years 1946 and 1947 were as stringent in food supply as any that the Italians had yet experienced.

Mistakes were not always outside the theater. AC had always believed that the best insurance against Italian radicalism was the development of a liberal democracy. This was difficult as long as war lasted but with the close of hostilities there was a better opportunity. However, for some reason the restrictions on political activity in AMG territory were not promptly lifted, with the result that an AMG officer arrested Pietro Nenni for making a political speech without a permit and thus gave one of Italy's most influential leaders little reason for kind feelings toward the Allies. Nenni was quickly released and the restrictions were later lifted. Far more important was the question of positive aid to Italian democracy, and the Executive Commissioner of AC believed the Allies had failed in not providing resources for a positive educational program. The main contribution of AC would have to lie in helping the government prepare a democratic machinery for the first local elections, and this in full measure it did. But whether its policy as regards Italian decision of the "institutional question" was altogether well-advised is more difficult to judge. It long acquiesced in a government decree which, though the government tried to deny this,

aimed at decision by a constitutional assembly rather than a democratic referendum. Also, even after hostilities closed, AC continued to keep the question from being raised, although Italians failed to understand why. But in this question there was, fortunately, self-reversal both by the government and by the Allies. The government changed its statute to permit the referendum AC desired, and the Allies changed their policy to permit the earlier holding of the referendum which the Italians desired. Italians on 2-3 June 1946 voted for a republic by a majority that was somewhat narrow but still large enough to show how far new influences had acted as leavening on the traditionally conservative masses. More important for immediate purposes was the result of the simultaneous elections for the Constituent Assembly, in which the Christian Democrats won more seats than any other party, and the moderate parties together an aggregate greater than that of the co-operating Communists and Socialists.

If this precarious ascendancy of pro-Western forces was to be increased or even maintained the Allies had to recognize that at this particular stage democracy was probably less important to Italians than nationalism. In his initial statement, Prime Minister Parri had mentioned almost in the same breath Italy's still unrealized restoration as a great nation and the boundary questions soon to be determined. At the September 1945 conference of Foreign Ministers the Allies came to realize that the only possible chance of settling boundary questions on ethnic principles and not too greatly to Italy's dissatisfaction was to delay the settlement until the Soviet Union would agree to the broad peace conference wherein the weight of opinion might be on the side of moderation. At this juncture the Allies might have done well to have given the Italians temporary appeasement by the civil affairs agreement which super-

seded the obsolete armistice and which the Chief Commissioner had recommended in his June memorandum. British hesitation evidently delayed offering Italy a new relationship until the end of May 1946, by which time the Italian government, which once had clamored for such a change, preferred to see how it would fare at the approaching peace conference.

Restoration of AMG territory and further relaxation of controls would also satisfy some of the longings of Italian nationalism, but here too there were obstacles as well as inhibitions. If the Allies overrode Yugoslav objections to returning any territory as long as Italy claimed Venezia Giulia, it was not as easy to override inherent military and political difficulties. Successive transfers beginning in May did not effect the restoration of even all the undisputed areas until the end of 1945, when it seemed safe to assume that Bolzano would not be seriously disputed as Italian and could therefore be restored together with the rest of northern Italy. The relaxation of controls was also accelerated by the end of fighting in Italy but this too was in some cases delayed. The delay was principally in such matters as foreign trade and financial transactions, over which the Allies needed to retain supervision until the end of the war with Japan.

Throughout the last phase of occupation, aid to Italy had been less a matter of controls than of influence and advice; but the importance of this type of aid was something which Washington and London authorities, remote from the scene of action and with their patience already overstrained by the protraction of military responsibility, were not in a position fully to estimate. When, therefore, the lifting of controls had reached a certain point, the CCS raised the question of curtailing AC's organization and transferring most residual functions to AFHQ. Both AC and AFHQ disagreed but at the end of March

1946 the CCS directed the dismantling of all of AC but the Executive Branch and a few subcommissions concerned with military matters. At the end of January 1947 the CCS directed the abolition of AC, a move which could not have come about at a more unfortunately premature time.

Affairs in Italy had never been good but at just this moment the picture was darker than ever and portended danger not only for the Italians but also for the Allies. The bad economic situation, and perhaps even more the depressing prospects at the Paris Peace Conference, had influenced the November elections, which resulted in heavy gains by the extreme left and Fascist right at the expense of the pro-Ally parties. The Socialist leader Nenni in November warned of civil war as the alternative to leftist assumption of power. In January Italy received the final draft of the Peace Treaty and Nenni handed the U.S. Ambassador a note of bitter protest over how little had been wrung by Italy's final pleas. He now asked for separate accords with the Allies, in disregard of the Peace Conference's determination, and also of how difficult or impossible a step this would be for two such war-weary countries. Well-informed and fair-minded Italians appreciated the fact that had it not been for the United States the terms would have been far worse, and that to hold out longer would only have opened the door to Yugoslav unilateral action against a disarmed Italy. Nevertheless, there was a real danger that the good will which the Allies had built up for themselves in Italy over five years would now be substantially lost.

In the case of both America and Great Britain, destiny seemed to have a way of calling twice. The United States, after engaging in second thoughts on international reconstruction, had another opportunity to retrieve the situation. The nation took advantage of this second chance. During his visit to the United States in Jan-

uary 1947, Prime Minister de Gasperi was given or promised substantial economic assistance for Italy. Later in the year Italy received its share in the Foreign Public Relief Program, and the various acts of waiver of financial claims and of positive aid culminated with the inclusion of Italy in the European Recovery Program. American assistance immeasurably strengthened the position of the moderate and pro-West Italian parties—so much so that in April De Gasperi, after commotion and even bloodshed in Italian politics, had the courage to form a cabinet from which, for the first time since Badoglio's government of technical experts, the Communists and Socialists were excluded. Hard times still lay ahead and it was not until the elections of April 1948, after the Allied withdrawal, that the victory of Italian parties friendly to the West became clearly manifest.

The final withdrawal took place on 14 December 1947, after three months in which AFHQ was no longer in existence and residual Allied functions were carried out by a Military Liquidating Agency with separate American and British components. On 13 December President Truman had issued a public statement affirming the continuing intention of the United States to concern itself in the preservation of Italy's freedom and independence. The day of withdrawal itself was marked by an exchange of friendly messages between Prime Minister de Gasperi and the President. The former expressed Italian gratitude for the past help of Allied troops; the latter, American gratification over the partnership established between the two countries in the defense of common ideals. This exchange of cordial national sentiments may seem largely perfunctory, but that it could occur at all is significant in light of the fact that most belligerent occupations had ended with a bitterness even greater than existed at the start. The exchange would not have been possible if,

during the occupation, benevolence had not on the whole outweighed narrow self-interest, and had not community of broad interests triumphed over conflicting interests.

One still later episode of the aftermath is also noteworthy, since it likewise broadens the historical perspective in which the conduct of Allied-Italian relations can be evaluated. In 1949 Italy became a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created to implement the treaty. By thus joining the community of free nations Italy repeated the same kind of act of faith as was her enter-

ing the Armistice of 1943 despite the deterrent threats of a totalitarian state. This eventuality also confirmed the faith and farsightedness of the Allies in having decided to treat Italy not as a conquered country but as a cobelligerent whose rehabilitation would be interdependent with their own long-term interest. The ensuing occupation, it must be admitted, had in some degree the recurrent disappointments which both the perverse circumstances of war and human fallibility had injected into all military occupations of the past. But, at least, the past had never seen an occupation whose immediate and ultimate success was greater.

## 1. AFTER THE FOREIGN ENEMY IS DEFEATED AN INTERNAL ENEMY EMERGES

### AS A MINISTER OF STATE THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S LEADER HAS EMOLUMENTS

[Memo, Lipsius, Chief, Black Market Cont Div, Rgn IV, for Rgnl Cmsr, Rgn IV, 15 Aug 44, ACC files, 10400/153/79]

14. In my conversation with him [Palmiro Togliatti] and his secretary, the question was raised by them concerning the propriety of sending for a Minister of State, instead of calling upon him. My reply to them was that he was being sent for as the leader of the Communist party, and not as a Minister of State.

15. An individual may choose to hold two positions, one of which entitles him to certain privileges and immunities, and the other of which does not. However, the privileges and immunities of the former are not attached to the latter, and it is my opinion that the leader of the Communist party is not entitled to any of the emoluments of office of a minister of state. \* \* \*

[Memo, Fiske, Deputy Exec Cmsr, AC, for Rgnl Cmsr Rgn IV, 24 Aug 44, ACC files, 10400/153/79]

2. The difficulties experienced by Lieut. Lipsius in this matter are fully appreciated. You should however remind him that Sig. Togliatti is first and foremost a Minister of State and as such en-

titled to the usual courtesies. Lieut. Lipsius should go to see Sig. Togliatti, not vice versa. \* \* \*

### THE MINISTER CLAIMS ITALIAN COMMUNISTS ARE PATRIOTIC AND HONEST—WITH EXCEPTIONS

[Notes of Conf Between Lipsius, Chief, Black Market Contl Div, and Signor Palmiro Togliatti, Minister Without Portfolio, 16 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/153/79]

\* \* \* Lt. Lipsius . . . showed him the records of two cases in which "squadre annonaire" of the Communist party had confiscated some merchandise. Togliatti takes notes and then remarks that one of said cases had been handled by the "Movimento Comunista Italiano" which is not a part of the Italian Communist Party. Lt. Lipsius wants to know what is the relationship among the different parties that in some way or other call themselves Communists and whether they have any doctrine, principle or program in common. Togliatti answers that the party of which he is the head is the only Communist party in Italy with nationalistic and patriotic tendencies. As to the rest, he adds, only a rather primitive distinction may be made, namely, the honest and the dishonest. The Catholic Communists may be classified "honest" whereas the "Movimento Comunista Italiano" which originated at the time of the German occupation of

Italy falls in the class of the dishonest. The latter tried to infiltrate into the Italian Communist Party but it was readily ousted. The "Movimento Comunista Italiano" is now having a declining life on the edge of Communism. Its policy being one of disintegration and disorder, it is being fought by the P.C.I. as well as the former is fighting the latter.<sup>1</sup>

Togliatti says that, perhaps, not each member of his party is honest. \* \* \*

#### IN THE SOUTH THE COMMUNISTS ARE BEGINNING TO BE PROVOCATIVE

[Min of Remarks of Lt Col F. H. McCleary, Rgnl Cmsr, Rgn II, at Conf of Rgnl Cmsrs, 22 Aug 44, ACC files, 10000/101/449]

\* \* \* I. . . . The Communist Party has continued its ascendancy to the point where it now is provocative. This is most marked in Potenza and Brindisi Provinces. Previous uneasiness has grown to fear among intelligent Italians that some violence will occur when the Allies withdraw. \* \* \*

#### IN ROME THE COMMUNISTS ARE DANGEROUS

[Note by Secy of SACMED's Political Comm., 20 Nov 44, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ Papers, PC(44)-136]

1. G-2 believe that the security situation in Rome is serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures.

4. There are three active organizations which, although communist inspired, are much more extremist than even the Russians may desire. They constitute a potential danger. They are (1) Communist Young Group, (2) Movimento Comunista d'Italia and (3) Movimento Partigiano. These groups vary in size but each is believed to be around 40000 or possibly more. They are well armed with weapons, ammunition and sabotage material secured either from the Allies prior to the fall of Rome, from the Anzio area or from German stocks. The members are well trained, very active and believe strongly in the theory of "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat." So far they have not advocated violence but are leaning that way.

5. Leftist propaganda is becoming more and more outspoken in its criticism of the Allies and

the Bonomi Government. Conditions in Italy are contrasted to those in Bulgaria and Roumania, to Russia's benefit. Peasants are being urged openly to seize the land of large landowners. To some extent this is tacitly approved by the Government.

7. Civilian morale is spiralling downward at an increasing rate. This is due to the lack of essentials for the coming winter and the extremely high cost of goods on the Black Market. There is some decrease in pro-Allied sentiments. This is caused by communist propaganda, Mr. Eden's latest speech regarding Italian colonies, and the Allies' failure to fulfill PWB promises of adequate food. \* \* \*

#### THE RADICAL CLNAI IS ASPIRING TOWARD THE DOMINATION OF ITALIAN POLITICAL LIFE

[Memo of Political Sec, AC, 12 Jan 45, ACC files, 10000/136/339]

4. The difficulties in regard to the formation of a new Government turned largely on the attempt of the Central Committee of National Liberation in Rome to impose a nominee of the Committee on the Lieutenant General, as Prime Minister, and, in general, to establish the Committee of National Liberation as the single dominant factor in Italian political life. With emissaries of the Committee of National Liberation in Rome at this period it was only natural that the latter's claims to recognition should figure in the demands put forward in the declarations and pronouncements of the Political Parties, particularly those of the extreme left.

5. When, therefore, the new Government was formed, one of their first acts was to issue a declaration in which, in welcoming the decision of the Central Committee of National Liberation to continue its collaboration in the war effort, the Government referred to the CLNAI as its representatives and stated that it had delegated to the CLNAI the task of directing the action of the patriots in the battle against the enemy. \* \* \*

#### BONOMI FEARS IF THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER IS SOCIALIST THE SUCCEEDING GOVERNMENT WILL BE COMMUNIST

[Msg, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to SACMED, 23 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

1. . . . At meeting of CLNAI, twenty-first [May], agreement was reached on formation of Government. . . . Later in meeting serious disagreement developed over insistence of three Left Wing parties on the right of CLNAI to

<sup>1</sup> The movement was one which continued the extremist policies of Communism after the Moscow-dominated Communist Party abandoned them for the duration. This abandonment began with, and was dictated by, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, which immediately ordered its followers everywhere to give the defeat of Germany priority over the fight for international communism.

dictate composition of Government. Liberal and Christian Democrats insisted that it must be done in consultation with leaders in the south and by constitutional means through the Lieutenant [of the Realm]. . . .

2. I met with Bonomi today. He protested illegal acts of CLNAI made under Inter Regnum Decrees prior to Allied entry into Milan. I am bringing these to attention of AMG, Fifth Army.

4. He [Bonomi] feels that if the next Prime Minister is a Socialist the next succeeding government will clearly be Communist.

#### ITALIAN LEADERS DECIDE TO FORM A MORE PROGRESSIVE GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for All Concerned, 26 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

\* \* \* At further meeting last night between the CLNAI, the Secretaries of Parties and members of Rome Government, now in North, full agreement was reached on:

1. Necessity of forming new government.

2. Necessity for all six parties to participate in new government.

3. Key positions in new government to be held by men who represent the progressive spirit shown by the people in their struggle for liberation. \* \* \*

#### EXTREMISTS THREATEN TO SET UP A SEPARATE LEFT-WING GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH

[Msg, Hopkinson, Br Political Advisor, AC, to Exec Cmsr, AC, 8 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

At concluding meeting of Regional Committees of National Liberation of Northern Italy yesterday strong criticism was expressed by speakers of various parties of delay in formation of new government. There was tendency to lay blame on politicians of the South and Republican party speakers went so far as to say that if Rome could not make up its mind the CLN's in the North should consider the possibility of setting up a provisional government of Northern Italy. \* \* \*

[Msg, d'A Hopkinson to Hq AC, 9 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

. . . discussion on premiership seems to have reached deadlock with De Gasperi and Nenni each refusing to accept the other.

. . . if failure to find a personality acceptable to all parties should lead to break up of coalition and assumption of power by right wing parties with exclusion of communists and Socialists a very serious situation would arise in the North.

I doubt whether left-wing parties here would be willing to accept such a solution and it might even lead to formation of separate government in the north. . . .

#### THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS FARTHER TO THE LEFT [Hq AC, Rpt for Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/105/240]

3. On 12 June, Signor Bonomi placed his resignation in the hands of the Lieutenant of the Realm and the Government crisis was officially opened. The CLNAI passed a resolution calling for action on a three-point program; namely, the designation of Signor Parri as the President of the Council, the representation in the new Government of all the political forces in the Committees of National Liberation, including such leaders as Signor Nenni, Togliatti and De Gasperi, and finally the appointment of five ministers without portfolio to be designated by Northern political parties. The Central CLN accepted the first point of this resolution the same day and on 17 June Signor Parri was received by the Lieutenant of the Realm and officially charged with formation of the new Government. . . .

5. . . . As might be expected, the north has the largest representation, fourteen of the Ministers having been born North of Rome. However, it is the most representative Cabinet on geographical lines that new Italy has yet achieved. . . . The new Government is farther to the Left than Signor Bonomi's last administration and Signor Parri himself is a man of avowed republican sympathies, although he does not share Socialist views on "Social Problems"—or so at least Signor Nenni has asserted. The powers given to Signor Nenni to take charge of the work of preparing for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and of the Office of Sanctions against Fascism are of considerable political significance at this time. On the other hand, the Right has also had its triumphs; it has succeeded in blocking the drive for a Socialist President which a month ago seemed sure of success. \* \* \*

#### NATIONAL LIBERATION PARTIES ARE NOW IN THE SADDLE

[Radio Address of Prime Minister Parri, 23 Jun 45, Transmitted to Stone, 24 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

\* \* \* This government . . . is born of the coalition of the parties who have led the movement of national liberation and who will have the right and the duty of guiding the country up to the time when it will have been able to

give itself free and regular representative organs. All the parties are represented in the government in just proportion; their leaders are at my side. Their presence, their responsibility is a guarantee of strength and stability for the government, the first guarantee of its efficiency, adequate for the gravity of the problems of the moment. \* \* \*

#### AT PARTING OF THE WAYS: PROPOSALS FOR MEETING COMMUNIST DANGER

[Memo on Future Policy Toward Italy from Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for the SAC, 23 Jun 45,<sup>2</sup> ACC files, 10000/136/299]

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1943, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years: she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 percent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph—possibly by force.

2. Communistic growth cannot be blocked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and morale, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions—to assist Italy

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<sup>2</sup>A considerable portion of the Chief Commissioner's lengthy memorandum has been omitted. Although the memorandum was sent to many influential quarters, including the White House, none of its specific recommendations was adopted. Evidently they seemed to call for a degree of aid to Italy that would overstrain Allied resources. It is clear, however, that the memorandum helped focus attention on the problem of adapting the Allied-Italian relationship to Allied postwar interests.

economically, and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiation of Italy's crime of 1940 must rightly be prolonged: indeed, her defeat and the course of battle since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, if not the will of the United Nations, will see to it that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profession and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-Armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies who liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear—since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country—or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military, political, and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism. \* \* \*

6. . . . Having "worked her passage," Italy must be allowed to emerge from defeat through co-belligerency to the position of an active partner, however lowly, in the maintenance of postwar security. If she is to serve as a bastion of democracy in Southern Europe, such a recovery is essential and must be encouraged.

7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the very near future. The agreement might include, among others, the following provisions:

(a) Italy to regain control of her naval fleet for employment under any regional security scheme which might be evolved for the Mediterranean. . . .

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men). . . .

(c) The Italian Air Force to be maintained at a token strength, or at present strength. . . .

(d) To enable her to fill her role as a "junior partner" in the maintenance of Mediterranean security, the Allies would agree to furnish a military mission to assist in the training and organization of the Italian land, sea, and air forces, similar to the prewar military and naval missions provided by the United States for certain South American republics. . . .

(e) Similarly, an Allied Police Mission to assist the Italian Government in the reorganization and training of the Police Forces of Italy could be offered. . . .

(f) The retention in Italy of an Allied Military Force of five Divisions (excluding Allied Forces in Venezia Giulia) until such time as revitalized Italian civil and military services were in a position to ensure democratic security in Italy. . . .

(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and

(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function. . . .

(i) The reassurance of credits in the U.S. and an increase in credits in the U.K. The latter might well take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.

(j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to co-ordinate (d) to (h) above and to function as advisors to the Italian Government.

(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the

interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense. \* \* \*

#### SACMED ALSO ASKS FOR A DEFINITION OF ALLIED POLICY TOWARD ITALY

[Memo, McNarney, Actg SACMED, to CCS, 27 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/136/263]

1. I forward herewith 6 copies of a memorandum [dated 23 June 1945] written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward Italy" [above].

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward Italy. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAN 487 [Chapter XVII, Section 8] I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Government is to "relax control . . . thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility." While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically," accepting the cost of doing this; or is it held that Allied interest in Italy is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favor of the policy of active interest. While personally I favor the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other, would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions toward Italy.

#### LONG-TERM COMMUNIST AIMS STILL SEEM THREATENING

[ACofS, G-2, AFHQ, Rpt, Appreciation of the Situation in Italy, 26 Aug 45, ABC files, 387.4, Italy, sec. 6 (CCS Memo for Info 295)]

3. c. The Communist Party. . . . It is highly organized at the centre and has direct contact with Russia. Its long term policy is presumably the creation of Italy as a communist state within the Russian sphere. To achieve this it is ready to wait a long time and meanwhile to co-operate with the governments in power. \* \* \*

## CHIEF COMMISSIONER FEELS HIMSELF LEFT IN THE DARK

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for CofS, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/69]

1. Before taking the drastic step of complete civilianization of the Allied Commission envisaged for the future . . . it would appear reasonable to ask for a declaration of Allied policy towards Italy.

2. With the exception of public declarations of

broad principles by Allied statesmen we remain in ignorance of Allied policy. In the Chief Commissioner's memorandum of 23 June and in the Deputy SACMED'S covering letter of 27 July to that memorandum, definition of Allied policy in many of its aspects was recommended and requested. So far no reply to these papers has been received.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>3</sup> About the same time McNarney, in Washington on a visit, was discussing the Admiral's memorandum with the War Department.

## 2. THE ALLIES TAKE STEPS TO MEET ITALY'S SECURITY NEEDS

### SACMED SEES ALLIED TROOPS AS STILL NEEDED

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to WD, 15 Jun 45, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 14625]

\* \* \* Main task of Allied Occupational Forces in Italy after handover of metropolitan Italy to Italian Government will be maintenance of Allied Military Government, law and order and security of Italian frontiers. . . . General situation in these areas (other than Islands) is likely to be unsettled. In Venezia Giulia and adjacent territories Jugoslavs are likely to foment agitation and exploit unrest with view to eventual incorporation in Jugoslavia. To meet the commitment in northeast Italy, I estimate that minimum Occupational Land Forces required, at least until end of year and probably until conclusion of final peace settlement in Europe, will be one corps of 2 divisions. In addition, since extensive and widespread disorders in remainder of Italy would prejudice security, maintenance, and movement of Allied Sea, Land and Air Forces in Mediterranean Theater, provision must be made for adequate Allied Forces to be available at short notice in event of failure of Italian Forces to maintain control. Depending on circumstances obtaining in northeast Italy<sup>4</sup> at time, this commitment could be met in part from the Allied Corps referred to above. I consider, however, that to rely wholly on this Corps would be to accept undue risk, and that a general mobile reserve must be established (not necessarily in Italy) from which forces can be rapidly removed to threatened areas. \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup> SACMED of course was referring primarily to Venezia Giulia.

### SACMED TELLS CCS THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS MORE TROOPS TO MAINTAIN ITS AUTHORITY

[Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 3 Aug 45, OPD Msg file, CM-IN 2640]

1. I have had under consideration the interim policy which, pending a final settlement by the peace treaty, should be adopted towards the Italian armed forces in the light of our intention to hand over to the Italian Government by 30 September responsibility for civil administration of all Italy, less Venezia Giulia and any other special areas which may be retained under AMG.

#### 2. *Internal situation in Italy.*

A. With a poor harvest and a general shortage of raw materials, especially coal, the economic situation in Italy is deteriorating and the position is not likely to improve. This will cause labor disturbances and internal unrest which is already beginning.

B. The authority of the Italian Government at present largely rests on the presence of Allied Troops which are being steadily reduced. If we are to avoid having to interfere in order to maintain law and order in Italy, the Italian Government must be given adequate forces whose efficiency must be increased as much as possible.

6. Requirements of Italian Government for Land Forces.

The Armed Forces which it is considered will be required by the Italian Government . . . can be summarized as:

A. An efficient and adequate police force deployed over the whole country.

B. Local Army reserves in each territorial region in order to back up the police force in quelling local disturbances.

C. A general Army reserve strategically located in order to undertake suppression of major uprisings.

D. Command administrative machinery.

\* \* \*

#### AMG IS ALSO NEEDED AND TROOPS MUST SUPPORT IT

[Memo, Brig. Upjohn, Vice President, CA Sec, AC, for Exec Cmsr, AC, 7 Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/584]

1. As a result of my recent tour there was one matter on which I found complete unanimity from everyone I interviewed: RC's, Legal Officers, PS Officers, and so on. It will *not* surprise you to hear that it concerned the prospect of the maintenance of law and order as the Allies withdraw.

2. In every case the view was expressed that the present state of comparative law and order would give way to (at minimum) a series of serious disorders and riots with much bloodshed and (at maximum) to a complete communist armed revolution.

3. In some cases the view was expressed that such disorders would start soon after the termination of AMG, in others that they would not start until the number of Allied troops was substantially diminished. Many cited the recent diminution of crime to a deliberate plan to lull the Allies into a belief that the standard of law and order was increasing. Instances (which could not be proved) of suspected large scale communist plots for uprising, of secret collecting of big dumps of arms (some of them already raided) and so on were all cited to me.

4. This universal feeling is familiar to you and must be faced. It gives rise to the problem: Ought AMG to be retained? I received the answer in nearly every case Yes but only if

(a) it is going to be retained for a long and advertised period, e.g. 6 months;

(b) Allied troops are retained in sufficient quantities to maintain AMG. \* \* \*

#### NEARLY ALL AUTHORITIES THINK MORE AMERICAN TROOPS ARE NEEDED

[Memo, McCloy for CofS, WD, 20 Aug 45, ABC files, 381, Italy, Armistice-Surrender (5-9-43), JCS 1411-1, sec. 1-C]

\* \* \* During my visit to Italy, I found some very strong opinions as to the need of our maintaining more troops than are presently contemplated for the occupying of Italy. The Am-

bassador and the people around him, General Hume—in fact, everybody, with the exception of General McNarney and Colonel Poletti, feel that to remove all American troops from Italy would encourage violent outbreaks before the new government is well established.

McNarney and Poletti took the view that the sooner we get out of Italy, probably the better off the Italians would be, as they would then be in a position where they would have to swim for themselves. Kirk's view was that until the present government got its roots down, it would be merely returning Italy to chaotic conditions to remove American troops. The argument was also made by some that if we withdraw, we would simply be selling out and abandoning the Italian peninsula to purely British policy.

I think there is something to be said for leaving two good American divisions there over the winter. On account of Venezia Giulia one division is presently contemplated. My inclination is to pull out all but the one division, although it may be risky to do so. \* \* \*

#### ITALIAN ARMED FORCES ARE RETURNED TO ITALIAN CONTROL WITH RAISED CEILING

[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 Sep 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 71688, FAN-621]

1. The Italian Government will be authorized to retain armed forces which are adequate to maintain law and order in areas under its control.

2. Italian Forces which are *not* necessary to maintain law and order but which are essential to aid U.S. or U.K. Forces in the Theater will be returned to civilian status after they are *no* longer required by the U.S. or U.K. Forces.

3. Italian Armed Forces required to maintain law and order will be placed under Italian Government control about 30 September 1945 in accordance with your recommendation.

4. The authorized ceiling for the Italian Army will be 140,000. The Army includes local reserves, mobile reserves, Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administration and training, and reinforcements. The authorized ceiling for the Carabinieri is 65,000. \* \* \*

#### AN ALLIED POLICE MISSION IS NEEDED BUT IS POLITICALLY UNWISE NOW

[Msg, Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan to CCS, 6 Oct 45, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 3001]

2. . . . Parri personally appears to agree to the desirability of such a mission. He officially states however

(A) That it would be inexpedient to invite a mission because the Communists would probably demand Russian participation.

(B) That if the Allies imposed a mission it would be contrary to present Allied policy and would be resented by the Italians.

(C) That, after elections when presumably the Communist would be an opposition party, the government might require a mission.

(D) That a mission might be agreed as part of a supplementary agreement to the peace treaty or even imposed as part of the treaty.

3. I still hold to the view that, unless the reorganization and training of the Carabinieri is placed under a qualified Allied Police mission, it will remain an inefficient and undependable force on which the government cannot depend in any crisis. I am hesitant however about insisting that a mission be accepted until it is clear that such action conforms to your policy. \* \* \*

#### THERE ARE STILL DANGERS AT THE FRENCH FRONTIER

[Msg, NAF-1098, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 13 Dec 45, ACC files, 10000/109/585]

Para 2. It is clear that unless we do restrict the employment of Italian troops in this zone pending the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments we risk provoking the French into precipitate action.

Para 4. I therefore propose at the time of hand-over to obtain an undertaking by the Italian Government not to station troops other than Carabinieri anywhere within 15 miles of the Franco-Italian border. This undertaking will be given no publicity. The Italian Prime Minister will be informed now that some such condition may be imposed.<sup>5</sup> \* \* \*

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<sup>5</sup> General Morgan, who succeeded Field Marshal Alexander as SACMED on 23 October 1945, was referring to the restoration of northern Italy to the Italian Government, a move which the CCS had authorized recently (see below, Section 6).

#### THE CCS SUBSTANTIALLY AGREES TO SACMED'S PROPOSALS ON OCCUPATION FORCES

[Msg, CCS to SACMED, 30 Dec 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 5346]

1. Subject to review from time to time of the actual size of the Forces, it is the present intention that an Allied Corps of one United States and one British division will remain in Venezia Giulia until that commitment is ended.

2. We cannot agree to set aside a reserve specifically for Italy alone but forces in paragraph 3 are temporarily available.

3. (A) I Armoured Regiment will continue to be provided from British resources.

(B) 6th British Armoured Division is remaining in your Theatre until required elsewhere.

(C) In event of emergency in Italy including Venezia Giulia, it may be possible, depending on current situation in Germany and Austria, to make available from United States resources in Western Europe reinforcements NOT exceeding 2 reinforced Infantry Regiments. \* \* \*

#### THE CCS RAISES CEILING OF THE CARABINIERI

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 22 Feb 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1040, NAF-1117]

\* \* \* I recommend . . . that the ceiling of the interim Italian Army including Carabinieri approved by you in paragraph 4 FAN 621 [above] be increased by 10,000 to allow the ceiling of the Carabinieri to be raised to 75,000 in order to clear up requirements for which the present ceiling of the Carabinieri is not designated and to assist the Italian government. There will be no additional Allied commitment as clothing, equipment, and food for this increase are now an Italian responsibility.

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to SACMED, 16 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 80895]

Approval is given to your proposal to increase the ceiling of the Carabinieri in the interim Italian Army. The Italian Government should be informed by you that this increase is without prejudice to any decision which in the peace treaty may be taken subsequently.

### 3. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES AID AS VITAL TO POSTWAR AIMS

#### THE FIGHTING IS OVER BUT NOT THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

[Finance Subcom, AC, Final Rpt Prepared by Lt Col B. E. L. Simmons, Chief Financial Advisor, 16 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

14. . . . Military Government can only be military immediately behind the battle line, i.e., when there are no other considerations than to crush the enemy. In the later stages of occupying and administering a country, and then of advising its government, the problems of government cannot remain military; they inevitably embrace all the complexities of human organization, in their political, social and economic forms. In short, to develop policies, financial or otherwise, for military government is to develop a foreign policy toward a country or countries. It is the peculiar quality of military government that it establishes a close day-to-day relationship between occupier and occupied, a relationship that does not normally exist in international relations, and throws in high relief any failure to develop a closely-articulated policy. Are supplies to be furnished without supervision of distribution by the supplying country? Is reparations policy consistent with a program of economic and financial aid? Are foreign credits to be made available without insistence on internal control of inflation? Whether the answers to these questions are affirmative or negative, the conclusions may not be evaded that decisions cannot be *ad hoc* but require to be made against a background of long-run objectives. . . .

#### THE ARMY'S SUPPLY PROGRAM WILL END

[Ltr, McCloy to Chairman of Liberated Areas Comm., 2 Jun 45, ASF, ID files, Civ Sup, DS-361]

(a) No funds will be included in War Department budget estimates for fiscal year 1946 for the provision of civilian supplies in this area.<sup>6</sup>

(b) The economic policy for Italy established in the joint statement of the President and the Prime Minister of September 26, 1944 can no longer be supported on a military basis. . . .

(c) In the event agencies of this Government other than the War Department assume the responsibility for provision of supplies to Italy, there are sufficient supplies currently in the pipe-

line to permit the War Department to furnish to such agencies other than the War Department civilian supplies for Italy on the disease and unrest formula through August 1945 loadings.

#### AFHQ SAYS OUTSIDE ECONOMIC AID IS NEEDED MORE THAN EVER

[Msg, CM-IN 8791, AFHQ to WD, 9 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38, Italy (2-20-43), sec. 151]

2. . . . Italy will need outside economic aid for some time to come and this aid may well be more important to orderly political and economic recovery after the close of the military period than in the early phases when the presence of troops itself is a stabilizing influence. If it is to continue to be United States policy to assist the recovery of Italy and to prevent the political and economic disturbance which would arise if aid was abruptly withdrawn, arrangements should be promptly made so that the continuity of the flow of minimum essential civil supplies will not be broken.

#### WAR DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES A LONG-TERM AMERICAN INTEREST IN ITALIAN STABILITY

[Statement of McCloy to Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 15 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38, Italy (2-20-43), sec. 16]

. . . With the cessation of hostilities, the necessities of the military situation in Italy are no longer such as they were when the operations were in progress. This, however, does not mean that the War Department no longer has a vital interest in the political and economic conditions which prevail in Italy. . . .

It is the period immediately following the tactical victory which may determine the pattern of the area for many years to come. Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean area makes its stability one of the keys to peace in Europe as a whole. Today Italy is economically prostrate and politically feeble. This situation can be cured only with some material assistance from the United States. The War Department is advised that a plan will be promptly formulated by the executive arm of our government, in consultation with the Congress, which will cover our long term interest in Italy's economy. In the meantime, our government's interest is that Italy shall not be permitted to further submerge economically. \* \* \*

As Italy has not been declared eligible for lend-lease, funds appropriated to the FEA can

<sup>6</sup> However, on 24 September CCAC notified SACMED that civilian supply for Udine and Venezia Giulia would remain a military responsibility. See below, Section 8.

be utilized only by their transfer to the War Department. The War Department supports the FEA in the request which it makes for funds for use in Italy and will undertake, to the extent that funds appropriated by the Congress for the purpose make it possible, to provide essential supplies to Italy to the amount of \$100,000,000 until December 31, 1945.

#### PRESIDENT TRUMAN REINFORCES STATEMENTS ON AID TO ITALY AS IN U.S. INTEREST

[Ltr, Truman to the SW, 2 Jul 45, CAD files, 14, Italy (1-25-43) (1), sec. 9]

It is a matter of deep concern to me that the economic situation of Italy be not permitted to deteriorate further. Our policy is to assist in the recovery of Italy as the only assurance against a resurgence there of the forces we have fought in Europe, and progress towards recovery in Italy will require substantial assistance for the United States for many months to come. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ FEARS CRISIS WILL RESULT FROM LACK OF COAL AND IRON

[Memo, Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Deputy Theater Comdr, MTOUSA, 9 Jul 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ papers]

4. a. Opinion is fairly unanimous that unless coal and raw materials are furnished to permit at least a partial resumption of industrial activity in the north the economic situation will deteriorate drastically during next winter. There is an employable industrial population of about 2 million, of which the concentration is in Milan and Turin. The bulk of these are at present held on plant payrolls under arrangements improvised by the companies and in certain cases with the Italian Government. Production in most plants is at a complete standstill and in others is only from 5 to 15% of capacity. Obviously these arrangements cannot last over a period of 30 to 90 days.

b. If all industrial activity is suspended and heavy unemployment results this fall and winter the political consequences are obvious. The temper of the workmen now is more conservative than has been expected; in fact, there appears to be a definite reaction against some of the excesses of the first few weeks. However this tendency can and probably will reverse itself if the basic problem of employment is not solved by the time the cold weather comes on.

d. The main answer to the problem is coal and raw materials, particularly cotton. \* \* \*

#### SACMED EXPRESSES ALARM OVER DELAY IN CIVILIAN AGENCY PROCUREMENT

[Paraphrase of Msg, Field Marshal Alexander to CCS, 6 Aug 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 1582]

1. I am seriously concerned over the uncertainty as to the means whereby the flow of essential supplies to Italy will be maintained after the proposed ending of combined military responsibility.

2. Unless essential food, coal and petroleum products are delivered without interruption, an alarming situation which may involve serious internal disorder faces us. As the result of reports that procurement of these items is not now taking place a damaging loss of confidence on the part of the Italian Government, which cannot plan a sound programme of relief and rehabilitation, is in prospect.

4. Therefore, I ask urgently for assurance that these essential commodities will continue to be supplied without interruption, particularly as regards the part of the programme not already guaranteed financially by the United States, until the end of 1945; and that I be informed of the measures whereby the Allied Governments propose to meet the requirements of Italy during 1946.<sup>7</sup>

#### RELIEVING NEWS—FEA AND THEN UNRRA WILL TAKE OVER

[Paraphrase of Msg (FAN-618), WD to Field Marshal Alexander, 17 Sep 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 8981]

2. Both Governments consider that UNRRA should assume responsibility for providing essential supplies for the Italian civilian population, and the UNRRA council at its session in London has approved a proposal to this effect. However, they have recognized that, if there is to be a continued flow of supplies to Italy, interim supply arrangements will be required to bridge the period between the end of military responsibility and UNRRA's effective assumption of responsibility. This period has, for planning pur-

<sup>7</sup> On 5 September SACMED received a message from the Chief Commissioner of AC stating that he had still not received any information regarding the administrative procedures and the availabilities in the civilian agency supply program after the August loadings of the military. He considered the situation most serious. AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 2554.

poses, been assumed to cover loadings during the last 4 months of 1945, with the understanding that these interim arrangements will terminate at such earlier time as UNRRA's assumption of responsibility may permit.

3. To meet this problem, U.S. Government has included 100 million dollars in FEA Budget for its share of essential supplies needed by Italy, which should be loaded during the assumed interim period. FEA has prepared in consultation with Allied Commission through Combined Liberated Areas Committee Supply Sub-committee a supply program and is taking necessary measures, including procurement, to implement program.<sup>8</sup> \* \* \*

#### SACMED IS AGAIN WORRIED AS FEA PROGRAM ENDS

[Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 14 Dec 45, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 4947]

1. The critical situation in Italy regarding basic civilian supplies makes it necessary that the matter be brought again to your attention even though in Par. 8 of FAN 618 you notified us that it might not be possible to provide relief supplies from civilian sources. However, Par. 9 left the door open for an appeal in an emergency.

2. With December loadings, existing flow of supplies ends, with no assurance of continuation. Should a break occur, I fear grave results which might necessitate the use of Allied military forces to maintain law and order. Every effort should be exerted to prevent development of a situation that would necessitate such action.

3. It is recommended that the appropriate authorities be informed immediately of the importance of uninterrupted flow of necessary supplies to Italy and that I be informed of your action.

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<sup>8</sup> The UNRRA program did not actually get under way until February. Amounting to \$50,000,000, it included, in its supply phase, food for expectant women and for children, and medical and sanitary supplies.

#### THE SUPPLY PIPE LINE WILL CONTINUE

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to Gen William Morgan, SACMED, 15 Jan 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 93035]

2. Necessity for continuing flow of essential supplies to Italy is known to appropriate civilian agencies.

3. Understand that State Department through War Shipping Administration expects to ship in January . . . FEA backlogs from December loadings. . . .

4. Understand that . . . an UNRRA loading program has been scheduled for January.<sup>9</sup> \* \* \*

#### AC MUST CONTINUE TO SPONSOR THE GOVERNMENT'S FOOD MEASURES

[Historical Rpt Submitted by Maj A. J. Parker for the Rationing Div to the Dir, Food and Agriculture Subcom, AC, 1 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/109/480]

\* \* \* It is a marked fact that in the past few months while the Italian Government has been responsible for the administration, the High Commission for Food would not undertake any adjustments of ration scales without prior sponsorship of the Allied Commission. On the contrary, their proposals involving increases in scales were persistently followed up, although in view of deteriorated amassing, the additional requirements could only be met from external sources. That this policy, excellent though it may appear through Italian eyes, can only result in disappointment, is shown by the recent revelations of world staple shortages which may mean a considerable shortening of supplies and reduction of rations for Italy with consequent reactions of the people against the Government. The High Commission was continually warned on the prospect of smaller imports. \* \* \*

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<sup>9</sup> The UNRRA program did not actually get under way until February. Amounting to \$50,000,000, it included, in its supply phase, food for expectant women and for children, and medical and sanitary supplies.

#### 4. WITH ALLIED ENCOURAGEMENT DEMOCRACY AND REPUBLICANISM ARE GIVEN THEIR CHANCE

##### LEFT-WING PARTIES ARE AVERSE TO A REFERENDUM ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

[Memo from Commodore Stone, Chief Cmsr, ACC, for SACMED, 17 Nov 44, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

2. The question has arisen again through publica-

tion in the New York "Times" recently of an interview with the Lieutenant General of the Realm in which the Lieutenant General expressed the view that a more accurate expression of popular will could be secured through the

medium of a referendum, rather than of a Constituent Assembly.<sup>10</sup>

3. When news of the publication in America was received in Rome, the Parties of the Left objected and proposed that a resolution be adopted by the Council of Ministers in which the Lieutenant General was severely criticized. The personal attack on the Lieutenant General was deleted and the following resolution adopted and issued as communiqué:

"The Government, having considered the declarations which appeared in a report of an audience granted by the Lieutenant General of the Realm to a journalist, reaffirms that the political Parties, from which the Government is emanated, are the expression of the will and of the aspirations of the Italian people fighting for its freedom and reaffirms the solemn pledge to decide about the institutional issue through a vote of a Constituent Assembly, as it has been established by a State law."

4. Since the communiqué appeared to be at variance with the assurances I had received from the President of the Council and the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, set forth in para 2 of my letter of 3 July—namely, that the question as to the means by which the Italian people might decide the institutional question would be left for future determination—I called on the President of the Council and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on November 9 for an explanation.

5. They were frank in setting forth the strong resistance of the Parties of the Left to permitting a determination by referendum as to whether Italy should be a constitutional monarchy or a republic, particularly as it is believed universal suffrage will be in effect at the time. They stated that the parties of the Left desire a republic and feel that they are more certain to attain their objective if the determination is made through the medium of a Constituent Assembly.

6. Notwithstanding the language of the communiqué, the President of the Council pointed out that the words in the communiqué "to decide about the institutional issue through the vote of a Constituent Assembly" were limited by the following words "as it has been established by a State law." The law in question, he argued, stated that the *form* of the government would be determined by the Constituent Assembly and not the

*type* of Government. In other words, he continued, the law still does not preclude the possibility that the type of Government—monarchy or republic—could be determined by referendum and the precise form of monarchy or republic, that is to say the Constitution, would be worked out by the Constituent Assembly. \* \* \*

#### ALLIED BAN ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION DOES NOT END WITH LIBERATION OF THE NORTH

[Memo, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 11 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

\* \* \* De Gasperi asked if the Allies were disposed to agree with Togliatti's contention that the Institutional question could be reopened as soon as the North had been liberated. I told him that the language of the December 10th commitment, which is identical with the language of the commitment of June 18th, was unequivocal and was not limited purely to the question of liberation, that the Government had committed itself to that language both in June and again in December, and that I did not see how the question was debatable.<sup>11</sup> \* \* \*

#### AC CONSIDERS A REFERENDUM THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for SACMED, 30 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

1. In discussing the question of the methods of determination of the future form of government of Italy, it is assumed that the primary consideration is the maintenance of the pledges of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain toward the Italian people of a free and untrammelled choice of the permanent form of their Government, and the guarantee that, insofar as possible, the will of the majority of the Italian people shall be carried out. . . .

2. Under present conditions in Italy, it would appear that the ultimate decision affecting the institutional question might be most justly brought about by means of a referendum rather than by entrusting the decision to the constituent assembly. Although it is of the opinion of the Legal Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission

<sup>10</sup> The "Institutional Question," which the Government had committed itself to keep closed until after hostilities had ended and the Italian people as a whole could express their will. In July 1944 the Cabinet had expressed itself in a manner which seemed at first glance to violate the commitment.

<sup>11</sup> The commitment of successive Italian governments to a truce on the institutional question envisaged continuation of the truce until the Italian people should be able to speak their will freely. AC considered that this meant the restoration by the government of the electoral process and free suffrage, which, as will be seen, were soon to be established when the government's preparations for the first local elections.

that Decree Law 151 of June 24, 1944, precludes the Government from deciding this question by a referendum (ACC/4005/L of 6 Oct 1944), paragraph 4 of the same opinion points out that this Decree Law can be at any time abrogated by the enactment of a subsequent similar piece of legislation. . . .

3. . . . In this connection, the President of the Council, Signor Bonomi, expressed to the Chief Commissioner subsequent to the Yalta Conference, the hope that the Allied Governments would require in the peace treaty or otherwise that the Italian institutional question be determined by referendum rather than by constituent assembly "in order to avoid the danger of having this question decided by less than a majority of the Italian people. . . ." It is hardly necessary to add that events and public statements over the past year have shown that if the institutional question were to be decided by the constituent assembly, strong political interests would undertake a concerted campaign to ensure the result desired by them, perhaps without sincere reference to the needs of the Italian people. . . .<sup>12</sup>

#### THE GOVERNMENT PLANS FIRST LOCAL ELECTIONS BUT AC URGES MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE

[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister Bonomi, 19 Apr 45, ACC files, 10000/109/670]

Following the receipt of your letter of 27 February 1945, in which you gave me a general view of your Government's intention with respect to the holding of local elections, officers of the Local Government Sub-Commission conferred with officials of the Ministry of Interior in order to get a clarification and elaboration of your proposed plans. I cannot but feel that the voting methods intended to be used by the Italian Government based upon the 1915 law do not provide sufficient controls and guarantees to ensure the possibility of holding an independent, free and secret vote. . . .

Some of the principal defects in the existing system are:

- (a) no formal nomination of candidates prior to the voting;
- (b) no official ballot paper;

<sup>12</sup> The left-wing parties believed that the large Catholic population might swing a referendum toward retention of the monarchy. But there is no reason to believe that the Allied Commission, in favoring a referendum, was influenced by anything but concern for what seemed the most democratic procedure. As matters turned out, the referendum had a different result from the one the left-wing parties feared (see below).

(c) no control of electioneering at the polling places.

Since the Allies are greatly interested in the rehabilitation of democratic institutions in your country, I feel that I must most earnestly recommend to you that the present election law be amended prior to the holdings of elections in territory under the control of the Italian Government. \* \* \*

#### AC SHOULD SEE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT WITH JUSTICE AND EQUITY

[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, 30 May 45, ACC files, 10000/136/256]

. . . much can and must be done to educate the minds of the Italians with regard to the democratic way of life. We cannot check the march of events but it is not too late to rectify past mistakes.<sup>13</sup> These elections will probably take place before the end of this year. It is essential that they should be carried out on democratic lines and in an atmosphere free from physical fear. The average Italian, if he thinks that the Communists will win the election and will use physical violence against those who have not voted for Communism, will, through fear and with the tradition of 20 years of Fascism behind him, vote for Communism against his own conscience. It is the duty of the Allies, and particularly of the Allied Commission, to ensure that the first elections in this country are carried out with freedom and equity. \* \* \*

#### AMG TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION OF ELECTORAL LISTS

[Directive, Hq ACC to All Concerned, 13 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/620]

2. Although all the Italian legislation upon the preparation of the electoral lists has been given a formal implementation in Military Government Territory, its practical effect has hitherto been confined to Italian Government Territory. With respect to provinces under Allied Military Government, the Italian legislation provided that the procedure for preparing the lists was to be commenced in any such province 10 days

<sup>13</sup> The omitted portion of Brigadier Lush's memorandum indicates that he is here referring to the failure of the two democratic Allies to provide educational measures in behalf of a positive program. He states that officers in the field had already proved the best ambassadors but lacked direction which should have emanated from the two governments. To this end he recommended the retention of Allied Commission officers during and immediately after the elections.

after its return to the Italian Government; no provision was made for any steps to be taken during the period of Military Government. On the representation of this HQ, the Italian Government have altered this by the enactment of Article 5 of the Decree [DLL 201, 12 April 1945] . . . which provides for Allied Military Government to fix the date or dates for commencing preparation of the lists. \* \* \*

3. Authority to fix a date or dates accordingly for the provinces under AMG will be exercised by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer at HQ AC. The RC's through the SCAO's will advise the CCAO as to the earliest date that can be set. The purpose of this directive is to give an indication of the considerations to be borne in mind in this connection.

4. The existence of electoral lists is a condition precedent to any sort of elections—national or local. The preparation of the lists is the first practical step in the return of Italy to the basis of democratic government, namely, the election of representative institutions, and it is thus an implementation of one of the fundamental policies of the Allies towards Italy.

5. The liberation of the whole of the country has brought the matter into even higher relief. Before that event, the lists could only be considered, for practical purposes, in connection with the holding of local elections in those parts of Italy that lay to the rear of our lines. Now, however, the holding of local elections throughout the whole of Italy more or less simultaneously is a possibility. The essential preliminary to local elections, the formation of the electoral lists, is already well under way in Southern and Central Italy; and the importance of not allowing the North to lag behind is obvious.

6. The preparation of the electoral lists and the necessary preliminaries thereto in Military Government Territory are, therefore, a matter of the highest priority and SCAO's and RC's will deal with the matter on that basis. \* \* \*

#### AMERICAN PRODDING ON EXPEDITING OF ELECTIONS

[Note, American Ambassador, 24 August 1945, Used as Basis of Conversation With Italian Prime Minister, 24 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

\* \* \* As soon as honest balloting may be possible, the Government of the United States desires to see Italy commence the reconstruction of its government on an elective basis. With the view to holding national elections as soon as electoral machinery established for local elections is in operation throughout the country, it is felt

that the Italian Government should consider immediately the holding of local elections, commune by commune, as quickly as preparations are completed. The United States Government advocates this course as the best guarantee of national democracy and as the most feasible in overcoming material difficulties precisely because the United States Government recognizes the serious responsibilities as well as privileges accruing to the Government of Italy in holding the first elections since the prefascist period. Such a course will provide already tested machinery for the national elections and would restore to the community, which is the foundation of the state, democratic responsibility. Although the Government of the United States is getting ready to conclude a treaty of peace with Italy, on the assumption that it is a democratic state, it is not possible up to the present time to point to a single commune which has a popularly elected organ of government, even in that territory early liberated and restored to Italian jurisdiction. Consequently it is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that at least communal elections will have been held throughout Italian metropolitan territory before the end of 1945. \* \* \*

#### STATE DEPARTMENT PREFERS SOME PROCEDURAL DEFECTS TO FURTHER DELAY OF ELECTIONS

[Memo, Deputy U.S. Political Adviser for ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 10 Sep 45, ACC files, 10000/141/735]

. . . the Department of State, while concurring in the objections and observations of the Allied Commission Local Government Sub-Commission regarding the Italian Government Law of 1915 feels also that the Sub-Commission should speedily conclude its negotiations with Italian officials to avoid any impression that the Allied Governments are responsible for additional delays in holding local elections. Therefore, while the Italian Law of 1915 may not be entirely satisfactory, the Department would prefer to overlook defects pointed out by the Sub-Commission rather than have the elections held up by disputes over minor points. The present law is not a permanent measure, but one which will be used only for the period prior to decisions on local government by a constituent assembly. \* \* \*

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/109/622, vol. III]

2. . . . the Allied Commission have been careful to refrain from taking "minor points" in its dealings with the Italian Government on this subject. The objections raised to the Law of 1915

relate to questions which, in my opinion, are fundamental to any democratic electoral system.

5. The objection that insistence on these points is delaying the elections does not arise, since the Italian Government is not, in any case, ready to hold elections, or likely to be for some time, for the following reasons:

(a) Electoral Lists have not yet been completed, except in a small fraction of the total number of Communes. . . .

(b) The Italian Government have not yet decided what local bodies or officials are to be voted for by the electorate.<sup>14</sup> \* \* \*

#### A REFERENDUM ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AFTER ALL

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 5 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 1142]

1. Copy of draft decree adopted March 1 by Council of Ministers to be submitted to Consulta on March 5 for consideration has been sent to me by Prime Minister. To be held simultaneously with elections for Constituent Assembly, a "referendum" (actually a plebiscite) to resolve the institutional question is provided for.<sup>15</sup>

2. If a republic is favored by a majority of voters, the decree further provides that a temporary Chief of the State will be elected by the Constituent Assembly. When this assembly drafts and approves the new constitution a Chief of the State will be appointed in accordance therewith.

3. The present regime of the "Luogotenente" will continue, if the majority vote against the constitution of the republic, until such time as a new constitution is decided upon by the Constituent Assembly and the new Chief of State shall come into power.

#### POLITICS ON THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION WILL NO LONGER HAVE TO WAIT

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 27 May 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 89394]

1. . . . The United States Government and His Majesty's government have . . . agreed

<sup>14</sup>In November 1945 the Italian Government enacted the amendments carrying out the Local Government Sub-Commission's recommendations. The task of preparing the lists was a heavy one and was complicated by several legal and administrative factors which arose both from the abolition of the Fascist system and such extension of Italian suffrage as the granting of votes to women.

<sup>15</sup>The Council of Ministers had always taken the position with AC that its decree law of July 1944 did not preclude a referendum on the institutional question. In view

that they shall take the initiative for the purpose of removing all basis for possible charges that the Allies have, by failing to terminate the truce, impeded the activities of the political parties and thus prejudiced the results of the referendum. . . .

2. Therefore, you should at once inform the Italian Government that in consideration of the issuance of the decree laws of the Constituent Assembly and the referendum, and because of the imminence of the referendum and the elections, the Allied Governments consider that the commitment given to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, by successive Italian Governments in respect to the institutional truce are no longer binding. \* \* \*

#### ITALY VOTES FOR A REPUBLIC

[Local Govt Subcom, Rpt for Jun 46, ACC files, 10000/109/617]

\* \* \* On 2 and 3 June the Referendum on the institutional form of the State was held. \* \* \*

On 18 June the Supreme Court of Cassation declared the final results:—

Republic	Total of valid votes	12,717,923=54.2%
Monarchy	Total of valid votes	10,719,284=45.7%
Republican majority		1,998,639= 8.5%

\* \* \* A close technical study of the procedure was made by officers of the Sub-Commission in Rome, Naples and Milan. AC Liaison Officers likewise observed the elections in typical parts of their districts. Full analysis and studies of the figures have since been made by the Sub-Commission.

The reports submitted by the Liaison Officers and by officers of the Sub-Commission, and the analyses and studies above-mentioned show that, in general:—

- (a) public order was good;
- (b) the numbers voting were remarkably high;
- (c) the procedure prescribed by law was properly followed.<sup>16</sup> \* \* \*

of the wording of the decree and the strong preference of the left-wing parties for a constituent assembly, the argument might well have seemed an equivocation. As matters developed, the opposition of more conservative parties to the constituent assembly proved very powerful. In the end the more radical parties yielded, and the draft decree for the referendum described above was duly adopted.

<sup>16</sup>Elections for a constituent assembly to implement the decision of the referendum were held simultaneously with the referendum itself. Local elections had already been held in March and April 1946.

## 5. THE PROSPECT OF AN EARLY AND SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT RECEDES

### A NEW ITALY WHICH EXPECTS A NEW DISPENSATION IN THE PEACE TREATY

[Radio Address, 23 Jun 45, of Prime Minister Parri as Transmitted to Chief Cmsr, AC, 24 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/143]

\* \* \* We have laboriously risen from the depth of the abyss, an abyss of defeat and shame. Under the Fascist Façade a new Italy has appeared; a poor, desperate Italy, but an Italy anxious for its liberty, wounded in its sense of honor. An Italy which has felt the duty and the right of shedding also its blood for its own redemption. We have purified ourselves, fellow citizens, with the blood of our best sons. We have placed a seal of blood on fascism, so that every bridge would be broken and any return to the past would be impossible.

We have risen in the estimation of the world, and above all in that of the three great liberating countries. But we are still far away from the position as a great nation, that our history, our importance, our number assign to us, on equal level and at the side of the other nations united in the democratic construction of the world.

We must deserve this place. It will not be given to us as a gift. We must gain it day by day with our work, hard and serious work, above all in this period in which the course of history is moving most rapidly and is nearing decisive hours for the destiny of Italy.

The boundaries themselves of our country are at stake. Soon the problems and the conditions of peace will be under discussion. The hour of the unification of the North [Venezia Giulia] with the peninsula—let us wish—is not distant. The Allies are showing full understanding of our needs, and it is in your name, Italians, that I express to the three great leaders the solemn thanks of the Italian people. \* \* \*

### MEANWHILE ITALY WANTS CHANGE IN ITS ARMISTICE STATUS

[Msg, U.S. Ambassador Kirk to the Secy of State, 11 Jul 45, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 9]

\* \* \* Parri [the Italian Prime Minister] wound up [a conversation with the U.S. Ambassador] by saying that it is essential to change Italy's armistice status, because at every turn he finds his hands tied by the present regime.

### THE UNITED STATES DESIRES A PEACE TREATY WHICH WILL ENSURE ITALY'S STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE

[Ltr, Acting Secy of State Grew, to Stimson, 15 Jun 45, CAD files, 014, Italy (1-25-43), sec. 9]

The British Government has proposed an exchange of views regarding desired topics for a treaty of peace with Italy. \* \* \*

The general policy of this government is to assist and encourage the conversion of Italy into a stable element among the nations of Europe. The United States repudiates the theory of economic and political spheres of influence. We do not wish Italy to be under the predominant influence of any single power but to be politically and economically independent. Like other powers of her rank, Italy should be encouraged to look primarily to the international security organization for her security in the future. For the immediate post war period, it is our aim to impose only such restrictions on Italy as are necessary to safeguard other countries from Italian aggression; but in order that Italy may have a genuine independence that country should not be so reduced in its defensive forces as to invite aggression. . . .

### THE TREATY SHOULD ALSO ENCOURAGE ITALY'S FRIENDLINESS TO THE WEST

[Ltr, SACMED to the Br CofS Comm. on the Peace Treaty With Italy, 10 Aug 45, OPD files, 336, sec. 6]

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report . . . it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:

a. To establish Italy as a useful and prosperous state.

b. To encourage Italy to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge. \* \* \*

### WAR DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THE VITAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PEACE TREATY

[Paper, Alternative Military and Air Clauses for the Treaty of Peace With Italy, p. 2, Prepared by OPD, 21 Sep 45, OPD files, 336, Italy, sec. 2]

\* \* \* The underlying principle of this [American] policy is to encourage and to assist

the development of Italy as a friendly democratic state. The policy together with the underlying principle is now taken as a guide for the Treaty with Italy.

The American objective respecting Italy is to strengthen the country economically and politically to withstand the threat of totalitarianism and unfavorable political realignment. \* \* \*

#### FOREIGN MINISTERS AT LONDON CONFERENCE DISAGREE ON ITALIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT

[Statement of Secy of State Byrnes, 4 Mar 47, before U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Dept of State Bull, XVI, 486-87]

\* \* \* At London the American delegation insisted that there should be a peace conference so that other states which had fought the war should be given the opportunity to make the peace. The Soviet representative opposed the proposal and the Conference adjourned in complete disagreement.<sup>17</sup> \* \* \*

#### OFFICE OF SACMED IS RETAINED TO KEEP CONTROL OF ITALY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN HANDS

[Msg (FAN 631), CCS to SACMED, 5 Dec 45, CCAC files, 334, AFHQ (5-25-45)]

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that Allied Force Headquarters and the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, should both be retained for the present, the matter being reviewed again in April 1946.<sup>18</sup>

#### AC URGES THAT THE OBSOLETE ARMISTICE BE REPLACED

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for AFHQ, 8 Dec 45, ACC files, 10000/136/91]

1. In your F-55392 of 5 Dec 45 you instructed me to send my views as to abrogating or modifying

<sup>17</sup> The Soviet supported Yugoslavia in its demand for all of Venezia Giulia, and itself wished large reparations from Italy. Although the members of the conference arranged to meet at Moscow three months later to reconsider the issues, the Allies at this point realized that preparation of a peace treaty would take a long time because of the conflict of aims between themselves and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

<sup>18</sup> According to the agreement at the Moscow Conference, 8 November 1943, (see Chapter X, Section 3) the Advisory Council for Italy would assume executive control in Italy at the expiration of AFHQ's military regime. It was therefore essential to retain AFHQ and the position of SACMED in order to restrict the Advisory Council, of which both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were mem-

bers, to its current advisory function. When the Combined Chiefs reviewed the situation in 1946 they decided that because of the continuing troubles and dangers over Venezia Giulia, AFHQ should be further retained. See CCS Msg to AFHQ, 11 Jun 46 (FAN 671), CCAC files, 334, AFHQ (5-25-45).

2. If we follow the public utterances of the leaders of the United Nations the terms of FAN 487 [CCS directive relaxing controls in Chapter XVII, sec. 8] and (notwithstanding certain restrictive financial directives received subsequently) the policy underlying those statements and directions: if we study the long terms of the Armistice and your commentary recently made thereon, we can arrive at only one conclusion, namely, that the Armistice is out of date; most of the clauses have been superseded by events, the remainder have with few exceptions been modified in implementation and the instrument, designed for the surrender of an enemy in war, enjoyed immediate modification as a result of co-belligerency during war and now is practically inapplicable. If it were thought that Italy was ready for a Treaty then it must be admitted that she is ready for a new formal relationship, which, while perhaps less than that of a member of the United Nations is certainly more than that of a defeated nation.

3. Moreover, from the purely practical point of view, an examination of the existing Armistice Terms demonstrates that any attempt to modify or abrogate the articles of the document piecemeal would leave an instrument so tattered and unbalanced as to be quite unsuitable.

4. We recommend, therefore, that the Armistice Terms be abrogated altogether and be replaced by an Agreement of which a proposed draft is attached. \* \* \*

#### ITALIANS ARE BITTER OVER LACK OF INDEPENDENT STATUS

[Pietro Nenni, Speech at Mtg of the Central Comm. of the Socialist Party, 7 Jan 46,<sup>34</sup> ACC files, 10000/136/229]

\* \* \* we owe them [the Allies] gratitude for the little daily bread and the little coal we have, for petrol and for raw materials. But to them to we owe our uncertainty as to our fate and the lack of independent national status. \* \* \*

bers, to its current advisory function. When the Combined Chiefs reviewed the situation in 1946 they decided that because of the continuing troubles and dangers over Venezia Giulia, AFHQ should be further retained. See CCS Msg to AFHQ, 11 Jun 46 (FAN 671), CCAC files, 334, AFHQ (5-25-45).

## ITALY IS OFFERED A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH MINIMUM CONTROLS

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to SACMED, 29 May 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-IN 3676]

1. Paragraph 3 of this message contains the text of an agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime, which was approved on 16 May 1946 by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France. The agreement is to be signed between the Italian Government and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

2. It is desired that you submit the text of the agreement immediately to the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Government and inform him that, if the agreement meets with the approval of the Italian Government, you have been authorized to proceed with its signature simultaneously with the conclusion of separate agreements between the United States and Italy regarding the maintenance of United States and British Governments which will be submitted to the Italian Government in a very few days. As soon as the agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime has been communicated to the Italian President of the Council, you should arrange for its publication in Italy.

3: . . .

1. The additional conditions of Armistice of September 29, 1943, are hereby abrogated.

2. Relations between the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet and French Governments, acting in the interest of the United Nations, and Italy, shall be governed by the Armistice of September 3d, 1943, as modified by the present agreement.

3. The Allied Commission is hereby abolished.<sup>19</sup> \* \* \*

## THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT NOW SEEMS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE PEACE TERMS

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 31 Jul 46, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 6517]

Now advised by Prime Minister that owing to engrossment of Council of Ministers principally with consideration of Peace Treaty . . . it does not seem likely that comments of Government on the British and American agreements accompanying the proposed revised armistice can be transmitted before his departure on 28 July for Paris.

Comment of Chief Commissioner, with which I agree, is that the Government prefers not to take a position . . . until they see at forthcoming peace conference how Italy will fare.

<sup>19</sup> Citation in Political Review by the Chief, Cmsr, AC, before 48th Mtg of the Advisory Council, 18 Jan 46, p. 5. Since the agreement was not even considered by Italy because of engrossment with the issues of the peace treaty, further text has not been included.

## 6. RETURN OF AMG TERRITORY CONTINUES NOTWITHSTANDING OBSTACLES

### WITH END OF HOSTILITIES MORE TERRITORY IS RETURNED DESPITE YUGOSLAV OBJECTION

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 8 May 45, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 2603]

\* \* \* 1. From administrative, political and economic viewpoints it is now possible to return to Italian Government further territory. Most desirable that as many AMG officers as possible should be made available for North. A further advantage of transfer now is show of confidence in and support to Italian Government.

2. Allied Commission was therefore given authority to arrange transfer following territory on 10 May to Italian jurisdiction, subject obtaining approval Advisory Council for Italy: Provinces of Macerata, Ascoli Piceno, Perugia, Terni. Pesaro,

Arezzo, Siena, Grosseto and Ancona less port of Ancona.

3. At Advisory Council Meeting 4 May . . . Yugoslav delegate personally objected to further return to Italian Government of territory as long as Italy objected to transfer of territory to Yugoslav Government. . . .

4. The above-mentioned territory is purely Italian and its ultimate disposition could raise no question. Accordingly it is felt that restoration should take place in accordance with original plans even if consent . . . not obtained by 10 May. We propose to proceed in this manner unless instructions from you are to the contrary.<sup>20</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>20</sup> The CCS did not object and the transfer took place on 10 May.

**SOME THINK AVOWED ITALIAN UNREADINESS  
MUST BE CONSIDERED**

[Ltr, Col C. H. A. French, Rgnl Cmsr, Umbria-Marche Rgn, for Exec Cmsr, AC, 15 May 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

1. I write of a subject which, whenever territory is handed back to the Italian Government, is brought home very forcibly to the Regional and Provincial Commissioners whose territories are being returned.

2. I met this problem at Syracuse and Catania, at Foggia and Campobasso, when the Abruzzi Region was given back, and more forcibly than ever, just recently in the present handover.

3. I refer, of course, to the complaint by the Italians that we hand back too quickly. The reasons given are always the same.

(a) that they have been under a dictatorship for over 20 years and have not the ability at present to govern themselves.

(b) Freedom of speech has been denied them during this period of dictatorship and now that this freedom has been given back to them and they are not afraid of expressing their ideas, they continually quarrel amongst themselves.

(c) they require someone to whom they can turn in case of trouble.

(d) Watching our methods of administration for a few months has only confused them and is not long enough for them to obtain a well grounded experience. \* \* \*

**FURTHER RESTORATION INDICATES FAITH IN ITALY'S  
SELF-GOVERNING ABILITY**

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Secy of Advisory Council for Italy, 8 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

1. With the rapid evacuation to the North of Allied Troops from the remaining provinces of Toscana, the Supreme Allied Commander on my recommendation has come to the conclusion that restoration of certain additional provinces to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government in the immediate future is desirable. Not only does a further restoration of territory at the present time indicate a continuing faith on the part of the Allies in the ability of the Italian people to govern themselves, but enables a number of valuable specialist staff officers to be released for work in the North.

2. I have to inform you, therefore, that the Supreme Allied Commander proposes to restore to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, as of 0001 hours, Tuesday, 19 June 1945, the following provinces:

Firenze  
Pisa  
Pistoia  
Livorno

The communes of Livorno, Pisa and Colle Salvetti will be excluded from this transfer owing to the great importance of the port of Livorno, the great destruction there and to the presence in these communes of extensive Allied Military supply dumps. \* \* \*

**REDEPLOYMENT NEEDS COMPEL RETENTION OF  
NAPLES BUT NOT OF ANCONA**

[Msg, AFHQ to CCAC, MAT-845, 30 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

\* \* \* Allied Commission being instructed to advise Advisory Council For Italy in advance that no objection seen to hand-over Ancona Commune to Italian jurisdiction. Under present conditions, not believed practical to restore Naples Commune. During current heavy movement of troops and material through that port in connection with redeployment of Allied troops in this theater, change in jurisdiction is not desirable.

**MORE TERRITORY IN THE NORTH IS RESTORED**

[Proclamation 16F, SACMED, 4 Aug 45, ACC files, 10000/109/583]

\* \* \* Allied Military Government established by me or my predecessor and all Proclamations and Orders heretofore issued by me or by him or under my or his authority in that portion of Italy comprising the Provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Reggio, Emilia, Apuania and Lucca are hereby terminated as of 2359 hours on the 4th day of August 1945. \* \* \*

**ITALIAN TERRITORY SHOULD NO LONGER BE HELD  
MERELY AS A MILITARY CONVENIENCE**

[Memo, Brig Gen Archelaus L. Hamblen, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for AFHQ Authorities, 26 Aug 45, MTO, HS files, 387.4-2, G-5, AFHQ]

1. Headquarters, Allied Commission in their Signal 4089 of 22 August (MC-IN 13741) recommend that the Communes of Livorno, Pisa, Colle Salvetti and Naples should be handed back from AMG Control to Italian Government administration at the same time as the rest of Northern Italy (less disputed territories). A recommendation to hand back AMG territory in the North

of Italy is now being considered by this Headquarters.

2. It will be remembered that AMG was retained in the Communes referred to in para 1 above although all surrounding areas have been handed back, in order that the military base installations and port facilities in Naples and Leghorn should be adequately safeguarded.

3. The following observations are made in regard to the handback of these Communes being reconsidered:

a. It is the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (as laid down in FAN 536) to restore Italian Metropolitan territory to Italian administration under the supervision of the Allied Commission, with the exception of certain specified territories which do not include the Communes under reference.

b. It is considered that port operations in Naples and Leghorn will not in any way be prejudiced by the relinquishment of AMG control. Military installations can be safeguarded in exactly the same way as anywhere else in Italian Government territory.

c. The time has come when AMG can no longer be retained merely as a "convenience." Only for reasons of vital military necessity can AMG be retained in these areas.<sup>21</sup>

#### REPEATED EFFORTS TO PRY THREE ISLANDS LOOSE FROM NAVAL AUTHORITIES

[Memo, Hamblen, ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, for CinC, Mediterranean, 12 Oct 45, MTO, HS files, 347.4-2 G-5 AFHQ]

2. The matter [of transferring to the Italian Government Pantelleria, Lampedusa, and Linosa] was first raised on 17 October 1944, while operations were still in progress. C-in-C Med [Mediterranean], then replied:

"It is highly undesirable from the Naval point of view that these islands should be released from Allied Military Government at this juncture. C-in-C Med, is in consequence unable to agree." \* \* \*

3. The matter was raised again on 22 August 1945 when it was considered that all operational reasons for retaining the islands had ceased to be valid.

C-in-C Med. replied:

<sup>21</sup> The naval authorities objected to the proposed transfer, but since the reasons cited were not technical naval objections AFHQ overruled them. However, because of the belief that Northern Italy would soon be returned, and the advisability of making the transfer simultaneous with that of the north, the communes were not given back until December, when the north was restored.

"C-in-C Med. is still unable to agree to the transfer of these islands to Italian jurisdiction." \* \* \*

4. . . . It is presumed that you are aware that only two Allied personnel are on duty in these areas at present and that the practical result of the transfer simply means that governmental agencies derive their authority from the Italian Government and not from SACMED: that the transfer has nothing to do with the future disposition of these areas; and that if necessary the same two individuals can be retained for liaison purposes.

5. In view of these conditions it is considered that the CG MTOUSA is justified in requesting that you detail your objections so that he may inform the War Department. \* \* \*

[Memo, CofS, CinC Mediterranean for ACofS, G-5 AFHQ, 30 Oct 45, MTO, HS files, 387.4-2, G-5, AFHQ]

\* \* \* The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, no longer objects to the transfer of control to the Italian Government. He is, however, of the opinion that steps should be taken to limit Italian activities on the islands to ones similar to those already authorized. \* \* \*

#### FINALLY AN AUTHORIZATION TO RETURN THE REST OF ITALY—WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS

[Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 8 Dec 45, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 87681]

\* \* \* 1. All areas in Italy, including the province of Bolzano and the Communes of Colle Salvetti, Livorno, Naples and Pisa, and the Fortress Islands of Lampedusa, Linosa, and Pantelleria, but excepting Udine Province and that portion of Venezia Giulia West of the Morgan Line, will be returned to Italian Administration as soon as possible and in any case NO longer than 21 days after receipt of this Directive. . . .

2. Simultaneously, in respect of any territories which may be retained under AMG, all command functions of ALCOM over AMG will be performed by XIII Corps, reporting directly to AFHQ. Military personnel detached from duty with ALCOM will NOT be utilized as AFHQ Liaison to ALCOM.

3. At times of handover you should inform Italian Government and make public announcement to include statements that:

a. Udine is retained solely for military reasons and NOT because it is considered a disputed area.

b. Return of Bolzano is without prejudice to final disposal of Province under Peace Treaty at which Italian rights will receive full consideration.

4. As regards Lampedusa, Linosa, and Pantelleria, handback of these Provinces should be made at the same time, subject to your obtaining agreement of Italian Government to:

a. Their demilitarization.

b. Your retaining right of inspection to ensure that demilitarization is maintained. You should provide, if you think it necessary, for Allied Officers to be stationed there, as in other parts of Italy administered by Italian Government, to ensure that Allied Military interests are safeguarded. \* \* \*

#### AC OBTAINS AN ASSURANCE ON MINORITY RIGHTS IN BOLZANO

[Ltr, Admiral Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister de Gasperi,<sup>22</sup> 8 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/288]

\* \* \* If the Italian Government could say quite simply, that it was not their intention to turn out of Bolzano any Sud Tiroler born there, whether he opted for Germany in 1939 or not, then, I believe that a very constructive step would have been taken towards a local peaceful settlement. \* \* \*

[Ltr, De Gasperi to Chief Cmsr Stone, 25 Jan 46, ACC files, 10000/136/288]

\* \* \* I am happy to confirm that the Italian Government, faithful to the traditions of democratic Italy, tending to respect the rights and claims of the minorities, has no intention whatever of expelling such German speaking citizens as remained there permanently even if they voted for German citizenship. \* \* \*

<sup>22</sup> De Gasperi succeeded Parri, whose government collapsed during the last week in November 1945. ACC files, 10000/136/120.

## 7. RESIDUAL CONTROLS ARE FURTHER CURTAILED

#### WITH CONCLUSION OF HOSTILITIES ARMY AREAS BECOME MORE PERMISSIVE

[Paper, Political Activities in North Italy, Submitted by Gen Spofford, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ to SACMED's Political Comm., 29 May 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ, G-5:0001]

1. The arrest on 25 May of Nenni, the Socialist Party Leader, on the ground that he had addressed an unauthorized public meeting in the 5th Army area, has drawn attention to the desirability, now that hostilities are over, of ensuring that the same provisions concerning the holding of political meetings should be appli-

#### THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSES ITALIAN GRATITUDE FOR AMG'S WORK

[Ltr, Prime Minister de Gasperi to Stone, CCAC, 1 Jan 46, CAD files, 0057 (3-16-43)(1), sec. 1]

Since the greatest part of the national territory is now being handed back to Italian Administration, it is a pleasure for me to tell you how deeply the Italian Government appreciates the work done by the Allied Military Government for over two years, through memorable events, against all kinds of difficulties and with unchanged feelings of sympathy towards our country.

Such feelings were always answered by those of the population, who considered the organizers of the Allied Military Government sincere collaborators of our reconstruction, while it welcomed the victorious soldiers of the United Nations as liberators.

I am happy to remind you that while the liberation war was raging, AMG had to cope with the worst difficulties: keep away the ghost of famine, bring relief to the refugees, prevent the spreading of epidemics, rehabilitate public services and private industry in devastated areas.

The way in which such difficulties were overcome with intelligence, energy and abundant means will remain a vivid and grateful memory with the Italians.

I beg you my dear Admiral to express to the Allied Military Government the gratitude of the Italian Government and the Italian Nation, and I trust that the friendly attitude inspired by the action of the United Nations will be maintained and confirmed.

cable in Army areas as those which apply in areas behind the Army boundaries under Regional AMG administration.<sup>23</sup>

6. There is no evidence that the meeting which Nenni addressed was disorderly, or could reasonably have been expected to become so, or that it would interfere with Allied Military activities. It appears that the refusal to grant a permit for the meeting was due to an excess of zeal on the part of a local AMG officer with-

<sup>23</sup> Nenni was released almost immediately on his promise not to violate regulations again. AFHQ appears to have been much disturbed by the incident.

in the Army area. It is felt, accordingly, that the instruction contemplated above would serve to clarify the position within Army areas and would prevent incidents occurring in the future. \* \* \*

[AFHQ Instrs to 15th AGP, 7 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/120]

\* \* \* Consider that now hostilities have ceased, permits to hold political meetings should be granted in Army areas as matter of course provided such meetings are not likely to cause public disturbances or interfere with normal Allied military activities. \* \* \*

#### RELAXATION OF CONTROLS IS REAFFIRMED IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS

[Ltr, Prime Minister Parri to Chief Cmsr, AC, 22 Jun 45, ACC files, 10000/136/88]

On behalf of the Royal Italian Government I accept all obligations towards the Allies entered into by the former Italian Government since the conclusion of the Armistice signed on the 3d September, 1943. It is understood that the rights under the Armistice and surrender instrument with respect to control of the Italian Government will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs.<sup>24</sup>

#### FISCAL CONTROLS LIFTED ONLY PARTIALLY AND CONDITIONALLY

[Ltr, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Parri, 18 Jul 45,<sup>25</sup> ACC files, 10000/107/470]

2. In order to implement further the declaration of 26 September, 1944, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain regarding Italy, I am now directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to inform your Government that the intervention of the Allied Com-

<sup>24</sup> ACC and G-5 had prepared this type of commitment in the feeling that the New Policy should be recognized in its terms.

<sup>25</sup> Admiral Stone's letter was pursuant to a directive sent by the CCS. The terms in which the controls were lifted are as interesting for the exceptions as for the rule. The continuation of the war against Japan made it necessary to take precautions against any transactions prejudicial to Allied economic warfare, and accordingly the Italian Government was required not only to keep the two governments informed but also to adopt measures which would ensure against such injury.

mission in Italian fiscal matters and other internal financial affairs will in future be confined to cases involving Allied military necessity. The Allied Commission will assist or advise your Government on financial matters in territory under your jurisdiction only when your Government specifically requests such advice or assistance, which will be given at a high level between the senior officers of this Commission and appropriate officials of your Government.

3. I am further directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to inform your Government that, subject to certain exceptions and conditions which are indicated below, it is no longer necessary to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission prior to the execution of Italian external financial transactions.

4. The exceptions to this general rule are as follows:

(a) the Italian Government is requested to consult with the Allied Commission before authorizing the use of Italian external assets for the purpose of paying claims arising prior to 8 September 1943. Thus all questions relating to the settlement of Italian clearing accounts should be discussed with this Commission before any action is taken.

(b) the Italian Government is requested to direct its exchange control and other appropriate authorities to consult with the Allied Commission before authorizing any external financial transactions undertaken by Italian insurance companies or involving the foreign branches or subsidiaries of such companies.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have stated that, as a condition of the relaxation of Allied control over Italian external financial transactions, the Italian Government is required to keep the Allied Commission fully informed as to the status of Italian external assets [and] of Italian external financial transactions. \* \* \*

6. In conjunction with the relaxation of controls indicated in this letter, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed me to inform your Government that it will be expected to take the following steps:

(a) to establish and maintain an *effective* foreign exchange control agency.

(b) to adopt measures in support of the economic warfare objective of Allied Governments.<sup>26</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>26</sup> In ensuing paragraphs the letter states that the controls will again be imposed if the steps in (a) and (b) are not taken within a reasonable time. It also sets forth further technical exceptions.

**WITH THE CONTINUING WAR ONLY SOME EXPORT CONTROLS CAN BE LIFTED**

[Ltr, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, to Prime Minister Parri, 31 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/1945]

1. I wish to inform you that after 31 July 1945, the activities of this Allied Commission with respect to Italy's exports, will terminate. This decision refers equally to the territory which has already been returned to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and to the territory which is at present under Allied Military Government. This means that the Allied Commission will no longer act as a channel of communication for export orders or for matters referring to the procurement or implementation of such orders.

3. There are certain controls which it will be necessary for the Allied Commission to continue to retain, over Italy's export activities:

(a) In order that the Allied military and civilian supply program may not be impaired by conflicting export activities, the Allied Commission will not continue to screen all declarations of exportable surpluses, [but] will require monthly statistics of exports effected after 31 July 1945, and will have access to all other relevant data.

(b) The Allied Commission will continue to be responsible for insuring that those commodities which have been declared exportable by your Government and which fall under Category "A" . . .<sup>27</sup> are reported to the appropriate Allied authorities and are subsequently exported to the country which such authorities shall specify. \* \* \*

**MANY MONTHS BEFORE ITALY CAN RESUME PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

[Commerce Subcom Rpt, for Nov 45, ACC files, 10000/109/842]

2. (a) Progress . . . was made during the month by the Italian Government's recognition of the Proclaimed and Statutory lists. As soon as these "black lists" had been recognized the Italians were perfectly free (so far as the Allied Governments were concerned) to start private trading immediately.

(b) The delay in so doing has been due to the necessity for the Italian Government to complete the setting up of the machinery required for the smooth functioning of private trade under those controls which the Italian Government desire to establish. \* \* \*

<sup>27</sup> Category "A" covered exports required for the Allied war effort.

**SACMED RELIEVED OF SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY— WITH EXCEPTIONS**

[Msg (FAN-634), CCS to SACMED, 8 Dec 45, ACC files, 10000/109/585]

5. You are completely relieved of Italian supply responsibility except for Venezia Giulia and Province of Udine. Supplies will be the concern of the Civilian Departments of the United States and United Kingdom Governments or the Italian Government programs. Pending further instruction, you should, as President of the Allied Commission, continue to advise and assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programs of supplies for the areas covered by its programs<sup>28</sup> and, when such programs have been established by the Italian Government, review and transmit them with appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee which will transmit them to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the United States and British Governments. You may also give assistance to the Italian Government in connection with the preparation of bids for transportation for the supplies when received in Italy. In addition, as Military Commander, you will have the right to communicate with the United States and United Kingdom Governments on supply matters affecting the security or redeployment of your troops. \* \* \*

**IT IS POLITICALLY INDISCREET TO ENFORCE ALL OUR RIGHTS**

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for G-5, AFHQ, 5 Nov 46, ACC files, 10000/136/123]

1. Paragraph 3 of the so-called Macmillan Memorandum of 24 February 1945 requires the Italian Government to keep the Allied Commission generally informed of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments. Notwithstanding this obligation, difficulty has been experienced in securing full compliance. . . . This question was subsequently the subject of correspondence with Prime Ministers Bonomi and Parri and Foreign Minister De Gasperi in 1945 and culminated in a renewed and satisfactory pledge by Prime Minister Parri on 24 August 1945. . . .

2. . . . recent news dispatches in the Italian press gave indication that the Italian Government had concluded a commercial treaty with

<sup>28</sup> The government's program for rehabilitation supplies, financed by the United States.

Poland without notification to the Allied Commission. . . .

4. My recommendation is that . . . violation, inadvertent or deliberate, of paragraph 3 of the Macmillan Memorandum by the Italian Government cannot be condoned. \* \* \*

[Ltr, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 12 Dec 46, ACC files, 10000/136/39]

The Supreme Allied Commander is cognizant of the violation of the "MacMillan Memorandum"

but considers it inadvisable to approach the Italian Government on this subject, at this time.<sup>29</sup>

\* \* \*

<sup>29</sup> A new government, with De Gasperi as Prime Minister, had just taken office on 9 December. It represented the Italian conservative parties less than those of the Committee of National Liberation, which were more disposed toward economic relations with the Soviet bloc and less amenable to continuation of remaining Allied controls. SACMED was probably cognizant of the new Prime Minister's political difficulties at the beginning of his administration.

## 8. HOW SOON CAN AC BE CLOSED DOWN OR CIVILIANIZED?

### FORECAST OF CLOSE-OUT TIME IS OPTIMISTIC DESPITE TROUBLED AREAS

[Memo, Lush, Exec Cmsr, AC, for CAO, AFHQ, 15 Jul 45, ACC files, 10000/109/256]

3. It is estimated that the winding up of the Regions will take approximately one month. Provincial Commissioners with their civil affairs and police staffs will be withdrawn to Regional Headquarters on September 1st. But the Allied Commission will have to continue until October 1st in nearly full operation and, if to be liquidated, will take until November 1st or even later to dissolve. This fits in pretty well with the life of AFHQ predicted by SACMED at four months \* \* \*

### AFHQ BELIEVES AC SHOULD BE RETAINED UNTIL THE PEACE TREATY

[Memo, Gen William Morgan, CofS, AFHQ, for Dir of CA, Br WO, 7 Sep 45, MTO, HS files, G-5, AFHQ]

3. Although it should be possible to make considerable reductions after the handover of Northern Italy, it will still be necessary to retain the framework of the Allied Commission until such time as the Armistice Terms are superseded by the Peace Treaty. This will be required to perform the following main functions:

a. To co-ordinate Civil Supply matters until such time as this function is assumed by UNRRA or other agency.

b. To act as the agency through which SACMED can give advice to and maintain adequate liaison with the Italian Government.

c. To control AMG operations in residual AMG territories. The latter will for the most part consist of Venezia Giulia where Allied Commission control will be of a technical and not a

policy nature. At the present moment this technical control cannot be undertaken by this headquarters [AFHQ] as the necessary machinery and staff do not exist. . . .

4. I do not think it would be desirable or possible for the Allied Commission to be absorbed into Allied Force Headquarters. Presumably there will be no Allied Commission after the Peace Treaty. It is therefore not worthwhile taking such a large step for only a short period. Furthermore both the U.S. and British Commands in this theatre are about to be reorganized making it well nigh impossible to effect this absorption. \* \* \*

### AGAIN A PROPOSAL TO DEMILITARIZE AC AND AGAIN THE ANSWER THAT CIVILIANS ARE NOT AVAILABLE

[Memo, Stone, Chief Cmsr, AC, for Maj Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, CofS, AFHQ, 10 Oct 45, ACC files, 10000/136/69]<sup>30</sup>

3. . . . It has been, naturally, the objective of the War Departments in Washington and London to be relieved of military responsibility, but few steps have been taken by the Governments on either side of the Atlantic to assist in civilianization by producing either in quality or in quantity the officials necessary to fulfill even the residual functions of the Commission contained in various directives from the CCS. . . . Absenteeism persists in that FEA personnel cannot be relied upon to remain for more than sixty days, and since the recent changes in the constitution of FEA, there has been evidence of a very general desire on the part of such civilians to return to the U.S. rapidly. On the British side

<sup>30</sup> Admiral Stone is referring to the draft of a proposed directive for the civilianization of the AC which was sent by General Hilldring to General Lemnitzer for comment.

practically no civilian personnel have been provided. It is generally accepted in London that it is impossible to secure their services. \* \* \*

5. The result of the detachment of military personnel from the Commission would leave the Commission to function with 50 American and 13 British civilians. . . . The Allied Commission has many responsibilities—some residual, some laid down in CCS directives such as FAN 487 and subsequent telegrams, and some on which policy has been requested.

(a) *Displaced Persons*. Many thousands of such persons are in process of movement and will remain moving for many months to come. In August 180,000 Italians alone came through the Brenner Pass. Some 20 camps and 20 collection centers are in operation. Over 100 Officers are employed. UNRRA, the ultimate organization to handle these people, is quite unprepared to take over fully and will be unready for months to come. So far as displaced persons are concerned, the implementation of the directive would create chaos, suffering, and political repercussion.

(b) *I.P.O.W.* Many hundred thousands IPOW remain to be repatriated. Withdrawal of Allied Officers from this work would create the same conditions as those described in the preceding paragraph.

(c) *Civil Supplies*. UNRRA is not ready to take over. Present CCS directives place the responsibility in AC. The Commission is working on the principle that UNRRA must take over in time (probably 1 January) and a scheme of coordination to this effect is in operation. The removal of Allied military personnel before UNRRA takes over would undoubtedly lead to the total breakdown of civil supplies and their distribution.

(d) *Coal*. Civil requirements for Italy is a responsibility of the Allied Commission. This section is staffed by Allied officers. Their removal would involve a similar breakdown.

(e) *Rehabilitation of Industry* and the guidance of the Industrial Councils is in the hands of Allied Officers. If assistance to Italy in this respect is to remain, the present personnel must remain.

(f) *War Material Disposal*. Much remains to be done. Military personnel are employed.

6. Above are a few of the responsibilities which exist. Policy on others has been requested. Are we to assist Italy in the elections, in the field of Public Security, in her education towards a democratic way of life, in the preparation of a Bill of Rights for her people?

7. The Directive removes from Italy the service

of Officers who for over two years have labored to assist Italy; who have gained a wealth of experience and knowledge in so doing both in the field of Italian economics and political administration. This surely cannot be considered sound policy. The quality of the civilians so far introduced, with a few exceptions, has generally been inferior, their experience necessarily smaller and their contacts fewer. \* \* \*

#### AFHQ DISAGREES WITH THE CCS ON DEGREE OF CURTAILMENT POSSIBLE

[Paper of G-5 on Agenda for Conf at AFHQ, 6-7 Mar 46, ACC files, 10000/136/69]

2. On 29 November 1945, [OPD, CM-OUT 85940] the Combined Chiefs of Staff asked for the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on a draft directive on the reorganization of Allied Commission. This directive virtually reduced the Allied Commission to the status of a co-ordinating body of the Service Sub-Commissions,<sup>31</sup> with the residual function of acting as the Supreme Allied Commander's mouthpiece for enforcing any of his reserved rights under the Armistice Terms which he might find it necessary to invoke. The present functions of Allied Commission in regard to AMG in Venezia Giulia and Udine were to be transferred to HQ XIII Corps who would report directly to AFHQ.

3. The AFHQ view was that it was inexpedient at this stage to dispense with the services of the Chief Commissioner and his staff in connection with Civil Affairs and AMG matters, of which they had wide experience and for the handling of which a working organization was already in being. Moreover there were certain Civil Affairs functions, e.g.; Advice on Local Government procedure in connection with the Italian elections and the review of AMG sentences, which the Allied Commission had already undertaken and which could not conveniently be transferred to any other body. Staff Sections to deal with those functions would therefore have to remain in the Allied Commission, even though the Chief Commissioner was relieved of his functions in connection with AMG.

These views were embodied in AFHQ signal . . . of 12 December 1945 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . which virtually recommended a continuation of the status quo, subject to a gradual reduction in the size of the Allied Commission as its various functions became re-

<sup>31</sup>The Service Subcommissions were concerned with the Italian armed forces.

dundant or were transferred to other agencies, e.g.: the British and U.S. Embassies.<sup>32</sup> \* \* \*

#### THE CCS DIRECTS AC TO REDUCE ITS FUNCTIONS

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to Gen William Morgan, 18 Mar 46, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 81110, Fan-650]

1. After careful examination of your recommendations in MAT 965, it is not considered that paragraph 2 of FAN 634 which instructs that "All Command functions of ALCOM over AMG will be performed by 13th Corps, reporting directly to AFHQ" will be sufficiently implemented. This instruction applies to control and technical advice as well as to policy direction previously coming from subcommissions of ALCOM.<sup>33</sup>

2. It is desired to reduce the functions of ALCOM more radically. This should be accomplished by elimination of subcommissions after their functions have been transferred to other agencies. All directives previously issued to these subcommissions will lapse.

3. Only absolutely minimum functions should be retained by ALCOM for a temporary period. These functions should be reduced by you as rapidly as practicable and the Combined Chiefs of Staff advised when, in your opinion, they serve no useful purpose and can be terminated.

4. It is understood that, in order to maintain liaison with the Italian Government, a small part of your G-5 Staff may have to be located in Rome. That staff will form part of AFHQ instead of ALCOM. Retention of subcommission structure in AFHQ is considered unnecessary in either Caserta or Rome. \* \* \*

#### AC FUNCTIONS ARE CURTAILED BUT ARE STILL SUBSTANTIAL

[Memo, Hamblen, ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, for Chief Cmsr, AC, 9 Apr 46, ACC files, 10000/105/470]

1. In FAN 650 [above] the Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed a more radical reduction of the functions of the Allied Commission. . . .

5. The Allied Commission will be reorganized under the Chief Commissioner to consist of an

Executive Branch and the three Service Sub-Commissions (Land, Naval and Air). No other Sub-Commission organization will be set up. Except for the Service Sub-Commissions all residual functions of the Commission will be covered in the Executive Branch.

6. The Commission is authorized to advise the Italian Government on Local Government matters until the Italian Government elections which are now scheduled for 2 June 1946. Liaison Groups of a minimum size will be maintained in the disputed area of Bolzano and on the Franco-Italian frontier. The Commission is authorized to give high level advice on economic and other problems, listed in paragraph 7 a, b and c below, and will continue temporarily to perform remaining export functions as directed by the C.C.S. No executive functions in economic matters will be carried out. The Commission will continue to perform the functions of the former Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission. Urgent steps will be taken to terminate the military phase of handling displaced persons and to complete the transfer of responsibility for their care to UNRRA, after which the residual functions of the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission will pass to AFHQ. The Commission will relinquish all command functions over military government territory, including not only policy direction but technical advice and control as well.<sup>34</sup>

7. On the effective date of these instructions, G-5 AFHQ will in addition to its present responsibilities become responsible for all residual functions of the Allied Commission except:

a. Those pertaining to the enforcement of the Armistice Terms.

b. Those of advising the Italian Government as listed in paragraph 6 supra.

c. Such other functions as SACMED may from time to time direct. The functions for which responsibility will thus pass to AFHQ will include those now being performed, or in the past have been performed, by the Captured Enemy Materials, Food, Labour, Education, Legal, Agriculture, Industry, Utilities and Fuel, Foreign Trade, Commerce, Communications, Public Safety, Public Health, Public Relations, Transportation, Shipping, Fine Arts, and Finance Sub-Commissions and/or branches. In respect to AMG Territories, G-5 AFHQ will be responsible for all Civil Affairs including import programming on military account.

<sup>34</sup> The effect of this provision was that AMG Venezia Giulia was henceforth to report directly to AFHQ.

<sup>32</sup> Among the arguments used by this cable against undue curtailment of AC was the fact that within its structure there existed the headquarters of AMG (still occupied in Venezia Giulia), which to be effective needed to maintain the closest contact with all Government ministries.

<sup>33</sup> AC recognized the feasibility of giving up its policy direction of AMG in Venezia Giulia but considered it necessary to retain a larger degree of advisory and control responsibility in other matters than the CCS thought necessary.

8. To perform the functions set forth in paragraph 7 supra, there will be set up in Rome a G-5 AFHQ Administrative Echelon. It will deal with the Italian Government on the ministerial and lower levels in matters not involving major policies. In major policies and in all matters pertaining to implementation of the Armistice Terms and pertaining to the residual functions of the Allied Commission, contact with the Italian Government will be made by the Commission. . . .

#### FOR THIS HISTORIANS OWE THANKS

[Paraphrase of Msg, SACMED to CCS, 8 Apr 46, AFHQ Msg files, MC-OUT 338 (NAF 1128)]

1. . . . It is the considered opinion here, after

## 9. THE PEACE TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT U.S.-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS

### THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PROTESTS THE PROPOSED PEACE TREATY

[Msg, U.S. Embassy at Rome to Secy of State, 21 Jan 47, WDSCA files, 014, Italy, sec. 2]

Nenni . . . handed me note concerning final draft of Italian treaty which points out that none of requests for modification of original clauses of draft treaty presented by Italian Government in Paris have been heeded; that treaty shocks national conscience, particularly territorial clauses; and that finally under those circumstances Foreign Ministry must express most explicit reserve and ask that principle of revision of treaty on basis of bilateral accords with interested states under control and within framework of UNO be recognized.<sup>35</sup> \* \* \*

### RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT IN THE TREATY OF PEACE

[Treaty of Peace Between Italy and the Allied and Associated Powers, 10 February 1947, Dept of State Publ 2743, European Series 21]

\* \* \* Whereas Italy under the Fascist regime became a party to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Japan, undertook a war of aggres-

<sup>35</sup> The treaty was signed by the U.S. representative at Paris on 10 February 1947. For provisions concerning Trieste and cession of major parts of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia, see Chapter XX, Section 7. In addition Italy ceded several islands to Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese Islands to Greece, and certain small border areas to France. It incurred the obligation of \$100,000,000 in reparations to the Soviet Union as well as smaller sums to other countries. Great Britain assumed temporary administration of Italian East Africa pending final disposition.

detailed examination and long discussion, that the records of the Allied Commission should be treated differently from records of a purely military nature. . . . Rather than of strictly military interest they will be of permanent primary interest for historical research in Economic, Social, and Political fields as records of an initial effort in Allied Military Government.

3. It is recommended in view of the above:

A. That microfilm copies of the original documents be sent to the War Office and the War Department and that the original documents be placed in a central depository as properly arranged archives. \* \* \*

tion and thereby provoked a state of war with all the Allied and Associated Powers and with other United Nations, and bears her share of responsibility for the war; and

Whereas in consequence of the victories of the Allied forces, and with the assistance of the democratic elements of the Italian people, the Fascist regime in Italy was overthrown on July 25, 1943, and Italy, having surrendered unconditionally, signed terms of Armistice on September 3 and 29 of the same year; and

Whereas after the said Armistice Italian armed forces, both of the Government and of the Resistance Movement, took an active part in the war against Germany, and Italy declared war on Germany as from October 13, 1943, and thereby became a co-belligerent against Germany; and

Whereas the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy are desirous of concluding a treaty of peace which, in conformity with the principles of justice, will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the events hereinbefore recited and will form the basis of friendly relations between them, thereby enabling the Allied and Associated Powers to support Italy's application to become a member of the United Nations and also to adhere to any convention concluded under the auspices of the United Nations;

Have therefore agreed to declare the cessation of the state of war and for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty of Peace.<sup>36</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>36</sup> Article 73 provided that all armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers would be withdrawn from Italy as soon as possible and in any case not later than 90 days after the treaty went into effect.

## U.S. SEEMS TO HAVE DONE THE BEST IT COULD FOR ITALY AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

[Statement of Secy of State Byrnes before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 4 Mar 47, Dept of State Bull, XVI, 487-89]

I might recall that the settlement involving Trieste was the most controversial aspect of our long negotiations. . . . The United States originally proposed that the area west of an ethnic line drawn after careful study by American experts should be the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, leaving the Italian populations of Pola and Trieste joined to Italy. \* \* \*

Yugoslavia supported by Soviet Russia urged the establishment of its frontier even to the west of Italy's pre-1918 boundary. For its contribution to Allied victory Yugoslavia asked to be awarded the whole of Venezia Giulia. Its representatives claimed that the western littoral including the city of Trieste should be joined to its Slav hinterland in spite of the fact that this area was predominantly Italian.

Because of the mingling of the two nationalities throughout the Venezia Giulia area, numerous Italian elements of the population will now be placed under Yugoslav sovereignty. However, the new line does establish a certain balance between the two ethnic groups, and the establishment of the Free Territory does insure home rule to the people of the Trieste area under international guaranties. \* \* \*

I am reconciled to the compromise for another reason—my fears as to what would have happened had our proposal been agreed to and Trieste given to Italy. Representatives of Yugoslavia had announced their determination to do everything in their power to take over Trieste. Nationals of Yugoslavia were daily moving into the city. After the treaty became effective and the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain returned home, it is probable there would be rioting in Trieste. Yugoslavia would declare it necessary to quell the rioting on its border and troops would be sent into Trieste. A disarmed Italy could not stop them. \* \* \*

While the United States did not oppose the requirement that Italy contribute to the rehabilitation of the countries she had invaded, we found difficulty in accepting reparation proposals which were put forward by the various claimant countries. Italy has few raw materials and has relied for her living primarily on the ability of her people to work, that is, by processing goods for export. \* \* \*

After many months of discussion a formula

was found for dealing with the Italian reparation problem which appeared to constitute a reasonable compromise between the conflicting viewpoints. \* \* \*

## U.S. WILL FURNISH ITALY RELIEF SUPPLIES

[Agreement Between United States and Italy, 3 July 1947, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 98]

### \* \* \* Article I. Furnishing of Supplies

(a) the program of assistance to be furnished shall consist of such types and quantities of supplies, and procurement, storage, transportation and shipping services related thereto, as may be determined from time to time by the United States Government after consultation with the Italian Government in accordance with the Public Law 84, 80th Congress, May 31, 1947, and any Acts amendatory or supplementary thereto. Such supplies shall be confined to certain basic essentials of life, namely, food, medical supplies, processed and unprocessed material for clothing, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel, and seeds.

(b) Subject to the provisions of Article III,<sup>37</sup> the United States Government will make no request, and will have no claim, for payment for United States relief supplies and services furnished under this Agreement. \* \* \*

## THE U.S. RENOUNCES WAR CLAIMS AGAINST ITALY

[Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S.A. and Italy Regarding Settlement of Wartime Claims, 14 Aug 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 373]

9. The Government of the United States of America, recognizing the contribution of Italy towards the winning of the war by Italian action since October 13, 1943, and recognizing the conditions and terms of the Treaty of Peace with Italy and of various clauses of this financial agreement, agrees to renounce and waive claims of the Government of the United States of America or its agencies arising out of the following connections:

(a) Civilian supplies furnished, prior to the effective date of this Memorandum of Understanding, under the military relief program;

(b) Dollars transferred or to be transferred to Italy, equivalent to the net lira expenditures of the United States armed forces in Italy; and

(c) Supplies procured with funds appropriated for the purposes of the Lend-Lease Act

<sup>37</sup> Article III provided that when U.S. relief supplies were sold for local currency, the proceeds would be used for relief and work relief purposes within Italy, including local currency expenses of the United States incident to the furnishing of relief.

and transferred to Italy through the agency of the United States Department of War.<sup>38</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>38</sup> In Article I of the treaty Italy waived its own claims, and that of Italian nationals, against the Government of the United States and Americans arising directly out of

the war. The claims renounced by the United States included the payment for relief supplies sent both during the period of military responsibility and afterward under the FEA program. The second waiver, that of expenditures of U.S. armed forces in Italy, had been foreshadowed by President Roosevelt incident to the enunciation of the New Policy toward Italy (see Chapter XVII, Section 3).

## 10. AT LONG LAST CLOSE-OUT

### AC IS ABOLISHED AND ITS FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED TO AFHQ

[AFHQ Staff Memo 3, 31 Jan 47, ACC files, 10000/136/39]

#### 1. *Abolition of Allied Commission*

In conformity with the instructions contained in Combined Chiefs of Staff Signal FAN 711, 11 January 1947, the Allied Commission is abolished with effect from 2359 hours, 31 January 1947.

#### 2. *Reorganization of Office of Chief Civil Affairs Officer*

a. In addition to the functions set forth in Staff Memorandum 48, AFHQ, 14 May 1944, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ, is hereby designated as Chief Civil Affairs Officer. He will assume the duties of that office coincidentally with the abolition of the Allied Commission. He is charged with responsibility for:

(1) Technical control and advice to all Allied Military Government Agencies, but not of the Italian Military Affairs Section, AFHQ. . . . He will exercise operational command over such agencies outside of Zone A, Venezia-Giulia. Operational command over AMG agencies in Venezia-Giulia is vested in G.O.C.-in-C., CMF.

(2) The final review over all Military Government Court cases which in conformity with existing instructions are referred to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

(3) The Administration of Allied Civil Affairs agencies and camps for displaced persons, and for the repatriation of the inmates thereof.

(4) The programming of all AMG imports.

(5) The maintenance and disposition of files and records of the Allied Commission except those pertaining directly to the Armed Forces Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission. These latter records will be maintained and disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued in due course.

(6) Liaison with the Italian Government in connection with the functions herein set forth or as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander.

(7) Such other matters pertaining to Civil Affairs and Military Government as may be directed by the Supreme Allied Commander from time to time. \* \* \*

### PROPOSAL FOR HANDLING RESIDUAL ALLIED FUNCTIONS AFTER ABOLITION OF AFHQ

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 11 Feb 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2265, NAF-1277]

1. After abolition of AFHQ, residual Allied functions will exist. By integrating the G-5 Sections on a co-operative basis, these allied duties can be performed as long as MTO and CMF are functioning.

2. By R plus 90 days all residual allied functions cannot be completed.<sup>39</sup> After R plus 90 days the Historical Section AFHQ, the Allied Forces Record Administration (AFRA), the Allied Financial Agency (AFA), and the Allied Supply Accounting Agency (ASAA) must complete their tasks. A considerable volume of residual allied business in addition which, it is anticipated, cannot be decentralized to other National Agencies or Embassies, will have to be transacted with the Italian Government for an unspecified period after R Day. Matters related to Civil Affairs will be the greater part of such business.

3. Upon disbandment of AFHQ it is proposed that, in order to ensure the early completion of these functions, a Military Liquidating Agency (MLA) be organized. . . . It is proposed that MLA be comprised of separate U.K. and U.S. military units. These will be integrated where necessary and will maintain close liaison under

<sup>39</sup> R-day was the day for disbandment of AFHQ, coincident with the coming into effect of the peace treaty.

coequal commanders who will report directly to War Office and War Department. \* \* \*

**PROBLEM OF UNREPATRIABLE DISPLACED PERSONS MUST NOW BE SOLVED**

[Paraphrase of Msg, Gen William Morgan to CCS, 7 Mar 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 1028]

1. One of our most difficult problems is the military responsibility for disposal, maintenance, and care of displaced persons, and it is causing General [Sir John] Harding and me increased concern. The time when it is imperative that disposal instructions be received has now arrived. It is my belief that failure to take some action well before R Day will cause embarrassment during the evacuation of Allied troops, may render ineffective the Allied policy of protecting displaced persons from forcible repatriation, and may make it difficult within the prescribed period to complete the evacuation.

2. Only four possibilities are apparent in view of the urgency for immediate action.

A. That the Allies terminate their responsibilities and withdraw forthwith all administrative and logistical support. . . . Under the provisions of Article 45 of the Italian Peace Treaty it appears most likely that demands for the surrender of major portion of the presently held displaced persons will be made upon the Italian Government immediately after R Day and, if the DPS are under their control, the Italian Government will be forced to accede to the demands. The Allied protection thus far provided will be rendered fruitless by such action.

B. That under agreement with the Italian Government, Allied Military Forces continue to maintain and hold DPS. Compliance with Article 73 of the Italian Peace Treaty would be made possible by such action.

C. That forthwith DPS be removed from Italy. That provisions for such action could be implemented fully in time to become effective is considered unlikely. . . .

D. That all displaced persons held by the Allies be transferred to the supervision and care of the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees (IGCR) with the least practicable delay. For some time the organization of the Displaced Persons Branch of G-5 AFHQ has been oriented in that direction. . . . This appears to afford the

best solution from the viewpoint of this Headquarters.<sup>40</sup> \* \* \*

**A MILITARY LIQUIDATING AGENCY TO SUCCEED AFHQ WHEN PEACE TREATY TAKES EFFECT**

[Paraphrase of Msg, AFHQ to CCS, 11 Feb 47, OPD Msg files, CM-IN 2265 (NAF 1277)]

2. On "R" Day separate national elements will be established as in Paragraph 3, NAF 1277 [above] to take over residual Allied functions. These elements should be as small as possible and should be reduced progressively; every effort should be made to the end that for completion of residual Allied functions by "R" plus 90 days there will be only a minimum of personnel. \* \* \*

**PEACE IS IN FORCE**

[Paraphrase of Msg, CCS to AFHQ, 15 Sep 47, OPD Msg files, CM-OUT 86325]

\* \* \* Having agreed to simultaneous deposit with the French Government of their respective ratifications of the treaty of peace with Italy, the Governments of France, USSR, UK, and U.S. have made said deposit on 15 September. As of that date the Treaty of Peace with Italy is in force.

**U.S. TROOPS WITHDRAWN BUT INTERDEPENDENCE CONTINUES**

[Statement by President Truman, 13 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1221]

Although the United States is withdrawing its troops from Italy in fulfillment of its obligations under the treaty of peace, this country continues its interest in the preservation of a free and independent Italy. If, in the course of events, it becomes apparent that the freedom and independence of Italy upon which the peace settlement is based are being threatened directly or indirectly, the United States, as a signatory of the peace treaty and as a member of the United Nations, will be obliged to consider what measures would be appropriate for the maintenance of peace and security.

<sup>40</sup>The solution recommended in the final paragraph quoted was adopted. On 30 April 1947 SACMED signed with IGCR a displaced persons transfer agreement which went into effect on 15 June 1947.

**THE JOINT STRUGGLE IS THOUGHT TO HAVE EN-  
GENDERED COMMUNITY OF IDEALS**

[Msg, Prime Minister de Gasperi to President Truman on Day of Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Italy, 16 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1269]

At the moment when all Allied troops have left our soil I wish to assure you that the Italians will forever retain the memory of their liberating action and the brotherhood of arms which united them afterwards with our regular and voluntary forces. Your troops fought in Italy for the cause of liberty and democracy. I shall be grateful to you if you will inform them that the common

ideals for which they shed so much noble blood remain the supreme law of the Italian Republic.

[Msg, President Truman to Prime Minister de Gasperi, 14 Dec 47, Dept of State Bull, XVII, 1269]

I am grateful for your message on the occasion of the departure from Italy of Allied troops. I know that the Italian Government and people are dedicated to the preservation and protection of the freedoms which they have regained, and I am confident that I speak for the American people when I say that we are heartened by the knowledge that Italy stands with the other freedom loving nations of the world in the defense of liberty and democracy everywhere.



PART THREE

SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN PLAN  
FOR THE LIBERATED COUNTRIES  
OF WESTERN EUROPE



## CHAPTER XXII

# Civil Affairs Agreements and Disagreements

From the point of view of civil affairs planning, France and the Axis-occupied countries to the north—Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway—shared basic similarities which called for treating them largely as a unit. Their peoples, in general, were pro-Allied, and all except Denmark and France had governments in exile which enjoyed Allied recognition. The government of Denmark had resigned in 1943 when the occupying Germans proclaimed martial law; the Danish legations in Washington and London continued their previous collaboration with the Allies. Even France was not too different; the French National Committee was recognized in 1942 as the authority which would be dealt with in those areas outside continental France where its forces were in control. In June 1943 the Committee developed in liberated North Africa into the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) which originally was under both Generals de Gaulle and Giraud and later under the chairmanship of De Gaulle alone. Thus civil affairs planners, except for inability to consider the FCNL as more than a provisional authority, adopted one and the same major aim for all the German-occupied countries of western Europe—to secure the maximum co-operation from the populations and governments in prosecuting the war. This aim

was to be achieved mainly through re-establishing the government or elected authority as soon as military circumstances permitted, and meanwhile through using both its liaison officers and loyal local officials as much as possible in the conduct of civil affairs.

Civil affairs in the western European countries were dissimilar to the operations in the Mediterranean which had been initiated earlier. In none of them would the situation upon invasion be handled as in French North Africa, where, because collaboration with an existing central government proved possible, the Allied armies did not have to assume formal responsibility for civil affairs at all. In none of them would the situation be as in Sicily and mainland Italy, which the Allies entered as enemy territory, and which, until Italy surrendered and became a cobelligerent, they occupied on the basis of the law of belligerent occupation. But the greatest difference between the prospective western European occupations and those of the Mediterranean Theater was in the degree of importance assigned to the two. However engrossing the occupations of French North Africa and Italy may have become, they were of lesser importance militarily than the operations which began with the cross-Channel invasion. In view of the basic strategy of the European War, tenaciously advocated by the Americans and later by

the British as well, the invasion of France and other countries of western Europe would have central and not peripheral importance. Aid and resources which became available in western Europe would help in the attack on Nazi Germany; and once the German border had been crossed, all of adjacent western Europe would be of logistical importance as the hinterland of the combat area. Western Europe was of prime political significance also in that the liberated countries had both the material and human resources which would be most valuable to the Allies in their task of post-war security and reconstruction that lay ahead.

For all these reasons civil affairs planning for western Europe was pursued longer even if not more carefully than for any other area. After the planning (which had gone on longest in Great Britain) reached a certain stage its fruits were embodied in civil affairs agreements with all the governments of the area except France and Denmark. These agreements, which contained the basic policy guidance for all planning and civil affairs operations, originated in considerations of policy rather than legality. Under the rules of land warfare it was possible for the troops of a nation to occupy and establish military control over friendly territories if such territories were occupied by, or threatened by, an enemy. Thus by invoking military necessity, Allied Armies would have been able to invade the various occupied countries without any formal arrangement with the governments-in-exile. For a number of reasons, however, the Allies chose instead to base the occupation of friendly territories on the consent of their duly recognized governments.

The initiative in the formulation of written agreements came from the far-sighted British. In June 1942, while still on the defensive, they had set up the Administra-

tion of Territories (Europe) [AT(E)],<sup>1</sup> a cabinet committee, to plan for the civil administration of territories to be liberated. In February 1943 the AT(E) began work on a civil affairs agreement with Norway which was to serve as a model for other agreements. In drawing up these agreements the British felt that it would be wise to make a distinction between enemy countries, which they would enter as conquerors, and enemy-occupied countries, which they would enter as liberators. Since the governments-in-exile of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Norway were recognized as *de jure* governments, planners concluded that clear and distinct understandings with these governments would evoke greater cooperation from the inhabitants, facilitate operations against Germany proper, and pave the way for harmonious relations after the war. Furthermore, some of the governments-in-exile controlled colonial and other resources which, if made available to the Allies, would be of great assistance. For reasons psychological, material, and moral, therefore, it was considered wise policy to enter into written agreements.

When the Norwegian agreement [see Chapter V, Section 2], arrived in the United States the Americans found themselves without precedents to guide them in the consideration of such a document. Nevertheless they agreed that it would be wise to have a full understanding with the countries to be liberated. In the North African campaign General Eisenhower had encountered initial difficulties in dealing with the French, and the agreement he was obliged to make with them was hastily drawn up and of purely military character. With only minor reservations, the new idea of preliminary agreements met with almost immediate acceptance.

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 120, n. 2, above.

Differences arose not over the basic idea but over the question of procedure: whether the agreements should be given their final form by the British in London or by the Americans in Washington. There was much to be said for the British position: the various governments-in-exile were located in London in close proximity to the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander; the British had more experience in handling civil affairs matters; they had a more precise concept of long-term political objectives; and they had taken the lead in advocating and negotiating the civil affairs agreements. The Americans, on the other hand, were to furnish the lion's share of men and arms. Various civilian agencies of the U.S. Government were concerned and they could make their influence properly felt only in Washington. So far as the immediate issue was concerned, Washington won out; the civil affairs agreements were drafted in final form by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and were approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee before being sent to the Theater Commander. The agreements provided at one and the same time for all the authority required by the Allied commander in prosecuting the war and for as speedy a restoration as possible of maximum authority to the national government. Thus they divided the occupation into two phases, in accordance with the anticipated development of operations. In the first phase, in which combat would be intense and widespread, the Allied Commander in Chief would exercise this authority chiefly through liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in a military mission to be established by the government in question; such officers would also be the principal intermediaries between the commander in chief and loyal local authorities who would be retained to the fullest extent possible. The second phase, to be determined by the

Allied Commander in Chief, would be the one in which the military situation had so far eased as to permit the national government to return, and in this phase the Allied Commander would invite the government to resume exercise of its authority subject only to special arrangements, prompted by military necessity, for areas of vital importance such as ports, lines of communication, and airfields. Other provisions of the agreements concerned the aid which would be rendered by the government to the Allied Commander and by the commander to the government, together with a definition of the respective rights of each.

The agreements offered a firm basis for final planning for the countries which had entered into them. On the other hand, in respect to France, the largest of the western European countries and the prospective scene of the invasion, the situation was unclear at the outset and unfortunately was to remain so for some time. In general it can be said that most British leaders and British popular opinion tended to favor De Gaulle as representing the spirit of resistance and the will of the French people. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, on the other hand, questioned that the French leader really represented the French people. The President was willing for General Eisenhower to have informal discussions with the FCNL but did not want him to consider that this precluded discussions with other French resistance groups.

In the divided counsels over the French Committee, General Eisenhower found himself in a difficult position. He occupied the dual role of Commanding General, European Theater of Operations U.S. Army, responsible to the War Department, and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His main—in fact, only—concern in the problem of the civil administration of France was to

receive maximum help from the French with minimum interference from the civilian population. His military needs, however, could not in all respects be easily reconciled with the political decisions reached on a higher level, and it was impossible for him to plan for civil affairs administration in France with any certainty under the limitations that the President's policy imposed upon him.

In a message of 19 January 1944 to the CCS and the CCAC he pointed out the need for an immediate crystallization of plans relating to civil affairs in France, stated that this required conferences with properly accredited French authorities, and requested that General de Gaulle be asked to designate an individual or group of individuals with whom he could enter into immediate negotiations in London. Soon afterward the Assistant Secretary of War informed him that he could feel free

to enter into discussions with representatives of the FCNL, as with any other French resistance group, should such discussions seem necessary for progress in civil affairs planning. This communication, however, did not seem to indicate any change in the President's basic thinking, nor did it meet clearly the issue which General Eisenhower had raised. On 15 March, through a letter to the Secretary of War which was to be redirected to General Eisenhower, the President reaffirmed that though the Supreme Allied Commander could consult with the FCNL informally he was not to assume an exclusive relationship with this committee, or do anything to imply its political recognition. This policy not only left De Gaulle dissatisfied, it left an uncertainty overhanging all civil affairs planning for France—an uncertainty which in fact was to last till after D-day.

## I. A DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH DELEGATES CA TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT AS FAR AS COMPATIBLE WITH MILITARY NEEDS

### MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE MAY BE CONSULTED ON CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

[Msg, CM-OUT 1381, from CAD to CG ETOUSA, 1 Oct 43, CAD, files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 1]

Military representatives of the exiled governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the French Military Administration may be consulted in planning for civil affairs in their respective liberated countries at such times and to such extent as you may determine. . . .

### CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION IN LIBERATED NORWAY

[U.S.-Norwegian Draft Agreement, JCS 398/3, 29 Jan 44, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]

The discussions which have taken place between the representatives of Norway and the United States of America concerning the arrangements to be made for civil administration and jurisdic-

tion in Norwegian territory liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force under an Allied Commander in Chief, have led to agreement upon the following broad conclusions.

The agreed arrangements set out below are intended to be essentially temporary and practical and are designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Commander in Chief and to further our common purpose, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Norway and the final victory of the Allies over Germany.

1. In areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the Commander in Chief of the Expeditionary Force on land must, to the full extent necessitated by the military situation, exercise supreme responsibility and authority.

2. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, the military situation permits, the Norwegian Government will be notified in order that they may resume the exercise of responsibility for the civil administration, subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the

Allied forces, such as ports, lines of communication and airfields, and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied forces of such other facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

3. *a.* During the first phase the Commander in Chief will make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance which will be tendered to him through Norwegian liaison officers attached to his staff for civil affairs and included in the personnel of a Norwegian military mission to be appointed by the Norwegian Government. He will also make the fullest possible use of loyal Norwegian local authorities.

*b.* The Norwegian liaison officers referred to in subparagraph *a* above will, so far as possible, be employed as intermediaries between the Allied military authorities and the Norwegian local authorities.

4. During the first phase the Norwegian Government will assist the Commander in Chief by reorganizing or reestablishing the Norwegian administrative and judicial services through whose collaboration the Commander in Chief can discharge his supreme responsibility. For this purpose the Norwegian Government will act through its representatives on the spot, who, for practical reasons, will be included in the Norwegian military mission referred to in subparagraph *3a* above.

5. The appointment of the Norwegian administrative and judicial services will be effected by the competent Norwegian authorities in accordance with Norwegian law. If during the first phase (see paragraph 1 above) conditions should necessitate appointments in the Norwegian administrative or judicial services, the competent representative of the Norwegian Government will, upon the request of the Commander in Chief and after consultation with him, then appoint the requisite officials.

6. Members of the Norwegian armed forces serving in Norwegian units with the Allied Expeditionary Force in Norwegian territory shall come under the exclusive jurisdiction of Norwegian courts. Other Norwegians, who, at the time of entering Norway as members of the Allied Expeditionary Force, are serving in conditions which render them subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, will not be regarded as members of the Norwegian armed forces for this purpose.

7. In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the Norwegian Government will make the necessary arrangements for insuring the speedy trial in the vicinity by Norwegian courts of such civilians as are alleged to have committed

offenses against the persons, property, or security of the Allied forces, without prejudice however to the power of the Commander in Chief, if military necessity requires, to bring to trial before a military court any person alleged to have committed an offense of this nature.

8. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 15, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied forces respectively and over all persons of non-Norwegian nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to Allied naval, military, or air force law. The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen as are not subject to Allied service law will require special consideration and should form the subject of a separate agreement.

9. Persons thus subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may, however, be arrested by the Norwegian police for offenses against Norwegian law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied service authority. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent, that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in paragraph 8, shall be conclusive. The procedure for handing over such persons is a matter for local arrangement.

10. The Allied Commander in Chief and the Norwegian authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or Norwegian jurisdiction.

11. There shall be established by the respective Allies claims commissions to examine and dispose of claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred by Norwegian civilians against the Allied forces exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.

12. Members of the Allied forces and organizations and persons employed by or accompanying those forces, and all property belonging to them or to the Allied Governments, shall be exempt from all Norwegian taxation (including customs) except as may be subsequently agreed between the Allied and Norwegian Governments. The Allied authorities will take the necessary steps to insure that such property is not sold to the public in Norway except in agreement with the Norwegian Government.

13. The Commander in Chief shall have power to requisition billets and supplies and make use

of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of the forces under his command. Requisitions will be effected where possible through Norwegian authorities and in accordance with Norwegian law. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of Norwegian liaison officers attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief.

14. The immunity from Norwegian jurisdiction and taxation resulting from paragraphs 8 and 12 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments present in Norway on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Expeditionary Force as may from time to time be notified by the Commander in Chief to the competent Norwegian authority.

15. Should circumstances in future be such as to require provision be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-Norwegian members of the Allied forces present in Norway, the Allied Governments concerned and the Norwegian Government will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

16. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of Norwegian territory by an Allied Expeditionary Force (in particular questions relating to finance and currency and the attribution of the cost of maintaining the civil administration during the first or military phase) which are not dealt with in this agreement shall be regarded as remaining open and shall form the subject of further negotiation as circumstances may require.

## 2. CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS ARE CONSUMMATED

### BRITISH SUGGEST THAT NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN

[Memo by Representatives of the Br CsofS, CCS-445, 22 Dec 43, CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. 1]

1. The progress of events in Europe and the possibility of an early collapse of Germany make it important that discussions should be opened without further delay between COSSAC and the military authorities of Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium on the machinery to be set up in those countries in connection with the administration of civil affairs.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*

4. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that instructions should be issued to COSSAC by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the discussion of civil affairs problems with the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian military authorities to be initiated forthwith within the scope of the principles laid down in the draft agreements with those governments. \* \* \*

### TEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DRAFT AGREEMENTS

[Ltr, Sir Henry F. MacGeagh, JAG, to Bovenschen, 16 Dec. 43, Incl to Memo of Birley to Hilldring, 27 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43)(1)]

I undertook at this [A.T.(E)] Committee meeting of the 2d inst. to let you have a note on the differences that exist in the texts of the draft agreements that my Legal Subcommittee have negotiated with the Norwegian, the Belgian, and

<sup>1</sup>For discussion of this subject, see Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 139-40.

the Dutch representatives, which you could pass to General Devers when you send him the Belgian and Dutch provisional drafts. \* \* \*

In the result it will be seen that we were able to arrive at agreements with the Belgian and the Dutch which, both in substance and in form, are similar to that negotiated with the Norwegians. It was inevitable, if there was to be any reality in our negotiations with the representatives of three nations differing in their juridical outlook, that there should be minor differences in the texts, but in my opinion, such differences as exist do not in any way modify the requirements of ourselves and the U.S.A. as covered by the Norwegian agreement. \* \* \*

It is clear from the Norwegian agreement that the basis for the exercise of supreme responsibility and authority by the Commander-in-Chief is recognized to be military necessity. Rather more emphasis is placed on this in the Belgian agreement . . . and in the Dutch agreement . . . by the insertion of "de facto" and also by the recital in the preamble to the Dutch agreement that "these arrangements in no way affect the sovereignty of the Netherlands Government." \* \* \*

Paragraph 3(a) of the Dutch agreement introduces new matter relating to the decree concerning a special state of siege, and finds what is to some extent its counterpart in paragraph 4 of the Belgian agreement, relating to such special legislation as may be required. Neither paragraph affects the overriding power, responsibility and authority of the Commander-in-Chief which is based on military necessity, and not on Belgian

or Dutch law. It is obviously more advantageous that the Commander-in-Chief's requirements should, as far as possible, be met through Belgian and Dutch authorities exercising powers granted, under existing special laws or such additional legislation as may be required, rather than that he should have to resort to his own overriding powers. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY NECESSITY AS BASIS OF SAC'S AUTHORITY

[Memo, Hilldring for JCS, 28 Dec 43, CCS-445, CAD files, 321 (12-21-43)(1), sec. 3]

\* \* \* 2. The proposed [Netherlands] agreement is similar in framework and follows the general pattern as approved by the CCS for civil administration in Norway except in one major vital respect. It is clear from the Norwegian agreement that the authority and responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief is supreme and flows by operation of international law based on military necessity. In the proposed agreement for The Netherlands the authority of the Allied Commander seems to stem out of an existing Netherlands special law establishing a state of siege. In the initial and military phase this arrangement may hamper the field force commander.

3. There are minor objections that deal with matters of form and drafting rather than substance.

4. The proposed agreement is in the hands of General Devers who will transmit it to the War Department, together with his comments and recommendations.

#### III. Recommendations.

It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, withhold approval . . . until the comments of General Devers are known and a further report is submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Civil Affairs Division.

#### AMERICANS MODIFY AGREEMENT WITH THE NETHERLANDS

[Memo, Hilldring to CofS, 7 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43)(1)]

1. A draft agreement between the British and the Netherlands Governments was informally negotiated in London. The draft as submitted was similar to arrangements with the Norwegian Government as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 274 Series).

2. A copy of the Netherlands draft agreement was handed to General Devers with a view of obtaining comments or formal approval to the

agreement of the War Department and other U.S. departments concerned.

3. At a meeting on 6 January 1944, in the office of the Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, attended by representatives of The Netherlands Government, Mr. James C. Dunn of the State Department, and General J. H. Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs Division, there was considered the draft agreement. The representatives of the United States proposed modifications which were incorporated into the agreement. The agreement as modified was transmitted to The Netherlands Government. The Agreement incorporating United States modifications . . . is acceptable to The Netherlands Government.<sup>2</sup> The State Department concurs.

4. The changes proposed by the United States are considered necessary to fully protect the Supreme Allied Commander in the accomplishment of the military purposes of the operation.

5. The State Department recommends that the agreement with The Netherlands Government be consummated on a military level. Mr. van Vredenburg, Counselor of The Netherlands Embassy, informs the State Department that the agreement would be signed on the Dutch side by The Netherlands Minister for War. \* \* \*

[Msg, WD to CG, ETOUSA, CM-OUT 11877, 28 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43)(1)]

. . . Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that you consummate this agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of The Netherlands government in London. . . . It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the U.S. and British agreements with The Netherlands government may be arrived at simultaneously, if possible. . . .

#### THE AMERICAN AGREEMENT WITH BELGIUM TO BE CONSUMMATED AT A MILITARY LEVEL

[Dir, CAD, Report on Administration of Civil Affairs in Belgium, JCS-697, 9 Feb 44, CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. 1]

7. In connection with the U.S.-Norwegian arrangements for civil administration, the Secretary of State has stated his preference for the agreement to be consummated on a military level. The State Department stated that they desire that the same procedure be followed in the consummation of the U.S.-Belgian Agreement.

<sup>2</sup>Text of this Agreement will be found in file cited above.

### Recommendation

8. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:

a. To recommend approval of Appendix "A" [draft agreement] by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That if Appendix "A" is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consummate the agreement on a military level with the Belgian Government.

[Msg, WD to CG, ETOUSA, CM-OUT 9898, 23 Feb 44, CAD files, 014, Belgium (11-14-42)(1)]

. . . Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that you consummate this Agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of the Belgian government in London.<sup>3</sup> The content of this agreement will be identical with the text in JCS 697 already furnished you, approved by the JCS February 12, 1944 and as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 445 on February 18, 1944. It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the U.S. and British Agreements with the Belgian Government may be arrived at simultaneously, if possible. . . .

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT IN LUXEMBOURG ALSO TO BE CONSUMMATED AT A MILITARY LEVEL<sup>4</sup>

[Msg, CCS for Eisenhower, 21 Feb 44, CCAC files, 014, Luxembourg (2-2-44), sec. 1]

. . . You are authorized to deal directly with the Luxembourg Government and their military representatives in London. For the purposes of planning for Civil Affairs, the proposed agreement for Civil Administration in Belgium should be used as a basis for planning for Civil Affairs in Luxembourg. In due course, formal agreements similar to those negotiated with the Belgian Government will be entered into with the

<sup>3</sup> Text of this Agreement will be found in CCAC files, 014 (12-22-43), sec. 1.

<sup>4</sup> CAD took the view that there was no necessity for formal agreement with Luxembourg but that General Eisenhower should be authorized to deal directly with that government, using the Belgian agreement as a basis for planning. The British took an opposite view and suggested that either the Belgian agreement be extended to cover Luxembourg or that a separate agreement be concluded along similar lines. The matter was referred to the State Department which recommended the British plan. As a result, the message of 21 February was sent to Eisenhower.

Luxembourg Government but these should not delay your approach to the Luxembourg Government as mentioned above.

[Msg, Hilldring to Eisenhower, 23 Jun 44, CAD files, 014, Luxembourg (4-1-44)(1)]

. . . JCS direct that you consummate this agreement on a military level with the appropriate agency of the Luxembourg Government in London. The context of this agreement will be identical with the text of enclosure "A," in CCS 493/2 [Civil Affairs Agreement and Directive for Luxembourg] already furnished you. . . . It is desirable that prior to the execution of the agreement you consult with the British in order that the United States and British agreements with the Luxembourg Government may be arrived at simultaneously if possible. The original of the United States-Luxembourg Agreement as consummated will be forwarded to the JCS with the report of your negotiations.<sup>5</sup>

#### PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS WITH THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, AND NORWAY

[Dept of State Press Release, 16 May 44, CAD files, 014, Belgium (11-14-42)(1)]

\* \* \* These agreements are intended to be essentially temporary and practical in character. They are designed to facilitate the task of the Supreme Allied Commander and to further the common purpose of the governments concerned, namely, the speedy expulsion of the Germans from Allied territory and final victory of the Allies over Germany.

The Agreements recognize that the Supreme Allied Commander must enjoy *de facto* during the first or military phase of the liberation . . . such measure of supreme responsibility and authority over civil administration as may be required by the military situation. It is laid down that as soon as the military situation permits . . . [the various governments] shall resume their full constitutional responsibility for civil administration on the understanding that such special facilities as the Allied forces may continue to require . . . will be made available for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

The Soviet Government has been consulted regarding these arrangements and has expressed its agreement.

<sup>5</sup> This Agreement will be found in CAD file cited above.

### 3. BRITISH AND AMERICANS FIND THEMSELVES AT LOGGERHEADS OVER THE DE GAULLE COMMITTEE<sup>6</sup>

#### THE BRITISH PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT WITH FCNL IN THE FORM OF A DIRECTIVE TO THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF

[Ltr, Bovenschen, Chairman of AT(E) to Devers, CG, ETOUSA, 4 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1)]

As you may have heard from the officers of your Headquarters who are members of the AT(E) Committee, we considered at our meeting on Thursday, a paper . . . dealing with the policy to be followed as regards civil administration in Metropolitan France on its liberation by Allied Forces.

As you will see, the policy has been planned for purposes of convenience, in the form of a draft directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but the basic principles on which the directive has been drawn up are set out in paragraph 3 of my covering note. As is stated at the head of the directive, the draft only covers the political (including administrative and legal) section and would clearly require supplementing on other aspects of civil administration such as fiscal, economic, etc.

It was agreed by the AT(E) Committee that I should ask you to be good enough to send the attached papers to the War Department for their approval, with the request that any detailed comments they might have to make on the principle or text of the directive, should be forwarded to you for discussion with us in London on the lines we followed in the case of the Norwegian agreement. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Devers, CG, ETOUSA to Chief, CAD, 13 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1)]

1. The Chairman of the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee [Bovenschen] has forwarded to me a draft directive dealing with the policy to be followed for civil administration in Metropolitan France on its liberation by Allied Forces, and has asked that it be forwarded to the War Department for its approval. . . .

2. The paper is cast in the form of a directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but it is also intended to serve as a basis for an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States on the one hand, and the French Commit-

tee of National Liberation on the other. It is apparent that the document in its present form raises a number of questions of policy which will be of interest to the War Department, and possibly to the State Department as well.

3. . . .

It is believed that the spirit of the document in its entirety may not be consistent with the President's communication regarding the recognition of the French Committee, in which he stated that "The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen." The proposed directive, by committing the military commander in advance to undertake dissolving certain specified political groups, might have unfortunate consequences in practice. \* \* \*

#### BUT AMERICANS PREFER A DIRECTIVE WHICH AVOIDS SEEMING AGREEMENT WITH FCNL

[Memo, Marcus for Chief, CAD, 17 Sep 43, CAD files, 014, (3-8-43)(1)]

2. The paper [the proposed British draft] is cast in the form of a directive to the Allied Commander in Chief, but it is intended to serve as a basis for an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States upon the one hand, and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other.

3. The American draft directive on this subject is based on the assumption that there will be no written agreement with the French Committee. It is my opinion that there should be no such agreement. Representatives of the Committee would be invited to participate in our planning, but it would not be considered within our policy to recognize the Committee to the extent of entering into a written agreement with it relative to the status of Allied troops in France.

4. The proposed British Directive is basically very similar in character to the American draft, but the American draft is brief and definite whereas the British draft includes provisions which it is unnecessary to mention in a directive. The latter partakes too much the form of an agreement. In particular, the British draft does not sufficiently establish that our troops will possess the powers and authority of an occupying force. If this point is definitely established as in the American draft, many of the provisions contained in the British draft become superfluous. \* \* \*

<sup>6</sup> For details on use of resistance forces and recognition of French Committee of National Liberation, see Pogue, *Supreme Command*, VIII, 140-57.

## AMERICANS BRING THEIR DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON FRANCE BEFORE CCAC

[Min of 12th Mtg, CCAC, 30 Sep 43, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

### \* \* \* *The Committee:*

a. Took note that the British Embassy will consult with the State Department regarding certain basic political questions involved in the proposed Directive.

b. Took note that British officials in London are now attempting to solve the problem of what group should have jurisdiction to consider the proposed Directive.

c. Agreed that the British members would refer the proposed Directive (except for Section 2 of Enclosure "B") to London for their information, with the statement that it represents the preliminary views of the U.S. members.

## A COMPROMISE PROVIDES FOR AN FCNL MILITARY MISSION

[JCS Memo for Info No. 146; Tripartite Conf of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, 19-30 Oct 43, an. No. 5. The following document, which was presented to the Conference as the agreed US-UK view, was known as the Dunn-Wright Agreement, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

### *Civil Affairs for France*

The primary purpose of the Allied landing in France will be the defeat of Germany. Subject only to this, it will be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority may be able to assume the civil administration. The ultimate aim of the Allies is the free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live. Meanwhile and until this stage is reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security shall be restored to the French people. As far as the over-riding interests of military operations allow, there shall be freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press, and of correspondence. The French flag shall be used on French public buildings.

With these considerations in mind, the following principles may be laid down as governing the civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities.

1. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity requires, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war

against Germany may continue unhampered.

2. The Civil Administration under the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French Officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in France.

3. The two Governments will inform the French Committee of National Liberation that the Supreme Allied Commander will invite the French military authorities to appoint a military mission on civil affairs to his headquarters. The Supreme Allied Commander shall in the planning of civil affairs consult the French military authorities appointed to assist in this work and give consideration to the policies recommended by them. When operations start the French Military Liaison Mission shall be associated in the direction of civil affairs.

4. Military control of civil affairs will be of as short duration as is practicable. The time of termination of military control will be decided by C.C.S. on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.

5. If circumstances permit, the transfer of civil responsibility to French hands may be progressive.

6. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander shall do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.

## BRITISH TRY A NEW TACK: DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

[Ltr, Secy of State Hull to the President, 24 Nov 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 2]

You will recall that just prior to my departure for Moscow you approved a paper entitled "Civil Affairs for France" which outlined the basic principles under which the Supreme Allied Commander would operate with regard to civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities. This paper had likewise received the approval of our War Department and subsequently was approved by the British Government. It was submitted to the Moscow Conference and by agreement with the British and Russian Delegations was referred to the European Commission. In view of the urgency of the matter and possible delay in setting up the Commission we suggested informally to the British that the Foreign Office might wish to

take immediate steps to clear it in London through the American and Soviet Embassies.

The British Foreign Office has, however, now come back with suggestions for an entirely different approach communicated in a memorandum left with the Department by the British Embassy.

The British memorandum sets out that the British Government feels "that in view of recent changes at Algiers and in particular of the fact that the French resistance movements, whose roles will be of such importance when Allied landings take place, are now strongly represented on the Committee, the collaboration of the French Committee and of the French military authorities may be impossible to obtain unless the matter is cleared on the Governments level with the French Committee before the Allied military authorities get in touch with the French military authorities in the matter. And French co-operation in the planning, and later in the actual work of civil administration, is essential to its success."

The memorandum also states that the British Government anticipates that since the Russian Delegates raised the matter at Moscow the Russians will again revert to the question of "the status and role of the French Committee" as soon as discussion is resumed with them. Consequently, the British feel, the memorandum continues, that "since this question raises an important aspect of a combined Anglo-American operation, it would be desirable that Anglo-American agreement should be reached before discussions are opened with the Soviet Government" and that for these reasons the British Government sees "no practical alternative to an early discussion of the whole problem with the French Committee, and feels that this ought to be done very soon if events are not to overtake action."

A similar approach has been made by [Charles B. P.] Peake of the Foreign Office to [William] Phillips in London and COSSAC requests an early reply. Phillips telegraphs in part as follows:

"(3) The proposed basic scheme envisages a French director of civil affairs. Manifestly his authority and responsibility would not extend to appropriate parts of the zone of operations until military conditions therein permit. However, under Rankin 'c' conditions, which envisage a Nazi collapse and the cessation of organized resistance by the German forces, on or before D day, there would arise an almost immediate need for the establishment of a provisional French administration for virtually all France. It would appear that the only available organization capable of handling such a situation in the large areas outside the corridors through which our

forces will pass, is the French National Committee which now has the support of the resistance groups. The Foregoing refers only to Rankin 'c.'

"(4) In the case of OVERLORD, this situation would probably not arise until very extensive areas of France have been liberated. Until this situation arises, the French director's responsibility would be necessarily limited to provide civil administration in areas to the rear of the fighting zone and then only as the military situation permits a progressive transfer of civil responsibility to him.

"(5) Therefore, the immediate and pressing problem now before us is . . . Rankin 'c.'"

As you will observe, giving the changes in the French Committee as their reasons, the British have now advanced a basic contention that we should agree to negotiations with the French Committee relative to the basic civil affairs formula on a governmental level rather than the previous arrangement of dealing with French military authorities on a combined operational level.

I should appreciate receiving your instructions as to the nature of the reply you wish made to this British suggestion as well as to the proposal that the French Committee be permitted to assume control of "virtually all France" under Rankin 'c' conditions.

#### PRESIDENT REFUSES TO GO ALONG WITH BRITISH IN ANY FINAL DECISIONS ON FRENCH CIVIL AFFAIRS OR DE GAULLE

[Msg, President, at SEXTANT Conf (Cairo), to Secy of State, 26 Nov 43 (Quoted in Ltr, Hilldring to SW, 28 Nov 43), CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 2]

\* \* \* I am convinced that no final decisions or plans concerning Civil Affairs for France should be made at this time. Entire North African situation is complicated but the Lebanon affair illustrates the general attitude of the Committee and especially de Gaulle. The latter now claims the right to speak for all France and talks openly of plans to set up his government in France as soon as the Allies get in.

The thought that the occupation when it occurs should be wholly military is one to which I am increasingly inclined.

Although I may discuss it informally with the Russians, I see no need for further discussion at this time.

Four days ago I saw Vishinsky and I don't believe the Russians will press for any immediate action. I am showing this to the Prime Minister and until we can see the picture more clearly I hope we can hold up the entire matter.

PLANNING FOR FRANCE TO GO AHEAD DESPITE  
PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE

[Memo, Hilldring, Chief, CAD, to CG, ETOUSA, 6 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 2]

1. On Friday, 26 November 1943, a message was received by the Secretary of State from the President at SEXTANT [above]. . . . We were concerned over this message as under a strict interpretation all Civil Affairs planning for France would have to be suspended until receipt of a further directive from the President. It was thought that such suspension at the present time might result in failure to have a comprehensive French civil affairs plan available for D day.

2. In view of these considerations and following discussions with the State Department the following conclusions were reached regarding the President's directive:

a. That the directive should be made available to Generals Devers and Barker and to Mr. Phillips [State Department representative at COSSAC].

b. That it would be desirable to authorize our representative in London to discuss this directive with the British.

c. That because of the time factor, printing AM francs should go forward without delay.

d. That as final decisions on early phases of relief and rehabilitation in France rest with U.S. and U.K. Armies, discussions in Washington with Mr. [Jean] Monnet on this subject may be continued under the directive.

3. These conclusions were transmitted to Mr. McCloy at SEXTANT by cable dated 30 November. . . . The same cable pointed out that General Barker is most anxious for some political guidance on tentative French planning and that it would be most helpful if we could advise him that he may proceed with such planning on a combined basis using the Dunn-Wright tentative formula for France as his basis. . . .

4. The reply . . . to the cable mentioned in the preceding paragraph states in substance that the President only intended by his message of 26 November to prevent the making of commitments regarding French administration until the conclusion of the discussions at SEXTANT and his return to Washington. The President indicated further that there is no objection to proceeding along the line indicated by the conclusions stated in paragraph 2 above. However, Mr. McCloy stated that he personally was not familiar with the document referred to in our cable as the Dunn-Wright Agreement.

5. We have attempted by cable . . . to fur-

ther identify our reference to the Dunn-Wright tentative formula. Advice was also requested if any restrictions upon the authority for French civil affairs planning were to be imposed in the light of the identification of the Dunn-Wright formula. No response to this request has been received to date.

6. From the foregoing interchange of cables with SEXTANT, we draw the following conclusions:

a. That planning for civil affairs in France may be continued with the Dunn-Wright tentative formula as a basis.

b. That there will be no further discussions with the French regarding civil affairs pending further authorization from the President.

c. That we may proceed with the printing of Allied military francs for use in France. . . .

d. That you may discuss with the British the President's directive of 26 November as amplified by the succeeding exchange of cables. . . .

7. You will be advised immediately if further instructions are received by us not to use the Dunn-Wright formula as the basis for French civil affairs planning.

8. Also in connection with French civil affairs matters you will be interested to know that a U.K.-U.S. commission to deal with the French political situation was considered at SEXTANT. The commission would sit in London, be responsible to the SAC, and have approximately the same representation as the CCAC. The advantage of such a commission would be the assurance of Anglo-American sanction to all civil affairs policies for France without regard to the allocation of primary responsibility for the detailed administration of such policies. Apparently no final decision was made as to the advisability of organizing this commission.

BUT COSSAC STRESSES NEED FOR A FRENCH  
INTERMEDIARY

[Ltr, Phillips to James Dunn, Dept of State, 19 Dec 43, SHAEF files, 11.02, COSSAC-CAD Opns & Policies]

It occurs to us that since the entire French problem is up for consideration in Washington, it might be helpful to you to have before you some of the thoughts which have occurred to General Barker and to certain other American officers connected with Civil Affairs in COSSAC. \* \* \*

From the military point of view, it is not considered necessary to make any arrangement whereby a French intermediary deals with civil affairs in the zone of operation and communications, because the military commanders them-

selves must be held responsible for the conduct of civil affairs activities within such zones. . . .

However, in the "hiatus area," the commanders will have no military means for dealing with civil affairs problems. Manifestly, it is a matter of serious concern to them that the method adopted for dealing with such areas should be satisfactorily established in order to avoid situations which might lead to general disorder. It is

evident that disorder in areas adjacent to military operations might seriously embarrass the conduct of those operations. Moreover, unless there is a "going concern," so to speak, set up in "hiatus areas," the Allied Commander's responsibility for civil affairs activities in the zone of communications may necessarily continue beyond the time when he would desire to be relieved of this by the French. \* \* \*

#### 4. U.S. NONRECOGNITION OF DE GAULLE HAMPERS CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING FOR FRANCE

CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING IN CCAC IS STYMIED  
[Ltr, Gen Marshall to Field Marshal Dill, BJSM, 31 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2]

. . . I hope that a satisfactory formula for civil affairs in France can be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in the near future.

After discussing this question with Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring, I am inclined to their view that the first question to be settled is the formula for civil affairs which we are to follow in France. They have also informed me about the very critical situation which has developed with respect to all civil affairs matters related to COSSAC operations through the inability of the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to discuss, for the past two months, any question concerning COSSAC's contemplated operations.

I will, for my part, do what I can to clear up this business.

GENERAL SMITH SUGGESTS DEALING WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE AS THE BEST VEHICLE AVAILABLE

[Msg, Gen Walter B. Smith to Hilldring, 7 Jan 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43)(1), CM-IN 4373]

2. Another phase that disturbs me is the apparent intention not to deal in any way with the French Committee on continental matters but rather to hope for the appointment of a French Army Officer who will in effect handle French civil affairs pending a proper election. I am far from being pro-Committee or pro-de Gaulle, as you know, but I believe we will have to use some vehicle and I don't see a better one at the moment. \* \* \*

GENERAL EISENHOWER WANTS TO DISCUSS CIVIL AFFAIRS WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

[Msg, Eisenhower, SAC, to CCS and CCAC, 19 Jan 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1, CM-IN 12460]

It is essential that immediate crystallization of plans relating to Civil Affairs in metropolitan France be accomplished. This requires conferences with properly accredited French authorities. I assume that such authorities would be representatives of the Committee of National Liberation.

I therefore request that General de Gaulle be asked to designate an individual or a group of individuals with whom I can enter into immediate negotiations in London. The need for prompt action cannot be over-emphasized since we will desire to turn over to French control at the earliest possible date those areas that are not essential to military operations. In areas essential to military operations military control will of course apply.

[Ltr, Gen Walter B. Smith to Lt Gen Sir Hastings L. Ismay, 23 Jan 44, SHAEF, SGS files, 092, Fr, vol. 1]

1. Confirming our conversation yesterday evening, this telegram [above] was dictated by General Eisenhower and represents his own thoughts in the matter. His belief is that if we are to avoid political and civil confusion and excessive commitments in personnel and supply after entry on the continent, we must be able to deal with some form of government of Metropolitan France. The French National Committee, whatever its faults may be, represents the beginning of civil government in France, and has received the allegiance of practically all of the French resistance

groups and its present seat, Algiers, is actually by law a part of Metropolitan France. Consequently, the Committee seems to be the logical vehicle. General Eisenhower discussed this matter on an informal basis with the President, the War Department and the State Department while in Washington recently, and found them in general agreement with his own ideas. \* \* \*

[Msg, from McCloy, to Eisenhower, 25 Jan 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1, CM-OUT 9856]

In a recent conversation with the President, apropos of your telegram relating to the need for getting ahead with civil administration planning for France, question of what we were doing on Combined Staff level for coordination and supply of resistance groups in France came up. He made it clear that if there was any hesitation in your mind or anyone else's as to propriety of dealing with Committee resistance representatives, it could be disregarded. There was no reason from the point of view of national policy why your staff could not go ahead with definite plans.

I understand that planning and considerable operating have already been carried out in England but largely through British sources and on less than the Combined Staff level which might now be advisable since concrete combined operations are in view.

There has been considerable criticism in the press emanating from Algiers to the effect that French have not been consulted in connection with the formulation of resistance plans. There have, of course, also been criticisms of lack of supplies.

This is simply to let you know informally that the President assumed that you would feel entirely free to take whatever steps you felt desirable to make this resistance as helpful to you as possible, including dealing with any suitable representatives of the committee in this regard. I believe that on this basis you could so far as the President is concerned discuss at once all matters of resistance with them saving out for the time being and so long as you deem desirable all information as to time and place of landing.

As matters of civil administration, we are now I think making real progress and will shortly communicate to you through the Combined Chiefs of Staff the basis on which you will be authorized to deal with the Committee as the authority to administer Civil Affairs in the non-military zone, such zones to be prescribed by you.

#### FORMULA FOR FRANCE HAS UNDERGONE ALTERATION AND TENTATIVE PLANNING AT SHAEF SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED

[Msg, Hilldring to SHAEF, 3 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2, CM-OUT 2083]

The formula for France that Mr. McCloy has been working on and a draft of which Holmes took with him to London has emerged considerably altered. It is therefore recommended that any tentative planning that has been started in SHAEF regarding the French formula be discontinued. Also in view of changes which have occurred in our thinking regarding the handling of the French situation, Mr. McCloy and the undersigned believe it would be advisable for Julius Holmes to come over here for a few days and talk with the State and War Department officials. If you think it inadvisable for Holmes to leave London at this time, will you authorize me to carry on these discussions with Barker?

#### THE THEATER URGENTLY NEEDS A POLICY ON FRANCE

[Msg, Gen Walter B. Smith to Hilldring, 6 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2, CM-IN 4125]

Would be very unfortunate if Holmes had to leave here at this time when he is just getting his hand into the Civil Affairs Organization and unless you think it absolutely vital I would rather he did not go . . . Believe Barker is sufficiently in touch with opinion here to discuss matter of French formula with you. There is also the possibility that I myself may have to make a quick trip to Washington within the next week but I sincerely trust that the French formula will have been solved by that time. I assure you that lack of definite instructions are causing us a great deal of trouble, particularly in view of the fact that Giraud is threatening a visit and others of equal importance may come.

#### A "FINAL" U.S. POLICY IS FORMULATED

[Msg, Hilldring to Gen Walter B. Smith, 7 Mar 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2, CM-OUT 3451]

We understand your reluctance to let Holmes leave London at this time. We will therefore discuss the French formula with Barker. We are well aware of the necessity of producing a directive on French Administration. Yesterday we arrived at the final United States policy and are engaged at present in clearing this policy with

the British. We hope to have a combined directive within a few days.

## 21 ARMY GROUP ASSUMES THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION WILL BE RECOGNIZED<sup>7</sup>

[NEPTUNE 21 AGp CA Plan, 15 Mar 44, SHAEF G-5 Hist files, 300, 21 AGp (Br), CA Sec]

\* \* \* *Political Considerations*

### 3. *The general political situation in France*

<sup>7</sup>In April 1944, Lt. Gen. Grasett, G-5 SHAEF, announced that in the first phase of operations 21 Army Group, through its civil affairs staff, would be responsible for all civil affairs activities in France. On activation of a

presents a problem of very considerable complexity.

There exists at present no properly constituted government, and it is a matter of high policy as to how far the National Committee of Liberation can be regarded as a substitute.

For the purpose of this Plan it will be assumed that this National Committee will in fact be recognized as the Allied National Authority for France, and that it will command the allegiance of the local government authorities who will act in its name. \* \* \*

U.S. Army Group, SHAEF G-5 would assume direct responsibility for co-ordinating civil affairs operations in the field, SHAEF G-5 Plng files, 16.01.

## 5. BOTH U.S. AND U.K. TRY STILL OTHER LINES IN EFFORT TO GET TOGETHER ON FCNL

### PRESIDENT HANDS DOWN A POLICY

[Ltr, President to SW, 15 Mar 44 (sent by Gen Hilldring as No. 324), CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

After much thought and many revisions, and with the approval of yourself and the Secretary of State, I request that the following order be sent to General Eisenhower. I think it covers the practical objective of giving the final command in the forthcoming occupation to General Eisenhower and, at the same time, leaving him free to consult any and all French organizations as circumstances may be determined by him:

General Eisenhower:

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory:

1. The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following:

A. The prompt and complete defeat of Germany

B. The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors

C. The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.

2. The following powers and instructions are given you for your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:

1. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander, you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when, and how the Civil Administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.

2. When and where you determine that there shall be set up a Civil Administration in any part of France, so far as possible there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has willfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the Allies.

3. In order to secure the setting up of any such Civilian Administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.

4. Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said com-

mittee or groups as the Government of France even on a provisional basis.

5. In making your decision as to entering into such relations with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following restrictions upon its purpose:

a. It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.

b. It favors the reestablishment of all historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule or personal government.

c. It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.

6. In any area of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of Civil Affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

7. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of Civil Affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French and American Commands, and review all plans.

8. You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

9. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy Regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

10. Instructions on economic, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO ENTER INTO WORKING AGREEMENTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

[Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 15, CM-IN-15260, 21 Apr 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* As it is urgently necessary that many matters affecting the civil administration of

France be settled in advance, authority is requested to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services, including civilian labor, treatment of banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc. These working agreements would in no case go beyond the limitation set forth in the formula approved by the President and transmitted in Telegram 324, 5 March [above] as interpreted by the Secretary of State in his public address of 9 April.<sup>8</sup>

#### WORKING ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE TENTATIVE PENDING U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENTS

[Proposed Reply to SCAEF 15, 21 Apr 44, Incl B to CCS-565, 4 May 44,<sup>9</sup> CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

Subject is your SCAF 15. Until there is combined agreement on the civil affairs formula for France, all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the French Committee must be tentative.

It must be made clear to the French National Committee that your arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from the other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France.

On this basis you are granted authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee to arrive at working arrangements on the matters mentioned in your SCAF 15. In this connection, we desire clarification on what is intended by the term "transfer of property". . . .

<sup>8</sup> Still seeking a formal agreement with the French, SHAEF was encouraged on 9 April when Secretary of State Hull declared that it was "of the utmost importance that civil authority in France be exercised by Frenchmen, should be swiftly established, and should operate in accordance with advance planning as fully as military operations will permit." Although the United States could not recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the government of France, Mr. Hull added, the President was disposed "to see the French Committee for National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief." The Prime Minister, assuming that this declaration changed previous United States policy, promptly approved it. Pogue, *Supreme Command*, p. 146.

<sup>9</sup> CCS 565 series deals with arrangements for goods and services to be provided in France. Text will be found in file cited above.

## SCAEF THINKS IT BEST TO INVITE DE GAULLE TO LONDON

[Msg, SCAEF for CCS, SCAF 24, 11 May 44, G-5 SHAEF, Hist Rcds, Negotiations With the French, an. 10]

The limitations under which we are operating in dealing with the French are becoming very embarrassing and are producing a situation which is potentially dangerous. We began our military discussions with the French representatives here in the belief that although we had no formal directive, we understood the policies of our own governments well enough to be able to reach a working basis with any French body or organization that can effectively assist us in the fight against Germany.<sup>10</sup> For the present there is no such body represented here except the French Committee of National Liberation. We have been in collaboration with its military and naval representatives, attempting to arrive at a solution of such pressing problems as the formation of security battalions to guard lines of communication, matters affecting supplementary franc currency, military security and civilian arrangements, billeting, the furnishing of local resources in goods and services especially to provide for large labor requirements, distribution of civil supplies, and most important of all, the initial approach to the French population. We also count on the influence of the French Committee to explain to the French people and reconcile them to the necessity of our bombing program.

The suspension of diplomatic privileges, including the use of foreign codes, which we ourselves urged for security reasons, has had one unfortunate effect in that it has produced a condition under which none of the above questions can be dealt with. The French Committee has directed its Senior Military Officer, [Lt.] General [Pierre] Koenig, *not* to communicate with Algiers except by French code, and *not* to proceed further in his discussions with us. I am aware that General Koenig feels very keenly the fact that he is denied even the most general knowledge of forthcoming operations although French naval air and airborne units are to be employed, and much is expected from French resistance, both active and passive. The sum total of these delays and resentments is, in my opinion, likely to result in acute embarrassment to the Allied Forces, and it will be too late, after the event, to correct them all.

<sup>10</sup> An interim directive was issued 14 May 1944. See Chapter VI, Section 4.

There seem to be only two possible solutions, both of which involve divulging certain general information to a very few French officers in London only and on the highest level. The first, and probably the most effective, would be for General de Gaulle himself to come to London, on the invitation of one or both governments. I would then be able to deal with him direct on the most immediate and pressing problem of the initial approach to the French people and their organized resistance groups. The other alternative is to arrange for General Koenig to communicate with General de Gaulle and the French Committee, in French Cipher, if necessary, so as to remove the present block to our plans and preparations. I repeat that either of these alternatives implies the necessity of taking at least one or two senior French officers into our confidence to some extent, and relying upon them not to communicate any military information to Algiers until authorized by me to do so. From a military point of view coordination with the French is of overriding importance. It is requested that this matter be treated as of the utmost urgency, and that it be considered, as far as possible, on its military aspect.

## IT IS ALL RIGHT TO BRING DE GAULLE TO LONDON BUT HE MUST STAY THERE UNTIL AFTER D-DAY

[Msg, President to Eisenhower, 13 May 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 092, French Relations, vol. 1, SMC-IN 1099]

I have today sent the following . . . message to Prime Minister Churchill: . . . I have no objections whatsoever to your inviting de Gaulle and others of the French Committee to discuss your [garbled] group being serviced [See SCAF 24 above] on military matters; however, you must consider, in the interests of security, keeping de Gaulle in the United Kingdom until the OVERLORD landing has been made.<sup>11</sup>

It is my understanding that General Eisenhower now has full authority to discuss with the Committee all matters on a military level. I do *not* desire that Eisenhower shall become involved with the Committee on a political level, and I am unable at this time to recognize any Government of France until the French people have an opportunity for a free choice of Government. \* \* \*

<sup>11</sup> Mr. Churchill felt it would be unwise to invite de Gaulle to London under conditions that he would undoubtedly regard as insulting. Pogue, *Supreme Command*, p. 149.

PRESIDENT EXPLAINS TO EISENHOWER WHY  
NONRECOGNITION OF FCNL MUST BE MADE  
CLEAR

[Msg, President to Eisenhower, 13 May 44, SHAEF-SGS  
files, 092, French Relations, vol. I, SMC-IN 1099]

\* \* \* I hope my previous directive was wholly clear to you. I know you will understand that any matters relating to the future Government of France are a political and not a military matter. The American position has always been firm on this point.

We must be certain that the words "Free Determination," which date back to the Atlantic Charter, shall be preserved in substance and in spirit. Therefore, no existing group outside of France can be given the kind of domination over the French people in France which would dominate the free expression of a choice.

The French Committee denies that it has any such intention, but so many instances have occurred in the last two years that I am unable to accept their declaration wholeheartedly.

That is why you as Supreme Commander must assume this additional task.

We must always remember that the French population is quite naturally shell-shocked just as any other people would be after such sufferings at the hands of German occupation. It will take some time for them quietly and normally to think through the matters pertaining to their political future. We, as the liberators of France, have no right to color their views or give any group the sole right to impose one side of a case on them.

I know that you will understand my desire that self-determination for them shall be our true aim.

THE BRITISH WISH TO SIDE-STEP THE ISSUE OF  
RECOGNITION WHILE DE GAULLE IS IN LONDON

[Memo by Representatives of the Br CsofS, CCS 565-1,<sup>12</sup>  
27 May 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 1]

1. We suggest, in view of the recent exchange of messages on the highest level with regard to the discussions which will take place on the arrival of General de Gaulle in the United Kingdom, that no further action is required on the proposals contained in CCS 565. \* \* \*

[Min of 166th Mtg, JCS, 6 Jun 44, CCAC files, 014,  
Fr. (9-21-43), sec. 1]

\* \* \* [Fleet] Admiral [Ernest J.] King expressed the opinion that the matter was linked with the immediate situation in Europe. The proposed reply to General Eisenhower has been approved by the President but the British have stated that no action is required because of General de Gaulle's presence in the United Kingdom. \* \* \*

General McNarney remarked that General Eisenhower is already acting in accordance with the instructions set out in the reply proposed in Enclosure "B" to CCS 565. The approval of the reply would confirm his actions and this, apparently, the British do not wish to do. \* \* \*  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Agreed to inform the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that the United States Chiefs of Staff cannot confirm their views that no further action is required on the proposals contained in CCS 565.<sup>13</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>12</sup> See Note 9, above.

<sup>13</sup> The Americans, in other words, believed that it was necessary to make clear to the FCNL that working collaboration was not tantamount to political recognition. The British, apprehensive of offending de Gaulle, thought it best at least to evade the question.

## Organizational and Policy Problems in Planning for Western Europe

In approaching civil affairs problems of western Europe, the planners were not obliged to begin from scratch. On the contrary, they could fall back on two bodies of precedent: the principles that had been developed in the Mediterranean and the groundwork that had been laid by COSSAC. The Mediterranean experience was especially important. The principal staff officers, including the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, and his Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, came from AFHQ. The Deputy Chief of G-5, SHAEF, was Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, who had been chief of the Military Government Section of AFHQ. All these men brought with them a knowledge of both the strength and weaknesses of the Mediterranean organization and procedure in civil affairs. Second only to AFHQ's influence was the headquarters of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) (COSSAC), which had been established in March 1943 to plan for a cross-Channel invasion. This headquarters was commanded by Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan (British), who had as his deputy Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker (American). By the end of 1943, COSSAC had over a thousand officers and enlisted men and was ready to begin functioning as a Supreme Headquarters. The organization included a Civil Affairs Section headed by Maj. Gen.

Sir Roger Lumley (British) and his deputy, Col. Karl R. Bendetsen (American).

Civil affairs planners at COSSAC, and later at SHAEF, addressed themselves mainly to three related organizational questions. First was whether Civil affairs in ETO should follow the AMGOT model, or (as the British component of COSSAC held) be more closely integrated with the military organization and chain of command; second was whether the country units (first set up by the British and later supervised by COSSAC) should be the nuclei of military administrations in the field or merely of military missions to the restored governments, much like the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Government at Brindisi; third, whether prior to the beginning of operations these units should have an organizational status preparing them for one or the other of these alternative roles. The winds of organizational doctrine shifted several times, and successive organizational changes at SHAEF reflected these shifts, but in the end the view of the former British component of COSSAC, now supported by General Smith, the American Chief of Staff, won out. At headquarters, the country units were finally placed closely under the Operations Branch, G-5, SHAEF, in accordance with the plan to use them merely as the nuclei of military missions. About the same time, on 1 May 1944,

SHAEF issued a Handbook of Standard Policy and Procedure that (1) made civil affairs the responsibility of each combat commander; (2) required that normal channels of command be followed; (3) limited civil affairs to operations required by military necessity; and (4) directed that civil affairs operations in a liberated country be mobile and temporary.<sup>1</sup> In sum, SHAEF had decided upon a type of CA organization that contrasted with the AMGOT territorial organization in static areas though it bore some resemblance to the mobile AMG's, Fifth and Eighth Armies.

If the organization of civil affairs in western Europe represented a blending of AFHQ and COSSAC principles, the supply plans represented a combination of plans drawn up in Washington and in the theater. In general, planning in Washington was concerned with the formulation of policy and determination of approved categories of supply and scale of supply. Theater planning, on the other hand, provided the actual basis on which supplies were moved, for supply sources depended on timing and shipping factors that could be finally decided only on the basis of phased theater estimates. Various plans had been drawn up, but during the summer and fall of 1943 the War Department had been primarily concerned with the day-to-day problems of the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. However, the needs of western Europe received added emphasis through the President's letter of 10 November 1943, which directed the Army to undertake the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies.<sup>2</sup> Plans currently under preparation were designed to meet problems arising from gradual liberation by military operations, but that

portion of the President's letter directing the War Department to be prepared for a collapse of Germany placed a new type of responsibility on the military forces. Accordingly studies were initiated in the Civilian Supply Branch, Army Service Forces, based upon four alternative assumptions: (a) collapse early in the year (1 February 1944) without scorching; (b) collapse early in the year with scorching; (c) collapse later in the year (1 September 1944) without scorching; and (d) collapse on the same date with scorching. A report was issued on 29 December 1943 covering the conditions in *a* and *b*. The estimates for operations without scorching provided the basis for the program referred to in these documents as Plan "A." In January 1944, COSSAC submitted civilian supply requirements for six months calculated on the basis of two operational plans, Plan I (RANKIN) and Plan II (OVERLORD). A comparison of theater plans with those worked out in Washington, the efforts to get the British to agree on responsibility for procurement, General Eisenhower's efforts to draw on the United Kingdom stockpiles for his initial requirements, and other important problems are brought out in the documents. It should be added that modern war involves the whole economic fabric of a country, and most questions of relief, recovery, rehabilitation, and morale lead straight to the vital question of supply.

Related to the supply problem were certain financial and currency questions which had to be explored and settled before plans for the economic phase of the occupation could be completed. Usually the problems of the currency to be used and of what authority should issue it are left largely to technical experts and present no particular difficulty. In the cross-Channel operation, however, such questions were very troublesome and had to be considered on the highest governmental levels. If local

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<sup>1</sup> Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 75-84.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the President's letter see above, page 108.

currency was to be used in France as in other liberated countries it would have meant, in the President's opinion, a recognition of the French Committee for National Liberation which contravened his principle that the question of the government of France should be open to later determination by the liberated French people. Americans at first preferred to use yellow-seal dollars but the British, who had no such doctrinaire attitude on the matter of French self-determination, favored the use of the metropolitan franc.

The two governments after considerable debate agreed on the use of francs but, to safeguard the American political position, with the proviso that they would be issued under the authority of the Supreme Commander. The British were doubtful that the French would support this disposition of the question. It so happened that the British were right but this did not become clear until, as invasion approached, De Gaulle, in London, made an issue of the question that was to bring many tense moments before it was finally resolved.

## I. A HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS IS SET UP

### GENERAL SMITH IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION AT COSSAC

[Msg, Gen. Walter B. Smith, CofS, AEF, to Hilldring, Chief, CAD, 7 Jan 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43)(1), CM-IN 4373]

I want to give you very personally my first reaction to the organization and prospects of COSSAC Civil Affairs Section as I have just seen it. It seems to me that the parallel system now set up for this most important section is faulty. The system of a joint head, British and American, and similar joint heads for each division and subdivision will produce a very ponderous and unwieldy machine. My intention is to change this at the earliest possible moment and make one individual the directing head. . . . I feel in this case as I felt in the case of . . . Allied Control Commission that an individual of junior cabinet caliber and really national standing is required. \* \* \*

### THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF ORGANIZING A CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

[Msg, Hilldring to Smith, CM-OUT 3403, 9 Jan 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43)(1)]

. . . I am certain that if you and Eisenhower desire to change the organization to an Anglo-American staff with a single head, there will be no objections in Washington. I have noted what you have to say about an individual of junior cabinet caliber and national standing, but we have no generals, at least I can think of none at the moment, who are of junior cabinet caliber

and possess a national reputation. Therefore, you probably intend that we should commission a civilian to head civil affairs in COSSAC. As I see it, a Civil Affairs Section can be organized in one of two ways: You can place at its head a prominent civilian in uniform and give him an Army executive to keep him on the track, or you can put a capable military administrator in the top job and surround him with political, economic and financial talent he needs. Waiving the question of capability, CAD in the War Department is organized on the latter concept. However, this does not make the arrangement sacrosanct. There are admittedly many advantages to the other conception. \* \* \*

### GENERAL SMITH'S PRIMARY INTEREST IS A MAN OF FIRST-RATE CALIBER

[Msg, Smith to Hilldring, CM-IN 7841, 12 Jan 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-22-43)(1)]

With regard to the organization of COSSAC staff, my message was simply to give you personally my first impressions. I am really not sufficiently in the picture to make definite recommendations. My preference for a civilian executive of national standing placed in uniform to head Civil Affairs goes back to my original ideas about Mr. McCloy for AMG. I agree that CAD in the War Department is organized on the military concept, but, in the first place, you have a Secretary of War behind you and in the second place, if the present head of CAD will come to London and do the job I would ask for nothing better. \* \* \*

## THE THEATER HAS A COMPLETELY FREE HAND IN ORGANIZING CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Ltr, Hilldring to Smith, CofS, AEF, 27 Jan 44, CAD files, 321 (12-21-42), sec. 4]

\* \* \* As to the organization of the civil affairs set-up in London, the War Department and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, I am convinced, will give you a completely free hand. You now have a double headed system which, I take it, you don't particularly like. It was established here in Washington after a conference between Generals Marshall and Morgan, but I don't believe that the arrangement was intended to be rigid or final. The Chief asked me at the time what I thought of it, and I told him that while I believed it would work, I didn't particularly like it. His response to that was that he didn't intend to prescribe an organization with any idea that it would endure until the end of time. \* \* \*

With regard to the chief civil affairs officer, I await word from you. We have already given you our views back here on topside organization of civil affairs, but have deliberately prevented the big boys from crystallizing their opinion in this connection. If you decide you want some one from the States as your civil affairs officer we will do our damndest to get him. Except for McCloy, and possibly for myself whom you so graciously mentioned in your last letter the sky is the limit. I think we can get anybody we want. McCloy is definitely out. Mr. Stimson is adamant on this proposition, and the Chief has instructed us not to bring the subject up again under any circumstances. It caused great furor around here, and I agree with the Chief that Stimson is not going to change his mind. As for myself, I am afraid the door is closed. I would give my right arm to break out of this jailhouse as you can easily understand. However, the Chief has on several occasions sensed my ambition in that direction, and on each occasion has dealt with me in his most forcible manner. \* \* \*

## CREATION OF G-5 DIVISION, SHAEF, IS APPROVED

[Msg, Smith to Hilldring, 6 Feb 44, CAD files, 210.31 (3-3-43), sec. 4, CM-IN 4260]

\* \* \* I now have General Eisenhower's approval of my proposed plan for reorganization of civil affairs section here. Briefly, it is to retain at Supreme Headquarters a small high powered section of General Staff, possibly to be designated G-5 for civil affairs. This Staff Division will be responsible for policies and directives, for long-

range outline planning and for general co-ordination. General Lumley will head this staff division but he must be supported by an American deputy of very high quality in whom both the Commander in Chief and myself have complete confidence. It is for this assignment that I wish [Brig Gen Julius C.] Holmes. . .<sup>1</sup> The operating part of civil affairs including training, organization and detailed planning will be under McSherry, who is particularly qualified for this phase of the effort, and who is very anxious to take it on. \* \* \*

## EUROPEAN CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION (ECAD) ESTABLISHED TO ADMINISTER CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL OF ETOUSA

[The General Board USFET [United States Forces European Theater],<sup>2</sup> Study 32: Civil Affairs and Military Government Organization and Operations]

37. *The Problem of Administration.* Consideration by the War Department of the organization of CA had raised the problem of a unit to administer the personnel engaged in CA in the ETO. The plan followed in the Mediterranean area had been ruled out and various solutions were advocated.

38. *Proposal by ETOUSA.* On 6 November 1943, Hq ETOUSA forwarded to the War Department a proposal that seven skeleton Military Police (Zone of the Interior) Battalions be authorized, in addition to the CA operational allocations. These skeleton battalions were to operate as CA administrative organizations.

### 39. *War Department Action on This Proposal*

a. The proposal of Hq ETOUSA was considered by the Civil Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, the War Department. On 31 December 1943, a memorandum was furnished to the Chief of Staff, recommending disapproval of this proposal and recommending instead the organization of a "European Civil Affairs Division." [ECAD] This recommendation proposed

<sup>1</sup> As the documents preceding this indicate, General Smith preferred an American officer but deferred to General Eisenhower's decision that it would be better to have a British officer as chief of civil affairs in order to avoid criticism of SHAEF policy in areas where the British had long-established interests. General Holmes was brought from AFHQ to assume the post of Deputy. See Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 81-82.

<sup>2</sup> The General Board was established by GO 128, Hq ETOUSA, 17 June 1945, as amended by GO 182, 7 August 1945, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the U.S. Forces in the European Theater. Extracts from the reports of this Board are used at pertinent points in this and following chapters. Copies of the General Board Studies, 131 in all, are on file in OCMH. Supporting documents are in Kansas City.

a Table of Distribution providing for one headquarters, one headquarters detachment, 28 administrative detachments, and seven medical detachments. Its proposed mission was "to perform the administrative and operational functions for all CA personnel (operational) in the ETO, U.S. Army, but exclusive of CA personnel assigned to Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, and First U.S. Army Group."

b. The War Department took action on this recommendation on 13 January 1944, establishing the following allocations of personnel for the ETO:

<i>Organization</i>	<i>O</i>	<i>WO</i>	<i>EM</i>	<i>Total</i>
Hq Supreme Allied Command	90	5	160	255
Hq ETOUSA	91	1	117	209
Operational, ETOUSA	2280	120	3600	6000
Instructional, ETOUSA	48	1	35	84
Administrative, ETOUSA	200	3	1512	1715
	2709	130	5424	8263

c. Thus was set up the so-called "Theater Overall Allocation" which appeared many times in the solving of the complex problems of CA manning. It was strictly adhered to through the diverse events of 14 months of rapid change, and made necessary the greatest possible flexibility in the use of personnel.

40. *Action by ETOUSA.* On 7 February 1944, Hq ETOUSA [GO 13] authorized the formation of ECAD and specified the provisional units authorized by tables of distribution similar to the ones mentioned in Par 39 above.

#### 41. *Activation of ECAD*

a. ECAD was activated on 12 February 1944, by the issuance of its General Order No. 1, which designated Colonel C. P. Stearns as commanding officer.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

#### 42. *Original Mission*

a. The original mission given to ECAD was as stated in Par 39 [above]. . . . This was further implemented by assigning to ECAD the former mission of the Civil Affairs Center. . . .<sup>4</sup>

b. The mission assigned required the organization of more than 6000 officers and en-

<sup>3</sup> On 4 May 1944 Col. Cuthbert P. Stearns was succeeded by Colonel H. McE. Pendleton. See Pendleton's article, "The European Civil Affairs Division," *Military Review*, XXVI (April 1946), 49-51.

<sup>4</sup> The Civil Affairs Center had been established at Shrivenham, England, on 1 December 1943, to receive, assign, train, equip, and move tactical units officers (and later enlisted men) who were to administer civil affairs in European territory occupied by Allied authorities. ECAD was created within the physical framework of Civil Affairs Center, and shared with it a common commanding officer. During the period 6 February 1944-4 April 1944 the two existed side by side, the personnel of the Civil Affairs Center passing into ECAD as the latter developed.

listed men, most of whom were sent from the U.S. to England in the spring of 1944, into working regiments, companies, and detachments, able to participate in the Normandy invasion, the liberation of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. . . . At the same time it was necessary to organize a number of "country sections" which would in due course become SHAEF Missions to liberated nations, or which would take over as the governmental units of occupied nations.

c. The complexity of the administrative mission should be mentioned. The plan called for CA/MG detachments to be deployed in town after town, as the latter were uncovered by our troops. A team once deployed would not, it was believed, normally move from its assigned location. Therefore, it was felt, the ordinary method of attachment of troop units to higher commands would not apply, inasmuch as the area in which a team or detachment was deployed would pass successively and rapidly from one command to another in the tactical progress of advancing troops.

## SURVEY AND APPRAISAL OF U.S. ECHELONS REQUIRED BY THE INTEGRATED COMMAND

[The Gen Bd USFET Study 32]

77. *Relation of United States Forces to Integrated Command.* As soon as an integrated command was announced, the presence of U.S. forces in the Theater made necessary two echelons of the U.S. Command:

a. A U.S. contingent in the integrated command.

b. A purely U.S. headquarters which would be, in effect, an echelon of the War Department, occupying for U.S. forces the same position which the War Office occupied for British forces.

#### 78. *Organization of Headquarters European Theater of Operations*

a. The practical step called for in Par 77 was taken on 8 June 1943, when Headquarters European Theater of Operations was established in the United Kingdom. . . .

b. Administrative matters solely the concern of U.S. forces became the responsibility of European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA). Matters of strategy and tactics, and administrative matters affecting the combined command became the responsibility of the Supreme Commander.

c. Civil Affairs/Military Government requirements were similarly divided between the two headquarters. The employment, policies, and combined training of CA/MG units and

personnel fell within the sphere of the Supreme Commander, with the CCS as a higher echelon. The procurement, allocation, equipment, promotion, pay, and personal administration of U.S. personnel for CA/MG remained a function of Headquarters ETOUSA with the War Department as a higher echelon.

d. This condition necessitated a CA echelon in Hq ETOUSA which was established as part of the Special Staff with duties analogous to those of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department. Liaison was effected with the integrated command.

79. *Organization of First United States Army Group (FUSAG)*. On 16 October 1943, Hq. FUSAG was activated and certain of the functions previously exercised by Hq ETOUSA were delegated to the new command. Hq. ETOUSA continued to formulate U.S. policy and perform "parent" administration for United States troops. However, Hq FUSAG, though not operational, took over planning for employment of CA/MG units, and began to exercise a greater influence on the organization and training of CA/MG personnel, with a view to the eventual commitment of such personnel to its command.

80. *Organization of European Civil Affairs Division was authorized* by General Order No. 13 Hq. ETOUSA, on 7 February 1944. In matters of supply, pay, personnel, and accounting, ECAD remained administratively under Hq ETOUSA. This fact influenced the performance of the CA/MG mission.

81. *Appraisal*. The Civil Affairs Section of Hq ETOUSA performed, at this time, an irreplaceable function in affording a link between the highest U.S. command echelons and the War Department, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the U.S. CA/MG organization, which was to be employed operationally as an agency of integrated command. Separation of administration, a U.S. function, from operational control under an integrated command, was shown to be sound and workable in this period. \* \* \*

G-5, SPECIAL STAFF, IS CREATED AND THE DCCAO, GENERAL McSHERRY, IS GIVEN A DIRECTIVE

[SHAEF G-5 Div, Directive to DCCAO (SS), SHAEF, 19 Feb 44 SHAEF files, G-5, 16.01 SHAEF (SS), Organization and Plng]

#### General

1. The following is a general directive issued to you to enable you to set up your headquarters and to start work without delay. More detailed

instructions will be issued to you from time to time.

#### Status of DCCAO (SS)

2. a. Your title will be Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Special Staff). Abbreviation DC-CAO (SS).

b. You will be in charge, during the planning and preparatory stages of Operations OVERLOAD and RANKIN, of:

(1) Training establishments at Shrivenham and Eastbourne.

(2) The Country Sections, i.e., Sections for Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France.

(3) The German Section.

(4) The rear echelon of G-5. . . .

c. You will be assisted by an A/DCCAO (SS). This will be a British officer who will, when appointed, assist you as you decide best. In your absence, whether from sickness or other reasons, he will carry out your duties and functions.

#### Task in General

3. a. In general you will be the functional agency through which the policy decisions of ACOS [ACofS], G-5, are put into effect in the organizations referred to in Paragraph 2b, and will act in accordance with policies and instructions received from ACOS, G-5.

b. Should you find yourself in disagreement with the policy given to you, you will represent your views to ACOS, G-5, or, in his absence to Deputy A/COS.

c. Your approach to other branches SHAEF will be through the equivalent sections of G-5 Branch.

d. You will forward to G-5 for review, detailed plans and instructions when completed.

e. You may maintain direct liaison with staffs at Army Groups, etc., keeping G-5 fully informed. \* \* \*

LT. GEN. SIR A. E. GRASETT IS MADE HEAD OF G-5 SHAEF

[SHAEF GO 9, 22 Apr 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 300.4 SHAEF GO's]

Announcement is made of the appointment of Lieutenant General A.E. Grasett, CB, DSO, MC, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, in addition to his other duties as Chief of the European Allied Contact Section, vice Major General Sir Roger Lumley, GCSI, GCIE, relieved. \* \* \*

## G-5 DIVISION, SHAEF, REORGANIZED

[SHAEF Staff Memo 43, 30 Apr 44, CAD files, 370.21, COSSAC (7-33-43)(1), sec. 2]

### II—Reorganization of G-5 Division

1. Effective 1 May 1944, G-5 Division, this headquarters is reorganized and will consist of the following branches:

Operations	Economics
Supply	Financial
Displaced Persons	Public Health
Legal	Administration

2. The G-5 Division will perform the conventional staff duties of supervision and promulgation of policies affecting Civil Affairs functions in the Allied Expeditionary Force. In addition thereto this division will be responsible for mobilizing, training and assignment of Civil Affairs personnel.

### III—Announcement of Organization of Country Sections

1. The Country Sections, already established, embrace the personnel, both commissioned and

enlisted, which will ultimately constitute the Civil Affairs elements of the military missions to the corresponding Allied National authorities and to such authorities as may be recognized in Denmark and Luxembourg.

2. The German section will provide the nucleus of the military government in enemy territory.

3. The Country Sections are placed under the control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, for operations and planning.

4. U.S. personnel of the Country Sections will be administered by the Commanding Officer, European Civil Affairs Division. Administration of British personnel will be as directed by the appropriate British authority.

### IV—Announcement of Appointment of Chief of the Operations Branch, G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Announcement is made of the appointment of Brigadier General Frank J. McSherry, GSC, as Chief of the Operations Branch, G-5 Division, this headquarters.

## 2. IN FINAL PLANS CA ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD WILL BE UNDER TACTICAL COMMANDER

### THE AMGOT-TYPE ORGANIZATION WILL BE AVOIDED IN EUROPE

[Memo, Gen Smith to Lumley and Holmes, 14 Mar 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 16.01, SHAEF (SS), Organization and Plng]

1. In reply to your memoranda of March 10th requesting a decision on certain basic questions of policy and organization, the following is my reaction:

*a.* In framing our Civil Affairs Organization I believe we must bear the following points in mind:

(1) Our Mediterranean organization had many defects although it did a splendid job and accomplished its object.

(2) There are certain differences between conditions in North West Europe and the Mediterranean, and our future organization must be based on the lessons we learned in the Mediterranean, and should start from where we left off. In my opinion the principal lessons learned in the Mediterranean are:

(a) The Civil Affairs Staff must be more closely integrated with normal staffs throughout the chain of command.

(b) We must avoid Civil Affairs Headquarters being set up entirely unrelated to a military Headquarters.

(c) We must avoid AMGOT organization—we have already been told to do this, and the latest paper from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff emphasizes this fact.

3. In accordance with the above.

*b.* It will be accepted that the command and staff channel runs from SHAEF to subordinate military commanders with direct communication with the Civil Affairs Staff of commanders on technical matters.

*c.* Business will be done with the Mission attached to each government from this Headquarters, or an agency thereof. Please remember that when I described the operating personnel of G-5 as a Special Staff I meant just that, and in a command it is important that G-5 itself should be organized with a very small section for each country. Civil Affairs detachments will work with local government representatives on the higher policy agreed between SHAEF and the governments concerned.

*d.* It will be made clear that subordinate commanders are not required to establish policies

which must emanate from SHAEF. It is, however, the responsibility of subordinate commanders to insure that the Supreme Commander's policies are implemented by the Civil Affairs Staffs. SHAEF will relieve combat commanders of Civil Affairs responsibilities behind combat zones, at the earliest possible moment. \* \* \*

**THOUGH ORGANIZED ACCORDING TO POLITICAL DIVISIONS, DETACHMENTS WILL BE MOBILE AND UNDER TACTICAL COMMANDER**

[SHAEF Memo on Organization of CA, Mar 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 16.01, SHAEF (SS), Organization and Plng]

2. . . . (f) Civil Affairs Detachments will be organized and trained to conduct Civil Affairs in the various portions of France falling within Army Group or L of C areas. These detachments will be so organized as to conform to the French political sub-division and will contain a detachment for each province and department and for the larger cities, with smaller detachments for groups of towns and villages. As the Armies advance, the detachments intended for territory about to be liberated will be sent forward and will operate under the command of formation commander in their appointed areas.

(g) The maximum possible use will be made of technical channels; that is to say, they will be used on all occasions when coordination with other branches of the staff is not necessary. Normal staff channels will be used for joint staff problems. By technical channels is meant direct channel between the SCAO of one formation and the SCAO of another formation immediately higher or lower than his. It does not mean, for instance, a direct channel from G-5, France to a detachment in an Army area. \* \* \*

**DIFFERENT TYPES OF DETACHMENTS**

[The Gen Bd USFET, Study 32]

49. \* \* \*

b. In theory, the detachments were organized to meet all possible requirements. Since detachments destined for liberated countries were to be primarily supervisory in nature, it was not deemed necessary to have a complete coverage of all functions.

c. Detachments were placed at all governmental levels, "A" detachments being intended for regional capitals, "B" detachments for de-

partmental capitals, and "C" and "D" detachments for arrondissement and city levels.

d. The composition of CA detachments is as follows:

<i>Detachment</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Warrant Officers</i>	<i>EM</i>	<i>Total</i>
A	16	3	20	39
B	9	2	14	25
C	6	1	7	14
D	4	0	5	9

e. The specialist reserve detachment normally consisted of eight officers and eight enlisted men. In theory, these officers were specialists but in practice they were also available as temporary replacements for Civil Administration administrative officers who were removed from detachments or casualties. \* \* \*

**CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON THE GENERAL STAFF LEVEL**

[Ltr, Hq ETOUSA to Fwd Ech, ComZ, *et al.*, 22 Apr 44, GO's, FUSAG 12th AGp]

1. It is planned to establish Civil Affairs Sections of a General Staff level (G-5), at each of the following headquarters:

- Army Groups
- Armies
- Army Corps
- Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
- Advance Section, Communications Zone
- Each Continental Base Section.

2. A General Staff Corps vacancy for this purpose will be provided this headquarters for Forward Echelon, Communications Zone; Advance Section, Communications Zone; and each Continental Base Section. Vacancies for Army Groups, Armies, and Army Corps will be provided from those presently authorized the Commanders concerned. At least one such vacancy should be made available to each Civil Affairs Section.

3. The determination as to the necessity of establishing Civil Affairs Sections in Divisions, and whether, if established, they should be at General or Special Staff level, will be at the discretion of Army Commanders. If such sections are established at General Staff level, at least one General Staff Corps vacancy should be made available from those authorized the Division Commander concerned.

### 3. BASIC POLICIES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

#### BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

[SHAEF Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest Europe, rev 1 May 44, SHAEF files, 14.1-6.]

2. The main features of these basic principles are as follows:—

(a) The conduct of Civil Affairs operations is the responsibility of each Commander in accordance with the policies laid down by the Supreme Commander.

(b) The discharge of this responsibility may require the employment of all agencies at the disposal of each Commander.

(c) Civil Affairs Staffs are provided for planning and coordination. Civil Affairs Detachments will be assigned commanders from time to time for duties in the field.

(d) The command and staff channel runs from SHAEF to subordinate Military Commanders, with direct communications between Civil Affairs staffs of Commands on matters peculiar to Civil Affairs.

(e) Civil Affairs operations are limited, except as future directives may otherwise prescribe, to the areas affected by military operations. Within these areas each commander is responsible for Civil Affairs operations in his own area.

(f) The primary objective is to ensure that conditions exist among the civil population which will not interfere with operations against the enemy, but will promote those operations.

(g) Relief, except as otherwise directed, is limited to that required by military necessity.

(h) Civil Affairs operations in a liberated territory are mobile and temporary and continue only until the situation permits the assumption of control by the Allied National Authority.

(j) Consistency of interpretation and application of policies will be secured, with respect to each of the countries affected, by country manuals. \* \* \*

#### WHAT SUPREME COMMANDER EXPECTED FROM CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS

[Eisenhower, Remarks Before ECAD and SHAEF Officer Personnel, 9 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 10, Hists and Monographs]

I wonder whether I could expedite this by asking you to forget any orders you have received so far today and break ranks and gather around here so that I can talk to you. Standing out there you re-

mind me too much of a firing squad. \* \* \*

First of all, you are soldiers. Don't forget that. No matter what the nature of your work, no matter what you have to do, from now on you are wearing the uniform of your country and you are part of the fighting forces of it. Now you are soldiers—with a soldier's job. Not soldiers in a Napoleonic sense—you are as modern as radar and you are just as important to the Command. We in command have learned of this necessity through experience.

We went into Africa just a year ago last November. In Africa we did not have an organization of this kind set up. In Sicily we were better prepared; in Italy still a lot better. We will be still better prepared when we are on the Continent, due to the training you have had and the work you have done . . . although humanitarian in its results, your job is to help win the war.

You have got to get the rear areas organized—electric lights, roads, and supply—and you must keep them working and get them restored as quickly as possible to some semblance of peacetime standards, so that they can support to the utmost the armies that are fighting at the front. You must take that responsibility for dealing with civilian affairs, whether it is restoring public utilities or helping a nursing mother who cannot get milk, and if you don't do your job, the armies will fail. A modern army is of great depth in the field. The fighting front of an army is a fringe of a tremendous organization. . . .

. . . you are part of an Allied team. Always remember that. Because your section of the army is called "Civil Affairs" you must not make the mistake of thinking you are politicians. . . .

There can be no differences between British and Americans at any level. Problems that need adjustment are solved, and adjustments are made, on a higher level than ours. I get a directive from two Governments, and that directive is translated into its various parts and comes to you, but that doesn't mean that either of those two parts is British or American. \* \* \*

Now a word about what you are doing here. No Commander can ever accumulate the supplies, the organization, the men that he needs in exact timing with the existence of that need. In other words, he piles up reserves. For some time some of you have been reserve. You're probably getting bored, some of you. You are a little tired of idleness, particularly when some of you were extraordinarily busy men in civil life, and

you gave up many things—made many sacrifices—and you are getting damned tired of not

being used usefully in view of your sacrifices.

Your time is coming, so don't worry. \* \* \*

#### 4. FINAL REORGANIZATION IN SHAEF TO ESTABLISH DIRECT SHAEF CONTROL OF COUNTRY UNITS

##### REORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONS BRANCH, G-5, SHAEF, TO ENABLE SUPERVISION OF FIELD OPERATIONS

[Memo, G-5 Div, SHAEF, to All Secs G-5 Opns and All Country Units, SHAEF, 24 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 16.02, SHAEF (SS), Opns and Policy]

1. Effective immediately, the Operations Branch, G-5, will be divided into two groups each under a Deputy Chief of Operations Branch as follows:

(a) Operations (Ops)

(b) Organization, Personnel, Equipment and Training Group (OPET).

2. . . . In brief the two [Ops and OPET] will function under the Chiefs of the Ops Branch as follows:

(a) Ops will:

- i. Supervise operations in the field.
- ii. Coordinate civil affairs operational plans with military plans at this Hq.
- iii. Coordinate civil affairs operational plans with due regard to policies of higher authorities, requirements of functional branches and availability of personnel and equipment.
- iv. Review CA operational plans of subordinate echelons.
- v. Coordinate Post-"OVERLORD," post-hostility and surrender terms planning.
- vi. Supervise the operations of Country Units, SHAEF, in the preparation of detailed plans, specialist manuals, etc.
- vii. Supervise the assembly and distribution of information for CA Staffs and Detachments in the field.
- viii. Supervise contacts with Allied National Authorities as they concern the operation of liaison officers.
- ix. Develop plans and policies covering Civil Affairs responsibilities in connection with:
  - Public Safety
  - Censorship (in conjunction with Economics Branch)
  - Security
  - Public Monuments and Fine Arts.
- x. Supervise the compilation of historical records

(b) OPET will:

(i) Develop plans and policies concerning Civil Affairs personnel and their equipment, organization and training.

(ii) Arrange for the issue of the necessary directives and orders to effect such of these policies as are approved.

##### RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNTRY UNITS REDEFINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FINAL PLAN OF SHAEF MILITARY MISSIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS

[Memo, G-5 SHAEF to All Branches and Secs, G-5, 5 Jun 44, SHAEF G-5 files, 16.02, SHAEF (SS), Opn and Policy]

##### *Role of the Country Units*

1. In general, Country Units will perform the following roles:

a. They will be detailed planning and working parties at the disposal of G-5.

b. They will form a reserve of expert personnel who will have specialized in, and concentrated on, problems affecting their respective countries. This reserve may be drawn upon from time to time to provide a CA Mission to the national authority with which they are concerned or to provide personnel for any need that may arise in their respective countries.

##### *Tasks of Country Units*

2. Tasks of County Units will include:

a. The production of a country handbook which they will keep constantly under examination with a view to improving it and bringing it up to date with current policy.

b. Constant study of the problems affecting their respective countries with a view to increasing the store of knowledge affecting these countries and to preparing personnel for operations in these countries.

c. The preparation of detailed plans in accordance with the requirements of branches of G-5.

##### *Relationship With G-5*

3. a. Country Units will be under the general surveillance of Ops Branch for matters affecting organization, planning, and broad policy. The

chain of command to Chiefs of Country Units will be run through Chief of Ops Branch.

b. The Country Staff Sections in Ops Branch will keep in close and constant touch with the country units to insure that country units are kept "in the picture," and so that the Staff Sections themselves can represent the views of Country Units in SHAEF. Except in purely technical matters Country Staff Sections will be the normal channel for conveying information and instructions to Country Units.

c. Branches of G-5 will have direct access to

Country Units on technical matters. \* \* \*

#### *Relationship With National Authorities*

4. a. Netherlands, Belgian and Norway Country Units will continue their existing contacts with the National Governments with which they are concerned, but will *not* discuss policy.

b. For France, however, when conversations are reopened with a French Authority, such conversations will be conducted on a G-5 level and *not* through the medium of the French Country Unit. \* \* \*

## 5. CIVILIAN SUPPLY: MILITARY PROGRAM

### COMBINED SUPPLY SUBCOMMITTEE SUBMITS ITS ESTIMATES

[Memo, Wright, Dir, ASF, for the Dir, CAD, 3 Feb 44, Hist, ASF, Civ Sup, DS-175]

1. Estimates of the minimum needs of the civil population of enemy occupied Europe for a period of six months after surrender or collapse of the enemy are hereto attached. (Tab A).<sup>5</sup> These estimates reflect the discussions which have taken place in the series of meetings held with the British representatives on this subject during the past ten days.

2. The basic assumptions underlying these estimates are:

a. that there will be no damage done to the European countries upon withdrawal or surrender of German Forces; and

b. that only those minimum supplies should be provided which are essential to avoid disease and unrest. Detailed instructions to the Technical Services outlining the assumptions in further detail are attached. (Tab B)

3. The attached estimates (Tab A) are in no sense a supply program. They are rather an analysis of the needs of the countries in question, prepared in order to provide a basis of discussion with interested supply and shipping authorities and relevant planning agencies, so that a statement of requirements and an outline of proposed supply action may be developed.

4. One of the basic problems yet to be determined is the responsibility as between the U.K. and the U.S. for furnishing supplies against such program as may be finally adopted. Ultimately this responsibility must be discharged by the

<sup>5</sup> Supply estimates and instructions to Technical Services, referred to as Tabs A & B herein, will be found in CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 2.

C.C.S. under 324/1<sup>6</sup>, and appropriate recommendations to this end will be formulated as promptly as possible. This problem requires coordinated consideration by the military, supply, shipping, political, and fiscal agencies of the supplying governments. . . .

5. A preliminary study of the problem of supply responsibility based on views of certain U.S. supply authorities, indicates that only a fraction of the entire program (probably not over one-fourth) would be shipped from the United States and that substantial priorities of the program may be supplied from within Continental Europe. \* \* \*

### ESTIMATES ARE COMPLEX AND TENTATIVE

[CCAC-64, Sup Subcomm. to CCAC, 16 Feb 44, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 2]

1. Combined civilian supply operational requirements have been submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by Headquarters, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. These requirements have been published as alternative plans, Plan I (RANKIN "C") and Plan II (OVERLORD) in C.C.A.C. (S) 11. The comments herein with reference to SCAEF requirements are directed to Plan I. . . .

2. SCAEF Plan I requirements have been prepared on the basic assumption that provisions should be made for initial relief items such as food, fuel, medical and sanitary supplies and equipment, soap, clothing and footwear, and in addition that provisions should be made for "industrial first aid equipment" (i.e., rehabilitation of general industry and spare parts for automotive

<sup>6</sup> CCS Directive for Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories, 22 Aug 43. (See Chapter V, Section 4.)

transportation). It should be noted that SCAEF requirements have been calculated only for those areas where it is anticipated troops will come into contact with the civil population during the course of operations.

3. The Supply Subcommittee has approved a combined program of requirements for all of enemy-occupied Europe in event of a German collapse without "scorching," (C.C.A.C.(S) 12) hereafter designated as Plan A.<sup>7</sup> Note should be made that approval of Plan A requirements does not carry with it the assurance that such requirements can be met.

4. Both Plan A and SCAEF Plan I have been computed on the basic policy that provision must be made for (1) those items necessary for immediate relief (i.e., food, clothing, medical and sanitation supplies); (2) those items necessary for the distribution of relief (i.e., fuel, and initial repairs to public utility, communication and transportation systems), and (3) those items which will have the effect of reducing the direct relief burden at the earliest possible date. In providing for the third class of needs, the two plans differ.

a. Plan A includes requirements for rehabilitation of the textile industry. The question of provision of fertilizers recommended by the War Department has been reserved for consideration by London.

b. SCAEF Plan I specifically excludes requirements for rehabilitation of agriculture and raw materials for rehabilitation of the textile industry, but, as noted in paragraph 2 above, includes a wide variety of items for "industrial first aid equipment."

5. *Recommendations:*

a. That SCAEF be informed that Plan A, as published in C.C.A.C. (S) 12, has been approved as establishing needs for Europe in the event of collapse;

b. That SCAEF accordingly be further informed that Plan A was regarded as supplying the basis for a statement of SCAEF requirements in lieu of SCAEF Plan I, as published in C.C.A.C. (S) 11;

c. That SCAEF be requested to comment on and, if so desired recommend changes in Plan A. \* \* \*

[CCAC(S) 12 (rev), Sup Subcomm. to CCAC, 18 Feb 44, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 2]

1. The Supply Subcommittee has agreed, subject to the conditions stated hereinafter and in the several enclosures, upon certain preliminary esti-

<sup>7</sup> See Chapters IV, Sections 6 & 7 and XVII, Sections 4 & 5; see also Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics, 1943-45*, Chapters XXI and XXII.

mates concerning civil relief for the military period for the countries of Europe (excluding the U.K., U.S.S.R., and neutral countries) prepared on the basis of complete German collapse, occurring in the early part of a calendar year and without "scorching."

2. These estimates have been prepared for the purpose of furnishing overall minimum estimates of needs of each of these countries for supplies from sources outside the respective countries and of affording a basis for the initiation of procurement action.

3. The express right has been reserved by the representatives of both the War Office and the War Department, in authorizing the agreement upon these estimates, to require reconsideration of any estimate with which either of them is not satisfied in the light of further expert examination of altered circumstances.

4. Further sets of estimates are at present being prepared by the Supply Committee, (1) on the assumption of collapse with "scorching" and (2) on the assumption of operational invasion with "scorching."

5. For purposes of initiating procurement (subject to approval by C.C.A.C.<sup>8</sup> and allocation of source of supply) consideration will be limited to the estimates for Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium (including Luxembourg), France (including Corsica), Germany, Austria, Italy (including Sardinia), Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece (including Crete and Dodecanese).

It should be noted that the estimates for Germany and Austria, with the exception of medical and sanitary supplies, soap, and agricultural rehabilitation, are based solely upon caring for the displaced persons (including forced labor, prisoners of war, and refugees) from other nations found within their borders.

6. The estimates for the remaining countries have been included in order to provide a more complete picture. So far as the Subcommittee is aware, there is as yet no decision as to the extent, if at all, the U.S. and the U.K. are to assume responsibility for the supply of any of these countries. Such remaining countries are Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

7. It must be clearly understood that accept-

<sup>8</sup> On 22 February 1944, the combined program of requirements was submitted to supply and shipping allocating authorities simultaneously by the U.S. and British, and on 25 February 1944 SHAEF was notified that the estimated civilian supply needs for enemy occupied countries contained in CAAC-62 had been approved by CCAC but had not been considered by CCS. SHAEF's comments and recommendations were requested.

ance or approval by the C.C.A.C. of the estimates stated for each of the several countries covered does not involve any commitment by the War Department or the War Office that any of such countries are in fact to be furnished with either the quantities or the kinds of the indicated supplies.

8. The Supply Subcommittee recommends:

a. That the Combined Civil Affairs Committee approve the estimates, subject to the reservations contained in paragraph 3 and 7 above, and take note that necessary supplemental information is being prepared as to the extent to which such requirements can be met and as to sources of supply and to the shipping implications.

#### EISENHOWER ASKS IMMEDIATE ACTION ON SUPPLY RESERVES

[Msg. SHAEF to WD, 23 Mar 44, Mel-4, CCAC files, 44 (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 16199]

. . . Imperative to detailed operational planning for movement of supplies that a credit be established for SCAEF. We have knowledge of supplies now available in UK and, because of shortness of time, must insist on use of such supplies to fullest extent possible to meet initial requirements. . . .

In order that we may make actual allocation of supplies to army groups and indicate source of supply, must receive allocation of procurement responsibility by 27 March. . . .

. . . The basis of allocation statement requested . . . is larger in amount than actual army groups figures. However, considered advisable here that our responsibility to make allocations of supplies between army groups with indication of source should be protected by larger allocation of procurement responsibility so that SCAEF will have an operational reserve credit on which to draw for unforeseen contingencies. \* \* \*

Repeat that matter of immediate concern to us is authority to draw on supplies now available in UK. Where items available in UK are not same as our stated requirements, but can be used as substitute we will accept. . . .<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Early in the year, following discussions with McSherry, Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, SHAEF, the CCAC(S) had generated a request that the British Government provide assurance to CCS that U.K. foodstocks would be available to meet initial requirements for relief of Northwest Europe. On 28 January 1944 the British replied in CIV-308 stating the conditions under which the War Office would earmark quantities of food from

#### INITIAL SUPPLY FOR OVERLORD TO COME FROM UNITED KINGDOM STOCKPILES

[Msg. CCS to SHAEF, CM-OUT 14303, 25 Mar 44, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 2]

2. Foodstuffs. You are authorized to use foodstuffs from UK food reserves as set out in CIV-308 for OVERLORD subject to all conditions set out in CIV-308. . . .

3. Medical and sanitary. You are authorized to draw on medical and sanitary supplies procured in UK for Civil Affairs purposes Northwest Europe to limit of availability even though not in similar units to CCAC (S) 12 items. Balance of your requirements will be provided from U.S. to the extent they correspond with CCAC (S) 12 items, unless you are later notified to the contrary.

4. Soap. You are authorized to draw on soap supplies procured in UK for Civil Affairs purposes Northwest Europe to limit of availability. It is understood that at present there is no soap available. Requisitions for balance should be submitted to U.S. Request that you notify us early whether you desire quantity shipped to and stockpiled in UK and if so how much?

5. Clothing and footwear. You are authorized to draw on such supplies procured in UK for Civil Affairs purposes in Northwest Europe. Uncertain here what quantities actually now available in UK for this purpose. Balance should be requisitioned on U.S. State whether, and if so to what extent, you desire balance now shipped and stockpiled in UK. \* \* \*

9. Above information sent you in view of urgency of your request to enable your planning to proceed. Detailed consideration of some of your requirements in comparison with tentative operational estimates at present urgently proceeding here and you will be notified shortly. Comment as to your estimates in scale or specifications is being forwarded by separate cable referring to all foregoing items. \* \* \*

U.K. stocks against the first 90 days of operations under assault and collapse conditions. The amounts offered came to approximately 200,000 tons against assault conditions and 700,000 tons under collapse conditions. The former amounted to 16 percent of Plan "A" food estimates for Northwest Europe, the latter to 55 percent. On 6 March 1944 the CCAC Supply Subcommittee recommended that the offer of the British War Office be accepted with the understanding that the decision as to the responsibility for making replacement and as to the sources of replacement be a combined U.S./UK decision, and that questions affecting lend-lease and ultimate financial responsibility would not be affected. CCS delayed action with the result that Eisenhower issued the virtual ultimatum reproduced here. See MS, History of CAD, Part 3, in files of OCMH.

SCAEF'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES  
IN HIATUS AREAS

[CCS to SCAEF as Contained in SMC-IN 2674, 27 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2080]

\* \* \* 1. The general policy of the United States and United Kingdom is that responsibility for the initial provision and distribution of relief supplies to all areas under your jurisdiction to be liberated from the enemy shall be a military responsibility and that such military responsibility shall not be confined to combat zones and areas of lines of communication.

2. Although it may not be essential to the successful accomplishment of your military mission to provide relief supplies in all areas of countries under your jurisdiction which are to be liberated from the enemy, planning for such an eventuality must be realized as a requirement and should be undertaken by your headquarters. It is recognized here that you alone are in a position to estimate the extent to which you will be required by circumstances to assume the initial burden for carrying out relief and rehabilitation measures in Europe to insure the least possible interruption to the advance of Allied Forces to the ultimate objective.

3. As Supreme Commander, AEF, you will assume responsibility under operations RANKIN and OVERLORD for the initial provision and distribution of relief supplies in all liberated areas under your jurisdiction, whether or not such areas or territories constitute combat zones or lines of communication, subject to the limitations and definitions set forth hereafter:

a. Such distribution must be accomplished without hindrance to the successful completion of the operation, particularly with respect to the logistical and administrative support required to sustain the forces allocated to you for the defeat of Germany.

b. Your responsibility does not extend to such areas and territories as may now or hereafter be decided to be areas which will be occupied by the armies of the U.S.S.R.

c. Your responsibility will not include areas or territories outside the combat zones or lines of communications, if it is determined by you that conditions within such areas or territories are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the provision of relief supplies therein.

d. The scale of relief to be provided for all enemy-occupied countries is contained in CCS 324/1, a copy of which has been forwarded to you. . . .

4. You are directed to undertake all measures necessary to carry out this responsibility. Policies established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning relief in liberated areas are contained in CCS 324/1. Indigenous resources will be utilized to the fullest extent and local authorities made responsible for transportation, distribution, and accountability of relief supplies to the extent deemed desirable by you. In so far as concerns areas or territories outside combat zones and lines of communication as determined by you, your responsibility shall be to make available such relief supplies as are deemed necessary by you. Your responsibility for distribution in such areas will be limited where possible to delivery at ports or other appropriate terminals. The distribution of supplies thereafter shall, unless otherwise directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, be the responsibility of the local authorities. You will receive further instructions on this point and on your dealings with foreign governments on relief matters.

5. Your responsibility in this respect will continue until a determination has been made, based on your recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the military situation permits transfer of this responsibility.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, is being furnished a copy of this directive and in order to insure uniformity between the theaters concerned, SACMED will effect such coordination with you in coming operations as you may deem necessary. \* \* \*

SCAEF CANNOT EARMARK TRANSPORTATION FOR  
CIVILIAN SUPPLIES

[Min of Mtg Held in McCloy's office, 30 May 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

Mr. Monnet . . . talked at length particularly with respect to the urgent necessity of providing transportation equipment. . . . He indicated that the French railroads were in extraordinarily bad shape and would need supplementing by additional equipment and quick repair materials and by automotive equipment. Mr. Monnet suggested that the Theater Commander be informed that he should set aside trucks for this purpose.

General Clay stated that SCAEF could not take any more trucks than had been shipped to him because of supply, shipping and port conditions in Britain, particularly the latter.

Mr. Monnet stated that despite General Clay's statement he could not help but insist that trucks

be supplied for distribution of civilian supplies and that SCAEF allocate trucks for this specific purpose.

Mr. McCloy stated that SCAEF could not allocate trucks for this purpose during the military period.

General Hilldring stated that transportation would be the prime bottleneck during the operational period both for the troops and civilian population. General Eisenhower had been charged with both problems, and has been given all the transportation we have. Under the circumstances he must be permitted to pool his transportation in order to get the maximum use out of it. \* \* \*

#### LIBERATION WILL NOT END FOOD SHORTAGES

[Ltr, McCloy to Monnet, Mission of the French CNL, 2 Jun 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

In accordance with your request there is enclosed a survey containing preliminary estimates of the important needs of France for civilian supplies during the initial six months period after German collapse. \* \* \*

It is most important that there not be created an impression in France that the day of liberation will bring an end to food shortages or restrictions. It is of equal importance that the French people should have no reason to believe that the United Nations have made promises as to food and other supplies which cannot be fulfilled. In this connection you are urged to preserve with the utmost care the confidential character of this information in order that revisions which undoubtedly will have to be made in the light of supply availability, shipping or other considerations will not give rise to confusion or misunderstanding. \* \* \*

#### U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT ON DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROCUREMENT AND PAYMENT

[*Aide-mémoire*, Br Embassy, 8 Jun 44, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 4]

1. Discussions have been proceeding for some time between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, on the provision of relief in Europe during the military period. Both Governments are fully alive to the importance of starting procurement forthwith but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for their part have hitherto found difficulty in agreeing on the basis for procurement in the absence of agreement on the manner in which the ultimate financial burden of

such relief should be distributed. In view of the urgency of the matter, however, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in the light of discussions that have been taking place between representatives of the two Governments, are now prepared to proceed on the understanding set out below.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have considered the proposals put forward by the United States members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and are prepared, subject to the reservation contained in the following paragraph, to agree that initial procurement under Plan A should go forward on the following basis:—That the United States shall bear initial procurement responsibility for purchases in the United States, that the United Kingdom shall bear initial procurement responsibility for purchases in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, excluding Canada, and that procurement responsibility for purchases in countries other than the United States and the British Commonwealth should be divided equally between the United States and the United Kingdom.

3. This agreement on the part of His Majesty's Government is, however, subject to the reservation which they understand is accepted by the United States members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, that the arrangement outlined above shall in no way prejudice the ultimate financial settlement for the cost of relief during the military period, which is a matter for negotiation between the two Governments.

4. It would be appreciated if the State Department would confirm their acceptance of the proposal made in paragraph 2 above and of the reservation in paragraph 3, so that appropriate instructions may be given to the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in order that procurement may go forward without delay.

5. It is the view of His Majesty's Government that any such final settlement between the supplying countries must be on an equitable basis and must be based upon a recognition of the relative financial strengths of the countries concerned. In this connection, His Majesty's Government desire to place on record their view that in the light of the difference in the financial strength between the United States and the United Kingdom, they would not be able to regard an equal sharing of the burden of relief in the military period between the two countries as an equitable settlement.

6. It will be noted that in paragraph 2 the po-

sition of Canada has been specifically reserved. This will be treated separately and will no doubt be the subject of special negotiations between the three Governments. \* \* \*

[*Aide-mémoire*, Dept of State, Washington, 8 Jun 44, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 4]

The Department of State has carefully considered the *Aide-mémoire* presented by the British Embassy. . . . The Department is pleased to confirm its acceptance of the proposal made in paragraph II and the reservation made in paragraph III of the *Aide-mémoire*. The United States Government will accordingly instruct its representatives forthwith to proceed with procurement on the basis specified in paragraph II and assumes that the Government of the United Kingdom will take corresponding action.

. . . The Department takes the view that the final settlement should be on a fair and equitable basis, in the determination of which no relevant factors should be excluded.<sup>10</sup> \* \* \*

#### SHAEF HANDBOOK SETS FORTH PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY PROCEDURE

[SHAEF Fld Handbook for CA (France) (Provisional), 16 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 115.04, Hist]

286. *General*. Responsibility has been placed on Commanders of Army Groups and L of C/ComZ having area responsibility for the provision to civilian populations within the zones of operations and lines/zones of communication of the CA supplies/stores necessary to meet such relief and rehabilitation requirements as will assure accomplishment of the military operations.

287. *Provision of CA Supplies/Stores*. Credits will be given authorizing the use by such Commanders of the CA supplies/stores made available to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Commanders will call forward the supplies/stores thus allocated.

288. During the planning stage initial overall

<sup>10</sup> This exchange of *aide-mémoires* cleared the way for final approval of Plan "A." The U.S. Chiefs of Staff approved Plan "A" on 22 July 1944 and the British Chiefs of Staff indicated their approval on 3 September 1944. These belated final approvals did not affect the availability of civilian supplies in support of operations during the summer of 1944. See A History of the Civilian Supply Branch, p. 223. The final U.S.-U.K. agreement on payment for civilian supplies provided that, while each country paid initially for the supplies which it procured, in the end this was to be adjusted on the basis of reimbursement by the recipient governments; and losses due to deficiency in reimbursement were to be distributed in accordance with a formula whereby the United States, in recognition of its greater financial strength, accepted the greater portion of the losses.

estimates of Civil Affairs Supply requirements will be made by SHAEF.

290. *Supply Organization*. Except for inherent organizational differences, CA Organization for Supply operations in U.S. and British formations will conform to a common pattern with regard to the methods of obtaining and distributing CA supply/stores.

291. *Scale/Basis of Issue*. Subject to such restrictions as may from time to time be issued by SHAEF, CA supplies/stores will be provided by appropriate commanders to civil populations on a scale/basis of issue designed to bring local standards up to a minimum consistent with the standards of military necessity. For provision of foodstuffs, a standard of 2,000 calories per day per head is established.

292. *Distribution*. CA supplies/stores will be made available in local areas by delivery to authorized French authorities for distribution by them to civilian populations. At the earliest possible date consistent with military operations, arrangements will be completed for turning over CA supplies/stores, at points of initial entry, to French authorities for distribution.

293. *Payment for Supplies/Stores*. Except when operational necessity requires otherwise, CA supplies/stores will be provided to French authorities only on prepayment. A list of prices to be charged for these supplies/stores will be prepared by SHAEF and furnished to lower HQs through technical channels prior to the start of operations. In accordance with the established financial policies, arrangements will be made for loans to such authorities when they do not possess sufficient funds to cover the cost of supplies/stores to be furnished. Where it is impracticable for loans to be advanced to French authorities who do not possess sufficient funds to cover the cost of the supplies/stores to be furnished, delivery may be made by or under authority of appropriate commanders with payment temporarily deferred. Instructions regarding receipt forms and the disposition thereof will be provided through technical channels.

294. *Direct Issues to Consumers*. In accordance with relief policies established by SHAEF, appropriate commanders will be authorized in emergencies to allow the direct issue by CA Detachments of CA supplies/stores to actual consumers. In order to permit future settlement between the countries concerned, a certificate covering these issues must be accomplished by the U.S./Br officer responsible for the distribution of such supplies/stores.

295. *Utilization of Local Resources*. Prior to

the issue of imported CA supplies/stores, French authorities will be required to make maximum use of existing local resources including manufacturing and production facilities. This will be accomplished by ensuring that locally available supplies/stores are procured and distributed by the French authorities before similar CA supplies/stores made available by SHAEF are distributed. However, military procurement of supplies/stores for CA purposes may be affected where necessary. Such purchases will be in accordance with policies and procedures laid down by the GPA [General Purchasing Agent] in the US Zone and the Procurement Board in the British Zone.

296. *Use of Civilian Labour.* French authorities receiving CA supplies/stores will normally be required to hire, pay and furnish civilian labour for the handling of such CA supplies/stores at the time and place of turnover from the

CA representative. However, CA Detachments may be permitted to hire civilian labour through appropriate military channels when French authorities are unable to provide that required for this purpose. The cost of such labour will be borne by the French authorities concerned.

297. *Use of Military Transport.* When French civil authorities, after receipt of relief supplies, are unable to provide transport for their distribution, CA Detachments will apply to formation/HQ for the use of military transport.

298. *Stock Control.* SCAEF will exercise control of credits allocated to commanders and reserves the right of transfer with regard to such stocks regardless of allocations made. To implement this policy periodic reports to SHAEF will be submitted by lower Hqs, indicating the status of credits allocated to them. Instructions regarding the form and periods of submission will be transmitted through technical channels. \* \* \*

## 6. BRITISH AND AMERICANS ARGUE OVER KIND OF CURRENCY TO BE USED

### QUESTION OF THE TYPE OF CURRENCY TO BE USED IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

[Ltr, F. Phillips, Br Sup Council in North America, to Daniel W. Bell, Undersecy of State, 6 Feb 43, CAD files, 123 (2-6-43), sec. 1]

1. A number of difficult questions relating to currency arrangements for future operations remain unsettled and in the spirit of the messages exchanged between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chancellor of Exchequer, who agree that all such questions should be the subject of common discussion, I would much welcome an opportunity to go over some of the important questions with you. \* \* \*

2. It is, I think, agreed policy in all cases that we should use ordinary local currency whenever it is available or can be obtained. But we know that owing to considerations of availability of such currency and of military security we shall not be able to rely solely on this method of payment. . . .

For the operations in French North Africa we are using British Military Authority (BMA) notes and you are using ordinary dollar notes distinguished only by the yellow seal. The first and most important question is whether the same policies should be adopted in European operations. We suggest that there would be great advantage in your using special notes as we do.

Many of the arguments which led to your decision in the case of North Africa do not apply to the countries of Europe. North Africa was a dubious neutral; the expedition was a great adventure and it was important to do everything to avoid any possibility of political friction. In Europe we are more likely to be dealing either with genuine allies or with genuine enemies. It is true that the yellow seal dollars have been more popular than our BMA notes but this has been no disadvantage to us. We have had no difficulty, so far as I have heard, in getting our notes accepted for the current purposes for which they were designed; and the preference for dollars only becomes a decisive factor when it comes to hoarding. . . .

On the other side, it seems to us that there are certain definite disadvantages in the use on the continent of Europe of ordinary dollars even if they are distinguished by a yellow seal or other similar markings. . . . What arrangements we may make for passing the cost of occupation to the enemy countries are a matter for later decision when it comes to making an armistice but it is at least a grave complication if the inhabitants of those countries have, in the meantime, received genuine American dollars which sooner or later can be used in the United States. They are likely to become an immediate instrument of hoarding. If, on the other hand, you use spe-

cial notes and put on the enemy government the burden of recalling them within a given time after which they will become valueless . . . this particular trouble is taken off of your shoulders. . . .

3. A second question, if one assumes that special notes are to be used, is whether they should be denominated in sterling and dollars or in the local currency concerned. I fear that the practical answer is that even if we preferred local currency denominations, we could not print the notes in time. At least for the present we feel that we must increase our stock of sterling BMA notes rather than try to make a new series of notes for all possible countries concerned.

4. In the case of the Western European Allies, the question remains of the use to be made of the local currency which the exiled governments have prepared. Those governments have asked both our governments to discuss the question of future currency arrangements with them. I think we are agreed that we must take full account of their views but that, for reasons of military security we cannot disclose our plans in advance. We are anxious that they should produce their notes in quantities considered adequate by those authorities. \* \* \*

#### BRITISH FROWN ON USE OF SPECIAL CURRENCIES IN LIBERATED COUNTRIES

[Min of Mtg Held in McCloy's Office, 24 Sep 43,<sup>11</sup> CAD files, 123 (2-6-43)]

\* \* \* Before the combined meeting, Mr. Taylor [U.S. Treasury] distributed to the U.S. members copies of the memorandums setting forth Treasury Department opinions regarding . . . Occupation Currency, European Theater and . . . Rates of Exchange for the Metropolitan franc. An exchange of views of the U.S. members took place and it was agreed that, after the Treasury memorandums had been studied, an agreement would be effected on the American side prior to coordination with the British.

Sir David Waley [UK] stated to the combined meeting the British position concerning various aspects of the problems under consideration, with several details, relative thereto, including the following points:

(1) The British prefer to use currencies of the countries to be liberated and, if possible, to avoid use of BMA notes and yellow seal dollars.

<sup>11</sup> Present were members of the UK Treasury delegation and representatives of the State, War, Navy and Treasury Department. The meeting was called in response to a letter of 15 Sep 43 from Sir David Waley to McCloy regarding invasion currency and rate exchange.

(2) Regarding supplies of various currencies, Dutch guilder notes are being printed in Montreal for the Netherlands governments-in-exile.

(3) The British desire to use Metropolitan francs as invasion currency for France. It is not certain, however, that the supply available is adequate.

(4) The situation regarding amounts available of Belgium francs, Dutch guilders and Norwegian kroners remains to be clarified. . . .

(5) The governments-in-exile would make available, in advance, supplies of their currencies, subject to future settlement. Early payment would be expected for such currencies used for payment of troops and other military disbursements. . . .

(6) The British are inclined to leave a large measure of responsibility to the governments-in-exile as to fixing their rates of exchange. \* \* \*

#### U.S. TREASURY FAVORS USE OF YELLOW SEAL DOLLARS IN THE SPEARHEAD PHASE

[Treasury Dept Memo, 23 Sep 43, sub: Occupation Currency, ET, Circulated by Taylor to UK Members of Mtg Held in McCloy's Office, 24 Sep 43, CAD files, 123 (2-6-43)]

##### I. Occupational Currency Problems in Military Operations

In considering currency problems associated with military operations it is convenient to distinguish between the three stages of occupation: (1) the spearhead invasion period, (2) period of military control, and (3) period of civilian control.

1. *Spearhead Invasion Period.* During this period the military is fighting to establish its bridgehead or foothold over the area and all other considerations should be completely subordinated. \* \* \*

##### II. *The U.S. Army must be certain that "Spearhead" Currency will be eagerly accepted by the local population in friendly areas*

The primary consideration in the choice of a currency to be used by the military in the opening stages of an invasion is the effect the use of that currency will have on military operations. The Army must have a currency that can be easily obtained in adequate amounts and that will be accepted without hesitation by the people in the invaded areas.

The U.S. dollar seems to be ideally suitable for use by American military forces during the initial stage of an invasion operation. Throughout the world the dollar is the symbol of the financial

strength and of the vast economic resources of the United States. . . .

The use of U.S. currency dollars may have the added effect of inducing a feeling of currency stability and economic order, thereby removing one factor of disruption to the local economy that is attendant upon any military invasion. \* \* \*

The U.S. Army is quite satisfied with its experience in North Africa and Sicily with yellow seal dollars and is prepared to employ this same type of currency during the initial period of invasion elsewhere if the situation seems to warrant it.

### III. *British Views on Currency To Be Used in Spearhead Operations*

Prior to the landings in French North Africa, the British War Office indicated that it was in favor of using special military currency (such as the British Military Authority note) for spearhead operations. The British cited the experience of Germany in Western Europe where the Nazis used special military currency and also referred to the use of BMA notes in Tripolitania as illustrations of the successful use of that type of currency. The British opposed the use, by the United States, of the U.S. dollar on the grounds that it was too expensive a currency, i.e., because it would probably have to be honored at face value in the future. The American Government, however, felt that all other considerations should be subordinated to the one paramount issue—the success of the military operations.

The question of money costs is not and should not be a decisive consideration, particularly since, in the final analysis, the cost of the operation obviously does not depend on the type of currency employed, but depends, rather, on other broad policy decisions.

Apart from the fact that ultimate costs can be controlled in other ways, the relationship of the use of U.S. dollars to costs is not likely to be significant for the following reasons:

(1) The shift from spearhead currency to local currency can be effected in a very short period of time. . . .

(2) When it is decided to recall dollars from circulation, it is anticipated that the great majority of these notes will be returned to our officers in exchange for local currency. \* \* \*

Since the invasion of North Africa, British views about the desirability of spearhead currencies have changed and they now seem reluctant to continue the use of the BMA note. This reluctance may have stemmed from the fact that the British feared that the BMA note would circulate at a discount vis-à-vis the dollar unless it

was linked to the dollar. By linking the BMA note to the dollar it became subject to some of the criticisms which the British levied against the use of yellow-seal dollars. Even when linked to the dollar the BMA note did not receive as favorable a reception as did the yellow-seal dollar.

London now tends to favor the abandonment of the BMA note for use in friendly areas and the adoption of local currencies in their possession and refugee currencies printed in London (and Montreal) by the refugee governments. This view raises the question anew as to what currency should be used during the spearhead period.

In addition to the objections mentioned above to the general use as spearhead currency of yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, the British have additional objections to their use in friendly countries. They feel that the exiled governments strongly resent the use, in the initial and later periods, of any currency other than the refugee currency prepared by those governments or such old local currency as may be in their possession.

The exiled governments in oral discussion with U.S. Treasury officials and in memoranda submitted have advanced the following reasons for their opposition to the use as spearhead currency of any but their own prepared or old local currency:

1. The refugee governments view the use of currencies not under their control as being both an *infringement of their sovereignty* and politically injudicious inasmuch as it may tend to prejudice their case in the eyes of the local populace. . . .

2. That the injection of such currencies will lead to a *disruption of the monetary system* through increasing distrust on the part of the local population in their own currency and may give rise to premiums on foreign currencies and discount for local currency. . . .

3. Currencies not controlled by the exiled governments will be *hoarded by the local populace*. . . .

It is not felt that these arguments are particularly weighty in view of the significance and importance of the military operations. These objections may be answered forthwith:

1. *The Sovereignty of the Governments-in-Exile*. The argument that the use of currencies not under their control may infringe the sovereignty of the governments-in-exile appears to be premised upon a faulty perspective. These governments will owe their very existence to the efforts of the Allied military machine. Unless they object to the use of the Allied armies as an infringement of their sovereignty, there can be

little basis for objecting on that ground to the use of one of the economic weapons which those armies deem effective to assure complete victory. \* \* \*

### 2. *Disruption of Local Currency Systems.*

Objections have been voiced to the use of yellow seal dollars in the spearhead operations, on the grounds that many different kinds of currencies would necessarily have to be dealt in and these would tend to disrupt the local economy and render it difficult for the local government to control its currency system at a later period. . . . The yellow seal currency and BMA notes could readily be withdrawn from circulation at a date to be determined after the invasion, by placing a time limit on the period within which they would be accepted as legal tender. . . .

3. *Currency Hoarding.* In view of the fact that the yellow seal dollars and the BMA pounds are currencies expressly designed for use in spearhead operations and distinguishable from the currencies circulating in the United States and Great Britain, the withdrawal of these currencies from circulation should present no great problem. . . .

. . . refugee government currencies might constitute a military hazard. Some of the governments-in-exile do not enjoy wide popularity among the native population. . . . For American troops to appear in the guise of liberators and immediately start using currencies of the governments-in-exile might prejudice the case of liberation in the eyes of local inhabitants. \* \* \*

### THE THEATER STRONGLY OPPOSED TO USE OF YELLOW SEAL DOLLARS

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, 8 Nov 43, CAD files, 123 (2-6-43), sec. 1, CM-IN 4980]

Use of Metropolitan francs as spearhead currency strongly favored this Theater, sufficient supply of same being available for initial operations. Plans should be made for supply of another currency, preferably an allied military franc. Possibilities of having such currency printed here now being explored upon which you will be advised later. Strenuous objections exist against use of yellow seal currency for the following reasons:

It seems inappropriate to liberate an occupied country and immediately introduce a new currency;

It adds one more type of currency to be dealt with by finance officers, British and Canadian Field Cashiers.

In those cases where costs of operation will

be charged to country occupied, it will be impossible to have country bear expenses initially if yellow currency is used as this will always remain an obligation of the United States to redeem. . . .

### AN ALLIED MILITARY NOTE THAT LOOKS FRENCH WILL BE USED

[Msg, Hilldring to McCloy at SEXTANT, 5 Dec 43, CAD files, 123 (2-6-43), sec. 1, CM-OUT 1927]

. . . The currency that we are proceeding to print is the Allied military franc and not the French Republic franc. Both Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson are agreed that the printing and use by Allied military forces of a French Republic Franc would confer upon the Committee a degree of recognition with respect to Metropolitan France which would jeopardize if not endanger the President's formula for dealing with the Committee. The Allied military franc in any form is not acceptable to the Committee according to Monnet. However, Monnet has been informed by Mr. Stimson that in his opinion there is no alternative in view of the terms under which the French Committee has been recognized by the United States. In the light of this understanding, Monnet has conferred with the War Department, State and Treasury Officials in the preparation of an Allied Military franc which is least objectionable to the French and we are proceeding to provide this type of Allied military franc. \* \* \*

### PRINTING OF ALLIED MILITARY FRANCS IS HALTED

[Memo, Hilldring for CG, ETOUSA, 17 Dec 43, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 2]

1. Supplementing my memorandum of 6 December 1943 [Chapter XXII, sec 3] regarding the above subject, you will have received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the British Chiefs of Staff cable dispatched to COSSAC today concerning monetary and fiscal planning for the various Western European countries. However, the following should be added in order to bring information up to date in regard to plans for France.

2. Paragraph 6a of my memorandum of 6 December 1943 indicated that we could proceed at once with the preparation and printing of A. M. francs for use in Metropolitan France. A few days later the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, called upon the Secretary of State and informed him unexpectedly that the British Government is now opposed to use of an Allied Military franc. The British now propose a French national currency

issued by the French National Committee.

3. In view of the President's message of 26 November 1943 and the principles set forth in the Dunn-Wright formula for civil affairs for France, the above mentioned developments brought to a halt the arrangements which had been started for the printing of an A.M. franc issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Treasury Department. Consequently the cable sent you today by the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated that final decision regarding franc currency must await further consideration at highest levels.

4. You will be kept posted of further developments as promptly and fully as practicable. Planning for France and other Western European countries is being pressed forward here as a matter of urgency.

#### SCAEF TO ISSUE A SUPPLEMENTAL FRANC BUT WILL NOT CALL IT MILITARY

[Cable GOV 2, CCAC to SCAEF, 29 Jan 44, GOV 2, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 1, CM-OUT 12364]

. . . following is present status of plans regarding production of supplemental invasion currencies for countries indicated below: France—design for franc note issue has been approved by US and UK authorities and concurred in by French mission in Washington. This supplemental franc issue will be printed in Washington on behalf of Allied Military Commander and for use under his authority. No mention of military is contained in design. Treasury Department indicates printing can commence by February 15 and probably earlier. . . .

#### WAR DEPARTMENT AGREES TO EXPEDITE THE SHIPMENT OF FRENCH FRANCS

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, 4 Feb 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 1, CM-IN 2923]

Have seen GOV 2 . . . seriously concerned at lack of finality in currency arrangements for continental operations. Essential that all necessary currency for OVERLORD be available in UK at least one month before D Day. We must also bear in mind possibility that RANKIN might occur before OVERLORD D Day, or might rapidly follow launching of OVERLORD. . . .

[Msg, CAD to SHAEF, 6 Feb 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 1, CM-OUT 2661]

. . . The packing of French francs for the first shipment to London has already started and the last of printing of forty billion will have been finished before April 15. It is believed that this time schedule can be shortened. Currency will be

shipped periodically as sufficient stocks become available. . . .

#### LOCAL BELGIAN, DUTCH, AND NORWEGIAN CURRENCY FOR ALLIED TROOPS

[Msg, CAD to CG, ETO, 29 Apr 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 1, CM-OUT 29891]

We have been informed by Morgenthau that the governments of Belgium, Holland, Norway, acting in accordance with our request, have made available to you amounts of their local currency for use of American Armed Forces that may participate in the liberation of these countries. Our request to these governments was that the currency should be turned over to you as Supreme Commander in such amounts and such places and in such units as you might deem necessary. . . .

[Msg, SHAEF to WD for CCAC, 9 May 44, VOG 36, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 6821]

Currencies turned over to the War Office by the Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian governments-in-exile are available to SCAEF for all purposes, including needs of U.S. forces without prior conclusion of Treasury agreements as to terms and conditions. SCAEF now exercises control over these currencies with the War Office acting as SCAEF's agent. The Financial Branch, G-5 Division, SHAEF, is the Staff division charged with responsibility to SCAEF on these matters.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS CURRENCY SECTIONS CREATED

[SHAEF Admin Memo 11, 4 May 44, CAD files, 319.1, Currency-Fr]

1. In accordance with directives of the CCS to this Headquarters, a Civil Affairs Currency Section will be activated for each country in which operations are undertaken by the Allied Forces. Each such currency section, when activated, will have the following functions and powers:

##### a. Functions

(1) Receive, hold, and supply adequate currency for pay and procurement of Allied Army Forces for Civil Affairs operations.

(2) Provide a central depository and clearing house for funds issued to and deposits received from the Allied Expeditionary Force, including Civil Affairs.

(3) Provide a central financial medium for such measures as may be necessary to insure an adequate banking and currency structure.

(4) Receive, hold and supply such stocks of postage stamps as are necessary in the interests of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

(5) Maintain such control and subsidiary accounts as may be required for the purposes of the U.S. and British Governments.

b. *Powers*

(1) Establish sub-sections.

(2) Designate one or more banks as its agent and make and withdraw deposits with banks.

(3) Make advances directly or indirectly to governments and their political subdivisions, para-Statal institutions, banks, industrial enterprises and others in the absence of other loan sources, when such advances are justified by military necessity, and to hold all evidences of debt or obligations arising from such transactions and to take any steps necessary to recover funds so advanced.

(4) To act as required as depository for and/or to exercise control over assets seized or impounded by the Allied Military authorities.

2. The first of the currency sections described above is hereby activated and attached to 21 Army Group. It will operate as a section of a Civil Affairs staff of 21 Army Group and will be subject to the authority of the Controller of Finance and Accounts of said staff. This Currency Section will consist of six officers (three U.S. and three British) and 10 enlisted men (U.S.). \* \* \*

4. For security reasons Currency Section hereby activated will include the name of the country in its title only after D Day. Before D Day it will be referred to as Currency Section - 21 Army Group.

5. The Currency Section - 21 Army Group will immediately take control of all currency in coin for operation OVERLORD presently held by the British War Office as agent for the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. \* \* \*

6. All currency requirements of Allied Forces in operation OVERLORD, both for military pay and procurement and for CA purposes, will be drawn from the Currency Section. . . .

7. Pay branches of the respective services will arrange for the Currency Section to be provided

with continuing estimates of their future currency requirements for military purposes, at such times and in such forms as are required by the Currency Section for organization of proper flow of deliveries from the War Office. Pay branches of the respective services will arrange for the provision in their estimates and in their shipping schedules for the movement forward of sufficient funds in bulk to take care of all currency requirements for military purposes on the continent through D plus 60.

8. Funds for CA purposes will be provided to the CA organizations in operation OVERLORD directly by the Currency Section, which, under agreement with the War Office, U.S. Fiscal Officers and the British DPIC may use their facilities for physical handling and movement of currencies to the extent it considers necessary. An advance detachment of the Currency Section, with bulk funds for CA purposes and with adequate transport facilities, will move forward by D plus 15 or as soon thereafter as movement considerations allow. The full Currency Section with bulk funds for both CA and military purposes, will move forward with the 21 Army Group Headquarters, or by D plus 35, whichever is earlier, subject to movement considerations.

9. Upon notices by the Currency Section that it is in a position to operate, the respective pay branches of all services will make arrangement for their currency requirements on the continent to be provided by the Currency Section. After movement of the Currency Section to the Continent, currency requirements in the UK for operation OVERLORD will be drawn by the respective pay branches directly from the War Office in accordance with arrangements to be notified to them by this headquarters.

10. All funds advanced by the Currency Section to the respective pay branches for military purposes will be reported by the receiving pay branch to the U.S. War Department, the U.S. Navy Department, or the British War Office, in accordance with the recipients' nationality. The Currency Section will independently report all such advances to this headquarters. \* \* \*

## 7. ALLIES AGREE ON CURRENCY FOR FRANCE BUT DE GAULLE'S SUPPORT IS UNCERTAIN

### SHAEF WANTS FRENCH COMMITTEE AUTHORIZED TO CONTROL CURRENCY

[Msg, SHAEF to WD for CCAC, 4 May 44, VOG 32, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 2965]

1. Preliminary discussions with the French military mission indicates that they consider the financial problem could best be met by solution on the following lines:

a. French authorities would organize or provide financial facilities and service to be expected in any well-ordered administration.

b. SCAEF should rely on French authorities to operate the economic and fiscal system.

c. French authorities would make necessary advances to public authorities and to banking systems through established French channels.

d. To meet inflation situation, French plan to continue price control and rationing systems and to soak up purchasing power by use of Corsican Scheme. . . .

e. To carry out above, it would be necessary for the French to use our supplemental francs.

2. All of above would be subject to over-riding power for emergency action by Allied commanders in absence of or failure of French authorities.

3. Following the policy indicated by intended extension of Lease-Lend arrangement with the French Committee of National Liberation to include Metropolitan France, we are prepared to agree in principle to the above program. We feel that definite plan with some French authority is necessary, and the FCNL is the only body with which satisfactory arrangements can be made prior to arrival.

4. We consider that there are strong psychological arguments against SCAEF alone declaring supplemental francs legal tender. We should prefer that FCNL issue primary declaration and that SCAEF support this by statement for information if necessary. Thus French would be fully responsible for the success of their financial program. SCAEF would retain such notes as he requires against proper accounting, though the whole issue would be the responsibility of FCNL.

5. In our view, these arrangements would achieve the essential purpose of putting the French authorities in a position adequately to carry out their financial functions of civil administration. \* \* \*

### U.S. WANTS SHAEF TO ISSUE CURRENCY IN FRANCE

[Transcript of WD Telecon 449, between Holmes, in London, and Hilldring, in Washington, 11 May 44, CCAC files, 092 (4-20-44)]

L. - . . . This affects our program about French currency. I'll expect an answer on that any time soon.

W. - I hope so. That has been a little difficult to handle. I will be glad to tell you what the U.S. short of the highest authority, is recommending with regard to this matter, and informally, the British Staff Mission will go along with our proposal, and here is our proposal: I'll give you the exact words here—"We approve, in principle, the program set forth in VOG 32, except that the FCNL shall not be set up as the issuing authority for currency in France."

L. - Who is the issuing authority?

W. - SHAEF is the issuing authority. Here's the next paragraph: "It must be made clear to the French Military Mission, and other representatives of the Committee, with whom you may deal, that any arrangements made with them must be considered tentative, and not preclude consultation with and assistance from other elements of the French people with whom you may feel it necessary or advantageous to deal while your forces are in France." (You've heard that before).

Third paragraph: "It should be made clear, also that the basis of authority for the issue of supplemental francs is vested in SHAEF, and not the FCNL, and the FCNL should not be held out as the issuing authority." \* \* \*

### RATES OF EXCHANGE

[Msg, CCS to SHAEF, 11 May 44, GOV 46, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 35242]

. . . You will decree the following rates of exchange on D Day, or not later than your entry into respective areas. Dollar-sterling cross rate will be \$4.03½ equal one pound sterling. . . .

France: 200 French francs equal one pound sterling; 49.5663 French francs equal \$1.00; Belgium: 176.625 Belgian francs equal one pound sterling; 43.7732 Belgian francs equal \$1.00. Netherlands: 10.691 Dutch guilders equal one

pound sterling; 2.6496 Dutch guilders equal \$1.00. Norway: 20 Norwegian kroner equal one pound sterling; 4.9566 Norwegian kroner equal \$1.00. Denmark: 24 Danish kroner equal one pound sterling; 5.9480 Danish kroner equal \$1.00.

The exchange rate to be decreed between the U.S. yellow seal dollar and the BMA pound note, if you find it necessary to use such currencies in forthcoming operations, will be \$4.03½ equal one pound, that is, at the same rate at which pound sterling funds in official U.S. accounts in banks in the United Kingdom can be purchased with and reconverted into U.S. dollars.

Convenient rates in rounded figures for British Army accounting purposes will be furnished to you by the War Office for Belgium and the Netherlands.

#### SCAEF TO ISSUE CURRENCY PROCLAMATION OVER HIS OWN SIGNATURE

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, VOG 53, 24 May 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 19307]

Since we have received no reply to our VOG 32, and understand informally that you are not favorable to paragraph 4, we propose to issue proclamation over signature of SCAEF, substantially as follows:

"A. In order to prevent any shortage of currency, due to the disturbance of war, supplemental franc notes will be used to supplement the existing currency.

"B. 1. All notes bear on the reverse the French colors and the words 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.' Supplemental francs shall be legal tender in Liberated Metropolitan France and shall in all respects be equivalent to other French lawful money of like face value. No person shall in any transaction whatsoever discriminate between supplemental francs and such other existing French lawful money.

"C. . . . However, transactions in all foreign currency, including U.S. dollar and Sterling notes are forbidden, except as permitted by the appropriate authority."

It has been represented to us that the inclusion of the last two sentences in B1 above involve an unnecessary assumption of sovereignty. However, unless the supplemental franc is declared legal tender there is the danger that it will not receive universal acceptance. Necessity for issue of this proclamation on D Day requires immediate decision. . . .

[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF, 27 May 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 42763]

Action proposed in VOG 53 is approved subject to omission of final sentence in your paragraph

1 (B): "No persons shall in any transaction whatsoever discriminate between supplemental francs and such other existing French lawful money." The reason for this omission is that it seems unnecessary repetition of a provision likely to be unpalatable to the French.

You are authorized to show the draft to the French in advance and to obtain French support announcements.

#### HAS EISENHOWER LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ISSUE CURRENCY IN FRANCE?

[Msg, Gen Smith for McCloy, SMC-810, 25 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 10]

We have just sent a message to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee suggesting a rephrasing of paragraph 4 of VOG 32 on the subject of French Currency.

I must admit that our recommendation is rather a solution of desperation. We believe that General Eisenhower had *no* real legal authority to declare this currency legal tender in liberated Metropolitan France or in the area of any other Allied Nation, and that the situation which will confront us on the Continent is entirely different from that existing in North Africa where our status initially was one of military occupation.

I also believe that since the French Committee for National Liberation has now declared itself the Provisional Government of France, it will be particularly resentful of a declaration of legal tender by the Supreme Commander as this will be considered a flagrant violation of French sovereignty. Whether the future French Government, whatever it may be, will fall in line later and confirm such a declaration by the Supreme Commander remains to be seen. Since the question of currency is a vital one, and since time is of the essence, I would like to recommend this matter to your urgent and personal attention.

#### CURRENCY PROCLAMATION WILL BE ISSUED WITH OR WITHOUT SUPPORTING STATEMENT BY THE FRENCH

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, 5 Jun 44, VOG 61, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 4053]

1. We have not yet been able to show draft to the French or obtain supporting announcement. We have not yet authorized issue of currency proclamations, since:

A. It is considered most important that support announcement should, if possible, be obtained and that this would be seriously prejudiced by a *fait accompli*.

B. Small amounts of supplemental francs likely to be circulated in the early days.

2. Proclamation by SCAEF will, in any case, be issued as directed with or without supporting statement, as soon as we consider that the currency situation requires it.

3. Pending issue of proclamation, we are trying to prevent all publicity of currency question here, including rate of exchange, and request you arrange same in U.S. . . .

MATTERS PERTAINING TO BANKS, PUBLIC FINANCE, AND CONTROL OF PROPERTY TO BE HANDLED BY THE INDIGENOUS AUTHORITIES

[SHAEF Fld Handbook for CA (France) (Provisional), 16 Jun 44]

SECTION II

73. Responsibilities set forth in this Section will be executed by the French authorities. In the event circumstances prevent the French authorities from executing their responsibilities the following action will be taken to fulfill them. Except as otherwise indicated this action will be taken.

*Currency*

74. Supplemental franc notes issued for use by the Allied forces will be made legal tender and will be interchangeable with regular franc currency and coin and administrative currency (such as that issued by the Communes) without distinction.

*Rates of Exchange*

75. The official rate of exchange expressed in terms of French francs to the dollar and French francs to the pound sterling will be announced to the population.

*Transactions in Currencies*

76. All transactions in currencies will be controlled.

*Banks and Moratorium*

77. Control of banks and other financial institutions will be in accordance with the program of the French authorities. If the situation in any locality is critical, however, and runs on the banks are threatened, the appropriate commanders, if possible not below Army, may, through the French authorities, in their discretion, cause the banks to be closed and a general moratorium to be declared. A report will be made to SCAEF of action so taken.

*Loans and Advances*

78. . . .

a. *Advances for Civilian purposes.* Expenditures by public authorities will be financed by

the French authorities themselves in accordance with the usual procedure. If an advance is required, a public authority will apply through the normal administrative channels or to the Bank of France or other French banks. If these methods fail and the need is essential and immediate, or if the failure to obtain funds will prejudice the military situation, an advance from CA funds may be made. Advances from CA funds will be to the highest level of public authority in the area and will be limited usually to a 30-day period. This authority will not normally be delegated below Army.

b. *Advances for Private Enterprises.* CA advances to essential private enterprises may be authorized only if they are unable to obtain their requirements from banks or other available sources and if their need is immediate and urgent and capable of prejudicing the military effort if not relieved. This authority will not normally be delegated below Army.

c. *Emergency Advances.* Notwithstanding the provisions laid down in "A" and "B" above, appropriate instructions may be issued to authorize CA officers in lower echelons to make advances to the minimum extent necessary to provide against a temporary and extreme emergency when the approval of higher authority cannot be obtained by normal communications and the military effort may be prejudiced if the advance is not made immediately.

*Public Finance*

79. Matters of public finance will be handled in accordance with the program of the French authorities. Non-essential expenditure should be discouraged and those of a capital nature will always be subject to special scrutiny. Existing tax laws should be maintained. Basic policy should be to continue service on the public debt, but if the fiscal situation dictates, payments of principal may be postponed. Government monopolies and municipal enterprises should be controlled and their revenues used in the normal manner. All bona fide government pensions and all social security benefits should continue to be paid.

*Control of Property*

80. Control of enemy and United Nations property including freezing and blocking regulations will be carried out by the French authorities. In the event of the French taking no satisfactory action:

a. All reasonable steps necessary to preserve the property of the United Nations and their nationals will be taken, within such limits as are

imposed by the military situation and a report of the situation regarding all classes of property will be made to SHAEF.

b. The appropriate French authorities will be urged to take measures to impound or block all assets of enemy governments, enemy banks, hostile individuals and organizations and all persons acting on behalf of the foregoing and, where appropriate, assets of all persons resident in enemy occupied territories. In the event no action is taken by French authorities, report is to be made to SHAEF. \* \* \*

#### FINANCIAL PROBLEMS—A SURVEY

[Financial Branch, G-5, SHAEF, Report on Financial Problems in Liberated Areas, 22 March 1945, SHAEF files, G-5, 113.21, Financial Branch]

#### \* \* \* *Basic Approach to Financial Problems*

The primary responsibility for the acceptance by the liberated nations of certain financial policies considered desirable from the military standpoint rested on the U.S./UK Treasury representatives who negotiated with officials of the respective nations. SHAEF participated in carrying on the discussions and in facilitating the operations of the financial programs developed by the various liberated governments. In the case of France earlier negotiations were necessarily on a tentative basis because the position of the Provisional Government had not been clearly defined.

From the beginning of planning long before D Day, the rights of the liberated nations as sovereign powers to determine their own financial policies and to be opposed to unnecessary interference in their internal financial affairs were recognized. SHAEF's interest in the financial programs of the liberated nations was based on several considerations which were made clear to the various official representatives in the initial conference.

First, it was emphasized that the interest of the Supreme Commander was in making sure that a financial policy would be adopted which would not produce an unstable economy that in turn might interfere with military operations. Secondly, it was stressed that it was beneficial for all liberated governments to adopt reasonably similar programs for controlling foreign exchange and the property of Nazis and other hostile persons and organizations. Authorities of the liberated countries appreciated the problem. This

is illustrated by a quotation from a letter from M. Hubert Ansiaux, Director Delegate of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, to SHAEF in connection with certain currency negotiations, as follows:

" . . . On the one hand it is recognized that the Belgians alone have the sovereign right to fix the exchange parity of the Belgian currency on Belgian territory. On the other hand it is recognized that the Commander-in-Chief has supreme power during the period and in the field of military operations. It would be deplorable from a political point of view if these two powers were not exercised in the same way and in mutual agreement."

From the commencement of planning SHAEF has followed the general policy of consulting with the financial authorities of the liberated areas in order to ascertain what their financial programs were going to be regarding inflationary control, taxation, closing of banks, deNazification of financial institutions and internal financial measures such as freezing, blocking and property controls. During these discussions members of the staff of SHAEF advised the officials of these governments on such matters as freezing and blocking controls, submitted questions to them for consideration and reply, and pointed out any apparently weak spots in their financial planning. As time passed it became evident that the various governments were going to be able to assume more and more financial responsibilities so that adjustments in the financial plans were made accordingly. This was especially true in the case of France.

In the field of freezing and blocking controls it was essential to ensure that the various governments had working knowledge of the freezing and blocking controls practised by the U.S./UK from the point of view both of policy and of administration. There was need for discussion to overcome certain peculiar local problems. In Belgium, for example, it was found that the constitution might have been construed to prohibit freezing and blocking control without arrest. After discussions and the obtaining of legal opinions the Belgian authorities undertook to establish freezing and blocking controls. Bank accounts, safe deposit boxes and real and personal property of enemy governments and their agencies were blocked. Advice was also given to the Belgian authorities as to methods of setting up Property Custodianship procedures for handling the property thus seized. \* \* \*

## Planning for France Extends Beyond D-Day

Civil affairs planners faced their supreme challenge in attempting to lay the groundwork for civil administration in France. When D-day dawned General Eisenhower still had no combined directive on this task. He had been acting under a directive approved by the U.S. "highest level," but the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff had so far been unable to agree on a combined policy. Instead of having drawn closer together, the views of the British and Americans had grown farther apart, as had also the views of the President and General de Gaulle. By D-day, in fact, the matter had reached such an impasse that it could be settled only by the heads of government.

Nevertheless, since early in 1944 planning had gone ahead on the assumption that despite nonrecognition De Gaulle would help; lest he be alienated a plan for military government was dropped. Two civil affairs plans were prepared in accordance with the decision to invade southern France in support of the main invasion across the channel. The planning for northern France went on at SHAEF and in 21 Army Group and was closely related with the planning for the countries of northwestern Europe. Since the invasion of southern France was to be under the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, civil affairs preparations for southern France took place in North Africa, at or near AFHQ.

A decision for the "eventual re-entry into Southern France" was taken as early as the First Quebec Conference in August 1943. Conceived of as a movement simultaneous with and ancillary to the main movement across the channel, an outline of the operation was discussed with the Russians at the Teheran Conference in late November. Anxious to encourage the maximum Allied effort on the western front—and possibly with an eye to having a free hand in eastern Europe—the Russians favored the plan strongly. Accordingly, on 8 December SACMED was directed to prepare to invade southern France in support of the main landings in Normandy. The CCS specified that as soon as the forces from the Mediterranean made a junction with those from northern France SHAEF would assume control of all Allied operations in France. General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, SACMED, delegated his responsibility for ANVIL (later DRAGOON) to the Commander of Force 163—and at the same time of the U.S. Seventh Army—Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch. Planning began at La Bouzaréa in North Africa on 12 January and continued until the operation was launched, but there was continuing uncertainty until July that the plans would be executed.

Civil affairs as well as operational planning ran into other problems including the necessity for co-operation between SHAEF

and AFHQ, the possibility of German withdrawal or collapse, and ambiguities in the relation with the French Committee of National Liberation. Since the operation was ultimately to pass under control of SHAEF it was essential that policies in the two headquarters be harmonious. From the beginning AFHQ and SHAEF exchanged views by letter and cable. In March 1944 AFHQ sent a mission to SHAEF where it remained until the planning period was nearly over. As manuals and directives were issued at SHAEF these were made available for the guidance of the planners in North Africa and thus a certain harmony of policies was achieved.

In addition to planning for ANVIL both SHAEF and AFHQ were directed to plan for occupation of areas under their jurisdiction under essentially noncombat conditions (Operation RANKIN). In planning both for ANVIL and RANKIN, AFHQ at first assumed that its responsibility would be restricted to the combat zone and line of communications. SHAEF decided, however, that planning should also include the so-called "hiatus areas," outside the area of active operations. Thus an area containing some 12,000,000 people, almost one third of France, had to be taken into consideration, a fact that vitally affected all planning, especially supply.

A third factor that complicated planning was relations with the FCNL.<sup>1</sup> In southern France the problem was more serious than elsewhere because greater responsibility was to be given French authorities. SHAEF's interim directive of 14 May stated that extensive reliance should be placed on "French Authorities other than Vichy" for the conduct of civil administration. In practice "French authorities" turned out to mean: (1) the Military Mission to the Seventh Army commanded by

General Henri Cochet; (2) M. Raymond Aubrac, the Regional Commissioner for Marseille Region consisting of six departments; and (3) the Préfets, Sous-Préfets, Maires, and other local officials.

Most of the planning was done at Courbet-Maine, a tiny summer resort on the Mediterranean, some forty miles from Algiers. This planning and training organization, for security reasons, was known only as the Civil Affairs Training Center. Other phases of the plans were prepared by the G-5 Section, Seventh Army; still more was done directly at Allied Force Headquarters. Since no clear-cut delineation of responsibilities existed, some degree of confusion resulted.

The worst confusion, however, was in regard to the attitude of De Gaulle, and as late as 5 August—nearly two months after the invasion of northern France—G-5 AFHQ reminded the War Department and the War Office that all of AFHQ's plans for civil affairs depended upon a still unrealized agreement with the French. While working relations with General Henri Cochet, the Military Delegate of the FCNL for southern France, had been excellent, G-5 stated that a definite agreement with the French was "urgently needed now."

Since early in 1944 SHAEF, together with the heads of governments, had been groping toward a solution. While the French Committee in Algiers, for the sake of security, had not been informed of plans for the forthcoming invasion, as the time approached the British felt that the only way to get De Gaulle's co-operation was to ask him to come to London.

When De Gaulle arrived in London on 4 June he was informed of several decisions already taken, including the plans for the employment of civil affairs liaison officers and the proposal to issue supplemental currency. He was also handed the text of an

<sup>1</sup> See Chapters xxii and xxiii.

address prepared by the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division and was told that he would be expected to read this speech directly after General Eisenhower's message on D-day. De Gaulle was furious. He felt he had been tricked into coming to London to be confronted with a *fait accompli*; he objected to parroting a speech that made no reference to the French Committee; but most of all he was aroused by the proposal to issue what he called "counterfeit" or "AMGOT" money. The issuance of currency, he said, was a violation of national sovereignty, a humiliation to which not even the Germans had subjected France. To impress his allies with his extreme displeasure the general at first refused to go on the radio, forbade the use of French liaison officers, and made official protest through diplomatic channels on the use of Allied military currency. After much discussion, he relented sufficiently to permit twenty civil affairs liaison officers to participate in D-day operations, and early on the morning of 6 June he also agreed to go on the radio but only on condition that he prepare his own speech, in which he proposed to tell the French to follow the instructions of their government and their chiefs in battle.

It may seem strange that so technical a matter as currency could have caused so much difficulty. The currency question was, of course, not the main cause but simply the efficient cause of the troubles with the French Committee. The main cause of the impasse that threatened to wreck Anglo-American amity and to seriously embarrass civil administration in France was a conflict of personalities. The two protagonists, Roosevelt and De Gaulle, were strong-willed men, each motivated by principles that he refused to compromise. The sincerity of the President in pressing for free determination cannot be doubted. Neither can the sincerity of De Gaulle,

who was deeply concerned about the dignity of his country and its restoration to an honorable position in the family of nations. Naturally enough he was extremely sensitive to anything that suggested an infringement of the sovereignty of France.

The story unfolded in these documents is one of compromise and gradual retreat on both sides. A compromise was precipitated by the action of the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Luxembourg on 13 June, followed a day later by Poland, in announcing their recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the duly constituted authority of France. The British press, the Foreign Office, and the Cabinet were pressing for recognition of De Gaulle, and the Prime Minister was obliged to ask the House of Commons not to force a debate on the question. Informed that the Prime Minister was unable to dominate the Foreign Office or the Cabinet on the French question, the President gradually receded from his lofty ground and invited De Gaulle to Washington. De Gaulle arrived on 6 July, and was greeted by a 17-gun salute and other honors approximating those reserved for heads of state. Both men made an effort to be affable and, as a result, their representatives were able to work out five memoranda that served as a civil affairs agreement. On 25 August, two and one-half months after the Allied landings, General Eisenhower and General Koenig, Chief of the French Military Mission, signed the agreement on civil administration in France. A revised directive could thus be sent to AFHQ at this point. Even with the signing of the agreement, recognition was not immediately forthcoming but De Gaulle did not insist upon it. The gradual process by which the committee gained recognition is brought out in the concluding documents of Chapter XXV.

# I. ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING FOR SOUTHERN FRANCE

## PLANNING IN ALGIERS IS HANDICAPPED BY UNCERTAINTIES

[App. H, Brief History of Civil Affairs Headquarters, Undated, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.18, 6th AGp, Jkt 1]

On January 21, 1944, the Military Government Section of AFHQ ordered Colonel Harvey S. Gerry to proceed from Caserta where he was stationed to Algiers to commence planning for the invasion of the Southern coast of France. It was originally intended that this operation would take place simultaneously with the invasion of the north. By the middle of February 1944 the following officers had joined Colonel Gerry in Algiers to commence the Civil Affairs planning for this operation: Maj. William L. Batt, Supply; Maj. Robert Bennett, Finance; Maj. Sheldon Elliott, Executive; Lt. Col. Mark DeW. Howe, Legal. They moved their headquarters to [La] Bouzaréa where they formed the Civil Affairs Section of Force 163, which subsequently developed into the Seventh Army. By the middle of March, this group was joined by Maj. Archibald S. Alexander, Supply, and Maj. Frederick K. Graham, Intelligence.

In addition, a number of officers connected with MGS (later G-5) AFHQ, participated in the planning, particularly Lt. Col. Henry Aronson, who set up the training program.

During March arrangements were made for bringing approximately 80 officers and the same number of FM from Italy to Courbet-Maine for training. Maj. Forrest Cranmer set up the camp and training center known as Civil Affairs Training Center. Active training for Civil Affairs in Southern France started at that time and continued until the camp was closed on August 22.

Early in March, Colonel Gerry and Lt. Col. Howe went to G-5, SHAEF, to co-ordinate planning for the two operations. Colonel Gerry remained a month; Lt. Col. Howe remained until early in June. From time to time they were joined by supply experts, including Major Batt and various officers from the Supply Section of G-5, AFHQ.

The difficulties surrounding planning for this operation were largely two-fold:

a. The great uncertainty as to whether or not any French Government would be recognized and whether the French authorities, either locally, or nationally, would be able to handle

local government or whether it would be necessary for Allied Civil Affairs officers to handle it.

b. Uncertainty as to whether or not the operation itself would take place.

The first question was never finally decided before the operation started but, after the experience in Normandy, it became clear that the French would largely be able to handle their own affairs and the chief problems would be those of supply.

It was finally decided on or about July 1 that the operation would take place. At that time the Civil Affairs Group had no organized unit, no table of organization, no authorized equipment, no CA Manual, and only the personnel mentioned above.

Colonel Parkman was then brought into the field, first as Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer and then as Chief of CAHQ [Civil Affairs Headquarters]. The problems mentioned above were gradually solved, first by the creation of the 2678 Civil Affairs Regiment (Overhead) [see below] to hold the personnel for the operation, including those with tactical forces, and then by bringing of 90 officers and approximately 250 men from England where they had been trained for civil affairs work in France.

The operation started on August 15, with the establishment of Civil Affairs Headquarters in Sainte-Maxime on D plus 1 attached to the VI Corps under Lt. Col. Howe and Major [Lewis H.] Van Dusen. Thereafter, personnel rapidly came in the Headquarters was moved first to Marseille and then to Lyon. The Regiment was assigned to the Seventh Army for the operation and then to the Sixth Army Group on September 15. . . .

The operation was of an Allied character in that one British officer was employed for approximately every 5 Americans. There were few British enlisted personnel used. \* \* \*

## A CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT IS ESTABLISHED

[AFHQ Staff Memo (unnumbered), 12 Feb 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army, 1 Feb-31 Oct 44]

1. There is hereby established a Civil Affairs Unit, Force 163.

2. The unit will consist of:

- a. Planning Staff
- b. Training Center

3. Personnel will be attached to the Unit, both officers and enlisted men, upon approval of competent authority.

4. The Unit will be attached to Headquarters Command, Force 163, for administration and supply.

5. Supplies and equipment are authorized as approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4.

6. The Military Government Section, this headquarters, is charged with technical supervision of this Unit.

[Ltr, Force 163 to CinC, AFHQ, 23 Feb 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army, 1 Feb-31 Oct 44]

1. It is assumed that initially the Commanding General, Force 163, subject to directives from higher headquarters, will be responsible for control of civil affairs during the operation ANVIL [later, DRAGOON] to the line Nice-Dijon-Nevers-Béziers.

2. Based on the above assumption, this headquarters considers a civil affairs unit of approximately 200 officers and 400 enlisted men will be necessary to efficiently administer the indicated area.

4. Personnel for this unit have been partially selected and are currently attached to the Military Government Section, AFHQ, for duty with Force 163. It is proposed that the Civil Affairs Unit for Operation ANVIL be located in the vicinity of Algiers for organization, administration and training.

#### SACMED RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

[Interim Directive, SHAEF to SACMED, 14 May 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 5]

1. This directive is issued to you under the powers conferred by CCS in FAN 318 and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs in the six administrative Regions of which the capital cities are Montpellier, Marseille (excluding Corsica), Clermont-Ferrand and Lyon and in the whole of the Departments of Haute-Garonne, Tarn, Côte d'Or and Doubs. Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN condition which may develop.

2. Within boundaries established by this Hq, you will have, *de facto*, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. . . . Appropriate redelegation of powers

to subordinate commanders is further authorized.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*

#### ADMINISTRATION DELEGATED TO SEVENTH U.S. ARMY

[Interim Directive, SACMED to CG, Seventh Army, 5 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43), sec. 5]

3. Until such time as supreme responsibility and authority reverts to SCAEF, you will be responsible to SACMED for such civil affairs activities as are of military concern throughout the whole of the area defined . . . [in SHAEF Interim Directive of 14 May, above] to whatever extent the military situation may necessitate.

4. Civil Affairs will be so administered in Southern France that whenever it is transferred to the immediate command of SCAEF the policies and procedures which have been followed and utilized will, to the greatest extent practicable, conform to those in the rest of liberated France.

5. Military government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be conducted and controlled by the French authorities. If, however, recourse to those authorities on matters of military interest should fail, you will have authority to take such action as the security of the forces under your command and the success of the military operations may require.

6. It is not contemplated that any military enactments prescribing rules of civil conduct, other than any initial Proclamation SACMED may make and such local regulations as subordinate commanders may find it necessary to issue for purposes of security in the areas of combat, will be issued by SACMED, by you, or by your subordinate commanders. For the enactment of such legislation as is necessary for achievement of your objectives, initial recourse shall, therefore, normally be had to the appropriate French authorities.

7. Should it, however, become necessary for subordinate commanders to issue military enactments—save for the local regulations mentioned above—they shall be issued only if:

a. They conform to the general policies established by SCAEF and SACMED;

<sup>1</sup> Plans for the operation were well advanced when this directive was received and since these plans were based largely on SHAEF policies, no substantial changes were necessary. The responsibilities outlined in the remaining paragraphs of the directive were redelegated by SACMED to the Commanding General, Seventh U.S. Army, in a directive dated 5 July 1944, cited on this page.

b. They are of a character and application purely local to the area of the commander's responsibility; and

c. They have been specifically authorized by you, unless military or other exigencies make such authorization impracticable.

All military enactments other than those mentioned above will be issued only within policies laid down by SCAEF and on authority of SACMED.

8. Initial recourse shall be had to French tribunals for the punishment of civilians committing offenses of concern to the military forces. No Allied Military courts for the trial of civilians will be established unless an order authorizing such action has been issued by SACMED.

9. The respective Allied services and naval courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied Forces and over all persons of non-French nationality who are employed by or who accompany those Forces and are subject to the naval, military, or air force law of one of the Allied Governments, or British naval courts. Subsequent directives or orders may be issued extending such immunity from jurisdiction of French courts to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Forces, as may be designated therein.

10. It is the intention of the United Nations that the termination of the Vichy regime shall be complete. The action necessary to secure such termination and to reorganize the governmental services will be taken by the French authorities. Only when military necessity requires the removal or appointment of an official, and the French authorities fail to take necessary action, will you or a subordinate commander having civil affairs responsibility throughout the area of the official's authority order such removal or temporary appointment.

11. Procurement of civil labor, billets, and supplies and use of lands, buildings, transportation, and other services for military needs, will be effected whenever possible through French authorities.

12. Except in areas directly important to military operations you will permit orderly political assemblies and meetings to be conducted to the end that when it is possible for elections to be held, the people may express their free choice.

13. Upon the liberation of any locality you will take all appropriate steps, in accordance with the directives of SCAEF and of this headquarters and in conjunction with the French authorities, for the full utilization of its industrial, natural,

and other economic resources for the support of your forces, the needs of United Nations Forces in other areas, and the basic needs of the French people.

14. You will, in co-ordination with this headquarters, prepare phased estimates of and requisitions for civilian supply and relief needs in that portion of liberated France which is your responsibility. These needs will be assessed by an appreciation of the extent to which failure to fulfill civilian claims to relief might interfere with military operations or with broader objectives as defined by SACMED or SCAEF.

15. You will, to the fullest extent consistent with the security of the troops and the prosecution of the war, assist French authorities to secure:

a. The preservation of public health.

b. The restoration of supervision of public services.

c. The maintenance of public order.

d. The supervision of economic institutions, practices and controls including those relating to banking and other financial functions.

e. The regulation of the movements of civilians within the whole of your area, and

f. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments and works of art.

16. In carrying out your obligations under this directive you will comply with the broad policies enunciated by SCAEF and SACMED as they may from time to time be transmitted to you by this headquarters in the form of orders, directives, instructions, and otherwise.

17. To aid you in the discharge of your responsibility for civil affairs activities and their co-ordination throughout Southern France, civil affairs personnel will be provided you for appropriate assignment throughout the area of your responsibility.

18. Civil affairs activities will be conducted through civil affairs personnel in areas affected by military operations and in other areas to the extent that military or administrative considerations necessitate the initiation of relief and other activities. Civil affairs activities will be organized with due regard to the basic principle that extensive reliance will be placed upon French authorities for the conduct of civil administration in all areas. Civil affairs personnel will consequently be so organized and deployed as to be in a position to offer the utmost co-operation and help in making that civil administration successful and effective.

19. In accordance with paragraph 8 of the Interim Directive from SCAEF to SACMED, British personnel will participate in the administration of civil affairs in Southern France. You

are free to determine the numbers in which such personnel will be utilized and to allocate such responsibilities to them as you may deem appropriate.

20. French authorities, in coordination with this headquarters, will make available to you substantial numbers of French civil affairs personnel for assignment to your headquarters, subordinate French and American headquarters, and to such other duties as you may determine. To the fullest extent possible you will utilize the services of such French personnel as an integrated part of your civil affairs organization, giving them responsibilities substantially identical or similar to those of American and British civil affairs personnel serving under your command. In all dealings which you and subordinate commanders may have with French public officials the fullest extent possible use will be made of the French civil affairs personnel.

#### A CIVIL AFFAIRS REGIMENT IS ORGANIZED AND BECOMES CA HEADQUARTERS FOR THE ARMY

[GO 50, Hq Seventh Army, 23 Jul 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army]

Effective this date the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Ovhd) is organized in the vicinity of Naples, Italy, with an authorized strength of one hundred (100) officers and one (1) warrant officer and is assigned to Seventh Army. . . .<sup>2</sup>

#### A STAFF SECTION IS ESTABLISHED TO CO-ORDINATE CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

[GO 50, Hq Seventh Army, 23 Jul 44, G-5 files, Staff Sec Rpts, 7th Army]

1. Announcement is made of the establishment of a General Staff Section of this headquarters to be known as the G-5 Section. This section will assume all the responsibilities and functions incident to supervision and co-ordination of Civil Affairs activities.

2. The G-5 Section, this headquarters, will be composed of an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and three assistants to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and enlisted operating personnel.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The Regiment functioned as Civil Affairs Headquarters for the Army from 6 August until the responsibility for southern France was transferred to SHAEF on 1 November 1944. Parkman was transferred from G-5, AFHQ, to become the Commanding Officer of the Regiment and Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the Army. App E, ECAD Hist Rpt for December in SHAEF files, G-5, 17.12, Jkt 6.

<sup>3</sup> A staff of nine officers and four enlisted men from the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment was attached.

#### A GENERAL STAFF OFFICER CANNOT COMMAND THE CIVIL AFFAIRS REGIMENT

[G-5, Sixth AGp, Historical Rpt, 18-31 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 504, 6th AGp Fld Rpts]

\* \* \* The original plan was that Colonel H. S. Gerry should be the chief of all civil affairs operations under General Patch in Southern France. All civil affairs personnel was to be organized into a regiment and Colonel Gerry was to be Regimental Commander and Chief Civil Affairs Officer. In the middle of July, however, he was appointed ACofS G-5, Seventh Army, and it was decided at Seventh Army that because of his character as General Staff Officer he could not command responsibility over the civil affairs personnel in the field. Accordingly, Colonel Parkman was named Regimental Commander and Chief Civil Affairs Officer. This meant that Colonel Gerry was vested merely with responsibility for advising General Patch on civil affairs problems and that Colonel Parkman was responsible for all operations, including those within Army areas. Although the division of authority between Colonel Gerry and Colonel Parkman had not substantially unsatisfactory results, the original plan for concentrating all authority in one officer was frustrated by the decision of Seventh Army that the ACofS G-5 could not command the Regiment.

The civil affairs plan of Seventh Army never included the organization of Detachments as such. It was planned to establish the Civil Affairs Headquarters at Marseille at the earliest possible moment, and to have all civil affairs personnel, other than those assigned to tactical units, work out of that Headquarters, being sent to such administrative centers as Regional and Departmental capitals as needed. This plan was carried into effect in operations. \* \* \*

#### SEVENTH ARMY REVISES ORIGINAL CIVIL AFFAIRS PLAN<sup>4</sup>

[CA Circ 1, G-5, Seventh Army, 28 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

2. *Civil Affairs Objectives:* In furtherance of the military effort the Commanding General will

<sup>4</sup> The Civil Affairs Plan, dated 13 June 1944, known as Annex 13 of the ANVIL Outline Plan, was based on policies and procedures established for OVERLORD. A copy may be found in CAD files, 014, France (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5. After Operation ANVIL became a certainty, G-5 of the Seventh Army revised the plan and issued it in two parts—Part I, Civil Affairs Circular 1, and Part II, Administrative Instructions 2. Only that portion of the latter which pertains to Civil Affairs Headquarters is included here. The remainder consists of detailed instructions for carrying out CA Circular No. 1.

seek to obtain the maximum co-operation from the French Authorities and the French people and a minimum of interference with operations against the enemy.

With respect to certain objectives of immediate military interest, he will assist French authorities to secure or, if military necessity requires, himself take steps to secure:

a. The early realization of local resources and manpower to the extent necessary for military requirements.

b. The necessary functioning of civil organizations and public services.

c. The maintenance of public order.

d. The regulation of the movement of civilians within his area.

The Commanding General has other objectives which are important because any failure to deal with them might interfere with the military effort, or with broader aims as defined by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These include:

a. The provision of essential civilian supplies and relief needs.

b. The restoration and maintenance of health, welfare, and the economy of the liberated areas.

c. The protection of economic institutions, including banks and other financial institutions.

d. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments, works of art, and private property.

It will be the object of the civil affairs organization now in process of formation to relieve the Commanding General as much as possible of civil affairs problems.

3. *Basis of Plan.* To achieve uniformity in civil affairs throughout liberated France, Supreme Hq. Allied Expeditionary Forces, has prepared:

a. Standard Policy and Procedure, Revised 1 May 1944.

b. SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs.

It is intended to follow the policies established therein and to observe the procedures to the fullest extent practicable. \* \* \*

4. *The Commanding General.* The responsibility for civil affairs direction in Southern France will be under the direction of the Commanding General, Seventh Army. He will exercise direction in all liberated areas until such time as territories to the rear of the Army line come under separate command, when G-5, Allied Force Hq. will coordinate civil affairs activities in the different areas.

5. *The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.* This

officer will be responsible for supervising and coordinating civil affairs operations and keeping the Commanding General fully advised on all matters pertaining to this field.

6. *Civil Affairs Headquarters, Seventh Army.* At this headquarters there will be a Chief Civil Affairs Officer assisted by administrative assistants and specialist as required.

7. *Corps and Division Staffs.* The staffs will be comprised of Civil Affairs officers and specialist officers as needed to supervise civilian activities in these areas.

8. *Civil Affairs Personnel.* All civil affairs personnel (U.S., British and French) not otherwise assigned or attached will be held in a pool under Army Headquarters from which they will be allocated as required.

9. *Command and Control.* Civil affairs officers accompanying forward troops will serve under the commanders of the headquarters in whose areas they are operating and their activities will be co-ordinated by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer. The chain of command will follow the normal channel. . . . However, where not inconsistent with the regular command channels, the technical channel will be authorized. . . .

15. *Civil Affairs Officers.* A number of these officers trained for field work with combat troops will be mounted on the D-Day and subsequent lifts, with transport and field equipment, preparatory to entering towns as soon as possible after taken. They will co-operate with the CIC and PW [Psychological Warfare] as well as other services in a co-ordinated town security plan. They will submit prompt situation reports to their commanding generals.

16. *Specialist Officers.* Certain specialists, particularly those dealing with civilian supply, finance, public health, public safety, and refugees and welfare, will enter liberated towns with the advance of civil affairs officers where required.

17. *Civil Affairs Headquarters.* An advance party will land with Army Headquarters and reconnoiter a temporary site to serve as report center for civil affairs personnel and transport subsequently. As soon as the site is located the officer in command will arrange to have all civil affairs officers notified through channels. Civil affairs personnel not assigned to operational units that may arrive subsequently will report to Civil Affairs Headquarters for orders.

18. *Civil Affairs Detachments.* In addition to the administrative section, there will be established at Civil Affairs Headquarters a number of specialist branches corresponding to the various civil affairs functions to be fulfilled in the liber-

ated areas.<sup>5</sup> Each specialist branch will be under the direction of a Chief, who may also serve as specialist staff officer with Army Headquarters. Detachment personnel may be assigned specific territorial or functional responsibilities, may be utilized to service French authorities and agencies, may be attached for supplementary use to operational military units to meet special problems, or may be assigned to rear area duties. Insofar as practicable, plans for civil affairs operations and the allocation of civil affairs personnel will be kept flexible and integrated closely with Army Headquarters. At such time as the area to the rear of Army Headquarters becomes sufficiently distant as to make an integrated program for civil affairs not feasible, the Commanding General may give the Civil Affairs Headquarters such independence of technical command as he deems necessary. \* \* \*

[Admin Instrs 2, G-5, Seventh Army, 24 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

3. When operations have advanced sufficiently to indicate its desirability, there will be established a Civil Affairs Headquarters, Seventh Army. The officer in charge of this Headquarters will be known as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, hereafter designated as CCAO.

4. The above Headquarters staff will consist, in addition to the CCAO, of necessary administrative officers and of 12 special divisions, each in charge of a chief. These divisions will provide:

(a) advice to the CCAO on questions in their specific fields

(b) technical instructions and assistance to civil affairs officers throughout the liberated areas.

For supervision and co-ordination of their work, the divisions will be grouped in four Branches, with a senior officer in charge of each Branch. There will be, in addition, a Public Relations advisor to the CCAO, an Intelligence unit and a Statistics and Reports unit. An Operations Branch will be provided to supervise generally the work of the CAO's in the field and necessary administrative detail will be handled by a Staff Duties Division.

5. The Civil Affairs Hq, when established, will be combined Allied-French Hq. It will comprise all specialists not assigned to Army, Regions, or Base Section and all CAO's and French officers of Administrative Liaison who are held in reserve against operational needs.

<sup>5</sup> The list of Specialist Branches contained in paragraph 19 of this circular is omitted. The branches provided for were, in effect, the same as those authorized by SHAEF for northwest Europe.

6. The functions of CAHQ will be:

(a) to maintain close liaison with the French authorities

(b) in liaison with the French authorities to develop and formulate policies for the conduct of civil affairs throughout the whole of the liberated area

(c) through the CCAO to be responsible to the ACofS, G-5, for the direction and control of civil affairs personnel and their activities in the areas outside of military boundaries, and

(d) to provide such liaison with, or representation on, the SHAEF Mission to the French authorities as may be required. \* \* \*

#### ONLY WORKING AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH ARE REACHED AT AFHQ

[Ltr, G-5, AFHQ, to WD and Br WO, 6 Aug 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (8-3-43)(1), sec. 5]

### III. Relationship with the French

#### 6. Negotiations with General [Henri] Cochet at AFHQ

a. By Cable S 53126, dated 5 May, SHAEF authorized AFHQ to begin conversations with the French authorities with instruction to avoid political subjects and to keep the conversations on a military and operational level, seeking to arrive at working agreements. After preliminary conversations between General Cochet, French Military Delegate for the Southern Zone, and the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief Administrative Officer and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, meetings with General Cochet's staff began on 14 June.

b. Through 21 July some 43 meetings were held at the G-5 level. Other interested AFHQ Staff Sections participated from time to time, as well as civilian representatives of FCNL's Commissariats. The conversations have been mutually beneficial and productive of mutual confidence. Informal discussions are continuing at the Army level in which General de Gaulle, as well as General Cochet and [Lt.] General [Alexander M.] Patch, have participated.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> General Cochet, like General Koenig, insisted that the FCNL be recognized as the sole French authority in France but AFHQ made it clear that only the discussion of practical working arrangements was authorized. It was not until 25 August 1944 that the Americans and British simultaneously signed agreements with the French on the administration of civil affairs throughout Continental France. For details, see below in Section 4. On the same day, revised directives were issued by SHAEF to SACMED, and to the Twenty-first and Twelfth Army Groups (see below, Section 4).

7. *Participation by French Liaison Officers in Civil Affairs Activities*

a. As a product of the Cochet conversations, the French authorities stated that they planned to utilize 73 officers and 167 EM/OR for the civil affairs portion of Operation DRAGOON. At that time it was planned to integrate this personnel into the Allied civil affairs organization at various levels, i.e., Army, Groups, Divisions, Base and Administrative Regions. It is now contemplated, however, that French civil affairs officers will be attached to the local civilian governmental authorities, i.e., Prefects, Sous-Prefects, etc., as in Normandy, leaving only a very small group to remain on a liaison basis with Headquarters, Seventh Army.

b. It is understood, however, that when and if the U.S.-French accord is signed, General de Gaulle has given General Cochet his consent to transferring such officers, by direct attachment, to tactical units in accordance with the original integrated plan.

c. The question of French civil affairs officers for civil affairs duties with French divisions and corps is at present a matter for determination by General [Jean] de Lattre de Tassigny, Commanding General, Army "B."

d. It is General Cochet's plan as to French Civil Administrative liaison officers that these officers be divided into two groups; one group to be attached to Allied units under General Patch, the other group to be attached to the French Army under General de Lattre de Tassigny. It has been suggested to G-5, Seventh Army, that Allied officers be in turn attached to the Administrative Liaison Group with Army "B."

e. Two French officers are now attached to G-5 Section, AFHQ, and are performing liaison duties, especially on supply matters. One officer represents General Cochet. The other represents the Commissariat of Supply and Production, the Commissariat of Communications and Merchant Marine, the Commissariat of Social Affairs, and Mr. Monnet, Commissaire en Mission, as well as General Cochet.

8. *French Administration of Southern France*

a. It has been decided that there will be no civilian delegate for the South of France. General Cochet, as the Military Delegate, has been entrusted by de Gaulle with the sole jurisdiction over the DRAGOON area, and the civilian commissariats will be represented within that area by delegations accredited to General Cochet.

9. *Necessity for Settlement of Political Policies*

a. No final directive to SACMED concerning the administration of Civil Affairs in Southern France has yet been received. The relationship with the French at the working level has been excellent. A definite agreement providing for the administration of civil affairs and the issuance of currency is, however, urgently needed now.

WHEN DE GAULLE SEVERELY LIMITS THE NUMBER OF FRENCH LIAISON OFFICERS AFHQ'S WHOLE PLAN IS IMPERILLED

[Min, Eighth Wkly Staff Conf, G-5 Div, SHAEF, 8 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5 Monographs and Sketches, Negotiations With the French, an. 1-A]

\* \* \* Grasett: About the French situation. We haven't made much progress. De Gaulle, as you know, arrived on Sunday. The plan was explained to him, and so on, and his attitude has been just a little difficult since he arrived. First of all, the liaison officers. The first news we had was that he disapproved . . . and would allow none of the Civil Affairs liaison officers to go. However, he was approached by Duff Cooper a couple of days ago and he agreed to twenty. I saw Koenig yesterday and told him that twenty was all that was needed the first day, and building up to 89. I explained the whole situation to him and said it was quite incomprehensible to us that the Allied Forces should go back to France unaccompanied by French officers, no matter what the political situation should be—it would be inconceivable. General Eisenhower's one desire is to meet the civil wishes in every way he possibly can, and all our instructions are to that effect. Koenig promised to go to De Gaulle, which he did, and the answer was twenty. When they agreed to 89 they were trained and attached to formations; however, there it is. That is the way I feel about it at the moment. . . . In my view that is not enough and we are now examining what we can do supposing they don't come back and give us more. We are examining officers who joined the British Army in 1940 to see if they are available and whether it would be a breach of contract, whether their lives are in danger as they are under different names, whether we could use them in both U.S. and British Forces. We will also try to collect them on the other side. . . .

## 2. THE CURRENCY ISSUE IS STILL UNSOLVED AFTER D-DAY

### DE GAULLE IS FURIOUS OVER ALLIED MILITARY CURRENCY

[Paraphrase of State Dept, Msg From Algiers (signed Selden Chapin) to Secy of State, 8 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 3, CM-IN 7764]

Accompanied by the British Chargé, I called on [René] Massigli [French Minister] this afternoon at his request. He seemed to be quite upset and said the Committee had held a special session this morning to discuss the cable from General de Gaulle concerning the omission and Allied Command's use of franc notes. (When Massigli was reading from De Gaulle's cable the expression "counterfeit money" was let slip).

A close paraphrase of the identical note which was delivered to Holman and me which the Committee approved, text of which was cabled to De Gaulle, follows:

"The provisional government of the French Republic has received information that the Allied High Command has put into circulation in the first French territories to be liberated notes which are payable in francs.

"It has astonished the Government that this initiative should have been taken by the Allied Command as it is an initiative which no friendly army has ever undertaken before. The Provisional Government fully realized the practical exigency which requires the military command during the course of operations to dispose of currency. Throughout the whole of the French territories overseas military authorities have always received at once and without limit any funds they have asked for, and the same system should and could have been established in French Metropolitan territories at a time when full sovereignty is about to be acquired by the latter. The Government is prepared to take the necessary dispositions within the framework of the agreement whose conclusion the Government has been seeking for some months from the Allied Governments.

"The Provisional Government cannot grant any legal value to the stamped paper (vignettes) which has been circulated without its consent, since traditionally the right of issuing currency has belonged to the national authority in France alone. Therefore the Gov't makes reservations as to the moral, financial and political consequences which this action may bring about.

"With this feeling the most earnest attention of the U.S. Gov't is drawn to the serious consequences which must result in France under the

circumstances which now exist and the inevitable recognition that there is no existing agreement between the French authorities and the Allied Gov'ts. upon which the French interior forces depend and to which they refer." \* \* \*

[Paraphrase of Msg. Murphy to Secy of State, 10 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 3, CM-IN 10677]

Someone in the French Administration, thoroughly trustworthy, who does not want his name known, has informed us that two very bitter cables were received this morning in Algiers from General de Gaulle. . . . De Gaulle insists that he was deceived and forced to come to London to find a *fait accompli*. The invasion was already prepared. He was even told by the British, very impertinently, that he was expected to speak over the radio on D Day after Eisenhower's speech. De Gaulle refused to . . . speak until the afternoon.

The question of what de Gaulle calls "fake money" . . . is making him furious.

The informant added that General de Gaulle had given permission to his technical liaison officer to go into France with the Allied forces, but he would not allow his administrative liaison to land with the British and Americans, giving the impression in this way that he was party to the Anglo-American decisions in civilian matters. De Gaulle did remark to the French Committee that the military preparations for the invasion were satisfactory, and he showed confidence that the assault would be successful. In one of these two messages de Gaulle tried to convey the impression that Eisenhower is very apologetic over the arrangements for dealing with civilian affairs. He infers that Eisenhower considers himself no politician and that he made none of the current arrangements. . . .

### WILL DE GAULLE DENOUNCE THE INVASION CURRENCY?—THAT IS THE QUESTION

[WD Telecon 5:46 Between McCloy and Holmes, 10 Jun 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \* Washington: . . . I want to talk about the fiscal situation. We have gotten here, a number of broadcasts from London which seem to be rather hysterical about this currency. We have also seen some communications from the Prime Minister to the President which indicate that he is trying to, at perhaps the price of getting de

Gaulle to approve this currency, to come pretty close to recognition of the provisional government. I think that the President is adamant against taking any steps which would be tantamount to recognition of the committee or of the government. What we are most concerned about for the moment is this: That de Gaulle should not denounce that currency. I assume that by this time the proclamation of General Eisenhower has already been posted in the liberated areas. Is that right?

London: The order went forward for them to be posted yesterday. My estimate is that they were probably put up today.

Washington: . . . It's all right, I think that the French will accept that, the population will accept that, unless de Gaulle denounces it. . . .

London: . . . I don't think there's any danger that he will. . . . What we did was this. . . . We held up posting these proclamations to give him an opportunity to get on the band-wagon. We told them that our instructions were to put it up, and that we proposed to put it up, but if they cared to make a supporting proclamation and come along, we'd give them the ball and let them run pretty well down the field. De Gaulle said, I believe that is the fact—we had no direct contact with him from SHAEF, we made it a point not to—but word came back that he was adamant, saying that nobody had any right to issue French currency but Frenchmen. We said, "Well there's no reason why you shouldn't make a supporting declaration, and come ahead and carry out your program, we'll do almost anything you want done on that." And nothing was done, and so we said, "If we don't hear from you by midnight on Thursday, we have to put it up the next day." We had waited as long as we thought we could, the area uncovered was not great, in terms of population, and we thought we were safe in doing that. We played the game as best we could, but we put it up. \* \* \*

Washington: What do you intend to do from here? Do you intend to ask de Gaulle again to support the currency? \* \* \*

London: . . . What we're going to do, we've told him that we are going to put up our own proclamation and go right ahead with this thing, and we've done that, and we're going to keep on doing it. If any of his people ask to discuss these matters with us further, we're entirely at their disposal. But we, SHAEF, propose to do nothing more in the way of an attempt to persuade him. I don't think we'll have to, because I think the initiative is going to be taken by His Majesty's government, because of the pressure I've just talked about. \* \* \*

## IS RECOGNITION OF DE GAULLE THE WAY OUT?

[Copy of Msg, Prime Minister of the President, No 696, 9 Jun 44, in Memo for Rcd by McCloy, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 3]

Inasmuch as General Eisenhower has urgent need to make a proclamation announcing the notes to be issued for the troops in France, I want to know your wishes about it. There is reason to expect that General de Gaulle will press for his proclamation to contain the wording "Provisional Government of France" or "of the French Republic" and publish it in the "Official Journal of the French Republic," his publication at Algiers, but he is quite ready to make a supporting proclamation. He fights at every point, and we shall naturally strive to convince him to stick to the French Committee of National Liberation. If General de Gaulle does not endorse the issue, the Treasury fears the notes will not have any backing behind them and on the other hand I feel that the proclamation of General Eisenhower will make the governments of Great Britain and the United States separately or jointly responsible to redeem them. In your mind, how does this stand?

There are others that even say that General de Gaulle might denounce the issue as false money. Personally I don't think that he will dare. If I were a French shopkeeper, I should myself think that a note printed in the United States tendered to me by a British or American soldier was well worth having whether de Gaulle endorsed it or not, if General Eisenhower declared the notes legal.

Will you let me know please what is your view in this matter? If we can get de Gaulle to take responsibility for these notes in his capacity as President of the Provisional Government of France, the French nation in that case will ultimately face the problem of redeeming them. Shall we do this? Or shall we wait to fix the ultimate responsibility at the peace settlement and say now that the United States and Great Britain will assume responsibility for these notes? . . .

[Copy of Msg, Prime Minister to the President, No 697, 9 Jun 44]

With further reference to my 696. I saw the specimens of the notes in question and they do not appear to us as very reassuring. Forging them looks very easy. Not a thing is mentioned regarding who is responsible for issuing and redeeming them. They must have some authority behind them.

. . . please look at them and say what should be done. Ought we to allow de Gaulle to obtain new status as his fee for backing them, or should we assume the burden for the time being, improve the issue later on, and make the settlement at the peace table where many accounts will be presented?

#### PRESIDENT REFUSES TO BUDGE

[Paraphrase of Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 13 Jun 44, CCAC files, 123 (10-30-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 50351]

I agree with you that the question of currency is being used as the method of rushing us into recognizing the Committee. I feel the situation regarding currency which your cable mentions is not as serious as the initial view might indicate and considering the angle of the supplementary currency being acceptable, I do not believe it is necessary for de Gaulle to publish his supporting statement concerning this currency. My suggestion is that we notify de Gaulle that: (1) it is our intention that the use of supplemental French franc currency will be continued in precisely the same fashion as arranged and as concurred in by the British Treasury. The members of the French Committee, [Pierre] Mendes-France and Monnet, understood these plans thoroughly. (2) General Eisenhower is authorized to use BMA notes

or yellow seal dollars if it should develop that the French people will not accept the supplemental franc currency. Therefore should the French public be incited by de Gaulle not to accept supplementary currency, the Committee will be held entirely responsible for any ill effects caused by using BMA notes and yellow seal dollars in France. One sure result will be that the French franc will depreciate on a sterling and dollar basis on a black market. This will bring to light and stress the weak spots in the monetary system of France. This was one of the main reasons for accepting the French Committee's request that we should not employ British military authority notes and yellow seal dollars as spearhead currency. Additional adverse results would obtain which would be evident to General de Gaulle as well as his advisors.

Concerning the currency, I should definitely not press de Gaulle to issue any statement of a supporting nature. With a clear understanding that he is acting with no concurrence from us and entirely upon his individual accountability, de Gaulle can put his signature on any currency statement in any capacity that he desires. . . .

. . . I have seen the franc notes the second time and consider their general appearance satisfactory. Due to the intricate combinations of colors, the experts on counterfeit money at the Bureau of Printing and Engraving tell me they will be very difficult to copy. \* \* \*

### 3. THE CURRENCY DISPUTE COMPLICATES OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN FRANCE BEACHHEAD

#### THE SCAO LEARNS OF A VIRTUAL COUP D'ÉTAT THROUGH STRANDED FRENCH COLONEL

[Interv With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, 26 Nov 44, on Relations With French Civil Authorities in Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 20-B]

\* \* \* The first intimation I had of what amounted virtually to a coup d'état was when I found a French Colonel, stranded by the side of the road near Army Headquarters in a broken down car. When I asked him who he was, he informed me that he was the military commander for the French Military Region [Col. Pierre de Chevigné], and that the Civil Commissioner for the Region of Rouen was in Bayeux. At the same time almost, reports were received that General de Gaulle had landed, addressed a meeting in Bayeux and left a civil commissioner [M.

François Coulet] behind to take charge of the civil administration. My meeting with the French Colonel was very cordial, and he informed me that M. Coulet wished to pay his respects to the Commanding General. In view of the fact that no official instructions on the subject had been received from London, I did not feel that I could accede to this request, saying in excuse that the General was fully occupied with the conduct of operations. I did, however, request that M. Coulet should come and see me, or alternatively that I would be pleased to go and see him.

A report was sent to London, but no answer, nor guidance was sent to me on this matter. Having found out that the Civil Commissioner was acceptable to the French, and that his first act was to dismiss M. Rochat, the Sous-Prefect of Bayeux, suspected of Nazi sympathies, I decided that I should accept him as the *de facto* civil

civil authority for the Region of Rouen. I then arranged a meeting with M. Coulet, which was very cordial. I explained that my task was purely a military one to work for the furtherance of military operations, and that any supplies handed over to the French were given with the intention of avoiding any civil interference in operations. Furthermore I was accepting him in the 21 Army area without prejudice to any later instructions I might receive from London. Except that M. Coulet took exception to the phrase "without prejudice," the meeting passed off very amicably and satisfactory personnel [*sic*] relationships were established. This cordiality was cemented by an invitation to M. Coulet, the Military Regional Commissioner and certain of their staffs to dinner in A mess.

I found M. Coulet, presumably on instructions of General de Gaulle, intensely suspicious of our intentions towards the civil population. He had been sent over with the primary object of asserting the sovereignty of France. He was so suspicious that we intended to follow AMGOT methods that he avoided the use of "Civil Affairs" in any communications for some time. Deeds and personal relationships could alone break down the suspicion. As a first step, I gave a copy of 2nd Army General Instructions to my Senior French Liaison Officer to read through, and to let me know whether there were any instructions in it in any way derogatory to the French Government and to let M. Coulet know the results of his perusal. It took about a week before M. Coulet was fully convinced of our good intentions, and thereafter he and his civil administration could not have been more co-operative. It was always necessary, however, to avoid any suggestions of infringing the rights of French Sovereignty. \* \* \*

#### THREATENED REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ALLIED MILITARY CURRENCY IN PAYMENT OF TAXES

[Interv With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, 26 Nov 44, on Mtg With Coulet, 27 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 20-B]

\* \* \* Only on one occasion did M. Coulet cause a crisis, and I personally think it was meant as a test case on his part. It was in fact overruled by French higher authority; but it caused me considerable anxiety at the time.

I received a telephone call at midnight (26 June) to say that M. Coulet had ordered a meeting of all tax collectors for 0900 hours the following day to tell them that they were not to accept Allied Military Currency in settlement of taxes. I arranged for a postponement of this meeting until I could interview M. Coulet, and

went to see him with my SOI (Finance) and the SCAO, FUSA, at 0900 hours next morning. My object was to ensure that a crisis of this nature in Allied-French relationships should not be precipitated by the actions of a minor official before reference could be made to higher authority. The meeting was a solemn assembly with the French fully represented. M. Coulet took the attitude that he was the French representative on the spot, that Allied Military currency was not accepted by General de Gaulle as legal tender and could not therefore be accepted in France in payment of taxes. I maintained that if the contemplated instructions were issued, M. Coulet would be going back on the Free French declaration that they would not do anything to discountenance the currency, though they might not fully accept it. In view of the fact that the currency was already in the hands of the Allied troops, his actions might have a grave effect on operations and therefore such a matter should only be dealt with on a governmental level. Talking went on all morning with due ceremony and withdrawals for discussion, until eventually M. Coulet agreed to the suggestion of the SCAO, FUSA, and myself that he should hold his hand until time had been allowed for reference to be made to London. French and British representatives were accordingly flown off during the afternoon, with the result already mentioned that M. Coulet's attitude was not supported by General Koenig. \* \* \*

#### A MODUS VIVENDI ON CURRENCY RESULTS

[Agreement Reached at Conf Held in the Office of Rgnl Cmsr, M. Coulet, at Bayeux, 0900, 27 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 56]

1. We accept the sending of the cipher telegram via London for transmission to Algiers subject to permission by the C-in-C and provided that cipher communications have now been reopened. During negotiations and subject to agreement by the C-in-C, cipher communication is to be permitted on financial matters only between General Koenig and M. Coulet and vice-versa.

2. We accept the dispatch of Comdt de Courcel by air if permitted by the C-in-C, by first dispatch boat if facilities cannot be made available, and will send a signal to Army Group to facilitate his return.

3. We accept as a temporary measure to avoid any disturbance of the financial position until instructions from higher authority can be received that any special currency collected in taxes during negotiations will be redeemed in Bank

of France notes. This acceptance is subject to complete secrecy in transaction and is not to be taken as any admission on our part that the special currency is now acceptable legal tender.

4. On the part of the Regional Commissioner he will not only take no action tending to discredit but will prevent any such action which will tend to discredit this currency and will accept it in payment of taxes.

5. The agreement will hold good until midnight 30 June 1944 and can be extended as may be agreed before that time.

6. Spoke Commander-in-Chief 1415 hours 27 June. He would not permit cipher. Agreed to Comdt de Courcel returning by air, . . . All other correspondence through Second Army HQ not cipher. M. Coulet informed. Comdt de Courcel left from London by air 1800 hours.

#### FINANCIAL EXPERTS HAVE MEANS OF PERSUASION

[Min, Weekly Staff Conf, G-5, SHAEF, 29 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 1-A]

\* \* \* Grasset: [After reporting, with approval, the Lewis-Coulet conversation and agreements, Grasset continued] . . . Another little thing has occurred. Koenig has written asking

that French troops be paid in metropolitan not supplementary francs. Koenig will be informed that this is impossible at 3:30 this afternoon. If he becomes intransigent our financial experts will find means of persuasion—such as issuing gold seal dollars or pounds at 500 instead of 200 francs. Again we can demand that supplies must be paid for in dollars or gold. We intend to tell Koenig to send an immediate telegram to Coulet that he must continue to accept supplementary francs and that after tomorrow night we will not redeem them in metropolitan francs. \* \* \*

#### SUPPLEMENTARY CURRENCY WILL BE ACCEPTED PENDING AN AGREEMENT AT GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL

[Msg, Gen Holmes, SHAEF, to Hilldring, 30 Jun 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 58]

2. The matter [of accepting supplementary francs in payment of taxes] has been taken up with General Koenig, who has agreed to instruct Coulet that supplemental francs are to be accepted for all purposes pending ultimate arrangements concerning currency between the U.S./UK Governments and the French Authorities. The temporary arrangement for the exchange of supplemental francs will not be continued after 30th June.

## 4. ALLIES AND FCNL COME TO TERMS

#### BRITISH PRESS FAVORS DE GAULLE

[Msg, Mil Attaché in London to WD, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 3, CM-IN 9694]

British press continues demand for agreement with French National Committee on civil affairs administration. The *Times* in leading editorial today repeats arguments that de Gaulle organization has a good or better claim to recognition than other exile governments, that no alternative authority exists, and that present situation jeopardizes French military aid. Issuance invasion currency without prior agreement criticized in several papers. Behind British concern over present situation is desire for strong and friendly France after war and fear that current policy will embitter Frenchmen toward their liberators.

[Msg, Gen Holmes to Hilldring, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 3, CM-IN 10353]

The distinct impression is being given by the British Press that the supplemental franc issue

is exclusively an American affair, and that the United States is solely responsible for the currency's employment. It is even inferred that these franc notes are in the possession of only American troops. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that a statement be issued in Washington that this currency is being used by the Allied Forces pursuant to instructions to the Supreme Commander given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which body can act only with the approval of both governments.

#### BRITISH OPEN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRENCH COMMITTEE

[Msg, Gen Holmes to McCloy, 18 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 3, CM-IN 14937]

The following is a tentative estimate of the French situation after conversations with [Robert A.] Lovett. De Gaulle left on the evening of 16 to return to Algiers. Before his departure arrangements were made for conversations to begin

on Monday, 19 June, between [Pierre] Vienot and 4 assistants representing the FCNL and 5 British representatives headed by the JAG, War Office, including Foreign Office and Treasury. These negotiations are to produce an agreement for the civil administration of France, and it is understood that if the British and French come to a satisfactory understanding, both will bend their best efforts to obtain the concurrence of the United States. The French will want to begin discussions on the basis of their memorandum to Murphy and Macmillan of September 7. The British will decline to negotiate on this basis as the memorandum is modeled on agreements reached in 1914-1918 with a recognized French Government. Am informed that British will insist on negotiating with the committee as such and not as the provisional Government of France. They will submit a draft with suitable modifications along the lines of the civil AEF agreement with Belgium.

I believe that the British are prepared to go as far as in their opinion the position of the President will permit. It is thought that they are fully aware that the President will not accord recognition as a provisional government and will not consent to the FCNL being the issuing authority for currency. I am not sure what their reaction will be to the committee's certain insistence that no other French group is to be concerned with civil administration in France. Arrangements have been made which it is believed will permit us to keep you currently informed of the progress of these negotiations.

At the time of his visit to Normandy de Gaulle was well received and with some enthusiasm. However, there are indications that he was somewhat disappointed in the warmth of his reception. Before leaving London he had a conversation with Eden which is reported to have been the most satisfactory talk anyone had had with him for a long time. It is reported that he stated that he would not insist on recognition as the situation required practical solution. It is also reported that with reference to the special issue of currency he said only that the matter must be settled speedily.

It is hoped that Monday or Tuesday we shall be able to send you a copy of the British draft agreement. . . .

#### AMERICANS STILL DO NOT FAVOR AN AGREEMENT WITH THE FRENCH

[Msg, McCloy to Holmes, 19 Jun 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 3, CM-OUT 53476]

Think it most unwise to work out a British-French agreement which will be presented to the United States behind the "bended efforts" of the

other two. Why cannot we start from a directive to Eisenhower somewhat along the lines of the existing unilateral one as modified by cable on subject from highest level to which General Marshall referred in his telephone conversation with Stimson. This directive should be agreed upon between the United States and the British and then submitted to the French. I very much fear that the concept of an agreement is definitely not the approach which has been firmly adhered to on this side. Certainly not an agreement entered into by anyone other than Eisenhower pursuant to a combined directive. Please inform Bovenschen of our views. \* \* \*

#### PRIME MINISTER TRIES HIS HAND AT SOFTENING PRESIDENT

[Msg, Prime Minister to the President, No. 709, 21 Jun 44, Incl to a Memo of Lt. O. S. Collins, USNR, The White House, for the Secy of the Treasury, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4]

. . . You may be right in thinking for the moment that the situation about the notes is not critical [message President to Prime Minister, 13 June, Section 2, above]. However it is not a comfortable situation and as we go forward it is bound to get worse. I believe we should study whether there is a basis for an agreement with the committee, provided there is nothing given away which you and we do not want to give away.

No indication of the authority by whom they are issued is given on the notes. We shall be morally responsible for seeing that they are honored unless we reach an understanding with the French Committee. Under the mutual aid arrangement which we are making with the other European Allies, they will bear the cost of civil administration and of services and supplies to our soldiers in their respective countries. However the French would contribute no mutual aid to the American and British armies of liberation if we should become responsible for the whole of the military notes issued in France.

Therefore we shall see whether a basis of agreement exists by discussion between the French officials and our officials. I will let you know the result. I am not thinking of the position of the French Committee in this whole matter.

#### BRITISH ARE COMMITTED TO DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH FRENCH

[Msg, Gen Holmes to McCloy, 23 Jun 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4, CM-IN 19245]

Events have progressed so far that it would only be possible to reorient the negotiations along the

line of your W-53476 [19 June, above] on the very highest level. The British Government is committed to negotiate directly with the French and have been so engaged since Monday. . . . The negotiations are really under the personal control of Eden. Bovenschen has extremely limited influence on them, and it would be profitless to discuss these matters with him. . . . I have informally conveyed the views expressed in your telegram to Charles Peake, British Political Officer of SHAEF, who confirmed also informally my estimate of Bovenschen's position in the matter and also that any change in the present method of approach was highly unlikely and could be accomplished only at the highest level. I am told by both Peake and Winant that the United States was notified of the British Government's intention to undertake these negotiations.

I had been promised a copy of the original draft which the British offered to the French but I was told yesterday that Eden had objected saying that as soon as anything approaching a final form is reached he himself will communicate it to the United States Government. Through a confidential source I have been able to see a copy of this draft which is modeled on the agreement with Belgium; the Delegate as provided in the ordinance of the French Committee of National Liberation of March 1944 substantially replacing the military mission provided in the Belgian agreement. It is specified that the agreement shall be in the form of an exchange of notes between the British Government and the French Committee of National Liberation, not the Provisional Government of France. It provides the same general authority for the Supreme Allied Commander as in the case of Belgium and stipulates that the French Committee of National Liberation will conduct civil administration until such time as the provisional government is formed. Financial questions are not mentioned except to state that separate financial agreements will be made. It is understood that this is being discussed between the French and British Treasury officials. Although I have no details, I am assured that the discussions thus far have gone forward in a friendly and satisfactory manner. Good British sources continue to emphasize the changed and reasonable attitude of de Gaulle particularly in his conversation with Eden just prior to departure for Algiers. Eden said he noted that de Gaulle had not asked for recognition of the Committee as the Provisional Government and he assumed that this was not a main issue. To this de Gaulle assented.

Eden took de Gaulle to task for the tone of the Algiers press with regard to the United States

and British governments and de Gaulle promised to obtain an improvement. De Gaulle said that he was in doubt about the timing of his visit to the United States but Eden urged him to make the visit in accordance with the invitation.

It should be borne in mind that relations with the French have almost become a major domestic political issue here. The Prime Minister is under great pressure from the cabinet led by the Foreign Office and from Parliament as well as the press for outright recognition of the Committee as the provisional government of France. He succeeded in postponing debate on the subject in Commons but will probably not be able to do so for any extended period of time. \* \* \*

#### PRESIDENT WOULD NOT LIKE A *Fait Accompli*

[Copy of Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 23 Jun 44 in Memo, Leahy to Secy of State, same date, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 4]

\* \* \* We are informed by your Embassy that the Government of Great Britain is planning discussion with the Committee of National Liberation prior to de Gaulle's visit with the thought of "being helpful to the Washington conversations."

I hope you will not make arrangements with the Committee prior to giving me an opportunity to comment thereon.

I should not like to be faced with a *fait accompli* when de Gaulle arrives in Washington.

#### PRIME MINISTER REASSURES PRESIDENT

[Text of the Prime Minister's Msg to the President, No. 713, 25 Jun 44, Taken From a Memo of James Dunn, Dept of State, 29 Jun 44, for McCloy, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4]

The conversations now proceeding with M. Vienot, the de Gaullist Ambassador in London, are on an unofficial level only, de Gaulle having declared himself unwilling to send any of his Committee members unless the U.S. were represented also.

The object of the conversations is to discover a basis that we might accept for operation of civil affairs in liberated areas of France in regard to which both the U.S. Government and we ourselves have agreed that French Committee of National Liberation should take the leadership. But these people have no power to conclude any agreement. Their work will be submitted to the Foreign Secretary and to me and, at the same time, before any agreement is made with the French Committee and before His Majesty's Government have pronounced on the result of their

works or intimated to the French Committee their decision, we shall consult with you and impart to you our views.

There is, of course, no question of recognition of a provisional government being raised at this end. You will certainly not be faced by His Majesty's Government with any *fait accompli*. I hope these assurances will be fully satisfactory to you.

#### A FRESH APPROACH TO THE FRENCH SITUATION

[Msg, Gen Holmes for Gen Walter Smith, 7 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4, CM-OUT 62443]

. . . The following memorandum initiated by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Acting Secretary of War was submitted to the President this morning:

"We should like to suggest to you a fresh approach to the French situation.

"This new approach would be to deal with the French Committee as the 'Civil Authority,' 'Administrative Authority,' 'De Facto Authority,' or 'French authority' and to reach agreements on civil affairs administration along the lines of those reached with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. These agreements, reconciled in the CCS, were signed on behalf of the United States by General Eisenhower as the U.S. Theater Commander and on behalf of Great Britain by the British Foreign Secretary. The agreements with the French authority would be based on the following principles:

"1. The agreements should be essentially practical and temporary pending the selection of a French Government by the free choice of the French people. The agreed arrangements would be based on the acceptance of the French Committee as the authority which should assume leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs during the period of liberation. However, the continuing status of the Committee must be based on the support which it has of the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France. The agreements would be designed to avoid prejudicing the right of the French people to choose their own government and would be so drawn as to avoid any expression of preference or political support for the Committee.

"2. The agreements must be such as will give the Supreme Commander the full authority he needs for the unimpeded conduct of military operations.

"3. With respect to currency the French

committee would become the issuing authority for the supplemental Franc currency, with appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations. . . .

If this meets with your approval, the matter will be referred to the CCS to take the necessary action."

The President approved in principle with the stipulation that he see the text of the agreement before it is referred to the CCS. He approved the use of the term "*De Facto Authority*" in the first paragraph.

Have completed a redraft of the British-French civil administration agreement in conformity with the above memorandum and to specify more clearly the authority of the Supreme Commander. Shall submit this draft to the President for his approval before it goes to CCS, where the CCAC will reconcile the draft in order that there will be identical British and American texts. This is the same procedure as followed for Belgium, Holland and Norway and will permit of the British signing on a governmental level and General Eisenhower signing for the United States.

Consider a satisfactory settlement of the entire French situation now probable, especially as the President has approved the proposal that the French Committee should become the issuing authority for supplemental currency. Shall keep you informed on progress.

#### FRENCH COMMITTEE THE *De Facto* AUTHORITY

[Msg, President to the Prime Minister, 10 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4, CM-OUT 63059]

. . . In reply to your telegram of June 25 I am prepared to accept the Committee as the *de facto* authority for civil administration in France provided two things are made clear. First, complete authority to be reserved to Eisenhower to do what he feels necessary to conduct effective military operations and second, that French people be given opportunity to make free choice of their own government. I have asked officials here to take British drafts as a base and modify them to insure these points and they will shortly be in touch with your people here. Suggest you authorize your political and military officials here to work out details immediately with our officials for final clearance through CCS. General de Gaulle is leaving behind officials qualified to deal with this matter. I urge that no publicity be given these arrangements until they are finally cleared. The visit has gone off very well.

## DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO U.S. BREAKS THE DEAD-LOCK

[Msg, Hilldring and Gen Holmes to Gen Walter Smith, 11 Jul 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43)(1), sec. 4, CM-OUT 64500]

. . . The revision of the Anglo-French draft has received the approval of the President, and it was gone over this morning with General Macready, McLean of the Embassy, and Wing Commander Birley. They indicated general agreement, but stated that the changes would have to be referred to London. . . . It was agreed that the U.S. representatives should begin discussions with the French at once, and that an endeavor should be made to get general French agreement before the revised draft is submitted to London. In his last conversation with de Gaulle, the President discussed in general the terms of the agreements with special reference to the clear definition of the Supreme Commander's authority, and reports that de Gaulle was in agreement. . . . De Gaulle and his party left very much pleased and relieved. It is felt that it will not be difficult now to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the French question. \* \* \*

## U.S. INSISTS THAT AGREEMENT BE SIGNED ON A MILITARY LEVEL

[WD Telecon 836, 16 Aug 44, Between Hilldring in Washington and Gen Holmes in London, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

*Holmes:* We learned from British Foreign Office sources that the agreement would not be ready for a signature today or tomorrow. Then the question came up of when, and in what circumstances, the two agreements, that is British and American, were to be signed because there was a proposal that Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, probably accompanied by Mr. Winant and Massigli, could (although that isn't sure) take a trip over to France. . . . Then it came up that Massigli and Eden were to sign for the British and that General Koenig presumably has been designated to sign with General Eisenhower for the United States.

*Hilldring:* That is correct.

*Holmes:* Gen. Eisenhower didn't like that very much. He thought that it was putting the United States in rather an unfavorable position if this fairly junior French general were designated to sign with the United States, whereas the Foreign Minister, Massigli, signed for Great Britain. . . . I was instructed to call you and see whether or not arrangements for Koenig and General Eisenhower to sign were firm or whether or not

it couldn't be changed.

*Hilldring:* There are two points here: One is that Mr. McCloy feels, and I agree, that it is not in consonance with the attitude of the State Dept. to have Winant on this in any capacity. \* \* \*

*Holmes:* All right. I will arrange that he will not go. \* \* \*

*Hilldring:* . . . Now the other point: . . . from the very beginning the President has been saying that Eisenhower is going to sign for the United States. . . . He expects Eisenhower to do the signing. . . . the French have not been any too happy about even General Eisenhower's signing. . . . they feel that . . . they are not getting everything that they should be getting. \* \* \*

This has got to be on a military level. We don't want any government-to-government business on this thing. We don't want to tell, we must not tell the French that Eisenhower is signing for the United States Government. He is signing by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is one of the points that the French have objected to. They did not want him to sign at the direction of or as the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They want his instructions to say that he is authorized by the U.S. Government to sign, and that has delayed the negotiations for several days. We had to . . . explain again that there were solid governmental reasons why he couldn't sign as the agent of the United States. It made it look like a treaty and we didn't want to go through the treaty procedure. He is being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do it, and it doesn't say anything about the U.S. Government.

*Holmes:* They have accepted that now?

*Hilldring:* Yes. . . . Can it be arranged so that there will be a simultaneous signing of this thing?

*Holmes:* Yes. We have arranged that it will be signed by both parties on the same day. . . .<sup>7</sup>

## TWO MONTHS AFTER D-DAY GENERAL EISENHOWER GETS A DIRECTIVE

[Dir, CAD, Report Submitted to JCS on Administration of Civil Affairs in France (JCS-1004), 16 Aug 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2]

3. The President of the United States has authorized the War Department to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation as the

<sup>7</sup> On 25 August 1944, the agreements were consummated on the governmental level by Great Britain and on a purely military level by the United States, General Eisenhower signing for the United States and General Koenig for the French. Msg 23824, 25 Aug, CAD files, 014, Fr, sec. 5.

*de facto* authority for liberated areas of France and has authorized representatives of the War Department, State Department, and Treasury Department to institute negotiations with the representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation with a view to reaching an agreement relating to the administration of civil affairs in liberated areas of France.

4. Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), representing General Eisenhower, took part in the earlier discussions instituted pursuant to this authorization at which the basic policies were set. Since his return to SHAEF, General Holmes has been kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

5. As a result of these negotiations, a series of draft agreements dealing with arrangements for civil administration in liberated areas of continental France have been drawn up which have been concurred in by Mr. John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War; Mr. Daniel Bell, the Under Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, Department of State; and Major General J. H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division, as well as representatives of the British Government and representatives of the French Committee for National Liberation. \* \* \*

[Msg, CCS to SHAEF, 23 Aug 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-OUT 85383]

"1. As a result of the discussions between American, British and French representatives, agreement has been reached on the practical arrangements for Civil Affairs Administration in continental France.

"2. This agreement is recorded in memoranda Nos. 1 to 5 inclusive:

- No. I. Relating to administrative and jurisdictional questions.
- No. II. Relating to currency.
- No. III. Relating to property in continental France.
- No. IV. Relating to publicity arrangements.
- No. V. Relating to the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in continental France.

These memoranda are being forwarded by air courier.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The texts of these memorandums are printed in Hajo Holborn, *American Military Government* (Washington, 1947), pp. 144-53.

"3. You should act in accordance with the terms of these memoranda in all matters which concern the civil administration of France. . . . Memoranda 1, 3, 4, 5, became operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted for the United States by the CG, USAF, ETO, to the Chief of the French Military Mission. Memorandum No. 2 becomes operative when put into effect for the British by the Foreign Secretary and when transmitted by SCAEF to the Chief of the French Military Mission.

"4. In connection with your rights and powers to use or requisition war materials and other property, information has come to hand that the Germans customarily requisition all useable supplies in any area before abandoning it. In exercising your right to use such supplies you should, so far as military necessity permits, give the greatest consideration to the economic interests of the civilian population and, where possible, leave at the disposal of the French authorities such transport material, food supplies and building materials as have been requisitioned by the German Armies or handed over to them under duress, and which are not needed by you in connection with military operations."

#### SACMED RECEIVES A REVISED DIRECTIVE

[Rev Directive, SHAEF to SACMED, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

1. This directive is issued to you under authority conferred by CCS in FAN 318 and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs within the area south and east of the outer boundaries of the following departments: Doubs, Côte d'Or, Saône-et-Loire, Allier, Puy-de-Dôme, Cantal, Aveyron, Tarn, Haute Garonne. It supersedes all previous directives on France issued to you by Supreme Commander, AEF.

2. As a result of discussions between American, British and French representatives, agreement has been reached on the practical arrangements for Civil Affairs Administration in Continental France. This agreement is recorded in Memoranda I to V. . . . [See preceding document.]

3. You should act in accordance with the terms of these memoranda in all matters which concern the civil administration of France. Although the designation "Supreme Allied Commander" as used in these memoranda refers to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, you will interpret it as referring to the Supreme Allied

Commander, Mediterranean Theater, for your area of responsibility outlined in paragraph 1, above.

4. In connection with your rights and powers to use or requisition war materials and other property, information has come to hand indicating that the Germans customarily requisition all usable supplies in any area before abandoning it. In exercising your right to use such supplies you should, so far as military necessity permits, give the greatest consideration to the economic interests of the civilian population and, where possible, leave at the disposal of the French authorities such transport material, food supplies and building materials as have been requisitioned by the German armies or handed over to them under duress, and which are *not* needed by you in connection with military operations.

5. You are authorized to make appropriate redelegation to subordinate commanders of the authority granted you under the terms of this directive.

#### MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH FCNL

[Memorandum No. 1, Relating to Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2]

\* \* \* 1. In areas in which military operations take place the Supreme Allied Commander will possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which in his judgment are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. Arrangements designed to carry out this purpose are set forth in the following Articles.

2. (i) Liberated French continental territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.

(ii) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (iv) below.

(iii) The interior zone will include all other regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance

with the provisions of Article 5 (ii) below.

(iv) The Delegate referred to in Article 3 below will effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law in such manner as to meet the requirements stated by the Supreme Allied Commander.

3. (i) In accordance with Article I of the Ordonnance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on the 14th March, 1944, a Delegate will be appointed for the present theatre of operations. Other Delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

(ii) The Delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a Military Delegate and Liaison Officers for administrative duties. The Delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the French authorities.

(iii) When the powers conferred on the Delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the Delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:

(i) The Delegate will take, in accordance with French law, the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander to give effect to the provisions of Article I, and in particular will issue regulations and make appointments in and removals from the public services.

(ii) In emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander under paragraph (i) of this Article, the latter may, as a temporary and exceptional measure, take such measures as are required by military necessity.

(iii) At the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the French Military Delegate will take such action under his powers under the State of Siege in accordance with French law as may be necessary.

5. (i) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefore, including the powers under the State of Siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities. Special arrangements will be made between the competent French authorities and the Supreme Allied Commander at the latter's

request in order that all measures may be taken which the latter considers necessary for the conduct of military operations.

(ii) Moreover, in accordance with Article 2 (iii) and (iv), certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance; for example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration areas. In such zones, the Supreme

Allied Commander is given the right to take, or to cause the services in charge of installations of military importance to take, all measures considered by him to be necessary for the conduct of operations and, in particular, to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. Consistent with these provisions, the conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities. \* \* \*

**SOLDIERS LIBERATE PEOPLES AND  
RESTORE GOVERNMENTS**



## CHAPTER XXV

# From the Beaches to Paris in Northern France

With this chapter the focus shifts from high-level planning, questions of policy, and intergovernmental wrangling to the scene of the battlefield. How did the carefully laid plans work? This question can best be answered by the officers and men in the field, for in all military operations, including civil affairs, the "battle is the pay-off."

In liberated western Europe civil affairs were a command responsibility and each commander was responsible within the area of his jurisdiction. In the American headquarters, down to and including corps, the civil affairs staffs were organized as a fifth section of the General Staff. The operating unit was the civil affairs detachment.<sup>1</sup> These detachments were assigned to the principal cities and towns in the combat zone and operated through acceptable heads of the local civil government, except in rare cases where military necessity required more direct control. Their area of jurisdiction was so defined that the entire territory in the military zone was covered. Civil affairs detachments normally remained in the area to which originally assigned, reverting to Corps, Army, and Communications Zone control as the rear boundaries moved forward. To get a picture of what actually happened, therefore,

it is necessary to examine the reports by Army Groups, Armies, and Corps, as well as records of detachments and personal accounts.

In a talk to civil affairs officers just before D-day, General Eisenhower had asked them to remember above all else that they were soldiers, "just as modern as radar and just as important to the command." Although their main job was to get the rear areas organized, they had to be on the scene early if they were to do their job well and be of maximum assistance in the battle. The first documents in this chapter detail the experience of three officers who went in on D-day with the airborne forces. Civil affairs problems in the beachhead phase were vastly simplified by the fact that the landings were made in a rich agricultural area that contained no large towns. The main activities of the civil affairs officers were establishing contact with the mayors of various small communities, assisting in traffic regulations, and arranging for the care and feeding of refugees. As the area of operations broadened an immense variety of duties fell upon them but the burden was eased by the energy and initiative of the French in taking over civil administration.

The first large city to be liberated was Cherbourg. Officers in Allied headquarters who referred to Cherbourg as the "most important port in the world" hardly exaggerated, for this city was the pivot around

<sup>1</sup> See Section 1, Report, CA Section, First U.S. Army, 9-30 June 1944, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 223, FUSA Opns. Rpts.

which the whole supply build-up was expected to swing. The first breach in the fortifications was made on 25 June; street fighting continued through the 26th; and by the 27th the last of the enemy strongholds surrendered. On the heels of the combat troops, Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1 moved into town, set up headquarters in the Chamber of Commerce, and went to work. A reasonably complete picture of what a civil affairs detachment did in an important city is revealed in a detailed report of Detachment A1A1, here included. Though conditions in the various cities or towns were never exactly alike, the problems faced by other Civil Affairs detachments followed the same general pattern.

In the minds of the civil affairs staff officers at SHAEF and at Twelfth Army Group, Paris loomed as the greatest challenge to be encountered in civil affairs. Staff officers expected that the population of approximately 4,000,000 would have to be fed for the first ten days very largely from imported supplies. They assumed that the inhabitants would be covered with lice, underfed, and suffering from rickets and tuberculosis. Food riots by an

armed population were considered likely. Accordingly, elaborate preparations were made to meet such emergencies. When officers of G-5, Twelfth Army Group, entered the city on 25 August 1944, they reported that the populace appeared well-disciplined, in normal health, and reasonably well fed. Thousands were about on bicycles. With the exception of a food shortage, extreme emergencies did not arise, and in Paris, as elsewhere, the French showed initiative in restoring civil administration.

During the first three months civil affairs for the most part enjoyed smooth sailing. However, as the armies broadened their fronts and moved toward the German frontiers in the fall months, serious difficulties began to arise. The liberation of large territories uncovered large numbers of refugees and displaced persons who had to be housed, fed, and transported (see Chapter XXX). Furthermore, deliveries of civilian supplies began to run behind (see Chapter XXXII). But these were merely the beginnings of problems that would develop more acutely in countries beyond the borders of France.

## 1. CIVIL AFFAIRS TROOPS HIT THE BEACHES IN THE ASSAULT

### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AIRBORNE

[Lt Col James S. Thurmond, Major Eberhard P. Deutsch, and Capt John J. Knecht, Report of Service on TD With 82d Airborne Div, 23 May 44 to 14 Jun 44, 15 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 223, FUSA Opns Rpts, Jkt 1]

1. On 23 May 1944, pursuant to orders, the undersigned left Bristol for Leicester, England, to join the 82nd Airborne Division, on TD, as a detail of Civil Affairs officers. . . .

2. Thereafter, the undersigned made careful studies of the probable Civil Affairs activities to be encountered in the operational area assigned to the division in France. . . .

3. At 1852 hours on the evening of 6 June 1944, the glider contingent moved out from

Greenham's Common. Each of the undersigned was assigned to a different glider but all three were near each other in the formation, the total of which was approximately 150 gliders. The glider numbers were 32 (Major Deutsch), 34 (Lt. Colonel Thurmond) and 38 (Captain Knecht). Gliders No. 32 and 34 contained  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks and trailers in addition to personnel, and glider No. 38 was personnel only.

4. The formation of the glider column consumed nearly an hour after which it headed across the English Channel. Shortly after 2100 hours the column crossed the coast line of France over the Utah beach and headed westward. At about 2120 hours, the gliders were subjected to heavy anti-aircraft fire and almost immediately

thereafter were released from the towing planes.

5. The experience of each of the three gliders in landing was almost identically the same as that of the others. All three crashed in small adjoining fields within the German lines.

6. Enemy fire on the occupants of the gliders took place the moment the landing had been effected and continued thereafter. Captain Knecht who was in the personnel glider (No. 38) and the other occupants of that glider immediately took to a ditch on one side of their field. Colonel Thurmond and Major Deutsch, in gliders No. 32 and 34 respectively, despite injuries sustained in the landings, assisted at once in the release of the vehicles from the gliders. All three gliders had been practically demolished in the landings. Colonel Thurmond and Major Deutsch managed to get together. Colonel Thurmond thereupon headed a reconnaissance party with personnel of his glider to locate a CP to which an effort was made to effect a rendezvous. Colonel Thurmond borrowed a vehicle from an officer of the 4th Infantry Division and made a reconnaissance of other nearby gliders, assisting their injured personnel in getting to the rendezvous.

7. In the meantime, Major Deutsch gathered as much as possible of the nearby personnel which had come in his and other gliders and, under cover of hedges, ditches and other natural obstructions, made their way to a nearby farmyard. There, a patrol was established to protect the area, and to bring in the wounded and injured, pending word to be sent by Colonel Thurmond as to the final rendezvous.

8. At the same time, Captain Knecht proceeded on a reconnaissance from his position and, under fire, managed to locate the farmyard just mentioned. He then returned to the ditch where the remaining personnel of his glider were waiting, and brought them back to the farmyard.

9. Shortly thereafter, word came from Colonel Thurmond that a tentative rendezvous had been established near the CP of a Battalion of the 4th Infantry, at the cross-roads a short distance from Blossville. The group at the farmyard thereupon proceeded by jeep and on foot, under guide of friendly civilians, to the rendezvous established by Colonel Thurmond. The enemy fire had remained continuous but was somewhat less intense. The wounded were carried in the vehicles taken from the gliders.

12. Colonel Thurmond received a severe contusion of his left knee and laceration of the left knee and both hands when his glider crashed. He was given first-aid treatment at an 8th Infantry aid station that night, and was treated

again the next morning at a medical station of the 82d Airborne Division. Captain Knecht received slight injuries to his hands and knees. Major Deutsch received severe injuries to his chest and back, which were later revealed to have consisted of fractured ribs and a strained back.

13. On the next morning it was found that the bivouac in question was still surrounded by the enemy, within range of small arms, and efforts were made to reach division headquarters by radio. Division headquarters, which was also surrounded, sent out reconnaissance, and the entire day was consumed in moving from one place to another in an effort to consolidate the positions. The detachment moved into no less than six positions during the day, constantly under fire and constantly seeking the protection of ditches, hedges and foxholes. At about 1900 hours that evening it was determined that the detachment could be saved only by getting it through to division headquarters somehow. A reconnaissance group was sent across to lead the detachment by secondary roads. A part of the way was along the main road in the vicinity of the Chef du Pont, which was under intense small arms fire. . . . The movement through this portion of the enemy line was finally successful, and the column reached division headquarters shortly after 2100 hours that night, having twice crossed the enemy line within less than 24 hours.

15. On the following day and thereafter the situation improved. Firm contact was established with the 4th Division and later with the 90th Division. . . .

17. The Provost Marshal requested assistance, and Captain Knecht from that point forward aided the Provost Marshal in traffic regulation, and in the processing of prisoners who were coming in in far greater numbers than had been anticipated.

18. The regular Civil Affairs officer of the division, while assuming responsibility for Civil Affairs, was largely engaged in matters connected with G-2 then of apparently paramount importance. Colonel Thurmond thereupon performed such essential Civil Affairs duties as the situation required, working in close co-operation with the division Civil Affairs officer. Among these matters were the procurement of civilian labor for grave digging; the contacting of Mayors of various small communities; arranging for prompt burial of civilians and the disposition of cattle killed during the combat activities; arranging for the clearance of bombs and grenades from a hospital at Ste.-Mère-Eglise so that it might be occupied by medical or other detach-

ments having need for the building; informing division ordnance detachment of the location of enemy ammunition; obtaining and turning over to G-2 enemy records located at Chef du Pont. In addition, Colonel Thurmond and the regular division Civil Affairs officer located the billet of the German Lieutenant General who had commanded the 91st German Division and who had been killed in action. The records found in the billet, of great importance and considerable volume, were promptly reported to G-2 and by them to Corps Hq. for handling.

19. At the request of G-1, Colonel Thurmond assisted in locating bodies of paratroops in the vicinity of Ste.-Mère-Eglise for the Quartermaster. When the Civil Affairs detachment for Ste.-Mère-Eglise arrived, Colonel Thurmond immediately made contact with it, and advised and consulted with them from time to time; thereafter assisting in its functions. Colonel Thurmond was of particular assistance to the detachment in the handling of refugees from other towns in the combat area. When the town of Cretteville was taken by the 82nd Division on the morning of 8 June 1944, Colonel Thurmond and the division Civil Affairs officer immediately entered the town and conferred with the Mayor. Arrangements were made for the feeding and care of refugees. A ceremony was held raising the French Tricolour. The signal section made photographs of this ceremony.

20. Major Deutsch's injuries prevented his extensive participation in direct Civil Affairs activities. However, he assisted in the interrogation of prisoners to determine conditions in local communities from which they had come. He interrogated civilians, and ordered the internment of two whose activities in behalf of, or at least in cooperation with, the enemy seemed clear. He assisted in obtaining data as to missing troops evacuated prior to the setting-up of division clearing stations; and he consulted from time to time with Colonel Thurmond and the other Civil Affairs officers on their activities, giving such help as he could.

21. On 13 June the undersigned moved forward with a portion of division headquarters to an advance CP just west of Picauville, again practically up to the front line, where the area was again subjected to enemy land and aerial fire. Pursuant to orders, Captain Knecht had returned to Army Hq on 12 June and Colonel Thurmond and Major Deutsch returned on the evening of 14 June 1944. \* \* \*

23. It is the conclusion of the undersigned that Civil Affairs activities in an airborne division are obviously more limited in scope than in a regular

infantry division. As a rule, an airborne division finds itself in territory less densely populated than others. Further, during the early stages, the airborne division is ordinarily engaged in combat of such a nature, that Civil Affairs activities are considerably curtailed. Further, the time during which an airborne division operates is limited. It comes in early, performs its mission, and is withdrawn, ordinarily, within a short time. On the other hand, except for the factors above mentioned, Civil Affairs operations in an airborne division are practically the same as those in an infantry division, once landings have been effected and consolidated. The problems of communities captured by airborne infantry are sometimes even greater than those of communities taken by regular infantry, because of the nature of the attack itself. \* \* \*

#### INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CIVIL POPULATION WILL BE ISSUED BY THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES

[Ltr, CofS, 21 AGP to FUSAG, *et al.*, 9 Jun 44, Internal Affairs Branch, SHAEF files, G-5, 676, Proclamations-Fr]

1. The policy of the Supreme Commander is that instructions to the Civil population in operation OVERLORD will be issued, where possible, by the civil authorities in accordance with the requirements of commanders, and conveyed to these civil authorities through the Civil Affairs Staff. Only if there is complete breakdown of civil administration will ordinances be published in the name of the Supreme Commander, and then only when he has authorized this to be done.

3. The Supreme Commander will issue initially only two proclamations:—

- (a) A general proclamation
- (b) A proclamation relating to currency

Copies of (a) have been issued to Officers Commanding Civil Affairs Detachments with authority to promulgate them without further instructions. Copies of (b) are in the process of being issued.

4. Commanders will require certain notices for display in the forward areas covering such matters as:

- (a) Curfew
- (b) Blackout
- (c) Prohibition of movement on the road.
- (d) Prohibition of use of cameras and binoculars.
- (e) Surrender of arms and ammunition.

Suitable notices, which can be handed to the local authorities for signature and issue, have been distributed to officers commanding Civil

Affairs Detachments for use as formation commanders may direct.

#### THE BEACHHEAD PHASE PRESENTS NO SEVERE CIVIL AFFAIRS PROBLEMS

[CA Sec, FUSA, Rpt, 9-30 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 223, FUSA Opns Rpts, Jkt 2]

The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, First U.S. Army, arrived ashore on Omaha Beach 2200 hours 9 June, accompanied by the Governmental Agencies and Public Safety officer. CA Detachment D7G1, attached to the Special Engineer Brigade for lift and duty, arrived ashore 2100 hours, 9 June, and was assigned to duty at Omaha Beach. Each division and corps ashore in the First Army had members of their CA Staffs present with their respective headquarters.

Three members of the CA, Staff, FUSA, attached for lift and CA duties to the 82nd Airborne Division, landed near Ste.-Mère-Eglise about 2200 on D Day. This was the first instance of participation by Civil Affairs in an air-borne invasion.

In his initial reconnaissance on landing at Omaha Beach, the Army SCAO found that the state of law and order was satisfactory. About 90 per cent of the normal population was present, and civilian casualties were estimated at not over 2 per cent.

CA Detachments were placed as follows on 11 June:

D3B1 . . . . . Isigny and Grandcamp  
D5B1 . . . . . Trévières  
D6B1 . . . . . Ste.-Mère-Eglise

Action was taken to deputize civilians and build up a larger police force. On 11 June, the Army SCAO requested that Civil Affairs Detachments be placed on a high transport priority so as to be immediately available for assignment as soon as towns had been captured from the enemy.

On 12 June, CA Detachment C2B1 was placed at Carentan. The same day, the Supply Echelon, CA Section FUSA, arrived on the Continent, with 12 officers. Two French liaison officers also reported that day. . . . On 13 June, the Army SCAO briefed officers of the Sections on the general situation, and a schedule of visits was arranged whereby every CA Detachment and Staff would be visited daily, and the entire zone of operations would be surveyed at frequent intervals by headquarters specialist officers.

On 13 June, the Army SCAO and the Governmental Agencies and Public Safety Officer conferred with the CA Office, 2nd British Army, on the general situation, with special emphasis

on milling, police, and civil administration, all centered at Bayeux. \* \* \*

By direction of the Army SCAO, a general survey was made of the supply situation, soon after the arrival of the Supply Echelon on the Continent. Apart from medical supplies, flour and soap were found to be the only major shortages in the Army area. The 2nd British Army agreed to make flour available through normal French channels. Request was made of the 21st Army Group to place butter on the free list, due to the surplus of dairy products in the lodgment area. It was also proposed to the 21st Army Group that supplies of canned milk in the allocation to Utah beach be cancelled, and 340 tons of flour be substituted.

Soon after the landing of the Supply Echelon, a limitation of 6 kilometers was placed on travel without permit, and the mayors were urged to increase civilian police forces. After contacting G-2 on security measures, the Naval Liaison Officer presented to the Naval Officer in Charge recommendations for reestablishing the fishing industry, an important element in the peacetime economic life of many towns in Normandy. \* \* \*

On 17 June, the Army SCAO directed attention of the 21st Army Group to the fact that officers sponsored by General de Gaulle had assumed authority in Bayeux, and that the previous sous-prefect had been deposed from office. [See Chapter XXIV, Section 3.] As this was not within the First Army area, and on advice of Brigadier Lewis, CAO Second British Army, who had jurisdiction at Bayeux, no positive action was taken in regard to posters and proclamations, either placing or displacing them. \* \* \*

#### THERE WAS SOME LOOTING

[Interv With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2nd Br Army, 26 Nov 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, Negotiations With the French, an. 20-B]

\* \* \* Thus the situation in the beachhead proved relatively simple, and did not present any severe problems. There was ample food, few refugees, and no administration problems within the small area concerned. There was, however, almost at once the question of looting to deal with. It was very bad in the early stages, and had never been covered entirely satisfactorily. Another question that arose early on the beachhead was the different attitudes adopted by the Divisional Commanders about the evacuation of the civilian population from their Divisional Areas. Divisions that have been under the command of the Canadian Army have been particularly in-

sistent on the clearing of their areas, maintaining that casualties from stray shots are often caused by enemy snipers in civilian clothes. \* \* \*

#### COMBAT DISCOMMODES A COMMUNITY

[PH Dept, FUSA, Report on Activities From Arrival to 30 June 1944, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 223, FUSA Opns Rpts, Jkt 2]

(2) *Sewage disposal* in all communities is by flush toilets emptying to sumps, or by privies emptying into sumps. In most places, before combat operations began, sumps were customarily emptied every two weeks. This service was conducted by the "honey cart" system, managed by an individual known as a "vidangeur," and efforts are now under way to restore this service. Most sumps were cleaned recently, and at present there is no acute problem or emergency. Where water for flushing toilets has been discontinued, due to damaged water mains, water is brought in hand containers. Contents of "honey carts" are reported to have been buried, although some use as field fertilizer is probable. \* \* \*

#### DETACHMENTS ARE TOO BIG FOR THE CIVIL AFFAIRS PROBLEMS IN THE BEACHHEAD

[Maj Frederick E. Simpich, Report on Civil Affairs Operations in the American Zone, Fr, as Reprinted in G-2 Sec ECAD, Spec Intel Bull IV (10 Jul 44), SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 221, FUSA CA-MG Opn]

\* \* \* Approximately fifteen detachments are now [30 June] in operation. All are 'D' except for a 'O' at Carentan and an 'A' at Cherbourg. Without exception the detachments are too big for the problems presented. Where one officer could do the job, four are present. Result is a general disposition to magnify the problem, make work, and undertake functions which are not a proper CA responsibility. No serious consequences are expected as the First Army has carefully drilled each detachment on the basic policy of reliance on the French. When the detachments operate rather than 'liaise,' it is in connection with military questions, as with the detachment commander who personally set about de-booby-trapping his town. Survivors will in any event benefit from the field experience. \* \* \*

## 2. FRENCH TAKE INITIATIVE IN RESTORING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

#### FRENCH AT FIRST VIEW ALLIED CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS WITH SUSPICION

[Monograph on 2d British Army Relationships With the French Civil Administration, Jun-Jul 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5, 8987/457]

\* \* \* General de Gaulle landed in France [14 June], addressed a meeting in the market square in Bayeux, and left behind him for the Region of Rouen a Civil Commissioner, M. Coulet, and a Military Commander, Col. P. de Chevigné. No notification of their arrival was given to Second Army, and the first the SCAO knew of their presence was when he met Col. de Chevigné standing in the road by a broken down car near Army headquarters. . . .<sup>1</sup>

. . . M. Coulet appeared suspicious of Civil Affairs, and studiously avoided the use of the term in all correspondence and conversation. It seemed that on instructions, presumably from Gen. de Gaulle, his primary concern was to assert the sovereign rights of France. Once, however,

he had had an opportunity of seeing for himself how Civil Affairs detachments were functioning in the field, and of finding out that the Allies had no intention of interfering unnecessarily in the French responsibility for civil administration, he became most co-operative, though it was always necessary to avoid any suggestion of an infringement of French rights. By 19 June, M. Coulet felt that he was in a position to draft instructions to all Maires [mayors], laying down the general principles to be followed in the reception to be given by them to Allied demands. These instructions, submitted to Second Army on 19 June and printed and issued by 6 July 44 dealt in particular with the following points:-

(a) That Allied authorities would require Maires to take certain police measure such as the posting of notices concerning restriction of movement, surrender of firearms, or the times of blackout, etc. These measures were necessary for operational reasons, and Maires were to comply without hesitation. If any requests appeared unreasonable, the matter could be referred to the Sous-Prefect; but this was not to be allowed to interfere with the prompt execution of the order. As these notices were to be signed by the local

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the meeting with the Military Commander of the Rouen Region and later with the Civil Commissioner, see Interview With Brig R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, in Chapter XXIV, Section 3.

Maires themselves, and not by the military commander, and as the procedure came within the framework of the French laws of *Etat de Siège*, this marked a considerable advance in the development of a legal and administrative understanding between M. Coulet and the Allied forces.

(b) That Maires should be prepared to cooperate with Military Commanders in the compulsory evacuation of women and children from areas within 3 kms of the front line in the event of a temporary stabilization of operations. This evacuation should not involve great hardship, as most of the people concerned could find accommodation with friends or relatives nearby, and in any case they could return to their homes after a few days.

(c) The question of the disposal of captured enemy material was brought to the attention of the Maires. \* \* \*

#### FRENCH MILITARY COURTS ESTABLISHED

[Monograph on 2d Br Army Relationships With the French Civil Administration, Jun-Jul 44, 60, SHAEF files, G-5]

\* \* \* On 16 June, Col. de Chevigné published a decree establishing a Military Tribunal for the Region of Rouen to sit in Bayeux or such other places later found more convenient for the purpose. It was not intended that these Military Tribunals should take the place of the normal civil courts. In fact it was planned that the civil courts should deal with all normal matters, and that the Tribunals should be confined to dealing with cases of an exemplary nature, or to cases where the security of the French State or Allied Military interests were concerned. In addition to hearing cases concerning Allied Military interests it was intended that the Tribunal should deal with charges for [*sic*] looting of French property by French nationals, and at a later stage, when evidence was more complete, with cases concerning collaborationists.

The Tribunal Militaire was never convened as such, but was replaced by the Tribunal aux Armées, established by Arrêté No. 59 dated 2 July 44, which served the same purpose. This court first sat in Cherbourg early in July, and tried several cases of looting and one of treason and espionage. The Tribunal aux Armées had jurisdiction within the zone of deployment of the Allied Armies and was to move forward with them as the situation might require.

In order that there should be full co-operation between the Tribunals and the Allied Armies, it was agreed that a liaison officer should be appointed by Second Army, and be attached to 202

CA Detachment at Bayeux, where he would be in close touch with the Court. This officer was to attend all cases which concerned military interests; give all necessary assistance to the French judicial authorities in the preparation of any prosecutions instigated by Allied Military authorities, or affecting military security; endeavour to obtain through the appropriate military channels the presence of all military witnesses, and be present during the giving of evidence to ensure that security was not jeopardized; and to arrange for travel permits to be issued to enable all civilian witnesses to attend, when they were required.

Once the general principle of the establishment of these tribunals had been agreed, it became necessary to reach a decision upon a number of smaller points. In a letter from the SCAO to the Brigadier "A/Q," Second Army, dated 22 June, reference is made to a conference held on 19 June and attended by the SCAO and M. Coulet.<sup>2</sup> \* \* \*

At the beginning of July the Inspector General of Justice Militaire, Brig-Gen. P. Mounier, paid a visit to the liberated area to see for himself how the legal administration was being carried on. In addition to the setting up of the Military Tribunes already set up by Col. de Chevigné, it was his intention to consider the advisability of establishing mobile Courts to be attached to Allied formations, and move with them to establish courts of justice as new territory was uncovered. The need for these mobile courts never arose. \* \* \*

#### THESE PEOPLE TERRIFY ME

[Analysis Sheet, 18 Jun 44, Summarizing an Article in the *Sunday Pictorial* (London) by Rex North on His Impressions of the French Attitude Toward the Allies in Normandy,<sup>3</sup> SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 300, 21 AGP (Br), CA Sec]

\* \* \* I thought I should be sitting here on the beaches of France reporting the war, but I am forced to the conclusion that there is another and possibly even more important story to write today.

It is a grave and disturbing story; of a people

<sup>2</sup> A detailed report of this conference is contained in the file cited at the beginning of this document. With the exception of a few cases which were referred to the 21 Army Group, tentative agreement was reached on the following points: authority for arrest and trial of military and civilian personnel; unauthorized possession of Allied military property; infringement of British orders and the method of securing witnesses; and the right to arrest persons subject to Allied military jurisdiction.

<sup>3</sup> Although the conclusions of this report are not borne out by other evidence, this document has been included as indicative of at least one point of view.

who are divided among themselves—and divided to a large extent against us.

Soberly and factually I must set it down. Six out of ten of the people over here distrust and detest us, and I have carefully checked the figure. Further, more than half seem to be allies of the Germans so that it is impossible to tell who, if any of them, are our friends.

For, like so many others, I expected everyone to fete our victorious forces as they came in. Instead, I have spent a week wondering where the next French bullet was coming from.

I expected to find a starved, oppressed country that would cry out for arms and for the right to stand up and fight with our armies of liberation.

Instead over half the French I met in Normandy had no wish to be liberated. Men on street corners—wearing German field grey trousers, let me add—turned their backs on me. Others just happened to spit at that moment.

Once I thought that all we had to do was to beat the Germans with our armies. Now—frightening thought that it is—I know there is a problem just as urgent.

Somehow we have got to get these men and women of France on our side. Somehow we must reach these people with the message that we are not bombing and blasting their cities just to save ourselves. As it is, I must confess that the attitude of these people to our cause terrifies me. \* \* \*

#### GIVEN THE DOUR NATURE OF THE NORMAN, THE ALLIED RECEPTION WAS FRIENDLY

[Ltr, 19 Jun 44, 21 AGp to PWD, SHAEF, as Quoted in Analysis Sheet, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 300, 21 AGp (Br), CA Sec]

\* \* \* It is considered that articles of this kind [see document immediately preceding] may seriously prejudice the relations between troops and civilians at the present time and diminish the degree of cooperation which we look for from local authorities.

The information in the possession of this branch, which is believed to be representative, does not confirm North's conclusions. Taking into account the dour and undemonstrative nature of the Norman, our reception has been friendly and the degree of cooperation afforded by local officials most satisfactory. That the population generally is anti-German and pro-Allied is beyond doubt. \* \* \*

#### STATUS OF FRENCH CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN LIBERATED AREAS

[Ltr SHAEF, G-5 to 21 AGp (Rear) CA, 3 Jul 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 115,304, Liaison, Fr]

2. M. Coulet and Col. de Chevigné . . . having been appointed by General de Gaulle, may therefore be considered to be officials of the FCNL. They are both under General Koenig, who is under General Eisenhower, and for this reason the Supreme Commander is in fact in full control of the Civil Administration in the liberated territory.

3. There is little doubt that M. Coulet has received instructions from the FCNL of the policy which he is to pursue, but there are no indications so far that he is not prepared to cooperate in every way with the Allied authorities or that he is likely to take any deliberate action which would prejudice operations.

4. This rather anomalous situation must be accepted and made to work particularly as negotiations between British and US Governments with the French are in progress. There is much to be said for the French authorities relieving us, to the greatest possible extent that operations permit, of all French civil administration. It is important that all Civil Affairs officers should realize that it is not possible at this stage to give a precise definition of the position of M. Coulet in the civil administration and that they should exercise tact and vigilance to ensure smooth working and operational requirements being met. In order to avoid any misunderstanding during the present phase, M. Coulet should be invited to submit for discussion any notice or proclamation which he finds necessary to publish on any subject which may be controversial.

#### LACK OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT DID NOT CAUSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES DURING INITIAL OPERATIONS

[1st Lt. Jesse C. Beesley, Memo on Observations in Normandy (Br Sector), 27 Jul 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 10, Hists and Monographs]

3. The question of Civil Affairs authority in Normandy did not reach a precipitation point for several reasons. (1) There was no disorder among the populace. (2) Local government was well in hand and continued to function. (3) All French mayors and lesser officials displayed a willingness to act in accordance with the wishes of the army, and made no effort to determine whether a wish

was a suggestion or order. (4) And no incident arose which was of sufficient importance to bring about a show-down on the question of authority. \* \* \*

#### THERE WAS LITTLE DIRECT ACTION: CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS WORKED THROUGH FRENCH OFFICIALS

[Beesley, Memo on Observations in Normandy (Br Sector) 27 Jul 44]

4. Civil Affairs performed primarily as a liaison function. Due to the fact that its authority was not clarified before entering the area, there was a tendency to avoid responsibility. This was true at every civil affairs level, and even caused some embarrassment at the detachment level. For example, detachment leaders could issue or refuse to issue travel passes. Yet, in the case of a refusal, a person could walk out of the CA office and proceed to his destination without a pass. In many instances CA officers were asked to settle property disputes, close public houses, remove suspects from office, and take action against undesirable persons. Such cases were usually referred to the mayors, the Sub-Prefect, or the gendarmerie, and CA acted merely as a clearing house. Such "buck passing" was expedient, if not a prestige-builder.

However, it should be mentioned that while early refugee problems were almost entirely met by the local government, it could not hope to continue without physical aid. By D plus 30 some detachments were already giving assistance. Where urban areas are liberated much more will be needed.

Another CA function of growing importance was the making of surveys on food supplies, industries, abandoned German property, transportation, etc. Due to the fact that detachments covered every area, had reliable contacts, their own transportation and quick communication with the higher levels, civil affairs was an efficient information source.

5. Looting by soldiers was a constant complaint reaching CA. Orders to detachments were to report, but not investigate, complaints. It was hoped that the severe punishments being meted out would lessen these complaints.

#### FRENCH SHOW EFFICIENCY AND INITIATIVE IN RESTORING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. 6, Gen Bd]

\* \* \* As rapidly as conditions permitted the French assumed responsibility at all levels of government. On 6 August, the French Military

Commander of the 10th Military Region issued a proclamation, under the Law of the State of Siege, ordering that no arrests be made in the Department of Ille-et-Vilaine except for flagrant offences, without the mandate of the Military Authority for the 10th Military Region. Thus the Provisional Government quickly asserted its authority over the area involved. The practical value of the action to Civil Affairs and the Army lay in the prompt exercise of jurisdiction by the French over offences which concerned the security of the Allied forces. The action also clarified the position of *Les Forces Françaises Intérieures* (FFI), already recognized as a component part of the Allied forces, and increased their activity and aid to the Civil Affairs Detachments.\* Soon, throughout the Army Zone, "FFI" members were assisting in traffic control and public safety functions. They gave information of enemy stragglers and concentrations, enemy supplies, native collaborationists, which was forwarded by Civil Affairs to proper Army authorities.

On the civil side, Regional Commissioners (*Commissaires Régionaux de la République*) exercised the powers given under the Laws of the State of Siege, and the power to appoint and remove officials, an end desired by Supreme Headquarters policy. The Prefect, Sous-Prefect, and Mayor of Rennes . . . and the mayors at Kinan . . . and Fougères . . . were removed.

French officials at all levels with whom Civil Affairs Detachments were required to deal, quickly resumed ordinary functions, and demonstrated initiative in meeting extraordinary problems. Public safety, relief, money and banking required a minimum of aid and supervision by Civil Affairs personnel. The movement and care of refugees, anticipated as a difficult problem, was satisfactorily handled by local officials and agencies in the main.

The early announcement of Civil Affairs objectives and the tact and judgment displayed by Civil Affairs personnel played an important part in reassuring the French as to Allied aims and in encouraging the resurgence of French authority in civil administration. The presence of Civil Affairs officers gave prestige and strength to established French officials. It also provided a means of liaison, through which Allied policies could be conveyed to French authorities and local needs made known to the Army. When needs were made known, appropriate action was taken. For example, an Army order was issued on 16 Au-

\* Marcel Vigneras, *A History of the French Forces of the Interior*, is in OCMH, MS files.

gust permitting the movement of civilians, under Civil Affairs control, to harvest crops. \* \* \*

#### ALLIES MUST TRY TO RETAIN FRENCH GOODWILL

[Survey of the PWD, 22 Aug 44, Summarized in Analysis Sheet, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 7-35, Relations With Gen and Spec Staffs, PWD, Jkt II]

#### \* \* \* Conclusions.

1. In Normandy the Allies, up to late July, were living in a honeymoon period. To put it another way, they had a credit in favor at the bank. The Allied landings were long expected and the uppermost emotional feeling was a sense of relief and optimism over the Allied successes and joy at the thought of coming freedom. Nor have the Normans been fundamentally disap-

pointed in this matter since the landings. By D+45, the great majority of them in the Cotentin Peninsula were still looking at the Allies through rosetinted glasses. But our future policy and conduct will determine how inexhaustible the bank balance is.

3. So far as food is concerned, much will depend on our future methods in dealing with the black market and the effectiveness of the rationing system, for food is a problem uppermost in the Norman's consciousness. At present the Allies have been helped by the impossibility of exporting the expendable goods in Normandy.

4. At all costs the Allies must avoid being likened to the Germans in their requisitioning procedures. This appears to be an important field for future propaganda directives. \* \* \*

### 3. CHERBOURG IS THE FIRST LARGE CITY TO BE LIBERATED

#### THE ARMY MOVES ON TO CHERBOURG

[Hist of G-5, FUSA, 12 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, FUSA Hist Rpts, Jkt 2]

Continuing their offensive, U.S. forces, after their beachhead landings, began their drive for Cherbourg. As combat troops uncovered French towns in the Cherbourg Peninsula, they were followed by Civil Affairs Detachments, who took up their duties, in many instances under enemy fire, following receipt of instructions from Corps and Division Civil Affairs Staff officers. Grandcamp, Isigny, Carentan, Montebourg, Valognes, Barfleur, St. Vaast, Ste-Mère-Eglise, Bricquebec, St.-Pierre-Eglise, and Cherbourg—in these, and other towns Civil Affairs Detachments put to a practical test their schooling in the United States and England.

Though no two towns presented exactly the same conditions, the problems facing Civil Affairs Detachments followed the same general pattern. These included the care of refugees, reestablishment of local government, provision of emergency supplies for the needy, public health and sanitation surveys, organization of auxiliary police, the issuance of passes for necessary civilian travel, procuring of labor for the Army, assistance to the Army in its relations with the civil population, and restoring to as nearly normal as possible the life of the community. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT A1A1 FROM UTAH BEACH TO CHERBOURG<sup>5</sup>

[Rpt, CA Detachment A1A1, Jun-Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.23, Hist Rpts, Cherbourg, Jkt 1]

#### *Administration and Policy*

The Detachment landed at Utah Beach on the evening of June 14, D plus 8 and that night reported to Senior Civil Affairs Officer (SCAO) of VII U.S. Corps, First Army. The detachment comprised eight officers (3 U.S. and 5 Br) two warrant officers (U.S.), one navy officer (U.S.) attached, one French Liaison officer and ten enlisted men (all U.S.). The remainder, ten officers and twelve enlisted men, had been left behind with the intention of following at a later date.

From June 14 until the morning of 22nd the detachment remained at VII Corps Hq. From the afternoon of 22 June until entry into Cherbourg on the 27th they were attached to 9th Div, Hq. During this period every opportunity was

<sup>5</sup> Civil Affairs Detachment A1A1 was commanded by Lt. Col. Frank O. Howley, American, with Major Rupert L. H. Nunn, British, as his deputy. It achieved fame for the administration of Cherbourg, the first large city to be returned to the French. Also, it became the nucleus for the teams set up to operate in Paris and Berlin. This condensed report is one of a series of case studies published in training-kit form in 1950 as a reference work for military government personnel of the Organized Reserves.

taken to collect as much information as possible regarding the situation in Cherbourg including the personalities involved, the food situation, economic position, population, administration, etc. Consequently when the detachment arrived in the city they had a very fair idea of what they would be likely to encounter. On the 27th the detachment moved into the town on the heels of the combat troops, set up their headquarters in the Chamber of Commerce and went to work.

A meeting with the Mayor and all the principal officials of the city took place that same day and each section of the detachment made the acquaintance of his opposite number on the municipal administration.

An interesting ceremony took place in the Place Napoléon on the 27th when [Major] General [J. Lawton] Collins, VII Corps Commander attended by his divisional commanders, greeted the Mayor and other officials and presented a Tricolor flag which the detachment had made from the parachutes of U.S. paratroopers.

On the 28th the rear party arrived bringing the detachment up to full strength. The first week involved largely a question of obtaining detailed particulars of the state of the various town services and bringing order out of the chaos. Generally the city was only about 25% damaged by the bombardment. The water supply was not functioning and was the first and most urgent repair required. The police were functioning to a limited extent and there was no real breakdown of law and order although individual cases of looting were reported during the first few days. Sufficient food was available for all for at least 30 days. The population had dwindled to some 5,000 out of a peacetime population of 38,000. Included were staunch patriots who wished to be on hand to witness the liberation they had long prayed for, town officials, young riffraff, and a large number of foreigners who had been left behind by the departing Germans.

The water was restored by the 3rd of July. The Mayor, M. Renault and his staff, the police and the officials of the Ravitaillement Général, Ponts et Chaussées were all at their posts while the leading bankers, legal and other officials quickly returned and gave wholehearted cooperation to the detachment.

The only person who was dispossessed by the French during these early days was the Sous-Prefect, M. Bourdin who had been appointed by Vichy. He called on the 28th to render his com-

pliments and respect to the detachment on the grounds that although he had been ordered to leave, "honor compelled him to greet the new authority." M. Coulet (Regional Commissaire) arrived in the city June 29th and spoke to the assembled population, in the main square. Other leaders were M. Gresselin (Resistance Group) and Capt. Schuman. The Provisional government was accepted by all with enthusiasm as being the only possible solution; at any rate for the time being. Considerable enthusiasm always greeted any mention of the name of General de Gaulle.

The enormous stock of captured food stocks in the arsenal presented a somewhat formidable problem as some were perishable. Much of this was handed over to combat troops of the 4th Division and later the detachment had orders to distribute the balance through the Ravitaillement Général which was duly carried out.

During the first phase some of the difficulties arose from the continual change of command. The detachment came in under 29th Regt. of 9th Division, during the day the 4th Division took over to be succeeded by 101st Airborne Division, later by 1st Army direct, then ADSEC, followed by 4th Port, then Area Command No. 1, which became Cherbourg Command. This succession of higher unit commanders led very naturally to lack of continuity in military policy and therefore a constant change of orders.

As Cherbourg was the first large city and port liberated, a constant stream of visitors, including many high ranking Generals, called at the detachment office. There were many reports. This was to some extent unavoidable but a close check on officers allowed to travel would have cut down the overflowing procession which taxed the energy and time, particularly, of the C.O. and his deputy.

The U.S. Navy and the French Naval and Military authorities were quickly on the scene and the C.O. of the detachment was instrumental in introducing all the principal persons concerned to the U.S. Army authorities and diplomatically smoothing over many difficulties. A feature of the Civil Affairs work was the task of acting as liaison between all authorities of all nationalities, both military and civil, not always a strictly Civil Affairs job.

On 3rd July the local paper, "La Presse Cherbourgeoise" was published, the first French newspaper to be printed in Free France. On the 4th the Stars and Stripes was published from Cherbourg as a continental edition. The Omnia Cin-

ema was opened ceremoniously on July 5th by a speech by the Mayor and an American Officer and the playing of the three National Anthems. This cinema hadn't been opened to the public since 1939 as it had been used exclusively by German troops. Radio Cherbourg started to operate and was at once a complete success. The equipment was not really sufficient for the job but the keenness and enthusiasm of the operating staff overcame all difficulties and the service was most highly appreciated by all the inhabitants. In addition to local "Avis" this radio-station relayed the BBC (London) (French) and ABSIE programs. Speeches by local personages were given and the C.O. of the detachment recorded a speech which was broadcast.

On the 7th July the town received a visit from General Koenig and the Detachment Commander attended a luncheon party given in the General's honor. On the 7th the Law Courts were reopened in ceremony and on the 8th two alleged spies were tried and condemned to a long term of imprisonment.

On the 9th displays were given by PAD and the city fire service and the detachment officers responsible for these activities reported most favorably on the efficiency shown. During this period considerable progress had been made by each section of the detachment and the normal life of the city was quickly being restored.

A very difficult problem was that of accommodation. Many people were returning to the city and a large number of troops were being brought in. The Town Mayor did not arrive until ten days after the capture and during this period property was acquired irregularly. The acquisition of important property in the city was a matter which required very tactful handling. The largest store was that of Rattis and it was required by the Army for a Red Cross Club for colored troops. Considerable negotiation was necessary to persuade the proprietor to release these premises voluntarily. The services of the detachment were instrumental in effecting a satisfactory conclusion to this negotiation.

The army also wished to requisition the factory known as the Usine du Maupas for use as an APO and distribution center. It was felt that the use of the factory in its proper function as a manufactory of agricultural implements far outweighed the army requirement. It also contained a foundry and saw mills and many excellent machines. This view prevailed and the detachment was able to save the factory from the army use.

Lt. Guidicelli of the French Navy had been killed in action when leading a party of Ameri-

can troops in an attack on the arsenal. His brave action will be remembered as one of the most heroic incidents in the struggle for Cherbourg and his funeral was attended by the C.O. of the detachment and other officers.

The delay in giving full recognition to the Provisional Govt. gave rise to many difficulties at the detachment level. As an example of this it may be mentioned the uncertainty at first of acceptance of the new currency. Another trouble was the question of postage stamps. A suggestion to overprint the "Pétain" head by the "Lorraine Cross" was vetoed and eventually orders came to continue the use of the Pétain stamp pending new issues.

Fishing was at first prohibited, but on the 26th July this rule was relaxed and the boats were permitted to fish under certain restrictions.

Civil transportation during the whole period under review was most inadequate.

A new Sous-Prefect, M. Leviandier, had been appointed and a new Prefect, M. Edouard Lebas. Our relations with both these men were extremely cordial and they came to rely upon the detachment for advice on many matters. M. Coulet, the Regional Prefect, also looked to the C.O. for information and advice and expressed his opinion that the Cherbourg C. A. detachment was a model one. The prefect had taken his quarters temporarily in Cherbourg pending the liberation of his departmental seat at St. Lô. As it happened, owing to the demolition of St. Lô, he didn't go there but instead set up his office later at Coutances.

The 14th July (Bastille day) was celebrated by a programme which, if not up to prewar scale, was perhaps more impressive by reason of the circumstances. It was naturally the first to be celebrated since 1939. Salvos of artillery and ringing of church bells took place at intervals during the day. In the afternoon a big parade assembled in the Place Napoléon made up of French military, Naval and civilian services, U.S. Army Units and British RAF and Army. This parade marched to the public garden to the Memorial of Dead. It was accompanied by M. Coulet, Admiral [George Thierry] d'Argenlieu, and all the notables of the city. The C.O. and deputy also took part in this parade. The memorial speeches were made by M. Bouchet (Resistance Group), Admiral d'Argenlieu, M. Coulet, Colonel Howley, C.O. of the detachment and others. Next on the programme was the renaming of the "Place Pétain" to the "Place Général de Gaulle." This was performed by the Mayor, M. Renault. A concert was held in the Municipal Theatre and the programme included

many of the old songs and tunes of France which had been prohibited for four years.

On 20 July there was a formal opening of the First American Red Cross club on French soil. Mr. [Harvey D.] Gibson, a director of the Red Cross, opened the club and the Mayor spoke and presented a tricolor flag. The club is in the rue Albert-Mahieu, which had been prepared by the Germans for a similar purpose but never used.

In all these social activities the detachment and particularly the Commanding Officer, played an important role. The task of coordinating the Civil and Military and Naval authorities and ensuring that the pride and susceptibility of all parties were safeguarded was not a light undertaking.

On July 15 M. d'Astière [de la Vifierie d'Astier], the Minister of the Interior paid a formal visit to the city and the Commanding Officer and Deputy attended a ceremony in the Hôtel-de-Ville welcoming this important minister.

On the 29th July the Commanding Officer and deputy were invited to the Prefecture Maritime to meet the Minister de la Marine, M. [Louis] Jacquinot. They were most cordially received and discussed general matters of interest at some length. With the open recognition of the Provisional Government of France by President Roosevelt, much of the hesitance and delay in many matters was removed.

In Public Health, an important event was the turning over of the Pasteur Hospital to the French civil authority. The hospital had been occupied by the Germans exclusively during their occupation. In addition a number of beds were reserved for the French at the Maritime Hospital. The opening of the Pasteur was commemorated in a very pleasant social ceremony on July 21st at which the C.O. and deputy, health, and relief officers of the detachment attended. The city's health was generally good, no epidemics were reported.

In the first few days of August the cantons of Beaumont-Hague, Octeville and St. Pierre-Eglise were handed over to the detachment so that the three "D" detachments concerned could be relieved. An officer and an enlisted man were sent to each place and within a fortnight it was found possible to close these offices entirely.

#### *Functional Work*

Detachment A1A1 was organized into twelve specialty sections. These served as a sort of Special Staff to the commanding officer, but they were also operational. The twelve sections for the Cherbourg operations were: Supply,

Civil Defense, Public Safety, Public Health, Public Utilities, Public Works, Finance, Legal, Relief, Economics and Labor, Communications and Transportation. Some of these sections had strictly Civil Affairs duties such as Relief. Others, such as Supply, had also military duties connected with the normal functioning of the detachment. Thus, the officer in charge of Supply was also S-4. Most officers actually wore two hats, one connected with the work of the detachment, the other representing a military function in the normal life of the detachment.

In accordance with policy set down for operations in France by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, civil administration was left to the French themselves. At the same time the Civil Affairs detachment kept close tabs on the workings of the civilian authorities, for further SHAEF directive ordered: "If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such executive action as the security of the Allied Forces or the success of the military operations may require is authorized."

The Civil Affairs officers and enlisted men took a direct part in several civilian functions that became quite important directly for the success of military operations, such as billeting and recruitment of civilian labor. But even in these Civil Affairs detachment was able to remain in the background officially.

The Legal Section, on its arrival in Cherbourg, found the courts closed and the officials gone. An immediate search brought forth a temporary Juge de Paix, the Procureur de la République and the Juge d'Instruction. Archives, furniture and lawbooks of the several courts were brought back from Valognes. The officers of the Tribunal Militaire were sworn in on 6 July, and two days later the first spy case in liberated France was heard, with life imprisonment at hard labor the eventual fate of the two defendants. The Tribunal d'Arrondissement opened on 7 July and the Conseil de Prud'homme on 26 July, giving Cherbourg a full legal organization.

In addition to getting civilian courts running, the legal Civil Affairs officers advised military officials in the city of the legal implications of various acts. On the basis of their experience in Cherbourg they recommended that higher Civil Affairs headquarters give supplementary information on the French laws of requisition and booty, and that unit commanders receive directives and explanations of policy dealing particularly with real and personal property.

The Cherbourg railway system, put in running order within two weeks after the capture of the city, was used overwhelmingly by the military

for port clearance. However, following requests from civilians to be permitted to travel on the road, an agreement was reached between Second Military Railway Service and Civil Affairs transportation officers whereby all requests for civilian travel were passed upon by Civil Affairs headquarters.

Electrical power was limited by a shortage of coal. More important, military traffic was heavy on the streets where the street car tracks existed, and military officials were loath to permit any potential interference by street cars. Civil Affairs officers did contend, though, that resumption of street car service would benefit the working population that came in from the outskirts of Cherbourg to work in and about the port. Similarly, no attempt was made to revive the motor bus service that formerly connected Cherbourg with the neighboring peninsula district because of the ban on civilian travel beyond six kilometers and the conservation of fuel.

A census of all civilian motor vehicles in Cherbourg was immediately directed by Civil Affairs headquarters to be undertaken by the Service de Répartition de Fret, an organization set up for that specific purpose within the Ponts et Chaussées. This organization eventually took care of the entire motor problem, distributing permits to circulate, receiving demands for transportation, coordinating and arranging loads, distributing fuel, controlling a vehicle pool, and allocating vehicles for the use of essential services such as the Ravitaillement Général, Civil Defense, and the First Service.

As of 1 August, 450 pleasure vehicles had sought registration permits to circulate in the entire Manche district, along with 218 light trucks, 111 heavy trucks, and 18 passenger buses. Of these vehicles, 75.4 per cent used gasoline, 19.8 per cent produced gas, 2.6 per cent alcohol, and 2.2 per cent diesel fuel. In the main it was the pleasure cars that burned gasoline. Discovery of a large number of vehicles abandoned by the Todt Organization and then looted of wheels, tires, and other parts, prompted Lt. Colonel Edward J. Gully to recommend that in the future all abandoned vehicles be removed to a civilian pool as soon as possible.

Major Shepherd, fiscal officer for the detachment, was joined 29 June by Captain Thorndike, and the two jointly shared the job of getting Cherbourg's financial affairs in order. In the city were found a branch office of the Banque de France, branch offices of four of the principal Paris banks, a branch office of a provincial bank, the head office of a Banque Populaire, and a

large savings bank. Separation from head offices still in German-held cities in some cases hampered efforts to resume banking operations, but by the end of July only one bank was not operating completely normal and even that one was open several days each week.

The local office of the Banque de France, which along with the largest commercial bank in the city, had been the only banking houses in Cherbourg to remain open during the occupation, had on hand 100,000,000 francs. Another equal sum had been placed for safe-keeping in the vaults of a Valognes bank that had been demolished by air attack during the battle for the peninsula. A detail of German prisoners-of-war, guarded by French gendarmes, searched through the debris for three days and recovered this currency, which was brought back to Cherbourg. These assets served to provide sufficient currency for all early business purposes in the city. Postal officials borrowed enough money to handle money orders, while the Banque de France resources were also tapped to permit a special relief payment of 750 francs to all whose jobs had been lost in one way or another because of hostilities and who were unable to find work for a three week period. The Recette des Finances, the national government finance office, also made funds available to the Caisse Départementale des Assurances Sociales so that social-insurance benefits could start on 17 July.

Re-establishment of communications in Cherbourg involved a special problem of international relations during time of war, with some of the French unable to understand why Americans who come in as liberators occasionally imposed more rigorous restrictions than had the German oppressors. Sometimes they failed to realize the difference between the relatively peaceful occupation by the Germans and the intensive work of the Americans necessary in establishing a huge supply base.

Although the local phone system, on which the Germans had permitted 1,000 civilian lines, was found in good shape on arrival of the Americans, the Signal Corps froze all telephones. On 16 July the Signal Corps announced its intention of taking over the local switchboard at the Place Divette, but gave permission for installation of a smaller board of 100 lines for civilian use. A week later installation of a second 100 lines was authorized. Captain Alan H. Westervelt, who handled communications affairs for Civil Affairs, pointing out that all phone communication in the northern part of the Cotentin Peninsula depended upon a service at Cherbourg, recom-

mended on the basis of his experience that communications problems be treated on area-wide basis. He suggested that in the future at least 10 per cent of local telephone facilities be reserved for civilian use.

During the first week after the fall of Cherbourg, military officials authorized reopening of local postal service for postcards and unsealed letters, including Cherbourg and its suburban area. However, the difficulty of postage stamps interfered and postal service did not start until 18 July. Permission to extend the service down the Cotentin Peninsula to Isigny on the east and to La Haye-du-Puits on the west was granted 24 July, although it was restricted to official correspondence of the French Government at first.

Public Safety activities in Cherbourg and surrounding area kept many of the detachment officers busy. The city and metropolitan area of Cherbourg with a total normal population of 80,000 was policed by four separate police bodies, each functioning independently, the Police Surete Nationale, the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Gendarmerie Maritime, and the Renseignements Généraux.

The detachment entered the town at approximately 1400 hrs. 27th June 1944. Apart from incidental shooting by isolated enemy troops fighting had ceased.

The town itself was not badly damaged, but most of the houses, shops, etc., had been broken open—many by the few remaining French for the purpose of looting—others by the fighting troops during the processing of cleaning up.

Apparently on the 23rd June 1944 the Germans published a proclamation ordering the civilian population to evacuate the town, nominating the routes Cherbourg-Briquebec and Cherbourg-Les Pieux as those to be used.

Most of the inhabitants left the town and the civil police were used to shepherd the evacuees along the roads. It is estimated about 2,000 civilians did not obey the order and remained in the town; these took shelter in the cellars of their houses, shelters, etc.

From the inquiries made it is quite definite that immediately the Germans surrendered a large number of the inhabitants started on a systematic looting of premises, both those formerly occupied by Germans and those of evacuated French families; quite a large amount of the huge stocks of German liquor stored in the town found its way into civilian hands and the remaining civil police did not effectively interfere.

In connection with the capture of the town, an official ceremony was arranged for 1600 hours,

and it was following this ceremony contact was made with the four chief officers of the police bodies and the following proclamations submitted to the mayor for his signature:

1. Curfew—between 2200 hours and 0500 hours
2. Blackout
3. Surrender of firearms
4. Surrender of pigeons
5. Prohibiting carrying of cameras, binoculars, etc.
6. General Eisenhower Proclamation

No Proclamation restricting travel had been received, so arrangements were made for a supply to be printed locally. These were posted later.

Prior briefing proved to be invaluable as far as details regarding the town was concerned. It is suggested that directives affecting sections should be collated and issued sectionally. Many Public Safety Directives were contained on one copy of a communication affecting three or four sections. Detachments should also be supplied with a form setting out various heads under which information is required. This would considerably simplify the submitting of information and returns.

A conference was held with C.I.C. prior to entering the town. Vulnerable points to be guarded were selected and request sent to military commander to provide personnel.

In respect of large towns, the following suggestion is submitted for consideration:

Civil Affairs Public Safety Officers, Provost Marshal, and C.I.C. should operate as a team with joint prior briefing, and the team should be retained in the town for a reasonable period. In Cherbourg the Provost changed repeatedly, with the result there was a consequent lack of coordination. The C.I.C. team remained static with the result coordination and cooperation have been excellent.

One of the major problems was the removal of property, particularly furniture, by both French civilians and members of the Allied Forces. This occurred in respect of premises occupied by Germans and French alike. Large scale removals were carried out by units of the Allied Forces without requisition and it did cause considerable unfavorable comment from the French.

At request of Civil Affairs, an order was issued by the military commander prohibiting the removal of any property without written authority.

It is suggested that in all cases immediately a town is occupied an order should be issued prohibiting any removal without written authority. Such order also to be applied to civil population

(through mayor). The authority for removal in respect of military should be given by the requisitioning officer and for civilians by the mayor.

For the first 14 days, at the request of the military commander, all billeting was handled by Civil Affairs Public Safety. This proved to be a big problem, particularly as practically no records were available at the Mairie. Troops poured into the town and there was no time to complete a census of available accommodations. Nor did any French machinery exist to carry out such a census.

The Public Safety team obtained details of the masonry of buildings previously occupied by the Germans and units who made application to Civil Affairs were accommodated. Many units, however, occupied premises without reference to Civil Affairs or anyone, with the result in many cases the houses of French families were wrongly taken over. This necessitated the units concerned making a change of billets which they could have avoided had they contacted Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs can undoubtedly render great assistance to any billeting officer and where no military billeting machinery is available, they can effectively handle it.

In Cherbourg considerable quantities of valuable material left by the Germans was found. It is impossible to make a complete collection of all such property in the early days. It is, therefore, suggested that an order be issued to all military personnel requesting details of any property found in premises to be forwarded to a central authority. This could be Civil Affairs, who would be responsible for collating a list. Military personnel desiring material for urgent work would then be directed to inquire at the Clearing House to see if such items were available in the town. Copies of the town lists could be forwarded to a Regional Clearing House, thus collecting details of available property in the whole area.

Only one senior police officer was removed from office, the officer being the Chief of the Gendarmerie Maritime. His removal was effected entirely by the French. Civil Affairs was never officially informed of his removal, although it was widely rumored in the town he was to be removed a week before definite action was taken. It is considered that it would have been the proper course for Civil Affairs to have been notified of the removal.

Very few instances of hair-cutting of collaborationists occurred in the area, the police being asked to take active steps to prevent this type of primitive punishment. One heard plenty of expressions by the French people that some sort of punishment should be given to the large number of women who lived on intimate terms with the

Germans, and they were quick to note that the same women were soon on intimate terms with the Allied services. On the whole, however, this situation was accepted philosophically, the French summing it up with the expression "La femme est internationale."

Under the French law, brothels are licensed by the police, the girls being subject to a weekly inspection by a medical officer. In addition licenses are issued to girls who carry on prostitution outside the brothels. It will thus be readily seen that although one might have four licensed brothels, there can legally be many others with individual prostitutes. All the licensed prostitutes are subjected to a weekly medical examination. The brothels were immediately placed "off limits" to Allied troops.

A proclamation restricting the civil population to six kilometer limit from Cherbourg was issued. Great difficulties were experienced in effectively enforcing this, chiefly on account of the numerous roads and by-lanes leading from the town.

Six joint control points with military and civil police were established on main roads leading into the town. These functioned with varying degrees of effectiveness, lack of police personnel in the country districts being one big disadvantage.

Military drivers were the chief cause for breaches of travel restrictions being responsible for bringing civilians into the town without permits. An order, actively enforced by military police forbidding the picking up of civilians not in possession of a travel permit, would have solved most of the problems.

In order to enforce the order, spot check points were set up in the busy parts of the city, the location and time being varied daily. These checks proved to be the most effective means of picking up undesirable visitors to the town. Any detained were not released until cleared by C.I.C.

The most practical and effective movement control check undoubtedly is for Control Points to be established on all main roads to town at approximately 6 kilometers from the boundary. Mobile patrols working between the control points outside should definitely be joint military and civil.

Permits to travel, etc., were made out and vetted by the civil police, all applications being made to them. The forms were then submitted to Civil Affairs Public Safety, who signed them after consultation with C.I.C. Signed forms were then returned to the police for issue to the person concerned. This method proved to be the most satisfactory as it avoided large numbers collecting at the Civil Affairs Office and made the issue and refusal appear to be primarily a French concern.

Certain prohibited areas, such as the arsenal and military installations, were established. Difficulty was then experienced by essential civilian workers, such as electricity employees, etc., in obtaining entry. In consultation with the military commander and Provost a "pass" was prepared by Civil Affairs and issued to all employees, who had been checked by C.I.C. and local police.

A military traffic scheme was instituted by the Provost without any consultation with Civil Affairs or the Civil authorities, with the result that signs indicating One Way Streets were erected in English only, in many instances in the opposite direction to an existing French One Way sign. M.P.'s were surprised and indignant that the French were not conforming to the military traffic system.

As is obviously important, the French civil authority must be consulted on traffic schemes and signs should be erected in French and English and continental traffic signs used as far as possible.

Immediately after the Germans left the district there seemed to be no shortage of petrol amongst the French civilians. Everyone who possessed a car was soon on the road with it. Undoubtedly the petrol had been left behind by the Germans and quickly appropriated by the French.

A vehicle permit was instituted in Cherbourg, but it is essential effectively to control motor transport for a regional permit to be issued.

It is essential in all areas to effect an immediate round up of all aliens with C.I.C. and civil police. Cherbourg being a center of the Todt Organization had large numbers of aliens and the problem of rounding them up was not an easy one, particularly as military units were anxious to employ many of them and did, in fact, employ them.

It is a fairly simple matter to collect the alien population of an area but once collected there must be some clear-cut policy and method of dealing with them.

In Cherbourg all persons detained were taken to a pound where they were screened by the C.I.C. in conjunction with the French military security police.

Certain classes were released but the majority were passed on to other camps, which had been set up.

The machinery for the registration of the civilian population was set up in Cherbourg shortly after occupation, but in view of the large number of evacuees returning to the city daily, it was decided advisable to delay this until the registration of the whole Department could be effected. Arrangements were made to effect the

registration in conjunction with the next issue of Food Ration Cards.

Great difficulty was experienced in dealing with persons who offended against the proclamation, curfew, travel, etc., particularly travel. Proclamations were issued by individual mayors. Thus a person arriving in Cherbourg from, say, Valognes violated the proclamation of Valognes and could not be dealt with in Cherbourg. The proclamation, as printed, did not provide a penalty and it is doubtful if there was any power to deal with offenders. This was the view of the French Administration. This matter was eventually put right by a regional proclamation from the regional commissioner. A further proclamation was made empowering the police to fine offenders on the spot. While not being in favor of this system of dealing with offenders, it was certainly the answer as far as Cherbourg was concerned. The fine was fixed at 15 francs. This system helped considerably in preventing undue breaches and was a speedy way of dealing with offenders.

The order on possession of arms was rigidly enforced. No person was allowed to possess arms unless a member of the Armed Forces or Uniformed Police. The carrying of arms by the Resistance group was stopped, and a percentage of the group, after checking, were enrolled in the Police Sûreté. They proved to be very satisfactory. There were no incidents of disturbances among the civil population.

In Cherbourg, Public Safety was fortunate in obtaining the services of a Gendarme sergeant, who spoke English fluently. He was thus able to act as liaison officer: his services were invaluable. All letters, reports, statements, etc., coming from the French were written in French only. Therefore, in order to pass copies to the various military departments concerned, chiefly the Provost Branch, it was necessary to have them translated: as the complaints were numerous, this proved a problem. The average French person who speaks English and is a good interpreter is not a good translator and difficulty was experienced in this direction.

All important buildings in the town were carefully checked by the engineers for booby traps, time bombs, etc., but nothing was found. There was no indication that the Germans left any booby traps in the city.

There was one prison in Cherbourg. At the time of occupation it housed 66 prisoners, the French estimation of the capacity being 100. Arrests continued to be made and the persons were put into the same prison with the result

at one time it was found to contain 168; a bad case of overcrowding and considerable lack of staff. The matter was taken up with the French officials and eventually the Naval authorities agreed to release the maritime prison for civilian use. This new prison provided facilities for segregation of prisoners and a far more humane standard of accommodation.

Under German occupation the black market flourished but following the Allied occupation prices dropped and, apart from some trafficking in clothing, there were no black market transactions which seriously affected the economic life of the community.

#### *Conclusion:*

In conclusion the work of the detachment may be summarized as follows:

The civil authorities and inhabitants of Cherbourg were in a state of confusion and bewilderment following the battle. The detachment gave them a feeling of security and a sense of direction. In the technical field they brought to bear their individual ability and qualifications to overcome the difficulties consequent on the damage created by battle and the German occupation.

They immediately brought about law and order and reorganized the essential services. The detachment acted as a buffer between civilians and the army ensuring that the former had a fair deal and also that the army secured whatever was essential for the military effort.

The diplomatic handling of problems which affected all branches of the civilian organization and the military, both U.S. and French, was a

major part of their duties and was carried through to the satisfaction of all parties—no mean feat in the uncertain political situation which at first prevailed.

All the city officials gave the greatest co-operation possible and the main problem involved co-ordination with the military. The Germans had occupied the city under peaceful conditions and our occupation was under quite different circumstances.

All these differences were quite obvious to the great majority of thinking French people. The comparison however with the German occupation was always an ever present fact which the detachment had to bear in mind in all its dealings. However, it is sufficient proof of the detachment's ability to state that when the time came for them to hand over their work, genuine regret and even concern was expressed by all leading civilian and military authorities. They all felt they had lost a friend.

Throughout, the work of the French Liaison officers was beyond praise—they filled a most important role as liaison with the civilian officials and were indispensable, particularly in matters requiring diplomatic handling and delicate negotiation.

Finally the joint American and British mixture was an unqualified success—all worked together harmoniously regardless of rank and nationality.

The overall SHAEF and lower echelon planning before "D" Day was found accurate, helpful and entirely practical. The correctness of the Civil Affairs setup from a broad view was obvious.

## 4. PROSPECTIVE SUPPLY CRISIS IN PARIS IS PREPARED FOR

### A SUPPLY CRISIS IS ANTICIPATED

[G-5 Sec, 12th AGp, Narrative Report for the Month of August, 1944, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.16, Rcds Narrative Summary]

f. The period was one of continuous preparation, planning, and coordination of Civil Affairs activities for the establishment of law and order and the alleviation of the supply situation in Paris. When it became evident, about 10 August, that Paris would be liberated earlier than was contemplated under the 'OVERLORD' plan, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force established a stockpile of food and medical supplies for the relief of the city; and assigned to this Headquarters six specialists to assist in

preparing a relief plan for Paris. Such a plan was prepared and approved by the Army Group Commander. \* \* \*

### TRANSPORTATION WILL BE THE KEY

[Directive, SHAEF to CG, 12th AGp, 14 Aug 44<sup>6</sup>, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 202, 12th AGp, Opns and Policy, Jkt 2]

1. Serious problems will exist with respect to the feeding of the civilian population on the capture

<sup>6</sup> To implement this directive, the 12th Army Group issued detailed instructions to the First and Third Armies and the Communications Zone on 22 August 1944. The situation found to exist in Paris made it necessary to modify the plan.

of Paris. This is to summarize for you the initial arrangements which are being or have been made by this headquarters in the matter.

2. It is estimated that on our entry, the food stocks in the city of Paris will be practically negligible. Moreover, it is anticipated that, in order to avoid disease and unrest, it will be necessary to feed practically one hundred per cent of the population from stocks, either imported or brought by military transport into the Paris area from other liberated portions of France, such as Normandy and Brittany. The estimated population of the Paris area thus affected is 3,800,000. French authorities in London place it as high as 5,000,000. Emergency feeding should not fall below 1,200 calories.

3. Conversations have been taking place with the French authorities in London and their representatives, with the appropriate authority to act, are being sent to Normandy in the course of the next day or so; at the same time, officers from this headquarters, fully conversant with the problem, have been sent over to your headquarters to assist in all ways possible.

4. Briefly, the problem appears to be largely one of transportation of needed supplies. It is considered that in France today you have sufficient stocks to tide over the initial difficulties, particularly as it should not be necessary to distribute any material quantity of imported supplies in Normandy, and because of the indigenous food-stocks available in Brittany. However, as a precautionary measure, arrangements have been made to stockpile 10 days of Paris requirements of food and medical supplies near Southampton or Bristol so that they can be called forward by you if required. In addition, a certain portion has been so located as to be available for movement by air. This arrangement will be completed by 20 August. Details of the above have been forwarded to your Civil Affairs staff through Technical channels. . . .

5. a. From the information available at this headquarters, it appears that little assistance with transportation, except local distribution in Paris itself, can be expected from the French, owing to a complete lack of serviceable transportation resources.

b. There are in the United Kingdom at the present time approximately two thousand (2000) 15-cwt trucks, with one-ton trailers, which are being allocated to your forces. Arrangements are being made to have these trucks and trailers made ready for immediate shipment and are subject to your call.

c. In addition, approximately three hundred

(300) three-ton trucks are being made available to you for immediate shipment if needed.

d. Details of these arrangements have been forwarded to your Civil Affairs staff through technical channels.

6. The French are making arrangements to provide the necessary drivers for these trucks in France. Discussions are also taking place with regard to the conditions upon which you will turn the trucks over to the French, and you will be informed of these as early as possible. \* \* \*

#### THE PARIS PLAN OF THE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

[Directive, 12th AGp to First and Third Armies and ComZ, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 202, 12th AGp Opns and Policy, Jkt 3, app. 35, Paris Plng Program]

#### II. *The Problem.*

1. To provide for the emergency requirements of food and medical supplies for Paris and immediate vicinity, the total population being estimated at approximately 4,000,000.

2. The period of emergency is estimated at 45 days, and is divided into two phases:

a. The initial emergency phase: 10 days.

b. The secondary phase: 35 days.

During the initial phase, due to the expected disruption of civilian services and depletion of food stocks, the total burden for the supply of the population will be a military responsibility. During the secondary phase, indigenous supplies will become increasingly available to meet requirements, provided sufficient power and transport are available. By the end of the 45-day period, the French Central Government authority is expected to take over the entire responsibility of supplying the Paris region. \* \* \*

#### III. *Requirements.*

##### 1. *Supplies.*

a. On the basis of present information, it is assumed that the supply of food available in Paris at the moment of liberation will not last for more than 48 hours. The probable disruption resulting from military operations will prevent the normal flow to Paris of any substantial amounts of food during the first 10 days.

b. It is estimated that 2,400 tons of supplies per day will be required to maintain the prevailing ration scale during the first 10 days.

c. It is estimated an average of 1,000 tons per day will be required during the secondary phase of 35 days.

d. In the event initial surveys indicate that a net saving in transportation can be achieved by substituting coal for other supplies, this sub-

stitution will be accomplished within the over-all transportation estimates.

2. Transportation.

a. The fullest practicable use will be made of Civil Affairs transport as it becomes available. In the event that such transport has not been placed in service sufficiently in advance of the liberation of Paris, the estimated maximum motor transport requirements from military sources will be as follows:

(1) For stockpiling in forward areas, 56,000 tons to be moved 120 miles.

(2) For movement from forward stockpiles to Paris during initial emergency period of 10 days, 2,400 tons per day to be moved 100 miles.

(3) For movement from forward stockpiles to Paris during secondary period of 35 days, 1,000 tons per day to be moved 100 miles.

b. The above estimates do not allow for possible reduction of motor transport by use of rail and waterways facilities or movements by air.

IV. Resources.

1. Supplies.

a. Imported Supplies.

(1) At the present time, stockpiles of CA supplies available in the U.S. area amount to approximately 6,000 tons. It is expected that by 30 August this will have been brought to 10,000 tons, under normal movement schedule.

(2) A stockpile of 23,000 tons is now earmarked in a port in Southern England for CA supplies. It has been requested that this stockpile be moved to this shore, under an accelerated schedule, by 30 August.

(3) The DCCAO, 21 Army Group, states that in an emergency he can provide from Civil Affairs imported stocks in the British zone the following food supplies:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Net Tons</i>
Biscuits .....	170 (perhaps more)
Canned Meats ...	400
Lard .....	30
Pulses .....	650
Sugar .....	130
Chocolate .....	80
Milk .....	80
Wheat and Flour	1,000
Total .....	2,540

b. Indigenous Resources:

(1) The immediate vicinity of Paris produces substantial amounts of truck-gardening

supplies, which should begin to move into the city by local transport after the initial emergency period of 10 days.

(2) In addition, considerable resources in wheat, meat, potatoes, dairy products and vegetables will be available in the nearby regions and uncovered areas. Certain processing supplies, equipment and transport will be required to make these indigenous supplies available for the Paris region after the initial emergency phase.

(3) The above estimates covering indigenous resources are based on the assumption that the French central and regional authorities will discharge their responsibilities effectively.

2. Transportation.

a. CA Resources.

(1) 185 3-ton trucks (British type), originally allocated for fire-fighting, are available in the U.K. It has been requested that these be delivered to Communications Zone by 30 August.

(2) 1500 ¾-ton trucks and 1500 1-ton trailers have been allocated to the U.S. zone to be turned over to the French civil authorities for the transportation and distribution of CA supplies. These vehicles have been phased in at the rate of 160 per day beginning 25 Aug.

(3) 21 Army Group state that they can transfer to temporary use in the U.S. zone 250 3-ton lorries now on hand. Also 440 15-cwt trucks and 440 1-ton trailers that are to be delivered at an early date. They cannot furnish drivers. Also that excess beach capacity exists in the British area and 15,000 tons storage space in Caen.

(4) Preliminary arrangements have been made for the movement by air lift of 3,000 tons of CA supplies to Paris. It is anticipated that this air lift will proceed at the rate of 1,000 tons per day, and may begin on the second day following liberation.

(5) It is not anticipated that a substantial number of captured enemy vehicles can be efficiently utilized for the movement of CA supplies.

(6) On the basis of present information, no reliance may be placed on availability of local French vehicles for the movement of CA supplies during the emergency period.

V. Internal Distribution in Paris Area.

1. Supplies will be delivered to six central distribution points in Paris, to be determined after detailed study.

2. It is expected that the present organization of the Ravitaillement Général will insure distribution down to the consumer through the Arondissement systems and commercial channels.

3. The present ration cards will be continued in use until such time as it is possible to replace them with new coupons.

It is not planned to allow any immediate increase in the present official ration scale.

#### VI. *Public Health.*

1. Available information indicates that certain communicable diseases, especially diphtheria, typhoid and scarlet fever, will require strict control measures. Owing to the scarcity of soap, a high degree of louse infestation will probably be found, and skin diseases will be prevalent.

2. Minimum requirements to meet public health problems are included in the 10-day emergency reserve now stockpiled in the U.K. for Paris, amounting to 53 tons; and an additional 518 gross tons of medical supplies for the secondary period.

#### VII. *Public Safety.*

1. Primary responsibilities for Public Safety measures in Paris will be assumed by the French authorities.

2. Coordination has been initiated in order to insure that French authorities will:

a. Take necessary steps for maintenance of law and order in the Paris region.

b. Insure security of supplies in transit and at points of distribution within Paris.

#### VIII. *Paris CA Detachment.*

1. A reinforced detachment has been charged with CA operations in Paris. Adequate reinforcements will be provided to deal with problems of Displaced Persons, Fiscal matters, and other special problems.

#### IX. *Responsibilities.*

1. G-5, this Headquarters, will:

a. Arrange necessary coordination with French National Authorities prior to the liberation of Paris.

b. Provide suitable detachments and special-ist personnel for initial Civil Affairs operations in Paris.

2. The Commanding General, First Army, is charged with the initial conduct of Civil Affairs activities in Paris; and will effect the necessary coordination with the Commanding General, Communications Zone, to insure:

a. The provision of essential supplies for the civil population.

b. The transfer to the Communications Zone at the earliest practicable time of administrative and operational responsibility for Civil Affairs activities in Paris.

3. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, will:

a. Move necessary relief supplies to suitable distribution points in Paris.

b. Effect necessary coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 21 Army Group, and other interested headquarters and agencies, for the shipment of Civil Affairs relief supplies to Paris by sea, air, rail, and motor transport.

c. Coordinate and arrange the organization and operation of French Civil Motor Transport Units, including provision of uniforms, rations, and other necessary supplies while operating under U.S. military control.

d. Provide for the taking over of such Civil Affairs detachments and personnel as may have been detailed by the Commanding General, First Army, and made available for subsequent activities under the Communications Zone; and assure the arrival in Paris at the earliest practicable time of such additional Civil Affairs personnel and equipment as may be necessary for the effective conduct of Civil Affairs operations.

4. Any requirements which cannot be met from resources of the Communications Zone, or through coordination with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 21 Army Group, and other available sources, without jeopardizing the military effort, will be referred to the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, for decision as to whether the requirements will be fulfilled at the cost of the military effort.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS TO TAKE DIRECT ACTION ONLY IN EMERGENCIES

[Copy of Ltr, Gunn, ACofS, G-5, First Army, to ACofS, G-5, Hq V Corps, 24 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, FUSA, Hist Rpts, Jkt 2]

1. Inasmuch as Paris is the Capital of France and is a city particularly well organized for administration, the Civil Affairs responsibility for Paris is less than has been assumed previously.

2. General Koenig is to be the military Governor of the city and as such is responsible for the administration thereof. Your Detachment Commanding Officers may well be told that their services are at his disposal. They will also be told that they are not to take aggressive action except in immediate or striking emergency. They are to survey and report on Civil Affairs matters, particularly as it pertains to public safety and public welfare, food and medical supplies, to you. The Commanding Officers will be careful to place themselves in a condition so that they can function in an emergency and carry out their full

responsibilities. All of the action taken must be with an idea that the First Army and you will not retain responsibility for more than several days.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS TO ASSIST IN UTILIZATION OF INDIGENOUS RESOURCES

[Directive, Hq ComZ (Fwd), G-5 Sec, to CG's Normandy GS, Brittany Base Sec, ADSEC (ComZ), 24 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 202, 12th AGp, Opns and Policy, Jkt 2]

1. The French Government is responsible for the production, processing, collection and delivery of indigenous food products to Paris. It is their responsibility to see that farm products are harvested, transported to the flour mills, creameries, slaughterhouses, etc., for processing, thence, to collection points selected and maintained by them, and on into Paris in balanced, daily deliveries.

2. It is the responsibility of Civil Affairs to maintain liaison with French officials and to assist them in accomplishment of these objectives to the end that necessity for imports by Allied forces of food to feed Paris and transport needs, shall be reduced to a minimum.

## 5. PARIS IS LIBERATED

#### CONDITIONS IN PARIS UPON LIBERATION

[Ltr, Col Cornelius E. Ryan, G-5, 12th AGp to CofS, 12th AGp, 27 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 3604, Relief of Paris]

##### 1. General Situation:

a. City is scarcely damaged. Great enthusiasm over liberation. De Gaulle wildly acclaimed as he walked from Arc de Triomphe to Notre Dame on afternoon of 26 August. Effervescence of people could get out of hand if food situation should become more critical. Police forces seem insufficient to control populace in event of widespread disorder, although many can be seen, appearing well-disciplined and presenting neat appearance.

b. As de Gaulle reached Cathedral, bursts of fire came from snipers in areas. Sniping continues intermittently throughout city and FFI are shooting indiscriminately at snipers in most sections of city. If sniping is not soon checked, this may lead to indiscriminate reprisals.

c. Last organized German resistance ceased at 1430 hours on 25 August as remaining elements holding out in various public buildings surrendered. Great damage was caused by incendiaries during a light raid night 26-27 August.

3. Base Section Commanders will be responsible for assisting the French officials in the production, harvesting, processing, collecting and delivery of these indigenous food products for feeding Paris during the emergency period.

4. The producing areas whence these indigenous food supplies will come cover a large territory and are widely dispersed. Available transport and power facilities are drastically limited. It is imperative that the collection and distribution from all these areas of indigenous food be co-ordinated in order to get maximum deliveries at the right time and to reduce need of transport facilities.

5. Areas of responsibility of Civil Affairs should be enlarged to include specified areas so delineated that no hiatus area exist within the over-all jurisdiction. These detachments will be advised by G-5 of the respective commands of the scope, purpose and procedure of this plan and in all matters necessary for its successful accomplishment, and they and G-5 will keep the coordinating officer in their area fully advised at all times. \* \* \*

Industrial areas Southwest of City suffered greatly. Visit on the spot showed no adequate civil defense or fire fighting organization functioning.

d. Vichy incumbents in key central and municipal offices were removed on Saturday 19 August by FFI who seized control of city as bulk of German garrison was withdrawn. Personnel removed has been jailed pending trial and replaced by appointees of the Resistance, presumably approved by de Gaulle although some difficulty may well arise when Algiers groups arrive to take over functions of central government.

e. People seem in normal health and standard of dress is satisfactory. Individual cars in small number driven by officials; more cars in hands of FFI; some trucks on the streets. Thousands of bicycles being used by populace for private transport.

##### 2. Supply Situation:

a. High Officials, who appear competent and straightforward, submitted following information in the course of several conferences held with U.S. representatives:

(1) Flour in sufficient quantity to last through Monday, 28 August. Small arrivals from nearby areas. . . .

(2) Miscellaneous food supplies, including substitutes, are held in sufficient quantities to last about 7 days on present reduced ration scale.

(3) Some meat available and cattle being brought on hoof to the city.

b. Public Utilities and Services:

(1) Electricity. Enough coal is available to last 10 days with 90 minutes per day for general consumption and to provide minimum allotment for utilities (water system, sewage, telephone, hospitals, police). It is expected that by end of 10 day period, power lines to Southern hydraulic plants will be restored. If this is done, enough power will be brought to the city to provide minimum requirements as above, plus operation of subway to 60% capacity. Water system operates with coal at a rate of 210 tons per day and present reserve will last two months. Should lines not be in working condition in 10 days, daily supply of 500 tons diesel and 500 tons of coal will be required to operate on minimum basis as above (alternative 1300 tons of coal per day).

(2) Gas. None available and need is urgent as 80% of population cooks by gas. 25,000 tons of coke on hand. This can be used to manufacture gas if Diesel oil is supplied. To provide 1 hour of gas per day for one month, 25,000 tons of coke on hand plus 9000 tons of Diesel oil will suffice. Unless immediate relief is provided, gas mains will fast deteriorate and several weeks will be required to restore system to working order.

(3) Milling Facilities. Flour mill at Corbelli is undamaged and has a milling capacity of 700 tons per day.

(4) Coal. French officials emphasize that unless substantial supply of coal can be obtained from Northern mines, or from other sources, by one month from now, the entire situation with respect to coal must be seriously examined and immediate emergency measures adopted  
\* \* \*

LACK OF CLARITY AS TO COMMAND CHANNELS  
CAUSES FRICTION

[Interv With Col Howley, Det A1A1, 27 Feb 45, Concerning CA Activities Subsequent to Occupation of Paris, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.23, Hist Reds, Jkt 2]

Saturday morning, Brig. Gen. Pleas Rogers with Lt. Col. Robert [M.] Hamilton, his G-5, re-

mained in the lobby of the Hôtel Louvre, demanding that I report to them. Brig. Gen. Rogers was at some future date to assume command of Seine Base Section, ComZ. I spent those hours searching for billets, getting my men placed out of the street fighting. I went to the Hôtel Louvre at 2 o'clock. Gen. Rogers gave me a skinning and demanded that I assist him immediately in locating adequate quarters for himself and his staff. I explained that I had been busy in the exercise of my duty and that the handling of real estate was done by the Engineer Section. That I was empowered to take care of Civil Affairs needs because the Real Estate Section had not yet arrived.

The General accused me of looking out for only CA interests and demanded that I do the same for him. I explained that I could accept his direct orders only after I was released from V Corps. General Rogers would listen to none of this. I called Colonel [William J.] Morony, G-5 of V Corps, introduced him to Gen. Rogers, and said that Col. Morony was my boss and I would do what he said. Col. Morony suggested it would be all right to give Gen. Rogers a note of introduction to the Prefect of Police, who, it was assumed, could requisition buildings for the American Army. \* \* \*

It was my definite understanding that I was in command of 23 Civil Affairs Detachments, that we were to be responsible for Civil Affairs in Paris, as we had been in Cherbourg. It was my overall understanding that I would be responsible to some CG, who would have, as advisor, a G-5. But that the CG, though exercising general responsibility for Civil Affairs, would not actually participate in the Civil Affairs Operations themselves.

Gen. Rogers considered that he was responsible for actual Civil Affairs operations in Paris at all times. Relations between the CG of Seine Section and CA were continually strained because the CG felt that we were encroaching on his program. \* \* \*

The skinnings and misunderstandings grew out of a conflict in our instruction. Seine Section and all members of its Staff thought Civil Affairs responsible only for introducing them for first contacts; after that, they carried on their affairs direct. We believed it our duty to direct civil affairs for the benefit of the Military, in accordance with directives we had received. It was our belief, and it had proved correct in Cherbourg, that the CG to whom we were attached would be happy if the Civil problems were taken off his hands. We thought this would also prove true in Paris, where we assumed the chief interests

of ComZ would be getting petrol and food supplies up to our army. This apparently was not true. From the start, the CG called conferences with French authorities, particularly on food. The Provost Marshal contacted the police, not only on problems dealing with soldiers, but any police problem which interested him. \* \* \*

#### AFTER SOME WAITING CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS GO TO WORK

[Interv With Howley, 27 Feb 45]

\* \* \* Monday morning, all Special Sections were at Hq. The arrondissement Det's were out in their districts. The Section Heads were impatient. Everyone wanted to get to work. But we had received orders from Col. Gunn, G-5, 1st Army, that we were not to operate. We were to be like the American Regular Army in peace time, ready. And we were to operate only if requested to do so by General Koenig, French Military Governor of Paris.

In a place where street fighting was still taking place, where the French Govt. was still not completely organized or only partly organized on a local basis, in a city where everything pointed to the need for a Civil Affairs job, it seemed inconsistent that we should be sitting around with an organization of 136 officers and 220 EM, doing nothing. I talked with Col. La Roque, my senior French Liaison Officer, and asked him if Gen. Koenig knew we were doing nothing. He contacted Gen. Koenig and within a hour reported that Gen. Koenig said we were to operate as we operated at Cherbourg. The message was: "Tell Howley and his gang to get to work."

My staff and I were known to Gen. Koenig. We had already proved that we were not Military Government in disguise, that we were genuine Civil Affairs. We had specialists in utilities, police, finance, supply, and we were willing and able to help the French. Within 20 minutes of Gen. Koenig's request, all functions of Civil Affairs in Paris were in operation. We contacted French authorities, we asked how we could help, we gave professional advice where wanted, we stressed the great friendship between the Allies and the French. \* \* \*

#### GI'S BEAT UP FRENCH POLICE WHO TRY TO INTERFERE WITH BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES

[Interv With Howley, 27 Feb 45]

\* \* \* Plenty of black market operations were taking place in the city. At the foot of the Eiffel Tower, American troops were known to be selling American foods, gasoline, and other stuff to

French civilians. Such activities were growing in scope and spreading to the Arrondissements. The matter was reported by my Police Officer to the French police. They were reluctant to interfere with activities of American soldiers, perhaps because the few police who did interfere were beaten up. The matter was then reported to Seine Section and more MP's were brought in. Black marketing of American supplies was curtailed and forced underground. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS WORK THEMSELVES OUT OF A JOB

[Interv With Howley, 27 Feb 45]

\* \* \* The Police Section, under Major Palfrey, British, did a bang-up job. Most of the heads of the local police department, 22,800 men, were not professionals. M. Louize, the Prefect of Police had been Representative Governor of Corsica. He was a man of skill and ability, but he did not know the administrative details of running a large police force. He was so appreciative of our help that he placed one member of his force, a M. Roche, on permanent duty at our headquarters for liaison work.

Other special functions helped the French, depending upon the need. In the case of Legal, no aid was required. \* \* \*

Within a very short time (3 weeks), except for Supply, my Civil Affairs units were working themselves out of a job. This was entirely in accordance with our policy of letting the French do it. Some sections were doing little or no work except to report daily activities. Legal, Economics & Labor, Fiscal, Public Health, Utilities, Communication, and Transportation were marking time. \* \* \*

. . . The only thing we had to do in Paris was to bring in supplies. Even then they might have avoided starvation without our being there. \* \* \*

#### CIVILIAN SUPPLIES BEING BROUGHT INTO PARIS AT EXPENSE OF THE MILITARY EFFORT

[Ltr, Hq 12th AGp to SCAEF, 31 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 202, 12th AGp, Opns and Policy]

1. Preliminary planning for the relief of Paris has been under constant revision throughout the current operation in accordance with:
  - a. Intelligence reports received.
  - b. Experience in areas first uncovered.
  - c. Analyses of indigenous food supplies, transportation facilities, and civilian organization.
2. Advance planning culminated in an order to the major Headquarters concerned, issued by

the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, 22 August 1944. . . .

3. The plan referred to above was put into operation immediately following the liberation of Paris, and is being carried out, at the present time, with modifications in accordance with the situation as found to exist in Paris. A copy of a report on conditions in Paris to the Chief of Staff, Twelfth Army Group, dated 27 August 1944, is attached hereto [see above].

4. The situation with respect to the delivery and disposition of relief supplies to the civilian population of Paris is as follows:

Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, has authorized the import of 2400 tons per day of Civil Affairs supplies into Paris. 1500 tons daily of this are authorized at the expense of the military effort. The 1500 tons are now being loaded in the Communications Zone, and first delivery of that amount from the U.S. zone should be made on Friday, 1 September. Meanwhile, the British are delivering approximately 500 tons per day, and the U.S. supplies landed at the Orleans Airport are being transported to Paris by military convoy at the rate of 500 tons per day. French civilian vehicles have started deliveries of indigenous resources to Paris. It is estimated that deliveries on Tuesday and Wednesday, 29 and 30 August, will amount to 500 tons per day. Efforts are being directed to expediting the movement of French indigenous resources and captured German supplies (released for Civil Affairs use) to Paris. 12 U.S. officers, Agricultural Specialists, have been assigned from a Specialist Pool to the job of assisting local French authorities in locating and arranging transportation to Paris for these supplies. These officers are working under the supervision and co-ordination of Communications Zone Agricultural Specialists. . . . It is estimated that on Monday, 28 August, 900 tons of Civil Affairs supplies and 500 tons of indigenous supplies were delivered, and on Tuesday 1000 tons of Civil Affairs supplies and 500 tons of indigenous supplies.

## 6. TROOP SPENDING RAISES QUESTION OF ANTI-INFLATIONARY MEASURES

### THE FRENCH SEEK CO-OPERATION IN AN ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM

[*Aide-mémoire*, 12 May 44, Dealing With High Pay of American Troops, inclosed in Ltr, Monnet to McCloy, 12 May 44, CAD files, 112.4 (3-13-43)(1)]

The French authorities in North Africa have on several occasions . . . pointed out that it was

### FOOD CRISIS IN PARIS OVERCOME

[SHAEF G-5 (Fwd), Rpt to Hq, SHAEF, G-5, 3 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 3604, Relief of Paris]

1. Food situation in Paris believed past critical stage due largely to the success of the French in bringing in indigenous supplies. Average daily indigenous supplies brought in by French now averaging approximately 1800 tons daily, as follows: wheat 900 tons, potatoes 200 tons, cabbages 300 tons, meat 100 tons, cheese, butter, eggs, vegetables and fruit 300 tons, milk 80,000 litres.

Daily improvements being shown in most of the above classifications, with 2500 tons of potatoes reported having reached Chartres from Rennes on the railroads yesterday. All CA foods unloaded in Paris to midnight 1 Sept; 2800 tons from 21 Army Group; 1400 tons from Airlift; 88 tons miscellaneous. In addition, the first group of 50¾-ton trucks with 1 ton trailers arrived in Paris from beaches with food, others reported on way. \* \* \*

### PARIS PLACED UNDER SEINE SECTION COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

[Ltr, 12th AGp to First, Third, and Ninth U.S. Armies, 8 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 202, Hist Rcds, 12th AGp Opns and Policy]

For your information and guidance, the following letter, dated 28 August 1944, has been received from Headquarters, European Theater of Operations:

"1. Paris and environs has been designated by Supreme Headquarters as within the U.S. zone of operation.

"2. Effective 1200 hours, 28 August 1944, the Seine Section, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, is designated as the sole U.S. agency for administration of Paris and environs, in accordance with the terms of the agreement concluded between the French Committee of National Liberation and the United Kingdom and the United States on 25 August 1944. \* \* \*

important, both on psychological and economic grounds, that the troops should not make full and indiscriminate use of the very high purchasing power which the conversion of their pay into francs gave them in a country where most goods were in short supply.

The Allied Army will be confronted with the

same problems in France, but on a much larger scale and in a more acute way. . . . The American Government is fully aware of the extremely precarious state of the French economy at this time. Four years of occupation have stripped the country of most of the consumer goods; there are no stocks of any kind, the population is underfed, every commodity is in short supply. On the other hand, the pay of the American troops converted into francs is out of proportion with the standard wages in the country. The daily allowance of an American private converted into francs at the present rate of exchange is higher than the daily salary of a French skilled worker; but whereas the worker has to live on his salary, the American soldier gets free lodging, food and clothing from the army, and will therefore have at his disposal in France a very high purchasing power on a market where there are few goods to buy.

The consequence will inevitably be a rise in prices and an increase of black market operations. \* \* \*

The French Committee of National Liberation wishes, therefore, to draw the most serious attention of the War Department to this important matter and suggest for its consideration the advisability of taking the following measures:

1. The daily allowance convertible into francs should, during the first months of liberation, and until such time as supplies may then become available, be limited to as low a figure as possible;

2. Appropriate instructions should be given by the Commander in Chief to prevent individual buying of food products by the troops;

3. The American troops should not be allowed to bring into France American currency and use or exchange it for their own private purchases.

#### THE OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE BORE LITTLE RELATION TO ACTUAL VALUES

[The General Board, USFET, Study No. 34: Financial Plans and Operations of Civil Affairs and Military Government, pp. 6-7, OCMH files]

\* \* \* a. The decision to use special supplemental French Currency, equal in value to the French Metropolitan currency, and to fix rates of exchange favorable to France, was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, after collaboration with the State Departments of the countries concerned. The exchange rate of 49.5663 francs to the dollar or 200 francs to the pound sterling, which was announced prior to D Day, was an official rate only for the purpose

of exchanging dollar and sterling currency in the possession of troops and of fixing the troop pay scales in francs. This rate of exchange was favorable to France, and bore little relation to the actual relative values of the currencies, which under the circumstances could hardly have been accurately determined. If yellow seal dollars and British Military Authority notes had been used, it would have been necessary to have fixed rates of exchange which would have been official for all purposes. This would have given rise, from time to time, to pressures to change the rates as economic and other factors changed. Initially, the rate probably would have been nearer to 200-1 than 50-1, as established for military purposes. It was the opinion of many qualified observers in the field of economics that extreme inflation probably would have followed. Such inflation would have injured the French people, already suffering from the effects of four years of German occupation, and probably would have necessitated the closing of French banks and the declaration of a general moratorium, with consequent impediment to the Allied military operations. The wisdom of the policy adopted has been questioned mainly on the ground that Allied troops have not received full value for the money they have spent in France. Since personal expenditures by troops have been only for items which cannot be classed as essential and consistently have involved only a small fraction of their earned pay, the loss to them appears to have been of small moment compared to the undeniable advantages that accrued from the avoidance of inflation. Certainly this was true during the period of active military operations.

\* \* \*

#### MEASURES ARE TAKEN BY SHAEF TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE TROOP SPENDING

[Msg, Gen Holmes, SHAEF, to AGWAR, for Hilldring, 12 Jun 44, CAD files, 112.5 (3-13-43), sec. 1, CM-IN 9976]

We have given a great deal of study to the question of inflationary effects of spending of Allied Troops overseas and have formulated a considerable program on the matter. . . . Following quotation from memorandum on this problem gives essence of program undertaken:

1. Facilities in American Army for voluntary allotments, remittances, savings deposits, purchase of war bonds and insurance and at post exchanges, quartermaster stores etc., have resulted in U.S. Army personnel spending only small fraction of their pay in foreign theater in which they are. . . .

2. Special Services is planning to extend its recreational facilities for Army personnel and to facilitate the establishment of civilian concessionaires at army posts. Army exchange service is planning an extended service and will include extensive line of souvenirs, including souvenirs acquired in liberated areas. . .

3. A public relations and educational campaign is being conducted to make troops understand harmful effect of their spending on economy of countries which we are liberating and the desirability of their saving money for post-war activities.

4. Orders have been issued by SHAEF prohibiting troops from making any local purchases for individual use (including food in restaurants). . . .

6. In view of the rate of exchange which has been fixed for French franc, prices in France are likely to be comparatively high and this together with the shortage of goods will discourage purchase by Army personnel. \* \* \*

#### NO WITHHOLDING OF PAY TO PREVENT INFLATION [Ltr, Hilldring to Holmes, 25 Jun 44, G-5, SHAEF files, Hist Reds, 113.04]

The report on SCAEF's program to limit the inflationary effect of military operations, sent with your letter of 8 June 1944, reflects that a fine job is being done.<sup>7</sup>

In fact, your consideration of the problems involved is so thorough that we can add nothing new to your program. However, it may be that the War Department can give you some assistance in its implementation.

If you have not already done so I suggest that full information regarding these plans be made available through Headquarters, SCAEF, to the French authorities with whom contact is maintained. This is most important from two angles, the first being that no anti-inflationary program can succeed without full cooperation between the troops and the indigenous authorities. Secondly, there is bound to be some inflation during our occupation, and we should make as clear a record as possible to prevent later claims by the French or by others that inflation is brought on solely by the troops' spending and that we have failed to take all proper steps to prevent inflation.

The request of the French that we limit the amount of pay given to troops is not possible to grant, not only because it would affect adversely

the morale of troops, but also because it would be unlawful. In order to clarify this point we requested a legal opinion from the Judge Advocate General, who has advised us that compulsory withholding of soldiers' pay under the circumstances cited would be in violation of federal law. \* \* \*

#### ALLIED TROOPS DID NOT AGGRAVATE INFLATION IN THE INITIAL STAGES

[Ltr, Holmes, DACoFS, G-5, SHAEF, to Hilldring, 15 Aug 44, CAD files, 014 (3-8-43(1), sec. 5)]

We have been able to ascertain the facts regarding the monetary and economic situation in liberated Normandy. . . .

. . . All evidence points in the direction that fears which may have been expressed by French authorities of inflation being augmented by the presence of large numbers of Allied troops whose purchasing power could not be sufficiently controlled, is not supported by the facts found in the region itself. . . .

Insofar as fiscal matters are concerned, the impact of the Allied invasion on the French economy has been well controlled. . . . The plans prepared have been well implemented and the regulations or orders issued have been observed in such a manner as to reflect credit upon Allied Forces in the area.

The facts found lead to these inescapable conclusions:

a. Expenditures of Allied Forces and individual troops have been relatively small, and have not contributed to inflation.

b. Plans to encourage savings have been successful. . . .

c. The tendency of prices, both legal maximum and actual prices, has been notably downward since liberation.

d. Black markets have ceased to exist in all commodities except a very few. . . . Such black markets as continue to exist (e.g. tobacco, coffee, gasoline, and sugar) are not patronized by and are not due to the presence of Allied Forces. \* \* \*

#### THE AMERICAN SOLDIER FEELS HE IS BEING CHEATED

[Extract from Memo, Chief Finance Branch, 31 Dec 44, Attachment to Memo From Lt Col Hilliard to Hilldring, 12 Jan 45, CAD files, 123.7(12-19-44), sec. 2]

\* \* \* A general feeling exists that military personnel, particularly those stationed in Paris or those utilizing Paris as a "leave center," are the victims of extreme financial injustice because

<sup>7</sup> The report was prepared by the Financial Branch, G-5 Division, SHAEF, on 3 June 1944, copy of which may be found in file cited above.

of the franc rate of exchange. This considered to be the result of:

a. The prices charged for alcoholic beverages and luxury items.

b. Soldiers who do not know the country often go to places that are normally much more expensive than they could frequent at home.

c. The knowledge that illegal or black market transactions in foreign exchanges are being effected at rates far more advantageous to the holder of dollars/sterling than the official rates.

d. Too much ill considered publicity concerning the rate.

e. The feeling of a portion of the military that it has "liberated" France and has "something coming" as a result.

f. The high prices of merchandise in shop windows which leaves an *impression* even though the items are not desired by the observer or can not be legally purchased.

g. Stories about cheap prices in France before the war.

h. The observing of heavy spending in public places, such as night clubs, by French civilians which can not be matched by military personnel. \* \* \*

#### A MOUNTING TIDE OF PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTS THE SOLDIER'S VIEWS

[Memo, Somervell to CofS, sub: Effect of Present French Franc Exchange Rate on Troop Morale, 6 Apr 45, CAD files, 112.5 (3-13-43)(1), sec. 2]

1. The complaints of American soldiers serving in France relative to adverse effect upon local purchasing power of official rate of exchange at which their unallotted pay is disbursed in French francs, have shown an intensity which cannot be disregarded by the War Department, which have won strong Congressional support and which, on the grounds of troop morale, as well as of public relations, demand that positive measures should be initiated by the War Department with a view to alleviating the cause of such complaints.

2. The fundamental basis of soldiers' complaints is that the exchange rate of approximately fifty (50) francs to the dollar used in payroll conversions is grossly out of line, both with the relative internal purchasing power of the franc, and with rates paid for dollars on currency black markets which have ranged from one hundred twenty-five (125) to two hundred twenty-five (225) francs to the dollar. . . .

3. In the financial planning of cross-channel invasion operations it was considered by the

United States and British governments that the ultimate responsibility for fixing rates of exchange for the metropolitan French franc rested with the French Committee of National Liberation. The Committee advised the Allied governments that it desired to maintain the same rates which had been set for the franc in French North Africa at the Casablanca Conference with the approval of the President and the British Prime Minister. It was agreed by the Allied authorities, prior to D Day, to use the rates desired by the French Committee of two hundred (200) francs to the pound, and forty-nine point five six six three (49,5663) francs to the dollar (based on the sterling-dollar rate of £1=\$4.035. . . .

4. All available evidence indicates that in terms of its relative internal purchasing power the French franc is highly overvalued at the present official rate of exchange . . . the present rates . . . represent a devaluation of only about twelve and one-half (12½) per cent. On the other hand, . . . the indications are that the present internal purchasing power of the franc has declined on the average of something like seventy per cent. . . .

6. Since it is our soldiers in France who are chiefly affected by the present dollar-franc rate of exchange, the War Department has a primary concern in initiating action designed to afford a measure of relief. \* \* \*

#### THE FRENCH AGREE ON A PROGRAM TO AFFORD THE SOLDIER RELIEF FROM THE UNFAVORABLE RATE OF EXCHANGE

[Paraphrase of State Dept Msg, 18 May 45, signed Grew, CAD files, 112.5 (3-13-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 20114]

When Plevin was here he talked with officers of the War and Treasury Departments about questions touching the welfare of U.S. troops in France, especially the trouble created by the unfavorable franc-dollar exchange rate. They in principle agreed upon a plan aimed at furnishing more entertainment facilities and non-rationed commodities for the troops at special terms. Col. Carl Pforzheimer, a delegate of the War Department, is going directly to Paris to consult with U.S. troops in France and the provisional Government so that an agreement may be put through for alleviating the situation which has caused numberless complaints by soldiers and which might produce considerable friction while the redeployment period continues if it is not solved. Colonel Pforzheimer intends to visit the Embassy after he gets to Paris and will tell you how his talks progress.

## 7. FCNL IS RECOGNIZED AS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND A ZONE OF THE INTERIOR IS CREATED

### SHAEF MISSION (FRANCE) IS ESTABLISHED

[Msg, SHAEF to CCS *et al.*, 15 Sep 44, SCAF 83, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01/5 SHAEF Mission, Fr, FS OUT-2495]

1. Advance elements of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Mission (France) now established Hotel Crillon, Place de la Concorde, Paris. Function of Mission is as follows:

A. To safeguard Supreme Commander's interests in France.

B. To represent Supreme Commander's requirements to *de facto* French authority.

C. To act as channel through which *de facto* French authority raises matters with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

D. To be the authorising agency for contact by all personnel of Allied Commands under this Headquarters with French authorities.

2. Head of Mission is Major General [John T.] Lewis (United States); Deputy Head Major General Redman (British).

### PROPOSAL TO CREATE A ZONE OF THE INTERIOR

[Ltr, Eisenhower to Gen of the French Army Juin, 13 Oct 44, SHAEF files, 371, Fr, vol. 1]

\* \* \* At the time when the agreements of 25th August were being negotiated, it was thought essential to make certain reservations to ensure the implementation of all measures, considered necessary by me, for the successful conduct of operations, since we could not foresee the conditions which would prevail in the liberated territories of France. However, thanks to the effectiveness of the French Administration, the powers reserved to the Supreme Commander in the Forward Zone have not been invoked.

The result has been that the Allied Expeditionary Force and the French National Authority have worked on the basis of the liberated portions of France being, in effect, a Zone of the Interior. As you know, the French Administration has, as soon as territory was liberated, begun to exercise its functions and has provided the Allied Expeditionary Force with military facilities as required.

Progressing, therefore, along the path of our close collaboration, I am of the opinion that the French Government should now declare formally

that a Zone of the Interior exists in an area of France, mutually agreed between us.<sup>8</sup> The area of the Zone of the Interior suggested in your letter should, it is thought, include all territory within the Eastern boundaries of the following departments: Seine-Inférieure, Oise, Seine-et-Marne, Yonne, Nièvre, Saône-et-Loire, Rhône (complete and including Lyon), Ardèche and Gard. The extent of this Zone will be increased as operations progress, early consideration is being given to the departments of Drôme, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rhône and Var.

There is, I believe, no need to draw up a detailed list of all these matters which our present working arrangement embraces. Indeed, we can ill afford the time which such a laborious work would entail. The continuance of our present degree of collaboration should obviate this formality.

To ensure the successful progress of operations, the facilities at present afforded to the Allied Expeditionary Force by the French must continue as was foreseen in the provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement. But as rapidly as military considerations permit, these facilities will be handed back for civil administration and use. \* \* \*

### EISENHOWER RECOMMENDS THAT THE DE GAULLE COMMITTEE BE RECOGNIZED AS THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT<sup>9</sup>

[Msg, Eisenhower to JCS, 20 Oct 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 19234]

From the military point of view the existence of a strong central authority in France is essential particularly in view of the difficult economic and supply situation which faces us this winter. The only French authority with whom we can deal is the present Council of Ministers and we urge that

<sup>8</sup> Creation of a Zone of the Interior had been provided for in Memorandum No. 1 of the CA agreement on France, 25 August 1944 (ch. XXIV, sec. 4, above).

<sup>9</sup> JCS on 17 October had asked General Eisenhower's advice as to the advisability of giving formal recognition to the De Gaulle committee. The opinion expressed in his reply of 20 October, which coincided with views already held in many European countries, was accepted in Washington and, on 23 October 1944, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and about five other nations recognized the French Provisional Government, headed by General de Gaulle.

every support be given to it including formal recognition as the provisional government of France.

It would be helpful if the announcement of American recognition could be made simultaneously with the announcement of the Zone of Interior. We anticipate the latter announcement will be made within a few days. . . .

#### A ZONE OF THE INTERIOR IS CREATED BUT THE CHANGE IS NOMINAL

[Msg, SHAEF to CCS, 21 Oct 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 19627]

1. Agreement is about to be reached with the *de facto* French national authorities for establishment of a zone of the interior in France. . . .

3. Practical effect of this development will be more nominal than actual. It will however enhance the prestige of the Provisional Government and will impress upon the French people that the facilities allowed to the Allied Expeditionary Forces are freely given as a part of the French war effort. Since French have already exercised a large degree of administrative control in liberated areas, we have not adopted the formal attitude provided for in the agreement of 25 August and are endeavoring to avoid invoking

the safeguards of Article 5 of that agreement so far as possible.<sup>10</sup>

4. Subsequent announcements will be made from time to time either extending the zone of the interior to the east or creating military zones within the present zones of interior, as for example, around the Bay of Biscay ports.

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, 22 Oct 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 21521]

Details of agreement with French authorities for establishment of the Zone of Interior . . . have been concluded and a decree prepared which will be signed and go into effect as soon as General de Gaulle returns to Paris, probably Monday, October 23, 1944. \* \* \*

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, 24 Oct 44, CCAC files, 014, Fr (9-21-43), sec. 2, CM-IN 22966]

General de Gaulle has signed decree establishing Zone of Interior. . . .

Decree is being published this morning.

<sup>10</sup> Article 5 of Memorandum No. 1 stated that ". . . certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance. . . . In such zones, the Supreme Allied Commander is given the right to take . . . all measures considered by him to be necessary for the conduct of operations. . . .

## CHAPTER XXVI

# The Tie-up With De Gaulle Pays Off in Southern France

No strategic commitment of the war caused such bitter and prolonged wrangling at high levels as the operations in southern France. The British and Americans exchanged their angriest words on the relative merits of a landing in southern France as opposed to some alternative employment of Allied forces. The debate continues in memoirs and reminiscences. To the historian who reviews the unfolding of the contemporary record and what has been written later, a certain irony appears in the fact that while this was the most controversial it was also the most successful large-scale amphibious assault of the war. In all probability criticism should be leveled less at the planning and landing aspects of the operation and more at the tactical decisions made by the invading forces once ashore.<sup>1</sup> From the civil affairs point of view the operation was distinctive in the amount of responsibility placed on officials of the liberated territory. The preceding chapter has indicated that in the SHAEF area control of civil affairs was indirect. In southern France they became so indirect as to resemble Allied administration only faintly.

Southern France was not invaded until 15 August 1944, about ten days before

SHAEF forces were liberating Paris. As mentioned in the chapter on planning, one of the difficulties met with during the planning phase was solved by the creation of the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Overhead) to direct civilian problems until responsibility passed to SHAEF. This regiment, whose commanding officer carried the title of Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Seventh Army, was set up according to the pattern common to the Mediterranean Theater. It included specific branches, regional teams, and detachments. The organizational pattern on D-day, together with certain changes in organization and supply procedure that took place early in the operation, appears in the opening documents. The first section of documents concerned with operations covers experiences and emergencies encountered in the first ten days. The advance progressed more rapidly and more smoothly than had been foreseen. Because of French help the planned civil affairs teams and detachments could be done away with rather soon. In their place liaison offices with from one to four officers were established at key geographical points where they served as clearinghouses for all civil affairs matters. The chief problem of CAHQ arose from the rapid liberation of large areas in which there was a food deficit. This necessitated speeding up the delivery of relief supplies.

<sup>1</sup> These matters will be treated in detail by Robert Ross Smith, *The Riviera to the Rhine*, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

The French were anxious to take over responsibility for civil administration in France and the Army was no less anxious to have them do so. On 12 September Civil Affairs Headquarters announced that "The policy of this Headquarters is solely to act as a liaison agency with the French Government, to learn its needs, and then to try to meet them within the bounds of military practicability. . . ." This statement is not to be taken to mean that Civil Affairs officers and men had little or nothing to do. Far from it. Later sections of the chapter deal with some of the continuing problems that were encountered after the initial impact of invasion. Practically all reports from the rapidly advancing units indicated that the most serious of these were shortages of transport, labor, and food. In this respect the south of France presented a sharp contrast to the situation in Normandy where there was a surplus of agricultural products. The south was largely dependent on imports from the north and west, and the destruction or confiscation of local transport facilities by the Germans had prevented both the preservation of food during the peak season and the shipment of surpluses to marketing areas. Various expedients were adopted to relieve the situation. The import of civilian supplies was speeded up, over five hundred trucks destined for the Middle East were diverted to France, and eventually southward moving military trains moved indigenous supplies down the Rhône valley. The American Army trucks were operated by two French "Groupes de Transport," which also made light repairs. Heavier maintenance was carried out in U.S. Army workshops.

The problem of dealing with the resistance in the south also presented a contrast to the situation in the north. In the north

the Germans had instituted a military administration and the resistance was concerned primarily with getting rid of Germans. In the south the Germans had exercised control through the Vichy regime. Hence the resistance was directed principally against collaborators and took on many of the ugly aspects of civil war. Old scores were paid off and political axes ground. The *Francs Tireurs Partisans Français* (FTPF), a Communist organization, along with the *Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur* (French Forces of the Interior) (FFI), arrested thousands of people and dealt out summary justice. In the department of Alpes-Maritimes, Communists were especially strong and in Marseille there was serious disorder. Allied civil affairs officers could do little but remonstrate with the French Military Mission. The French were ineffective also since they had neither arms nor transport. The situation improved somewhat after a French division was marched through Marseille. Eventually the Resistance forces were allowed either to join the army or return to their homes.

Dealing with the resistance was a problem primarily for the French but the extensive black market that rapidly sprang up was a U.S. Army problem. The black market was encountered in every theater of the war but it seems to have assumed unusual proportions in southern France. According to one source, an estimated 20 percent of the supplies landed at Marseille was stolen and sold by members of the armed forces and their followers; not only civil affairs supplies but also Army stocks were pilfered. At one point the theft of gasoline threatened to halt the Allied advance up the Rhône. The best efforts of military police and of the few public safety officers were inadequate to bring the situa-

tion under control for several weeks.

When the Sixth Army Group assumed command on 15 September 1944, the Regimental Commander, Col. Henry Parkman, Jr., in addition to his other duties, became Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, of the Army Group. Thus the original plan calling for all civil affairs responsi-

bilities to be vested in one officer became effective. SHAEF assumed responsibility for administration in southern France on 1 November and for supply on 20 November 1944. Control of shipping in the Mediterranean was still an Allied Force Headquarters responsibility.

## 1. STATUS OF CA ORGANIZATION ON D-DAY AND ENSUING CHANGES

### DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY GREATER IN DRAGOON THAN IN OVERLORD

[G-5, Sixth AGp, Hist Rpt, 19-31 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 504, 6th AGp Fld Rpts]

\* \* \* The basic differences between the SHAEF plan and that which was worked out at Seventh Army were, in general, as follows: (a) the delegations of authority which AFHQ made to the CG, Seventh Army, were more extensive than those which SCAEF had made to Army Group Commanders in the OVERLORD operation; (b) the Seventh Army plan was based, from the first, upon an assumption of greater authority by the French civil authorities than had been contemplated by the SHAEF plan; (c) the civil affairs personnel was to be far less numerous in the ANVIL area than in the OVERLORD area. To a very considerable extent these differences were the result of the fact that the Seventh Army included among its units French Army "B," and that accordingly the same degree of political responsibility did not have to be assumed by the American commander in all operational areas. The fact that planning was being carried on in Algiers in the shadow of the Committee of National Liberation may also have tended to make the Seventh Army and AFHQ more aware of the inevitable drift towards full recognition of the Committee than was the case with planners in London. \* \* \*

. . . It was planned to establish the Civil Affairs Headquarters at Marseille at the earliest possible moment and to have all civil affairs personnel, other than those assigned to tactical units, work out of that Headquarters, being sent to such administrative centers at Regional and Departmental capitals as needed. . . .

### UNIQUE POSITION OF CAHQ CAUSES FRICTION WITH G-5, SEVENTH ARMY

[History of Civil Affairs Operations for Southern France Under AFHQ, 15 Aug-1 Nov 44, p. 15, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt 5]

\* \* \* As CAHQ for the Seventh Army, CAHQ occupied a unique position. While it operated under policies set down by G-5, Seventh Army, it reported directly to AFHQ and received orders directly from that source. Furthermore, it set up policies itself.

It derived authority for this from the Seventh Army's "Administrative Instruction No. 2" which outlined CAHQ's principal functions in this way:

a. to maintain close liaison with the French authorities.

b. in liaison with the French authorities, to develop and formulate policies for the conduct of Civil Affairs throughout the whole of the liberated areas."

This duplication of the policy-making functions led to definite discord between CAHQ and the G-5 Section of the Army. Within two weeks after the landings Seventh Army staff officers were charging CAHQ with infringing upon their domain and CAHQ was countering with a charge that G-5 officers were transgressing in the operational field.

The dispute was resolved on the 15th of September when the Sixth Army group was activated and the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment passed under its control, becoming its Civil Affairs Headquarters. \* \* \*

## THE CIVIL AFFAIRS REGIMENT IS READIED FOR ACTION

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr]

\* \* \* By D-Day (15 August 1944) the authorized strength of the regiment had been increased to 196 officers and 398 enlisted men. . . .

After intensive study of the ACC and the ECAD organizational charts, Colonel Parkman decided to establish five branches: Operations; Service and Supply; Law, Public Safety, Fine Arts; Economics and Finance; Welfare, Displaced Persons and Public Health. Almost immediately after D-Day, however, Public Health was constituted as a separate branch.

The organizational diagrams also provided for a Public Relations Adviser to the CCAO, a headquarters housekeeping staff, five regional teams of five officers each, one city detachment of eleven officers, three port detachments, one follow-up team and four specialists detachments. This provided posts for the greater part of the 196 officers. The remainder were attached as CAO's to tactical units or to the Civil Affairs Group of CBS (Continental Base Section), the unit designated to handle port and supply matters for the combat troops. \* \* \*

## SMALL LIAISON GROUPS TO REPLACE DETACHMENTS AND TEAMS

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr]

\* \* \* early assignments were almost completely re-shuffled by D plus 30, the date by which the last of the CAHQ officers had arrived in Southern France. Experiences of the CAO's . . . indicated to Colonel Parkman and his staff that there was little, if any, need for the various teams and detachments.

He, therefore, eliminated all the detachments and teams from the Tables of Organization. A few small groups, ranging from one to four officers, were sent into the field to handle liaison with the French at key points. All of the port work was placed under the Continental Base Section. The other officers remained at Headquarters.

This re-organization did not emerge until the middle of September but it was being discussed as early as D plus 3. Colonel Parkman also decided about that time that 196 officers and 398 enlisted men were far too many for the work at hand. Accordingly, he arranged with AFHQ for 50 of these officers and 75 men to be sent to Italy, rather than to France. Most of them, though, rejoined the regiment by October 1.

## CIVILIAN SUPPLIES WILL BE REQUISITIONED THROUGH AFHQ

[AFHQ Interim CA Directive on Supply to CG, Seventh Army, 20 Aug 44,<sup>1</sup> CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

1. *General.* You will be responsible for the initial provision and distribution of such relief supplies to civilian populations throughout the area of your jurisdiction as are essential to the successful accomplishment of your military mission and as necessary to meet minimum essential civilian requirements.

The term "relief supplies" refers to those items of supply procured specifically for civilian use, whether by importation from without the theater or by local procurement within the theater. Some of these supplies may be identical in type to United States Army supplies and, in fact, procured from excess or used United States Army supplies. For that reason every care must be exercised to prevent mixing civilian supplies with Army stocks. Further and specifically there is no authority for the issuance of United States Army stocks of any type, including subsistence, for civilian use except in extreme emergency. Such supplies issued under that condition will be in minimum essential quantities and a detailed report of such issuance will be furnished this headquarters immediately.

2. Requisitions for Civil Affairs Supplies will be submitted by your headquarters to this headquarters. On approval by this headquarters, submission of these requisitions to CCAC and the necessary provision arrangements with authorities concerned will be responsibility of this headquarters.

3. *Requisitioning Procedure.* Requisitions will be at this headquarters ninety (90) days before delivery is desired in this theater. In the case, however, of requisitions for the period D plus 90 to D plus 180, a delay is authorized sufficient to make an on-the-ground estimate of supply requirements. Requisitions for the six months' period D plus 180 to D plus 360 will be in this headquarters by D plus 90. Emergency requisitions may be communicated by telegram but will be confirmed by standard requisitions. This

<sup>1</sup> On the same date, 20 August 1944, separate directives were issued on price control and rationing, agriculture and related industries, monuments, fine arts and archives, political prisoners, refugees and displaced persons, law and order, labor, and transportation. Copies will be found in file cited.

headquarters will advise you of action taken on all requisitions.

4. *Shipping.* The import of civil supplies will be dealt with in the same manner as the import of military maintenance supplies and will be related to the overall acceptance capacity of ports of discharge and ability of the administrative organization to store and distribute. All requisitions will therefore include a phased shipping schedule based on the acceptance capacities of French ports. This headquarters will be responsible for making the necessary shipping arrangements within the limits of available shipping and for advising you of all arrivals of civil supplies covered by your requisitions.

5. *Scale of Issue.* Subject to such restrictions as may from time to time be issued by this headquarters, you will provide CA supplies to civil populations on a scale of issue designed to bring local standards up to a minimum consistent with the standards of military necessity. For provision of foodstuffs a standard of 2,000 calories per day per head is established as the desired goal.

6. *Distribution.* You will make CA supplies available in local areas by effecting delivery thereof to authorized French authorities for distribution by them to civilian populations. At the earliest possible date consistent with military operations, arrangements will be completed by you for the turnover of CA supplies at points of initial entry to French authorities for distribution.

7. *Payment.* Supplies for local civilian use may be delivered to authorized representatives of FCNL against physical receipts only, subject to later settlement. Detailed instructions regarding payment for supplies will be provided you through technical channels.

8. *Direct Issues to Consumers.* In accordance with relief policies established by this headquarters you are authorized in emergencies to allow the direct issue by CA detachments of CA supplies to actual consumers. In order to permit future settlement between the countries concerned you will require that a certificate covering these issues be accomplished by the U.S./Br/Fr officer responsible for the distribution of such supplies.

9. *Utilization of Local Resources.* Prior to the issue of imported CA supplies you will require French authorities to make the maximum use of existing local resources including manufacturing and production facilities. You will accomplish this by ensuring that locally available supplies are procured and distributed by the French au-

thorities before similar CA supplies made available to you by this headquarters are distributed. However, you are authorized to effect military procurement of supplies for CA purposes where necessary. Such purchases will be in accordance with specific directives to be issued by this headquarters.

10. *Use of Civilian Labor.* Ordinarily you will require French authorities receiving CA supplies to hire, pay and furnish civilian labor necessary for the handling of such CA supplies at the time and place of turnover from your CA representative. However, you are authorized to permit CA detachments to hire civilian labor when French authorities are unable to provide that required for this purpose.

#### SCREENING OF RELIEF SUPPLY ESTIMATES A G-5, AFHQ, FUNCTION

[Robert W. Komer, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Mediterranean Theater, HS, MTO files]

\* \* \* A question arose as to whether the general co-ordinating authority of SHAEF included the duty of reviewing the estimates approved by AFHQ. G-5 SHAEF interpreted a CCAC directive of 17 June 1944 to mean that it was authorized to screen AFHQ supply estimates in detail. After discussion, however, with the AFHQ mission and G-5 representatives sent to London, G-5 SHAEF concluded that detailed examination of the AFHQ estimates would involve undue delay and was also not in conformity with AFHQ's status as an independent headquarters. SHAEF recommended to the CCAC that it be responsible only for co-ordination of the general basis of planning, that is, of such matters as insuring importation of the same categories of supplies and the maintenance of the same ration scale in both zones. The CCAC agreed that it should receive AFHQ's operational requirements directly and co-ordinate them with SHAEF's. Thus the estimates of relief needs for southern France were screened only by AFHQ.

The planners also evolved a supply requisitioning procedure which generally followed that already in use in Italy. Seventh Army and the French metropolitan authorities would together be responsible for the estimation of phased-long-term requirements. . . . AFHQ would edit and review these requisitions and submit them to the CCAC. \* \* \*

## 2. THE FIRST TEN DAYS

### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS GO INTO ACTION

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

The assault waves of the Seventh Army were still surging up the mined beaches of the Riviera coast, in the onset of Operation DRAGOON, when the first Civil Affairs officer to set foot on Southern France, crashlanded in a glider ten miles inland. Immediately, he started work on civilian problems.

It was 0900 on D-Day, August 15, 1944, when 1st Lieutenant Joseph Welsh, CAO of the 1st Airborne Task Force, pulled himself out of the wreckage of a glider, one mile northeast of Le Muy, a small city in the Department of Var. Reporting personally to Major General Robert T. Frederick, Commander of the unit, at his nearby CP, he received orders to "look after the civilians." At once he began visiting farm houses in the vicinity to determine conditions there.

A few hours later, most of the Civil Affairs officers attached to the three American divisions which spearheaded the southern debarkment were also on land, hurrying from town to town checking on political, supply and other key questions, while trying to keep pace with the rapid advances of their organizations.

VI Corps Headquarters landed soon after. Its Civil Affairs staff, headed by Major Campbell Dickson, chose a waterfront villa at Ste.-Maxime for an office, moved in and started work on the rigorous task of establishing communications with the Divisional CAO's.

Members of the G-5 Section of the Seventh Army came ashore the next day. Led by Colonel Gerry, Assistant Chief of Staff for G-5, they proceeded under fire to the Army CP at Ste.-Tropez. En route, Major Robert Bennett, finance specialist, helped capture a sniper.

The afternoon of D plus 1 was not old before the Civil Affairs machinery set up to handle the early combat phase problems was in full gear. Top-ranking officers of the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment (Ovhd), which actually operated this machinery, had also established a CP by then and were co-ordinating the hurried, early reports.

First accounts from the field were unanimous in telling of the wild, sweeping enthusiasm with which the local French populace was greeting its American liberators, of the evidently high state of organization of the underground "Resistance" movement and its apparent co-operative attitude. They also detailed the surprisingly

small amount of war damage, the dearth of refugees and the satisfactory status of public health. However, almost all reports reflected the imminence of what were to be the two big Civil Affairs problems: the lack of food and the lack of transport. Hunger could be seen in the distance.

Since the Commanding General, Seventh Army, felt that the French could be depended upon to govern themselves, the function of Civil Affairs in that stage of the operation was largely one of information gathering.

Two Civil Affairs officers from the 2678th Regiment were attached to each of the three American divisions, the 3rd, the 36th and the 45th, and one with the Airborne Task Force. Their job was to cover all of the important towns freed by their units and send back a report on the situation as they found it.

These CAO's worked closely with French liaison officers, members of the staff of General Henri Cochet, Chief of the Military Mission from the De Gaulle government to Major General (later Lieutenant General) Patch, Commanding General of the Seventh Army. One was to have been attached to each of the American units but initially only the 36th and the 45th Divisions were so supplied.

It was the responsibility of these liaison officers to resolve local political questions and to install in office the Maires and Préfets designated in advance by Algiers. Lack of a sufficient number of the liaison men was probably the first big organization difficulty encountered by CAHQ (Civil Affairs Headquarters).

When the ABTF (Airborne Task Force) captured Le Muy on August 15th, for example, Lieutenant Welsh did not have the services of a liaison officer. Entering the town with the combat troops, he stopped long enough only to capture 30 German prisoners, and then went to the Maire. He found there that no Maire had been selected to replace the incumbent official, a Vichyite by then in flight. Consequently, he had to take it upon himself to locate the former, pre-Vichy Maire and, in the name of General Frederick, restore him to his old post. Later, a French liaison officer regularized the appointment.

Civil Affairs officers with the 3rd Division were also without the help of a liaison officer, but, fortunately, in the 13 towns they covered during the first three days of the operation, the FFI (French Forces of the Interior) were so well organized that, according to a CAHQ report

dated August 18th, "No problems of replacements of public officials arose which were not handled by the FFI."

Finally, by dint of constant pressure on the Cochet Mission, the full complement of four liaison officers was finally obtained. The work they did in saving the Allied Forces "the embarrassment of unresolved political problems" has since been described as both "imperative" and "invaluable." \* \* \*

#### SOME PROBLEMS OF A CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER ON D-DAY

[CAO, 36th Div, Weekly Rpt, Undated, to Corps and Army SCAO's, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

1. Landed D-Day H 11:45 at Green Beach. \* \* \*

The division is moving so fast we cannot set up all towns falling into our hands. We are letting Corps catch the towns adjacent to our route. . . .

Our operational setup is: I remain with the division CP and move with it to settle local divisional problems. Examples: looting in St-Raphaël, murder in Trans, labor for division on military highway and bridges in Sisteron. The team of Lts. Justis and Broadhead pull up to the rear, setting up the town as they go along. They join me at division. At first this didn't work because of the French long operational reports that have to be made out by Lt. Justis. Since Lt. Justis visited Corps and Army for discussion of these problems the above setup is working smoothly. . . .

. . . the political situation looks to be all right. However, it may break loose once things ease up (excitement of troops and liberation). Suggest Army Civil Affairs work through Department heads to check on developments and instructions to small towns in the interior. Due to the fact that this is vegetable season, food situation is fair. Health is normal. Children need attention. Most of them are underfed. Practically no flour. Please note our food situation reports on preliminary sheets. The Forces of the Interior are doing a wonderful job of German collaborator and political cleanup. Our work is easy due to the work they have done before we arrived. We cannot revisit a town passed so the later report is not forthcoming. . . .

#### DIVISIONAL CAO'S FIND FRENCH FORCES OF THE INTERIOR WELL ORGANIZED AND ON THE JOB

[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 18 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

1. The Civil Affairs officers with the Third Division have covered 13 towns. In each town the

FFI<sup>2</sup> was well organized and although this Civil Affairs Division group is the only one without a French Civil Affairs Administrative Liaison officer, no problems of replacement of public officials have arisen which were not handled by the FFI. Therefore, no decisions of this kind have been made. The condition of these towns is good, the people healthy and enthusiastic and food in the near future is likely to be the big problem.

2. The Airborne Division with one CA officer took the town of Le Muy [see above]. . . .

3. The two CA officers with the 45th Division are now ashore and are taking over the towns in the middle (45th Div) area which were previously being handled by VI Corps because of the absence of the 45th Division CA officers due to delay in their disembarkation. The condition in these towns seems satisfactory. There is a French Administrative Liaison officer with this Division.

4. The CA experience of the 36th Division officers has been highly instructive to date. They have been in St-Raphaël, Frejus, and Draguignan. In each town the FFI was completely organized and was prepared to take over the government, install a Maire and care for the civilian needs. A very competent French Administration Liaison officer (CA) is with our men and in each case he authorized the installation of the new Maire and got things started. The only difficulty along this line appears to be that this French officer has so many reports to make to the new Prefect of Draguignan (all ordered by Algiers who installed the Prefect) that he cannot keep up the amount of work thrown on the CAO's because the Division is moving so rapidly. Some instructions either increasing the number of French liaison officers or decreasing their paper work would be very desirable at division level. Perhaps the reports could wait until a later stage.

5. . . . These towns, under their new Maires and the FFI are well organized and it is believed that they will be efficiently run. \* \* \*

#### TACTICAL UNITS RELIEVED OF DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATION

[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 18 Aug 44]

6. We are working toward a plan whereby, as soon as Departmental capital is taken, the

<sup>2</sup> A comprehensive account of the activities of this organization was prepared by Marcel Vigneras under the title of French Forces of the Interior, Their Organization and Participation in the Liberation of France, 10 vols., 1944, a copy of which is on file in OCMH.

French civilian problems will be put on a territorial basis except for those directly affecting military matters in the forward areas. CA VI Corps is thoroughly co-operative and helpful on this as well as all other problems. However, since the divisions are moving so fast and towns are being turned over to Corps either just after a divisional CAO has been in a short time, or before he has been in at all, it is necessary to secure a strong and active French Administrative Liaison officer—which we have not at present. The assignment of good active French liaison officers in the forward areas is most important and is a No. 1 problem with us. \* \* \*

[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to CG, Seventh Army, 21 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

\* \* \* the Departmental administration of Var and the coastal towns, plus Frejus and Draguignan, were turned over to CAHQ, as far as Civil Affairs responsibilities were concerned.<sup>3</sup> This includes the area back of Draguignan, Longues, Le Luc and Collobrières (not including the last three towns). CAHQ has officers in Draguignan, St.-Raphaël, Ste.-Maxime and St.-Tropez. It is believed that these officers can shortly be made available, except that a CAO in St.-Tropez will be needed as long as Seventh Army is there. \* \* \*

[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to SACMED, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

6. *Departmental Administration.* A report from the CAO who has been in Draguignan to render assistance in the reorganization of Departmental administration indicates that the administration is now as firmly established as is possible in the circumstances . . . things are going ahead so

<sup>3</sup> Early plans provided that CAHQ would not assume responsibility until an area passed to Army. At that time it was anticipated that the advance would be slow but steady and divisional CAO's would be able to visit and revisit towns in their areas, with VI Corps civil affairs staff making follow-up surveys after the divisions moved forward. The rapid advance made that procedure impossible. In an effort to ease the burdens of the tactical units, CAHQ put into effect the plan mentioned above in the 18 August report to AFHQ in less than a week after the landings. As soon as the French civilian problems were put on a territorial basis, divisional and/or Corps CAO's would go into a town, determine requirements for food, milk, medical supplies, etc., and report the situation to CAHQ. For example, when Draguignan, the capital of Var, was liberated, CAHQ sent in one of its own officers as CAO to work with local officials who had been installed according to procedure brought out in the above documents. Other CAO's were sent out to make surveys at such key points as Nice, St.-Raphaël, and Brignoles and staff officers from the G-5 Section of Seventh Army were drafted to help cover the area.

smoothly that on 22 August the CAO leaves Draguignan. The two problems upon which the success of civil administration depends are communications and supply. . . . The possibility of making some communications facilities . . . available to the civil authorities is under consideration. In so far as civil supplies are concerned, the population has evidenced very general understanding of the priority of military interests and it is anticipated that the small communities so far liberated will be able to get along on local resources for the next month or so with minimum assistance from Allied sources. \* \* \*

#### PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN FORWARD AREAS

[CAHQ, Rpt to CG, Seventh Army, 21 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

3. The chief problems encountered in the forward areas to date are:

a. Division CAO's have had to move so rapidly that they have gotten out of touch with Corps.

b. A strong French Administrative Liaison officer is needed at Corps and has not yet been produced.

c. Shortage of flour and other basic foodstuffs in all communes.

d. Vigorous action by FFI is re-establishing local government immediately after a town is evacuated by the Germans.

e. Numerous reports of looting of buildings and seizure of civilian vehicles by civilians and troops. The behavior along the coastal area and Frejus seems to have been the worst. The Commanding General, VI Corps, has made the prevention of looting a unit command responsibility. \* \* \*

Experience to date indicates that CAO's in the forward areas can most profitably perform the following functions in this operation:

a. Information-collection and transmission to higher headquarters.

b. "First aid" assistance to civilians where it is requested and necessary to relieve the distress immediately following combat, and

c. Assuring certain measures necessary to the operation of the Divisions and Corps (including control of civilian traffic, provision of labor, enforcing the curfew and blackout, and the like). In this latter connection, it is to be observed that in many cases the Germans had removed the Gendarmerie from the smaller to the bigger towns so that they are short in the former. However, no difficulty exists as yet from this situation.

The French Administration of the Department of Var is still getting under way at Draguignan. The only two problems upon which Allied assistance is requested are:

- a. The importation of flour to assure adequate bread ration, and
- b. Communication facilities between the office of the prefect and those of the Maires of the principal cities. \* \* \*

#### OPERATING PROCEDURES IN FRENCH AND U.S. UNITS

[CAHQ, Seventh Army, Rpt to SACMED, 23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

1. *Civil Affairs Officers with French Units:* Contact has been made and operating procedures worked out with the CAO attached to each French Infantry Division and the Acting SCAO with French Army B. . . . The CAO with the [French] 3d Division operates without the use of a French officer as an intermediary. However, he confines his inquiries largely to matters relating to civilian supplies and transport, all political, public safety and other specialists problems being handled locally with the Maires by the Sécurité Militaire attached to the division in whose section the CAO works. Information secured by the CAO indicates that the condition of the towns visited by him (north of Solliès Pont, south of La Roquehussanne and west of the line drawn between them) is substantially similar to that in the towns thus far uncovered in the American area. . . .

2. *Civil Affairs Officers with U.S. Units:* Owing to the speed of advance, it has been found necessary to split the four officers at VI Corps into teams to keep contact with and to follow up the men with the Divisions. . . . The CP's of the three Divisions are considerably further forward. Towns can only be visited once by the Divisions and only those manifesting some important problem by the Corps officers. \* \* \*

#### CIVILIAN SITUATION GENERALLY GOOD BUT FOOD STOCKS DIMINISHING

[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

Colonel Lavilleon, Chief of Staff of the Military Delegate for Southern France, reports that considerable progress has been made in the organization of civil administration in liberated territories in the Department of Var. He states that immediately after the arrival of Allied and

French troops, administration was based on the Commune. Acting under authority conferred upon him by the Military Delegate, he has either appointed mayors or confirmed appointments made by local Resistance committees. . . . Administration is now being placed on a Departmental basis. \* \* \*

There has been little violence in liberated areas to date except for the reported shooting of six enemy agents of French nationality as Allied troops were landing. There have been a number of cases in which women had had their hair clipped by "young patriots." A considerable number of collaborationists have been incarcerated by Resistance groups. \* \* \*

To date, the refugee and displaced persons problem has nowhere presented any substantial difficulties. In most of the small towns there are a number of French persons from other communities. They seem to have been absorbed into the towns and have been satisfactorily taken care of by friends and relatives. . . . In Brignoles, with a normal population of 5,000, there are 3,000 refugees from Toulon, recently evacuated. The officials of Brignoles are making satisfactory provision for their welfare. The municipal authorities have been instructed to take vigorous action to prevent the return of the Toulon residents to their homes until Toulon is ready to receive them. Similar advice will be given to all other towns near Toulon and Marseille in which refugees are found.

With the fall of Toulon expected in the near future, a considerable problem of refugees returning to the city is anticipated. A refugee specialist of Civil Affairs Headquarters is at present making a quick survey of a number of towns in the area between St.-Tropez and Brignoles, in which towns there are reported to be many refugees from Toulon.

The rapid advance of operations had made impossible the screening of persons of uncertain status who have been detained by the Provost Marshal. Accordingly, all persons who are prima facie entitled to the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention are being held as prisoners of war and are being evacuated. \* \* \*

In thirteen towns, including St.-Tropez, Cogelin, Collobrières and Ramatuelle, the condition of the towns is good, the people healthy and enthusiastic.

The general impression is to the effect that most of the important collaborationists left with the retiring enemy forces. It has been called to the attention of the Chief of Staff to the Military

Delegate that unwarranted arrests might lead to social unrest. He stated that he has already started screening these arrests with a view to preventing injustice, but he cannot move too quickly owing to the passions of the moment. \* \* \*

Individual communes have not more than one or two days' stocks of food left. The small stocks in the uncovered area come from two sources: (1) captured German dumps and (2) stocks de sécurité. The former are very limited in quantity but are being guarded by the Resistance and distributed by the mayors of the communes. The latter are stocks accumulated secretly by the Ravitaillement Général. In Var, this cache is located at Draguignan and Ste.-Maxime. \* \* \*

It is hoped that presently available food in the country districts will enable the people to subsist until the food starts flowing in and that the emergency imports can be retained for the large cities. Permission has been secured from naval authorities for the resumption of fishing in restricted areas in the neighborhood of St.-Tropez. It is believed that this will be of substantial assistance to the civil population. \* \* \*

Emergency medical supplies for St.-Tropez have been provided by the Medical Section, Headquarters Seventh Army, and the situation is in hand. . . .

A bombing at St.-Tropez . . . put a strain on the hospital and medical facilities. . . . Local medical facilities are poor but generally the situation appears to be in hand.

. . . Power and telephone lines were found to be nearly all intact. . . . Damage to central office equipment is virtually nil. . . . The questions of restoring water and electric services are related, for water supplies will be adequate when the electric pumping systems are restored to service. In a number of communities it has been possible to provide supplies of fuel oil sufficient to pump limited amounts of water. \* \* \*

Two banks function in temporary quarters in St.-Tropez and also the Caisse d'épargne with staffs intact and tax collectors present. \$29,000 worth of freshly-printed French currency was captured on a German. Le Muy is being held by the Finance Officer. The supplemental currency is circulating freely with the tradespeople and it does not appear necessary to post the currency notice. . . . The situation seems generally satisfactory. No advances have been required by the French authorities thus far and ample currency is reported available in the area uncovered to date.

[Summary of First Reports,<sup>4</sup> Submitted by 36th Div CA Officers, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts, 7th Army]

1. Les Arcs (1130, 20 Aug)—Capt. Broadhead.

a. Local officials in control; new officials designated by Fr. liaison officer. Population: 1939-3200; present, 3500. Slight bomb damage; no minefields or booby traps. Local citizen has removed unexploded bombs. Fire and civil defense services are organized.

b. Approx. 5 days food on hand. Flour needed.

c. Public health excellent; no epidemics.

d. Water system, satisfactory. Electricity partly operating. Resistance apparently has sufficient trucks.

e. No surplus labor.

f. Financial situation: 50,000 fr. No banks. Post office open.

3. Montferrat (0940, 21 Aug)—Capt. Broadhead.

a. Local authorities have situation in complete control. New officials designated by Fr. Liaison officer. Resistance actively organized under a local chief. Population: 1939, 220; present, 370. Attitude, jubilant. No damage, mines or booby-traps. Traffic clear. Small-town fire service, everybody volunteers.

b. No food other than garden products. Town representative has gone to see Prefect about food. Flour needed.

c. Public Health: most of the children have just had scarlet fever and need food badly. No doctors or serum. Recommend special consideration for food supplies.

d. Water OK; electricity OK; telephone cut. No transport.

e. No surplus labor.

f. No money in commune; obtained from Prefect as needed. No banks. Post office open.

7. Digne (1530, 21 Aug)—Capt. Broadhead.

a. Local authorities in complete control of situation. New prefect has not arrived although Vichy appointee has been replaced. New city officials designated. Resistance actively organized under a local chief. Population: 1939-7800; present, 10,900. No refugee problem. Attitude: jubilant and friendly. Slight bomb damage, no mine-

<sup>4</sup> These were printed forms to be filled in by the civil affairs officers on day of entry into a town. They were meant to reduce the paper work and were broken down as follows: A. Government Affairs; B. Relief; C. Public Health; D. Economics; E. Labor; F. Fiscal; G. Remarks. The conditions as shown by the summaries cited herein are included as typical.

fields or booby-traps. Fire and civil defense services are organized.

b. Sufficient food for several days, one week or slightly more. Need milk more than other food products.

c. Health and sanitation OK. Hospital 300 beds. Sufficient doctors.

d. Water and electricity OK; telephone cut. No trucks, no railroad or other means of transport; needs transport.

e. No labor surplus.

f. Sufficient funds for operation. Three banks. Post Office is open.

g. Recommend visitation by Army.CA personnel to work out problems on departmental level with new prefect and staff.

9. Sisteron (1430, 21 Aug)-Maj. [John P.] Powhida.

a. Everything under control. Resistance group small, well organized. Population about 200 (subnormal, due to bombing last week). Morale high. About 50 buildings destroyed; 200 persons killed. Touring hotel mined (unexploded bombs reported to Ordnance). Fire and civil defense well organized; given 5 gals of gasoline to enable them to go to a fire.

b. Food will last several days, after that, drastic.

c. No health and sanitation problems, but children underfed.

d. Communications and public services all destroyed. No local transport.

e. Labor situation good, being used by division to clear military highway and blown bridges.

f. Funds on Hand: 200,000 francs.

#### A CA DETACHMENT MOVES INTO MARSEILLE UNDER FIRE

[Memo, Col Parkman, CO, 2678th CA Regt., to CG, Seventh Army Through G-5, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

An advanced detachment of the 2678th CA Regiment, consisting of the CO, two other officers and one enlisted man, arrived in Marseille at 2000 24 August 1944. Heavy fighting was going on in certain sections of the city and the detachment, in order to reach the Prefecture, had to proceed under small arms fire.

A brief reconnaissance of the military situation at that time showed that there was much artillery fire under way in the advanced elements of the French 3d DIA as they sought to smash remaining German resistance centered in the Port areas. \* \* \*

. . . the detachment established contact with representatives of the CBS and made preliminary arrangements for setting up an office and for billeting. . . .

The detachment then met with officials in charge of the city's food supplies. . . . Inasmuch as the total amount of available food is entirely contingent upon the amount of damage wrought in the Port areas, it was arranged for these officials to survey that area just as soon as the fighting now in progress there permits. \* \* \*

The Resistance elements seem to be in control of the departmental and municipal governments and appear to be working well with M. Aubrac [Commissaire Régional de la République]. The former head of the municipal government has been ousted and replaced by M. Lionel. As far as can be seen the government is functioning with these officials "meeting first problems first."

. . . Both the gendarmerie and the police are said to be reliable and anti-Vichy. Some looting occurred during the early days of the FFI's fight against the Germans here, approximately three days ago, but this was held to an absolute minimum and reputedly presents no further problems. \* \* \*

It is reported that the Germans have destroyed most, if not all, of the port facilities and have blocked the entrance to the ports by sinking ships across them.

Because of the high number of civilian casualties occurring during the FFI onslaught against the Germans here, the hospitals are reported crowded and there is said to be a "desperate shortage of medical supplies." \* \* \*

#### FRENCH MEASURE UP TO EXPECTATIONS IN ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITIES

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

\* \* \* The experiences of these first ten days demonstrated something of high value to CAHQ. Its entire concept of Civil Affairs operations in Southern France was predicated on the thesis that the French would be able to handle their own affairs with only small assistance from Allied CAO's. As a result, it planned very little use of detachments in the field, and not too many officers at headquarters. Months later, Major Lewis H. Van Dusen, Operations Officer for CAHQ, commented:

"If the French had failed to take over their responsibilities, we would have been in the soup. As it was, they proved capable and we encountered no unsurmountable difficulties."

In summary, the first ten days after the H-Hour landings saw a mass of important information collected and interpreted. It saw the French take control of their affairs and their government with fine competence.

Serious difficulties were met and, in large part, solved. Plans had to be re-adjusted to coincide with the rapid military advances. Shortages

in Civil Affairs personnel and liaison officers had to be overcome. Relationships between various CA staff and operational elements had to be resolved. Policies governing such key questions as the recruitment of labor and dates for the importation of civilian supplies had to be determined. All this was done, though, and in the main, satisfactorily.

### 3. THE CA SETUP IS PUT TO THE TEST IN TROUBLED AREAS

#### THE BIGGEST JOB WAS AT MARSEILLE

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

\* \* \* The biggest job of all, of course, both during the early days and even later after the cessation of hostilities in the south, was at Marseille.

This city was destined to be a great port of entry for American supplies and troops. The Germans, however, had done "an unparalleled job of demolition" and left its docks, cranes, slips in ruins. The harbor was heavily mined and jammed with the wrecks of sunken ships. Reconstruction of the port was deemed an even bigger task than that of Naples, but upon its rapid rehabilitation and proper operation depended the supplies of the Sixth Army Group.

Army and Navy engineers commenced rehabilitation within hours after the liberation, and came at once to CAHQ for help in getting labor. Staff officers of CBS (Continental Base Section) also were asking aid in procuring workers. More than 12,000 laborers were demanded. CBS wanted hospitals for army wounded, warehouses, garages, and factories for supply functions. It was up to CAHQ to persuade the French to meet these requests quickly.

Civilian needs had also to be met.

Conferences were immediately instituted with the staff of the Commissaire Régional on the question of labor registration, on the necessity for an immediate re-organization of the governmental labor machinery then in tatters through the departure or arrest of erstwhile collaborators. Requisitioning procedures were discussed. Medical officers were sent out on surveys of nearby hospitals. Supply officers, newly arrived from Naples, held long sessions with the French Ravitaillement officials to determine regional needs and to evolve distributing methods. \* \* \*

#### LIBERATION OF COASTAL CITIES NECESSITATES A CHANGE OF PLANS

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

Marseille—principal seaport and transportation hub of Southern France, with a population which included the dregs of six continents, the flotsam of many races—provided the first real test of CAHQ's effectiveness.

By a week from D-Day, G-3 reports indicated that Marseille with its 650,000 inhabitants, as well as those other two big coastal cities, Nice with a quarter of a million and Toulon which had a normal population of some 180,000, were likely soon to be liberated, much ahead of schedule.

The news caused a rapid adjustment of plans among the handful of officers, nine in all, then at CAHQ's Ste.-Maxime CP.<sup>5</sup> It meant that some of these CAO's would have to be ready to move to Marseille at a moment's notice. It meant that others would have to go east to Nice and Cannes. Headquarters itself would have to operate on a shoestring with almost nobody present there for days at a time. Lack of CA personnel during this early phase was proving a serious handicap.

Of even greater importance was the question of supplies. Allied food imports were not due to start arriving until D plus 40, a date set before the landings, when it was thought that the Allied advances would be much slower. Now, more than a million people would have to be fed.

At once, G-5, Seventh Army started cabling AFHQ, urging that the imports be speeded up to D plus 10. \* \* \*

<sup>5</sup> On 21 August, CAHQ was increased by five enlisted men, three jeeps, one weapons carrier, and one trailer. CAHQ Rpt, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17.

CIVILIAN LIFE GRADUALLY RESUMING A NORMAL ASPECT

[2678th CA Regt., Rpt to G-5, AFHQ, 27 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts, 7th Army]

2. *Urban Life.* Increasing evidence of a return to normalcy was perceptible on all sides. Efforts were being made by householders to clean up sidewalk debris. Some shops had reopened. The hectic atmosphere of the past few days seemed to be subsiding. It was reported that a large number of people had gone on foot and by bicycle into the countryside to search for fresh vegetables. According to the newspapers, nearby farmers were generous in giving freely from their stocks.

Moves toward the resumption of normal business life were also apparent in press notices directing employees of the Electricity Company, of the Administration of Public Assistance, Postal Federation to return to work tomorrow morning.

Condensed milk was distributed today for children up to 18 months of age.

Concern over the low stocks of food was expressed in all newspapers but assurances were printed to the effect that every effort is being made to ease the situation. One newspaper, the *Provençal*, printed a big front page story stating that it had learned from authorized sources that an important stock of food has been built up in Algiers by the American Army for the population of Marseille. It stated that this is composed of flour, potatoes, dried vegetables and oil. The stock, it said, has already arrived in France and is now being unloaded in Frejus and St.-Tropez but that it will be at least two to three weeks before all difficulties regarding food have been surmounted.

3. *Law and Order:* Today's newspapers carried lists of collaborateurs arrested here. Truckloads of Vichyites who have been active in the street fighting against the FFI here were carried away yesterday to "imprisonment."

A State of Siege order by [Lt.] General [Aimé de Goislard] de Monsabert, CO of the 3d DIA, directing disarmament of civilians was declared by him not to apply to members of the FFI.

Notice was given to all Jews in Marseille who have been "obliged" to use false identity cards to report to the Union of Jews to have their real identities re-established.

4. *C.B.S.* A conference was held with officials of the C.B.S. to discuss civilian problems affecting their operations. . . .

7. *Utilities.* It was learned that there is an acute need of 50 gallons of gasoline per day in order to operate the auxiliary power plants of the telephone service in Marseille. P.T.T. officials declare that this amount of gasoline is vitally needed in order to permit a resumption of telephone service in full.

8. *Medical Conditions.* Since no civilian hospitals here have been as yet damaged, there seems to be adequate hospital facilities for civilian needs even including civilian battle casualties (it is estimated that 200 civilians have been killed and 500 wounded here). Since all of the 800 civilian doctors in Marseille were ordered to remain here, there is adequate medical care. The hospitals also have enough nurses at present.

Malaria is reported to be rare in Marseille although the anophelin mosquitoes are found throughout the city. Sand fly fever has begun to appear, though. This is the first year in which sand flies seem to be abundant here. \* \* \*

THE NICE-CANNES AREA IS A TROUBLE SPOT FOR CAO'S

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

Famine, street demonstrations, and disorder not only among the FFI but among Allied troops as well—these spelled the chief Civil Affairs problems in the Nice-Cannes area. In Toulouse, constant attention had to be given to reported threats of a Communist uprising. Only in Montpellier were conditions calm.

The Nice-Cannes-Grasse section with its continual holiday atmosphere, its mixed population that included tens of thousands of Italians, and its concentration of Communistic sentiment, was a trouble-spot from the beginning. Once the playground of the World, it had become a war zone afflicted by tragic hunger and unrest.

The fighting along the Italian border, only a few miles from Nice, made few headlines but it continued 24 hours a day with a dull ferocity. The 1st Airborne Task Force was assigned there as a static force to hold the Germans off the Seventh Army's right flank. Its foxholes were only a short ride from the Nice bistros and rough, hard-boiled paratroopers, tense and nervous from relentless days under fire, flocked to them for release. . . .

The conduct of these soldiers was often wild and unruly. Fights between them and civilians were frequent and complaints about them flooded the local Civil Affairs office. The CAO's there had to spend a great deal of time smoothing wounded civilian feelings.

. . . General Frederick, Commander of the 1st ABTF [Airborne Task Force], was . . . "very Civil Affairs conscious." He paid close attention to civilian developments and gave full support to his CA personnel.<sup>6</sup> \* \* \*

By September 6th, the political situation in Nice had quieted down to such an extent that [1st] Lt. [Joseph] Welsh was able to report to CAHQ that "from the operational point of view there does not seem to be any cause for alarm. Order has definitely been established although there are a few isolated cases of looting and banditry on the part of groups of FFI." \* \* \*

[CAO, Cannes, Rpt, 23 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Sec, Monograph, vol. II, an. M-30, Jkt 6]

\* \* \* As is generally the case between cities the world over, there exists quite naturally a rivalry between Cannes and Nice and during this past week it has made itself manifest in at least the three following situations:

(a) Nice ordered the discontinuance of the Cannes newspaper, the Cannes Riviera, which was under the control of the Liberation Committee. . . .

(b) The Bureau Militaire Hq in Nice cut the Cannes Office by 50%, put 3 members off the staff because they were not in the military and, finally, reassigned Col. Petrequin to another area. The reason for this is that Cannes is now to be run as a peacetime office. . . .

(c) The same situation exists in the Ravi-taillement. Nice has made accusations (proven false) that Nice's trucks have been hi-jacked in Cannes, and Cannes claims that Nice takes stocks to Nice that should remain in Cannes. I am getting reports on all of these things and hope that

<sup>6</sup> On 29 August Communist-dominated FFI forces liberated Nice and a reign of terror began. By 31 August it was estimated that approximately 100 summary executions and 1,000 arrests had taken place. The ACofS, G-5, Seventh Army, General Cochet's Chief of Staff, and a representative of the French Ministry of the Interior made a rush trip to the city for investigation. As a result, they recommended that Nice be occupied by French second-line troops and that the Regional Commissioner and a responsible Communist leader visit the city in an effort to evaluate the situation, stating that ". . . there are indications that the independent action on the part of the Communists in Nice is not in line with the current Party policy and would be repudiated by its higher leadership. . . ." SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Jkt 5, app. M-4, 5, 6.

in some small way we can reduce this sort of misunderstanding.

#### THE RULERS OF MONACO POSE A NOVEL PROBLEM

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

\* \* \* the tiny principality of Monaco with its one city, the world famous Monte Carlo, was in the throes of even worse conditions than Nice.

An independent nation under the control of France, it had to face within its few acres the usual FFI problems, the usual torrent of arrests and even more than the usual starvation.

A CAHQ report on conditions in Monte Carlo, distributed to the press on October 8th said: "This former playground is like a house of mourning, shuttered and hungry. Producing nothing itself and with railroad connections virtually suspended, it has been living on the community soup kitchens and the black market. The latter is under sharp fire, and penalties for those engaging in black market activities are severe, but it flourishes nevertheless. An idea of prices may be gained from the fact that a kilo of chicken is 1200 francs, a kilo of old mutton is 800 francs. Most things, no matter what the price offered, are unobtainable."

The Monagasques complained bitterly that the French were not sending them enough food. The French lacking food and transport both, of course, could do little to help them. However, through the efforts of CAO's at Nice, some supplies were sent there, and the situation did improve.

Dissatisfaction with the French and fear of the local FFI on the part of the rulers of Monaco led to a novel Civil Affairs problem for General Frederick, one with real international significance.

Lieutenant Welsh has told of the incident. According to his account, Prince Louis, ruler of the little monarchy, and his Prime Minister, M. Robilot, were so afraid of the local FFI that at a conference with General Frederick in Monte Carlo, the Prince offered to lead his people into the American Nation. He asked that Monaco be permitted to become a protectorate of the United States.

General Frederick, Lieutenant Welsh says, declined the offer with thanks. \* \* \*

#### CAO'S EASE THE SITUATION IN HIATUS AREA

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XI]

\* \* \* On the west side of the Rhône River, there lie vast stretches of Southern France which

were termed in CA planning the "hiatus area".

CAHQ responsibility for this hiatus area took in all the six departments in the Montpellier Region . . . but only three of the Toulouse Region. . . .

The first CA personnel reached Montpellier early in September when Major Allison Lucal went there to make a preliminary survey. . . . He found that refugees had swelled the normal 1,600,000 population to 2,000,000. Although four of the six departments produced wine almost exclusively there was sufficient food grown in the other two to ease the general situation had transport been available. . . . His reports over subsequent weeks concentrate largely on his efforts to ease the transport difficulties, of his attempts to get the nearby port of Sète swept of mines so that CA food ships could enter. They also tell of his actions in trying to ease the bridge situation over the Rhône River; there, as in Lyon, the Germans had practically paralyzed road and rail traffic by their demolitions. . . . By [October 28] the arrival of 83 imported Allied trucks had eased the food situation.

. . . Politics was the main concern of the CA officers stationed in Toulouse. For many weeks wild rumors flooded France and even reached England and America that Toulouse was a center of wide-spread Communism, that Soviets were being established in its factories, that it was unsafe for a conservative business man to walk the streets. . . .

As early as September 3d, Major W. [Wilbur] W. Sacra was sent into Toulouse to make preliminary estimates of the conditions there. He noted the usual after-liberation characteristics of FFI and epuration problems. Food, however, did not represent a big problem. Toulouse was a surplus area. \* \* \*

[SCAO, Toulouse Rgn, Rpt to CO, 2678th CA Regt., 21 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, ]kt 6]

\* \* \* The political situation, one gathers, is not any too good. . . . Roughly the situation is that the Communist element is very strong and independent. The FTP forces are certainly very active and aggressive around the city and apparently are acting somewhat independently of the general FFI forces and so far not volunteering for service elsewhere in the French Army. . . .

[CA Liaison Officer, Sixth AGp, Rpt to CO, 2678th CA Regt., 1 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, ]kt 6]

\* \* \* . An impression has apparently been created in parts of France that the city of Toulouse is a hotbed of unrest and violence. . . . I

wish to report my own conclusions that, considering the times, there is a high degree of order here and that there are no valid grounds for rumors of violent struggles. . . . I visited the office of the Regional Secrétaire Général of Police, . . . and he stated that he too knew that various rumors had spread but that there was no basis for them and that it was quite obvious to anyone who wished to investigate that complete order existed in Toulouse. He furnished us with copies of the Police Record for Toulouse (city) for the month of October as evidence of the absence of disorder. . . .

2. When we arrived in Toulouse seven weeks ago, we heard various stories from some quarters about the danger from radical elements. There was no unusual violence actually being committed but the fear was of what might happen, particularly since it was considered that the police force was inadequate and under-armed. There was some basis for uneasiness because of the fact that there were thousands of armed men walking the streets, many of them very young. Almost all of these, however, are now in the Army or disarmed and the streets present a different picture. There was also some fear expressed regarding the danger of an illegal assumption of power by the FTP [FTPF] (*Francs Tireurs et Partisans Français*) element (considered Communist) within the FFI. This has not materialized and there do not appear to be any reasons for believing that it will.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS WORK IS SOFT-PEDALED

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IX]

\* \* \* Headquarters did not want regional or other CAO's making statements to the press that might be in conflict with over-all policy. In line with its wishes to soft-pedal Civil Affairs work, it preferred to have little or no public attention given its officers.

Accordingly, a directive . . . prepared for Colonel Parkman's signature was circulated on September 10th. It said in part:

"In view of the complex nature of the duties of Civil Affairs officers in Southern France, it is felt imperative that a centralized control be maintained by Civil Affairs Headquarters over all information, statements or activities of Civil Affairs officers which affect Civil Affairs public relations.

"It is therefore directed that no Civil Affairs officer will issue any statement or information whatsoever to the press, radio, newsreels, etc. (domestic or external) without first clearing the

same with PRO [Public Relations Officer], CAHQ." \* \* \*

#### SITUATION AT END OF FIRST MONTH

[Memo, PRO, Seventh Army, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 523, 7th Army Opn Rpts]

\* \* \* *Government:* Within minutes after the liberation of their cities, departments and regions, the French have gone about the re-establishment of government and have proceeded efficiently towards the solution of pressing problems. Today, both regional and local governments seem generally to have popular support and to be doing a competent, effective, and democratic job.

*Civilian Supply:* The civilian supply situation is generally good and is improving, although there are critical shortages in milk, gasoline, oil, and transportation. Food is short in the coastal areas, but the arrival of civil affairs food supplies has eased the problem. It might be noted that whereas no food ship was originally scheduled to arrive until D plus 40, it was possible through the co-operation of all branches of the Army and Navy, to get a food ship here on D plus 10. As a result, food actually reached Toulon before firing had ceased. In Nice, when our food arrived there, people got their first taste of bread in 12 days, and their first white bread in five years. Marseille, which had been suffering from an acute food shortage, now has been able to boost its bread ration from 150 to 200 grams a day.

To meet a critical dearth of milk for babies, the 7th Army released from its own stocks 100,000 cans of condensed milk and 3,450 pounds of dried milk.

Naturally, the lack of trucks and the great scarcity of gasoline have made difficult the distribution of such food as was available.

*Public Utilities:* Electricity is working in most places, even Nice and Toulon. Long distance telephone communication is still largely interrupted, but there is partial service in most cities. Repairs to improve these services are under way. Postal service has been re-established locally, and in some cases, on an inter-urban basis. Insofar as communication lines are concerned, the Army has curtailed its own use of them to immediate battle requirements.

*Labor:* The French government has reorganized its labor machinery, and is proceeding to the establishment of wage rates. It is working closely with the re-established trade unions on these matters. \* \* \*

#### PROBLEMS OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER ARE LEGION

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

\* \* \* Top CAHQ personnel met twice weekly with Regional Commissaire Aubrac and his staff. At these formal conferences, the Army's requests and complaints were voiced to the French, and the latter's brought forth as well. Matters which could not be solved at a lower echelon between the French departmental heads and CAHQ officers were thrashed out.

Minutes of the meeting of September 22nd records a typical session. There M. Aubrac urged that certain schools, requisitioned as billets by Army troops, be released for the education of children. Maj. Karl [S.] Cate, Head of Economics and Finance Branch, replied that he was "working on it" in conjunction with the real estate officers of CBS.

Then M. Aubrac asked when the port of Marseille—by then partially repaired but open only to certain military ships—could "be used for civilian supply shortages in order to save trucking so many supplies from Toulon."

Lt. Col. LeGros, supply expert, reported that this could not be done for at least a month because the port of Marseille was needed for military supplies. \* \* \*

Major [Donald B.] Robinson brought up the question of FFI shooting American officers in error. M. Aubrac said that a number of these were German sympathizers dressed up in FFI garments. M. Aubrac was told that we did not believe such to be the case in most instances. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Chief, CAO, Sixth AGp to Rgnl Cmsr, Marseille, 28 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt 5, app. D-9]

1. Herewith reply to your letter of 16 September 1944, with each of your inquiries listed in the order of its submission by you.

2. *Derequisition of Lycée Thiers:* This school will probably be vacated by 7 October 1944. \* \* \*

3. *Derequisition of Lycée Périer:* This school is still required by the Military, being occupied by Port labor troops.

4. *Derequisition of Raffineries St. Charles:* The U.S. Quartermaster is still using these refineries.

5. In regard to paragraphs 3 and 4, the Real Estate Section, Continental Base Section, is continuing its search for alternative accommodation

for the present occupants of Lycée Périer and Raffineries St. Charles.

6. As soon as the Economics and Finance Branch of this Headquarters receives the list of schools which M. Massenet requires to be de-requisitioned, the Branch will obtain particulars of numbers of personnel occupying these schools and will inform M. Massenet.

7. *Supplies, Medical, and otherwise, needed by the Marseille hospitals:* Reply to this inquiry has been sent to your office under date of 23 September 1944 by the Public Health Section of this Headquarters.

8. *Faculté Mixte de Médecine Générale:* So far, no supplies of deuterium and helium seem available for use of the anti-cancer substitute, but inquiries are being continued.

9. *Letter from General Secretary for Police Affairs:* Major Oscar R. Bowyer of the Economics and Finance Branch has interviewed the General Secretary for Police Affairs, and has asked him for a detailed list of materials needed for the proposed internment camp near Marseille. Upon receipt of this list, inquiries will be prosecuted as to availability of the materials.

10. *Letter from the Consulate General of Greece:* Recruitment of maritime personnel is dealt with by the appropriate French authorities, as are all our requests for manpower. It is suggested that the Greek consul convey the problem of placing Merchant Navy officers of his nationality to Mr. Peltier, Director of the Port of Marseille. The pertinent correspondence is therefore being returned to you. . . .

11. *American newspapers:* This Headquarters has communicated "Le Provençal's" offer of a printing press to the Public Relations Officer at Continental Base Section.

12. *Russian National Anthem:* A cablegram has been dispatched to Allied Force Headquarters requesting delivery of the musical score of the new Russian National Anthem.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The French had asked the Americans to get this score for them, saying that they were embarrassed at state functions by their inability to match the "Star Spangled Banner" and "God Save the King" with a rendition of the USSR anthem which had replaced "The Internationale." Months later, the score still had not arrived and the Communists continued to complain about the music played during the local ceremonies.

#### 4. THE LIAISON OFFICES SERVE AS CLEARINGHOUSES

##### FRENCH LIAISON AND SPECIALIST OFFICERS TO BE USED IN RELATIONSHIPS WITH FRENCH CIVILIANS

[CA Circ 1, G-5, Seventh Army, 28 Jul 44, CAD files, 014, Fr (3-8-43) (1), sec. 5]

11. *French Personnel.* . . . It is expected that French officers will be attached to staffs at all levels, down to and including divisions, in both American and French forces. Such officers will be employed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officers of the Staffs to secure, from the civil authorities and the civil population, compliance with the wishes of the Commander. They will undertake negotiations on civil affairs matters with French officials. They will advise on relations with the civil administration and the population. Such officers, though subject to the authority of the Commander, may receive and, after consultation with the appropriate members of the Commander's staff, act upon such instructions of the French authorities as are inconsistent with the requirements of the Commander. \* \* \*

##### A FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LIAISON OFFICER TO ACCOMPANY THE CAO

[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

\* \* \* In St.-Raphaël, Frejus and Draguignan a competent French Administrative Liaison Officer has accompanied the CAO's and in each case has authorized the installation of the new Mayor. . . .

At Toulon, it was agreed that, while awaiting the arrival of French Administrative Liaison Officers (who have now been agreed upon between General Cochet and General de Lattre), the Commanding General should be requested to produce a qualified French officer from his own staff to deal with the French officials in Toulon. . . .<sup>8</sup> After these officials have been consulted, a

<sup>8</sup> On 23 August, Seventh Army reported that ". . . The Acting LCAO, French Army B, is just making contact with his CAO's because of the delay in unloading his transport. He has been briefed concerning his duties. . . ." SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts, 7th Army.

special team, consisting of available CAO's and specialists (probably a total of two or three) would proceed into the town to assist with the problems which presented themselves to the CAO of the Division. \* \* \*

#### FRENCH LIAISON OFFICERS PROVE OF VALUE TO TACTICAL UNITS

[Memo, SCAO, VI Corps to Chief, CAHQ, 23 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. C-10]

1. During the planning for the present operation, there was considerable speculation about the participation of French Administrative Liaison officers with the civil affairs staffs attached to American tactical formations.

2. After 5 weeks in the field, it can be reported that the work of these French officers has been invaluable; the presence and co-participation of French Administrative Liaison Officers has been imperative to the type of civil affairs functions which American officers attached to tactical formations have been called upon to perform.

3. The French officers attached to divisions have entered towns with combat troops to appraise the political situation the day of liberation. The Corps liaison officer has followed up within a day or two, and has frequently accompanied new prefects into the department capitals. Consequently, American civil affairs officers could establish immediate liaison with properly designated civil officials without the embarrassment of unresolved political problems. The French officers have maintained close contact with local and departmental officials and Resistance leaders until the tactical formation moved forward; it has been very clear that their advice and liaison has been as valuable to civil officials as to American civil affairs officers. \* \* \*

#### LIAISON OFFICES ARE CENTRALLY LOCATED

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. X]

\* \* \* Within a few weeks after the landings, liaison offices were established in six regional capitals, Lyon, Dijon, Clermont-Ferrand, Montpellier and Toulouse, in addition to CAHQ's organization in Marseille.<sup>9</sup> Offices were also set up in Grenoble and in the Nice-Cannes-Grasse areas.

<sup>9</sup> Civilian needs did not constitute a serious problem in the majority of these regions since they were in large part farming areas.

They served as clearing houses for all local Civil Affairs problems. They kept in constant touch with, and submitted comprehensive reports weekly on, every phase—political, economic, public safety, legal and other activities in their areas.

As a rule, the liaison officers established their headquarters in centrally located hotels or office buildings, their living quarters nearby. They hired civilian interpreters and secretaries, civilian cooks and servants. They draw their rations from American Army units, if any were present in the locality, or trucked them in from CAHQ. For transportation, they usually were assigned one or two military vehicles. These they augmented by requisitioning or borrowing civilian cars. They received their instructions, mail and pay from CAHQ couriers who made the rounds of the liaison offices several times each week. \* \* \*

#### WORK OF THE LYON OFFICE WAS UNIQUE

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. X]

\* \* \* Lyon liaison office . . . was charged with responsibility for the departments of Ain, Ardèche, Drôme, Haute-Savoie, Isère, Loire, Rhône and Savoie. In the city of Lyon, it had the third largest metropolis in all of France, one with more than 600,000 inhabitants and with large silk and chemical industries.

Traffic control was the most serious problem faced by the Civil Affairs officers who entered the city a few hours after its liberation on September 3d. Normally a routine matter, in this instance it constituted a case of "life and death" urgency for the Seventh Army.

. . . Lyon straddles two rivers, the Rhône and the Saône, with the heart of the city located on a narrow strip of land no more than a mile wide between the two streams. The rivers are traversed by 23 bridges over which run the main roads from the South to the North. As such, they were, of course, of vital military importance. Furthermore, since they provided the only means of ingress and egress for food trucks and pedestrians, they were also of prime significance to the existence of the city.

The retreating Germans demolished 21 of these 23 bridges, including every one over the Rhône. The results were almost paralytic.

Seventh Army engineers came to the rescue and hooked up the destroyed sections of one bridge, providing a one-way crossing for vehicu-

lar traffic. Immediately civilian trucks, cars and pedestrians by the thousands started pouring across it. The jam became even worse when hundreds of peasants also crowded on the bridge, too, pushing cartloads of farm produce. So great was the congestion that Army convoys were stalled for hours. The average time to get from one side to the other was 2½ hours; in some instances, it ran to six hours.

The situation on Seventh Army supplies grew critical. Lt. Col. M. Hay, Senior Regional Liaison Officer at Lyon, worked desperately in conjunction with the civilian police to arrange traffic control plans. Unfortunately, the police were none too efficient and there were no MP's available for duty. Things got so bad that Colonel Hay and an assistant had to go on the bridge and direct traffic themselves. Their problems were made more acute by irresponsible FFI members who insisted on driving the wrong way in the one way traffic lane and even went so far as to threaten the American officers with tommy guns to force their way through. \* \* \*

Other problems encountered by the CAO's in Lyon encompassed some minor difficulties with the FFI, some disagreements between the French and the Army over requisitioning procedures, and some difficulties in the distribution of food surpluses. Although the Region of Lyon was a surplus food area, many of its departmental officials were reluctant to let food leave their districts. . . .

Civil Affairs work was greatly simplified in Lyon by the formation of a special Inter-Allied Mission as a liaison office for the regional government. Under the procedure established by M. Farges, Regional Commissioner at Lyon, the Civil Affairs liaison officers channeled all their requests on governmental agencies through the Mission and left it to the Mission to follow up on them.

A typical day at the Lyon office, according to the War Diary kept by Maj. Cedric C. Payette, who succeeded Lt. Col. Hay as Regional Liaison Officer, included a meeting with several American newspaper correspondents and making arrangements for them to interview the local French officials.

It also comprised such things as:

1. A session with the Greek consul over 14 Italians who had escaped from Switzerland.
2. A call by an American woman who wanted a divorce from her French husband, then in jail as a collaborator.

3. A talk with a French manufacturer who was seeking war contracts.

4. Participation in a memorial ceremony for Allied dead.

5. A conference with the Regional Commissioner on rationing plans and price control.

The most delicate problem which Major Payette had to handle was the relationship between his office and the Commander and Staff of Area Command B, a subdivision of Delta Base Section. \* \* \*

The Base Section personnel, according to Major Payette, themselves took over all dealings with the civilian authorities in Lyon. . . . They were pre-emptory in their attitude both toward the French and Civil Affairs, Major Payette feels, and he thinks that the Army's interests suffered resultingly. "I had to spend a great deal of time soothing feelings among the French," he said. [Annex L-6 to file, cited above, Section I.]

Even after CAHQ moved to Lyon, no success attended any effort to reassert Civil Affairs jurisdiction here. Friction continued. \* \* \*

#### DUTIES OF A LIAISON OFFICER COVER A DIVERSIFIED FIELD

[Hist of CA Ops for Southern Fr, pt. III]

\* \* \* liaison officers were charged with day-to-day contacts with the civilian authorities in their regions. They were expected to determine regional supply needs and to observe the distribution of imported Allied supplies. Further, they represented local army units to the civilian officials, executed special assignments from CAHQ such as surveys of industries, studies of the press, etc.

Specialists from Headquarters toured the entire South, following up problems in their particular fields. Transportation experts, for example, worked on plans for setting up pools of . . . army trucks which were loaned to local French civilian administration for aiding in the distribution of food. Coal experts checked on mining problems. Utilities men dealt with PTT (Post, Telephone, Telegraph) and the Signal Corps arranged for the return of telephone circuits to civilian use. Public Works officers surveyed road and bridge conditions and co-operated with Army Engineers in arranging for the French departments of Ponts and Chaussées . . . to rebuild certain bridges and repair important roads. \* \* \*

## 5. UNDESIRABLE ELEMENT IN FFI MUST BE DISARMED<sup>10</sup>

### RESISTANCE GROUPS ARE THE BACKBONE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civil Admin]

\* \* \* The real force behind all administration at the moment is the Resistance movement. The Comité Départemental de la Libération in Var is under the leadership of "M. Mouche," whose real name is not revealed. There are eight sub-committees in the principal towns of Var. That part of the department which extends from the Maures Mountains to the sea coast is under a sub-departmental committee at the head of which are two coleaders: M. Marc Rainaut for military matters and M. Girard for political and administrative matters. The latter is Acting Mayor of St.-Tropez. M. Rainaut was recently decorated with the Silver Star by the Commanding General of the Seventh Army in recognition of the part he played protecting paratroopers who landed in and near the town. \* \* \*

### NEED FOR STABILIZING RESISTANCE FORCES IS RECOGNIZED

[G-5, AFHQ, Rpt, 18-23 Aug 44]

\* \* \* Bands of young members of the FFI have been roaming the countryside and some have taken threatening attitudes towards civilians. The activity of these bands is less pronounced than it was immediately after the landings. Also there has been some indication of disagreement between members of the FFI due, it is thought, to the fact that the "regulars" have considered that some of the recent "converts" were not entitled to membership. Many are said to be wearing armbands who are not authorized to wear them. The danger of possible civilian disorders has been brought officially to the attention of Colonel Lavilleon and it has been considered

proper to suggest that members of the FFI, who have no military purpose to perform, should be disarmed. Colonel Lavilleon has taken the position that any precipitous action in requiring the FFI to disarm would be unfortunate, but he recognizes that the situation requires attention and proposes a program as follows:

(1) Instructions to chiefs to disarm all below the age of 18 and above the age of 45.

(2) Immediate enrollment of all authorized members, numbering of their armbands to prevent misrepresentation, and disarming those not entitled to serve as members of the FFI.

(3) Control of arms at local headquarters and authorization for the use thereof only on authorized missions.

(4) Organization of commando groups of the younger members who desire active military service and incorporation of such groups in French Army B.

(5) Of those remaining, to transfer volunteers to regular territorial Army units as soon as the military administration in Southern France can be reconstituted.

(6) Those not wishing to serve in the regular French Army to return to civilian life.

The Commanding General of the Seventh Army feels that the matter requires clear-cut action and he is desirous that General Cochet proceed to Southern France for the purpose of taking responsibility for the implementation of policy outlined by Colonel Lavilleon. Efforts are being made to arrange passage for General Cochet to Southern France for the purpose mentioned. \* \* \*

### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS DO NOT SEE EYE TO EYE ON LOCAL MATTERS

[Maj Russell Kennedy, CMP, Hist, Public Safety Operations, Southern France,<sup>11</sup> SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, J-2]

\* \* \* When Marseille fell, the FFI there numbered about 1,600. Within two weeks this number had grown to 4,500, as all the hoodlums and grudgeholders flocked to the colors after the fighting was over. In another month the figure had dropped to about 3,000 as the original mem-

<sup>10</sup> This section deals with efforts to bring under control the disturbing element in the French Forces of the Interior, an element found primarily among the younger members and armed civilians posing as members. As brought out earlier in this chapter, the FFI were so well organized in the towns uncovered during the rapid advance of the Seventh Army that practically no problem of civil government arose which they could not handle with a minimum of assistance from civil affairs officers.

Primary tasks for the Resistance forces during operations were laid down at AFHQ. An account of those activities is the subject of French Forces of the Interior, by Vigneras. In the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series, *Rearming the French*, 1957, by the same author, deals briefly with the subject.

<sup>11</sup> The two major problems facing officers of the Law and Public Safety Branch of CAHQ were coping with the unruly elements in the FFI and fighting the vast black market trade in property stolen from the U.S. Army. Still another function, though not so demanding, was the safeguarding of cultural objects.

bers, mostly reputable citizens, returned to their normal pursuits, leaving the undesirable elements as the great bulk of the organization. It was at this time that, having reported that the FFI in the Marseille Region consisted largely of criminals and undisciplined young hoodlums and that effort was being made to secure the liquidation of the outfit, I received a letter from Lt. Col. Mark Howe informing me that I had lost my perspective and did not understand the troubles of France. \* \* \*

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VIII]

\* \* \* The difference in viewpoint between Lt. Col. Howe and Major Kennedy was representative of the wide cleavage in attitude among CA personnel. Officers who served at CAHQ report that two extremes could be seen there, the one holding that "everything the French did or didn't do was perfect and that the American Army should remain completely aloof from French affairs," and the other feeling that "nothing the French did was right and that an AMGOT should be established."

Inasmuch as the policy-making officers, it is said, leaned more to the former view than the latter, CAHQ in general tended to follow a hands-off policy.

Some mild protests were made to the French when the FFI set up its own street patrols to ferret out alleged collaborators. Trigger-happy boys, some as young as fourteen, were quick to shoot at anyone who disregarded their orders to "Halt and identify yourself." \* \* \*

The situation grew more acute as several members of the Allied forces were shot by the FFI by error. . . . on September 22nd he [the CAHQ Public Safety Officer] was able to report that he had taken steps to prevent further incidents and that he was "optimistic that none will occur as the FFI leaders are most anxious to prevent such incidents." \* \* \*

Unfortunately, however, the civilian police, whose arms and vehicles had been taken either by the Germans or the FFI, were in no position to enforce these edicts [issued by the French Secretary General for the Police]. And the difficulties with the FFI continued. \* \* \*

#### FIRING ON AMERICANS CONTINUES AFTER ELIMINATION OF THE FFI

[Hist, Public Safety Opns, Southern Fr]

\* \* \* Prior to the abolition of the FFI in the Marseille Region, there were numerous instances of American personnel being shot at by FFI members and five reported cases on which

the shots took effect. One captain was wounded slightly in arm and head, one lieutenant critically wounded in the abdomen, and one was shot through the head and killed. The latter two occurred when FFI men, without warning, opened fire on the outskirts of Toulon on a car in which they were riding. . . . Investigation by the CID resulted in the apprehension of the two men responsible who admitted the shooting but claimed that the occupants of the car had fired on them first. The French authorities made a collateral investigation and reported that the Americans were unarmed and that the culprits had made this allegation merely to reduce their own culpability. Despite this, when the two men were turned over by CID to the Sub-Prefect at Toulon for incarceration and trial, the latter promptly released them. . . . now, nearly three months after the shooting, the men not only have not been tried or spent a night in jail but, so far as I have been able to determine, no steps have been taken looking toward their prosecution. \* \* \*

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VIII]

\* \* \* A re-appraisal of the facts of this incident . . . indicates that CAHQ did not take very positive steps towards obtaining punishment for the killers of one of its own men. There were, unquestionably, mitigating circumstances in that the American soldiers were driving after dark in an unmarked civilian car without lights. On the other hand, the various investigations substantiated the fact that the two FFI members, both men with criminal records, opened fire without any warning at all. And the further fact remains, as Major Kennedy pointed out, the perpetrators did remain unpunished in any way.

Although certain CAHQ officers were unperturbed about the state of public safety, it is also true that in off the record conversations, officials of the Regional Government at Marseille admitted their concern. Eventually a French division "happened" to move through the city and to make a parade up its main streets. Shortly afterwards, a regiment of Zouaves was moved in to aid the police in patrolling the streets.

By government action, the FFI finally was eliminated as an organization and its members given the alternative of joining the Forces Républicaines de Sécurité (FRS), enlisting in the army, or reverting entirely to civilian life.

The FRS quickly developed a good state of organization and discipline and, as recounted by Major Kennedy, "did excellent work in prevent-

ing the transport of stolen military property in civilian vehicles.”

Months later, though, shooting could still be heard on most nights in Marseille. \* \* \*

#### THE COMMUNISTS IN MARSEILLE OFFER NO RESISTANCE TO REGULARIZING THE FFI

[Hq, Seventh Army, Rpt, 3 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI]

In the ten days that have passed since the liberation of Marseille, the local Communist leaders have continued their policy of working with other political groups in the city and with the departmental and regional officials. . . .

## 6. ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING IN ARMY GOODS GROWS TO RACKET PROPORTIONS

#### TRADING CIGARETTES FOR WINE BY ASSAULT TROOPS STARTS SNOWBALLING

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VI]

\* \* \* American soldiers were guilty of contributing heavily to the black market. The practice started innocently enough when the assault troops began trading cigarettes for wine, but it grew to enormous proportions thereafter as the Base Section and Port soldiers discovered that they could get astronomical prices for the PX rations and Army supplies. Cigarettes sold at 100 francs a package; C ration cans for 25 to 50 francs; gasoline at 60 francs a liter.

Inroads into the army stocks became critical and the effect on the French economy serious. \* \* \*

Many arrests . . . were made and much government property recovered through the use of road blocks, increased number of guards at the ports and depots, constant surveillance of known outlets and through tips supplied by undercover operatives. . . . But these were only a drop in the bucket.

The thefts and black market sales continued and spread. Soon the trade took on the proportions of big business. The light sentences given by the French courts to civilian offenders—despite CAHQ protests—did little to deter them.

. . . Officers of the Sécurité Militaire declare that the Communists are creating no problems, and members of Aubrac's staff confirm that there are no difficulties—at least “for the present.” This qualification, however, indicates a fairly general undercurrent of nervousness that the Party may change its line without prior notice. \* \* \*

Finally, it is of some importance that the Communists—whose shock troops, the FTP, are particularly important in the local FFI formations—are apparently offering no resistance to the announced measures for regularizing the status of the FFI. . . .

The road blocks did do fairly good work in stopping the transport of stolen army property in civilian vehicles but they reached only a small proportion of the traffic. Since the majority of the goods moved in military vehicles, these road blocks—usually manned just by French police and security forces—were completely unable to control it. Joint patrols of French and military police were needed for this purpose but because of the local dearth of MP's, were impossible to arrange. \* \* \* [See extract from History of Public Safety Operations by Major Kennedy, in concluding section of this chapter.]

#### STEPS TO SUPPRESS THE BLACK MARKET IN ARMY GOODS IN NICE

[CAO, Nice to CCAO, Seventh Army, Rpt, 20 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt VI, M-19]

2. In an effort to suppress the black market now existing in Nice in Army food supplies, a memorandum has been issued to the units within the 1st ABTF and read to the troops . . . and is used as a warrant to confiscate any and all Army rations, gasoline, and other material found on the persons or property of civilians.

3. The Prefect has taken complementary action to prevent the purchase of food and other supplies from militaries. . . .

**IN TOULON, BLACK MARKET OPERATIONS MOVE UNDERGROUND BUT ILLEGAL SALES BY SERVICEMEN DECLINE**

[Econ and Finance Branch Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGP, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, J-7]

\* \* \* a. During the first few weeks after the liberation of Toulon it is probable that several jeep loads of army rations and clothing were sold in Toulon. These sales were made in the period prior to the putting into operation of effective preventative measures by the Provost Marshal.

b. The Provost Marshal of Toulon is sincerely interested in preventing black market operations by service men and is making a real effort to prevent such operations.

c. The black market operations by service men in Toulon have declined to a point of minor significance. . . .

[CAPO, Toulon, Report to SCAO, G-5, Delta Base, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, app. J-47]

1. (2) The campaign against black market in U.S. Government supplies and property is now organized and proceeding satisfactorily. The local police have assigned four plainclothesmen to this work and their efforts are being coordinated and directed with the Provost Marshal by this office as per instructions received from your office through Captain Kolgore. The campaign has not been in operation long enough to determine the size of the existing black market. However, it has been ascertained that the more or less haphazard black market activities mentioned in previous reports has stopped. The black market at present is underground and may be well organized, dealing principally in tobacco and selling to retail stores or individual civilian retailers who in turn sell to the general public. The campaign

was organized 2 October and began to function the following day. . . .

**CAO'S MAY BE SERVED BLACK MARKET MEAT WHEN DINING WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS**

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VI]

\* \* \* It was difficult to persuade the French civilians not to patronize the black market. For four years, these men and women had been trained to use it as the usual concomitant of their daily existence. They regarded it as a normal, unmoral perhaps, but never immoral affair. The highest French officials patronized it themselves and it was not an extraordinary event for CAO's to be invited to dinner by a ranking public servant and to dine off obviously black market meat or stolen American canned goods.

Some inroads on the practice were made by the French, acting under constant CA pressure. Sharp police and court action were taken against black market profiteers. Blazing newspaper publicity was given to their methods and to the menace they offered to France's economic health. As a whole, though, the black market continued to thrive. \* \* \*

**IN ONE DEPARTMENT, AT LEAST, BLACK MARKET CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED**

[CAO, Alpes-Maritime, Rpt, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-12]

\* \* \* it has been reported to me that our combined efforts against the black market are now beginning to be felt. As previously reported, 1,500,000 francs have been collected and several individuals are under arrest. One baker who sold bread at 90 francs per loaf is up for 500,000 francs, imprisonment or deportation. The situation is, I think, looking better.

**7. TRANSPORT, LABOR, FOOD—THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS**

**INITIAL CIVILIAN SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS TO BE SUPPORTED FROM THE U.S.**

[ASF, ID, Hist of Civil Sup, vol. I, pp. 237-38]

\* \* \* These requirements were based on a 1500 calorie scale of provisions for 65% of a population of 7,600,000 and amounted to 48,900 tons of foodstuff, 1200 tons of soap and 23,200

tons of coal. They were approved without modification by the Supply Subcommittee at its 20th meeting, 17 March 1944, as falling within Plan "A" estimates for France. For purposes of operational convenience it was decided that the U.S. would furnish the initial civilian supply shipments for Southern France since only in this way could the supplies be combat-loaded on the

initial assault convoys then being loaded in the U.S. . . .

2. *Co-ordination of SCAEF/SACMED Requests:*

By LAC 406, 19 May 1944, requirements for the ANVIL [DRAGOON] areas were resubmitted on collapse (RANKIN) assumptions. Through subsequent exchange of cables it was agreed that 45 days on collapse assumptions were equivalent to 90 days operational Requirements and allocations were made on this basis within the over-all supply plan. At the same time SACMED was informed in CAL 502 that action on his second 45-day collapse requirements (second 90-day operational) must await SCAEF comment in order to avoid combined SHAEF/AFHQ requests in excess of approved quantities for France and that in future co-ordination of SHAEF/AFHQ requirements for France would be essential. . . .<sup>12</sup>

TECHNIQUES IN HANDLING CIVILIAN SUPPLIES DIFFER FROM METHODS USED IN ITALY AND NORTHERN FRANCE

[Gen Bd Study 33: Procedures Followed by CA and MG in Restoration, Reorganization and Supervision of Indigenous Civil Admin]

157. . . . Techniques of operation in Southern France contrasted with those used in Northern France. Instead of the supplies coming under the jurisdiction of G-4 Section it was a separate and distinct Civil Affairs operation. Ships arrived solidly loaded with Civil Affairs supplies and a section of the docks at Marseille was designated for the unloading of these supplies. All Civil Affairs supplies were turned over to the French at the port, on official receipts, for the French to distribute. . . . The vehicles brought in for transportation of Civil Affairs supplies were issued to the French to take care of necessary transportation and to supplement the indigenous transport. This procedure placed the responsibility of allocation, transportation, and distribution solely on the indigenous authorities and relieved the Allied armies of transportation, storage and accounting for supplies except at dockside. It must be noted, however, that the supplies brought in at the southern ports were for one country and all of the supplies could be immediately turned over, while in Northern France supplies, all originally for the French, were later destined for France, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and displaced persons in Germany. In that case the turn-

over of supplies at dockside would have been more difficult. \* \* \*

[Komer, CA and MG in MTO]

\* \* \* The handling of civilian supply in army areas was the responsibility of the Quartermaster, Seventh Army. This was a departure from the system used in Italy where civilian food supplies, although standard quartermaster items, had been distributed by AMG and ACC. The handling of identical items by two distinct agencies resulted in losses . . . of both military and civilian supplies and also entailed duplication of personnel and records. \* \* \*

ONLY ONCE WAS INTERVENTION IN DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES NECESSARY

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IV]

\* \* \* Once the supplies were delivered [to French authorities], responsibility for their distribution in France became a responsibility of the French. CAHQ did reserve the right, though, to advise on allocations, and even in case of emergency to overrule their wishes.

Only once was it necessary to question a French decision in this respect. It followed upon the action of Regional Commissaire Aubrac in "freezing" within the Region of Marseille all imported Allied foodstuffs, some of which had been destined by representatives of the National Ministry of Agriculture for other southern regions as well.

Major Archibald Alexander, Chief of the Service and Supply Branch, in a conference with M. Aubrac, told him forcefully that he had not the right to issue such an order. M. Aubrac asserted that he had. Alexander insisted to the contrary, taking the position that the disposition of Civil Affairs supplies was and had to be, under the control of the Delegate of the National Minister of Agriculture.

Necessity for drastic steps by CAHQ was averted, though, when the Paris Government upheld Alexander's position and directed Aubrac to countermand his order. Accordingly, the food was distributed generally, not exclusively to Marseille. \* \* \*

SUPPLY REQUISITIONS SUBMITTED TO AFHQ FOR SCREENING

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. IV]

\* \* \* During the planning stage, G-5 Section Seventh Army and CAHQ submitted requisitions to AFHQ. They requested sufficient civilian supplies to last 180 days under combat conditions or 90 days under conditions following

<sup>12</sup> See above, Chapter XXIII, Section 5.

a complete cessation of hostilities. Eventually, it was decided that these supplies were to be used over 120 days.

AFHQ screened these requisitions, then submitted them to the CCS who allocated 180,000 tons from sources in the U.S.A., the U.K., and the Middle East for use over this four-month period. AFHQ then ordered the supplies forwarded, as needed, to Africa and Italy, but left it to CAHQ to decide what actually should be shipped into France on the agreed ten-day phasing schedule.

After the August 15th landings, CAHQ was to notify AFHQ four months in advance concerning over-all supply requirements, and 90 days in advance of "What it wanted to arrive, and where, and when."

It was also CAHQ's responsibility to arrange for port acceptance of so-called Civil Affairs ships on which these supplies were transported; to see to it that they were unloaded and their contents accounted for before they were turned over to the proper representatives of the French Government.

The Service and Supply Branch of CAHQ handled all phases of the import program except for accounting procedures which were done by experts of the Economics and Finance Branch and the unloading and turnover which were supervised by the CA Port Detachment.

This Port Detachment created an enviable record. Originally its personnel was to have constituted the Civil Affairs Section of the Continental Base Section. . . . However, the presence of CAHQ in the same city as CBS led to the handling of most of its Civil Affairs problems by headquarters itself.

As a result, CBS CA personnel . . . were directed to concern themselves exclusively with unloading Civil Affairs ships and the delivery of their contents to the French. \* \* \*

To help the French develop information on which to base their allocations, as well as to assemble the necessary data on which to formulate the requisitions to AFHQ, the Services of Supply Branch sent officers throughout Southern France to make a survey of potential harvest returns. They interviewed all Ravitaillement and Agricultural officials and brought back a detailed study of future food requirements. \* \* \*

With hundreds of French trucks immobilized for lack of gasoline CAHQ arranged for deliveries of POL to the French Government from Army, captured enemy and imported stocks. . . .

Long sessions with the Transportation Corps produced tonnage allowances on Army trains for

civil affairs supplies heading from Toulon to Marseille and from Marseille to the North. In September, an allowance of 300 tons a day was granted to carry foods from the port at Toulon to Marseille. By the 15th of October, this figure had risen to a point where the Railway Priority Board had approved the movement of more than 50,000 tons of civilian supplies, comprising coal, machinery, milk, vegetables and meat. . . .

Although the freight movement by rail played an enormous part in the relief of the starving coastal areas, as did also the rehabilitation of civilians' automotive transport, it is safe to say that the deciding factor was the importation of Allied military trucks for use by the French Government. \* \* \*

. . . [Major Bennett, G-5, Seventh Army] wrote: Transport in France was a greater problem than supply. Imported supplies without transport brought in to move them cannot be effectively used quickly where needed. . . .

#### GENERAL SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT IN COASTAL AREAS BUT NOT SO SERIOUS AS FEARED

[Civil Affairs Report on Liberated Areas, 18-23 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 20.31, Fr, Civ Admin]

\* \* \* The Resistance in each town has one or two trucks. The Ravitaillement in most towns has from one to four additional trucks, depending on the town's size, and has the use of Resistance trucks in other instances. This capacity is adequate to care for the needs of the towns so far uncovered. The cities are expected to present a more difficult problem. A number of trucks have been hidden by the departmental Ponts et Chaussées, the wheels in one place, the engines in another, and the bodies in a third. They are now being reassembled. Assurance has been given that adequate trucking will be available to handle imported civil supplies. All trucks are gazogene powered and the authorities have been advised to keep them so in view of the general gasoline shortage. Supplies of charcoal are abundant in Var. The ingenuity and initiative shown by the French officials and FFI in regard to transport are characteristic. \* \* \*

[Civil Affairs Report 2 to ACofS, G-5, Seventh Army, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-10]

\* \* \* At present there are approximately 40 civilian trucks (wood-burning) operating in the supply haul from St.-Tropez warehouse [to Nice]. Cannes and Antibes are dispatching their own trucks to Tropez. Although the cutting of the Var bridge has made it difficult for these

vehicles to get through, progress is satisfactory. All civilian traffic over the Var has been halted with the exception of supply trucks. \* \* \*

#### INEFFICIENT TRANSPORT AND LACK OF FUEL CAUSE CRITICAL SITUATION IN NICE

[Civil Affairs Liaison Officer, Nice, Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGP, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt V, M-11]

\* \* \* An absolute minimum 500 tons of food are needed daily. We have enough gazogenes to haul 600 tons daily but these trucks are so slow and inefficient that it takes them two days or more to make a one day trip. . . . Therefore, . . . it is impossible to import . . . half of the absolute minimum. . . .

We have 15 trucks which could haul 25 more tons daily if we had gasoline and oil. . . .

The chief of the Ravitaillement has informed me that the people would absolutely be starving but for the importation of American flour. . . .

To remedy this situation we need gasoline and oil and at least a few of the 526 [*sic*] army trucks loaned to the French government by the U.S. Army. If these trucks are forthcoming, please send them to Nice *loaded* not *empty*. Food is being held for Nice in other departments and with sufficient transportation we can pool this food in the ravitaillement.<sup>13</sup> \* \* \*

#### DESPITE HANDICAPS ALLIED TRUCKS PLAY A KEY ROLE

[Hist, Road Transportation Branch, 15 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. E-14]

During the month of April of this year a Group was formed which was named the Transportation Committee and had as its aim the formulation of plans for the rehabilitation and handling of all transportation in the area of Southern France then assigned to the particular operation. Plans were formulated based on the total amount of supplies to be imported and a request placed for the allocation of 900 1½-ton trucks for the use of Civil Affairs. At that time it was the intention to bring these trucks in on a sale basis, deliver them to the various former commercial trucking concerns in the area with the proviso that they give first priority to the hauling of

food. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. . . . disagreed with our original request and substituted in lieu thereof 557 4-ton trucks which were then in the Mid-East. . . .

Included with these 557 vehicles was a complete one year supply of spare parts involving some 8 or 9 hundred tons. . . . Several weeks passed and we continued planning with General Cochet's representatives in North Africa along the lines of turning these vehicles over to existing commercial firms. We were suddenly confronted one day by the fact that G-4 of the Task Force had ordered that since these vehicles were consigned to the Commanding General of the Seventh Army for use of Civil Affairs they were in fact a part of the Army equipment, and although they were designated for use in Civil Affairs in Southern France, we would not be permitted to make any arrangements for the sale of these trucks to French commercial firms prior to the receipt of specific instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. . . . Further, that the Civil Affairs transport group would be fully responsible for the maintenance, operation and accounting for these vehicles and spare parts. . . . Realizing that we should never be able to obtain sufficient American or British personnel to adequately control and operate these vehicles, a plan was devised by the Transportation Section to request from the French cadres of officers and enlisted men to form two Groupes des Transports, the equivalent of an American truck battalion—I say the equivalent but it was much larger than a truck battalion.

General Cochet approved of this plan and took immediate steps to have necessary officers assigned by the Ministry of War. It was then proposed by the undersigned officer that a school be established and conducted by the transportation committee for the purpose of instructing these assigned French officers in the administration and maintenance of vehicles in accordance with existing Army Ordnance regulations. The school was formed and conducted in Algiers during the first week in August. It was attended by six officers and 12 enlisted men. . . . After the finish of the schools . . . final instructions and authority were given to the groupe commanders to begin requisitioning of garages, hiring of drivers and completion of their garages immediately upon their entry into the country. After arriving in Marseille we made immediate contact with the group commanders whom we found were already here and carrying out their instructions and plans. . . . The first trucks to arrive were brought over from Italy where they had been erroneously shipped . . . and were turned over

<sup>13</sup> It was reported that ammunition trains between Marseille and Lyon were returning empty whereas surplus fresh fruits and vegetables available in the Lyon area could well have been brought into the deficit area. By the middle of October tonnage allowances were provided not only for shipment of surplus products to the south but for Civil Affairs stocks to be sent north.

to our groups after being serviced on 13 October 44. . . . We were informed at 8 o'clock on the morning of 15 October 44 that two ships from the Mid-East were in Marseille Harbor containing . . . a total of 220 of our vehicles. Having assigned to us at that time only three qualified American maintenance officers and eight mechanics it can be easily imagined the amount of work that this small group of men were expected to accomplish. . . . After three different attempts and numerous arguments with the Army we finally obtained suitable parking space and garage facilities. . . . While we were in the middle of servicing the first 220 vehicles we received word from Toulon that the balance of our trucks, which would bring us up to a total of 556, were being off-loaded at Toulon. This again threw the operation into complete confusion . . . since neither the space nor facilities were adequate for the additional vehicles. . . .

Some of the problems encountered at Toulon were the lack in that city of trained civilian mechanics and of adequate civilian tools. The mechanic problem was solved with German POW's and the tools were badgered, scrounged and begged from the Ordnance. . . . The plan of distribution devised in North Africa was seen to be completely impracticable since in that plan the supply committee had decided on the establishment of various depots and sub-depots throughout the territory and the trucks could be more efficiently used by working directly from these depots and sub-depots. With the arrival of the supplies and their immediate turnover to the French it was seen that the main problem then involved would be—first, port clearance and secondly the distribution of the supplies from the main warehouses at Toulon and Marseille to the various regions. The second problem would be the gathering in from the various areas the indigenous supplies, vegetables, etc. It was therefore decided to distribute the groups as follows: Two companies consisting of 88 trucks each in Marseille; one company of 88 trucks in Toulon. These three companies comprise the Groupe de Transport 521 in Marseille. The other Groupe de Transport, or 522 Groupe, was to have its headquarters in Lyon. Its companies would be established with two companies remaining in Lyon and the northern region and one company to be established in Montpellier. . . . This plan was put into operation and companies established. Since that time a great many changes have been made. . . . The operation as a whole was almost impossible to control. Sufficiently trained American maintenance officers and mechanics were impossible to obtain. \* \* \*

. . . Our organization, while still being inadequately staffed, is nevertheless accomplishing work and in such amounts that it is being noticeably appreciated by French officials throughout the southern zone. A compliment by a senior officer not long ago . . . stated in a few words a great deal of praise. He said, "everywhere you travel now in southern France you see in *operation* our Civil Affairs trucks." \* \* \*

#### LACK OF A SATISFACTORY LABOR POLICY PUTS AN ADDITIONAL STRAIN ON CAHQ

[Hist of CA Ops for Southern Fr, pt. V]

Largest of the CAHQ sections, the Services and Supply Branch, also was charged with handling such functions as labor, communications, public works, utilities and solid fuels. Labor was probably the most ticklish.

Several successive crises occurred in this field. Controversial questions involving U.S. Army jurisdiction, wage policies, recruiting methods, union recognition, etc., had to be solved.

. . . The army urgently required skilled stvedores for the docks, mechanics for ordnance shops, common laborers for railheads and depots as well as scores of other classifications. It needed thousands upon thousands of men but, unfortunately, the local labor market was both limited and of poor quality. There could be no denying the truth of the French statement that the cream of Marseille workers were prisoners of war, had been drafted for forced labor by the Germans, or had joined the FFI. The remaining number was small and markedly inefficient.

In addition, at the moment of liberation, there was no working governmental machinery for recruiting such workers as remained nor was there any over-all policy governing the U.S. Army's labor relationships. The situation was both difficult and vexatious. \* \* \*

The French were startled to find that the plan laboriously agreed on earlier [in Algiers] was apparently to be discarded or, at least, delayed. However, they were persuaded to begin the recruitment of workers while CAHQ requested AFHQ to get a ruling on the matter from SHAEF.

The recruitment commenced under French control but with CAHQ assistance. It went slowly, due in large part to public confusion over wage rates, working hours, etc. Day by day, though, slowly it mounted until on September 17th, end of the first payroll period, the Army had been supplied with 7,000 civilian workers. \* \* \*

#### CAO'S MAKE PERSONAL APPEALS TO LOCAL OFFICIALS FOR LABOR TO UNLOAD ARMY SUPPLIES

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. II]

\* \* \* On August 19, CAHQ told AFHQ that, "Owing to the speed of the advance, the Army requires several thousand laborers to unload quickly supplies in ships in the harbor off the beaches near St.-Tropez. Since the towns are small and since food is scarce there has been considerable difficulty in securing this labor . . . Major Bennett is touring the area, appealing to the FFI leaders for aid, and organizing a program for the registration of labor."<sup>14</sup>

Bennett and other CAO's actually drove from town to town along the coast and for 30 miles inland, appealing to local officials to get Frenchmen to volunteer for Army labor.

This was a difficult task in that the low wages offered and the hard type of labor expected did not attract many workers. So difficult was the task, in fact, that heated debates raged at CAHQ and G-5, Seventh Army, over whether or not to urge the Cochet Mission to institute labor conscription. This was urged by some as military necessity and opposed by others as undemocratic. The opposition carried the day and no such recommendation was made. \* \* \*

[CA Rpt on Liberated Areas, 18-23 Aug 44]

\* \* \* At the present time, it appears that voluntary workers will not reach the required number; accordingly, beach labor is being requisitioned by the French authorities. Such workers are being classified as dock workers. As such, it is planned to pay them 10 francs per hour, plus two francs for the family allowance. Rations are not available in sufficient quantities to serve the noon meal to workers. \* \* \*

#### FIRST ESTIMATES OF LABOR REQUIREMENTS FOR MARSEILLE ARE EXORBITANT

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

\* \* \* there was considerable confusion over CBS' actual labor requirements. Upon arrival in Marseille, the Base Section's Branch chiefs deliberately overestimated their labor needs as a guarantee against possible future shortages.

<sup>14</sup> Civil Affairs report covering the period 18-23 August stated that labor registrations had been instituted in St.-Tropez, Ste.-Maxime, Plan-de-la-Tour, La Garde Freinet, St.-Raphaël, Frejus, Le Muy, and Draguignan.

The first estimate of CBS labor requirements was given to CAHQ on 27 August, while Marseille was still a battleground. . . .<sup>15</sup> This estimate was exorbitant and later changed repeatedly, thereby making the task of CAHQ's labor officers far more complicated than it should have been. CAHQ's labor specialists have since observed that careful evaluation of future labor requirements, made jointly by CBS and CAHQ in advance of the landings, would have avoided many subsequent difficulties.

CBS insisted that it wanted all these workers and that it wanted them in a hurry. CAHQ, therefore, undertook to find them and set about stimulating a reorganization of the French labor machinery. Its efforts along these lines finally succeeded when representatives of the National Ministry of Labor arrived to take charge themselves.

Initially CAHQ claimed complete jurisdiction over the recruitment of all workers—as well as over the setting of all army labor policies—however, the staff readily acceded to the demand of CBS that its Base Purchasing Agent be made the sole army hiring agency because it knew full well that it lacked sufficient personnel to man the employment offices. \* \* \*

#### DISSATISFACTION WITH LOCAL LABOR RESULTS IN USE OF ITALIAN POW'S

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

\* \* \* Delays in the preparation of the payrolls, plus misunderstandings of the rates followed by the Army (the French had changed the wage levels just at this time) contributed to worker unrest and resulted in several spontaneous stoppages. These, combined with the notorious laziness of Marseille workers, their reluctance to work on Sundays and often on Mondays, too, their refusal to work in the rain (due in part to a lack of raincoats and boots), their demands for two-hour lunch periods, infuriated CBS officers who had to get ships unloaded and supplies moving.

They resolved to expedite the arrival in Southern France of trained units with personnel comprised of Italian prisoners of war, 28,700 in all. This decision was alarming to CAHQ because

<sup>15</sup> The figures are given in Memo, CO, 2678th CA Regt., to G-5, AFHQ, 27 Aug 44, filed in SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, D-6.

of the intense anti-Italian feeling among the populace. \* \* \*

. . . Despite the early fears, no serious troubles involving them occurred. \* \* \*

[Memo, RRO [Regional Relief Officer] Marseille, to ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. F-7]

. . . trained service units, comprising 28,700 Italian prisoners of war, are expected here by D plus 60. . . .

It is planned that some 14,000 will be employed in Marseille and the others at Dijon.

The decision to proceed with early plans to bring in the Italians was apparently taken with great reluctance and over the objections of CBS G-2, CIC, and the CBS Civil Affairs police officer that the presence of the Italians would be likely to provoke rioting.

Reasons cited for the decision to bring them in are general dissatisfaction with CBS' present civilian employees and conviction that it would be impossible to find 14,000 additional workers here. \* \* \*

The Army's plans in this regard were outlined to M. Aubrac at yesterday's regular conference. The first announcement came as a great shock to M. Massinet [Massenet] and others on Aubrac's staff but M. Massinet agreed that it would be quite impossible to find 14,000 more civilian workers here. He also declared that he could well understand the Army's feeling that its present civilian employees are anything but satisfactory. . . .

M. Aubrac concurred and said finally that the French Government would not object to bringing in Italian POW's under the following conditions:

1. That present civilian employees are not discharged.

2. That the Italians are treated strictly as POW's, kept under heavy guard (also for their protection), wear uniforms marked POW, and are not fed better than French civilians.

3. That they work in the port or at Army installations and not be used as truck drivers working separately around the city.

He said that if the Army needs truck drivers, he will make a great effort to find 500-1000 of them. \* \* \*

Late last night, Aubrac's position was reported to Colonel Wickersham in the absence of Colonel [Royce P.] Gerfen. Wickersham felt that the

three conditions (with the exception of the question of rations) were acceptable to CBS. In the matter of truck drivers, he said that the Italians would be employed only in convoys under heavy MP escort.

#### IN THE ABSENCE OF A LABOR POLICY, WHO PAYS THE WORKERS?

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. V]

\* \* \* In evolving a labor policy satisfactory, both to the French and to the U.S. Army, the biggest problem CAHQ had to meet was the question of who was to pay these workers—the American Army or the French Government. Involved in this question was the ticklish subject of payment of various French social and wage taxes, family allowances, etc.

Conversations between French labor officials and CAHQ labor officers in Algiers had produced a draft of a plan by which the French agreed to pay the U.S. Army's civilian employees, charging the funds so dispensed to reverse lend lease. The plan would have permitted the Army, under certain circumstances, to pay its workers directly at wage levels fixed by the various regional commissioners. In this latter instance, however, it was to deduct from each employee's wage the social security tax, and the government wage tax, but to add a "vacation indemnity." A copy of its payroll was to be given the French who would pay these workers, their family allowances, and workmen's compensation.

Unfortunately, the draft of this plan had not been finished by the time the first CAHQ officers left Africa for France.

On their arrival in Marseille, they knew little about the plan except what was told them by a French labor official who had participated in the Algiers talks. Their reaction was that they lacked authority under the governing SHAEF policies to commit the Army to such a drastic change of policy. \* \* \*

Meanwhile, the proposed labor policy was discussed at length with CBS. Its officers, in the main, were strongly opposed to it and preferred to continue the traditional methods of the Army meeting its own payrolls, without any of the deductions and additions called for under traditional French social legislation. However, they eventually were persuaded to follow CAHQ policy provided that it was in accordance with SHAEF wishes.

When the first payday arrived, no decision had yet come from SHAEF. Accordingly, it was determined with French consent, that the Army would pay the workers directly. \* \* \*

#### WAGE RATES ARE REVISED UPWARD

[Servs and Sup Branch, Report, Sixth U.S. AGp, 23 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, app. F-5]

1. Wage payments by the Army for the first payroll period ending 17 September 1944 are now being made and in a few smaller installations have been completed. Revised wage rates have been released by the French Labor Office and in some categories show an increase. Especially is this the case with common labor where the hourly rate moves up from 12.5 francs to 16 francs. . . .

3. There is some indication that a shortage of skilled labor exists. However, the payment of increased wage rates, feeding and payment of social benefits, if and when directed, may bring sufficient skilled workers to the fore. Surely a well defined labor policy consistent with French law together with more realistic wage scales will improve labor relations. \* \* \*

#### FRENCH WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN LABOR

[Ltr, ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, to Chief, Servs and Sup Branch, CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, F-8]

1. On 13 September 1944, cable FWD 14723 from SHAEF to AFHQ stated that "where Seventh Army is certain that French regional or local organizations are in position to pay civilian employees and accept burden of administering social security payments, Seventh Army may agree to French assuming such payments and obligations."

3. Having examined the question of the capacity of the French national, regional, and local authorities in the Region of Marseille to make payment of the wages of civilians employed by the armed forces and to fulfill the burden of administering social security payments on account of such employees, it has been determined at this headquarters that those authorities are in a position to make all such payments. The employing arms and services are, accordingly, free to permit the French national, regional, and local authorities in the Region of Marseille to assume such payments and obligations.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Following in large part procedures laid down in Algiers, the French were authorized to meet the U.S. Army's 1 October payroll.

#### AT LAST, A LABOR DIRECTIVE IS ISSUED

[Provisional Directive for Civ Labor, CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 3 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt V, F-10]

1. The following provisional directive is published under the authority of cable FWD 14723 from SHAEF to AFHQ, dated 13 September 1944, for the preparation of French payrolls for civilian employees in Southern France.

2. The Civil Affairs Section will make every effort to assist the military forces to procure whatever labor they require, to make available labor for essential civilian needs; to prevent work stoppages in civilian operations; to assist the local authorities in alleviating unemployment; to maintain the system of Social Security and Workmen's Compensation Benefits and Contributions; to re-establish labor exchanges or employment offices and other governmental agencies required to accomplish the above.

a. The above will be accomplished to the fullest extent possible by reliance upon the French authorities and the efforts of Civil Affairs officers will be confined to liaison relationship.

3. Method of Procuring Civilian Labor.

a. Necessary civilian labor will be furnished by the French Office of Labor and Manpower. In communities where such offices are not established, labor will be procured through the Mayor.

b. By direct hiring, emergent cases only, when labor is not available under a above.

c. The use of private contractors will be adopted only in circumstances permitting no other efficient manner of accomplishing the work; however, such contractors working for components of the Army will be bound by all labor and social security laws and regulations and all undertakings with such contractors will contain a provision insuring compliance with these laws and regulations.

4. Wage Rates.

a. Wage rates in every instance will be those legal French rates existing in the Regions and Departments according to zone and skill classifications. Wage rates will be secured from the French Regional Labor Office. Changes in wage rates will be made by French authorities only.

5. Payment of Wages.

a. Wages usually will be paid by the French Office of Labor and Manpower.

b. However, in the case of direct hiring, wages will be paid by the using Arm or Service.

c. In both instances the using Army and Service will submit payrolls for each payroll period to the French Office of Labor and Man-

power on forms to be supplied by the French authorities.

d. The deduction for worker's wage tax and social security contributions and the payment of vacation indemnity will be made by the employing service only in cases of direct hiring.

e. In every instance the French authorities will be responsible for the payment of social security and workmen's compensation benefits and family allowances.

6. Workmen's Compensation.

a. All accidents or compensable occupational diseases arising out of or in the course of employment shall be reported immediately to the French Office of Labor and Manpower on forms provided by French authorities.

7. Conditions of Employment.

a. Normal work week is 48 hours; six days of 8 hours each, exclusive of meal time or time of travel to and from the job. *Work week* begins on *Monday* and ends on *Sunday*.

b. Overtime will be paid for all time worked over 48 hours in any *work week*.

c. Overtime rates will be paid as follows:

(1) *Day Work*

10% increase on basic day rate for work performed over 48 hours between hours 0500 and 2200.

(2) *Night Work*

25% increase on basic *day* rate for work performed over 48 hours between hours of 2200 and 0500.

(3) Sundays and holidays for night workers will be considered as beginning on the night of such Sunday or holiday and ending the following morning.

8. Termination of employment.

a. All workers shall receive one week's notice except as follows:

b. Fortnightly (14 days) workers employed for at least six weeks shall receive two weeks' notice.

c. Monthly workers employed for at least six weeks shall receive two weeks' notice and if employed for three months or longer they shall receive one month's notice.

9. Meals and rations will not be provided to workers unless directed by the Commanding General in areas as he may deem necessary. When meals and rations are provided the cost of them will be deducted from the worker's wages at prices approved by the French authorities.

10. Instructions for the preparation of French payrolls will be published by this headquarters as may be required.

FIRST CIVILIAN FOOD SUPPLIES ARRIVE AT ST. TROPEZ

[CAHQ to SACMED, Rpt, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

\* \* \* SCAO Continental Base Section arrived on August 25 with four other officers (Allied) and two French officers from the staff of General Cochet. The SCAO immediately took charge of unloading the Liberty Ship, *William Pender*, which had just arrived with 5,000 tons of civilian food supplies. The unloading is proceeding satisfactorily at St.-Tropez and SCAO CBS proposes to establish himself and his men there until the arrival of additional staff on D plus 15, at which time he will move to Marseille. Four CAO's and some vehicles arrived from Oran today. One CAO is being sent to join the Airborne Division in the Nice-Cannes area. He [SCAO] proposed that another will be assigned to wind up the labor recruitment program for the beaches and the remaining two will move on to Marseille and Toulon. . . . SCAO Army B has also arrived and has taken his place at G-5, Army B. \* \* \*

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF FOOD SITUATION IN MARSEILLE

[Memo, Adv Ech, 2678th CA Regt., 25 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.17, Hist Rpts]

\* \* \* as of 20 August, there was enough flour to last until September 1 on the basis of the present ration of 150 grams per person per day.<sup>17</sup> \* \* \*

There were also 20,000 kilograms of special flour for children.

There were 150,000 cans of condensed milk, said to be a 10 days' supply for children up to 18 months. . . .

There were 150 tons of frozen beef. Sixty-six tons will be consumed tomorrow in a 90-gram per capita distribution, the first distribution of meat here in at least two months.

There is only enough olive oil on hand to permit a distribution of 100 grams per person (possibly 300 grams). . . .

<sup>17</sup> Upon receipt of Allied imported flour shortly after liberation, the bread ration was raised to 200, then to 250 and 300, until finally, by 1 November, it had reached 350 grams a day. The Services and Supply Branch handled all phases of the import program except accounting, which was a function of the Economics and Finance Branch, and the unloading of supplies and turnover to the French authorities, which was supervised by the Port Detachment.

There are no dried vegetables and virtually no wine.

This situation of low food levels may possibly be eased through the requisition of certain supplies belonging to the Swiss government, provided that they have not been destroyed. \* \* \*

During the morning, a report came through to the Supply authorities that 15,000 people in the Endeume section of Marseille were isolated and facing famine. Accordingly, a fervent request was sent to the commander of French troops requesting him to send food—supplied by the city—to this section in a tank column. \* \* \*

#### ALPES-MARITIMES DEPARTMENT POSES A FOOD PROBLEM

[CAO, 1st ABTF, Report to ACofS, G-5, Seventh Army, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-10]

Food is probably scarcer in the Nice area and in the Department of Alpes-Maritimes than in any other region of France. To date, since the invasion in the South, 70 tons of flour have been received in Nice and Cannes, which has been the basis of a distribution of 175 grams in Nice last week, and 125 grams so far this week, of bread per person. Last Saturday, 3 September, 200 grams of "pâtes" were distributed but so far in September no other foodstuffs have been available. Since the 1st of August only 75 grams of meat have been given out. Now in the process of distribution are 250 grams per person of "confiture" (against FE ration card) and 90 grams of meat. Preparations are being made for the distribution of milk to children for the first ration period of September. Cards are now being given out for the month of September.<sup>18</sup> \* \* \*

\* \* \* A number of U.S. citizens are presenting themselves to the CAO requesting food. In Nice there are a number of American women, married to Frenchmen, who chose to remain in the country during the German occupation. They now request the Army to furnish them with extra rations. Our policy has been to explain that,

<sup>18</sup> Since there had been no bread ration in Cannes for ten days, no bread was available except on the black market. In the Grasse area there was sufficient bread for a week or ten days and in Draguignan sufficient food for the same period. At Nice, when Allied food arrived, the people got their first taste of bread in twelve days, and their first white bread in years. Farther inland the situation was not so critical but in the coastal cities there was no reserve supply of either flour or meat.

on the part of the Army, no official differentiation can be made between these people and the French citizens who draw rations in the same manner through the civil supply channels, and that the Army has no supplies to place at the disposition of American citizens.

#### AFTER NEARLY TWO MONTHS, THE SITUATION IN THE NICE AREA IS STILL CRITICAL

[CA Liaison Officer, Nice, Report to CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-11]

The food situation for this department is catastrophic. There are 425,000 people who are living on starvation rations and without an increase in diet we can expect severe reactions from the entire population against the American Government. It is a well-established fact that the people ate better under the Nazi occupation, though the black market was running rampant, but we are now employing all facilities to halt the black market and they no longer can rely on this source of food.<sup>19</sup> \* \* \*

#### CAO OBTAINS FOOD FROM ARMY SALVAGE STOCKS FOR EVACUEES FROM THE FRONT<sup>20</sup>

[Liaison Officer, Alpes-Maritimes Dept, Rpt, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-12]

On 1 Oct 44, we took our Weapons Carrier to the Ration Dump at Ste.-Maxime and returned with 514 cans of emergency stocks to be used in connection with evacuees from the front. Last Sunday, 8 Oct 44, three more vehicles were added to the Weapons Carrier—a 2½-ton truck borrowed from the MP Company and two gazogene camions belonging to the Ravitaillement Général. We also took 8 men along to load the trucks. We returned with the following items, all taken from salvage: Milk—4448

<sup>19</sup> About a week later, the liaison officer reported that the situation in Nice had improved but was still critical, not from a shortage of American products but because of inadequate transport. The bread ration had been increased from 100 to 350 grams for workers, and from 50 to 300 grams for adults; it remained at 250 grams for small children. Also, a ration of American meat was to be issued twice a month, as well as a little soap and sugar. Local newspapers accused the American forces of not allowing the French people sufficient transportation for food shipments. To determine the exact situation throughout the Alpes-Maritimes Department, Colonel Parkman was directed to make a personal survey. His report, dated 29 October, is included herein.

<sup>20</sup> See AFHQ Interim Directive, 20 August 1944, in Section 1, above.

cans; Corned beef—1462 cans (3 kgs each); Meat and Vegetable Stew—4500 cans; Vegetables (large size)—115 cans; Miscellaneous (sausage, jams, etc.)—150 cans.

The plan of distribution briefly will be this: the Ravitaillement Général . . . and the Directeur des Services Sanitaires . . . will jointly control distribution to the hospitals, the children and the needy. The exact plan was worked out in my office and is now being prepared by these gentlemen for the approval of the Mayor. I personally have confidence that this food will get to those who need it most. \* \* \*

[Ltr, Sr Rgnl Liaison Officer, Alpes-Maritimes, to Chief, Econ & Finance Branch, Sixth AGp, 19 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, vol. II, Jkt VI, M-13]

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter requesting further information concerning some food recently gotten from army salvage. I shall answer the questions in their order:

a. Who had title to the food issued?

The U.S. Army Quartermaster Ration Dump.

b. Was issue made out of Army stocks or stocks that had previously been turned over to IMPEX?

Issue was made at my request from *salvage stocks*, which means canned goods not in cases due to breakage of cases, dented or otherwise not suitable for distribution to the Army. It had not previously been turned over to IMPEX.

2. Who operates the salvage dump?

It is not a salvage dump. It was the Ste.-Maxime QM ration dump and all ration dumps acquire some salvage which they stock in an open field and it becomes a problem. Therefore they are willing if the cause is just to let me have some of it for the use mentioned in report.

3. Any other information of value to determine whether Allied authority must account for the civilian supplies mentioned in your report?

I believe I have given all the facts. However, I simply went to the dumps with 4 trucks, loaded them, returned to Cannes and turned stock over to the Ravitaillement. The next morning the chiefs of the Ravitaillement and Health Depts., together with the French Liaison Officer and myself agreed that this small amount of food-stuff should be given by direct issue to the hospitals, the children and the needy. The Ravitaillement delivers an order from Dr. Advier, the chief of the Health and Welfare Dept. I received a receipt for the whole stock and I

also received original copies of the orders for distribution. \* \* \*

#### RUMORS OF CIVIL OUTBREAK IN ALPES-MARITIMES NOT JUSTIFIED

[Ltr, Parkman, ACofS, G-5, to CofS, Sixth AGp, 29 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 17.18, Jkt 1]

Pursuant to oral orders from the CG on 25 Oct 44 and further instructions contained in Memorandum of the same date from G-4 Section . . . the undersigned left this Hq at 1200 hours 25 Oct and proceeded directly to Nice, arriving at 1630 hours. On arrival he reported at once by telephone to Major General Frederick and arrangements were made for morning conference on 27 Oct. The evening was spent in conference with M. Geguen, Directeur du Ravitaillement for the Department of Alpes-Maritimes (A-M) in company with the Civil Affairs Officer, 1 ABTF (Capt. Welch), and the Liaison Officer for Nice (Capt. Pritchard), and in personal reconnaissance and interviews with local citizens. In the morning of 27 Oct. conference was held with General Frederick, after which the undersigned conferred with the Departmental Prefect, M. Escande, and the Commissaire Régional de la République for the region of Marseille, M. Aubrac, who was in Nice for a short visit. After report to General Fredericks the undersigned took off for Marseille, arriving at 1400 hours 27 Oct. At Marseille conferences were held with the Supply and Transport officers of Civil Affairs Headquarters, with Brig. General [John P.] Ratay, Commanding the Delta Base Section, and with members of his staff, and a meeting was held with Commandant Soulmagnon, representative of the National Ministry of Ravitaillement for the Southern Zone of France. The undersigned departed from Marseille at 1030 hours 28 Oct., arriving at Vittel airport at 1600 hours, after calling at Lyon for conference with the Chief Supply Officer of Civil Affairs Headquarters.

2. General Frederick expresses his concern on two points, in particular:

(a) The feeding of the population of Monaco. Was a fair allocation being made to Monaco of imported food stocks and other produce available to the Department of A-M? Could a decision be made one way or another on the question of whether Monaco would come under the Department of A-M for the distribution of food supply or whether it could deal directly and

independently with the Regional authorities at Marseille?

(b) Possible unrest among the population of Nice due to uncertainty of food supplies. Could a long range program, for three or four months, be laid down which would enable the local authorities to get away from their present hand to mouth existence?

3. On the points raised in 2 (a) above, the undersigned satisfied himself by direct questioning of M. Aubrac, M. Escande, and M. Geguen, and by personal check of the figures that the allocation of imported food supplies to Monaco was done on a fair and equitable basis. . . . On the question of Monaco dealing directly with Marseille, the decision of M. Aubrac and M. Escande was definitely in the negative. This seems sound to the undersigned as the Monagesques number only about 2,000 as against 18,000 French, and it would be poor administration to allow so small a number the special privilege of direct dealing, when all other communities were administered by the Department.

4. On the point raised in 2 (b) above, there is no question that the Regional and Departmental authorities would be only too glad to make firm plans on a quarterly basis instead of monthly or weekly as is now the case. However, as they pointed out, it would be unsound to do so, and even more unwise to publish a long term program, in the light of all the uncertainties of transport, both by sea and by land. Failure to make good on a published program would even be more disastrous to public confidence than the present uncertainty. M. Geguen has endeavored and is endeavoring to keep the public fully informed on the facts by a series of radio talks, which seem to have a good effect and to have been well received. . . .

5. General Frederick expressed himself as satisfied when the decisions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 were reported to him.

#### 6. *Status of Food Supply in Nice Area.*

a. *From liberation to date.* There has been a steady and substantial increase in the foodstuffs made available to the population of Nice. . . . [as best evidenced by the tables appended at Tab "D."] In addition, the undersigned was convinced by talks with men and women on the street that, in literal translation, "Everything goes better." The people in their conversation are always talking food, but one hears, or overhears, constant reference to the improvement since the days of the Germans, or "since the Americans arrived." A visit to the local market showed a quantity of vegetables and fruit for sale at reasonable prices, grapes, pears, figs, onions, pota-

toes, squash, and an apparent delicacy called "pissaladière." There is, of course, a great lack of meat, sugar, and fats. The distribution of 300 gr. of olive oil in October was the first in several months.

b. *For November.* There is considerable concern expressed about food supply for November. However, the undersigned sees no reason why this concern should be any greater for November than it has been for previous months. In fact, it should be less. Twenty-two 2½-ton trucks, allocated by the CCS for Civil Affairs, have been recently turned over to the Department to be used in bringing in supplies from outlying regions. M. Geguen informed the undersigned that the olive oil about to be harvested ought to total 1,000 tons. The newspapers of 27 Oct. carried the news that 200 tons of potatoes had arrived at St.-Raphaël, and . . . [a] letter from Civil Affairs Hq. . . . confirmed M. Geguen, indicates that the Paris Ministry has allocated 12,612 tons of potatoes to the Department of A-M. Imported supplies are behind schedule and there is no reserve, but ships now discharging flour and wheat assure continuance of the present ration of bread of 300 grams a day. There seems to be no cause for serious alarm.

7. *Transportation of Food Supplies.* The solution to the problems of Nice (as, in fact, of all areas in Southern France) lies in the provision of transportation, particularly rail. Stocks of potatoes are available to the Department in the Regions of Dijon, Clermont, Châlons-sur-Marne, etc. Cheese is available in quantity at Lons-le-Saunier. Chestnuts are ready for shipment in the Department of Lot. All these cases have been reported to Civil Affairs Headquarters and to French Regional authorities, and the method of obtaining rail transport, through their own channels for North to South movement, has been made clear to them. It is believed arrangements are now in train to provide the transportation needed to bring these supplies from the interior and north of France to San Raphaël, whence they will move by truck to Nice.

8. *Coal.* As suggested by General [Clarence L.] Adcock, Sète can be used as a shipping point for the coal which is badly needed at Nice to manufacture gas for cooking purposes. Latest information obtained by the undersigned is that minesweeping began 25 Oct. and the port should be ready by 8 Nov. The undersigned, by cable to SHAEF G-5, requested they support the demand made on the French Ministry of Communications by the Departmental authorities that the coaster *Ville de Bastia* now in the port of Sète be assigned to the run. This vessel can carry about

1,800 tons or a month's supply for the minimum requirements of Nice for cooking gas. Efforts are also being made to work out rail transportation by a devious route from the mines at St-Etienne, with transshipment by truck at two stages en route due to the destruction of bridges.

9. To summarize, the difficult situation at and about Nice is not to be minimized. The area is almost completely dependent on imports from outside and its means of communication and transport are badly cut off or damaged. However, the people are not starving even though they may not be plentifully fed and there is, in the writer's opinion, no basis for fearing any outbreak or serious unrest. Civil authorities are alert to the difficulties, are endeavoring to solve them, and are being actively assisted by Civil Affairs Headquarters, Sixth Army Group. . . .

#### OTHER PROBLEMS—BUT NONE SO GREAT AS ANTICIPATED

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. VII]

\* \* \* utilities and public works experts . . . found the French officials quite competent to handle the reconstruction of war damaged facilities. As a result, they concentrated largely on surveys of the utility situation. \* \* \*

CAHQ communications experts worked closely with the Army Signal officers in arranging for military use of civilian lines and later in developing policies for their restoration to the French. They also collaborated with G-2 on plans for the resumption of mail services. \* \* \*

The housing of troops and installation was a matter of primary importance and controversy to the Army and the French both. Requisitioning of space by the Army was often unwise and extravagant; complaints by the French often unfounded and selfish. The Economics and Finance Branch of CAHQ had the job of trying to mediate the opposing views. \* \* \*

At one time it was proposed that a mediation board comprising representatives of the Base Section, the Regional Government and CAHQ be established to study these requisitioning complaints. The proposal, made by CAHQ, was never consummated as the French insisted that the Board be given arbitrary powers, a demand to which the Commanding General of the Base Section naturally refused to accede. \* \* \*

More success attended efforts of the E&F [Economics and Finance] officers to have the French set price ceilings for such soldier needs as barbering, dry cleaning, laundry service and

drinks. In general, the prices were adhered to by the civilians.

At the request of the French, CAHQ arranged with CBS to forbid soldiers from entering French restaurants and eating the depleted local food stocks. This move worked out well, as can be seen in an E&F memorandum, dated October 4: "Eighteen restaurants and cafés were checked in the downtown areas of Marseille during dinner and supper time. Only one soldier was seen in a café and he was not eating. No sailors were seen eating in restaurants."

Through the efforts of CAHQ, Army purchases of French foodstuffs were confined solely to those items—vegetables and fruits—in which a surplus existed. It was the responsibility of the E&F Branch to determine whether such surpluses existed. When the harvest season ended, these surpluses vanished and CAHQ saw to it that the Army returned to its usual diet of imported foods.

In pursuance of SHAEF and AFHQ policy, CAHQ also started a drive to curtail any purchases, except those of drinks, by American soldiers in French stores. \* \* \*

. . . The CA representatives were empowered by SHAEF to discuss with the French [during the planning phase] solely the implementation of policies laid down by SHAEF. They evolved the arrangements for the use of Allied supplemental francs and stamps in France, plans for emergency credit arrangements of private enterprises, accounting and auditing procedures, financial reports and property control. \* \* \*

Some difficulties did arise shortly after the liberation in connection with the use of Allied supplemental currency. . . . As a general rule, the Allied franc was readily accepted by the population. However, the CAHQ weekly summary of September 17 says: "It is apparent in many parts of Southern France that the population does not have an adequate understanding of the status of the supplemental franc. As a result, in some areas it circulates at a distinct premium and in others, it is not readily accepted—the latter only in the places where Allied troops have not entered. AFHQ has been requested to urge the French Government to issue a clear statement on this matter. . . ."

Acting at AFHQ's request, the Paris Government issued instructions clarifying the status of the Allied franc, and their acceptance generally became an accepted fact. . . .

In addition to the financial and requisitioning problems, the E&F Branch made a number of surveys of French industries, their potentialities and their needs. In liaison with the Ministry of

Production, it started the wheels moving for the importation of necessary raw materials and machinery. \* \* \*

The E&F Branch was charged with still another duty. It had to safeguard the property of United Nations nationals until American, British and other consuls arrived on the scene and could handle this work themselves.

Working with the Swiss consul, who had protected Allied interests in Southern France during the German occupation, E&F officers toured up and down the Riviera, checking on the condition of Allied homes and other property, making arrangements for their future safeguarding. On one occasion, several headquarters officers, as well as a number of regional officers were directed in a "priority order" to make an immediate quest for information on the property of the Duke of Windsor, scattered as it was from Toulouse to Grenoble to the Riviera. Consisting of houses, "furniture, *objets d'art* and souvenirs," it was found in good condition. On another occasion, they were asked to check on Lord Beaverbrook's villa on the Riviera. \* \* \*

Extensive plans for handling streams of refugees had been drawn up in Algiers at conferences between members of the Cochet Mission and officers of the CAHQ Welfare and Displaced Persons Branch.

From the very first days after the landings, though, it was readily evident that no great difficulties would be encountered in that line. . . .

Some misgivings were felt in connection with some 135,000 refugees from the bomb-and-shell battered city of Toulon who had been evacuated to the Departments of Drôme, Isère and Ardèche before the debarkment. . . .

These misgivings were largely unfounded. The French officials maintained competent control throughout the South. \* \* \*

Since the French were geared to do such a good job, the Welfare activities at CAHQ were largely confined to surveys and spot-checks. \* \* \*

By CAHQ definition, a displaced person was one of another nationality than French who did not reside normally in France. While there were not huge numbers of them in the Sixth Army Group zone, there were at least 20,000 Italians who had formerly been POW's of the Germans, 8,000 to 10,000 Poles, over 5,000 Belgians, several thousand Russians as well as smaller groups of Czechs and other nationalities. . . .

On September 10, in the weekly CAHQ summary, there is a comment that "Displaced persons problems are not receiving adequate attention. . . ." Not only were the French largely disinterested but so was CAHQ. Lt. Col. Aronson

himself later said, "The French and we both ignored the displaced persons problem as militarily unimportant." \* \* \*

CAHQ had the aid of liaison officers from the Belgian, Polish, Dutch and Czechoslovakian governments in dealing with displaced persons of those nationalities. These men were attached to CAHQ by SHAEF directive and acted under its orders. . . .

As early as August 10, Lt. Col. Aronson foresaw a big Russian problem and cabled AFHQ asking for a Russian liaison officer. He repeated the request again from France after he had encountered hundreds and hundreds of Russian POW's of the Germans there. . . . Not until December, though, did a Russian liaison officer arrive.

The first big movement of people which the Branch had to handle came late in October when the Sixth Army Group took over responsibility for the Displaced Persons Center at Vittel. This was a former German internment camp with a population of some 2,000 persons, chiefly women and children of claimed British and American nationality. The Sixth Army Group decided that the inhabitants of the camp had to be moved farther to the rear. . . . Eventually it was decided to set the camp up at La Bourboule, Puy-de-Dôme. Some 700 persons were brought there by train and lodged in resort hotels after 1,200 others had been sent to their former homes in France or to other destinations of their own choice.

An ECAD detachment was brought in to run this camp, the only instance of the use of such a detachment. \* \* \*

Their very first surveys of health conditions along the coast as they drove from hospital to hospital, from one municipal public health office to another, indicated that CAHQ's problems in this field would be slight. Health conditions everywhere were generally good. \* \* \*

Only in medicine and hospital equipment were they short, and CAHQ was able to help remedy the dearth by supplying emergency medical units at first and later by importing more than 100 tons of key medical stocks. These were turned over to the Ministry of Public Health for distribution. \* \* \*

A summary of the work of the medical personnel at CAHQ indicated that their chief value was one of a preventative nature. By watching closely all incidence of communicable diseases, they were able to help safeguard the health of American troops and to stand ready to assist the French. \* \* \*

## 8. SHAEF ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY

### RAPID ADVANCE OF SEVENTH ARMY NECESSITATES CHANGE IN PLANS

[Komer, CA and MG in MTO]

\* \* \* It had been planned that when Seventh Army advanced beyond Lyon, the limit of the AFHQ zone, SHAEF would assume control of all operations in France. The speed of the advance was such that as early as the end of August [the Army] was operating in the SHAEF zone, far beyond the limits of the zone of communications in southern France. Accordingly, on 15 September SHAEF assumed operational control in southern France and made Sixth Army Group operational, with all Allied tactical forces in southern France under its command.<sup>21</sup> Since it was desirable to continue to supply these forces from the Mediterranean theater as long as that theater had excess reserves, AFHQ was to retain control of the administration and maintenance of the forces in southern France. It was also to be in control of civilian supply and civil affairs in general as long as it retained responsibility for the maintenance of these forces. Thus Sixth Army Group, while under tactical control of SHAEF, assumed responsibility to AFHQ in supply and civil affairs. . . .

In the latter part of September discussions took place between G-5 AFHQ and G-5 SHAEF on the final transfer of civil affairs responsibility. As the national administration, re-established in Paris, had abolished the missions for the Northern and Southern Zones and proposed to screen centrally all supply requisitions from regional prefects, SHAEF planned to use its Mission to France to centralize in Paris all Allied relations with the French Government. The elimination of AFHQ as an intermediate headquarters would enable the Allies to manage civil affairs on a national basis and conserve manpower. Accordingly, it was agreed that AFHQ would transfer its remaining civil affairs responsibilities in southern France to SHAEF as soon as SHAEF was in a position to handle all administrative and supply matters.

On 25 October the French Committee of National Liberation was recognized by the United

<sup>21</sup> The 6th Army Group had been activated in Corsica on 1 August 1944 and had followed the invading Seventh Army into France. SHAEF files, G-5, 504, 6th AGp Fld Rpts.

States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as the Provisional Government of France. On the same day, General de Gaulle signed a decree establishing a French zone of the interior [Chapter XXV, Section 7]. This merely confirmed a previous status, for the Allies had not found it necessary to invoke in the forward zones the powers vested by the civil affairs agreements in the Supreme Allied Command. \* \* \*

### THE ORIGINAL CIVIL AFFAIRS PLAN BECOMES EFFECTIVE

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. III]

\* \* \* practically all the personnel for the G-5 Section of the Sixth Army Group were drawn from CAHQ. Colonel Parkman became its ACofS (Assistant Chief of Staff) for G-5, Lt. Col. Mark Howe, Chief of the Law Branch, its DACofS (Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff) and various branch chiefs were given similar posts. Each of these officers continued to hold down their old assignments in CAHQ, too, with Colonel Parkman remaining CCAO and Commanding Officer of the regiment.<sup>22</sup>

The move to the Sixth Army Group carried with it additional prestige for CAHQ but it also created serious administrative difficulties. Since Colonel Parkman and the majority of his immediate staff had to spend most of their time at Sixth Army Group Headquarters, then situated 216 miles away at Lyon, "on the spot" leadership and decisions were often missing at CAHQ. It was a current complaint there that the organization was floundering for "lack of a boss."

In October, Sixth Army Group moved even farther away, this time to Vittel. In an effort to bridge the distance between the Commander and his unit, CAHQ moved to Lyon, and an acting DCCAO (Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer), Major (later Lt. Col.) Karl S. Cate was appointed. \* \* \*

<sup>22</sup> On 31 October 1944 the 2678th CA Regiment was disbanded and the 6837th CA Regiment organized on 1 November in the 6th Army Group. On 21 November the 6837th was relieved and the personnel reassigned to the Southern Line of Communications for duty with G-5 Staff Sections or detachments. Details will be found in the following files: Hq, 6th U.S. AGp, 320.2-1 (Oct 44) and SHAEF files, G-5, AG 370.5-27, CA Detachments and Units.

## SACMED RELIEVED OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS EXCEPT IMPORT OF SUPPLIES

[Directive, SHAEF to CG, ComZ, ETO, and CG, SHAEF Mission (Fr), 2 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, AG 014.1-1, Fr, folder 6]

1. Effective 0001A 1 November 1944, the Commanding General Communications Zone, ETO, is charged with responsibility for all Civil Affairs activities in the area designated in paragraph 2 hereof, and the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater, is relieved of such responsibility, except insofar as he has undertaken by Memoranda of Understanding of 24 September and 13 October 1944, and cable of 12 October 1944 (NAF 799) (the substance of which is set forth in Annexure A) to assume temporary responsibilities in connection with the import of civilian supplies into the designated area.

2. The area covered by this Directive (herein called the Designated Area), comprises the following named departments: Alpes-Maritimes, Var, Bouches-du-Rhône, Gard, Hérault, Aude, Pyrénées-Orientales, Ariège, Haute-Garonne, Tarn, Aveyron, Lozère, Ardèche, Drôme, Vaucluse, Basse-Alpes, Haute-Alpes, Savoie, Cantal, Haute-Savoie, Isère, Ain, Rhône, Loire, Haute-Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Allier, Saône-et-Loire, Côte-d'Or Doubs.<sup>23</sup>

## SACMED RELIEVED OF ALL RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

[SACMED, Report to CCS on Operations in Southern France, Aug 44, OCMH files]

\* \* \* It was decided that on 1 November my general administrative responsibility, apart from supply, might be terminated. Accordingly,

<sup>23</sup> CG, 6th Army Group, immediately requested clarification of this directive which appeared to divest him of responsibility for civil affairs in the departments named. On 13 November he received the following message: "CG, 6 Army Group has Civil Affairs responsibility within those portions of the 31 departments which now lie or may hereafter fall within army boundaries, and such responsibility is to SCAEF directly. As Army boundaries move forward, COM ZONE ETO will assume responsibility within the designated areas." SMC-OUT 5568, 13 Nov 44 in SHAEF files, G-5, AG 014.1-1, #6.

on that date General Eisenhower's Headquarters assumed certain administrative functions, chiefly those pertaining to personnel and at the same time took over the administration of French Civil Affairs, except for the provision of civil supply requirements. As to these, SHAEF would assume responsibility for over-all planning and, after consultation with H.Q. Communication Zone Advance (NATOUSA) advise AFHQ as to its desires for import and movement of civil supplies to Southern France ports. AFHQ was thereafter to act as agent for SHAEF in the procurement, calling forward, shipment and discharge of such supplies, and to determine priority of discharge as between civilian and military cargo.<sup>24</sup>

Just prior to the transfer of administrative responsibility decision was also reached as to the transfer of supply responsibility as well. Effective 20 November ETOUSA was to take over the administration of supply from NATOUSA. Effective that date H. Q. Southern Line of Communications ETOUSA was to be activated under General Larkin [Maj. Gen. Thomas B.] as Commanding General, and authorized to communicate direct with NATOUSA on matters pertaining to personnel and shipment of supplies from Italy and North Africa to Southern France and movement of shipping in the Mediterranean. Responsibility for the movement of shipping in the Mediterranean was to remain with AFHQ-NATOUSA and Commander in Chief Mediterranean. Practically, this involved the transfer of a considerable part of SOS NATOUSA with its Chief, General Larkin, from NATOUSA to ETOUSA. Initially his new headquarters was to be located at Caserta and, pending its removal to France, an advance headquarters was to be established at Dijon.

These arrangements completed the transfer of general administrative and supply responsibilities to General Eisenhower and at 0001A hours on 20 November my last official connection with the operations in Southern France was dissolved.

<sup>24</sup> For complete coverage see Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, September 1944-May 1945*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, chapter on Southern Line of Communications.

## 9. RETROSPECT AND CONCLUSIONS

### PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

[Ltr, CAHQ Opns Officer to ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 29 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, vol. II, Jkt V, N-2]

1. Below are listed the principal organizational and procedural problems met with by the 2678th CA Regiment to date during the DRAGOON Operation:

a. Speed of advance plus late date at which personnel of Civil Affairs Headquarters arrived caused a large number of Civil Affairs problems in the early stages when there were very few persons available from Civil Affairs Headquarters to handle them. This resulted in G-5, Seventh Army, departing from its staff functions and conducting operations. This move, while it may have been necessary under the circumstances, resulted in considerable and continuous confusion.

b. Absence of transport, petrol and spare parts; destruction of railroads and bridges—all made it necessary to use a number of ports along the coast. Such use required additional personnel to handle the unloading and turning supplies over to the French. At the same time, difficulty in removing mines and other obstructions delayed the use of the largest port for civilian supplies, thereby increasing the transport problem.

(1) In addition, there has been great difficulty in obtaining trucks for hauling civilian supplies. Confusion results when Army Headquarters *accepts* figures, say for trucks needed for civilian supplies in the Southern France operation, and then *retains* these trucks for its own use on the grounds of military necessity, thus negating months of careful planning by CA Transport. Also, experience to date indicates that Civil Affairs Headquarters is not being informed adequately relative to the names of ships transporting CA trucks, the identity of the trucks concerned, nor the port of distribution. The result is that CA authorities must beat the bushes looking for vitally-needed vehicles which have actually been found in the unauthorized possession of other units.

c. There were problems connected with the interpretation of the agreement between the Allies and the French concerning the procurement of services and supplies directly through the French instead of indirectly. The French were slow in being able to assume this operation and the Army, to a less extent, in taking hold of it. Frequently, procurement and requisitioning by

the Army resulted in depriving the French of facilities which they so urgently needed.

d. The payment of labor by the French was slow, involving problems relating to social security, family allowances and uniform rates of pay. Owing to lack of communication, it was difficult to find out who had exclusive and final jurisdiction on any one matter! Consequently, Civil Affairs Headquarters sometimes would not know from whom to get an answer for the question.

e. French Liaison Officers arrived very late and the job they were to perform was almost solved before their arrival.

f. The problems in the forward areas were negligible. The big problem was the lack of communications between front and rear and questions of supplies and transport for the French. Questions of currency, public health, welfare, and displaced persons were negligible as they were handled by the French. Field personnel were late in getting in the field and when they did arrive they would not appear to be badly needed, except in towns where there were large groups of troops, such as Marseille, Grenoble, Dijon, Lyon, and Besançon.

g. The problem of conflict of jurisdiction between the local civilian authorities, FFI, and the Army made it extremely difficult to solve the problem of disarming the large number of FFI who were going about armed.

(1) An additional problem was the disposition of collaborationists. At first, all collaborationists were being brought before the Cours Martiales composed of FFI officers. The emphasis on the speed of this court has now given almost completely away to the system of justice and due process of law under the Cours de Justice. According to the Minister of Justice, all trials to have been conducted under the old system will be withheld awaiting the establishment of the Cours de Justice in the individual sectors concerned. All military offenses are to be tried under one of the permanent military courts.

h. And, finally, there was the problem of the conflict between the Base Section personnel as to unloading their ships and the Headquarters personnel interested in maintaining accurate accounts of the material handed over to the French. The former group thought the latter was unnecessary in operations, and the latter thought the former were not handling their job in a consistent manner. This conflict was considerable. And therefore it is recommended that in the

future every effort be made to foresee and thereby forestall similar conflicts in similar operations.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED

[Ltr, Parkman, CCAO, Seventh Army, to ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 17.18, 6th U.S. AGp, Jkt 1]

2. It is believed that the organization of one unit, such as the 2678th Civil Affairs Regiment, to operate as the vehicle through which both army administration and civil affairs were handled was a most satisfactory expedient enabling the operation to be conducted with only approximately 135 officers, and in many ways saving time, trouble, and confusion.

3. It is believed that the operation of civil affairs through a headquarters attached to the army formation responsible for the whole area was sound because it enabled the CCAO to speak for the Commanding General and for Army Echelon which controlled the whole area and at the same time centralize civil affairs responsibilities in one head.

4. It is believed that the operation of the civil affairs headquarters out of which all civil affairs personnel not on detached service with any army unit worked was desirable in that it placed a pool of officers and men at the disposal of the CCAO, giving the greatest amount of flexibility and mobility to the organization.

5. It is believed that the principle, in a liaison operation of this kind, of placing officers only at the administrative centers where the highest local officials were established was a sound proposition. It was unnecessary except in an area occupied by a considerable number of troops to have personnel for local work and the liaison work to be adequately performed by attaching liaison officers to the officials at the top (Regional Commissioners).

6. Although there was some difficulty in connection with the accounting procedure adopted by the officers attached to the base section in connection with unloading of civilian supplies, this situation is not believed to have resulted from any inherent weakness in the organizational setup but rather from the failure to establish correct methods of handling the problem to which all agreed in advance. Civil affairs officers with base sections should receive their policies from CA Headquarters and should, in accordance with these policies, then devote themselves to solving the problems presented to them by their respective Commanding Generals.

7. For the first time, civil affairs was placed with several base sections in the same area. The

Commanding General of each base section desired to have a civil affairs staff attached to him. This worked satisfactorily as long as the Civil Affairs Headquarters was available to set the civil affairs policy in accordance with the wishes of the Commanding General of the unit in charge of the whole area, but considerable difficulties are anticipated and may arise when no one commanding general controls the whole area, i.e., both the communications zone and the forward areas. It is to be hoped that in this and other cases some over-all civil affairs control on the spot as that now available from SHAEF in Paris would be established before any possibility of split jurisdiction in connection with the handling of civil affairs policy could arise. It is fundamental that in the entire area, irrespective of whether it be the Commanding General, hiatus area or forward area, one civil affairs policy be established and administered by one civil affairs headquarters attached to the commanding general having jurisdiction over the whole area, and this civil affairs headquarters should be on the spot even if the headquarters of the commanding general (such as AFHQ) should not be. Some of the difficulties were mentioned in the last letter, to which this is a supplement, and which should be corrected in a future operation as follows:

*a.* The lifts bringing in civil affairs personnel were too late.

*b.* Adequate information and planning was not done with the base section and forward area organization prior to D Day largely because of difficulties caused by separation between Africa and Italy.

*c.* Base section personnel must be selected from officers who know civil affairs and have considerable background and experience in it. In this operation some of the civil affairs officers with the base section had little civil affairs experience and were not properly trained in the over-all civil affairs policy to be used in the operation.

*d.* The G-5 of the Headquarters of the Commanding General controlling the area and the CCAO should be the same person so that there is unified responsibility. If they are two persons, the G-5 should remain with the Commanding General in the forward areas and should permit the Civil Affairs Headquarters to operate without divided responsibility in the whole area.

*e.* The selection of personnel to be brought in early lifts should as far as possible include general civil affairs officers rather than specialists. In this operation the Army Special Staff sec-

tions insisted that certain specialists be brought in in the early stages. The services of these specialists were not needed (Public Health, Public Welfare, Communications) in the early days as much as were the services of general civil affairs officers.

f. In the liaison operation the need for medical personnel is small and few need be brought in.

g. The problems connected with administering civil affairs units can be reduced to a minimum and were reduced to a minimum by permitting the units to secure messing and billeting locally rather than having it provided from a central source. The system followed in Southern France was far more economical than the ECAD detachment system. However, if this is to be followed provisions should be made for reimbursement of the officers and men insofar as they are required to spend their own money for messing and billets.

#### SOME PROCEDURES PECULIAR TO SOUTHERN FRANCE APPLICABLE TO ALL LIBERATED AREAS

[ACoS G-5, Report to CG, Seventh Army, 6 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.18, Hist Rpt, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* 1. *Political.* The political situation had elements of difficulty which could well have impeded the progress of the Seventh Army. Due to the efforts of the Cochet Mission (Délégué Militaire Français pour les Opérations du Sud), working in close co-operation with the FFI and other resistance groups, satisfactory and capable regional, departmental and local officials were installed in all important governmental positions. These appointed officials, with new thoughts and energies, when acquainted with the needs of the military, devoted themselves to the creation of an orderly and stable government, thus facilitating the military effort by the establishment of a stable rear area. In no small measure was the work of these officials made easier and support obtained from the people because of their recognition and acceptance by the Allies through Civil Affairs officers.

*Conclusion.* Political problems in any liberated country should be entirely resolved locally by the inhabitants themselves with Allied support of a central government to which local officials can look for authority and general administration. Such procedure ensures the support of the Allies by the population, allays any of their fears of a "quasi occupation," makes enemy political propaganda ludicrous and leaves the Army free to devote itself to the tactical phase exclusively. \* \* \*

2. *Liaison Officers.* French liaison officers were attached to all echelons of civil affairs. Liaison in a liberated country is letting the other fellow do the work vis-à-vis the population. French liaison officers have taken great pride in guaranteeing proper civilian control in Army areas and civilian officials have co-operated with them to an extent impossible with American officers. *But* the presence of U.S. Army officers, concerned with Civil Affairs, has reassured local officials as to lack of selfish intentions of the Army operation and that instructions and requests of French liaison officers had U.S. Army support and approval.

*Conclusion.* Liaison officers of nationality of liberated country where operations are in progress should be attached to all echelons of Civil Affairs and almost exclusively used as a medium of contact with officials and population. U.S. Civil Affairs officers should, however, make their presence and support known as well.

3. *Labor.* Immediately upon arrival at the beaches, there was a demand by the Army for civilian labor on a scale not envisaged and beyond the capacity of villages located near the beaches to supply. Contact was made by Civil Affairs officers with Mayors of villages as much as 30 miles removed, registration of laborers effected, transportation to and from the beaches of the laborers done by employing units. \* \* \*

*Conclusion.* Problem of civilian labor is best handled by Civil Affairs as it is essentially a civilian matter.

Using services should make a careful survey of labor requirements in planning stage and advise Civil Affairs which then can make a study of probable availability of labor in area of operations based on population density. Wage scales and conditions of employment should be widely circulated within the Task Force, under the lowest security classification possible, to effect the required general distribution of information to units.

Wage scales should be strictly uniform and broken down into simple categories of unskilled, semiskilled, skilled and very skilled. Other occupations likely to be encountered in Army hiring, such as waiters, cooks, orderlies, should be listed in wage scales.

Deduction by Army of social insurance contributions by civilian employees working for Army, should be accepted by Army as a principle. Each labor instruction in Sicily, Italy and France provided against it. Eventually, however, it was done through one means or another on instructions from higher authority. Considerable record confusion, from a civilian standpoint, would be avoided if a flat percent, most closely approximat-

ing the total employee contribution, were made by Army on each total weekly payroll, i.e., if percentage 10%, pay employee 90% of wage and pay 10% of total weekly payroll into Social Insurance Fund. Necessary conversion tables could easily be prepared and administrative details are not insurmountable.

4. *Public Health.* Favorable weather and a rapid advance reduced public health problems largely to a question of prompt furnishing of emergency medical supply kits containing some 36 different items ranging from codeine, ether, morphine, sulfa drugs to suture catgut, rubber gloves and bandages. Civilian medical supplies were low and sometimes exhausted and the kits were most useful. \* \* \*

*Conclusion.* Adequate medical supplies should arrive by D plus 3 and Civil Affairs officers should land some with them on D Day or D plus 1, if civilian population of any size is to be encountered at an early stage. Thereafter, Civil Affairs officers at Corps and Divisions should carry emergency kits along with them. Plasma should be included in emergency medical supply kits.

Chlorinators and H.T.H. should be in by D plus 10. Fabric glass for hospital repair should arrive early. Medical supply officers and sanitary engineers should land at an early date, certainly by D plus 2.

Reporting of communicable disease cases by civilian authorities, should be made through nearest Civil Affairs officer and forwarded through military channels to Chief, Public Health Branch, Civil Affairs. This method is necessary for prompt reporting when civilian communication channels are confused or broken.

Hospital assembly units to care for large civilian disasters should be phased to arrive at an early date.

Indigenous medical personnel, doctors, and nurses, are likely to be adequate. Supplies are the important thing.

5. *Finance.* The supplying of Army Finance Officers with adequate supplemental currency early enough to permit troop exchanges before debarkation is the principal task of finance. Thereafter, enough currency to care for payrolls and procurement for 90 days in advance should be brought in. \* \* \*

*Conclusion.* Finance, public and private, presents no large problem for Civil Affairs in a liberated country.

6. *Requisitioning (other than local procurement).* Requisitioning in a liberated country, no matter how carefully planned and operated,

is a source of constant friction with the civilian population.

*Conclusions.* In liberated countries full use of local officials should be made in service of requisitions on populace. In rear of actual combat areas, requisitions should be served and no property taken without such formality. Requisitioning of real estate and obtaining of billets should be under Engineer's guidance and control with the senior commander in any village/town in rear of combat, appointing an officer to act as Town Mayor during occupancy of that area to ensure that necessary formalities are observed and to eliminate "space competitions" among units.

7. *Communications and Utilities.* Civilian communications were damaged and thrown into confusion during the advance. The damage was not wholly due to bombing and shelling incidental to the advance, but was in substantial part due to planned enemy demolition. \* \* \*

*Conclusion.* In Army area, Civil Affairs officers should leave restoration of communications and utilities to Army Engineers and local officials. . . .

#### 8. *Supply and Transport.*

a. Maximum effort on the supply side of Civil Affairs should be directed at reconstituting the economic services of the indigenous government. Emphasis should be placed on making available to these services the supplies essential to the subsistence of the civil population which are unobtainable from local resources, and the facilities (especially truck transportation and telephone communications) necessary to enable these services equitably to allocate and efficiently to distribute these and indigenous supplies. It is a disservice to render too much assistance in that the civil supply services thereby tend to become dependent upon Army assistance and unable to operate when the Army leaves. \* \* \*

b. Phasing of imported civil supplies was correct, taking into account the limitations imposed upon the civil supply program by the limited unloading capacity for the whole operation. It was this factor which delayed the arrival of trucks until D plus 40. In future, if the military supply program and unloading capacity in the target area permit, trucks (with one year's spare parts) should be given as high a priority as the top priority foods. As it was, we had to depend on the depleted, worn-out, gazogene-powered supply of indigenous trucking for the first 40 days, not only to haul local production in a populous area completely lacking in normal rail transport but for port clearance of imported

supplies as well. No demands were made upon Army for loans of military transport, and military truck capacity was so overtaxed that no such demand could have been filled anyway without seriously handicapping the military effort. The need for importing civil trucks at an early stage would be even more marked if invasion were being planned of a country without the transport reserve of France.

c. The principal mistake in the civil supply program was placing dependence upon arrangements made by higher headquarters without actual physical check of these arrangements. The following instances illustrate this point:

(1) Arrangements were made and confirmation in writing received from AFHQ for the provision of two coasters loaded from Liberty ships arriving at Mostaganem on D-5, these coasters to be held for call forward to the beaches if food shortages met with upon arrival made this necessary. Decision to call these forward was made and message despatched on D plus 1 calling these coasters forward. On D plus 2 AFHQ advised that the coasters were not ready and the Navy would not allow them to sail in convoy, anyway. Fortunately, time allowed to call forward the Liberties instead with the convoys leaving Oran on D plus 5 and D plus 10.

(2) A supplementary coaster program was arranged for Alpes-Maritimes and telegraphic assurance given by AFHQ on D plus 27 that a coaster of required tonnage would arrive at latest by D plus 35 and D plus 40. A coaster of half the required tonnage arrived on D plus 55. Emergency arrangements had to be made to transship supplies from Toulon by LST [Landing Ship (Tank)] and truck, but the report of a food shortage demonstration by 2,000 people before the Prefecture at Nice at the end of September indicated that these were inadequate. Fortunately, the demonstration did not prejudice the military situation.

(3) Olive oil was known, in the planning stages, to be one of the serious shortage items in France. Requisitions were placed with AFHQ and confirmation received that the 17,000 tons of olive oil in North Africa would be phased in as requested on D plus 40 and every 10 days thereafter. Word was recently received from AFHQ via Sixth Army Group that the olive oil program has collapsed.

*Conclusion.* Indigenous resources in France were, except in large cities, adequate for minimum diet.

Transport in France was a greater problem than supply.

Imported supplies without transport brought in to move them cannot be effectively used quickly where needed. Some trucks, destined for civilian use, should arrive by D plus 15 with one year's spare parts and turned over to civilians for operation under Civil Affairs supervision during the initial 60/90 days.

Closer study should be made of possibility of use of empty supply trucks and trains to move indigenous supplies from surplus areas to deficiency areas through which such returning military transport might pass.

Regional and local officials should solve their own supply problems with minimum assistance from Civil Affairs. Such independence ensures a much speedier return to normalcy and fuller use and exploitation of local resources, makes minimum demands upon military resources of supply and transport.

9. *Displaced Persons and Refugees.* Due to the rapidity of the advance, the problem assumed far less proportions for the Seventh Army than was envisaged. Refugees are a real problem in a static situation.

Through co-operation with the Provost Marshal and assistance from FFI and local gendarmerie, roads were kept free of persons moving from the combat zone to the rear and moving from village to village. The movement, in no case, assumed proportions of any size. \* \* \*

*Conclusions.* During a rapid advance, refugee problem is not of sizable proportions. Local authorities in a liberated country can take care of such cases as do arise. \* \* \*

#### 10. *Public Safety.*

a. *Circulation.* While circulation is an aspect of public safety, it is worthy of special treatment as a vexatious problem particularly in Corps and Division areas.

In conjunction with CIC and Provost Marshal, a system of pass issuance which left Corps and Division free to take steps they considered necessary in their area, was erected, at the same time throwing the burden on civilian authorities and Sécurité Militaire to screen most passes issued. \* \* \*

b. *General Public Safety.* Problems were relatively few. Gendarmerie, police, fire and air-raid services were found reasonably intact in personnel and equipment. Small arms and uniforms were sometimes a problem with the gendarmerie. This problem was treated on a SHAEF level. \* \* \*

*Conclusions.* Circulation pass issuance, if abused, can permit enemy access to Army area by enemy agents. CIC, PM and Civil Affairs

should work very closely together on any general rules of pass issuance. Particular care should be exercised in forward areas.

Public safety services in a liberated country are competent and should be left free to do their own work with full explanation given them of military requirements. Civil Affairs should assist PM and CIC in their contacts with such officials, making no arrangements themselves except with prior approval of PM or CIC. Routine matters, not affecting Army, are of course an exception to this rule. \* \* \*

#### *General Conclusions:*

1. A minimum number of Civil Affairs officers should be used in liberated countries. Except for special problems, use of Civil Affairs Detachments in towns and villages, is not necessary nor, in our experience, welcomed by local officials.

2. Army and Corps should have a G-5 Section as part of the authorized T/O [Table of Organization], together with necessary T/E [Table of Equipment].

3. Higher Civil Affairs Hq or G-5 Sections should use command channels for all correspondence and reports, technical or otherwise to lower echelons.

4. Liaison officers of nationality of liberated country should be attached at all echelons and carry on all contacts with officials and population.

5. Corps G-5 should have two 2½-ton trucks available for emergency use in transporting civilians and supplies.

6. Close co-ordination with other general and special staff sections at Army, Corps and Division levels is constantly needed for full utilization of the civil affairs services and to delineate spheres of responsibilities in the light of actual operational problems.

7. Reports required from Corps and Division Civil Affairs officers should be kept to an absolute minimum. (Successfully done in this operation.)

8. A Civil Affairs officer, apart from the G-5 Section of Army, is needed in any city, town or village where the Army Hq is located in order to deal with local problems affecting Army, but to be physically separate from Hq to eliminate civilians passing in and out at Hq.

9. A port detachment of Civil Affairs officers and men should be landed well in advance of receipt of any imported supplies to work out the innumerable attendant details of storage, accounting, transport, distribution, local needs and all that goes into a smooth-working supply organization. Initially, this was done by G-5, Army. Valuable contacts (civilian) and knowledge of

local supply situation were thus acquired by G-5 which moved with Army, making it necessary for the port detachment to go through the same learning process. It is fruitless to say that such knowledge can be fully passed on to a successor. The details are too many, the personal contact and resulting confidence created cannot be transferred to another.

10. Military government and civil affairs in any country present the same basic common sense problems. While recognizing the need for detailed procedure in some fields, such as accounting, it is felt that too much written, little-used material was produced. Policies and procedures should be as broadly stated as is consistent with clear direction of responsibility. Experience and the facts of a particular situation will dictate the operational details.

#### WAS THE PUBLIC SAFETY BRANCH HAMSTRUNG BY CAHQ?

[Kennedy, Hist of Public Safety Opns]

\* \* \* As Chief of the Public Safety Branch, I wrote the Public Safety section of the Civil Affairs Manual for the operation, and same was approved and incorporated verbatim in said Manual. However, no steps were taken to implement the plan, and my requests for personnel, equipment and organic transport were ignored. \* \* \*

It was my repeated recommendation that Public Safety officers come in on D plus 2 or D plus 3, as in the Sicilian and Italian operations, so that they could take things in hand before they got out of control, but this recommendation was not even considered. The Chief of the Public Health Branch, a Medical Officer, was brought in on D plus 2, but I was not permitted to come in until D plus 10. This delay in bringing in Public Safety officers permitted the FFI, FTP, Milice Patriotique and other extra-legal organizations to take control of the situation, disarm the police and steal their transport and equipment, and to generally take matters into their own hands. Had an adequate number of Public Safety officers been present, to work with, advise and lend moral support to the civilian public safety agencies, this situation would not have arisen; some lives, many unfortunate incidents and many thousands of dollars worth of military supplies would have been saved.

Landing at St.-Tropez on D plus 10, the CBS advance party immediately began unloading a ship of flour, sugar, etc. The French authorities were immediately contacted on the security angle, and promised to furnish adequate guards for ship-

holds, beach, trucks, route and warehouse. These promises were not kept, and the guard force at St.-Tropez was at no time half as large as it should have been; moreover the guards furnished were undisciplined and unreliable, would hide and sleep whenever possible, and frequently abandoned their posts. The French IMPEX officer in charge, Captain Silvère, when pressed on the subject of guards and laborers, stated, "After all, this is American property until I receipt for it, and we're merely helping you unload it."

Completing the St.-Tropez unloading, we moved to Toulon to prepare for the unloading of additional ships. A security plan was drawn up and presented to the French officer in charge, Lt. Col. Guzzy, who promised to put it into effect with 400 guards. He actually produced less than 200, and the security of the operation was at no time adequate. \* \* \*

Captain Smith was placed in charge at Toulon, while I proceeded to Marseille and with [Col. William D.] Williams and Spencer attempted to bring some order out of the chaos. Several weeks of intensive effort finally brought the police, fire and civil defense agencies to a reasonable state of efficiency, as we succeeded in securing for them gasoline, arms, the return of some of their vehicles stolen by FFI members, etc. \* \* \*

The Provost Marshal of D.B.S. [Delta Base Section] was highly co-operative, but he simply did not have the personnel. Naples had 1,100 MP's; Marseille, a city of comparable size, had 280! The French authorities in Marseille did everything requested, and did it reasonably well, to suppress the traffic in military property, but only military police arresting military personnel for selling or trading the supplies can really suppress such traffic. \* \* \*

When C.A. Headquarters moved to Lyon . . . it had become quite obvious that those individuals running civil affairs in Southern France were not favorably disposed toward Public Safety. The attitude seemed to be that Public Safety was a useless appendage of Civil Affairs, that it could not be abolished because required by directives, but that it should be restricted, hamstrung and ignored in every way possible. No vehicle was ever assigned by Headquarters to the Public Safety Branch or to any officer in it, despite repeated requests. The expenditure of confidential funds ceased when Lt. Col. Cate took over as CCAO, although four hundred dollars, expended over a period of about six weeks in Marseille, had brought in information which probably saved two hundred thousand dollars worth of military property from theft or resulted in its recovery. The weekly reports of the Branch were emasculated

before being incorporated in the Civil Affairs Weekly Summary, favorable comments on conditions or organizations being left in, but unfavorable comments being omitted. As a result, one reading the Weekly Summary would receive a completely erroneous picture of public safety conditions in the area. Moreover, reports coming in from Public Safety officers in the field were not always sent to the Chief of Branch; a report on a serious disturbance among German prisoners employed on the ship unloading operation at Toulon was diverted, and never did reach the Public Safety Branch. Finally, the Public Safety Branch was abolished and its Chief declared surplus, along with several other Branch Chiefs.

The prime lesson to be learned from the Southern France operation so far as Public Safety is concerned—and it should have been learned from the Sicilian and Italian operations—is that whenever the Army goes into a new area, enemy or otherwise, disturbances among the civil population, and thefts of military supplies and equipment, will be in inverse ratio to the number and efficiency of Public Safety officers present in the initial stages. The Public Safety Branch's recommendation for this operation was for 45 officers, 60 enlisted men and 40 vehicles, preferably civilian type, equipped with radio. We received 4 officers, 3 enlisted men and no equipment of any kind. It was estimated by competent officers on the scene that as high as 20 percent of the cargo which came ashore in ducks at Marseille was diverted and sold by the drivers. An adequate complement of public safety personnel, on the scene early, could have so organized the civilian public safety agencies as to have prevented a large part of this, and would have saved many hundreds of thousands of dollars of losses. The tremendous and thriving Black Market in Marseille in American rations, cigarettes, gasoline and other supplies got its start through the lack of Public Safety officers—and continued to thrive because of the shortage of both Public Safety officers and military police.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS DID A GOOD JOB

[Hist of CA Opns for Southern Fr, pt. XII]

November 1st 1944 was the day AFHQ control over the South of France terminated and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, took over. The first phase of Civil Affairs in Southern France was ended.

Looking back on their work of the initial eleven weeks from August 15, CAHQ officers feel that they accomplished much of military

value; much also of genuine political and humanitarian worth.

Some important things were perhaps left undone, they admit. On the whole, though, it is their belief that Civil Affairs made a real contribution both to the war effort and to the rehabilitation of liberated France.

On the credit side of the CAHQ ledger, they point to the effective manner in which, all through the Operation DRAGOON, CAO's prevented civilian problems from interfering with the drive of the combat troops.

On the same black side of the ledger, they note their efforts in helping to feed and clothe French civilians. Their imports of food and trucks were the key factor in averting stark famine. Their pressure on the local officials did much to increase governmental efficiency.

Summing up, they say that Civil Affairs assisted the Army materially in its relationships with the civilians; and it greatly helped the civilians to readjust themselves to meet the stern necessities and the stringent demands of warfare.

But there is a red side to the ledger, too, according to CAHQ veterans; debits comprising more sins of omission than of commission.

They say: Lack of prior planning on labor needs made the recruitment of workers move more slowly than it might have. Lack of attention to the need for repatriating displaced persons, particularly Italians, left thousands of them in the area to constitute a possible security threat. Failure to take a strong position with the French may have permitted a degree of lawlessness to continue longer than it should have.

Looking back, himself, on this initial phase, Colonel Parkman, the CCAO, said that he was completely satisfied with the work of the organization and the policies of his group. The only change he would have made would have been to have phased in more Civil Affairs personnel earlier in the operation as well as to have insisted that more Civil Affairs trucks—those brought in for loan to the French—arrive earlier.

Unlike the landings in Normandy, where the

troops encountered rich food-producing provinces at the start, the Army in the South found famine at the coastline and only moved into surplus areas hundreds of miles inland. We needed CAO's at once to handle the supply question and we needed trucks desperately for transporting supplies. \* \* \*

#### WHAT DID THE FRENCH THINK OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS JOB?

[Hist of CA Opns, DRAGOON, pt. IX]

\* \* \* At the conclusion of eleven weeks of AFHQ control in Southern France, the population knew something of the Allied contributions to their welfare, but not as much as they might have.

Their early enthusiastic liking for the American Army and the American soldier was beginning to wane. Criticisms and rumors were becoming endemic. Misconceptions of American ideas and policies were starting to cascade. Unfortunately, though, little now could be done to counteract this. Policy was against it.

[Ltr, Cochet, former Mil Delegate for Southern France, to Parkman, ACofS, G-5, Sixth AGp, 6 Oct 44. SHAEF files, G-5, Jkt VI, N-5]

As you have learned, sometime ago the Provisional Government of the Republic decided that the military delegations were no longer needed for the direction of French territory because the liberation of the land and the progressive re-establishment of communications have permitted the central power to resume its chain of command.

I therefore leave my command and want to tell you how I've appreciated your efforts and those of your officers in the period which followed the landing of the Allied Armies in France.

I pay my respects to all those who have worked under your orders for their desire to help France. In the name of my personnel and in the name of the people over whom I exercised my command, I thank you. \* \* \*

## In Belgium and Luxembourg Both Fighting and Politics Retard Stabilization

Having made preliminary agreements with the exiled governments, the Allies did not enter the countries of northwest Europe with the same initial uncertainty as in France. There was, however, uncertainty that the Allied policy of delegating civil affairs to local and national authorities would prove successful. For the sake of political and military advantages the Allies were assuming the calculated risk of entrusting authority to peoples who might succumb to political disunity and internal strife. To minimize this and other risks the CA agreements endowed the supreme commander with freedom of action during the military period, together with the right to use his own judgment as to when conditions safely permitted return of full authority to a national government. Though some of the governments administered better than others, in no case, fortunately, did administration collapse.

The nearest approach to collapse of indigenous government came in Belgium. Although the normal functioning of the Belgian Government was restored with a minimum of Allied interference, there was much political friction during the first months of the liberation. As the government-in-exile, the Pierlot administration had acquired a dubious reputation among the resistance movements and the leftist

elements. Upon its return to the continent, it encountered strong opposition. Charges against the government included ineptitude in handling food supplies, dilatoriness in punishing quislings, and failure to give proper recognition to the resistance. In November three ministers, representing the left wing and the resistance groups, resigned. Faced with the possibility of the collapse of an effective local government, Maj. Gen. George W. E. Erskine, head of SHAEF Mission (Belgium), intervened. He offered to assist the Pierlot government in maintaining order and held conferences with the three ministers who had resigned. The three ministers agreed to do nothing to impede the Allied war effort, and the resistance groups agreed to hand over their arms to Allied authorities. Thus a possible collapse of administration was averted.

Efforts to restore efficient administration in Luxembourg followed a checkered pattern for two reasons: intense combat took place in the area and the enemy, during the period of occupation, had eliminated every vestige of the former Luxembourg government. Officials, even when they could be located, had been divested of responsibility for four years. A SHAEF Mission was sent into Luxembourg early in September on the assumption that the ad-

vance into Germany would continue and that the mission would shoulder the burden of all government contacts, leaving the tactical commanders free for their operational responsibilities. Instead, the armies were checked on the eastern boundaries of Luxembourg, putting the country in the forward zone of operations. On 21 October the mission was therefore dissolved, and a Headquarters, Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment, Twelfth Army Group, was established.

The most difficult time for civil affairs officers in both Luxembourg and Belgium was during the unexpected enemy counter-offensive of December 1944. Although the few documents reproduced here cannot pretend to tell a comprehensive or even connected story, they do illustrate the activities of civil affairs officers in preventing hysteria among civilians, in controlling

circulation, in enforcing curfew, in guarding against enemy agents and sabotage, and in supervising the evacuation of civilians. These and other miscellaneous activities, such as removing cattle from artillery Fire Direction Centers (FDC's) and making civilian laborers available to dig trenches, relieved the tactical troops of such tasks and enabled them to proceed with their main mission of halting the German threat.

It was only after the defeat of the German counteroffensive that political and administrative difficulties both in Belgium and Luxembourg were finally resolved. A new Belgian government was formed in February, and in April a solution was found to the administrative anomaly in Luxembourg by making the head of the Belgian mission at the same time the supreme commander's representative to the Luxembourg Government.

## I ORGANIZING AND PLANNING FOR BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

### EARLY BRITISH PLANNING FOR NORTHWEST EUROPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMBINED PLANNING FOR BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

[Belgium and Luxembourg Country Unit, Semi-Monthly Hist Rpt, 15 May-1 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, Country Units, Hist Rpts, Belgium]

\* \* \* Occupied Belgium is governed by the Secretaries General under a German military governor, ostensibly according to the letter of the Belgian Constitution. Only the districts of Eupen, Malmédy and St. Vith, restored to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles, have been completely incorporated in the German Reich.

The case of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is different. It has been made *in toto* an integral part of the Reich, and it is reported that some 300,000 Germans have been added to its population of roughly the same number. Annexed to Germany since 1940, its governmental machinery has been completely destroyed, and it is governed as part of a neighboring German Gau. This state of affairs will make necessary a different Civil Affairs approach from that employed in Belgium. . . .

During the early history of Civil Affairs planning in World War II, Belgium was considered as a part of Northwest Europe. The U.S. at first played the role of an interested and sympathetic observer, while the British made a start in collecting and arranging materials for Civil Affairs in the Low Countries and Northern France. This region has always been a matter of concern to England from geographic, economic and political considerations.

Accordingly, in the Spring of 1942, the Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee (hereafter referred to as AT (E) [see also Chapter V]), was set up at the War Office under the Chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary for War, Sir Frederick Bovenschen. On 10 October of the same year, it authorized the formation of a branch of the War Office to draw up plans for Civil Affairs in future operations in Northwest Europe. Brigadier S. Swinton Lee was in charge, with the title of Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO), and he had as assistant Major V. C. Greening. Shortly afterwards, two more officers were added, Major E. R. Sumner and Major H. C. Talbot. [Major Greening,

a food expert, and Major Talbot, an authority on transportation, are now with the Belgium and Luxembourg Section.]

The DCCAO prepared the first Military Manual of Civil Affairs (Provisional). Since the need for trained Civil Affairs officers was great, the DCCAO organized the first Civil Affairs training course of thirteen weeks which started at Wimbledon on 25 February 1943, and selected candidates to attend it. The present Head of the Belgium and Luxembourg Section, Colonel J. F. Bygott, M.C., was Chief Military Instructor and Assistant Commandant of the School. \* \* \*

. . . By the summer of 1943, it became apparent that a reorganization was imminent. Brigadier Lee was encouraged by the War Office and by COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command) to begin organizing "Country Houses," while in July, a Civil Affairs Directorate, under Major General S. W. Kirby, had already been set up by the War Office. On 23 August 1943, the DCCAO ceased to exist. Its function of planning Civil Affairs for Northwest Europe was taken over by the Chief Staff Officer for Civil Affairs, COSSAC, and the "Country Houses" were formed. The Civil Affairs organization at COSSAC was a joint U.S./UK undertaking from the start, and American and British officers together set up the "Country Houses" or Country Sections as they came to be known. . . . The country planning was co-ordinated with military requirements as envisaged by the "Overlord" and "Rankin" operations.

It was during this period that the first significant combined U.S./UK effort at Civil Affairs planning for Belgium and Luxembourg was made. In August 1943, the Belgium and Luxembourg Country Section took up its quarters in Norfolk House. It later moved to Cadogan Square. Since code names were required, the Belgium and Luxembourg Section was at first called "Bysep" (a combination of Bygott and Sepp) and later "Maxwell." Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas J. Sepp (U.S.) was the Head with Colonel J. F. Bygott, M.C., (Br.), serving as Deputy. The need for a detailed Civil Affairs plan for Belgium and Luxembourg was becoming increasingly urgent. On 11 September 1943, Memorandum No. 1, called *Preparation of Emergency Plan*, was issued by Lieutenant Colonel Sepp to serve as a guide in the preparation of what came to be known as the *Maxwell Plan* for Belgium and Luxembourg. This was amended by Memorandum No. 3, of 29 September 1943 which provided for C. A. Administration in Belgium and Luxembourg under four

possible contingencies. Both memoranda assumed as basic the following:

a. That both countries are friendly to the United Nations' cause.

b. That the minimum supervision will need to be exercised.

c. That the maximum use will be made of local authorities; and therefore the minimum need of Civil Affairs officers."

The four contingencies which might arise in the course of military operations were to be covered by plans based on the assumptions:—

(1) of an immediate German disintegration which would present our forces the opportunity for attacking at once;

(2) of a deliberate withdrawal by the enemy from both countries;

(3) of the complete collapse and surrender of Germany;

(d) that the enemy would resist strongly everywhere and that the two countries must be liberated by combat.

The priority for the preparation of the plans was to be in the order listed above, and the same factors of destruction and/or confiscation were to be applied to all four.

While much basic material for preparing these plans was available owing to the earlier research, a great deal more had to be done quickly to meet the "target date for the completion of all plans"—30 November. Actually this was advanced, and the Maxwell Plan was hastily put together by 30 October 1943. . . . For each of the four contingencies a complete Civil Affairs Administration was envisaged, the method and time of its establishment varying with the conditions under which Belgium and Luxembourg were to be occupied. Although the postponement of the invasion prevented the use of the Maxwell Plan, the material then accumulated was to be of use in the preparation in 1944 of *Plans and Policy Instructions for Civil Affairs in Luxembourg*. \* \* \*

The completion of the Maxwell Plan ushered in a change of policy regarding Civil Affairs organization. The country sections were swept away and their finished research and supply estimates, together with most of their personnel, were absorbed by over-all functional sections, composed of specialist staffs, for Northwest Europe. The heads of the country sections alone remained and became a liaison section of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) COSSAC. They continued such liaison with the nationals of the various countries concerned as was possible under the changed conditions arising from the postponement of the invasion. Colonel Bygott was

able to keep alive, on an informal basis, the cordial relationships already established with the members of the Belgian Government in London. This liaison work was important during a period when official contacts had to be almost completely severed, and made possible the resumption of semi-official relations when once again invasion plans had to be prepared. During the interlude lasting from November 1943 to February 1944, Civil Affairs for Belgium and Luxembourg were carried on by the specialist functional staffs, with Colonel Bygott keeping open the door for future close collaboration with the Belgian authorities.

Meanwhile, COSSAC was giving way to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), after the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) on 16 January 1944.

It was becoming apparent that some means must be found to co-ordinate and consolidate the work being done by the Special Staff, CAD, SHAEF, into handbooks for the conduct of Civil Affairs in the various countries concerned. Hence once again it was decided to form country sections. . . .

SO No. 2 from SHAEF dated 25 Feb 44 ordered all components of the Special Staff, CAD, SHAEF, to move to the Civil Affairs Center at Shrivenham, beginning Monday, 28 Feb 44. \* \* \*

At Shrivenham, the Section settled down in three dormitory rooms in Watson West. \* \* \*

. . . On 22 Feb 44, CAD, SHAEF, had ordered as a matter of urgency the preparation of handbooks for France, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, and this was also the order of priority. The Belgium and Luxembourg Section was given great freedom as to the form and contents of the handbook but it was urged that it should be severely practical so that it could serve as the only necessary book for a Civil Affairs officer in the field. . . .

Intensive work on the handbook commenced on arrival at the Civil Affairs Center to meet the deadline of 1 April 1944. The completed first draft of the "*Plan and Policy Instructions*" was then submitted to G-5 for approval. During this period and until shortly after the section was moved back to London on 25 April 1944, its work was handicapped by its officers being allowed to consult with Belgian authorities on matters of information only. It was not until the beginning of May that permission for discussions on policy with the Belgian authorities was granted. Only then could the functional officers of the Section proceed to work out agreed plans and instructions for Civil Affairs with the Belgians on the

basis of the various functional chapters of the "*Plan and Policy Instructions*."

Meanwhile, all the country sections, except Germany and Austria, had been moved to 27 Princes Gardens. . . . The move was made to give the large German section more room and to enable the other country sections to maintain quicker and closer contact with the Norwegian, Netherlands, Belgian and French Governments in London. \* \* \*

. . . Since it had become increasingly obvious that the problems of Belgium and Luxembourg were radically different, the request of the Section to issue the Luxembourg sections in a separate handbook was granted on 26 May 1944. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF DIRECTIVE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CIVIL AFFAIRS AGREEMENT WITH BELGIUM

[Directive, SHAEF to Hq, Northern Gp of Armies, and CinC, Central Gp of Armies, 1 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 703, Internal Affairs, Br-Directives, Belgium and Luxembourg]

1. *Civil Affairs Planning and Operations.* Civil Affairs planning and operations will be carried out for those areas of Belgium in which you have or may have responsibility for Civil Affairs in conformity with Annexures hereto, and with such Civil Affairs policy Directives and Instructions applicable to those areas as may be issued from time to time by this headquarters.

2. *Powers.* a. An agreement has been entered into with the Belgian Government which provides that in areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a first or military phase during which the Supreme Commander must *de facto* exercise supreme responsibility and authority to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. [See Chapter XXII, Section 2.]

b. It is not intended, however, that Military Government will be established in liberated Belgium and civil administration will normally be operated by the Belgian Government.

c. If at any time or in any locality the Belgian authorities do not render the assistance necessary to enable the Supreme Commander to accomplish his mission, then such executive action as the military situation may require is authorized. Appropriate redelegation of power to subordinate commanders is also authorized, but no general redelegations of authority to take direct action are authorized to an echelon lower than that of the most senior headquarters at the time located within Belgium. No executive action of a civil administrative nature, which is national in character, such as the enactment of legislation national in scope (e.g. relating to price or wage

control, rationing, currency, establishment of courts, etc.) or the suspension or appointment of national officials shall be taken except as hereafter expressly authorized by the Supreme Commander.

d. As soon as, and to such extent as, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander, the military situation permits the resumption by the Belgian Government of their responsibility for the civil administration he will notify the appropriate representative of the Belgian Government accordingly. The Belgian Government will thereupon, and to that extent, resume such exercise of responsibility subject to such special arrangements as may be required in areas of vital importance to the Allied Forces, such as ports, lines of communication and airfields and without prejudice to the enjoyment by the Allied Forces of such other facilities as may be necessary for the prosecution of the war to its final conclusion.

3. *Area of responsibility.* You will be responsible to the Supreme Commander for Civil Affairs activities in your respective areas in Belgium.

4. *Civil Affairs Detachments.* Combined Civil Affairs Detachments organized for administrative purposes into Groups/Companies, will be employed for the discharge of Civil Affairs responsibilities in the field. They will be allotted by this headquarters. You will be responsible for calling forward these Detachments and for their inclusion, with their organic equipment, in the lift tables of the appropriate units under your command. Direct communication on Civil Affairs matters between you on the one hand, and ACofS, G-5, this headquarters, on the other is authorized.

5. *Provision of Stores/Supplies.* a. You will be responsible for calling forward stores/supplies to meet such relief and emergency requirements

as must be fulfilled to insure accomplishment of your mission. You will be given credits authorizing your use of such stores/supplies as may be made available to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will utilize military movement and supply agencies to the extent necessary, and will be responsible for completing arrangements to call forward and deliver such stores/supplies to the points where Belgian or other civil agencies can take them over.

b. Adequate control and inspection measures will be instituted by you to assure that the stores/supplies are utilized for the purposes intended.

6. *Belgian Civil Affairs Officers.* The Belgian Government will provide Belgian officers who will be attached to your command for use in the discharge of your Civil Affairs responsibilities and in effecting such policies as the Belgian Government has agreed or may agree with the Supreme Commander are consistent with his operational requirements. You will be responsible for the inclusion of the Belgian Civil Affairs officers and also such representatives of the Belgian Government as the Supreme Commander may direct, with their organic equipment, in the lift tables of the appropriate units under your command.

7. *Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Mission (Belgium).* The Supreme Commander will appoint and accredit a Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Mission (Belgium) to the Belgian Government. This mission will have a Civil Affairs component which will in addition to its other duties, when requested, transmit to that Government the Supreme Commander's needs with respect to civil administration and the utilization of Belgian resources.

## 2. CONDITIONS IN BELGIUM RIGHT AFTER LIBERATION

### THE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE RETURNS BUT WITH THE "EATON SQUARE JITTERS"

[Capt A. W. Williams, Historical Survey of Events in Belgium, September 1944 to July 1945, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. 1]

3. The constitutional government of Belgium came over from London on the 11th of September and took control. The secretaries general under the occupation were removed and replaced by loyal Belgians. Previous to the arrival of the Gov-

ernment, executive powers were exercised by a Belgian Military Mission, which arrived from England with the advance part of SHAEF Mission on 5 September. There was also a military mission made up of members of the Resistance groups, which soon came under the Belgian Military Mission from London.

4. Herein lay the seeds of future political discord. Throughout July and August in London there existed a complaint known jokingly as "the Eaton Square jitters." The Belgian Government

in exile had their offices in Eaton Square; and as the time drew near for their return to Brussels, a day that had seemed so impossibly remote in 1940 and which was now rushing upon them, the nervousness of the politicians became very apparent. Should they not have made more plans and worked harder? How would the voters back home feel about them?

5. One thing they had in their favour. The inevitable dispute over the problem of King Leopold III could be indefinitely postponed, for by some quirk of German policy he and his family had been taken away to Germany. Thus it was possible to install his popular brother, Prince Charles, as Regent, which was accordingly done on 20 September. Secondly, the people were willing to give the Government a chance. True, M. [Hubert] Pierlot, the Prime Minister, was not a very popular figure. Nor were his London colleagues regarded in the light of liberating heroes. But they were the constitutional government of Belgium and they acted according to the constitution in resigning and then reforming at the request of the Regent. \* \* \*

#### THE SITUATION IN BRUSSELS ON LIBERATION

[Cable, G-5, SHAEF (Main), to G-5 SHAEF (Fwd), 10 Sep 44, Incl to Analysis Sheet, 18 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

1. *General Administration.* Government has returned and position Belgian Military Mission not therefore clear. SHAEF Military Mission under command 2nd Army and in close contact Belgian authorities National level although sorely handicapped by lack of transportation and personnel. Problems being dealt with by Belgians on national level and contact so far U.S. zone and military mission nil. [Lt. Col. K. T.] Moseley despatched 1st U.S. Army to remedy this but recommend military mission revert to SHAEF Mission. Lack of SHAEF representative to deal with Transportation on national level very marked. Recommend despatch representative G-4 immediately. . . .

2. *General Situation.* Brussels presents better appearance than Paris as utilities are operating. Clothing not so good but quite adequate. Great excitement shown our troops and flowers still being handed out to all and sundry. Restaurants reopened. Theaters reopening.

#### 3. *Food situation.*

(a) *Flour.* Threshing has only just started with result that indigenous stocks will not be available in quantity for a week. Brussels still has about 3 days stocks but badly distributed with result that some districts have been without bread

for 3 days. 2nd Army has asked for airlift of 400 tons daily commencing today and all arrangements made for reception. This will cover both Brussels and industrial region Mons-Charleroi where position somewhat unclear. 2nd Army CA now seeing if this cannot be moved in by rail. Recommend you investigate immediately Northern Army Group. Position of other towns not too clear but all seem to have about a week's stock. Threshing dependent on availability Diesel Oil. Reports vary considerably on this but Hermann spot checking. Recommend Armies be instructed to issue locally where needed. Quantity required about 15 tons a day for all Belgium. Recommend further arrangements now be made for having coaster loaded with diesel and ready sail Antwerp whenever freed for handing over to national authorities.

(b) *Meat.* Scarce but ground now being uncovered will provide adequate stocks. No immediate requirements.

(c) *Milk.* Brussels distribution now 70 per cent requirements.

(d) *Fats and Coffee.* In view small tonnage recommend importation as soon as military situation will allow. Present stocks nil.

#### 4. *Utilities.*

(a) Telephones Brussels not operating. One month to repair damage.

(b) Water apparently all right although some doubt in Ghent and Ostend area. Recommend northern army investigate. . . .

(c) Electricity. Satisfactory Brussels, Antwerp and apparently generally. Average 30 days stock plants. Charleroi power station damaged affecting coal mines. Cissler investigating with possibility completing lines Brussels-Charleroi if damage to plants extensive.

(d) Gas main problem. Coking plants Brussels operative but Charleroi out owing damage to railway bridge. Compressor gas vehicles now large consumers and supply Brussels may have to be restricted to them although sufficient coal for 20 days operating on present reduced scale at Brussels and Antwerp. . . .

5. *Coal.* Position not yet clear. No flooding appears to have taken place but problems are:

(a) Lack of pit props and explosives.

(b) Lack of power Charleroi region.

(c) Indecision over transport.

#### ACTIVE RESISTANCE GROUPS PRESENT A PROBLEM

[An. A, Hist Rpt, FUSA, 1-30 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, First Army, Rpt I]

As the Civil Affairs detachment moved forward into Belgium in the wake of the armored col-

umns, they were confronted with a problem they had never met in France—that of co-ordinating several distinctly different Resistance Groups operating actively in the area. The French Resistance Groups had all united under the name of the FFI before the invasion, thereby presenting a single authoritative leadership that could be dealt with easily by the Allies and was in a better position to give aid. Those in Belgium, however, had not yet reached that state in development when the Allies arrived. The Resistance was active, more so than in most parts of northern France—but its efficiency was thwarted by the very fact that there was no control authority to guide its actions, and one group frequently served as a stumbling block for another while both were trying to accomplish the same objectives.

The *Armée Secrète*, also known as an *Armée Blanche*, was the chief resistance organization in Belgium, composed entirely of volunteers and led by officers who had formerly been members of the Belgian army. The Allies had been in contact with this organization long before D Day and had dropped arms and other equipment to them to aid their sabotage activity. Although small quantities of arms were dropped to other resistance groups, the *Armée Secrète* was the one over which the Allies maintained continued direct control, and with which it made plans for the final authority.

The two other resistance groups which were large enough to play a part were: the *F.I.* (*Front de l'Indépendance*), an organization whose members came largely from the laboring class, and which according to Belgian officials, has political ambitions of a Communist nature.

*M.N.B.* (*Mouvement National Belge*), which represented the extreme right, and was composed of leading jurists, statesmen, catholics, and others who did not join the *F.I.* or *Armée Secrète*.

While the *Armée Secrète* was purely a military organization, created and used solely for that purpose, the *F.I.* and the *M.N.B.* tended to revert into political organizations once the actual fighting had passed on.

From the view point of Allied armies, the resistance groups were extremely helpful, difficulties arising only after liberation. Many Belgian towns were liberated by the resistance, thus facilitating the advance of our troops. They were of immense value in clearing out isolated pockets of Germans in the wake of our forces, and took many prisoners. They were used as guards by Civil Affairs detachments and assisted in the direction of traffic, keeping civilians off the military roads.

The difficulty that Civil Affairs encountered as it settled in Belgium was that of chaos created by many different local resistance organizations, many of which had offered only passive resistance to the Germans, blossoming out with colored armbands once the battle had passed on. Some had fought in their own locality, but were not interested in the national scope of the war once their own town had been liberated. The *Armée Secrète* moved on, leaving behind it the local factions.

Detachment A-1, E-1, Charleroi, met a resistance problem which was typical of Belgian industrial towns. As it entered with the Third Armored, it found the different resistance groups engaged in rounding up Rexists and other collaborationists—venting all the hatred and contempt of five years. In this activity, they produced a great deal of friction, due to the fact that each resistance group had its own black list, and occasionally the black list of one group would include the name of a person associated with another group. Those who were rounded up and thrown into the Caserne were given no immediate trial and many were severely beaten and subjected to inhuman treatment by the Belgians who were having their revenge, according to reports from the detachment. Bands of resistance members roamed the streets taking into custody any and all who were connected with the Nazi regime.

As soon as the Civil Affairs office was set up, complaints flooded in about relatives being arrested without cause, complaints about terrorism, complaints that Resistance groups were requisitioning food and supplies. Two different groups would attempt to requisition the same item, and the question arose as to who had the authority as well as the guaranty of payment.

The gendarmes, who ordinarily would have taken charge of the situation in their capacity for preserving law and order, were handicapped by lack of arms and ammunition, and therefore could not function efficiently during a time when the man with the gun had the last word.

In the face of these circumstances, the Detachment Commander, Lt. Col. Albert A. Carmichael together with Maj. Raymond M. Criswell, Public Safety Officer, called a meeting of all resistance leaders in the Civil Affairs office. There it was pointed out to the resistance that all the confusion was interfering with the smooth working order of the city, and therefore with the army. They were also told that the brutalities were to stop at once, and that the prisoners in the Caserne were to be granted immediate trials in Belgian courts. Col. Carmichael also told them

that they should do their requisitioning of food and supplies through official channels, to obviate the complaints that were being brought against them. He emphasized the fact that the Detachment was not a ruling body, and therefore it was up to the people themselves to form order in the city.

The situation improved rapidly after the meet-

ing, and the mass round-ups ceased, as did the cruel treatment in the Caserne. Trials and investigations commenced, with result that many persons were freed as being innocent of collaboration. Requisitioning was put through channels, and there were no more seizures of food stocks in Charleroi.

### 3. SHAEF MISSION COMES TO BELGIUM

#### APPOINTMENT OF HEAD OF SHAEF MISSION

[Ltr, CofS, SHAEF to Maj Gen George W. Erskine, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

1. You are appointed Head of the Supreme Commander's Mission to the Belgian Government.

2. You will set up your mission in Brussels at the earliest opportunity. It will be accredited to M. Pierlot, Prime Minister.

3. You will be the Supreme Commander's representative in dealing with the Belgian Government, and your object will always be to obtain agreements which conform with the Supreme Commander's policies.

4. You will be the authorizing and screening agency when Commands subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters wish to make contact with the Belgian Government.

5. The Heads of your staff sections will arrive fully briefed on the Supreme Commander's policies. Changes in policy will be notified to you.

6. You will rely on the political officers of Supreme Headquarters for your political advice.

7. . . . The Civil Affairs component [of your mission] represents an advance section of the Supreme Headquarters Belgian Country Unit, which is available to you as required for Civil Affairs work in Belgium. The G-5 component is at present under the command of 21st Army Group, but you will assume command of it at a time suitable to yourself and Army Group. Colonel [John B.] Sherman, United States Army, has already been selected as your deputy. \* \* \*

#### FIRST REPORT OF SHAEF MISSION

[Cable, SHAEF Mission Belgium to Lt Gen Sir Frederick Morgan, DCofS, SHAEF, 10-17 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

1. The Mission was established by my arrival in Brussels on 10 Sept.

The G-5 Section under Col. Bygott has joined me and is now under my order by agreement with Brig. [T.] Robbins, 21 Army Group. I urgently need the rest of my Mission. My Deputy, Col. Sherman, has joined me but I have nobody for my G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 Sections, and no administrative commandant or staff. I realize the difficulties but it is extremely inconvenient to work without any staff. . . .

2. Anything which can be done to improve my communications with SHAEF would be most valuable. 21 Army Group lines are very congested. . . .

3. The Belgian Government are most anxious for the rest of their Mission to be brought over from England and also certain Belgian officials including the members of the Belgian Parliament. The latter is most urgent as Parliament meets on the 19th and the absence of their deputies in London is most undesirable as their support is required and their absence might be considered "fishy." . . .

4. Another important requirement from the UK is the Belgian Government franc note issue. That is, I believe, held by the Bank of England awaiting release by SHAEF. These notes are required to effect the change in currency circulation. This as you know is necessary to prevent inflation. It is highly desirable to make the announcements when the Chamber assembles on the 19th and give immediate effect to the announcement by exchanging the old circulation for the new.

If the new notes are not here by the 18th this cannot be done. There will then be a serious danger of lack of confidence in the present issue, and this is likely to affect food prices and the whole economy of the country. . . .

5. The arming of the Gendarmes is a matter of considerable urgency. The Belgian Government feel that they might find themselves much embarrassed with large numbers of the various resistance movements under arms but their own

Gendarmerie unarmed. They feel there is a lack of authority behind their orders. . . .

7. The Belgian Government and all officials have been most helpful. The generally excellent spirit of cooperation is as good as ever. . . . I understand from the Prime Minister that they will appoint Prince Charles the Regent. The Government will then resign and a new Government will be formed. I do not think anybody can say what the composition of the new Government will be. . . . I have impressed on the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior the importance of organizing the food and transport. The transport is really the key to the food situation. The transport could be much improved by central control of civilian vehicles and this is being done. . . . We may have to help over road transport particularly with petrol. . . .

8. The internal communications in Belgium are very bad and almost nonexistent. \* \* \*

#### THE BELGIANS ARE MORE INCLINED THAN THE FRENCH TO RELY ON ALLIED AID

[Personal Impressions of Lt Col Walker Smith, Opns Branch, G-5 SHAEF, to Chief Opns Branch, G-5, Undated, SHAEF files, G-5, 22, Belgium-Nation]

\* \* \* The Belgium problem is like the French in that the root of its supply problem is the lack of transportation, and the difficulty of achieving full coal production. In other respects, however, the position is rather different. Civil Affairs officers in coming into Belgium found their welcome more warm hearted than in France; and there is no doubt of the warmth of the sentiment of this somewhat emotional people

for the Allies. On the other hand, they have not exhibited the self reliance of the French. In France the authorities on the whole are only too anxious to assume the burden of its administration in order to demonstrate to the world that they are capable of so doing. The Belgians, on the other hand, preferred to solve their problems with a more generous reliance upon Allied co-operation.

The reason for this is not hard to seek. France has a traditional status of a great power. She is anxious above all to assume this status. Belgium on the other hand, is not so much concerned with the problem of prestige. It is therefore more natural for them to look for continued assistance from the Allies without feeling that any loss of face is thereby incurred.

The result is that, in addition to the supply problem in Belgium, there is a political problem of possibly mounting gravity. The government headed by M. Pierlot is in every sense a compromise government without the fortification of any electoral mandate from the people. It is a compromise between parties—reading from right to left Catholics, Liberals, Socialist and Communist—and a territorial compromise between Walloons and Flemings, headed by an old man who was not desirous of taking office. This government like all partially emigré governments returned on the tide of partial victory is faced with many difficulties. It is faced with the charge of not being wholly conversant with what is taking place within the countries; it is faced with the charge of depressing instead of ameliorating conditions; it is faced with the charge of having an inadequate policy for reconstruction and for maintenance of order. \* \* \*

#### 4. TROUBLE IN DISARMING RESISTANCE FORCES IMPERILS THE GOVERNMENT

##### EISENHOWER URGES THE RESISTANCE GROUPS TO DISARM

[Eisenhower Order of the Day, 29 Sep 44, Summary of Belgian Press Opinion, 3 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

The hour of combat has thus passed for most of you as soldiers of the resistance troops. This does not necessarily mean that your services are no longer necessary. The war has been carried into enemy territory and if your government orders you to continue the struggle as soldiers of the

regular armed Belgian forces, I shall be proud to have you again under my command. In the meantime, in my capacity of Supreme Commander, I desire that it shall be made known to members of the resistance groups that those who are no longer in combat or required by orders of Allied military leaders as guards or for other military duties can not do better to aid the military effort than by giving up their arms to their authorities and by waiting for instructions as to the manner in which they can take part in the struggle to come.

## BELGIANS REGARD THE ORDER AS TYPICALLY AMERICAN

[*La Nation Belge*, Summary for 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

. . . Others besides ourselves will catch the humor of this lecture; it is not for nothing that Gen. Eisenhower is from Mark Twain's country. It is absolutely American, and now we may expect that the Belgians, who are supposed to have a sense of humor, will respond by deferring without delay to a bit of advice that is not the less imperative for having been given in a fatherly fashion. \* \* \*

[*La Libre Belgique*, Summary for 5 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

\* \* \* We have only one regret, namely that this measure was not promulgated by the Belgian Government. We are aware that the Government has plenty of excuses. It is still in the first flush of adaptation and numerous tasks require its attention. Notably the police forces which are at its disposal must yet accomplish their organization and armament. But let us not forget that it is the duty of the Belgian authorities, in the first instance, to put their house in order. \* \* \*

## BELGIANS ARE PRODDED ABOUT FOOD DISTRIBUTION

[Ltr, Gen George Erskine to Lt Gen Paul Tschoffen, Chief, Belgian Mil Mission, 14 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

1. I am much concerned over the question of an equitable distribution of foodstuffs throughout Belgium. From my own personal observations and those of officers of my Staff, I am convinced that there is a widespread lack of imagination at all levels, both in administration and distribution, which results in grave shortages of essential foodstuffs in certain areas.

2. Now that it has been established that sufficient stocks of food exist in Belgium to maintain and in some cases improve the existing ration during the next few months, there can be no question of diverting Army transport, which is urgently required for operational purposes, to import food during this period. It therefore becomes a virtual military necessity to prevent any possibility of a breakdown in the distribution of food within the Country, whereby military operations might be seriously hampered.

3. I cannot find that there is any one Government Authority or Coordinating Board for food distribution. The Ministries of Food, Relief and

Communications seem to be the most interested parties. The normal peacetime method of leaving distribution to uncontrolled private enterprise leaves a great deal to chance and to black market profiteering. In case of a threatened breakdown, I am not certain with which Government Department I should deal.

4. I am sure the Government are giving the matter their attention. I should like to satisfy myself that the arrangements contemplated will work, and I would be only too glad to attend any meetings on a Ministerial level that you might like to convene.

## SHAEF WARNED THAT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION MAY COLLAPSE

[Ltr, Gen Erskine to SCAEF, 21 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rcds, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

1. By raising the matter of the collapse of the Civil Government in Belgium I do not wish to infer that such is imminent or probable. But if it occurred it would raise a set of circumstances which we ought to be prepared to meet at least in matters of broad policy. . . .

2. The present Belgian Government is faced with certain difficulties. The food situation is acute through lack of adequate distribution. The coal industry is only just commencing to work again and there is a serious shortage of coal to run essential civil requirements. Many men of the Resistance Movement are still maintaining themselves in a state of mobilization and the presence of so many armed civilians—numbering approximately 70,000—tends to overawe the Police and Gendarmes whose accrued strength amounts to approximately 6,000, and by the nature of their duties are dispersed into small parties and detachments. There is very considerable unemployment because industry is closed down, mainly owing to the shortage of coal.

It needs no imagination to see that rioting might easily occur and that the Government forces of law and order might well be insufficient to restore tranquility. If this should occur the Government might resign and . . . in such circumstances there would be very considerable difficulty in forming any Belgian Government. The situation might then further deteriorate requiring military forces to restore order and military assistance to work the essential services.

It might well be that before there was an actual breakdown the Government would come to me and demand certain assistance to avoid collapse. If this assistance was refused or not available the Belgian Government would be able to

lay the blame on SHAEF. To some extent this has already happened by approaches requesting demonstration of troops in certain areas and suggesting that it would be better if we disarmed the Resistance Movements using force if necessary.

3. I have repeatedly pointed out that SHAEF have no intention of assuming any responsibility for the Government of Belgium and that they look to the Belgians to govern themselves. While I feel on firm ground that this is the right and correct attitude and the one most likely to spur on the Belgian Government to the greatest efforts, I feel that there may be a phase when a little practical support might prevent or limit trouble and so avoid a worse situation. \* \* \*

#### EFFORTS TO DISARM THE RESISTANCE PRODUCE A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 17 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. 1]

The Ministerial crisis, which began on Saturday, has steadily worsened since then. Thursday afternoon the two communist ministers, MM. [Albert] Marteaux and [Raymond] Dispy, and the resistance minister, M. [Fernand] Demany, handed in their resignations, although they had voted with the Government in previous decisions to demobilize the resistance forces. The Front de l'Indépendance, which may properly be considered the radical wing of the resistance groups, marched and countermarched most of the afternoon, but the big meeting, which had been scheduled for the evening at the Cirque Royal and at which M. Demany was slated to speak, was forbidden by the Governor of Brabant. The Government almost fell three weeks ago over the question of food supply and it will now be interesting to see if it can weather this crisis as well.

All the three resigning ministers issued statements to the press explaining their action. Dr. Marteaux said in part: "The Government has several times signified its intention to assimilate the healthy elements of the resistance into the army. It is on the realization of this plan that we cannot agree. Ill will is being shown by certain parts of the military administration. In certain quarters it is obviously desired to destroy first the armed forces of the resistance, next to attack the resistance movement in general and finally to do the same with certain political groups, notably ours. To ask us to be associated in the destruction of the resistance movement, when we know that in principle it is directed against

ourselves, is certainly a bit thick. And that is not all; there is the whole question of "epuration" which has not been solved.

#### MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A BREAKDOWN

[Directive, SHAEF to CinC, 21st AGp; CG, 12th AGp; CG, ComZ; Head, SHAEF Mission (Belgium), 18 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

##### *General*

1. It has been represented to this Headquarters that disorders may arise in Belgium which will be beyond the powers of the civil administration to control. These disorders may require military forces to restore order and military assistance to work essential services. The object of this directive is to lay down how our military interests are to be secured, and the channels of command and communication which are to be followed in dealing with this situation.

2. The sole concern of the military authorities is to ensure that the Allied war effort is not impeded by internal dissension in Belgium. We have no desire to interfere in Belgian internal affairs, but it is our duty adequately to secure our installations and lines of communication, and full precautions must, therefore, be taken.

3. While Army Groups and Communications Zone will be responsible for watching for internal security problems in their respective areas in Belgium, the Supreme Headquarters Mission (Belgium) will be responsible for communicating to them the forecasts of the Belgian Government in this respect. Army Groups and Communications Zone will communicate their information and appreciations to the Mission both for the information of the Belgian Government and for co-ordination to be carried out by the Mission.

##### *Warning of Internal Disputes*

4. SHAEF Mission (Belgium) will be responsible for conveying to Army Groups and Communications Zone any information which it received from the Belgian Government on situations which may affect the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of essential services. Army Groups and Communications Zone will be responsible for looking locally for indications of this nature and for keeping in touch with local administrative officers.

##### *Precautionary Action*

5. Precautionary measures, such as redistribution of troops, will be taken by Army Groups and Communications Zone as they consider neces-

sary and on the advice of SHAEF Mission. They will keep SHAEF and the SHAEF Mission fully informed of such action.

#### *Action in Support of the Civil Power*

6. No action to support the civil power will be taken unless the local commander is satisfied that military interests are involved.

7. Allied intervention in the preservation of law and order will fall under two main headings:

a. Where the Belgian Administration calls for military assistance.

b. Where riots, strikes, picketing, etc., make military action necessary in order to safeguard military operations, without requests from the Belgian administration.

It is of the greatest importance that the former of these two alternatives shall be adopted whenever possible and that the latter shall be the extreme exception. The Supreme Headquarters Mission, Army Groups and Communications Zone will therefore encourage authoritative action by the Belgian authorities by maintaining close touch with the Government and the local administrative authorities, by exchanges of information and by tendering advice.

8. It is also of importance that the Belgian Government shall take the first steps in dealing with the troubles by use of the police and gendarmerie. In such circumstances it will be of advantage if evidence of Allied backing is shown by the presence of Allied military police with the Belgian civil power. The Allied military police will not take an active part at this stage.

9. A request for military assistance must be made in writing and will whenever possible have governmental approval from Brussels.

10. Once it has been decided to provide military assistance, the action to be taken is entirely a military responsibility and the military commander alone will give orders. There must, however, always be appropriate representation by the Belgian civil power.

#### *Priority Measures*

11. Should internal dispute become widespread, priority in countermeasures will be given to:

a. Preservation of essential military services and security of military installations.

b. Measures required to keep those civilian services working on which the sustenance of the civil population depends.

#### *Command and Control*

12. Twelfth and 21st Army Groups and Communications Zone will remain under the direct

command of Supreme Headquarters for action in support of the civil power and for the preservation of facilities essential to operations. Army Groups and Communications Zone will have full discretion in the action they take within the terms of paragraphs 5-9 above. \* \* \*

#### THE GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MILITARY EFFORT

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 19 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

General Erskine had a conference with the three resigning ministers after which all parties signed the following communiqué: The former ministers state that they do not agree with the methods adopted by the Government for the disarming and integration into the army of the resistance movements. That is one of the reasons for their resignation. They acknowledge Gen. Erskine's statement according to which the necessities of war and military operations exact in point of fact that only those persons can carry arms who have been specially authorized by virtue of signed certificates to that effect issued by Allied military commands. Gen. Erskine asked them to do their best to avoid occurrences which might bring about conflicts with Allied military forces. The three resigning ministers acknowledged this request. They agreed to do all in their power to assure respect for the law and that everything should take place in an orderly fashion. By way of conclusion, Gen. Erskine stated that it was his formal desire that the arms of the resistance movements should be handed back according to the orders of the Government. This desire will be communicated to the resistance movements and the three resigning ministers undertake to see that these movements will avoid any conflict with the Allied forces. \* \* \*

#### RESISTANCE GROUPS AGREE TO HAND OVER THEIR ARMS

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 19 Nov 44]

\* \* \* Meanwhile the resistance groups met and decided to hand in their arms to the "inter-allied military authorities." They acknowledged the communiqués of M. Pierlot, of the Allied High Command and of the resigning ministers and declared that the arms had been given to the movements and not to the men individually. Therefore, they could not turn in their arms for payment of a bonus. "A soldier does not sell his arms." They would hand them in to their responsible chiefs who would make an inventory

and then comply with the directions of the "inter-allied military authorities." \* \* \*

#### THE TROUBLE LIES NOT WITH OUR MINISTERS

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 24 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

\* \* \* *Le Peuple*, after having once again recited the old story of the vicious circle of domestic problems, says: "All this is only too clear and it is useless to recall that specially interested critics of the government have tried to make us believe that all our ills stem from bad politics and it will suffice to cure them by changing ministers. The best minister in the world, upheld by the will of the masses unanimously, would remain powerless before those difficulties. They arise out of the war which ruined us and they continue because the war continues. It is stupid to wish to remedy them by solutions of principle or propaganda. The situation will only get better with Allied successes and the putting into operation of the port of Antwerp. But time is necessary for that." \* \* \*

#### BRITISH NEWSPAPER QUOTED AS FAVORING A BETTER BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

[Belgian Press, Summary for 29 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

\* \* \* It is also with barely concealed delight that *Le Drapeau Rouge* picks up and quotes an editorial in the *London News Chronicle* that Saturday's [25 November] demonstrations "bear witness to the unpopularity of the Pierlot Government which maintains its authority with the support of the Allied High Command." The London paper goes on to say that "this Government was never constitutionally elected and now it appears that important patriotic elements re-

puciate it. It is sustained by the industrial and financial interests, which were not all exempt from collaborationist tendencies, rather than by the Belgian workers. . . . After all, the best method of protecting the lines of communication is to have at the head of the country a government which enjoys popular support. From another angle, the high Command must never allow itself to be so situated that, by the presence of its arms, it confers authority on a government which does not have the support of the Belgian people. . . ." \* \* \*

#### CHURCHILL DEFENDS EISENHOWER'S INTERVENTION

[Gist of Churchill's Remarks in the House of Commons as reported in *La Libre Belgique*, 10 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

\* \* \* In Belgium there would have been a *coup d'état* in November against the government of M. Pierlot, which was the only constitutional tie with the past. There were demonstrations and lorries loaded with armed men were despatched from Mons, but orders were given to arrest them and British troops were placed in the streets. These measures have been ordered by Gen. Erskine, who holds his authority from Gen. Eisenhower. I consider the decisions of Gen. Eisenhower absolutely just. Not only have we obeyed Gen. Eisenhower's orders, but we believe they were wise, reasonable and dictated by common sense. We British, about whom it is hinted that we are faithless friends of democracy, have lost between 35 and 40,000 men in the operations for the reopening of the port of Antwerp. Those things too must be considered in the same light as the "friends of democracy" travelling in lorries from Mons to Brussels to unleash a bloody revolution. \* \* \*

## 5. SHAEF MISSION FINDS TROUBLED CONDITIONS IN LUXEMBOURG

#### SHAEF LUXEMBOURG MISSION NOT WELCOMED BY THE CORPS COMMANDER

[SHAEF Luxembourg Mission, Report for Period 3-15 September 1944, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.06, SHAEF Mission to Luxembourg]

1. The Luxembourg Mission was activated as of 1100 hours 3 Sep 44. . . .

c. Upon arriving on continent, contact was immediately established with Headquarters, Cen-

tral Group of Armies, and with Headquarters, First United States Army, through their respective G-5 Sections.

d. In accordance with verbal instructions issued by Supreme Hq, AEF, Main Headquarters, G-5, request was made of the Commanding General, Central Group of Armies, to furnish the necessary items of equipment which the Mission did not have at time of departure from United Kingdom. G-5 of the Central Group of Armies

stated that in view of the fact the Commanding General, First United States Army, was to be held responsible for transporting the Mission to Luxembourg, he would also be held responsible for taking care of the needs of the Mission.

e. Col. Damon Gunn, G-5, First United States Army, upon being informed of his responsibility, immediately initiated action whereby certain transport was procured from captured enemy motor pools. . . .

g. Under date of 9 Sep 44, the Luxembourg Mission departed for Laon, France. The departure was made when the Mission learned that approximately a week or more would be required to procure all of the supplies requisitioned for the Mission by the Commanding General, First U.S. Army. Arrived at Laon 1800 hrs 9 Sep 44.

h. Due to breakdowns of motor transport, it was decided to halt the movement at Charleville, the afternoon of 10 Sep 44, in view of the fact Headquarters, Fifth Corps, United States Army, had moved North into Belgium.

i. Departing from Charleville at 0800 hrs 11 Sep 44, the Mission reported to Headquarters, Fifth Corps, United States Army at 1030 hrs., same date, having been delayed because of bridge destruction and bad river crossings.

j. Official representatives of the Government of Luxembourg, who were members of the Mission, were greatly disturbed over the fact that Prince Felix, the Prince Consort, had been installed as the HEAD of the Government as of 10 Sep 44, a position he was not entitled to fill under their constitution. Their fears were allayed when informed that the error had been rectified and that Prince Jean, the heir, had been brought in late the same date.

k. G-5, Headquarters, Fifth Corps, United States Army, informed the Mission that the Corps Commander was installing Civil Affairs detachments within the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and that the Corps Commander would brook no interference from the Mission, or any other source. Further, that all dealings concerning Civil Affairs matters would be referred to the Corps Commander for action. Army and higher headquarters were criticized for not co-ordinating the movement of the Mission, and further for not acquainting the Corps Commander as to the purpose of the Mission. The Corps Commander had not asked for the Mission, instead, Headquarters, First United States Army, had directed the Corps Commander to receive the Mission and assist in its arriving safely in Luxembourg. It was evident that the Mission was not welcome in the area under jurisdiction of the Fifth Corps, United States Army.

2. The Luxembourg Mission arrived in the Place de Ville, Luxembourg City, 1500 hrs 11 Sep 44. Proceeding to the Mairie, contact was established with Prince Felix and the Burgermeister. The citizens, from the time the frontier was crossed, cheered continuously. . . .

a. Prince Felix and the Burgermeister expressed their gratitude and appreciation for the arrival of the Mission. The Prince stated that now the Mission was here he was transferring all responsibility to the Mission and would depart for London as soon as practicable.

b. No Civil Affairs Detachments were in Luxembourg when the Mission arrived.

c. The first assignment given the Mission was assisting elements of the Fifth Armored Division, United States Army, in the selection of points to establish road blocks, areas to be patrolled, and other defensive measures necessary to afford protection to the city and the governmental agencies. Enemy stragglers, and enemy units being pinched out by the tactical operations and bypassed, were harassing the villages near the city. Light mortar fire from enemy on outskirts caused some casualties.

d. The first Civil Affairs detachment arrived at approximately 1800 hrs 11 Sep 44.

e. Prince Jean the Heir, Grand Duke of Luxembourg, was contacted approximately 1900 hrs 11 Sep 44.

#### MISSION FINDS CIVIL LIFE PRACTICALLY AT A STANDSTILL

[SHAEF Luxembourg Mission, Rpt, 3-15 Sep 44]

f. All banks and financial institutions, courts, public offices, general merchandise stores and shops were closed. Shortage of staple food permitted no food stores and cafes to remain open. Garages and repair shops were also closed. This condition had prevailed since 5 Sep.

g. No police force or gendarmerie existed. Members of the Union of Patriots were functioning under self-appointed authority. Population was very orderly.

h. Electricity and water were operating intermittently at but partial capacity.

i. Health conditions were excellent.

j. All communications (telephone, telegraph, radio and postal) were closed. Radio Luxembourg had been damaged by enemy action as well as the telephone exchanges and transmissions system. . . .

k. Transportation was at a standstill except for private cars operated by members of the Patriots Union. Rolling stock of the rail and

tram, or bus systems, were in the yards or dispatch buildings.

l. Industry was completely closed down throughout the entire Duchy.

m. At the time the Mission arrived nothing had been done in regard to economic or administrative rehabilitation, or organization. The enemy had during the period of occupation eliminated every vestige of the former Luxembourg Government. When the enemy withdrew, the officials, civil and economic, left with them taking all records possible and attempting to destroy the balance.

n. In addition to the elimination of the Luxembourg Government, the enemy had installed their own government. The Duchy was redistricted or rezoned and a complete change over made in the functions of the administrative officials. New offices and bureaus were created with a complete change in the keeping of civil, or, what may be termed public or quasi-public records. When a former Burgermeister or public official, either national or local, was found he obtained no aid from the files at hand when such files were located. The heads of many offices, including the private ones, had been out of touch with their respective function or duty over four years, having been replaced by the enemy shortly after the occupation began.

o. The enemy had departed or removed from the Grand Duchy approximately 50,000 persons. Over 30,000 were in Germany (including Austria), some 5,000 in Poland, others were forced into German Army or Todt organization. Majority of those removed were civil servants, both national and local in character. In a country of approximately 250,000 nationals this was a great loss. Without the civil servants and officials to assist, the problem of restoring the Government presented a new angle.

p. In addition to those departed, under Displaced Persons problems came those persons imported into South Luxembourg. This is the industrial centre of the Grand Duchy. As of this date there were approximately 3,000 persons, chiefly Russian, in this area. There was a probable flow from Belgium of 200 or more per day which will constitute a major problem in feeding and providing shelter.

#### COMBAT FORCES MAKE SOME ILL-ADVISED ARRANGEMENTS

[SHAEF Luxembourg Mission, Rpt, 3-15 Sep 44]

3. A verbal agreement apparently has been entered into between the Miliz and Union of Patriots (both Luxembourg) [resistance

groups], and the military forces occupying the liberated areas. This was necessary at the time of occupation due to the fact that there were no Luxembourg Government officials present, nor were the local officials present, i.e., Burgermeister, civil servants, police and similar.

a. This purported agreement has created considerable confusion and embarrassment. Proclamations have been issued informing them they are free, that in absence of the government the Union is the responsible agency within the Grand Duchy for the preservation of life. All are signed "l'Union."

b. On 14 Sep 44, the Union proclaimed a general mobilization of Luxembourg, and attempted to call up the classes of 18-26 to put into the armed forces. The Mission promptly called a conference of the leaders of the Union and informed them the Mission would not tolerate such action and to withdraw the proclamation. . . .

c. Major George Schommer, Chef de la Mission pour les Affaires Civiles, initiated action whereby the judicial and civil servant systems would be re-established. First meeting of the judiciary group was to be held 1400 hrs 14 Sep 44, and the meeting of chiefs of civil servants was arranged for 1000 hrs 15 Sep 44. The organization of the judiciary and bureaus would immediately begin following the conference indicated. . . .

d. Major François Ewsch as head of the Armed Forces of Luxembourg, began recruiting personnel for the military forces, gendarmerie, and police force. Personnel were being drawn from the Miliz, Union of Patriots and citizens at large. This included the persons who were formerly in the military forces, gendarmerie, and police force, as well as those who were in the German Army, Belgian, and French resistance movements. The Luxembourg Battery, now a part of the Belgian Army, when made available, will form the nucleus of the military force.

e. Major Guill Konsbruck, aide-de-camp to the Grand Duchess Charlotte, and representing M. [Pierre] Dupong, Prime Minister of the Duchy, inspected the Ducal Palace and other government buildings upon his arrival late in the afternoon of the 12 Sep. Conferences were held with such officials as could be found relative to the establishing of government under a state of siege. \* \* \*

#### LUXEMBOURG MISSION SIZES UP ITS JOB

[SHAEF Luxembourg Mission, Rpt, 3-15 Sep 44]

g. The Mission resolved that its primary functions were the following:

1. To assist in the establishing of a military force, gendarmerie and police.

2. The re-establishment of the judicial system in order that those persons now under arrest could be tried.

3. The placing in office of loyal and efficient civil servants.

4. The opening of banks, both commercial and savings, and provide for the payment of taxes in order that salaries and other government expenses could be met. Taxes to be paid in marks in order that the mark can be withdrawn before financial decrees are issued.

5. Reopen the stores and shops in order that trade and commerce could be resumed, retaining existing price and rationing systems.

6. Restore electricity and water service which were functioning intermittently.

7. Restore transportation service.

8. Restore communications (P.T.T.).

9. Opening of cinemas, provide concerts by the band, and similar forms of entertainment.

10. Establish bureaus for the handling of Displaced Persons and Welfare problems. \* \* \*

#### HEAD OF THE MISSION RECEIVES INSTRUCTIONS

[Ltr, CofS, SHAEF to Brigadier S. O. Jones, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.06, SHAEF Mission to Luxembourg]

1. You are appointed Head of the Supreme Commander's Mission to the Luxembourg Government.

2. You will set up your mission in the city of Luxembourg at the earliest opportunity. It will be credited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg.

3. You will be the Supreme Commander's representative in dealing with the Luxembourg Government, and your object will always be to obtain agreements which conform with the Supreme Commander's policies.

4. You will be the authorising and screening agency when Commands subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters wish to make contact with the Luxembourg Government.

6. In view of the links which existed between Belgium and Luxembourg before the war, you will maintain close touch with the Supreme Headquarters' Mission (Belgium). You must not, however, presuppose that the two countries will wish to enter again into those or even similar agreements.

7. You will rely on the Political Officers of Supreme Headquarters for your political advice.

8. The composition of your mission is shown at Appendix "A" [in above cited file]. The Civil Affairs Section comprises the Supreme Headquarters Luxembourg Country Unit; it is at present in Luxembourg under command of Twelfth Army Group, and you will assume command of it as early as possible.

9. The Chief of your Civil Affairs section will also be Deputy Head of the Mission.

10. There will be no Naval or Air representation on the mission. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF MISSION (LUXEMBOURG) IS DISSOLVED

[Ltr, CofS, SHAEF to Head, SHAEF Mission Luxembourg, *et al.*, 21 Oct 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-4]

1. At the time when it was decided to install the Supreme Headquarters Mission (Luxembourg), it was considered advisable to make provision for what at that time, appeared likely, namely a rapid advance by the Third Army into German territory. It was, therefore, necessary to pre-suppose that the Headquarters of Armies and even the Advanced Headquarters of Twelfth Army Group would shortly be situated east of the Duchy of Luxembourg with the resultant need for a Mission in Luxembourg which would shoulder the burden of all Governmental contacts and leave Commanders free for their operational responsibilities.

2. As events have turned out, our forward advance has been checked on the Eastern borders of Luxembourg leaving that state in a forward zone of operations. In these circumstances civic matters are so closely related to the requirements of battle that they can best be handled by the Commander on the spot. The presence of a Mission becomes, in these circumstances, redundant.

3. It is, therefore, more satisfactory that the Supreme Headquarters Mission (Luxembourg) be withdrawn and that Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group deal directly with the Luxembourg Administration.

4. The Supreme Headquarters Mission (Luxembourg) will be withdrawn at the earliest possible date, less the Civil Affairs component which is to come under command of the Twelfth Army Group. At a later date when the advance is resumed, a Mission may become necessary, and at that time a detachment from the Supreme Headquarters Mission (Belgium) might assume the responsibilities of governmental contact.

## 6. ARDENNES COUNTEROFFENSIVE PUTS CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL TO THE TEST

### CONDITIONS BEHIND THE FRONT PRIOR TO GERMAN DRIVE

[Hist Rpt, G-5, XII Corps, for Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 244, Third U.S. Army]

b. Prior to enemy counteroffensive [16 December 1944], civilian life in the Grand Duchy [Luxembourg] had almost returned to peacetime normal. The national government and local administration were functioning efficiently. Civil police and gendarmerie, supplemented by specially appointed police of the "Miliz" were enforcing local law and order. \* \* \*

[Hist Rpt, G-5, FUSA, 1-31 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17-11, Hist Reds]

\* \* \* The German attack confronted Civil Affairs and Military Government with the most serious problems since D Day. At the moment the enemy struck, numerous difficulties in many communities had just begun to be ironed out; rehabilitation of the war-torn villages and towns was well under way; and the "self-help" program for the civilian population had made remarkable progress, due largely to two factors: a mounting belief among the civilians that for them the war was over, and a gradually abating fear of Nazi reprisals against those who collaborated with the occupying authorities.

The German counter-offensive struck hard at both these impressions. Civilians suddenly realized that, far from being out of the war, they might be in the thick of it for some time to come. Word of the Wehrmacht return instantly raised the spectre of Nazi vengeance. Rumors adding to the general apprehension were stimulated by the absence of reliable news owing to the lack of electric power and communications; some communities had no official word of the attack four days after it began. Nevertheless, the widespread fear at no time degenerated into panic. \* \* \*

### MAIN PROBLEMS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN A DEFENSIVE OPERATION

[Robinson, HS, SHAEF, G-5, Monograph, CA/MG Activities in German Counteroffensive, Dec. 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, CA/MG in Defensive Opns (Ardennes) (Northern Alsace), May 45]

\* \* \* As the Germans smashed into Belgium and Luxembourg (and the following month into Alsace), tension became endemic among the civilian population. A recurrence of German atrocities against public officials, resistance mem-

bers, and possibly the general populace was foreseen. With the return of bitter hostilities to many areas, terror grew acute and, for a time, panic threatened.

Intense fighting produced widespread devastation, disrupted utilities, paralyzed supply machinery, created a mounting list of civilian casualties. Civil administration tottered in places; the excellent state of law and order previously prevailing threatened to lapse. Thousands of inhabitants of the affected area in the liberated countries, as well as in Germany, started to take to the roads in an effort to flee. The danger became so imminent that Allied military operations might be hamstrung by a breakdown in civilian controls.

### *Military Demands on CA/MG:*

Faced with these civilian problems, the tactical troops turned to their G-5 Sections for concrete and immediate help. Never before had CA/MG been so integral a part of the military team.

The most pressing task for the G-5 Sections at Army, Corps and Division levels during the withdrawal operations was "to prevent any interference with the Allied counter-measures, especially the convoys of troops and supplies that seemed to move on every road every hour of the day and night."

This called for intense activity by almost every CA/MG officer to restrain hysteria among civilians, to control refugees, to keep military routes clear of civilian traffic, and to ensure the maintenance of security. The security question was a vital one in view of the presence of German parachutists and enemy partisans within the hit districts. In some instances the mass evacuation of entire towns became an operational necessity.

Of key importance, too, was the "expeditious billeting of Allied units which had fallen back or were coming up to meet the German advance."

### *Civilian Demands on CA/MG:*

Homeless, hungry, terror-stricken and often wounded, tens of thousands of people, chiefly friendly, looked to CA/MG for succor.

Detachment had to meet such problems as finding ambulances and hospitals for civilian casualties; locating adequate housing facilities for civilians who had fled, or who had been evacuated from overrun towns. They had to organize police, civil defense, and fire fighting services. They had to restore local civil governments.

With supply routes cut off, the CA/MG detachments were forced to solve food problems, in some cases distributing Allied food stock—military and other. In some instances, they had, at the risk of their lives, to move supplies into a cave between the German and American lines near the village of Welferding where hundreds of people had sought shelter.

More important than all, perhaps, CA/MG officers had to lend strength and reassurance to the officials and population of the localities in which they were assigned. They had to supply the greatest and most difficult of all intangibles—courage and stamina—to thousands of frightened people.

#### *Administrative Demands on CA/MG:*

For all CA/MG officers, from the highest Army Group level down to the smallest detachment, the withdrawal produced administration problems never before encountered.

Onrushing German advances forced Divisions and Corps repeatedly to move their CP's (Command Posts). Even Army CP's had to be shifted. The result was a serious disruption in communications between G-5 Sections and some detachments. Frequently it was difficult to maintain messenger liaison, let alone telephonic contact.

The detachments in the field often were faced with an acute lack of information concerning the military situation and received their first notice of enemy locations from the approaching sound of shellfire. In some instances they manned the firing line themselves; had to decide when to retreat. Pushed back by the enemy progress, or moved from locale to locale by higher authority, they were required to solve, under most trying conditions, questions of transportation, communications, rations, and billeting.

For ECAD (Europe Civil Affairs Division) administrative headquarters, the problems were equally acute as companies in the field struggled to keep in touch with their wandering units. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS AMONG THE LAST TO LEAVE THREATENED AREAS

[Hist Rpt, FUSA, 1-31 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, Hist Rcds, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* In the opening days of the German offensive, several Civil Affairs detachments in extreme forward areas were forced to evacuate. In almost all cases these detachments remained in their assigned towns until the last possible moment; several instances were reported where

detachments left only with the withdrawal of the last tactical troops. . . .

On the northern shoulder of the offensive, detachment I4G2, with jurisdiction over Landkreis Monschau, elected to remain in Monschau despite the threat that the town would be overrun by German troops. After a conference of the detachment officers, the decision to remain in the town was made for the following reasons: (1) The detachment's presence in the town was of considerable assistance to the local tactical unit, which expressed a desire for the detachment to remain. (2) The detachment's departure would be obvious to the local populace, which had already observed the removal of a group and two battalion headquarters from town, and would have a very serious effect on civilian morale, with the possible result of attempted mass evacuation. (3) Military Government would in the future be handicapped in the Kreis, if the detachment departed leaving behind, for the mercy of civilian opportunists and possibly German military personnel, the civilians who had cooperated with the administration. . . .

While the tactical situation in Monschau remained serious throughout the remainder of the month, with the town suffering from constant shelling, the detachment maintained complete control over the population, which remained calm and cooperative. . . .

The detachment in Eupen, augmented by V Corps Provisional Military Government Security Guards, was also a "tower of strength" during the emergency period after the launching of the German offensive. . . . Areas still farther to the rear, such as Verviers, Spa and Liège, also felt the impact of combat conditions again, with Verviers being subjected to shelling and to intermittent attacks by enemy aircraft. Since several important supply routes passed through Verviers, prompt and careful supervision of civilian circulation and curfew were required to prevent impeding military traffic.

The situation was highly fluid in the first days of the offensive, and detachments in Malmédy, Stavelot, Marche and Spa evacuated their assigned towns since they were in danger of being overrun. The detachments returned as soon as the tactical situation permitted. \* \* \*

#### ONE CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT WIPED OUT

[SHAEF, Public Relations Div, Press Release covering Dec 44-21 Mar 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 13.06, Hist Rcds]

A complete civil affairs detachment, stationed in a Luxembourg town which was engulfed by the

German midwinter offensive in the Ardennes is now officially reported missing in action.

The detachment, a small one of two officers and five enlisted men working to help restore normal conditions in Clervaux, near the German frontier, fought against the advanced German forces, was besieged and shelled by armoured columns and was last seen defending itself from the Post Office, where its records were being burned. . . .

Reports show that although some civil affairs and military governments detachments were swept from their respective areas of administration and occupation in the first week of the German advance, the Clervaux detachment was the only one lost. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL ADMINISTRATORS ARE EVACUATED FROM FORWARD COMBAT AREAS

[Historical Rpt, FUSA, 1-31 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, Hist Rcds, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* As a consequence of the German advance, all mayors in Belgian and Luxembourgish towns near the front lines were advised that they would be warned and evacuated in case the situation should become critical. Mayors and other important civil administrators left, or were evacuated by Civil Affairs detachments, in Spa, Butgenbach, Berg, Nidrun, Barvaux, Ciney, St. Vith, Wiltz, Veilsalm and Bastogne, Belgium and Nersch, Comar-Berg, Fels, and Diekirch, Luxembourg. In all cases where officials left cities remaining in our hands, they were replaced, and the substitutes were instructed in the enforcement of curfew and other security regulations as well as in the normal grist of governmental activity. \* \* \*

#### USE OF INDIGENOUS POLICE

[War Diary of Detachment 18D2 for December 1944, dated 8 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 624 ECAD ECAR, Second ECAR, Co. D]

1. e. During German counter-attack emergency, beginning 16 December 1944, all Militz [Miliz] and Auxiliary Police in this Cantone [Capellen] of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have been mobilized and given authority to arm. They are being used to enforce civilian circulation and curfew regulations. In many cases, they are being used at road junctions to direct traffic. They have been given authority by this unit to confine known German collaborators to their homes and they have been directed to make arrests. One known Nazi collaborator has been arrested and taken to Luxembourg Prison by this Detachment

and several others have been arrested by Auxiliary Police. All main roads have been kept clean of civilian traffic and evacuees "frozen" to the towns they now occupy. Identity papers have been issued to the Militz and/or Auxiliary Police used on Night Patrol. Large numbers of American troops have been billeted, under cover in all cases, by this unit during this emergency. This unit has been successful in controlling the civil population, alleviating panic, counteracting rumors, and in keeping the people calm, under control, and subject to our instructions. Curfew from dark to daylight has been imposed and enforced. Passes have been withheld except to the Militz, Police, and other essential persons, such as doctors. Contact and control has been maintained with and through the local police and officials. Close liaison has been maintained with Army units in the Cantone. This unit has arranged temporary, alternative, and supplemental office in another village six miles SW of present office for effective handling of the situation. Steinfort reported bombed by German planes at 1420 this date (23 Dec 44). It is felt this bombing was slight. Civilian doctor requested to report there to care for casualties and wounds inflicted. \* \* \*

#### FIRE FIGHTING

[Periodic Rpt of Unit D7C1, Malmédy, Belgium,<sup>1</sup> 17 Dec 44-4 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, Hist Rpt, First Army, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* When first fire broke out on 23 Dec. as a result of the bombing, the fire house was forcibly entered by Det D7C1 and fire-fighting equipment was dispatched to the scene and manned by members of the Detachment and passers-by. During the night, pressure mains supplying water failed completely as a result of bombing and continued shelling and an aspiration pump was drawn by Det. jeep to the fire. Hose lines were laid and manned by Detachment and 291st Engrs. and the fire spread was checked and brought under control. Further bombing on 24 December started new fires and destroyed the second pump. Detachment personnel brought a third pump to the town square and diverted water from city sewer system by partially damming the Warchenne River. Another bombing raid knocked out one Army fire-fighting truck and the third pump, but the one remaining truck kept the fire from sweeping the town. The last available civilian pump was destroyed by enemy shell-fire Dec. 27, 1944. All

<sup>1</sup>In November the Volunteer Fire Department in Malmédy had been reorganized and activated but by the 23d of December the entire group had left the town.

fires had been brought under control 28 Dec. 44. \* \* \*

#### ROUNDING UP GERMAN PARATROOPERS

[Log of Det I4G2, 16 Dec 44-15 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11, First Army, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* 22 December 1944

0830-Capt Goetcheus received a note brought by a civilian from Lt. Col. Baron von der Heydte, German commander of the paratroops launched in the Eupen-Malmédy area. The colonel expressed his desire to surrender to the Military Government Commandant because he was ill and at the end of his physical endurance, and was lying at the house of a local civilian. Capt. Goetcheus arranged with Nostril Red for an ambulance and went to receive his surrender. The officer claims to have been the one who demanded the surrender of the British forces at El Alamein in 1942. \* \* \*

#### FISCAL PROBLEMS IN THE GERMAN DRIVE

[CA Daily Rpt, 124, of Det C2G1, 13 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.11 First Army, Jkt 6]

##### 5. Operations

(a) When German activity in the Ardennes began, arrangements were made with the Director of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, for disposing of funds on hand for purposes of security and for protection of the Director. In a meeting with the Director, arrangements were made to either transport the funds to Brussels or to protect him and the Bank by a paper transaction here. He assured us that there was an excellent hiding place in the City, which he told us about, and at which spot he had previously hidden money. Transportation was then provided for him to transfer the funds to the agreed spot. To protect him, we gave him our receipt for 100,000,000 francs of old type bank notes, and for our protection we had him give us a receipt for the same funds. Thus the possibility of these old type bank notes being placed in circulation again by the Germans would have been avoided. Upon request, the Director has submitted a letter relating this incident and giving his suggestions, which amount to previous arrangements for transferring funds or for all or part of funds on hand to be turned over to the Allied Authorities. . . .

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS PLAY A ROLE IN THE HEROIC DEFENSE OF BASTOGNE

[Robinson, CA/MG Activities in German Counteroffensive, Dec 44]

\* \* \* The epic defense of Bastogne includes a story of unequaled CA/MG gallantry and effectiveness.

The Civil Affairs Section of Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division, under Captain Roger F. Hull, moved into Bastogne on December 18th, the day before the CA detachment stationed in the city was evacuated. On the 20th, the CA Section of the 101st Airborne Division, headed by Captain Robert S. Smith, arrived. The two worked hand-in-glove from then on.

Some 2000 of the normal 5000 civilian population fled the city before the encirclement was completed on the 20th. Control of the 3000 who remained was, of course, of major military importance.

The city was left without any civil administration for three days after the mayor and many other officials together with the local gendarmes and maquis fled on the 20th. A new mayor and 17 auxiliary police were appointed on the 23rd, all of whom proved "very helpful in providing billets for refugees, burying civilian dead, supervising civil food distribution, and procuring needs for the army." The new administration, however, re-established only the Mayor's office, Ravitaillement and police, and those solely on an emergency basis.

The horror of war was fully felt in Bastogne. On the 18th, the city's power source fell into enemy hands and electric service was discontinued. All governmental functions, as well as trade and industry, ceased concurrently with the mass flight of civilians on December 18th and 19th. Telephone and telegraph service was suspended on December 19th by order of the CAO's.

Shelling of the city started on the 20th; bombing on the 24th. These, together with resultant fires, damaged 99 percent of the city's buildings by the end of the month. Some 30 percent, including two hotels, were totally destroyed. . . .

Although the Chief and three regular members of the Fire Department remained in the city, efforts to reorganize this group were ineffective since their equipment was incapacitated by the freezing weather. . . .

Luckily, the local food supplies were adequate for the inhabitants of Bastogne and some 600 refugees from nearby villages who were fed and housed by local authorities through Catholic Church organizations. As a matter of fact, for one day, the army itself drew on civilian supply meat and small quantities of other items. Fuel supply was ample, too, since requirements were drastically cut by civilians staying in large groups in air-raid shelters.

The CAO's devoted most of their efforts, of course, to the control of civilian movement, the Combat Command B reported, saying, "Hundreds of civilians attempting flight and impeding essential military traffic were removed from the streets daily, and impounded wherever they were apprehended. Later each day, they were returned to their home under escort, and were given orders to remain there. At the beginning of the period, all civilian circulation was forbidden, except under military escort. On December 23rd, 1944, the curfew was lifted from 1200 to 1400. . ."

\* \* \*

CA personnel also contributed to the rescue of the Bastogne defenders. When the 6th Armored Division was ordered to attack the German forces besieging the city, Major R. S. Wiesenberg, 6th Armored Division CAO, helped immeasurably at the Hablay-la-Neuve base in obtaining passes for railroad industrial workers and food handlers, in establishing security measures, and doing the myriad of things which enabled the division to move speedily, and successfully, on its succoring mission. \* \* \*

## PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL TO CIVIL AFFAIRS DURING WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS

[Lt Col Azel Hatch, G-5, CA Sec, VIII Corps, Periodic Rpt, 17-23 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.16, 12th AGp]

### 8. Pertinent Comments

A. Principles found to be essential for operations of CA activities during withdrawal operations:

(1) Communications must be maintained. Liaison by messenger, when telephone communication is lacking. Report to next higher echelon frequently.

(2) CA detachments should be deployed in depth.

B. Primary missions for CA detachment during withdrawal:

(1) *Prevent hysteria among civilians.* Spike rumors. Attitude and bearing displayed by CA personnel exerts powerful influence on population.

(2) *Prevent civilian circulation,* except for only essential occupations (doctors, railroad workers, etc.).

(3) *Establish rigid curfew* on approval of tactical unit.

(4) *Keep military routes clear of civilian traffic.* Local police or Gendarmerie may be augmented for this purpose. Motorized road patrols by personnel speaking native tongue. Loud speaker systems excellent. Post routes with signs.

(5) *Have critical bridges and utilities guarded.*

(6) *Make complete survey of billeting facilities.* \* \* \*

## 7. NEW GOVERNMENT FORMED IN BELGIUM

### GENERAL SURVEY OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION

[Jt Intel Comm., SHAEF Mission (Belgium), Rpt, Undated but Presumably in Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium]

The present political crisis in the country has come as a surprise to no one, and certainly not to either this sub-division, or P.W.

For the cause of the crisis, it is not necessary to look further than the two commodities:-Food and Coal.

The hardships, due to lack of both, which the population has been asked to suffer have been such that they have probably never before experienced. The absence of the latter was especi-

ally felt during the recent cold spell. The population is aware that the civilian administration of the country is the responsibility of the Government, and as four members of it, including the Prime Minister, were members of the ill-reputed "Emigré" Government in London, it was viewed with a certain amount of distrust from the start.

The Communist inspired troubles of November last were successfully met by the Government's somewhat surprisingly firm action, which had the support of the average Belgian, who can always be relied upon to act similarly if he can be convinced that anti-national interests are at work.

The fact that the Allies intervened at the criti-

cal stage had, however, left him under the impression that the Pierlot Government has the support of the Allies, and criticism which was, at one time, wholly directed towards the Government, is now, to a certain and increasing extent, being aimed at the Allies.

Six months after the liberation of the country, the man in the street is frankly bewildered. He is asked to suffer restrictions and hardships which he thinks should not be necessary had the country been administered by a competent and energetic government, and if the Allies had shown more interest in their problems.

He will support most things if he is convinced that it is necessary to the war effort, but he needs to be told the situation and feels that he is not being told enough either by the Government or by the Allies.

All parties including the Communists are anxious to help the Allies to win the war in the shortest possible time. They cannot understand why there should be more than 300,000 unemployed in the country, or why more young Belgians are not being enrolled in the Belgian Forces. They see their steel factories closing down, for lack of coal, when they should be working full-blast for the Allies, and compare the German efforts to utilize their industry to the apparent lack of interest, in this respect, shown by the Allies. They want to be told—and told by the Allies—why it is still more than ever necessary for them to pay fabulous prices on the black market if they want to live.

If the food is in the country, procurable only at Black Market prices, then it should be made available to the population through an equitable distribution at controlled prices. If the Government is incompetent to do so, then the Allies should step in and organise distribution and if it is necessary to import certain quantities, surely the war situation would justify the release of a few Liberty ships for such purpose, since the BBC during the occupation repeatedly told them that the Government in London had bought up large supplies for distribution when the country was liberated. \* \* \*

#### THE SOCIALISTS RESIGN FROM THE PIERLOT GOVERNMENT

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 3 Feb 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

The Government crisis is now in the open, with the resignation of the socialist ministers ([Paul H.] Spaak, Foreign Affairs; [Achille] Van Acker, Labour; [Ernest] Rongvaux, Communi-

cations; [Léon] Delsinne, Supply; [Herman] Vos, Public Works).<sup>2</sup> Some regret is expressed that the socialists torpedoed the Government in an unparliamentary fashion. However, the socialists have agreed and the Prime Minister will submit an explanation before Parliament on Tuesday [6 February]. *Le Soir* points out: "It can be said that the decision of the bureau of the socialist party was a dramatic stroke. In fact, it had not been expected that it would enjoin the socialist ministers to resign since some of its members had submitted a demand for questions. On the other hand, it seems as though M. Pierlot had wanted to resign after this decision of his socialist colleagues. But the Cabinet Council decided not to resign at once but to follow parliamentary tradition, that is, to appear before the Chamber." \* \* \*

#### A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMED UNDER VAN ACKER

[Belgian Press Opinion, Summary for 12 Feb 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission to Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

The new Government under the premiership of M. Van Acker has been formed since the catholic party evidently agreed at the last moment to sit in a cabinet with the communists. . . .

There are six members of the Pierlot cabinet who have remained in M. Van Acker's team. M. Van Acker, himself, has undertaken the specific responsibility of the coal problem in addition to his duties as Prime Minister. At his old post of Labour is a new Minister, M. [Léon E.] Trolet, a socialist. M. Spaak stays on at Foreign Affairs, M. Rongvaux at Communications, M. Vos at Public Works—all these are socialists. M. [Edmond] Ronse, the only catholic from the Pierlot team to continue, takes over Information where he had held Interior. M. [Paul] Kronacker, liberal, is listed for Importations specifically instead of without portfolio. The communist Dr. Marteaux returns to his old post of Public Health; he was one of the ministers who resigned out of protest in November.

The other communist in the Government, is M. [Edgar] Lalmand, secretary of the communist party and chief editorial writer for the *Drapeau Rouge*. He takes the difficult post of

<sup>2</sup> The socialists in the government maneuvered a crisis on 1 February. The resignation of the socialist ministers, on top of the resignation of the communists back in November, was sufficient to topple the Pierlot cabinet. History of Events in Belgium, Sep 44-Jul 45, in SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, Final Rpt, pt. I, SHAEF Mission to Belgium.

Supply, and it may be interesting to see him get a taste of his own medicine as well as to watch the reaction of his own paper. \* \* \*

#### BY MARCH CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN BELGIUM IS STABLE

[The Gen Bd, USFET, Study 33, p. 59]

On 7 February 1945 an order was distributed to Corps, Divisions and Civil Affairs Detachments of the First U.S. Army to prepare immediately for turning over full responsibility for govern-

mental affairs to the civil authorities, in order that civil affairs personnel might be made available for a quick entrance into Germany and the assumption of Military Government functions. This preparation entailed the closing of civil affairs projects under way, but it was suggested that civilian plans be drawn up promptly so that the local authorities might have the benefit of advice from Civil Affairs officers. When the First U.S. Army's offensive rolled into Germany in March, civil administration in Belgium was stable and working efficiently. \* \* \*

## 8. ALLIES STRAIGHTEN OUT THEIR REPRESENTATION IN LUXEMBOURG

### THE LUXEMBOURG "MISSION" OCCUPIES AN ANOMALOUS POSITION AS CA DETACHMENT

[SHAEF Mission Luxembourg, Final Rpt, 4 Sep 44-14 Jul 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.06, SHAEF Mission Luxembourg, Jkt 2]

d. From 21 Oct 44 until 4 April 45 the Mission continued under the command of 12 AGp, being known first as "Headquarters, Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment, Twelfth Army Group," and later as "Headquarters, Civil Affairs Detachment, Twelfth Army Group." . . . During the whole of this period the position of the Mission was anomalous in the extreme: a Mission which was no longer a Mission and a Detachment which was not a detachment, it was operationally under the control of 12 AGp and administratively dependent on the U.S. and British elements of SHAEF Mission (Belgium) with which it had ceased for the time being to have any other connection. Its members moreover were from time to time augmented by the attachment of Officers and EM from 12 AGp, and the constant efforts of the Heads of the Mission to obtain a consolidated WE/TO being of no avail, the Mission remained an administrative jigsaw puzzle throughout this period.

e. The climax of administrative chaos was reached when, on 4 April 1945, the Head of the Mission was informed by the ACofS, G-5, ETOUSA, that the Army boundary having moved forward the Mission had passed from the control of 12 AGp to that of ComZone. . . . The matter was then satisfactorily concluded by the appointment of General Erskine as Chief of the SHAEF Mission to Luxembourg, with Colonel [Frank E.] Fraser as Deputy Chief, the Mission

in Luxembourg being able to rely on the Mission in Belgium in G1-G4 matters. \* \* \* [See below, letter GS [CofS], SHAEF, to Gen. Erskine, 24 April 1945.]

### GRAND DUCHESS CHARLOTTE RETURNS

[Hq CA, 12th AGp, Daily CASUM 68, 19 Apr 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 132.06-B, SHAEF Mission to Luxembourg, Jkt 2]

1. HRH The Grand Duchess of Luxembourg returned to her country from England on 14 Apr, landing at an airstrip near the Capital. . . .

2. Her Royal Highness, who was accompanied by Brigadier HRH the Prince of Luxembourg, HRH Prince John, HRH Princess Alix, M. [Joseph] Bech, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Major Konsbruck, Minister of Agriculture and Supplies, M. [Andrew J.] Clasen, Luxembourg Minister to the UK, and Colonel Anthony D. Biddle, Chief EACS [European Allied Contact Section], representing the Supreme Commander, was met on arrival by the Ministers of the Government, the Head and Deputy Head of the Mission. . . .

9. On 17 Apr Their Royal Highnesses Princess Elizabeth, Princess Marie Adelaide, Princess Marie Gabrielle and Prince Charles arrived from the UK, driving ambulances in a convoy of vehicles presented to the Grand-Duchy by the British Red Cross Society. The Party was escorted from Le Havre by two officers of the Mission, and was met at the frontier by the Head and Deputy Head and Major Konsbruck.

11. The return of the Grand Duchess has been received by the population with an enthusiasm which has continued throughout the period un-

der review, crowds forming several times daily outside the Palace to acclaim Her Royal Highness. . . .

#### QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION AT LUXEMBOURG

[Staff Study Prepared by ACoS, G-3, SHAEF, for CofS, 23 Apr 45, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-47]

##### I. Discussion

1. Since the disbandment of the SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg) contact with the Luxembourg Government has been maintained through the Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group. The advance of the Twelfth Army Group gives rise to the question of the Supreme Commander having appropriate representation with the Luxembourg Government.

2. In October 1944, when the Luxembourg Mission was withdrawn the Civil Affairs component was left at the disposal of Twelfth Army Group and became known as the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment; subsequently, after the advance of Twelfth Army Group beyond Luxembourg, it was placed temporarily under command of Communications Zone, pending final decision of the subject matter by this Headquarters.

3. Personnel of the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment are included in the WE/TO of the SHAEF Mission (Belgium). They were detached from the G-5 component of the Belgian Mission for the purpose of forming the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment. However, as such, they have never been under the command of the Head, SHAEF Mission (Belgium).

4. The possible solutions to the problem of future SHAEF representation appear to be:—

a. Retain the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment under command of Communications Zone.

b. Place the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment directly under command of SHAEF.

c. Reconstitute SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg) incorporating therein the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment.

d. Give the Head of the SHAEF Mission (Belgium) the additional responsibility of assuming governmental contacts with Luxembourg and command of the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment.

Course a. above is not desirable because the Communications Zone is solely U.S. Headquarters. Course b. provides, on other than G-5 matters, only a remote and impersonal contact. Course c. would be most acceptable to the Luxembourg Government but would involve unwarranted personnel and equipment commitments. Course d. is the most economical and practical and is the one visualised by the Chief of Staff's letter \* \* \* [following].

#### THE HEAD, SHAEF MISSION (BELGIUM), IS MADE SCAEF'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT

[Ltr, CofS, SHAEF, to Gen Erskine, 24 Apr 45, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-4]

1. In addition to your duties as Head, Supreme Headquarters, AEF Mission (Belgium) you are hereby designated as the Supreme Commander's representative to the Luxembourg Government.

2. The existing Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment is placed under your command to assist you in conducting Luxembourg affairs.<sup>3</sup> Colonel F. E. Fraser, Head of the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment is designated as your Deputy for Luxembourg. Matters other than Civil Affairs will be handled by your present staff in such a way that they are kept separate from Belgian Affairs.

4. You will be the authorizing and screening agency when commands subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters wish to make contact with Luxembourg Government. However, on administrative matters a subordinate Headquarters, having established an original contact through you, is permitted to deal with the appropriate branch of the Government with or without your continued participation or assistance, though you must be kept informed of the general course of the more important negotiations. When matters of policy arise or when problems reach a ministerial level you will be the only channel between commands subordinate to Supreme Headquarters and the Luxembourg Government. \* \* \*

<sup>3</sup> In letter, CofS, SHAEF, to General Erskine, 11 May 1945, the Luxembourg Civil Affairs Detachment was redesignated SHAEF Mission (Luxembourg).

# Piecemeal Liberation of the Netherlands Amid Serious Civilian Distress

Planning for the Netherlands was based on the so-called collapse theory which assumed that German forces would all surrender at one time and that accordingly a complete civil administration for the entire country would be available. As it turned out, only a part of the country, and that a relatively small and politically unimportant part, was liberated initially. In the absence of a central government for the entire country the SHAEF Mission (The Netherlands), with one echelon in Belgium and a forward echelon at Eindhoven, dealt with the Netherlands Military Administration (NMA) and with certain provincial authorities. Its principal difficulties arose from the attempt to restore civil administration piecemeal.

The most serious consequences of the piecemeal occupation were in the sphere of supply. Until May 1945 the Germans held the northwestern part of the country, including the important cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. This area was normally dependent for food upon the surplus-producing areas of eastern Holland. When a general protest strike by the Dutch railway workers tied up rail traffic, the Germans refused to move food into the deficit areas in adequate volume. Flooding and scorching destroyed a considerable part of what production there was in the vicinity of the large cities. But

the difficulties in the Netherlands resulted not only from the vengeance wreaked by the Germans but also from the nature of the country itself. Largely dependent on dikes and canals, Holland is a sort of man-made machine that must run as a unit or not at all. Much of the soil is poor and will produce little without fertilizer. The fertilizer cannot be brought in unless the water in the canals is at the right level. The water levels cannot be controlled unless the canal locks and sluices are in operation; and these in turn are dependent on the mining and transport of coal and on the production and flow of electricity. A large population depends on the operation of this intricate network of machinery. Acting with these considerations in mind, civil affairs officers dealt first with the supply of liberated Holland but also initiated high-level planning for the relief of the enemy-occupied portion of the country and moved in as quickly as they could on final liberation. Large tasks confronted the SHAEF mission not only in immediate civilian relief but also in obtaining coal, in rehabilitating transportation, in solving labor problems, and in repatriating displaced persons. It was not until nearly two months after the German surrender that the head of the mission could convey to the Netherlands Government the decision that the military phase had ended.

## 1. THE PLANNERS ASSUME COMPLETE GERMAN EVACUATION AFTER COLLAPSE

### MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ESTABLISHED IN THE NETHERLANDS

[Directive, SHAEF to CinC, 21 AGP, 14 Aug 44, CAD files, 014, Netherlands (8-28-43) (1), sec. 2]

2. *Powers.* An agreement between the United States, British and Netherlands Governments provides that in areas affected by military operations it is necessary to contemplate a First or Military Phase during which the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, will, to the full extent necessitated by the military situation, *de facto* possess full authority to take all necessary measures. It is not intended, however, that Military Government will be established in The Netherlands as liberated. During the First Phase, civil administration will normally be operated by the Netherlands Government. . . . During this Phase the Supreme Commander is to make the fullest possible use of the advice and assistance tendered to him through Netherlands Civil Affairs Officers who are included in the personnel of a Netherlands Military Mission appointed by the Netherlands local authorities. Netherlands Civil Affairs Officers are to be employed as intermediaries between the Allied military authorities and the Netherlands local authorities.

Under the Agreement the First Phase is to be as short as possible, and the Netherlands Government will, as soon as practicable, exercise full responsibility for the civil administration. . . .

4. *Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments.* Personnel of the SHAEF Mission (Netherlands) and integrated Civil Affairs Detachments will be employed for the discharge of Civil Affairs responsibilities in the field. They will be allotted by this Headquarters. . . .

5. *Netherlands Civil Affairs Officers.* The Netherlands Government will provide Netherlands officers who will be attached to your command for use and discharge of your Civil Affairs responsibilities and for effecting such policies as the Netherlands Government has agreed or may agree with the Supreme Commander. . . .

7. *Provision of Stores/Supplies.* During the First Phase and subsequently, in areas affected by military operations, i.e. combat zones and L of C/Com Z, you will be responsible for calling forward stores/supplies to meet such relief and emergency requirements as are required to ensure accomplishment of your mission. You will be given credit authorizing your use of such

stores/supplies as may be made available to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will utilize military movement or supply agencies to the extent necessary, and will be responsible for completing arrangements to call forward and deliver such stores/supplies to the point where civil agencies can take over. . . .

### GENERAL EDWARDS APPOINTED HEAD OF SHAEF MISSION<sup>1</sup>

[Ltr, CofS SHAEF to Maj Gen J. K. Edwards, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01/7]

1. You are appointed Head of the Supreme Commander's Mission to the Netherlands Government.

2. You will set up your mission close to the Seat of Government when you are ordered to do so. It will be accredited to Her Majesty, the Queen of the Netherlands.

3. You will be the Supreme Commander's representative in dealing with the Netherlands Government, and your object will always be to obtain agreements which conform to the Supreme Commander's policies. \* \* \*

### EARLY PLANNING FOR THE NETHERLANDS BASED ON THE COLLAPSE THEORY

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2 to Monograph entitled: Relief to Holland, Jun 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rcds]

G-5 Section of the SHAEF Mission to the Netherlands started its existence as the "Netherlands Country Unit" in London early in 1944. This unit was charged with the task of planning for Civil Affairs in the Netherlands in conjunction with the Netherlands Military Administration.

The basis of that planning was on the understanding that the Netherlands would be totally evacuated after German collapse and estimates were made of the likely requirements under this heading.

Unfortunately, . . . this basis proved to be wrong and this false assumption had its repercussions later in the work of the Netherlands Military Administration, for instead of finding a complete civil administration available in the

<sup>1</sup> General Edwards was succeeded as head of the Mission by Maj. Gen. John G. W. Clark (Br) in January 1945.

country it only found a part, and that not the most important part of it, in a small and comparatively unimportant part of the country.

On 6 September 1944 the unit was mobilised for operations as G-5 Section, SHAEF Mission to the Netherlands. . . .

On 10 September 1944 orders were received from SHAEF for the advance part of the Section to proceed by air to Brussels, together with the Advance Party of the Netherlands Military Administration [NMA], commanded by Lt. Colonel W. Chr. Posthumus Meyjes. \* \* \*

## 2. THE U.S. ARMY LIBERATES A PORTION OF SOUTH HOLLAND AND MEETS REAL PROBLEMS

### MINING AREA OF SOUTH HOLLAND LIBERATED FIRST

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2]

\* \* \* It soon became apparent that the first Army to enter Holland would be the First U.S. Army, who were about to enter Maastricht and the important coal-mining area of South Limburg.

The Mission and the NMA had between them regarded this area as a very vital one for the future of Holland. Not only was the entire mining industry of the country centered in South Limburg but also the main sources of power supply and gas supply for the Southern portion of the country came from this area. . . .

On 14 September 44 Maastricht was entered by the 19th Corps and a fairly rapid advance was made to the Eastern frontier and as far North as inclusive Sittard. In the subsequent days the front was pushed Eastwards to include Heerlen, which is the main mining district. Brigadier [A. de L.] Casenove and Lt. Col. [Lawrence] Bosworth, accompanied by Colonel Cisler of SHAEF, after obtaining permission from the U.S. Army authorities, took an early opportunity to get in touch with the mining and power officials in the Maastricht area. From their reports it appeared that the mines were undamaged but their power plants had been immobilized by the Germans, except in so far that there was sufficient power left to maintain the pumps at the mines. Thus for the time being, although the mines had not been destroyed, no mine operating was possible. Colonel Cisler and Lt Col Bosworth therefore made immediate plans to link up the power lines with Belgium, thus providing sufficient power to work the mines on a modified scale. Immediate plans were also made for the rehabilitation of the power units in order that the mines might operate to capacity and provide power, when the time came, for North Brabant. \* \* \*

### THE RATION FOR MINERS IS LESS UNDER ALLIES THAN UNDER GERMANS

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2]

\* \* \* The food situation . . . promised to be critical from the start owing to lack of resources in the immediate area. The caloric value of the ration did in fact at one time fall below 900, whereas the caloric value of the ration under German occupation was in the neighborhood of 3500 for miners. The re-attainment of this figure was the subject of constant effort by the First U.S. Army and subsequently by the Ninth U.S. Army for the next three months, and it was a matter of constant anxiety to the G-5 Section of the Mission. \* \* \*

### ALLIES ADVANCE TO ARNHEM

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2 to Monograph]

\* \* \* The second part of Holland to fall to Allied troops was the Eastern part of Zeeland-Flanders, which was cleared by the Polish Division under command of the First Canadian Army.

The first notification of any problem here was the arrival in Brussels of some Dutch civilians from the area. Since the Headquarters of the First Canadian Army were at that time at St-Omer, contact was at once made by Brigadier Cazenove with the Polish Armoured Division then at St-Nicholas, when arrangements were made for the Netherlands Military Commissioner for that area to take up his post at Axel. Fortunately very little damage had been done to the countryside during the operation, but the Western part of Zeeland-Flanders had yet to be cleared of the enemy. \* \* \*

Meanwhile small advances had been made by the Second [British] Army towards N. Brabant and by the end of September the line ran approxi-

mately from inclusive Neerpelt thence exclusive Turncut to Antwerp.

On 17 September, Second Army, together with parachute formations, made a thrust through Eindhoven to Veghel, Nijmegen, and Arnhem. Dutch liaison Officers had been previously detailed to accompany detachment both of the Second Army and of the Airborne forces. These officers . . . were detailed for certain special areas . . . but since operations did not materialise to the full extent of the plan many of these officers found themselves performing tasks other than those assigned to them.

One of the first duties on entering Dutch territory was to post three proclamations: one from the Queen of the Netherlands; one from the Supreme Commander; and one from the Netherlands Government. This duty was carried out in the neighborhood of Eindhoven by Lt Col Vergeer, U.S. Army and Captain Winkel, NMA, on 17 September 1944.

As soon as Eindhoven was cleared of the enemy, a Netherlands Military Commissioner was established with the CA Detachment, and a reconnaissance party consisting of Major McDowell and Captain Laan, NMA, was sent forward to investigate the position. \* \* \*

#### COLLABORATIONISTS AND RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS ARE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2 to Monograph]

\* \* \* The immediate problems to be dealt with at Eindhoven were those of the collaborationists and the Resistance Movement.

The collaborationists were arrested by members of the Resistance Movement immediately after liberation and placed in confinement. Many of these collaborationists, however, were minor offenders and the conditions under which they were confined were far from being good. Early steps had therefore to be taken to arrange improved conditions and organize, through the NMA, reviewing committees to release those who were minor offenders. The arrest of collaborationists continued for the succeeding few months to be a bone of contention between the NMA and the Resistance Movement and promised to be an explosive factor. Subsequently, however, a satisfactory arrangement was made whereby members of the Resistance Movement could only make arrests in the extreme forward areas and then would hand the cases over to the police. In all other cases, the police were to take all necessary action.

The Resistance Movements were found to be numerous. In the first place there was the Orde Dienst (commonly called the OD), which was a body mainly of ex-officers of the Dutch Army, who had organized themselves to take over the administration of the country between the time that the Germans evacuated and the normal Government was established. They were not "resisters" in the fighting sense of the word. Moreover, the arrival of the Military Commissioner from the NMA deprived them of the functions for which they had set themselves up. The NMA had regarded the OD with some suspicion prior to these operations; events, however, proved that they were both loyal and co-operative, so that their services could well have been used to a greater extent by the NMA in the early stages. Even so, it was not long before they were made considerable use of.

The other bodies were Resistance Movements in the proper sense of the word, although it is doubtful whether they were of any particular military value. There were a number of them of varying political outlook. They did not see eye to eye with OD, nor was there much co-operation among themselves. The fact, however, that Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, son-in-law of the Queen, had been proclaimed by the Supreme Commander as Commander of the Resistance Groups tended to unite them, although many difficulties remained to be solved.

The position of the Resistance Movements became somewhat menacing in view of the weakness of the municipal police who were to a large extent disorganised, since many of their senior officers had fled to Germany, and unarmed because the Germans had removed all lethal weapons from them.

Similar difficulties showed themselves at Nijmegen, but in a more intense form, since here fighting raged round about for some days quite close to the town, which was under shell and air bombardment. Here again, however, the situation was brought gradually under control and the civil authorities though hesitant were gradually educated to perform their duties and responsibilities. \* \* \*

#### WITHOUT CENTRALIZED DIRECTION THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IS FOUND TO BE UNSATISFACTORY

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2 to Monograph]

\* \* \* Early in October, the clearing of the remainder of North Brabant began and was car-

ried out by the Second Army and the First Canadian Army.

\* \* \* The liberation of this area gave us a large number of additional Civil Servants and this applied especially to 's Hertogenbosch and Tilburg, where many of the provincial organisations were established. Thus it was possible to set up the various economic councils, food, industry, transport, etc., which were to act on a national level under the direction of the NMA.

These councils were faced with many very difficult problems. In peace time, and indeed during occupation, Holland had a very centralised administration, based on the Hague. These councils now had to take the place of the Hague administration with comparatively few personnel, no telephones and very few cars. They consequently took a very long time to get going, and this added to the difficulties of the Armies in supplying their needs. Moreover, it led to a good deal of acrimonious talk on both sides. On the one hand the Army complained that the Civil Administration did not move quickly enough or improvise sufficiently; on the other hand, civil administrators complained that the Army was not doing enough to help.

In point of fact the difficulties which arose were purely natural phenomena of an operational area. \* \* \*

#### AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT USED TO EVACUATE PEOPLE AND CATTLE

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, an. 2 to Monograph]

\* \* \* On 8 October 44, the liberation of West Zeeland-Flanders, South Beveland and Walcheren was begun. These operations were rapidly carried out, but they caused a considerable amount of material damage in West Zeeland-Flanders and serious flooding by sea water during the bombing of the dykes on the island of Walcheren. Flushing was also to a large extent destroyed.

The First Canadian Army had laid careful plans for the evacuation of the civil population from West to East of Zeeland-Flanders and from Walcheren, to South Beveland. Many people in these areas, however, refused to leave, preferring to remain in their desolated or flooded farmsteads. Matters became serious in this respect in December and January, and especially steps had to be taken on Walcheren, . . . Here, amphibious craft had to be used to evacuate both people and cattle, but all was eventually accomplished and much of the cattle was saved. \* \* \*

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS CONDUCTED THROUGH NETHERLANDS MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Final Hist Rpt, 1 Mar-14 Jul 45, p. 15, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.07, Hist Rcds]

\* \* \* Further and more general mention should be made of the Netherlands Military Administration or *Militair Gezag*.

This body was . . . formed in London with the object of carrying out, under the special State of Siege, the interim Government of the Netherlands between the time of the withdrawal of the Germans and the installation of normal Government.

In London it was but a small body recruited from those Dutchmen who happened to be away in or who subsequently got away to England. After the planning stage was over its anticipated task was to enter Holland with the Allies when the Germans collapsed and to act as agent between the Mission and the Civil Administration for the expected few weeks before the arrival of the Government.

As things turned out, Holland was not liberated all at once. Instead only that part of the country South of the Rivers was liberated between September 1944 and May 1945.

This meant that the area South of the Rivers was totally divorced from the national civil administration and so it was that the NMA had to set up a completely new Governmental machine South of the rivers and expand its resources and responsibilities many times over. Economics, Public Safety, Transportation, Administration of Law, P.T.T. [Communications], all came within these responsibilities.

It was not an easy task, especially in view of the often weak backing given to the NMA by the Government in London.

The NMA had to choose the path between dictatorship and laissez-faire and it was frequently criticised on both counts. The press was especially hostile.

The NMA also got much criticised by the Armies, sometimes for inefficiency, frequently for lack of drive and less often for lack of co-operation.

These criticisms were no doubt from time to time justified, yet it was through the NMA that all Civil Affairs in Holland were conducted. They now were the agents for all activities and the least that can be said was that they saved the Armies from having to govern the country directly themselves.

In point of fact the NMA with all its shortcomings served Holland in her hour of disorgani-

zation and need with unmatched devotion and zeal.

Throughout, it worked in the closest contact with the Mission and CA detachments frequently sharing the same Offices and Messes. This close contact served to effect the very close co-operation both in planning and execution. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF MISSION TO HOLLAND IS ESTABLISHED IN BRUSSELS INITIALLY

[Cable, SHAEF to Secy, CCS, *et al.*, 20 Oct 44, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-7, SMC-OUT 2036]

Advance elements of SHAEF Mission (Netherlands) are now established at 18 Avenue Des Gaulois, Brussels. Object is to have an advance echelon of Supreme Headquarters in Belgium to handle Netherlands matters until such time as the Netherlands government moves from

London on to Netherlands soil when the Mission will be formally credited to it. \* \* \*

#### THE ARMY FINDS LOCAL OFFICIALS SLOW TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY

[Lt, Brigadier R. M. H. Lewis, SCAO, 2d Br Army, to Robbins, DCAO, 21 AGp, 25 Nov 44, an. 7 to Monograph]

(f) After four years of servitude the Dutch officials are slow and unwilling to accept responsibility. \* \* \*

It is not a military duty nor is it practicable for an Army organization to run the Civil Administration. Our duty is to provide such help as is possible and to encourage the civil authorities to put their house in order. This duty is secondary to assisting the military operations. There need have been no undue delay in raising the ration scale in the Second Army area. . . .

### 3. THE GREATEST PROBLEM IS FOOD

#### A SPECIAL RELIEF SUPPLY PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED IN THE NETHERLANDS

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, CM-IN 14394, 15 Dec 44, MEL-371, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 12]

. . . Present indications are that the relief supply program in the Netherlands is and will be serious. More than 500,000 acres are now flooded and this may be increased to 3,000,000 acres. The effect will be to isolate the west coast of the Netherlands from the remainder of the country and make its supply through Army supply lines running through Belgium south and east Netherlands very difficult if not impossible so supply must be through the coast line or through Belgium and then north and through canals, if usable.

To simplify supply problem for planning purposes, the Netherlands has been divided into the following areas:

Area A, all that portion south of River Waal

Area B, all that portion west of River Ijssel

Area C, all that portion east of River Ijssel

Area B may be subdivided into area B 1 and area B 2 by a line from Hilversum-Utrecht-Tiel, B 1 lying to the east of this line and B 2 to the west. It is Area B 2 that may be isolated from the remainder of the Netherlands.

If this area were isolated, its supply through the normal lines of communication of 21 Army Group would be difficult if not impossible. These supply lines will run east from Antwerp toward Germany and will not go through or near area B 2. To overcome this difficulty the following plan has been made:

Twenty-one Army Group are to accumulate a 14-day stockpile for this area which it would endeavor to introduce by emergency means as soon as the area falls in. Thereafter there would be a separate programme for this area enabling supplies to be landed, if and when practicable, through the west coast of Netherlands. \* \* \*

Arrangements being made for supplies as follows: 21 Army Group are to accumulate the 14-day stock pile as mentioned . . . above for this area. Thereafter supplies would be introduced as a separate program and a 60-day program for immediate shipment is being set up. Supplies for this 60-day program are to come to the maximum extent possible from UK sources, in view of shortness of time before which they will be required and because loading in coasters and small ships may be necessary. War Office has been asked to secure release of CIV 308 collapse stocks, where existing credits of supplies of UK origin are not sufficient.

## FAULTY DISTRIBUTION NOT THE WHOLE STORY

[Copy of Ltr, P. S. Gerbrandy, Netherlands Prime Minister, to Gen Walter Bedell Smith, 16 Dec 44, an. 18, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rpt, 60, Relief to Holland]

Your letter of 4th December was handed to me on my return to London. . . .

1. I am reasonably satisfied with the progress that is being made for the improvement of food situation in liberated Holland. Progress has been slow, but, nevertheless, General Edwards had expressed his conviction that when he comes to London (on Friday, 22nd December) he will be able to report that rations per person per day will have been raised to 1600 calories, and that from then on there will be a gradual increase to the 2000 calories essential for health.

2. My trip through the liberated areas has convinced me that a level of 1600 calories is certainly too low. After four years of undernourishment many people are in a very low state. There is, with certain exceptions, order and recognition of authority, but beneath the surface there is, even among this obedient and very manageable people, a current of unrest. This is due not only to the food position but also to causes of a psychological nature. Nevertheless, the truth remains that in the present situation the way to the heart lies through the stomach.

3. Your letter gave me the impression that, in your opinion, sufficient amounts of food had, in fact, been delivered by SHAEF and that, if this food (together with the stores on the spot) had not reached the consumers, it was due to lack of distribution by the Netherlands Military Administration. This is only half the truth. There has been a shortage of transport for many weeks: transport in our case means food, and NMA can only get transport from SHAEF, hardly any vehicles being left in the area concerned. It has taken at least five weeks for the provisions from Allied sources to reach the population. There has only recently been improvement in this direction. The general result is that since the day of liberation our population has, from the material point of view, been far worse off than under the German regime. This makes me the more grateful for the improvement that is now on the way. But this process supplies a severe lesson with regard to relief of that part of my country still to be liberated, and this is the main reason why I must ask you, in whom I have such great confidence, to speed up my promised meeting with General Eisenhower so that I can explain the situation. I am therefore sending by the same post a letter

to General Eisenhower asking for a meeting if possible before Christmas but at any rate before the New Year.

## SLOW PROGRESS IN LIBERATED AREA BODES ILL FOR UNLIBERATED HOLLAND

[Copy of Ltr, P. S. Gerbrandy, Netherlands Prime Minister, to Eisenhower, 16 Dec 44, an. 41, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to Holland]

During my trip through liberated Holland I found many problems which have to be solved. There are other problems besides those connected with food, and I need not burden you with the details of them. But I reached one frightening conclusion, of which I think you should know. It is this: if the now occupied part of the Netherlands has to go through the same process as the liberated part, we shall witness a calamity as has not been seen in Europe for centuries, if at all. This calamity would be comparable only with those that have sometimes fallen upon the people of China.

In the liberated Netherlands the means of transport have been taken away by the Germans, in many regions few livestock are left, communications have been destroyed, power stations have been demolished, many little towns are nothing but ruin, larger towns like 's Hertogenbosch, Nijmegen, Flushing, are severely damaged, tens of thousands of houses have disappeared, the fuel situation is nearly everywhere heartrendingly bad, clothing is lacking. With the help of your men and of your Mission, and in collaboration with the Netherlands Military Administration, if we all exert our best efforts, these difficulties can be overcome.

The matter is quite different for the occupied Netherlands. There all the disasters mentioned above will be ten times as horrible as in the southern liberated part of the country. I need not enlarge on this matter. You already know something of it. You can imagine the desert that will be left by the Germans in North-Western Holland with its population of over four millions: no stores of food, no livestock. . . . And to this must be added the fact that the population of this part of the Netherlands is less tractable than the people of Brabant, Zeeland, Limburg, and Gelderland.

On 26 October 1943,<sup>2</sup> President Roosevelt decided that the responsibility for the relief of the

<sup>2</sup> Presumably Gerbrandy has reference to the President's letter of 10 November 1943 (see page 108) giving the Army responsibility for civilian supply.

liberated populations would be with the military authorities. From that moment we have had to depend on what these authorities think and do. Our stores remain in the United States of America, our ships are still playing their part in the Allied scheme, our skill is unused, and for the most part we remain onlookers. We were obliged to accept that state of affairs, and we have confidence in your management. But at the same time, after my journey, during which I have seen how slowly progress is being made, what difficulties have still to be overcome, what dangers still threaten us, my conviction that everything will come right in the end is gone.

I should like therefore to discuss with you the situation that will arise and the special measures to be taken.

I have in mind three measures:

1. Relief for the occupied Netherlands at the time of the liberation must have priority above everything, even above the slogan: first of all defeat the Germans. The Netherlands Government cannot accept the liberation of corpses.

2. In the preparation of the relief planning of the 21st Army Group we should be consulted. . . .

3. Those things which can best be done by the Netherlands Government itself should be done by me. The military authorities should provide us with the means we need, no matter whether they are owned by us or by our Allies.<sup>3</sup> \* \* \*

#### DUTCH WILL BE KEPT IN THE PICTURE OF RELIEF OPERATIONS

[Copy of Ltr, Eisenhower to Gerbrandy, 21 Dec 44, an. 42, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rpt, 60, Relief to Holland]

Thank you for your letter of 16 December. . . .

I, of course, fully appreciate your desire to be kept in the picture regarding the progress of plans and preparations for the relief of the Netherlands and am issuing the necessary instructions to ensure this. I can assure you, too, that we will gladly avail ourselves, both in planning and operation, of the expert advice and assistance which you and the Dutch people can provide.

<sup>3</sup> On 20 December 44, the Acting Secretary General Staff, Lt. Col. Carter L. Burgess, forwarded a copy of this letter from the Netherlands Prime Minister to Grasett, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, for the preparation of reply for the Supreme Commander's signature, which had the Supreme Commander's minute as follows: "To C/S-"I think we'll have to see him, but Lord knows what we can promise. His letter is quite moving. D.E."

You will be aware that I have recently issued a directive to 21 Army Group putting on it the responsibility for providing relief supplies in Western Holland when liberated. This responsibility will continue to be vested in 21 Army Group until direct shipment can be started from the United Kingdom to a Dutch port. 21 Army Group are forming a special Headquarters to undertake the planning and execution of the relief operation, and I have directed the Army Group to make the fullest use of Dutch expert advice and to arrange this through my Mission to your Government.<sup>4</sup> The Mission will also be responsible for keeping you fully informed of the details of progress made.

I am shortly issuing a further directive to 21 Army Group making it responsible for the stockpiling and concentration of certain equipment necessary for the de-watering plan. This plan provides that the pumping equipment shall be operated as far as possible by Dutch experts.  
\* \* \*

#### BAD CONDITIONS MAKE THE DUTCH QUEEN APPEAL FOR RELIEF AHEAD OF LIBERATION

[Copy of Ltr, Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 15 Jan 45, an. 43, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to Holland]

. . . The discussions both with General Eisenhower personally and the next day with General Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower and Lt. General Grasett, Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs were, to the minds of the Netherlands Cabinet Ministers, quite satisfactory and they received the very definite impression that everything humanly possible would be done by SHAEF, not only in the planning itself but also in view of the timely execution of the relief operation *provided there does not result from this action undue prejudice to military operations*, a notion which, it was agreed, was to be defined further, if possible.

It is not, therefore, because the Netherlands Government feel disappointed or discouraged in consequence of their latest talks with SHAEF that I have decided to make this personal appeal to you. It is because the situation in my country has become so critical that I feel that it is no longer sufficient to plan for immediate relief

<sup>4</sup> The West Holland District, later known as the Netherlands District, was created on 5 February 1945. It was given the task of planning for, and ultimately carrying out, the relief of the B-2 area, together with the de-watering of the flooded area.

after liberation, even if the plans devised are the best possible plans and their timely execution assured, but that *action of an entirely different nature* will have to be taken *now*. Conditions in the still occupied part of Holland . . . have at present become so desperate, that it is abundantly clear that, if a major catastrophe, the like of which has not been seen in Western Europe since the Middle Ages, is to be avoided in Holland, something drastic has to be done *now*, that is to say *before* and not *after* the liberation of the rest of the country.

The situation is precarious enough in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the Germans have carried off great quantities of foodstuffs and cattle and where they may be counted upon with certainty to carry off or destroy whatever remains when the time comes for them to retreat. But it is especially in North Western Holland, the section comprising the provinces of North Holland, South Holland and Utrecht where by far the worst conditions prevail. Four and a half million people, or half the total population of the Netherlands, live in this densely populated area. . . .

According to the latest figures available, the average rations in the cities just mentioned had gradually dropped to 630 calories per day (the minimum number of calories a person, doing very light work, can normally live on, is put at 2000 calories per day; the British rations, which admittedly are not luxurious, are calculated to represent 2500-3000 calories per day). Seyss Inquart, German Governor of the Netherlands, in a recent broadcast to the people of Holland (on January 7th, 1945) admitted with cynical frankness that "nobody could or should contend that the present rations were even approximately sufficient." \* \* \*

Hunger, cold, darkness, dirt, disease and floods, is it any wonder that Seyss Inquart with unparalleled cynicism ironically wished the people of Netherlands good luck this year, "for otherwise the situation which to-day is characterized by hunger, cold and misery, might unexpectedly grow into a catastrophe . . .?"

All this is appalling, but to make matters infinitely worse the Germans have officially called up all men between the ages of 17 and 40 (born between the years of 1905 and 1928) to work in Germany. \* \* \*

It is, that goes without saying, necessary that this war be won, but I assert that it is *not* necessary for winning the war that conditions are allowed to spread and develop, whatever duties

our ruthless enemy may have to provide for the feeding of the population of the Northwestern part of the Netherlands, which will inevitably result in its total or partial ruin and extinction. On the contrary, it is precisely because there is no need to sacrifice these unfortunate people that help should be brought to them without delay. It is now the duty of the Netherlands Government to ask for urgent military action for the purpose of driving the Germans out of Holland. They feel that this is a reasonable and necessary request, and they would be grateful for an assurance that nothing will be left undone to this end.

Should, contrary to the hopes of the Netherlands Government, immediate military help be out of the question, then immediate relief in the form either of mass evacuation or in that of food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies is an imperative necessity.

#### THE NETHERLANDS COAL SITUATION DOES NOT IMPROVE UNTIL FEBRUARY

[Hist Notes, G-5 Sec, SHAEF Mission, Netherlands, 6 Sep 44-28 Feb 45, an. 2, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to Holland]

\* \* \* The organization for the production of coal was initially undertaken by G-5 but shortly became the responsibility of the Solid Fuel Section of G-4 SHAEF, which was a branch separate from the Mission and from G-5. Nevertheless, G-5 was ultimately concerned in the matter since lack of coal had untold repercussions on general civilian well being.

In the early stages of liberation it had been arranged to have an Exchange Agreement with Belgium whereby coal from S. Limburg would be taken to Belgium and Belgian coal should be taken to Holland, thereby economizing in transportation. This agreement however, was unsatisfactory from the start, in that for a variety of reasons, political considerations being paramount, the Belgians did not maintain their side of the agreement.

In consequence of this, the coal position in liberated Holland went from bad to worse until in January 1945, the position was so critical that many public utilities were on the point of closing down. By the efforts of 21 Army Group to ensure that there was no pilfering in transit, matters improved slightly towards the end of the month, but it was clear that the Exchange Agreement was completely unsatisfactory so far as the Dutch were concerned. In consequence, the Agreement was abandoned, and it was decided that as from

1 Feb 45, Holland would be supplied with Dutch coal and that it should be transported by canal to Budel, Eysden, Neerpelt and Antwerp and from thence by rail in the case of coal going north and by further barge shipment in case of that going to Zeeland.

Pending the complete movement of the barge traffic it was arranged that coal should be sent under 21 Army Group auspices to Holland by rail. This resulted in a very great improvement in the coal position in Holland in February. \* \* \*

#### 4. DRAMATIC ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING FOOD INTO GERMAN-OCCUPIED HOLLAND

##### STARVATION THREATENS IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES OF THE NETHERLANDS

[Transl Report of Dr. W. Pfister, Relief Measures Undertaken by the Don Swiss and the International Red Cross Joint Relief Commission, dtd 27 Mar 45, an. 54, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rpt, 60, Relief to Holland]

##### 6. Food Situation

Since the middle of November 1944, the western provinces have been completely without provisions. \* \* \*

The Secretary General of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries as well as the Director General of the Reich Bureau for Feeding in War Zones explained to the IRCC Delegate that the plight of the 4,500,000 inhabitants of the three western provinces will become absolutely catastrophic and desperate from May 15, 1945, if outsiders are not prepared to send, on the one hand, coal to thresh the wheat in reserve, and on the other, send 3,000 to 3,500 tons of flour a month to the Netherlands. . . .

An example, which illustrates the dangerous food situation, is given by statistics according to which the caloric content of a Dutch workingman's rations have scarcely exceeded 500 a day since December 10, 1944. \* \* \*

##### MILITARY OPERATIONS TO LIBERATE NORTHWEST HOLLAND NOW ARE INADVISABLE

[Analysis Sheet, SCAF-250, SMC-IN 9439, 27 Mar 45,<sup>5</sup> an. 68, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rpt, 60, Relief to Holland]

##### Part I—Appreciation

. . . It is unlikely that the enemy's plan is to withdraw from Holland. . . .

Estimate present enemy strength North of Maas and West Ijssel at over 200,000. It would be

<sup>5</sup>This message was sent in response to CCS's FACS-160, SMC-IN 4754 of 14 March, in which SCAEF had been told to prepare an appreciation and plan showing requirements of an operation to liberate Holland as soon as practicable after his Rhine crossing had been secured.

a major undertaking to conduct operations in Northwest Holland in the present circumstances. \* \* \*

##### Part III—Recommendations

19. Most rapid means of ensuring liberation and restoration of Holland may well be the rapid completion of our main operations when full priority could be allocated to the task.

20. So long as enemy continues cohesive resistance in Northwest Holland it is militarily inadvisable to undertake operations west of Utrecht. Suggest you should make clear to the Royal Netherlands Government the great cost of Dutch lives and property that any other course would necessitate. \* \* \*

##### SCAEF PROPOSES FREE DROPPING OF FOOD IN HOLLAND AND A STRONGLY WORDED MESSAGE TO THE GERMAN MILITARY COMMANDER

[Analysis Sheet of SCAF-300, FS-OUT 2593, 23 Apr 45, Eisenhower to CCS & Br CofS, an. 69, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to Holland]

The question of relief for Holland and the proposals for attempts to save it from further destruction and widespread starvation have been taken up by the Prime Minister. This matter has assumed increasing urgency and for sheer humanitarian reasons something must be done at once. The Dutch Government states supplies in occupied Holland will be used up by 28 April. Our information confirms theirs that deaths through famine will then start on a considerable scale unless supplies are promptly replenished.

Due to present employment of our troops we cannot possibly mount and carry out for some weeks decisive operations in Holland. When this does become possible, determined resistance by the Germans would inevitably result in even more widespread destruction. Entirely aside from the fact that our possible offensive action in Holland would be too late and would materially in-

terfere with essential current operations, it would inevitably impose additional disaster on the peoples of Holland without presenting a solution to the immediate problem.

I am aware that the Seyss Inquart proposals are being discussed on a Governmental level in San Francisco, but it may take some time to arrive at a three-way agreement. In the meantime the situation is so bad that something must be done to arrange for the introduction of food into Holland by free dropping and by every other possible means even though the best we can do may be a small contribution in comparison with the widespread destitution which now exists.

As an additional measure from a purely military standpoint I propose to send a very strongly worded message to the German Commander [Generaloberst Johannes] Blaskowitz pointing out to him that he is undertaking to defend an area which will later be indefensible and which, even if held by him, in no way impedes the operations of the Allied Armies; that the flooding of large areas of Holland with the resulting destitution, starvation and the enormous loss of life to the population will constitute a blot on his military honor and that of the German Army which can never be effaced. He must be told to cease opening the dykes and to take immediate steps to assist in every way possible the distribution of food which we supply to the starving people in Holland for whose welfare he is directly responsible, that he should assist from stocks of food available or made available to him, and that if he fails in this respect to meet his clear obligations and his humanitarian duty, he and each responsible member of his command will be considered by me as violators of the laws of war who must face the certain consequences of their acts.

The tragic situation in Holland does not permit further delay and I would like as free a hand as possible. . . .<sup>6</sup>

#### FREE DROPPING OF FOOD IS CARRIED OUT IN THE NETHERLANDS

[Monograph entitled Relief to the Netherlands, dtd Jun 45, p. 41, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpts, Relief to Holland]

\* \* \* 26th April, saw a request from SHAEF to Bomber Command and the U.S.

<sup>6</sup>In FACS-194, Eisenhower was given permission to carry out the plans proposed in this message.

Eighth Air Force asking them to alert 200 aircraft for the Dutch succour mission. The 27th brought word from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, SHAEF, that food dropped into Holland would be distributed by the Dutch rationing authorities with the assistance of the German Army. The Germans, it was said, had agreed not to fire on the Allied planes. G-4 heard on the same day from the War Office that 8,000,000 rations were packed and waiting to go; four million more would be ready by 14 May, and still another 6,000,000 by 21 May.

SHAEF Air Staff, on April 27th, directed that the free dropping operation commence the following morning. Bad weather intervened, though, and it was not until 29 April that the planes took off. \* \* \*

During the period from 29 April through 8 May, 9,866,300 British POW rations, 720,000 U.S. POW rations, and 889,070 CA rations were dropped into B-2. \* \* \*

#### REICHSKOMMISSAR OF THE NETHERLANDS RECEIVES A CHILLY BLAST FROM GENERAL BEDELL SMITH

[First Canadian Army Intel Summary No. 308, 4 May 45, app. D, an. 71, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Hist Rpt, Relief to Holland]

The following is an account of the negotiations undertaken between Allied and German representatives [30 April 1945] for the purpose of relieving the food crisis in Holland. \* \* \*

The small village of Achterveld . . . was chosen as the meeting place. The school rooms of the local village school had been turned into a series of conference rooms. . . . Our own arrival coincided with that of the Russian delegation. About five minutes afterwards Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, arrived with his retinue. . . . headed by a jeep and two motorcycles, all flying white flags, a procession of staff cars hove into view and came to a halt outside the school. In the first was the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General [C.] Foulkes, who had gone out to meet Seyss Inquart. In the cars behind were Seyss Inquart's staff, members of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, his own escort of two SS officers and a varied collection of Dutch civilians whose business was connected with transportation, distribution and final allocation of food supplies so eagerly awaited. All the cars, one by one, disgorged their occupants and the whole

party, headed by Seyss Inquart, moved into the village school. The eyes of every officer, other rank and villager were on the central figures in this drama. Leading the procession, limping along slightly in advance and looking straight in front of him moved the hated Seyss Inquart, Reichskommissar of the Netherlands. . . . With the disappearance of the German party, the Allied representatives made their way into the school from the other side. After some slight rearrangement the first main conference between General Smith on the one hand and Seyss Inquart on the other began. \* \* \*

In cold, matter-of-fact language the points connected with this food distribution were discussed. At the same time, the nature of the whole proceedings became more and more obvious. Here were the Allies, forced by a set of circumstances beyond their control, to negotiate with this man, one of the worst war criminals. . . .

This first conference lasted about one and a half hours before the proceedings went into the sub-committee stage.

General Smith held a smaller conference with Seyss Inquart to explore more fruitful possibilities. A dramatic incident occurred when General Smith turned during this discussion to Seyss Inquart and said:—"Well, in any case, you are going to be shot" to which the Reichskommissar replied:—"That leaves me cold." General Smith then retorted:—"It will." \* \* \*

## GERMANS AGREE TO RELIEF MEASURES

[Monograph entitled Relief to The Netherlands, dtd Jun 45, p. 43]

\* \* \* After some disagreement, the Allies and the Germans finally reached an accord on the terms under which land and water convoys could pass freely from the Allied to the German side. A North and South demarcation line was set up to demarcate a neutral zone for the supply trucks. Arrangements were made for identifying and escorting Allied ships. Other arrangements were concluded for the flight of relief planes.

## SHAEF MISSION IS MOVED TO HOLLAND

[Ltr, CofS, SHAEF to Head, SHAEF Mission Netherlands, 4 Apr 45, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-7]

2. Movement of Headquarters, SHAEF Mission (Netherlands), less Naval Component, to Breda, Holland, is approved. However, such move will not take place until 21 Army Group is able to provide the necessary accommodation and communications facilities without prejudice to its current operations. Your proposed target date of 1st May 1945 is approved contingent upon the above proviso.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Headquarters NMA and all elements of the SHAEF Mission moved into the Royal Military Academy at Breda on 9 April 1945. Final Hist Rpt of SHAEF Mission Netherlands, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.07, Hist Rcds.

## 5. ALL HOLLAND IS NOW LIBERATED

### SURRENDER OF GERMAN FORCES AND ALLIED ENTRY INTO WESTERN NETHERLANDS

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Final Historical Rpt, 1 Mar-14 Jul 45, p. 12, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.07, Hist Rcds]

\* \* \* Field Marshal Montgomery received the surrender of the Commander of all German Forces in Holland, Denmark, and North West Germany on 4 May. Acknowledgement of this was formally received by Lt. Gen. Foulkes, GOC, 1st Canadian Corps, at Wageningen on 5 May from General Blaskowitz, Commander of 25 German Army, the force occupying the B-2 Area.

Two days elapsed between the formal receipt of the German surrender and the entry of Allied troops into the Western provinces. During this time the provision of supplies under the truce arrangement continued. Meanwhile plans were

made ready for the deployment of the "B2" Civil Affairs detachments, NMA and Red Cross relief personnel under the supervision of 1st Canadian Corps. This was a subordinate part of the operational plan of entry of tactical troops. Advance Civil Affairs elements and NMA Commissioners were to go with the division columns on the first day, and the remainder of the Civil Affairs were to come one or two days later. On 7 May the 49th British Infantry Division entered the province of Utrecht, sending troops to the cities of Utrecht, Hilversum and Amersfoort and to German installations in the area. On 8 May the 1st Canadian Infantry Division passed through the 49 Infantry Division into the provinces of North and South Holland, including the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The Princess Irene Brigade which had been formed of Dutch sol-

diers in England and had fought in several engagements during the liberation of The Netherlands was attached to the 1st Canadian Infantry Division as the unit first to arrive in and liberate The Hague.

Major General H. J. Kruls, Chief of Staff of the NMA, the Head of the G-5 Section of the Mission, senior officers of the NMA and three other Officers of the G-5 Section entered The Hague with the Princess Irene Brigade, setting up temporary offices the next day and maintaining representation in The Hague ever since. On the evening of 8 May the Chief of Staff of the NMA and the Head of the G-5 Section met with the Head of the College of Vertrouwensmannen, the provisional body appointed in the German-occupied Netherlands by the Netherlands Government in England to act as representatives of the Netherlands Government at the moment the German rule should cease. \* \* \*

#### WITH SURRENDER OF GERMANS AID IS RUSHED IN

[Monograph entitled Relief to the Netherlands, Jun 45, p. 44]

\* \* \* The official capitulation of the German Armed Forces in Holland came at 0800 hours 5 May. The long months of planning for B-2 area relief were at an end, the period for instantaneous action at hand. As developments proved, days and even hours counted.

The First Canadian Corps had local responsibility for the area and met it with a three phased plan. Phase 1 called for bringing every CA detachment of 7 Group north of the Rhine to the area. By mid-day 6 May, this had been done and detachments were located in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and other major towns.

Phase 2 called for moving 49 Division into Utrecht Province on 7 May and establishing CA control. This phase was completed by noon, 8 May.

Phase 3 provided for moving 1 Canadian Division into Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague on 8 May and establishing CA control in the remainder of the B-2 area. This phase was completed by 1600 hours, 9 May.<sup>8</sup>

In all, some 21 CA detachments were deployed, and within 78 hours after the official capitulation, CA representatives were functioning at every

<sup>8</sup> On Saturday, 12 May, responsibility for the relief of the B-2 area passed to the Netherlands District Headquarters.

main center in Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht Province.

#### SHAEF MISSION MOVES TO THE HAGUE

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Final Historical Rpt, 1 Mar-14 Jul 45]

\* \* \* Representatives of the G-5 Section visited The Hague in increasing numbers after the liberation and for the next three weeks the activities of the Section were concerned with assisting national governmental and Netherlands District officials in the B-2 Area and co-ordinating the Civil Affairs programmes in the rest of the country from Breda and Zwolle. After the initial relief requirements were met, the problems of obtaining coal and transportation for the needs of the country loomed largest. Other major problems indicating the national scope of the civil rehabilitation programme in the Netherlands were those of labour conditions in Limburg and the repatriation of the Netherlands Displaced Persons from Germany through Southern and Eastern Dutch Reception centres. To co-ordinate all of these matters it appeared immediately desirable to move all of the national agencies to a central place in the West of the Country, and on the week-end of 2 June all of the elements of the Mission, the Headquarters of the NMA and the Netherlands District were moved to The Hague. \* \* \*

#### THE SITUATION IN B-2 AREA IS BAD BUT BETTER THAN EXPECTED

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, CM-IN 12808, 13 May 45, MEL-765, CCAC files, 400 (9-21-43), sec. 21]

1. The following is an interim report on conditions in the B-2 area of the Netherlands based upon incomplete information and subject to verification. . . .

2. The food situation is not as serious as had been anticipated. Starvation conditions are not apparent. Malnutrition exists in urban centers but no indications have been found in country districts. Under-nourishment is especially noticeable in Rotterdam. Flour mills in Rotterdam and Amsterdam areas were described as intact immediately prior to liberation. Food was moving into the northern part of the B-2 area at that time. Approximately a half million tons of potatoes are reported available in the C area together with an undetermined surplus of meat, cheese, butter and grain. Movement of this food to the B-2 area has begun.

## THE MILITARY PHASE TERMINATES

[Copy of Draft Interim CA Agreement, Presented by Maj Gen John G. W. Clark (Br), Head of SHAEF Mission, Netherlands, to Netherlands Govt, 19 Jul 45, Incl to Memo From BJSM, 14 Aug 45, CCAC files, 014, Netherlands (3-23-44)]

1. In order formally to recognize the situation presently obtaining in respect of the responsibility for and conduct of the civil administration in The Netherlands, I have recommended and I have now been instructed by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to declare to you and the Netherlands Government that the first or military phase of the operations in The Netherlands by the Allied Forces is terminated.

2. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, wishes to confirm that the military situation is such that, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Agreement Regarding Civil Administration and Jurisdiction of 16th May 1944, full and complete responsibility for civil administration in The Netherlands will be resumed by you. It is understood that the following arrangements will continue to apply:

(a) That port, lines of communication, transport, airfield and other facilities, services and installations in The Netherlands will continue to be made available as may be necessary for the normal requirements of the British-United States Forces.

(b) That the Netherlands Government in its conduct of civil administration will give consideration to all such requests as may be made to assist the British-United States Forces in carrying out their work.

(c) That in respect to members of the German armed forces in The Netherlands, the British-United States Forces will be permitted to exercise, in co-ordination with The Netherlands Government, complete military jurisdiction. . . .

(d) That the work of Allied Counter-Intelligence personnel against enemy nationals be permitted to continue. . . .

(e) That persons who are subject to exclusive jurisdiction of The Netherlands authorities, in the absence of Netherlands authorities, may be arrested by Allied Military Police and detained by them until they can be handed over to competent Netherlands authorities.

(i) That the British-United States and the Netherlands authorities will take the necessary steps to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and securing the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under their respective jurisdiction.

(j) That the claims commission now established for the examination and disposal of claims for compensation for damage or injury, preferred by Netherlands civilians against the British-United States authorities, be continued.

(k) That members of the British-United States forces . . . and all property belonging to them or to their Governments, shall be exempt from all Netherlands taxation (including customs). . . .

(l) That the British-United States forces shall have the right to retain use of such lands, accommodations, facilities, equipment and installations as are now in actual use by them. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XXIX

# Return to Self-Rule in Denmark and Norway

The story of how the resistance forces in Denmark and Norway took over from the occupying power and provided a smooth transition to self-rule is a remarkable one illustrative of the best traditions of democratic government. In both cases without bloodshed or violence, a regime viewed with implacable hatred for five years was displaced and an orderly government set up. The Allies had to prepare for the possibility that they would have to furnish extensive friendly guidance and help in both cases. But when the SHAEF missions moved in after German surrender they found the quislings expelled and an indigenous government in complete control of the situation. Nothing but supply assistance, especially in fuel and raw materials, was needed of the Allies by either country. The food shortage was much more severe in Norway than in Denmark.

Prior to the German surrender supply assistance had already been given to a part of Norway which had been occupied by the Russians. The aid had been terminated quickly, however, by a purely jurisdictional difficulty, and the unfortunate termination casts something of a shadow over the otherwise felicitous relations between the Norwegians and the Allies. During October 1944 the Russians invaded the province of Finmark, in northeastern Norway, and took the city of Kirkenes. In the face of the

Russian advance, the Germans withdrew from Finmark, and in their retreat they leveled the small fishing villages along the Arctic coast, destroying docks, boats, and nets, and taking along all the food they could find. Actually the Russians advanced only as far as the Gna River, about seventy-five miles from the easternmost tip of Norway. Beyond their advance was a vast no man's land extending through the rest of Finmark. Informed of the terrible plight of the Norwegians, SHAEF authorized the issuance of civilian supplies to the inhabitants of northern Norway. The documents tell the interesting story of an American officer's negotiations with the Russians to move the first medical supplies into Norway, the abrupt termination of SHAEF's generous gesture by higher authority, and the plight of the Norwegians in the face of jurisdictional niceties. Possibly these niceties were insisted upon by higher authority lest a precedent be set which might lead to the Soviet's dependence upon Allied relief in other areas of Russian occupation.

Immediately on liberation six Allied destroyers moved into Norwegian ports with token Civil Affairs (CA) supplies. Within ten days after Liberation Day twelve vessels were en route to Norway carrying more than 20,000 tons of basic needs, chiefly of food supplies.

In Denmark, as in Norway, the principal assistance rendered by the Allied forces was in civilian supply, but the only substantial needs of the Danes were for coal and POL. In both countries the military

phase terminated rather quickly—with the gratified recognition of the missions that effective planning by local undergrounds had made the carrying out of elaborate Allied planning largely unnecessary.

## 1. ALLIES FIND EFFECTIVE DANISH GOVERNMENT IN OPERATION

### POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

[Basic CA Directive for Denmark, CCS to SCAEF, CCS 574-3, App. "B," Special Political Guide, 16 Jun 44, CCAC files, 014, Denmark (3-1-44), sec. 1]

1. Constitutional government of Denmark continued under the German occupation until the 29th August 1943, when the German military authorities declared martial law and the Danish Government resigned. There is, therefore, at present no Danish Government in operation, although the administrative system of the country has remained, generally speaking, in working order. The Danish people are virtually unanimous in wishing to restore a constitutional government as soon as possible.

2. *a.* After the German occupation, King Christian continued to act as the constitutional head of the Danish State. Since the declaration of martial law in August 1943, he has ceased to exercise his constitutional functions and has regarded himself as a prisoner. His conduct throughout has enhanced his reputation among the Danish people and he is generally regarded as a symbol of national unity and resistance to the Germans.

*b.* It is expected that, as soon as Denmark is free from the Germans, King Christian will wish to resume his functions and form a new government from persons not tainted by hostility to the cause of the United Nations. It may be assumed that the personal influence of King Christian, who is the brother of King Haakon of Norway, will be friendly and helpful to the Allied forces of liberation.

3. It is likely that Danish sentiment after the liberation of their country will favor the formation of a coalition government representing the main political parties.

4. *a.* The Danish Parliament (Rigsdag) continued to meet under the German occupation until August 1943. In March 1943, a general election was held throughout the country, which is believed to have been free insofar as limitations imposed by the German occupation permitted, except that the Danish Communist

Party, which had three seats in the previous Parliament, was unable to participate as a result of a ban imposed by German pressure in 1941.

*b.* It is likely that there will be a demand from the Danish people after the liberation of their country for a new election, in which the Communist Party would be allowed to participate. Apart from the Communists, the old party organizations in the country have continued intact under German occupation.

5. The Danish administrative and police services have been maintained to a large degree intact during the German occupation. Civil administration is at present carried on by the heads of the Danish Government Departments, who have power to draw up regulations where legislation would normally be necessary. These Danish administrative services and the local authorities may be regarded generally as well disposed towards the cause of the United Nations and suitable to co-operate with the Allied military authorities pending the re-establishment of constitutional government.

6. The Danish armed forces were disbanded after the German declaration of martial law in August 1943. The attitude of members of these forces has been on the whole patriotic and favorable to the cause of the United Nations.

7. A "Council of Freedom" was formed within Denmark after the declaration of German martial law in August 1943, to co-ordinate the activities of the resistance groups. This Council has not claimed any sort of governmental status or aspired to any role after the liberation of Denmark and the restoration of constitutional government.

8. The Danish Nazi Party obtained three seats out of 148 in the Lower House of the Danish Parliament in the 1943 election. This party has since shown evident signs of dissolution and its members are regarded by the great majority of Danes as traitors.

9. The German minority in South Jutland have behaved throughout as Germans rather than Danes. They have served in the German

Army and co-operated with the German authorities through their local organizations.

10. The Faroe Islands were occupied by British Forces in April, 1940. Greenland was occupied by American Forces in 1941 under an agreement concluded between the United States Government and the Danish Minister in Washington. The overwhelming majority of Danes, including officials, appreciated the military necessities for these occupations and they approve thereof.

#### DENMARK TO BE TREATED AS A FRIENDLY STATE

[Basic CA Directive for Denmark, CCS to SCAEF, CCS 574/3, 16 Jun 44,<sup>1</sup> CCAC files, 014, Denmark (3-1-44), sec. 1]

1. Denmark should be treated, for the purpose of the planning and execution of civil affairs, so far as possible as a friendly state, on the basis that although she is not formally a member of the United Nations she is entitled to such treatment on account of the friendly attitude shown by the great majority of the Danish people to the cause of the United Nations, and by their resistance both active and passive to German occupation, which has contributed to the Allied cause.

4. At all times, the Danish King will be accorded the honors and respect appertaining to his position. \* \* \*

#### HEAD OF SHAEF MISSION INSTRUCTED

[Msg, SHAEF to Maj Gen Richard H. Dewing (Br), Head of the SHAEF Mission to Denmark, 4 Nov 44, CCAC files, 014, Denmark (3-1-44), sec. 1]

#### *General Responsibilities*

1. You will be responsible to the Supreme Commander for assistance and advice to the Danish Government on the conduct of all Civil Affairs activities in Denmark, in accordance with agreements made or to be made with the Danish Government.

2. The responsibility for civil administration throughout Denmark rests with the Danish Government.

3. You will endeavour to bring the Danish Government to comply with such Civil Affairs policies as the Supreme Commander may formulate or with such requests as he may from time to time address to the Danish Government through the Mission under your command.

#### *Organization and Command*

4. The Mission under your command includes a G-5 component. The command and staff channel is from the Supreme Commander to you with

<sup>1</sup>Omitted clauses correspond to the basic directives for other liberated nations.

direct communication in Civil Affairs technical matters between the Head of the Civil Affairs component and G-5 Division, Supreme Headquarters.

5. Your Civil Affairs staff has been selected for its knowledge of the problems peculiar to Denmark. You are free to effect any internal reorganization within the Civil Affairs component that you may deem expedient in the light of circumstances and experience.

6. The Port Detachment for Copenhagen and a Minor Port Detachment will be attached for all purposes to your Mission and will be under your command. You will issue appropriate orders to these detachments.

#### *Co-ordination of Civil Affairs Activities*

7. You will attach to the appropriate formations and headquarters such liaison officers as you consider desirable. You will set up such Boards or Committees as are essential to co-ordinate Civil Affairs plans with civilian agencies and to supervise their due execution.

#### *Functional Responsibilities*

8. *Supplies.* You will be responsible for receiving, screening and consolidating requests for Civil Affairs supplies from the Danish Government. You will submit such requests to Supreme Headquarters accompanied by your recommendation. You will call forward supplies, allocated to Denmark as required. You will arrange for these supplies to be handed over to the Danish Government at ports or other terminal points. You will account for these supplies. The whole will be carried out in conformity with the standard and routine supply procedure laid down by Supreme Headquarters.

The Danish Government is responsible for the distribution of these supplies. You will do all possible to ensure that these supplies are utilised for their proper purposes.

9. *Economics.* You will assist the Danish Government in their endeavours to stimulate marketing and production of essential civilian supplies in order to reduce the necessity for imports and to provide the maximum export of foodstuffs for other allied countries.

10. You will report to Supreme Headquarters on actual and estimated future exportable surpluses.

You will convey, on the request of the Danish Government, their plans or requests on less immediate export problems and co-ordinate, as far as possible, in consultation with Supreme Headquarters the immediate and long term plans for the export of surpluses.

You will consolidate all requests made by the Danish Government for the importation of raw materials to implement the objects set out in paragraph 6 above, make your recommendations thereon and submit these requests to Supreme Headquarters for approval and procurement.

11. *Finance.* You will maintain liaison with the Danish Government on all problems relating to currency, property control and general financial questions.

You will not be concerned with the closing of banks, declaration of a moratorium, public finance and advances to local authorities and private enterprises.

Consistent with the foregoing, and where applicable, you will be guided as to policy by the separate financial directive issued by the Supreme Commander relative to Denmark.

12. Questions relating to the cost of supplies and the disposal of enemy assets and property will remain open and will be determined at some future date by agreement among the governments concerned.

13. *Political Prisoners.* You will arrange with the Danish Government for the release of political prisoners who are citizens or subjects of any allied governments.

14. *Enemy Organizations.* The eradication of enemy, or enemy inspired organizations and the punishment of persons connected with such organizations is the responsibility of the Danish Government. You will keep Supreme Headquarters informed thereon and submit any reports that you consider appropriate.

15. *Displaced Persons.* You will be responsible within Denmark for representing Supreme Commander's, AEF, interests in all plans relating to Displaced Persons.

16. *Public Health.* You will investigate the possibility of Danish doctors, nursing staffs and medical stores being made available for relief in other allied countries.

#### *Policy Decisions*

17. You will refer to Supreme Headquarters, for decision or reference to higher authority, all questions requiring policy decision raised by the Danish Government outside normal and routine Civil Affairs activities.

#### AFTER SURRENDER OF GERMAN FORCES, DANES FORM A GOVERNMENT

[Cable, SHAEF (Fwd) to 21st AGP for Dewing, 6 May 45, SHAEF-SGS files, 322.01-2, SHAEF Mission to Denmark, FS-OUT 3630]

1. You are entering Denmark as the Supreme Commander's representative with the Danish

Government formed by H. R. Buhl who has been appointed by the King.

2. As soon as the necessary formalities have been completed it is anticipated the H. R. Buhl's government will be recognized by the British Government, and it is hoped that similar action will be taken by the U.S. Government. Diplomatic representatives will then be appointed.

3. German forces in Denmark having surrendered to Field Marshal Montgomery, he has been charged by the Supreme Commander with task of implementing such surrender. The Supreme Commander hopes for, and anticipates, the co-operation of Danish government in this matter.

4. A civil affairs agreement regularizing the relations between Supreme Commander and Danish Government will be negotiated though you as soon as arrangements for this purpose can be completed. Meanwhile, and pending further instructions, you should arrange with the Danish government for relations to be established as far as possible on the lines of draft agreement which was forwarded to you on 23 April.

#### SHAEF MISSION FINDS A GOVERNMENT IN OPERATION

[History of the Danish Mission, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.03, Hist Rcds, Country Unit, Hist Rpts-Denmark]

\* \* \* On 4 May 1945, when collapse in Europe seemed imminent, the entire G-5 Division was placed on 24 hours notice to move to the continent, and from then on events moved very rapidly. On the announcement of the surrender of the Germans occupying Denmark, Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing, CS, DSO, MC, and certain officers of his staff were flown to Copenhagen, and arrived at Kastrup Airfield on the afternoon of 6 May 1945. Two days later a further group arrived at Copenhagen by air, where they immediately assumed their various duties, and the remaining personnel followed, by boat, to Ostend and thence by road through Belgium, Holland and Germany, reaching Copenhagen on 17 May. \* \* \*

The Division was established on the 5th floor of Dagmarhus, Copenhagen and immediately commenced the tasks for which it had so long been planning. \* \* \*

Legal Section planning in London had embraced two possibilities in Denmark, one that the country should become a fighting zone, the other that there should be a Danish Government in being with whom all legal transactions could be effected. Happily the latter proved to be the case and at a stroke half of the plans the Section

had been for months preparing in London were rendered unnecessary and the amount of work with which it was called on to deal was very drastically reduced.

#### A SURPLUS OF FOOD BUT A SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORTATION AND FUEL

[Hist of the Danish Mission]

\* \* \* Supply and Economics Section held a meeting on 9 May 1945 with representatives of the Danish Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Agriculture for an explanation of SHAEF procedure and a discussion in general terms of Denmark's needs. It was arranged that discussion on the technical level should be promptly held and the supply programme investigated by working parties of specialists, and on 12 May the first Four Party Committee Meeting was held. The general economic situation was found to be as follows:-

(a) Rail transportation was at a minimum due to lack of fuel, with no passenger trains operating, while road transport was hindered by lack of petrol, tires, parts and wood for producer-gas units to such a point that some difficulty was experienced with the movement of necessities in Copenhagen.

(b) Food was ample and surpluses would be available if transportation was made easier.

(c) Clothing—particularly workers' and children's—was in very short supply.

(d) Electricity and gas were rationed to a degree believed to be the lowest practical operating level.

(e) Unemployment was increasing and the cessation of German employment was causing a considerable amount of additional unemployment.

(f) Factories were in working condition but were short of fuel and raw materials and were much curtailed in operation.

(g) The administrative machinery of the Government was working efficiently at all levels.

Since the most vital Danish problem was that of fuel, the immediate move of the Solid Fuels Sub-Section of SHAEF was requested, and by

13 May this had arrived and was established in Dagmarhus. On the same day a letter was sent to the General Purchasing Agency outlining the capabilities of Danish industry, and two days later the Solid Fuels Sub-Section requested 30,000 tons of coal for May and 80,000 for June.

While fortunately not so acute as the coal situation, that of POL was shown to be very serious . . . For the transport of POL only small tankers were available and these could not travel to England.

No time was wasted in remedying this serious state of affairs, for on 18 May 1945 a Port Detachment proceeded to Aabenraa and on the following day the first convoy of lorries carrying POL arrived and the work of unloading commenced, proceeding smoothly in the following days.

The transition to active work in Denmark from passive planning in London had thus been smoothly accomplished and by 21 May supply estimates for the second period of 90 days were in course of preparation, while at Aabenraa supplies were beginning to trickle into Denmark and definite allocations were proceeding at SHAEF. \* \* \*

#### FOOD SURPLUSES EXPORTED TO DEFICIT AREAS

[Hist of the Danish Mission]

\* \* \* The beginning of June found Supply and Economics Section hard at work along the lines already followed during May, the work of bringing supplies into Denmark and exporting foods out of Denmark continuing uneventfully. On June 1st, at a meeting of the Allied Executive Surplus Foods Committee, the Danish authorities agreed to arrangements suggested regarding the export of food and it was planned that 4,000 tons of butter, 1,700 tons of bacon and 1,500 tons of eggs should be loaded and shipped during the first week of the month.

In addition to substantial shipments to the U.K., a considerable quantity of food was sent from Denmark to Norway, 13,546 tons being shipped between 18 May and 4 June, in addition to an unknown, but probably large, amount sent as a gift from the Danish people. Sweden received during the same period 891 tons. \* \* \*

## 2. JURISDICTIONAL NICETIES CUT SHORT DISPATCH OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO NORTHERN NORWAY

### SHAEF PROPOSES TO SEND RELIEF TO NORTHERN NORWAY

[Msg SHAEF to CCAC, CM-IN 8469, 9 Dec 44, MEL-355, CCAC files, 400, Norway (5-26-44)]

2. Reports indicate civilian population in northern Norway are in grave situation through lack of supplies owing to German scorched earth policy in areas evacuated by them.

3. Requests have been received from Norwegian Government and approved by Commanding General, Task Force, Norway, for authority to ship civilian supplies to northern Norway for distribution there, particularly in Kirkenes area, which is presently occupied by Russians.

4. Russian Government has advised Norwegian Government that it has no objection to importation of relief supplies.

5. This headquarters has accordingly authorized the dispatch of up to 6,000 tons of civil affairs supplies for relief of this area. These supplies will come from credits authorized to US for Norway and sub-allotted by U.S. to British Scottish Command for civil affairs operations in Norway.

### THE FIRST ALLIED OFFICER IN LIBERATED NORWAY IS AN AMERICAN WITH RELIEF SUPPLIES

[Col Paul B. Boyd, Head 2/19 CA Unit on Temporary Duty North Russia and Norway, Rpt, 18 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Hist Rpt, Norway, Jkt 1]

On verbal orders GOC-in-C Scottish Command, the undersigned officer proceeded to north Russia and Norway with medical supplies for the civilian population via Catalina flying boat.

Departure was made . . . on 6 Dec 44 with 1000 lbs of medical supplies. . . . The Catalina was manned by a Norwegian crew furnished through 18 Group Coastal Command and consisted of a crew of ten. The pilot and captain of the ship was S/Lt Hartmann. . . .

Take off was . . . from Shetland Islands, 6 Dec 44, . . . and landed at Petsamo, Finland . . . 7 Dec 44 . . .

. . . We had difficulty in finding any one to understand English or Norwegian but were finally ushered into the office of the Post Commandant, a naval officer with captain rank. After some time an interpreter was secured, and we informed the Russians that we desired transport to Kirkenes in order to arrange for truck transport for our medical supplies from that

end. This was eventually agreed to, providing a Russian naval officer accompanied us, and we were scheduled to leave for Kirkenes at 1300 hrs, being told that it was approximately a five hour drive. Lunch was served to the crew on board the Russian destroyer. The Russians were very co-operative and went to some length to ensure our comfort.

At 1300 hrs S/Lt Hartmann and myself, accompanied by a Russian Lt Comdr., started for Kirkenes. Along the road were evidences of war. Farm houses and small towns were totally destroyed. \* \* \*

We crossed the Finnish-Norwegian border at Furumo after some difficulty with the sentry but the Russian naval officer handled the situation. After entering Norway a great change was evident. There were few Russian soldiers and no movement along the roads except for natives with horses and sleds. . . .

Contact was made with the Norwegian Mountain Company at the headquarters near Kirkenes. \* \* \*

From the standpoint of Civil Affairs the situation is bad. About half of the population remain in Kirkenes, and they are sleeping at least ten people to the room. There is a diphtheria epidemic, scabies is prevalent, and a lot of dysentery. The food situation is bad, and there are no potatoes or fish available. Some flour has been supplied by the Russians, but they have been given to understand that that cannot be continued. Fortunately the Germans left good stock piles of coal, and they succeeded in destroying only a small amount. . . .

A truck was secured to return to Petsamo with us and pick up the medical supplies. \* \* \*

### SCAEF NOT AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE SUPPLIES FOR AREAS NOT UNDER HIS COMMAND

[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF, CM-OUT 86221 (GOV 189), 3 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Norway, 5-26-44]

1. Provision by you of combined supplies for that part of Norway or any other areas occupied by forces not under your command is not authorized. Any further proposal with regard to such areas must be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for instructions.

2. With regard to the supplies referred to in MEL 355 [above], you are authorized to deliver them in the United Kingdom to the Norwegian

Government against receipt, subject to later settlement.<sup>2</sup>

#### IN SENDING SUPPLIES TO NORTHERN NORWAY SCAEF WAS ACTING IN AN EMERGENCY

[Ltr, Maj Gen Frank F. Scowden, Chief, Sup and Econ Branch, G-5, SHAEF, to Hilldring 22 Jan 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 12]

This is in reference to GOV 189 in which we are instructed not to ship relief supplies to areas not under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander without prior consultation with CCS. I thought you might be interested in conditions leading to the shipment of relief supplies to Finmark, prior to our receipt of GOV 189.

Shortly after the Russians had occupied Kirkenes, the Scottish Command, on behalf of the Norwegian Government, represented to this headquarters that unless prompt action were taken to provide relief supplies for civil population, a critical food situation would prevail in this area and might result in starvation for a part of the population. . . .

At that time I discussed the matter with Lt. Col. [Arthur E.] Palmer [Jr.] of the International Division, who is here, and he stated that insofar as he knew, the question of supply of relief items to area occupied by the Russians had not been presented to Combined Chiefs. He was under the impression . . . that it had been considered by the American side and that their view was that it should be done only after a specific request for assistance had been received from the Russian Government. This coincided with my views on the subject.

Accordingly, when the Kirkenes situation arose, a cable was dispatched to the Scottish Command with information copy to CCAC authorizing the use of Civil Affairs supplies previously allotted to that headquarters for Norway, provided a request for such assistance was obtained from the Russian Government. The Russian Government, through its Embassy in London, informed us that it had no objections to the proposed shipment of supplies. The supplies authorized amounted to 6,000 tons of which 2,000 were items procured and owned by the Norwegian Government. . . . a report by Col. Paul B. Boyd, who later made a trip to the above area with urgently needed medical supplies [indicates that] the prompt turnover of civilian relief sup-

<sup>2</sup>In CCS 505/2 CCS advised SCAEF that his responsibility for distribution of civilian supplies did not "extend to such areas and territories as may now or hereafter be decided to be areas which will be occupied by the armies of the USSR."

plies by SHAEF has saved many civilians from death by disease and starvation. \* \* \*

#### NORWEGIANS ARE TOLD TO GET THEIR SUPPLIES FOR FINMARK FROM CIVILIAN AGENCIES

[Min, 2d Mtg, Four Party Sup Comm.,<sup>3</sup> 22 Feb 45, app. 2 to Historical Rpt, SHAEF Mission, Norway, 1-30 Apr 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Hist Rpt, Norway, Jkt 2]

#### 16. SHAEF Responsibility for Finmark . . .

Colonel Boyd explained the attitude of SHAEF toward the shipment of further supplies to Finmark. He pointed out that for the first 90 days, a total of 5,183 deadweight tons were shipped. Of this total, 3,515 deadweight tons represented Civil Affairs Supplies (transferred to the Royal Norwegian Government on quantitative receipt in the UK) whereas 1,668 deadweight tons had been procured by the Royal Norwegian Government through civilian agencies.

For the second 90 days, a proposal was made to SHAEF asking permission to send a total of 4,648 deadweight tons, of which 2,684 deadweight tons would be Civil Affairs stores (to be transferred to the Norwegian Government on quantitative receipt in the UK) while 1,964 deadweight tons would be procured from civilian agencies by the Norwegian Government. The reply of SHAEF to this proposal was a teletype stating that no more CA supplies could be sent into that portion of Norway where the occupying troops were under Russian operational control, that the Norwegian Government should be advised to attempt procurement of supplies from civilian agencies, that the Norwegian Government should make efforts to obtain shipping, and that only in the event that supplies were not available from civilian agencies should a request be made to SHAEF for transmittal to CCS.

#### THERE IS PRECIOUS LITTLE A GOVERNMENT CAN BUY IN THE OPEN MARKET

[*Aide-mémoire*, Norwegian Embassy, Washington to the Dept of State, 28 Feb 45, as contained in JCAC [Joint Civil Affairs Committee] 1, 15 Mar 45, CCAC files, 400, Norway (5-26-44)]

\* \* \* 1. As regards supplies for civilian population, permission has now been received as

<sup>3</sup>The Four Party Committee, with numerous sub-committees, was established in Paris in the fall of 1944 to deal with all problems relating to imports for the civilian economy. The first step was the formation of a Civilian Import Program (see Section 3 of this chapter). SHAEF was represented on the Committee through its Missions.

far as the Russians are concerned to send supplies from Scotland to Northern Norway. . . . However, it appears that SHAEF and Scottish Command maintain that supplies from SHAEF stock in Great Britain can be sent only to territories liberated and controlled by SHAEF. The Norwegian Government has been informed that it is free to buy in the open market. This however, is illusory as practically every commodity is being controlled by the United Nations authorities and very little of these can be bought outside such control. \* \* \*

The present situation, according to which neither SHAEF nor the Russians accept the responsibility for civilian supplies, is unten-

able. . . . The only solution seems to be that supplies from SHAEF stocks be made available for civilian population of the parts in Norway liberated and to be liberated. As SHAEF has already reserved supplies for all of Norway, it would seem that sending of supplies should not be hindered by the present uncertainty as to the responsibility for the territories in question.<sup>4</sup> \* \* \*

<sup>4</sup>The Norwegian *aide-mémoire* was referred by the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 1945 with a request for review of the military considerations involved. JCS maintained that the Norwegian *aide-mémoire* presented no new information on the basis of which the CCS should be requested to modify their policy.

### 3. THE UNDERGROUND RESTORES INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT IN NORWAY

#### SCAEF IS GIVEN GENERAL POLITICAL GUIDANCE ON NORWAY

[CCS Directive to SCAEF on Civil Affairs in Norway, CCAC 78-1, 20 Apr 44, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1]

1. For purposes of planning for the conduct of civil affairs the Norwegian Government will appoint a military mission to serve in liaison with the Civil Affairs Section for Norway. Appropriate consideration will be given to the policies recommended by such military mission. Members of the Norwegian military mission may be invited to accompany Allied civil affairs officers as you think fit. The Norwegian members will serve as advisers to Allied civil affairs officers.

7. During the military phase, unless military necessity demands otherwise, you will co-operate with the Norwegian Government to enable it to take such measures as it deems proper with respect to:

a. The dissolution of all Nazi inspired organizations and all laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinion which have been imposed upon the Norwegians by the Germans.

b. The impounding or sequestering of property belonging to Germany and her associated powers or their nationals not required for military purposes.

c. The dissolution of political parties and organizations which have collaborated with the enemy.

d. The taking of necessary measures to permit religious worship and such freedom of speech

and assembly as is consistent with military necessity.

8. You will arrange for the arrest and internment of the leaders of the parties and organizations in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 c and of any other persons whose detention is considered necessary in the interest of the Allied cause or the maintenance of order. All such persons who are Norwegian citizens will be turned over as soon as possible to the competent Norwegian authorities to be dealt with in accordance with Norwegian law as soon as practicable.

12. King Haakon enjoys the undivided loyalty and regard of his people. The Monarchy is generally regarded by them as the rallying point of all Norwegians in the fight against Germany.

13. The present Norwegian Government, which was elected in 1936 for a period of four years, had its mandate extended indefinitely by the Norwegian Parliament when the King and Government left Norway in 1942. In the Spring of 1943, in accordance with Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, it declared its intention of resigning on returning to Norway in order that the King, in consultation with the outgoing Government and the "Home Front" (i.e., the underground resistance movement) might appoint an interim government to carry on until the Norwegian people were able to choose their own government by means of a general election. The Government has constantly kept in touch with the leaders of the "Home Front" and has been careful to seek its concurrence on all important matters, including the policy underlying the Civil Affairs Agreement. The "Home Front" is re-

garded by the Government as the eyes and ears through which it keeps in touch with trends and opinions at home.

#### AFTER FIVE LONG YEARS THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE ARE ONCE MORE FREE

[Statement From the Royal Norwegian Govt Info Office in London, 12 May 45, as Quoted in Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5 Div, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Hist Rcds, Jkt 2]

\* \* \* "By virtue of Germany's unconditional capitulation, the German forces in Norway have laid down their arms. The Norwegian Home Front and Forces of the Interior are now in charge in Oslo and all over Norway. The transition has proceeded with remarkable smoothness and ease, thanks largely to the discipline shown by the Norwegian people and to the careful advance planning by the Home Front and the Norwegian Government. An Allied Military Commission arrived in Oslo on Tuesday [8 May] to arrange the formal signing of the surrender instrument. On Wednesday the Commission issued a communiqué announcing the withdrawal of all German troops from all the principal towns by midnight on Friday.

"Obeying the Home Front order that they should 'maintain calm, dignity and discipline,' the Norwegians abstained from provocative acts and refused to take the law into their own hands. The people marched in processions and sang their songs in an orderly fashion, and no clashes or bloodsheds were reported. Even some German soldiers were carried away by the general enthusiasm and were shouting 'Hurrah for Free Norway!'

"On the afternoon of 8 May, as vast crowds continued to celebrate in Oslo, two flying boats, with Norwegian flags on their fuselages and manned by Norwegians, circled over the city and then landed at Fornebu. The Allied Military Delegation had arrived. They proceeded immediately to Oslo and continued later to the German Military Headquarters at Lillehammer to settle the formalities of surrender. Later they returned to Oslo and established headquarters at Hotel Bristol, where the British flag now waves alongside the Norwegian.

"The reception of the Delegation in Oslo was overwhelming. Never has the Norwegian capital witnessed such scenes of rejoicing. The crowds surged around their cars, cheering and singing the British and Norwegian National Anthems as though for five years they had lived only for this moment. \* \* \*

#### ARRIVAL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES

[Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5 Div, Historical Rpt, 1-31 May 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Hist Rcds, Jkt 2]

\* \* \* On 9 May 45, Lt. Col. E. A. J. Johnson, Chief of the Economics Branch, arrived in Oslo by plane as the first Civil Affairs Officer to enter the country since the surrender of the German forces. Colonel Johnson was joined in Oslo on 11 May by Col. E. R. Summer, Chief Staff Officer; Lt. Col. John Enrietto, Chief of the Legal Branch; Lt. Col. E. Ross Jenney, Head of the Public Health Section, and Lt. Col. R. F. E. Laidlaw, Chief of the Public Safety and Welfare Branch, and on 13 May Brigadier [P. H.] Hansen himself arrived in Norway. \* \* \*

Brigadier Hansen's capacity here is Head Civil Affairs, Norway and Staff Officer and adviser to Gen. Sir A. F. Andrew M. Thorne, G.O.C. Allied Land Forces Norway,<sup>5</sup> on Civil Affairs matters.

In imposing the surrender terms of SCAEF upon the German forces in Norway, General Thorne's main responsibility is to disarm the considerable remnant of the Wehrmacht forces in Norway and to accelerate the evacuation from Norway of some 83,000 Russian ex-prisoners of war as well as the unexpectedly large number of approximately half a million Germans now in this country.

In assisting General Thorne in his task, it is Brigadier Hansen's responsibility to keep disease and unrest among the civil populace at an absolute minimum. \* \* \*

#### A WELL-ORGANIZED UNDERGROUND CAN BE THE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF TRANSITION

[Lt Col John Enrietto, Chief of the Legal Branch, Allied Land Forces Norway, Rpt as Quoted in Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5 Div, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 45]

The country had just experienced the sudden but well-organized emergence of the underground organizations into power and control. The Germans were in the process of systematic withdrawal from populated centers and were to be found on the streets and highways, armed and

<sup>5</sup> On 31 January 1945 Lt. Gen. A. F. Andrew M. Thorne (Br), had been appointed Head, SHAEF Mission (Norway) and Col. Charles H. Wilson (U.S.), Acting Deputy Head. General Thorne was given the usual functions of a SHAEF country mission. On 19 April Brig. Gen. Edwin E. Schwein (U.S.) was made deputy Head of SHAEF Mission (Norway) vice Col. Wilson. See CCS Memo 281, 6 Feb 1945, and CM-IN 18000 (19 Apr 45) SCAF 287, CCAC files, 014, Norway (8-16-43), sec. 1 and 2.

in contact with the Resistance Group, the regular constabulary, so far as it had not been purged, and the civilian population.

This constituted probably one of the most unique episodes of history, for the change-over from a regime, viewed with implacable hatred for five years, to an *ad hoc* government by a resistance group was smooth, controlled, restrained and thoroughly effective. The conclusion from this is that by proper organization and discipline of an underground organization, such as Milorg in Norway, it is possible to effect a substitution of an indigenous government for a government of an occupying power without political turmoil and without relaxing the control and restraint upon the people.

The judiciary and the legal machinery of government had been purged of quisling elements within a few days, and new appointments were made without resentment. This again bespeaks the effectiveness of a government in exile keeping in close contact with underground organizations, permitting the personnel of that organization to:

a. Do the purging necessary in the governmental structure, and

b. to fill the vacancies with personnel previously agreed upon, so far as any positions are concerned, with the exile government. \* \* \*

#### FOOD, DRAFT ANIMALS, FUEL, AND RUSSIAN PRISONERS THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS

[Lt Col E. A. J. Johnson, Rpt as Contained in Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5 Div, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 45]

\* \* \* The first problem presented to me was what Disarmament should do about a large number of Russian prisoners who had allegedly not been fed for several days. Inasmuch as the responsibility for the relief of refugees and displaced persons was a Norwegian responsibility, I promptly referred this to the acting Minister of Supply and Reconstruction, and food was dispatched at his request to the prison camp.

The next urgent problem had reference to draft animals. During the occupation, the Norwegian farmers would borrow horses from the Wehrmacht for agricultural purposes during the planting season, and since the planting season was now at hand, they asked for authority to proceed as they had in the previous years. Whereas it would have been better to have made an outright release of the requested number of horses, time did not allow of any statistical survey, and as a consequence Disarmament issued orders to the Germans to loan horses to farmers who required them.

Next only to these immediate problems of food and draft animals was the problem of fuel for the Norwegian State Railways. The entire railroad system was operating at a very low efficiency. The Todt organization had provided railway fuel, and inasmuch as that organization was no longer operative, the effective operation of the railroads made immediate coal import imperative. A Signal was dispatched pointing out the urgency of the coal situation. This in turn was relayed from Edinburgh to SHAEF, Main, by telephone where plans were made for the allocation of some locomotive coal for shipment to Norway.

In order to insure that Civil Affairs supplies could be received and distributed to Norwegian ports, contact was made with the Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction. A schedule of available Civil Affairs supplies was laid before the Minister of Supply so that the Ministry might have time to make proper plans for the receipt of supplies in several Norwegian ports for which they were destined. All the representatives of the Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction betrayed great satisfaction with the supply plans that have been made, their one criticism being that an inordinate amount of biscuits had been provided and that this might in turn hamper the improvement of the Norwegian biscuit factories. \* \* \*

#### STRICT LEGALITY OBSERVED IN DEALING WITH QUISLINGS

[Enrietto Rpt]

\* \* \* This [emphasis on constitutionality and legal procedure] is best illustrated in the arrest, imprisonment and preliminary hearing accorded Vidkun Quisling. The preliminary hearing which, under Norwegian law, is required within 24 hours after arrest but was somewhat delayed in the case of Quisling, took place promptly at noon Saturday, 26 May 45, at the Tinghuset before Dommer Guldbrandsen. Despite a crowded court room, batteries of cameras, photographers' lights and all the paraphernalia of modern publicity, this preliminary examination was conducted in a restrained, impressive and dignified manner. There was no demonstration or display made by any of the crowd; no dramatics were attempted by any of the participants.

In my judgment, this is largely attributed to five years of persistent psychological discipline of the people, which was based upon repeatedly dinning into them the standards of dignity, strength and discipline. . . . The usual incidents of cutting of hair of women, who col-

laborated or consorted with the enemy, have taken place but with no great disturbances and regarded as rather a minor form of punishment.

Towards women who married Germans, or who consorted with Germans during the occupation, no specific policy has been evolved. It seems to be the Norwegian attitude that these women will be such social outcasts that they will find it necessary to go to Germany or to emigrate elsewhere. . . .

#### GERMAN FORCES SURRENDERED IN NORWAY NOT TO BE TREATED AS PRISONERS OF WAR

[Enrietto Rpt]

\* \* \* A somewhat startling departure in the field of international law is the determination by SHAEF that members of the German armed forces in Norway who surrendered effective 2301 8 May 45 would not be declared prisoners of war but would be treated as disarmed military personnel, subject to the command and control of the Allied Joint Commanders in Norway. Apparently, from questions asked by the German Commander, their impression has been that they are prisoners of war. \* \* \*

In the meantime, the Commander of the Wehrmacht in Norway requested that the German Command be permitted to exercise complete military jurisdiction over the members of the German armed forces. A directive on the subject was issued to him, specifying the extent to which such jurisdiction could be exercised, and provided for an over-riding authority in the Commander Allied Land Forces Norway to remove any case from their jurisdiction. In general the jurisdiction was modelled upon the military government legislation for Germany.

The effect of the foregoing was to create in international law an entirely new class of persons, viz, disarmed military personnel operating under a military organization and military law of a foreign country with only the top command and control changed by the act of surrender. Such persons are not prisoners of war nor are they displaced persons, but represent a class in between whose privileges and burdens are not specified by any body of established law nor by any international convention.

The creation of such a class is inevitable in the case of a mass surrender involving large numbers of persons such as was entailed by the mass surrender of 8 May 45. . . .

A further interesting development is the distribution of staff responsibilities in respect of that body of persons. Normally, prisoners of war are an A/G-1 responsibility. However, in this operation C. A. Legal Officers have been made responsible, because of the international character of the problem, for all legal matters respecting the surrendered Germans, and JAG's functions have been limited to legal matters relating to the Allied troops operating in this territory. \* \* \*

#### THE SUPPLY SITUATION ON LIBERATION

[Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5, Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 45]

The outstanding problem of the Supply Branch is the procurement of an adequate supply of fuel. By this is meant both coal and POL (petrol and diesel oil in particular).

Norway has been thoroughly stripped of commodities of all sorts. There is a real shortage of food and of all other items of supply. It has never been a country which produced sufficient items of food and clothing for its own requirements within its boundaries.

There is now one potential source of indigenous supplies. This is the captured German stocks. It is, of course, necessary to retain enough of these to fill the allotted rations to the Germans. Thereafter, there are certain needs of the Allied military forces which will have a call against these goods.

There will remain a considerable quantity of goods of various sorts which may be of use to the Norwegian economy. Though these may amount to large quantities, they are not always items which are particularly needed, nor particularly useful to the Norwegian civilian operations. \* \* \*

Immediately on liberation, six Allied destroyers moved into various Norwegian ports. Each of these vessels carried a "token" shipment of C. A. supplies. The composition of each of these shipments was:

Coffee . . . . .	10.0 tons
Vitaminized Choc . . . . .	1.5 tons
Soap . . . . .	2.0 tons
Canned Meat . . . . .	5.0 tons
Evap. milk . . . . .	3.0 tons
Med. Sups . . . . .	0.5 tons

22.0

Within 10 days from Liberation Day, 12 vessels had been loaded with C. A. supplies and

were en route to Norway. These vessels carried more than 20,000 tons of basic supplies. They are being distributed from Oslo all the way to Tromsø. Roughly, the shipments were made up as follows:

Food.....	83%
POL.....	9%
Shoes & Clothing.....	3%
Soap.....	3%
Medical supplies.....	2%
	100%

To summarize the food position: 15,000 tons have now been moved to Norway, 8,000 more tons are presently being loaded. 21,000 tons are still available in the U.K. and will be moved in early lifts. A further 21,000 tons will move by direct shipment from the U.S. and are scheduled to arrive in July.

Substantial quantities of coal have been programmed: 23,550 tons for May and 45,000 tons with the possibility of an additional 25,000 tons for June. \* \* \*

The shortage of fuel—both coal and POL—is one of the biggest problems here. Again and again, this obstacle is encountered. There is no indigenous production. . . .

Every gas works in the country is shut down, not because of destruction but because there is no coal.

The railroads are in reasonably fair shape, in so far as equipment and right of way are concerned. But the shortage of fuel has reduced operations to a bare minimum of the most important lines.

The economy of Norway depends on its tremendously complex water transport system. Here again, the boats are adequate, but the scarcity of petrol, diesel oil and coal endangers operation.

Norway's fishing industry is the big potential source of thousands of tons of surplus food for world supply. The vessels and the gear, though worn, are serviceable. POL and coal are necessary to insure this activity. \* \* \*

#### THE KING RETURNS AND THE MILITARY PHASE IS ENDED

[Hq, Allied Land Forces Norway, CA, G-5 Div, Historical Rpt. 1-30 JUN 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Hist files, Jkt 3]

On 7 June 45, five years to the day after the pressure of German invasion forced King Haakon

VII and his Government to leave Norway to continue the war against the aggressor from the British Isles—and one month after the reception of the first news of the surrender of the German armies to the Allies—His Majesty the King returned to his liberated people.

About one hour before King Haakon VII set foot on liberated Norwegian soil, Brigadier P. H. Hansen, VC, DSO, MC, Head of Civil Affairs Norway, rode from his office through the flag-decked streets of jubilant Oslo to the Royal Palace. He carried with him a letter from SHAEF terminating the Military Phase of the Norway operation. This letter announced to the Norwegian Government that the complete responsibility for civil administration in Norway was restored to His Majesty the King and to the Norwegian Government, confirming that the military situation was such that in accordance with para. 2 of the Inter-Governmental Agreements of 16 May 1944 full and complete responsibility of civil administration in Norway be exercised by the Norwegian Government, subject to certain arrangements necessary to enable the British-U.S. forces to conduct the following operations:

(a) The disarmament and removal of German Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, together with German auxiliary organizations and civilian agencies and the disposal of enemy property.

(b) The repatriation of ex-prisoners-of-war and displaced persons.

(c) The orderly withdrawal of Army, Navy, and Air forces from Norway.

Though of historical value, this declaration has in no way affected the work of Civil Affairs, which, in any case, has always worked in very close co-operation with both governmental and local authorities. These responsibilities will continue until the Allied Forces are eventually withdrawn.

Of the many Civil Affairs responsibilities in Norway, which are now beginning to assume full shape, the more important are the following: To assist the Royal Norwegian Government with—

(a) The provision of supplies for the civil population, including coal and POL.

(b) Disposal of refugees and displaced persons.

(c) The establishment of Military Courts for the trial of Germans. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XXX

# Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Wake of Battle

The care and disposition of refugees and displaced persons was one of the most perplexing of civil affairs problems. Though the problem had many ramifications some of the principal difficulties arose from certain false assumptions. In the planning stage the civil affairs staffs were obliged to proceed on very meager intelligence as to the nature and extent of the problem. In estimating the number of displaced persons, for example, the governments-in-exile sometimes deliberately exaggerated in order to lead the Germans to believe they had exhausted the supply of slave labor or to cover the activities of the underground. Another complicating factor in planning was the variety of classes of uprooted people to be dealt with. In addition to displaced persons and refugees, there were stateless persons—those who had no governmental allegiance because their own national government, whether Allied or enemy, no longer existed. There were also borderline cases, individuals native to an area close to international frontiers who did not know to which group they belonged. An example of these were the residents of Eupen and Malmédy, many of whom had lived under German, then Belgian, then German, and finally Belgian authority. All these various classes required special consideration and made planning exceedingly complicated. Still another false assumption was that the displaced persons generally would be tractable and

acquiescent. When liberation came, they in numerous cases in fact exhibited what came to be called a “liberation complex,” a psychological malaise that made its victims very difficult to handle.

Probably the main error was the assumption that after the combat troops had left behind settled rear zones the various national governments could handle the problem. Modern warfare is apt to monopolize most of the economic resources of a country. In a nation which is conducting warfare, or in which military operations are being carried on, the armed forces have control over, or prior claim on, all communications, facilities, and supplies. Under these circumstances it was unrealistic to expect the recently liberated governments to assume, unaided, such a huge undertaking as the care and repatriation of displaced persons. Experience showed that it was necessary for the military forces to assist civilian governments with specially trained personnel, supplies, and facilities. Thus, by a certain point in the operations, policy had so evolved that, in addition to the direct responsibility assumed in forward zones and in care for stateless persons, military authorities were advising and assisting the French and other governments in reception centers, supply depots, and transit centers which had been established near their borders for all returning persons liberated by the advance into Germany.

## I. CIVILIANS BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN FRANCE DURING RAPID ARMY ADVANCE

### REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: DEFINITION AND POLICY

[SHAEF Fld Handbook of CA, France, rev ed., 26 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 115.04]

#### 210. *General Definition.*

a. Refugees are civilians not outside the national boundaries of their country, who desire to return to their homes but require assistance to do so and are:

(i) temporarily homeless because of military operations: or

(ii) at some distance from their homes for reasons related to the war.

b. Displaced Persons are civilians outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of the war:

(i) who are desirous but unable to return, or to find homes without assistance; or

(ii) who are to be returned to enemy or ex-enemy territory. \* \* \*

212. The policy of the Supreme Commander with regard to refugees and displaced persons is:

a. To prevent any hindrance to Military operations which might be occasioned by their massing or uncontrolled movement.

b. To prevent the infiltration of enemy agents posing as refugees or displaced persons.

c. To prevent outbreaks of disease among refugees and displaced persons which might threaten the health of the military forces.

d. To relieve, as far as practicable, conditions of destitution among refugees and displaced persons which might adversely affect military operations.

e. To assist the French authorities, when the military situation permits, to set up an organization to effect the rapid and orderly repatriation of displaced persons. \* \* \*

### FRENCH WILL HAVE FULL RESPONSIBILITY

[SHAEF Fld Handbook of CA, Fr, rev ed., 26 Aug 44]

213. The French authorities will have full responsibility for refugees and displaced persons. However, in the Forward Zone in emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority is in a position to put into effect the measures deemed necessary by commanders, the latter may as a temporary and exceptional measure take such action as is required by military necessity. Moreover, in Military Zones, commanders may take, or cause the services in charge

of installations of military importance to take, such measures as are necessary for the conduct of operations and, in particular, those necessary to assure the security and efficient operation of such installations. \* \* \*

### NO GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN THE EARLY DAYS

[The General Board USFET, Study 35: Displaced Persons, Refugees and Recovered Allied Military Personnel, OCMH files]

#### 15. *Displaced Persons Operations, D to D Plus 45*

a. The bulk of the operations during this period involved French refugees rather than displaced persons. As had been forecast, portions of the population in the area occupied prior to D plus 45 had been evacuated. Within a few days after the capture of each town, the civil population began filtering back and on an average, towns had from 25 to 30 per cent of their normal population by the tenth day after liberation. The immediate problems were food, housing and health. As the operations took place in summertime, it had been expected that shelter would not be a major problem. The continuous rains following D-Day, however, made shelter an early problem. Improvisation of shelter from ruined buildings was hampered by the extensive booby-trapping engaged in by the Germans. Few relief supplies were available, but French local authorities appointed by Civil Affairs, utilized indigenous supplies to feed the civil population and also distributed the limited imported supplies.

b. The displaced persons uncovered included former members of the Organization Todt, who were treated as prisoners of war. Plans for the evacuation of displaced persons and refugees to England were not invoked. No large-scale attempt was detected, on the part of the Germans, to push large numbers of civilians through the lines to embarrass our effort.

c. A large number of French refugees were rapidly absorbed into normal civilian community life. Towns were placed "off limits" to military personnel, a move which had, among others, the effect of conserving the limited food supplies available for civilians.

d. Fortunately, few problems in public health arose. Exposure to the elements resulted in some temporary illnesses, but no epidemics were reported.

e. During this period, two displaced persons camps were opened, one in the vicinity of Cher-

bourg and one in the vicinity of St.-Mère-Eglise . . . These camps accommodated both displaced persons and refugees and were operated by the First Army. As the advance progressed further to the south, it was necessary to open successive displaced persons centers, and as rapidly as possible refugees were dispersed and absorbed into the civilian population. \* \* \*

#### IN A RAPID ADVANCE, STANDFAST ORDERS CANNOT BE ENFORCED

[AAR of Civil Affairs and Military Government in OVERLORD and ECLIPSE Operations 1944-45, sec. X, SHAEF files, G-5, Hq 12th AGp]

c. After the breakthrough at St. Lô, over a quarter of a million refugees were uncovered in a few days. Soon after their liberation, the refugees attempted to return to their homes unaided. The control of their movements became a greater problem because the number greatly exceeded capacity of the military transport available for their movement. At first, orders were issued that the refugees were to stand fast until transport to their homes could be arranged. It was soon evident that standfast orders could not be enforced, and plans were made to control rather than to stop the movement of refugees. \* \* \*

#### CONTROL ROUTES ESTABLISHED

[AAR, G-5, Third U.S. Army, ch. 3, sec. IV, Gen Bd files, dr. 634]

\* \* \* The rapid movement of the Army resulted in the by-passing of many communities, leaving the local government and homes relatively intact in many of them so that local authorities were available and local resources adequate to care for the problem of refugees. It was both undesirable and unnecessary to establish formal Collection Points or permanent facilities for care of refugees under these conditions. Moreover, no opportunity developed for identification and separation of refugees from displaced persons and the establishment of permanent assembly Centers for displaced persons.

On the other hand, the necessity did arise of establishing routes over which refugees could move without obstructing Army operations and supply. Beginning 8 August, Detachments C112 and D212 were detailed to plot such routes. Upon being approved by G-4 Traffic Control Section, the selected roads were posted with signs reading *Route Autorisée Aux Civils*. Before the month's close they extended from Gavray . . . to Rennes . . . as the southern extremity, and from Rennes . . . to Pithiviers. \* \* \*

Detachments reported in almost all communities refugees varying in number from small

groups to several thousands. Operating through the *Maires*, *Secours National* and the *Croix Rouge Française*, in most instances the Detachments were able to have the refugees billeted and fed without other military assistance. Only in two instances was it necessary to furnish relief supplies. \* \* \*

#### GERMANS ATTEMPT TO HAMPER ALLIED OPERATIONS BY DISGORING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

[AAR, G-5, Third U.S. Army, ch. 3, sec. IV]

\* \* \* A special problem developed in the vicinity of Brest . . . when the Germans expelled the city's civilian population in the probable hope of embarrassing the American forces. Detachment C112 was dispatched to this area and the G-5 Refugee officer, together with a French liaison officer, surveyed the area. Instructions were issued to the *Maires* and the Chief of Gendarmes of each community to clear the main highways and route individuals to communities where billeting facilities still existed. Six thousand refugees were entrained from Landerneau . . . to Morlaix. . . The refugees which came through the German lines were excellently handled by the French authorities, with the assistance of four women of the Military Liaison for Administrative Matters, through dispersal and billeting in nearby communities. Detachment C112 provided emergency hard rations, which included soap, codfish, pulses, biscuits, meat, milk and chocolate. Its officers coordinated the work of the *Maires*. The *Secours National* established emergency feeding stations where necessary and a total of 24,000 refugees were cared for without interference to military operations or supply, and without suffering to the individuals. \* \* \*

#### TURNOVER OF THE CAMPS TO FRENCH GENERALLY RESULTS IN A SUPPLY PROBLEM

[M. Forestier, Chief of Mission of French Provisional Govt Delegation, Copy of Report on Inspection of Refugee Camps in France, Aug 44,<sup>1</sup> SHAEF files, G-5, 2749-4, DP Branch]

\* \* \* In the battle zone, at proximity of the line of battle, SHAEF organizes transit camps in which all refugees are sent for three or four days, and are then sent to more permanent dwellings. The Free French Volunteers consisting of women are in charge of these camps under the immediate authority of the Allies. Furthermore, M. Le Gat is authorized to choose all additional civil help

<sup>1</sup> This text is the only copy of the report that has been found; it covers the period 31 July-4 Aug 1944.

needed to carry on duties and all further suggestions are accepted.

Later on, as the front line goes forward, these camps are considered rear camps, the Military Authorities transferring all responsibilities of the camps to the French Civil Authorities. The people then use these camps as a more permanent place and keep all refugees until homes can be found for them.

The supplies sent to these camps is done marvelously by the Allied military authorities, while they are held responsible. Rations issued vary from the part of the country you are in but are in all cases quite sufficient and even reach a figure of 4,000 calories in certain camps.

Medical supplies and chemical supplies are also brought by the Allies and all sanitary installations and dispensaries are infallible.

The only difficulty so far is the transfer of Military authorities to the French civilian authorities.

I have, however, insisted so as a maximum of supplies is left by the Military authorities when they leave camp, and so far the greatest demand is for tents, camp beds or similar equipment. It is, in fact, often the case when refugees, upon arrival, have to sleep on some straw or, even worse, on the floor. \* \* \*

#### CIVILIAN INTERNMENT CAMPS UNCOVERED

[AAR of CA and Mil Govt in OVERLORD and ECLIPSE Opns 1944-45]

c. Two large civilian internment camps were uncovered in September. One was located at Clermont and the other at Vittel. These camps contained approximately 4,300 civilian internees including nationals of the United States, Great Britain and other Allied countries. A Civil Affairs detachment was placed in charge of the Clermont camp and provided for the care of the internees until they could be returned to their homes or evacuated to Paris. Two Civil Affairs detachments assisted by American Red Cross personnel took charge of the Vittel camp upon its liberation. This personnel supervised the care of the internees until they could be sent to their homes or evacuated elsewhere. \* \* \*

#### ADVANCE TO GERMAN FRONTIERS INCREASES THE DP PROBLEM

[AAR of CA and Mil Govt in OVERLORD and ECLIPSE Opns 1944-45]

d. With the advent of winter and the fighting along the frontiers of Germany, the refugee and

displaced persons problem became more serious. . . .

e. The occupation of the Moselle industrial area resulted in increases in the number of Allied displaced persons in the Army Group area. Because of the lack of sufficient billeting space for troops, destruction of homes by combat, and the presence of considerable numbers of foreign workers, it was necessary to move about 40,000 Russian and Polish displaced persons out of Army Group area during the months of November and December. These displaced persons were sent to camps in the Communications Zone in the vicinity of Troyes, Orléans, Provins, Chaumont, Châlons-sur-Marne and Clermont-Ferrand.

f. The establishment of a stable battle line near the frontier of Germany resulted in the evacuation for security reasons of German nationals in the immediate battle area. Approximately 10,000 Germans were moved into Belgium from the Belgo-German Border and placed in camps under the supervision and control of Civil Affairs detachments. \* \* \*

#### EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE NEED FOR SPECIALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL

[AAR of CA and Mil Govt in OVERLORD and ECLIPSE Opns 1944-45]

5. a. Prior to the invasion no special personnel were earmarked for the care and control of refugees and displaced persons, as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force considered the care and control of refugees to be a general Civil Affairs or Military Government function. However, operational experience soon indicated the use of specially trained personnel for this purpose to be highly desirable. As a result, eight Civil Affairs detachments were earmarked and used by the Armies primarily for handling refugees and displaced persons. These detachments were assisted by American Red Cross personnel, Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative Welfare teams (MMLA) and Allied Liaison Officers for repatriation. By the end of the period D plus 180, approximately 65 American Red Cross personnel, 16 MMLA teams (each consisting of five trained and experienced French militarized female workers, and a male driver), 4 Dutch Liaison Officers for Repatriation, and 21 Polish Liaison Officers for Repatriation were on duty in the Army Group area. These assisted in the handling of refugees and displaced persons. \* \* \*

## 2. DELEGATION OF THE PROBLEM DOES NOT WORK

### BELGIANS ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS

[Ltr, Tschoffen, Chief, Belgium Mil Mission to Gullion, Chief, DP Branch, G-5, SHAEF 1 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission Belgium Final Rpt, pt. I]

Following the conference held on the 20th July 1944 at Norfolk House, and referring to the wish expressed by your Deputy to have the agreed undertakings by the Belgian Government confirmed by letter, I summarize hereunder these undertakings which are based on the recognition of the presence in Belgium of Allied and enemy nationals who should be repatriated.

It is quite understood that the restoration of order in Europe will require some reasonable care and control of displaced persons and refugees after the termination of enemy authority over them, and that, in general, their return to suitable homes in their own countries should be effected as expeditiously as military necessity and political and economic considerations will permit.

#### *Agreed Undertakings:*

1. It is therefore agreed that, subject to such action by SCAEF as the military situation may permit or necessitate and to subsequent financial adjustments to be agreed upon, the Belgian Government will, within the limits of their available resources, and in accordance with Government regulations on matters of repatriation:

a. Limit the movements of displaced persons and refugees to a minimum, through "standstill" instructions, regulation of frontiers, and other appropriate measures, until their repatriation, settlement, or other disposition has been authorized;

b. Provide the necessary care and control of such persons, including medical supervision to prevent epidemics, pending their repatriation or other disposition;

c. Register all displaced persons, including (1) allied nationals (2) enemy nationals, and (3) persons of doubtful, dual, or no nationality, through a standard procedure and on forms provided by SCAEF; such registration record to accompany the displaced persons so registered thereafter on his basic personal record, to his final disposition;

d. Establish Processing Centers for the reception, care and disposition of foreign displaced persons within Belgium, and for the reception of displaced Belgian Nationals from abroad, or for Belgian refugees;

e. Appoint liaison, repatriation or consular officers to be accredited to other allied national authorities, and to military authorities designated by SCAEF (in Germany or elsewhere), to identify and issue visas to their respective nationals, and to facilitate their necessary care, movements and repatriation; and to receive such officers accredited to the Belgian Government by other national authorities;

f. Authorize and facilitate movements into, through, and out of Belgian territory, in accordance with central traffic control requirements, of persons whose repatriation has been approved, or whose movement is required for military purposes, subject to such health or security measures as may have to be taken and admit into Belgium all persons of any or no nationality, displaced by war without discrimination on account of race, religion or political belief.

g. Turn over to SCAEF upon demand, for such disposition as may be determined by competent allied authority, any or all enemy displaced persons, and authorize and facilitate their movement through and exit from Belgium, or other disposition indicated, reserving the right to retain for investigation or trial all persons charged under Belgian law.

h. Cooperate with SCAEF and the national authorities of other allied countries concerned in such other measures as may prove expedient and mutually desirable to effect the purpose above declared.

2. This agreement, made to facilitate the common purpose above declared, is without prejudice to the rights of military necessity, or existing agreements in other matters. It does not apply to prisoners-of-war, who will be the subject of an eventual separate agreement.

3. May I express the hope that SCAEF will give to the Belgian Government and their officials all facilities to get into the Belgian Territory and even outside it as may prove expedient and mutually desirable to effect the above purposes.

### ROLE OF SHAEF MISSION TO BELGIUM IN HANDLING THE DP PROBLEM

[SHAEF Directive to AGP's, 30 Sep 44,<sup>2</sup> SHAEF files, G-5/2702/1, DP Branch]

2. Responsibility for the care and eventual repatriation of Displaced Persons in Belgium rests with the Belgian Government.

<sup>2</sup> Copies of the directive to each government concerned.

3. As Displaced Persons are uncovered in military zones, they will be collected, accommodated, and cared for under military arrangements until such time as they can be handed over to the Belgian authorities for disposal.

4. a. The registration of Displaced Persons, a necessary preliminary to their repatriation, will be undertaken by the Belgians in accordance with the procedure agreed between Supreme Headquarters, AEF, and Allied national governments. At a time to be agreed by the Belgian Government and the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (Belgium), acting on behalf of Supreme Headquarters, AEF, instructions will be issued by the Belgian Government to put this procedure into operation.

b. The Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (Belgium) will be responsible for procuring and issuing to the Belgian Government the necessary forms and instructions.

5. The Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (Belgium), will impress on the Belgian Government the need for Allied Liaison Officers, who are accredited to the Belgian Government for the purpose, having ready access to the centers in which their nationals are accommodated and for being provided with any necessary data concerning them.

#### IMPATIENCE OF DISPLACED PERSONS; A PROPOSAL FOR CONTROLLED MOVEMENT

[Memo, Brig A. G. Salisbury-Jones, Deputy Chief, DPR&W Branch, G-5, SHAEF, for Gullion, Chief, DPR&W Branch, G-5, SHAEF, 9 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5/2748/2, DP Branch]

10. . . . We also visited the Assembly Center south of Eindhoven in which were 5 displaced Frenchmen and one Italian. As I had expected, the Frenchmen were in an impatient frame of mind and wondering why they could not be allowed to proceed home under their own arrangements at once. The impatience could not be excused on the ground that the camp was uncomfortable. Indeed it was relatively comfortable; and I cannot express the view too strongly that any attempt to stop young able-bodied Frenchmen from trying to move into France under their own arrangements will cause trouble and discontent. In this view I was strongly supported by Brig. Feildem of the Q Staff of 21 Army Group and also by many others, including the G-5 staff at 12th Army Group. I submit, therefore, that while arrangements must still be made

to house and feed displaced persons until transportation arrangements can be made, Army Groups should also legislate for controlled movement by road along routes not used by the armies.

21. d. In view of my experience at the Eindhoven Assembly Center and of the strong views expressed by many others well qualified from experience to advise, I think that Army Groups at their discretion should be encouraged to organize controlled road movement in addition to the normal evacuation by train or other forms of transportation. I consider that this is most important, primarily on psychological grounds. Many of the individuals concerned are young and strong and they have not seen their families for several months. Any attempt therefore to hold them up unduly at the Assembly Center can only lead to disastrous results. The organization of controlled road movement will also relieve congestion in the forward area more quickly and will reduce the demands on transportation resources. \* \* \*

#### IT WILL NOT DO TO SAY: "THESE PEOPLE ARE FRANCE'S RESPONSIBILITY"

[Ltr, Gullion to SCAEF, 24 Oct. 44, SHAEF files, G-5/2772, DP Branch]

6. Here is the grievous situation: There are about 40,000 displaced persons now on the Allied side of the line between Germany and Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. The French have no transportation to move them away from the border; no housing to move them to; and inadequate food and other supplies to take care of them. Transportation, food and supplies can, in a pinch, be diverted by the Army to displaced persons use, but housing in November can not be improvised by the French.

If the 40,000 named above were all, the whole problem would not be insoluble among SHAEF Mission, Communication Zone and the French Government. But for operational reasons, General Montgomery wants to move over 100,000 Dutch civilians, through Belgium, into France. That is but a small fraction of what is to come. At a meeting between representatives of the French Mission, M. Frenay, and of Displaced Persons Branch, it was estimated, from reports received from the G-5's of the Armies and from other sources, that at least 500,000 displaced persons would be shoved out of Germany into Allied

territory during the first month alone, following an all-out, fairly successful drive against Germany.

It will not do to say "These people are France's responsibility. She agreed to take care of them—let's hold her to her agreement." The current world and posterity will think that France, Holland and Belgium are doing enough to take care of themselves, and if scores of thousands of Allied displaced persons freeze or starve, the Supreme Commander and his Staff will be held responsible.

The French say they can not handle the problem. G-5 Communication Zone (Brigadier-General Stearns) says that he is utterly without resources to meet the situation.

7. Therefore, I recommend:

(1) That instructions be given to military commanders in Germany that, until further orders, only in cases where successful operation will otherwise be jeopardized, will displaced persons be moved out of Germany.

(2) That a high level conference, consisting of representatives of G-1, G-3, G-4, G-5 and Communication Zone be held at once, with a view to determining whether it is feasible to make plans for the diversion of Allied personnel and resources to care for what may total three quarters of a million people under the circumstances outlined above.

(3) If so, that plans be made.

#### THE DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM SEEMED BEYOND HOPE

[Interv sheet dtd 15 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist Rcds, 132.02, SHAEF Mission Belgium]

Capt. ——— committed suicide in Brussels. He was head of the Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 component of the SHAEF Mission to Belgium. With a .45 pistol he shot himself through the heart. Two letters were left, one to his wife, and one to his commanding officer. In both he expressed his despondency over the tremendous problems involved in displaced persons and his

inability to see any solution or do anything about them. \* \* \*

#### WITHOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE, FRENCH WILL BE UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM

[Memo, Brig Gen Stanley R. Mickelsen, Chief, DPR&W Branch, G-5 SHAEF, for Chief Opns Branch, G-5, 8 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5/2701/4 DP Branch]

2. The problem of the handling, care and welfare of displaced persons within France is one which is increasing in magnitude with the progress of operations, and which will continue to do so. The responsibility for the control of displaced persons within France is now divided between military commanders in forward areas and the French Government in the Zone of Interior; while Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. Mission (France) is responsible for coordination. The French Government is doing its utmost to cope with the problem, but, in my opinion, as long as all communications and supplies are controlled by the military, they will be unable to fully meet their responsibility, regardless of the extent of their effort.

3. The original French Border Control Plan, as approved by G-5 Division, called for the assignment of 6 Civil Affairs Detachments to be located at key control points, for the purpose of assisting the French through the establishment of liaison with the military. At that time, it was agreed with Ops [Opns] Branch, G-5, that these detachments, totaling 27 officers, would be made available, and would not be removed from France as long as there was an apparent need for their retention. Some of these detachments actually have been deployed while others have not, primarily because the strategic points at which the detachments were to be located were, until recently, in the hands of the enemy. In any case, the efficiency of those deployed has been hampered, because they were not under the control of Supreme Headquarters, A.E.F. Mission (France) the coordinating body for the displaced persons problem within France. \* \* \*

### 3. ALLIED AUTHORITIES MUST TAKE MORE RESPONSIBILITY EVERYWHERE

#### SHAEF LAYS DOWN A CLEAR-CUT POLICY OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSEMBLY CENTERS

[AG, SHAEF, Directive for All Concerned on Responsibility for Assembly Centres for Displaced Persons and Refugees, 18 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 17.02, SHAEF Mission Belgium, Final Rpt, pt. I]

#### 2. *Responsibility in Allied Countries.*

a. In Interior Zones Allied Governments are wholly responsible. Supreme Headquarters, AEF Missions will, however, advise them and when necessary secure the assistance of military commanders.

b. In Forward Zones military commanders are wholly responsible. However, they may delegate partial responsibility to Allied local authorities as soon as the latter are in a position to assume normal civil governmental activities in any given area. Military commanders will, in such cases, insure that essential transport, accommodation and supplies are available to Allied authorities, with regard both to present needs and estimated future requirements. \* \* \*

#### HOW XX CORPS RETURNED 40,000 EVACUEES TO THEIR HOMES

[Hist Rpt of G-5, XX Corps, for Dec 44, dtd 7 Jan 45, SHAEF files, 244, Third U.S. Army]

3. One of the problems which continues to occupy a high priority in the activities of this section and the detachments operating under its control is that of refugees and displaced persons. To appreciate the importance of this problem one need but consider the total number of refugees and displaced persons which passed through the XX Corps area to the areas in the rear. In the period covered by this summary a total of approximately 40,000 French refugees were returned from the forward areas to their homes either within the Corps area or to the rear of Corps area, of which, approximately 8700 were transported by military transportation. In addition, a total of 2023 displaced persons were transported from within Corps area to displaced persons assembly centers in the rear.

a. It has been found that the most advantageous way to handle the evacuation of these individuals is as follows:

(1) Upon an area being uncovered by our tactical troops, the American Red Cross Civilian War Relief representative, attached to this section, is dispatched into the area for the purpose of

making a survey. Information is obtained by him from Division Military Government Staff Sections, civilian authorities, Civil Affairs/Military Government Detachment Commanders and American Red Cross Civilian War Relief personnel, attached to detachments. This information embodies the numbers present in the area, the facilities locally available to take care of the people and their food and clothing requirements. In addition, information is obtained, in the case of refugees, as to the towns where they formerly resided. A survey is likewise made of these towns to ascertain existing conditions so that an overall picture is obtained. Plans may then be made for the return of refugees as soon as the tactical situation permits. It is important that these surveys be made at the earliest practical moment for to wait until such an evacuation becomes necessary results in confusion and makes such an evacuation almost impossible. Such was the procedure followed by this section during the months of December and it is believed that the results obtained testify to the effectiveness of this plan.

(2) To alleviate the shortage of clothing for French refugees, approximately sixty (60) tons of American Red Cross clothing were transported into the area under the supervision of the American Red Cross Civilian War Relief representative, attached to this section. This clothing has been deposited in various warehouses throughout the Department of Moselle and was and will be distributed by the French Red Cross and Secour Social Teams on a needs basis.

b. In addition to the regular refugees and displaced persons problems as we had previously known them, two new ones presented themselves in our area.

(1) One was the existence of two separate caves located in Buren and Linsdorf, Germany, wherein some 3000 German refugees, who had refused to evacuate their towns on orders of the German officials, had sought protection from the artillery shelling. Inasmuch as both of these caves were in division areas the immediate responsibility for handling these people rested with the divisions operating in the respective areas. However, a Civil Affairs Detachment was dispatched by this section for the purpose of assisting in the care of these people so that they would not become a hindrance to the tactical forces. The people were kept in the Buren Cave for approximately three weeks at which time it was

decided, because of the tactical situation, to evacuate them to towns in the rear of the division areas. During the time that these people were confined in the caves, they were under guard. However, individuals were permitted to return under guard to the towns from which they had fled for the purpose of gathering food supplies and baking bread. At the close of the period no evacuation had been made of the Linsdorf Cave and the people were being cared for and supervised by personnel of the 95th Infantry Division Military Government Staff Section, assisted by Detachment C2D2.

(2) This section during the early part of the month also temporarily maintained a detachment at the Johannis Bannberg Hospital, Denting, France, and at a hospital at Creutzwald, both of which had been used by the Germans as Prisoners of War Hospitals. At the time of their retreat from the area they abandoned the hospitals leaving behind some 2100 Russian, Polish and Serb Prisoners of War. Until it was definitely determined by higher authority as to whether these people were to be handled by the G-5 Section as displaced persons or by G-1 as Prisoners of War, Detachment C2D2 was in charge of the two camps. Third U.S. Army eventually determined that they would be handled as Prisoners of War and a Medical Detachment was dispatched from Third U.S. Army to relieve Detachment C2D2 and assume the care of these individuals. All of the patients were eventually evacuated to Toul. When these camps were uncovered it was found that the greater number of these patients were suffering from tuberculosis and in addition were suffering greatly from malnutrition. It can be expected that as our lines move forward more of these camps will be uncovered and it appears that this is another of the enemy's efforts to place in our path obstacles which will require a considerable amount of time and personnel. Information received indicates that the Germans in retreating would compel those prisoners of war who were capable of marching to accompany the German evacuation and would leave the bed-ridden and ill Prisoners of War behind.

c. Another problem which presented itself during the month of December was the decision of 90th Infantry Division to evacuate all civilians from a strip of land in its forward area. A similar situation confronted us previous to the attack on Metz, namely the evacuation of towns along the west side of the Moselle River, so that such an evacuation was not a new experience for this section. Accordingly, a Military Government Detachment was dispatched to Niedaltdorf, Ger-

many, the town in which it was decided to segregate these civilians. Motor transportation was obtained from the French Provisional Truck Company attached to Third U.S. Army and with the assistance of Military Government Detachments I5G2 and I1A2, approximately 3000 persons had been evacuated to Niedaltdorf at the close of the period. The evacuation of the town of Borg, Germany, had to be carried out entirely at night because of enemy mortar and artillery fire.

d. To assist in the return of French refugees to the Thionville and Metz areas, transitory refugee points were operated at both of the aforesaid towns, utilizing in addition to Civil Affairs personnel, personnel of French MMLA Teams. At these two transitory points, refugees arriving late in the day can be cared for overnight until arrangements are made for return to their residences. French Red Cross and French MMLA personnel were also utilized to good advantage in arranging to have refugees in a town ready for evacuation when the transport arrives. Valuable transport time is saved in this manner.

5. Closely allied with the refugee and displaced persons problem was that of restricting civilian circulation on the highways in the Corps area. The limitation of Civil Affairs circulation passes to a minimum does not of itself solve the question of keeping civilians off the road. It has been found necessary and is the practice of this section to have an officer make daily reconnaissance over the various military highways for the purpose of obtaining first hand information on the civilian circulation situation. As a result of the information obtained through this means the source of this unauthorized civilian traffic can be traced and steps are then immediately taken to remedy the fault wherever it may be. Through co-operation with French civilian authorities, French Gendarmes were secured and placed at strategic points for the purpose of denying the use of the highways to unauthorized civilians. This system serves as a security measure in addition to being an aid in the control of civilian circulation. As a further aid in the control of civilian circulation, arrangements were made for a French Civilian Summary Court to be established in Metz for the purpose of prosecuting violators of circulation restrictions. \* \* \*

#### MILITARY AID IN ESTABLISHING FRENCH RECEPTION CENTERS

[Directive From SHAEF to the AGP's, CG, ComZ, ETO and SHAEF Mission France, 17 Feb 45, SHAEF files, G-5/2701/4, DP Branch]

1. Past experience has indicated the necessity of rapidly clearing displaced persons from opera-

tional areas and it is anticipated that the numbers of such persons to be moved for operational reasons will increase with major advances of Allied Expeditionary Forces into Germany. In addition, it is the agreed policy between this headquarters and the French Government that French displaced persons uncovered within Germany be repatriated to France as soon as possible, consistent with military commitments. The French Government, as part of its responsibility for the care, welfare and repatriation of displaced persons who may trek across the frontiers, or who may be returned from Germany to France by military authorities, plans to establish reception centers, supply depots and rail transit centers near the Franco-German, Franco-Belgium and Franco-Luxembourg frontiers.

2. The French Reception Control Plan has been approved by this headquarters and envisages the establishment of 21 reception centers, 5 supply depots and 4 rail transit centers. . . . [locations omitted] \* \* \*

3. Reception centers indicated above are designated to accommodate 40,000 people and to be able to clear half this number to the rear daily. The four rail transit centers should be capable each of clearing 3,000 persons daily rearwards. The French Government has taken necessary action to organize administrative staffs to operate all of the above centers and have requested that Army Group Commanders and Commanding General, Communications Zone, deploy Civil Affairs personnel to act as advisers and as liaison officers between local representatives of the French Ministry of Prisoners of War, Deportees and Refugees and their respective military units.

4. Army Group Commanders and Commanding General, Communications Zone, are directed to take the following action:

a. To detail Civil Affairs Detachments to each of the supply depots indicated above as soon as such depots are established; such detachments to advise and assist French personnel charged with the responsibility of administering and operating supply depots; where necessary, detail such other Civil Affairs personnel as are required to reception centers and rail transit centers to perform liaison between local officials and the military on matters of supply, transportation and accommodation. The minimum scale of personnel recommended for these details is as follows:

(1) For supply depots—Civil Affairs detachments consisting of 2 officers and 3 enlisted men;

(2) For all other centers—1 officer and 2 enlisted men.

b. Consistent with military requirements, to give every assistance to the French in the establishment of the reception centers, supply depots and rail transit centers in the locations set forth in paragraph 2 above. A survey of the facilities needed will be made at the earliest possible date by representatives of the French Ministry of Prisoners of War, Deportees and Refugees, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (France), Communications Zone and representatives of the Army Group Commander in whose zone of responsibility such facilities are located. Agreement will be reached as to what facilities not now requisitioned can be earmarked for the French, what facilities already requisitioned can be released at once to the French and what facilities already requisitioned can be released on 10 days' notice when their actual use for displaced persons become necessary. In the event that release of a given facility desired by the French is not acquiesced in, the matter will be referred by Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission (France) to this headquarters for decision. Once the earmarking or release of facilities for the French Reception Control Plan has been agreed upon, British/U.S. Forces will not requisition such facilities except where urgent military necessity so dictates.

c. Supplies procured by the French and moved to the above supply depots will not be requisitioned for military use except when urgently required for emergency military needs. In such event, arrangements to insure immediate replacement will be made.

d. Civil Affairs officers detailed to the above duties will be instructed to screen and report to the next higher headquarters all requirements needed by the French from military sources. \* \* \*

#### DISPLACED PERSONS POUR THROUGH BELGIUM IN MARCH 1945

[Ltr, 1st Lt. R. U. Ricklefs to Capt E. M. M. Warburg, DP Branch, 13 Mar 45, SHAEF files, G-5/2702/1, DP Branch]

##### 1. *What's happening:*

The flow of DP's from the EAST is as follows:

a. Belgians are returning at the rate of 150 a day—OK.

b. French are passing through en route to France at the rate of about 200 a day (Brussels alone)—OK.

c. Eastern Europeans and Italians are pouring in at the rate of 500 a day, have filled the centres established by the Belgians to overflowing and are being housed in facilities set up temporarily, mostly by the Belgians.

2. *What's being done about it:*

a. By the Belgians—

(i) Every emergency thrust at the Commissariat has been met.

(ii) More than 5,000 Eastern Europeans and Italians as of this date are being housed, fed, and cared for entirely by Belgian agencies.

(iii) Schools have been closed in the morning in order to accommodate Russians arriving from the army areas that same evening.

(iv) Equipment was drawn from existing centres and various stockpiles to equip a centre at Louvain to accommodate an anticipated flow from the 21 Army Group Forward Zone (which has never shown up) of Russians, Poles and Western Europeans at the request of the 21 Army Group, even through the CBR [*Commissariat Belge au Repatriement*] objected to the selection of Louvain as a reception centre.

b. By 21st Army Group—

(i) Located a detachment at Louvain to assist in the preparation of the projected centre there; reported assistance is slight.

(ii) Located a CA detachment at 97 Rue de Stall, Uccle, to assist in the preparations of the projected reception-assembly centre, slight assistance reported.

(iii) Furnished two trucks on 12 March to move Russians from an emergency centre in Brussels to the centres in Lembeke and Tourneppe.

(iv) Operate a transit camp for Dutch at Termonde (through which stray Dutch nationals are billeted on the Belgians).

(v) Not one displaced person of any nationality is being cared for by the 21st Army Group.

c. By the U.S. Army Formations—

(i) Operate reception centre at Verviers through which all DP's from the US forward areas are processed and dispersed.

(ii) CA detachments in ASCZ have established in conjunction with CBR a number of centres in that zone and are helping meet the emergency flow in all respects.

(iii) CA, Channel Base Sector, is active in establishing new centres, but has no personnel and must rely entirely upon the Belgians; CBS [or CBR?] has furnished much food and equipment.

3. *What should be done about it:*

a. The flow of Eastern Europeans into Belgium should stop.

b. The Eastern Europeans, Italians and Germans now in Belgium should be taken over immediately and *completely* as a military responsibility.

NOTE.—The excuse of no personnel is stupid in the face of the millions who will have to be handled in Germany with existing CA military personnel.

c. The Commissariat Belge au Repatriement should concentrate its efforts entirely in the preparation of adequate facilities for the reception and repatriation of Western Europeans, soon to come in very large numbers.

d. Facilities for 20,000 DP's—divided approximately equal between the British and American Zones—should be made available to the Belgians for the use of Western Europeans. \* \* \*

#### 4. THE RECEPTION PLAN IS CHANGED IN THE LAST PHASE OF HOSTILITIES

##### BORDER RECEPTION PLAN REVISED AFTER THE ARMIES ENTER GERMANY

[AAR of CA/MG in OVERLORD and ECLIPSE OPNS, 1944-45, sec. X, SHAEF files, G-5, Hq 12th AGP]

17. In the period of planning before "D" day, the French authorities had prepared a plan for border reception facilities. This was largely based on the assumption that a surrender would take place before our Armies entered Germany. In December 1944, it became apparent that such

would not be the case, and this headquarters recommended through Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission to France that the plan be revised accordingly. This revision became effective in March 1945.

18. The original plan had disposed French border reception centers laterally, on the assumption that there would be a great deal of road movement and a minimum of rail movement. The revision recommended was on the basis that there would be little convoy movement, and that

rail movement would be restricted to the comparatively few main lines which would be rebuilt after inevitable damage by combat. The latter proved substantially to be the case. The French authorities established automatic daily quotas for the reception centers, notifying Armies weekly of any changes. However, no distinction was made at these reception centers between recovered allied military personnel (French) and displaced persons. Accordingly, a clear coordination was not had in every case for movement from these two sources, with the result that the French authorities were faced with duplicate arrivals at their reception centers. The matter was finally adjusted by instructions of higher authority which placed on G-5, this headquarters, the task of coordinating movements of all returning personnel whether recovered allied military personnel or displaced persons. Tribute must be paid to the extraordinary adaptability of the French authorities by which they handled all shipments of either nature which actually arrived. At the close of the period, it was found that more than 1,200,000 French citizens had passed through these centers, uniformly gratified by the fact that they had been returned to their homeland. \* \* \*

#### COMBAT FORCES OVERBURDEN RECEPTION CENTERS WITH DISPLACED PERSONS

[Hist Rpt, 1-31 May 45, SHAEF G-5, 17.04, SHAEF Mission, Fr]

Still imbued with consciousness of the urgency of repatriating the many thousands of DP's in Germany, the Army Groups tended to send them towards the nearest French processing point by trainloads. Telegrams giving Border Reception Center daily capacities were still being sent each week to Army Groups by the D.P. R&W. Section, hopeful that the Army Groups would not seriously overburden the centers by throwing in trainloads of DP's above the handling capacity of the centers.

But the French Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees and Refugees (PRD) had a plan to smooth out these obstacles to rapid repatriation. It proposed to establish movement controllers at four points near the French border (Valenciennes, Mézières, Metz and Sarrebourg). Given direct two-way communication with the Army Groups and the processing centers, and working closely with military and French civil transportation authorities, these movement controllers would, it was planned, route incoming convoys of DP's to those centers able to deal with the number in each convoy.

In the first half of the month [May 1945] this plan was being examined by the 21st, 12th and 6th Army Groups.

Border Reception Center capacity at the beginning of May was 34,350 daily, while the provisional center in Paris could process each day another 8,000. With total daily handling capacity thus 42,350 there seemed to be a fair margin over the actual daily intake of 20,000 Dp's. By the beginning of the second half of the month total daily capacity was increased to 54,700.

But the numbers of persons repatriated was rising. The total for the month of March (34,607) shot up to 262,197 for the month of April. Obviously, post-menstrual calculation of daily averages was meaningless in relation to the actual number inflicted on any one day. For instance, in one twelve-hour period early in May the Reception Centers at Jeumont, Maubuege and Valenciennes which could handle between them only 5,000 a day, received 11,700 and had eight trainloads of 11,500 more moving rapidly to the 1,000 a day center at Jeumont.

Last minute re-routing of the trains to Paris saved the day, thanks to Mission and Communications Zone. \* \* \*

#### LIBERATION: ASSUMPTIONS AND REALITY

[The Gen Bd USFET, Study No. 35: DP's, Refugees and Recovered Allied Mil Personnel]

3. . . . Implicit in the planning for care and control of displaced persons was the assumption that the individuals would be tractable, grateful and powerless, after their domination from two to five years as the objects of German slave policies. They were none of these things. Their intractability took the form of what was referred to repeatedly by officers in contact with them as "Liberation Complex." This involved revenge, hunger, and exultation, which three qualities combined to make displaced persons, when newly liberated, a problem as to behavior and conduct, as well as for care, feeding, disinfection, registration, and repatriation. During the combat phase, this problem assumed critical proportions at times. \* \* \*

#### MASSIVE REPATRIATION BEGINS OF WESTERN EUROPEANS LIBERATED IN GERMANY

[Brig Gen. Cuthbert P. Stearns, G-5, ETOUSA, Rpt, Civil Affairs Activities of ETOUSA, 30 Jun 45 CAD files, 319.1, CA Sec. 5, 30 Jun 45]

\* \* \* *Evacuation from Germany of DP's for military necessity:* March 1945 saw the envelopment of Germany by military operations and an-

other 32,754 were added to the roster of displaced persons in the Communications Zone. These persons were moved out of Germany to the rear as the spectacular advance of our armies uncovered them. This burden, made necessary by the limited space available in Germany during initial stages of the advance, had not been contemplated in original plans, and it was impossible to forecast the number involved on the basis of factual intelligence. Nevertheless, prompt estimates were made and proved to be almost exact (40,000); responsibilities were allocated among the subordinate commands and accommodations and care were provided promptly and with a minimum of confusion.

*Repatriation:*

a. *French Border Control Stations:* Massive repatriation of Western Europeans liberated in Germany began on 12 March 1945. Prior to this date the French and Belgian Governments, in collaboration with G-5, prepared a program of repatriation through border control installations located at points along their frontiers.

It was of first importance to the Communications Zone to see that this border control system functioned smoothly. Any breakdown in the system would have constituted a potential or actual threat to military operations. Civil Affairs officers and enlisted personnel were deployed, therefore, to these border control installations in a liaison capacity to assist the French in procuring installations, equipment, supplies, transportation and other aids.

By V-E Day approximately 800,000 Western Europeans had been repatriated, of which one-half million were French. They came by plane, by train, by truck convoy, on bicycles and on foot, carrying or pushing their poor pitiful possessions accumulated through the years of slavery and confinement by the Nazis. At the border control stations each individual was registered, photographed, screened for security, bathed, X-rayed,

disinfected, given ration cards, identity papers and money for immediate need; if ragged he was clothed, if sick, he was hospitalized. The border control stations, working around the clock cleared a repatriate and started him toward his home within a few hours.

This has been due in great part to the expert seconding by the Civil Affairs liaison teams; thus the French were able to accomplish the gigantic task of repatriating a million and a quarter men and women in three months' time (as of June 30 1945). Hundreds of thousands of Belgians and Dutch have, in like manner, been returned to their homelands.

b. *Repatriation of those who became a military responsibility:* Displaced persons maintained in Communications Zone as a military responsibility have included Russians, Poles, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Danes, Norwegians, Greeks, Italians, Latin-Americans and even some Chinese.

The Russians were moved eastward to the border of the Russian-American zone of occupation in Germany. At the border they were turned over to representatives of their countries. The Italians and Greeks were carried to the seaport of Marseilles and thence repatriated to their respective countries. Plans were made for the repatriation of all possible in connection with which every means of transportation has been and will be used—airlift, train, ship and truck.

c. *Problem Nationals:* In the very large family of displaced persons there are those members who require special care. These are the non-repatriables, who for political or other reasons, must be maintained until decisions are reached between governments as to their ultimate disposition. The Poles, the nationals of the Baltic States, the Jugoslavs and the Spaniards will remain the wards of the Army until such time as they can either be repatriated to their countries of origin or turned over to the governments of the countries in which they are located. \* \* \*

## CHAPTER XXXI

# The Protection of Historical Monuments and Art Treasures

Although Civil Affairs specialist officers got off to a late start in preparing for their mission in western Europe with respect to the protection and preservation of cultural treasures, they were at an advantage in being able to profit by their earlier experience in Italy. The documents of the chapter set forth some of the organizational vicissitudes of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section (MFA&A) in this endeavor, describe its planning activities, and illustrate the work of the men in the field.

In March 1944 the Civil Affairs Special Staff outlined a preliminary plan for organization and operation of MFA&A which formed the basis for a series of orders, directives, and instructions. The most important of these was General Eisenhower's order of May 26. Reflecting the mounting concern over the bombing of Monte Cassino, this order directed that historic sites and cultural monuments be spared as far as compatible with military necessity. The attitude manifested in this order was undoubtedly a basic factor in facilitating the work of the CAO's. Implicit in some of their reports is evidence of greater co-operation with military authorities, as for example in the notes by the civilian adviser to the MFA&A on the section's achievements

in the forward areas of France. (See p. 870.)

Keeping in mind lessons learned in North Africa and in Italy, Civil Affairs officers sought to establish effective liaison with the Army; to obtain an adequate number of qualified personnel, especially men with the right kind of technical background; to define more precisely the relationship between the CAO's and other officials involved in the effort to safeguard Europe's artistic treasures; to provide useful instructional material as well as detailed maps and lists of monuments to be preserved; and to co-operate with local authorities as far as possible. Problems of liaison, adequate personnel, exchange of information, and other such matters, were of course not completely solved. But without the work of MFA&A officers and the firm direction of the Supreme Commander the loss to the world of art and culture might have been much greater. A General Board study, after noting the extent to which MFA&A work had been hampered by lack of rank and other means of acting effectively within the military framework, recommended that the MFA&A policy, organization, and mode of operation used during the European campaign should with certain revisions be continued in future planning.

## I. "PROTECT AND RESPECT THESE SYMBOLS WHENEVER POSSIBLE"

### MONUMENTS, FINE ARTS AND ARCHIVES SECTION ESTABLISHED AT COSSAC

[The General Board, USFET, Study 36: Report on CA-MG Activities, MFA&A, Copy in OCMH, MS files]

7. In November 1943, when the Civil Affairs Section of Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives was established at Headquarters, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (COSSAC), the duties of the section were:

a. Record and assess war damage suffered by historic monuments prior to our occupation; take or advise the steps necessary to prevent further deterioration; supervise and pass estimates for repairs.

b. Prevent damage by troops; affix notices, close buildings or procure guards; check billeting; interest the troops by lectures or otherwise; and investigate charges of wanton damage brought against the Allied troops and report proved cases.

c. Prevent the looting, sale or removal of objects of art.

d. Establish the fact of looting by enemy troops.

### ORGANIZATION AND PLANS FOR MINIMIZING DAMAGE TO EUROPE'S CULTURAL HERITAGE

[Geoffrey Webb, Adviser, MFA&A, Report to June 1944 to CofS, G-5, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

#### *Early Stages: Personnel*

The adviser in Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives, Professor Geoffrey Webb, began to make semi-official contacts with the Special Staff, G-3, as from January 1944.<sup>1</sup> He was not finally appointed Civilian Adviser, pending the militarisation of the appointment, until 1 April. The Special Staff was at that time organized in Country Sections and Functional Sections. The former specialized in the particular problems of the European countries, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and France; the latter, with which MFA&A was included under Government Affairs, dealt with questions common to all countries and acted as a co-ordinating office. By 1 April the following officers had been temporarily attached to Special Staff for MFA&A work:

With the Adviser in the Sub-Section:

Capt. [Marvin C.] Ross (USMCR)

Lt. [George L.] Stout (USNR)  
Capt. [R. E. L.] Balfour (KRRC)  
With the French Country Section:  
Capt. [Walker K.] Hancock (AUS)  
Capt. [Louis B.] LaFarge (AUS)  
With the German Unit:  
Maj. [Theodore] Sizer (AUS)  
Lt. [Calvin S.] Hathaway (AUS)

On 1 April Capt. Hammett and Capt. Hammond joined the Functional Sub-Section and the German Unit respectively.

#### *Early Stages: Organization*

The earliest scheme for organization as drawn up in January 1944 envisaged a Chief Adviser (Br), two deputy chiefs (one U.S., one Br), and a staff of specialist officers roughly in equal proportions of U.S. and British. A proposed establishment was worked out on this basis, and allowed for a total of 17 officers in the first instance with a possible increase to 27 should the speed of advance be such as to require additional officers to deal with the areas uncovered.

The next step was to put forward a First Edition of Instructions to CA staffs and detachments in the matter of MFA&A. It was envisaged that this first edition should be issued after discussion.

In the course of March the Civil Affairs Special Staff was sent into . . . the West of England to devote themselves to planning; their concrete task was the production of a CA Handbook for each country concerned. These handbooks were not merely informative but contained the orders and instructions under which the CA officers were to work. Preference was given to the French Handbook and in this phase the pace was set by Capt. Hancock and LaFarge (the two Monuments officers attached to the French Section) in collaboration with the Functional Sub-Section. The work was based on the assumption that a General Order, or equivalent document, modeled on the order issued on December 23, 1943 by General Eisenhower for the Mediterranean Theater, would be issued and would determine the nature of the new organization. The first need was a list of monuments to be exempt from military use and which should be the basis of any list of buildings to be given special consideration in planning operations. \* \* \*

A beginning was made on the French list before the staff was moved . . . and lists for Norway, Denmark and Germany (as far as the areas to be controlled by SHAEF were con-

<sup>1</sup> Professor Webb, Slade Professor of Fine Arts at Cambridge University, served throughout World War I and had held a Staff position for three and one-half years during World War II.

cerned), for the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg were produced. Where possible the co-operation and criticism of the Allied Governments were invited before final versions of the lists were determined. In addition to the work on the lists, officers in the French Country Sections and the Functional Sub-Section concerned themselves with the problems of advice to CA officers in regard to care of Monuments, etc., in places where Specialist officers were not immediately available . . . and with the compilation of a Standard Operation procedure for specialists in the field. . . . In addition to the work on their respective handbooks and lists, the MFA&A officers with the French and German Country sections also had to work out plans and requirements for future operations in the countries concerned. Similar work for the other European countries was largely undertaken by the Functional Sub-Section.

#### *Personnel: Second Phase*

. . . The Adviser conceived it to be part of his duty to recommend officers for appointment as need arose in order to assure the best and most economical use of men available having regard to their technical qualifications and background. He decided at the outset that as the whole activity was a joint U.S./Br enterprise the principle should be established that U.S. and Br specialist officers should be employed interchangeably irrespective of the nationality of the forces to which they were attached. For this policy he found support in the authorities at SHAEF. It was therefore decided to recommend that 1 U.S. and 2 British officers should be allocated to the British forces and 1 British and 2 U.S. to the U.S. forces as they should be required. . . .

#### *Organization and Personnel: Second Phase*

As a result of the preliminary work carried out by the Functional Sub-Section and the officers of the French Country Unit, a series of orders, directives and instructions were issued in the latter part of May. Most important of these was General Eisenhower's order to the Commanders-in-Chief of 26 May, the directive which accompanied it and instructions to CA officers for France issued by 21 A/G [Army Group], this letter being based on the French handbook. 21 A/G also issued a directive to Armies making clear the need for adequate mobility of the MFA&A officers and the importance of so placing them that they could adequately

cover the areas allotted to them and be available to advise the Army as the occasion should arise. . . .

In the course of May, Colonel Newton arrived on a visit from the War Department and before his departure for Italy, his advice, more particularly on the special problems and the background and technical qualifications of the U.S. personnel, was most valuable. . . .

#### *Relations with the Air Force:*

Contact was established with the Staff of Air [Chief] Marshal [Sir Arthur W.] Tedder in April, which, as soon as the SHAEF organization took over the control of all Air operations toward the end of May, resulted in the demand for information from the Adviser in a form especially suited to the Air Command's needs. This was of two kinds:

(a) Information to enable due consideration to be given to cultural monuments in framing a strategic bombing programme. This involved the supply of a special list made up by towns graded according to their importance. This was supplied.

(b) Information as to the sites of particular buildings, for use in tactical bombing operations. On this matter, the Adviser recommended the Frick maps. Specimens were supplied, and this resulted in the demand for copies of the Frick Atlas for France which it was fortunately possible to supply at short notice. Further information has been passed to the Air Command as it has become available.

#### *Restitution:*

This problem which in the future will be one of the governing considerations for the MFA&A officers, has scarcely affected the organization up to date. . . . In the final analysis, this is largely a problem of Police technique and Intelligence. . . .

#### *Information:*

The basis of the work on the official list of Protected Monuments has been the material supplied from the U.S. Though the Frick maps with the accompanying lists and the list of the American Defense Harvard Group have come to hand somewhat irregularly and in some cases there has been more material for the compilation of the official lists than in others, these documents have been fundamental and essential. . . . It is to be emphasized that these lists supplied from U.S. can, in no way, supersede the Official Lists

which with all their imperfections . . . have been framed as minimal lists consistent with reasonable military requirements. . . . In the same way the instructions on first aid to buildings and care of works of art issued in Washington are somewhat too full and unhandy to be carried about by an officer in the field and in the technical instructions issued to MFA&A officers, these have been used as a basis for a shorter work. The compilation of this technical instruction has been undertaken by the officers themselves working with the Adviser and apart from its permanent usefulness has served as a device for training and clearing the minds of the officers as to their job. . . . In this connection the criticism of those officers with experience in Italy has been most valuable. . . .

#### *Training:*

The most important aspect of the training of MFA&A officers has perhaps been their joint work on the Technical Instructions (above). It has, however, been the consistent policy of the Adviser to bring together as far as military organization would permit, as many officers as possible round the central nucleus at Hq so that these officers who otherwise had been given only general CA training might get some idea of the way the organization was being built up, and the various problems and the tentative solutions which were being worked out by the Staff at Hq. . . .

#### *General:*

. . . Few of the U.S. officers are above the rank of Captain, and some are below. The U.S. Army system apparently does not allow of "acting rank" whereas this is normal practice in the British Army. The U.S. officers selected for this service are of the highest quality both personally and by reason of their technical qualifications, but they are, with few exceptions, too low in rank to carry the authority which is desirable for the efficient performance of their duties in the field. The Adviser has every confidence in these officers but wishes to emphasize most strongly that their junior rank may well prove a considerable and unnecessary handicap to them. . . . There is, moreover, the personal difficulty that the U.S. officers are liable to be outranked by the British officers doing the same work. Although the loyalty and generosity of spirit of the U.S. officers has prevented this issue from arising, the Adviser feels most strongly that for this reason, as well as that indicated above, every effort should be made to find a solution to this difficulty.

#### CONCERN OVER NONARRIVAL OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVE

[Msg, American Embassy, London, to Secy of State, 21 Apr 44, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 2]

The British have taken over organization of the monuments officers in this theatre in consequence of the non-arrival of Newton.<sup>2</sup> At present the command is in the hands of British Lieutenant Colonel Woolley in War Office and British Professor Webb at SHAEF. The suggestion that Newton reverse his itinerary, coming here directly, to arrive before organization entirely frozen is joined in by Dinsmoor. . . .

[Ltr, Chief, CAD to C/ACOS, SHAEF, 2 May 44, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43), sec. 3]

This will introduce to you Colonel Henry C. Newton, Inf., of CAD who has been authorized to visit the European Theater of Operations to gather information and aid in the formulation of a program for the preservation of fine arts and historic monuments in occupied territories.

. . . The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas has strongly recommended him as an outstanding officer to head the Arts and Monuments Section of Civil Affairs in your theater. Furthermore, it is my opinion that Colonel Newton is eminently qualified to perform the highly specialized functions which will be the responsibility of the officer occupying this position on your staff.

#### SHAEF PRESCRIBES A STANDARD PROCEDURE

[Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined Civil Affairs Operations in Northwest France (pars. 51-52 and 116-17), rev 1 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 327]

\* \* \* *Public Monuments and Fine Arts.* CA Detachments will render assistance in the protection of public monuments and art or literary treasures, for example, by organizing local

<sup>2</sup> As stated in Chapter XIV, Note 36, Colonel Newton had been directed to visit both the Mediterranean and European Theaters to gather information that would aid in formulating a program. Because of his civilian ability as an architect and his army experience, Civil Affairs Division considered him a suitable officer to head the Arts and Monuments Section in the European theater. The recommendation met with opposition at SHAEF, particularly by the British. Though Hilldring, Chief of Civil Affairs Division, was informed in November 1944 that Newton would be designated Deputy Chief, MFA&A, by Eisenhower, the records do not show that such action was ever taken. On 1 April 1945, a message from SHAEF, G-5, to Hilldring stated that Newton was returning to the United States. CAD files, 000.4 (5-25-43) (1), sec. 6.

police to provide guards. They will also collect data which may later assist recovery of looted objects of this character. Qualified officers will be included on the staff of the Supreme Commander and will give technical advice when required. CA Staffs will also be responsible for advising commanders as to areas which should be placed out of bounds to troops, in order to avoid damage to historical monuments and art treasures.

*Government Records and Archives.* Every effort will be made to preserve local archives. CA detachments will be responsible for arranging for the posting of guards where necessary: Government and other records will not be removed without the authority of the Military Commander.

#### IN MAY, MFA&A WITHOUT A HOME IN SHAEF

[Memo, Webb, Adviser, MFA&A, to ACofS, G-5, 19 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 1]

2. In the organization of G-5 Division which became effective on 1 May 1944 no place was assigned to MFA&A Sub-Section.

3. The alternatives appear to be that MFA&A should be a policy branch comparable with Legal, Fiscal, Supply, Public Health and Economics or a Section under Operations Branch.

4. There have been examples in the past few weeks of the Country Sections making their arrangements in matters affecting MFA&A both in matters of personnel and policy without consultation with the Adviser.

5. Changes have been introduced into the French Country Handbook and a directive issued relating to France which only came to the knowledge of the Adviser accidentally.

6. The present anomalous position in which MFA&A are omitted from the organization chart promulgated on 1 May has led to delays in the work, of which an example is that a recommendation for special equipment . . . was returned with the comment "Status of MFA&A Section is ambiguous. Is it part of G-5 or SHAEF SS? No provision in organization chart G-5, 1 May 1944."

Of the alternatives mentioned in 3 above, the latter, that MFA&A should be a section under Operations Branch, offers no guarantee that the state of things indicated in 4 and 5 above will not continue or that the Adviser will be in a position to coordinate the work of MFA&A officers. The adoption of the first alternative, i.e., that MFA&A should be a policy branch, would presumably solve these difficulties.

#### MFA&A GIVEN A HOME, WITH APOLOGIES<sup>3</sup>

[Memo, Brig E. A. L. Gueterbock, G-5, SHAEF, to Adviser, MFA&A, 29 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 1]

1. It has been decided that the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section will be in the Operations Branch under the Deputy Chief, Ops. The necessary amendment to War Establishment will be made in due course.

2. As regards appointments in country units and CA groups, etc., the policy is that the chief of the technical branch, sections, etc., at SHAEF Hq is to advise on the selection of technical personnel. This applies to MFA&A officers also. It is wrong that the country units should have made their own selections without consulting you, and I should be grateful for your advice on any MFA&A appointments.

3. *Directive and Instructions in French Manual.* The Editing Committee on the directives found it necessary to cut down all directives as far as possible, and to transfer "instructional" matter to the C.A. Instructions themselves. The production of the instructions are the responsibility of French Unit in conjunction with the functional representatives. It is regretted that proper co-ordination did not take place with you.

#### SUPREME COMMANDER DIRECTS THAT SYMBOLS OF CULTURE BE RESPECTED<sup>4</sup>

[Directive, Eisenhower to All Comdrs, 26 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 1]

1. Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve.

2. It is the responsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible.

<sup>3</sup> When Operations Branch was abolished on the re-organization of G-5 Division, 1 March 1945, the functions of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section were allocated to the newly activated Internal Affairs Branch.

<sup>4</sup> In a study dated 1 April 1944, Government Affairs Branch, CA SS, SHAEF, recommended the preparation of a letter of instruction from the Supreme Commander to all commanders and a general order, both modeled on those issued for MTO on 29 December 1943. Issuance of the General Order was disapproved on the ground that detailed instructions on preservation of monuments, fine arts, and archives were included in directives to Army Group Commanders under preparation for the guidance of civil affairs officers in each liberated country. It was felt that SCAEF's directive was sufficient to impress on all commanders his concern for cultural objects.

3. In some circumstances the success of the military operation may be prejudiced in our reluctance to destroy these revered objects. Then, as at Cassino, where the enemy relied on our emotional attachments to shield his defense, the lives of our men are paramount. So, when military necessity dictates, commanders may order the required action even though it involves destruction of some honored site.

4. But there are many circumstances in which damage and destruction are not necessary and cannot be justified. In such cases, through the exercise of restraint and discipline, commanders will preserve centers and objects of historical and cultural significance. Civil Affairs Staffs at higher echelons will advise commanders of the locations of historical monuments of this type, both in advance of the front lines and in occupied areas. This information, together with the necessary instructions, will be passed down through command channels to all echelons.

[Ltr, Asst ExecO, G-5, ETOUSA, to ACOFS, G-5, SHAEF, 12 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 751]

1. Pursuant to letter of Supreme Commander, 26 May 44, Subject: "Preservation of Historical Monuments," . . . it is necessary that Field Commanders know what objects lie before them in their respective zones of action. With this knowledge certain structures might, consistent with military necessity, be saved from damage or destruction.

a. For this purpose MFA&A Official List of Protective Monuments, France—Parts I, II, III and Army Service Forces Manual, M352-17A, Supplement Civil Affairs Handbook, France—a French Atlas of the important cities and regions with the important MFA&A objects listed and spotted therein—have been prepared and partial distribution has been made.

b. In order that proper and timely information may be in the hands of Field Commanders it is believed that these Atlases should be distributed through FUSAG to Staffs down to Divisions.

2. One hundred thirty-five (135) copies of the French Atlases (Manual M352-17A) have been distributed to the Air Forces so that each Briefing Room possesses a copy.

3. CA Detachments have their instructions covering preservation of MFA&A and MFA&A Spec. O's have been assigned to TUSA & FUSA to aid CA Dets. in their work. ETOUSA and FEComZ [Forward Echelon Communications Zone] will also have MFA&A Spec. O's [Special Officers] for ComZ. They will aid and advise CA Dets, keeping in close touch with G-2 and G-3

for record of damage already done, works to be guarded, etc., but it is highly important that everything should be done during planning and in the initial combat phases to provide a program that will prevent damage, as far as military necessity will permit and not provide one of picking up the pieces.

4. Recommendation: That French Atlases, ASFM [Army Service Forces Manual], M352-17A, be distributed to all units in FUSA & TUSA down to Divisions with copies for the General Staff Sections and to CA Sections.

#### HOW TO USE MFA&A OFFICERS

[Directive, 21st AGP to Armies, FEComZ and LOC, 30 May 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21 Jkt 1]

1. Three Monuments and Fine Arts officers will be allotted to each of the British and U.S. Zones. They will form part of the normal specialist increment of a CA Group.

2. SCAO's will utilize these officers to the best advantage in the areas for which they are responsible and should, in the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, be advised by the officers themselves as to their location and movement.

3. Wherever located, Monuments and Fine Arts officers will be attached as an increment to the most conveniently situated CA Detachment and will be under command of the CO of that detachment.

4. Within the limits of availability and consistent with other requirements, these officers will be afforded full facilities for movement and communication with each other.

5. Reports rendered by these officers will be forwarded, without alteration, through CA channels to Headquarters, 21 Army Group. Any comments by SCAO's will be made in a covering letter. \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE WANTS MORE ACTION

[Ltr, Newton to McSherry, Chief, Opns Branch, G-5, SHAEF, 8 Jun 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 1]

8. If the entire program of MFA&A should be at all ineffective, I feel, at the moment, that any such condition can be attributed to the following:

a. Delay in getting essential information to our MFA&A officers in the field. For example, the SOP has not as yet been forwarded to SHAEF even in draft form.

b. Lack of proper coordination of the work with the G-2 and G-3 Sections of the tactical command.

c. Insufficient trained personnel combining the essential professional and military background.

9. I have done everything I possibly could to implement the program while in the Theater; however, I feel that all these matters are of extreme importance and any clarification thereof will place our officers on a more secure footing and provide for a more effective accomplishment of the mission.

#### CIVIL AFFAIRS INSTRUCTIONS REVISED

[CA Instrs 15 to FUSAG, 21 AGP, ComZ, and All Country Secs, Jun 44,<sup>5</sup> SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 1]

##### 1. General Policy

A. Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments will operate in conformity with Standard Policy and Procedure, Paras 51 and 116—Public Monuments and Fine Arts and Paras 52 and 117—Government Records and Archives [see above], and in conformity with the order of SCAEF on the Preservation of Historical Monuments . . . 26 May 1944 . . .

B. It is the declared Policy of the Allied Governments to prevent by all practical means, including first aid repairs wherever practicable, further deterioration of already damaged buildings and to safeguard any movable works of art from misappropriation or decay.

D. It is the duty also of Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments to protect the Allied Authorities from false claims for compensation based on exaggerated values, or even on the alleged loss of works of art which may never have existed.

##### 2. Information

The Official Lists of Protected Monuments for Northwestern Europe have been published by G-5, SHAEF, and copies are available. Supplementary lists of other important monuments are being printed and will be available to CA officers commanding detachments. Sets of "Cultural Maps" of N.W. Europe are being issued by the Army Service Forces Manual (Section 17A Supplement). C.A. Handbooks for Countries of N.W. Europe, the one for France being already published (M352-17A Supplement). . . . The S.O.P. for MFA&A specialist officers is in mimeographed form. Advice on technical questions is obtainable from Monuments, Fine Arts, and

Archives Section of G-5, SHAEF. Lists of museum personnel, archivists and librarians are being prepared for MFA&A Specialist Officers as well as material on the administrative set-up in the various countries of N.W. Europe.

##### 4. Instructions for Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments

A. 1. It is the responsibility of the DCCAO at Army Group Hq to inform the GOCinC as areas containing historic monuments and works of art come within the sphere of Allied operations and to pass this information to commanders of subordinate formations and officers commanding CA Detachments as security permits. [The remainder of subparagraph A deals with administrative duties of the DCCAO.]

B. It is the responsibility of SCAO at Army Hq and Hq Z/L of C so to dispose of the Specialist MFA&A officer or officers that they are readily available for advice and are conveniently placed in relation to the areas in question to carry out the duties outlined in C (below).

C. The MFA&A Specialist Officers in the field will:

1. Visit as many places as possible within the area covered by the group of detachments in order to inspect and report on the condition of monuments, repositories, and works of art;

2. See that all monuments on the Official List of Protected Monuments have been exempted from military use unless specific permission has been given by the appropriate authority;

3. Consider whether any monuments or portions of monuments on the Official List of Protected Monuments may suitably be used for billeting or other purposes, and if so, advise the CAO to forward a request to higher authority;

4. Consider whether other historic monuments, e.g., those on the Supplementary List, should be placed out-of-bounds and if so discuss with the CMP and CAPO;

5. See that notices are posted when required;

6. Advise Officers commanding CA Detachments which buildings are in need of urgent repairs;

7. Arrange if necessary for the salvaging whenever possible of fragments of important monuments and works of art;

8. See that proper steps both physical and legal are taken for the care of movable works of art;

9. All questions of temporary repairs will be referred to the CFA through the O.'s Cmdg. [Commanding] Detachments and will be done in collaboration with the indigenous authorities, being paid for in accordance with CA Instruction No. 116.

<sup>5</sup> Based on discussions with authorities and officers who had served as MFA&A specialists in the Mediterranean Theater and on experience gained in the preparation of Country Handbooks, Civil Affairs Instructions No. 15, issued by the Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF on 17 February 1944, was revised and enlarged.

10. Send monthly report through channels to Adviser, MFA&A, SHAEF.

#### POLICY ON ARCHIVES DEFINED

[Ltr, SCAEF to AGp Comdrs, 20 Aug 44, SHAEF files, AG, 000.4-1, 1944<sup>a</sup>]

1. Accumulations of documents connected with business of all kinds, public and private, secular and ecclesiastical, are to be found in all towns. Some of these Archives date from early times, others from the present day; but whatever may be their intrinsic worth, all have great value for every kind of research and organization, and may be of considerable importance to the Intelligence Service and to agencies concerned with the reconstitution of civil life.

2. The importance of these Archives lies in the fact that not only do they contain valuable

<sup>a</sup>This letter marked the first concrete definition of policy on archives.

information, but also they are a continuous series of related documents. They may be almost as effectively ruined by displacement of a few documents as by the destruction or disposal of the whole. Moreover, their value as evidence depends largely on their continuous preservation in authorized custody.

3. In order to insure that Archives are not destroyed or damaged, all buildings in which they are housed will, where practicable, be put out of bounds to all troops. Should it be essential to occupy parts of such buildings, the necessary steps will be taken, in consultation with the responsible custodians to insure that there is no access to the Archives except for officers duly authorized by Army Group Commanders.

4. Important archives are for the most part kept in official buildings but, in order to insure that none are overlooked, the local authorities in all large towns will be consulted as to their whereabouts.

## 2. LESS DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED IN NORTHERN FRANCE

#### CULTURAL PROGRAM AT CHERBOURG

[Detachment A1A1, ECAR, 1 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5 751]

A preliminary survey of the historical monuments, cultural institutions and art collections in Cherbourg . . . has been completed.

\* \* \* All monuments listed are adequately protected by the civilian agency or the military authority (French Navy) exercising supervision over the monuments or institutions except in the case of the *Cité Chautereyne* . . . which is under civilian ownership. . . . Repairs of historical structures and other buildings . . . will proceed under the direction of the French authorities.

#### MFA&A ADVISER FINDS SITUATION FORTUNATE IN MANY RESPECTS

[Rpt, Adviser, MFA&A, to Chief, G-5, Opns Branch, 19-20 Aug 44 SHAEF files. G-5, 130.21. MFA&A Rpts, Jkt 1]

##### 1. *British Army*

The Adviser, MFA&A, G-5 Operations Branch, SHAEF, left for N. W. France on Saturday, 19 August. . . . two days were spent with Captain LaFarge [AC, AUS, Monuments officer] visiting Caen, Falaise, and other sites in the area of 2d British Army. Captain LaFarge has clearly done a very fine job of work in the 2d

British Army area and not the least is the admirable relations he has established with these gentlemen. . . . The situation as regards monuments in this area is more satisfactory than one could have dared to hope and far fewer buildings of outstanding quality have been damaged or destroyed than the scale of military operations would have led men to expect. The chief difficulty in the way of first aid repairs appears to be labour. . . . In view, however, of the relatively small amount of French labour taken up by the Armies, this is a purely French concern. . . . Another difficulty which has arisen has been that of destruction of already damaged buildings by the Engineers. The most outstanding example of this has been that of Norrey church, a building of considerable interest though not on the Official List of Protected Monuments. The case has achieved some degree of publicity. The intention of the Engineers to demolish the tower was, however, averted and though some damage was done to the east end of the Church the situation has now been rectified as far as possible. \* \* \*

##### 2. *U.S. Armies*

. . . the Adviser visited the area of the U.S. Armies and was able to contact three out of the five monuments officers and visit Hq, 12th U.S. Army, Hq, 1st U.S. Army and Hq, Z/LOC. . . .

In general, the same observations as to the possibility of first aid repairs and the danger of destruction of damaged buildings by over zealous Engineers apply in the heavily damaged towns of the 1st U.S. Army area as in those in the British area but where the advance has been fast and the damage to houses consequently less, it will be possible for the French to start first aid repairs much earlier. . . . In the matter of transport one officer . . . stated that since the acquisition of so much enemy transport, he found little or no difficulty in getting all the transport facilities he needed. . . .

### 3. General

The damage even in the area where fighting was protracted and concentrated is less than might have been anticipated; up to date no monument of the first order of importance has been reported as severely damaged. . . . The Cathedral of St. Lô is the most outstanding exception. . . .

. . . Mr. Jaujard, Director of the Musées Nationaux at the Louvre . . . was able to assure the Adviser that the contents of the National and Provincial Museums under his care were according to his latest information intact. The depots where the works of art had been placed for safe keeping were mainly in the area south of the Loire and therefore at the time of the meeting still cut off from Paris and from the Allied Military authorities but those in the area immediately to the north of that river which included the very important depot of Souches northwest of Le Mans are believed to be intact. In the case of Souches . . . this is known to be so. Souches contains among other things the Marie de Medici, Rubens series, the Radeau de la Méduse and other exceptionally large pictures. . . . The Adviser found that the monuments officers had already made contact with the officials in charge of the various depots and had initiated measures to help them with their most urgent problems. . . .

[Deputy Adviser, MFA&A, Rpt, 31 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* *St. Mâlo.* The amount of damage to the cultural monuments and institutions in the older portion of the town is very great. The old town, as a small XVII Century city, is almost gone. \* \* \*

The remnants of buildings of historic interest have been all posted so that they will not be torn down indiscriminately. Anything in the way of

cultural material (i.e., archives, libraries, etc.) in the old part of the town is gone. However, the French have undertaken repairs already. . . .

*Brest.* At first sight the destruction seems almost total. . . . In short, the destruction in Brest was such that with the exception of the old fortified château and portions of façades, anything of cultural value left in the city was doubtless destroyed. \* \* \*

*Conclusions:* At St. Mâlo and Brest, the destruction is great and often very tragic. Outside of such places, however, Brittany remains pretty much unchanged and unharmed by the war. Only one of the famous *Calvaire* (that at Plougastel-Daoulas) was injured and there are a few losses among the churches. Even the quaint *pardons* continue as usual. In many areas the local custodians are showing considerable initiative in caring for the historic monuments in their charge.

### UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL OF ART FROM VERSAILLES AVERTED

[Ltr, Monuments Officer, ComZ to ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, 16 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

1. The Royal Palace and Gardens at Versailles are on the Official List of Protected Monuments issued by Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Your monuments officer was told by Major Ward of this Hq at 0730 today that he was told that paintings and furnishings were being taken from Versailles and used for the decoration of General Eisenhower's private office.
3. Before going to Versailles to investigate this matter as well as the continued use of the garden area for British signal equipment, recent bivouacking by First Army and proposed use of the grounds for SHAEF units, Lt. Col. [P. Earnest] Gabler informed me . . . that there had been some thought of purchasing furnishings for the above-mentioned office and that it could be done only upon written request of General Eisenhower himself. \* \* \*
5. . . . Directeur of the French National Museums had approved request for furnishings from Versailles as he was told that it had come from General Eisenhower or his immediate representative. . . .
6. Captain [John B.] Coates, [Jr.], CO Civil Affairs Det. at Versailles, had not heard of the request.
7. On 14 September . . . [town Major for Hq, ComZ] delivered a handwritten note for the following items to the Chief Curator at Versailles:

11 paintings, 7 engravings, 1 terra-cotta statue—all objects in the official catalogue of the Versailles museum. The Curator and I visited the Hq. office in question and there saw these objects and also a magnificent 18th century desk which came from Versailles and was not on the temporary receipt. The fine Persian carpet and furnishings from the Mobilier National in Paris had been secured by request for the Hq.

8. . . . [the town Major] had seen the Prefect of Seine-et-Oise and had worked with a French SHAEF Liaison Officer who was not informed of the official listing and protection of Versailles in American Army directives. The chief curator at Versailles had wanted to be helpful when requested by American officers and the Prefect to give objects for the office of our Commanding General. . . . [the town Major] took me to Colonel Brown who is from SHAEF and is preparing the General's Hq. . . . Finally he suggested returning the things to the Palace. The undersigned stated that he was there to investigate the situation and that if his advice were asked he would advise that in view of the official list, the propriety of taking such objects at this time, the importance of the objects, the fact that criticism might cause General Eisenhower unnecessary embarrassment, etc., that the objects be returned. Colonel Brown directed me to make the necessary excuses to the Curator who had been anxious to co-operate and see that . . . the objects were returned tomorrow morning.

9. When the herein-mentioned situation was discussed with you and General Rogers, the latter commanded that I write a report for your earliest attention and stated that I was to assume no responsibility for the returning of the objects though I could be present and offer advice. He wanted the objects returned.

[Ltr, Asst ExecO, Hq ComZ, to ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* a. Capt. Hammett presented to Col. Webb the general picture of Versailles, use of the grounds and some of the buildings, and the fact that the Directeur had not been formally called upon and permission asked, as reported by Seine Base Section. He told of the attempted use of Versailles Museum pieces for furnishing one of the offices and now of the painting of the doors and trim of the Louis XIV military quarters. In view of the fact that SHAEF is the principal military group involved, it was agreed that the Monuments Officers of SHAEF should handle the problem. \* \* \*

## GAPS FOUND IN MANY COLLECTIONS

[Capt Marvin C. Ross, Deputy Adviser, MFA&A Report to Chief, G-5, Opns Branch, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF files, 130.21, MFA&A Rpt, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* a. Museums: The Musées Nationaux are said to be intact. The Musée de l'Armée lost about 2000 objects to the Germans. A copy of the German report is being made for the MFA&A Section of SHAEF. Certain Provincial Museums that did not evacuate their collections suffered losses due to operations.

b. Archives: Certain archives such as those of Lorraine are stated to have been removed by the Germans. Other archives as in Normandy (for example, St. Lô) have suffered due to operations and because they had not been removed to places of safety.

c. Libraries: Books do not appear in general to have been taken from National libraries. The report that certain Carolingian Manuscripts had been removed from the Bibliothèque National was neither denied nor affirmed. The removal of the former Librarian would have made any definite statement difficult at this early period.

d. Private Collections: Personal visits were made to two private collections, Mon. Marquet de Vesselot and Mon. Poulhae, who appear not to have suffered any losses. It was reported, however, that many other private collections in Paris had been looted for removal to Germany, particularly Jewish collections. \* \* \*

The French were highly concerned about the Château at Valençay (Indre) where the Venus de Milo, the Nike of Samothrace, and other famous sculptures from the Louvre were stored. Brigadier Lee dispatched a message to G-5, SHAEF, Forward, to request that it be given protection in any possible operations. . . .

The French officials expressed appreciation of what the MFA&A officers with the Armies and the Communications Zone had been able to accomplish for them.

## FRENCH RAPIDLY TAKING OVER

[Ltr Asst ExecO, Hq ComZ to ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

2. *General Situation.* The Communications Zone has been operating with very few Monuments Specialist Officers. Transportation has been difficult due to the rapid movement of our armies,

<sup>1</sup> Confirming conference between Chief, MFA&A, SHAEF and Chief, MFA&A Sec, Seine Base, 30 September 1944.

and the necessity for vehicles and gasoline for more pressing needs. Notwithstanding, the work is progressing and is being gradually finished up.

a. New directives place the responsibility in the hands of French authorities to check and report to this Headquarters for forwarding to SHAEF. . . .

b. Monuments, particularly châteaux, are being placed "Off Limits" to military personnel by Section Commanders where situation demands. (Usually checked by Monuments Specialist Officers.) \* \* \*

3. *Policy and Operation.* Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives.

a. SHAEF directs policy for entire Allied Military Zone (to Communications Zone through G-5 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone).

b. French Mission contacts Ministries and Agencies on the National level and transmits policies via G-5 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone.

c. G-5 Section, Headquarters Communications Zone, supervises the operations in its Base Sections. \* \* \*

#### HITLER VIOLATES HIS OWN ART COMMISSIONER'S AGREEMENT

[MFA&A Officer, 2d Br Army, Rpt, 15 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

\* \* \* The most outstanding point in information received suggests again the apparent integrity of Count Metternich, German Commission for the Protection of Art in France and Belgium. This official drew up an agreement early in 1942 between the German Military Authorities, the French Ministry of Education and the Belgian owners of those works of art sheltered in France to the effect that access to the latter was prohibited excepting with the written consent of the three parties of the agreement. The fact that this was broken by [Adolph] Hitler, through his emissary on 3 August 1942 when he removed the Van Eycks from Pau with [Pierre] Laval's complicity, led Metternich to protest vigorously to his government, causing his eventual dismissal. \* \* \*

#### MFA&A OFFICERS AMBASSADORS OF GOOD WILL

[Notes, Adviser, MFA&A, for ExecO, G-5, SHAEF, 29 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 751, Jkt 4]

##### 1. *Work in Forward Areas*

The work of MFA&A officers in France has been and still is of a kind difficult to express

statistically though MFA&A officer with British and U.S. Communications formations are said to have visited 901 towns and 1827 sites since the beginning of operations. In areas of active operations, e.g., in Normandy during June, July and August and now in Alsace-Lorraine, the monuments officers with the advanced formations are in a position to help the French authorities, especially the officials of the Service des Monuments Historiques and the Archivistes Départementales [*sic*] to resume their functions, to smooth the way for these officials with the military authorities in circumstances where the scale of purely military activity might otherwise have made it impossible for their services to function at all. The numerous inspections of monuments carried out by the MFA&A officers which included nearly all the Monuments scheduled by the French authorities as of importance enabled them to call the attention of the appropriate authorities to urgent tasks which, without the MFA&A officers' visits, would not have come to their notice owing to dislocated communications, etc. Unlike the MFA&A Service in Italy, very little direct action as to first-aid repairs has been taken and the policy has been always to help the French help themselves. On occasion, however, the MFA&A officers have been able to obtain for the French badly needed supplies of roofing material from captured enemy stocks for urgent first-aid repairs.

##### 2. *Mitigation of Effects of Air Attack*

It is difficult to estimate how far the comparative immunity of the greater cathedrals of France from damage by bombing has been due to the efforts of the Allied Air Forces based on the information supplied them by SHAEF at their request, but certainly such information was sought by the Air Staff and supplied, and except for the Cathedral of St. Lô and to a lesser degree Rouen, the greater Gothic monuments of northern France have escaped comparatively lightly. The same may be said of the Depots of the National Museums, the positions of which the Air Staff was warned in May 1944.

##### 3. *Billeting*

This is a constant preoccupation of MFA&A officers both in forward areas and in lines of communications and these latter include the Paris area and a large part of the most celebrated parts of France. The problem shows no sign of becoming less insistent and has assumed new proportions with the onset of winter. The work of MFA&A officers in this respect has not been

confined to the buildings listed by SHAEF as immune from military use but has included visits to innumerable other buildings of historic importance where troops have been in occupation and where a satisfactory adjustment of difficulties has been reached through the good offices of MFA&A. Requests for the evacuation or regulation of military use of particular buildings put forward by the French are constantly being dealt with at all levels of the MFA&A organization. On occasion it has been possible for MFA&A to take action in cases where the French, out of politeness or a desire not to seem grudging to the U.S./Br forces, had allowed the use of National Monuments against their own better judgment;

the occupation of the Château de Rambouillet is an outstanding example.

#### 4. General

The most important aspect of the MFA&A work in France is the most intangible, the exhibition of good will on the part of the Military authorities toward an aspect of French national life and sentiment of which the French themselves are especially conscious. The French have been given a feeling that their National possessions and sentiments are not a matter of indifference to us and that we are prepared to do all that is in our power to help them to preserve their inheritance which has been endangered twice in five years.

### 3. A GOOD JOB IN SOUTHERN FRANCE TOO

#### WAR DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE, MFA&A, MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS

[Ltr, WD Representative to ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, 11 Jul 44,<sup>9</sup> CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43), sec. 3]

4. . . . relative to Force 163 [Seventh Army] being developed under Col. H. S. Gerry, with special reference to the MFA&A Section. . . . I am not familiar with the extent of this proposed operation but have gained certain information . . . which leads me to somewhat of a conclusion. The southern part of France, including such areas as Avignon, Arles, Nîmes, Narbonne, Béziers, Montpellier, is crowded with historic structures, art centers, museums and churches. Due to the Italian influence during the X to XVII centuries, this area assumes nearly as great an importance as portions of Northern Italy.

5. Realizing this condition, I made certain suggestions to Lt. Col. Mitchell relative to the T/O for the MFA&A Section, which suggestion I wish to re-emphasize herein.

6. A minimum of six (6) officers will be necessary to undertake the work. These might be divided as follows: 3 Museum Specialists, 1 Art Historian, 1 Rehabilitation Specialist, 1 Architect.

7. This subdivision would give you a balanced team and provide expert advice for any problem encountered. If possible they should speak French and be familiar with the portion of France

over which they will operate. This is nearly an essential requirement.

9. In addition to the six (6) officers required there should be one and one half enlisted men for each officer—or a total of nine (9) in this case. The volume of clerical work in connection with MFA&A matters is tremendous and efficient operation will depend somewhat upon the clerical personnel. Vehicles should be supplied on the basis of one (1) to each two (2) officers—the drivers being from the EM noted above.

10. Definite plans should be made for the taking of photographs since the pictorial record will be of great importance—this is one of our very trying problems here. \* \* \*

#### FINE ARTS EXPERTS WILL NOT BE ASSIGNED TO TACTICAL UNITS<sup>9</sup>

[Ltr, CO, 2678th CA Regt (Adv) to ACofS, G-5, 9 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt VI, J-35]

1. Special attention had been given to measures required for safeguarding monuments and other artistic treasures from damage or destruction in course of operations, or as a result of careless, uninformed action on the part of Allied troops.

2. The CG, Seventh Army, has already published a letter to commanders similar to that issued by the CinC NATO on 29 December 1943. In addition, a further instruction is in course of publication, directing commanders to secure from Civil Affairs Headquarters sufficient copies of

<sup>9</sup> This letter was written a few days after the writer arrived in Rome and set forth a plan based on his observations in Northwest Europe and Italy. As indicated below, a different plan was adopted.

<sup>9</sup> No Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section, as such, was set up in southern France. The safeguarding of artistic treasures was a responsibility of the Law, Public Safety, and Fine Arts Branch of Civil Affairs Headquarters.

lists of Arts and Monuments in the area of operations to insure distribution down to battalion level [lists were issued 14 August 1944]. . . .

3. Administrative Instruction No. 1, Hq. Seventh Army,<sup>10</sup> published about 14 July 1944, contains specific instructions regarding buildings having historical, religious, or cultural value which may not be occupied by troops.

4. A competent Fine Arts and Monuments officer is stationed at Civil Affairs Hq. After thorough consideration it has been decided not to send Fine Arts experts into the field with tactical units, as it has been found by experience that such experts do not obtain as full consideration from their commanders as do the regular CAO's attached to staffs of unit commanders. CAO's with tactical units have been thoroughly briefed on their duties with respect to the care and protection of Arts and Monuments.

#### FRENCH REQUEST CIVIL AFFAIRS AID IN SAFEGUARDING ART TREASURES

[Ltr, Cochet, Mil Delegate for Southern Theater of Opns, to CG, Seventh Army, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, Hist, 60, Jkt VI J-36]

The Allied Military Command . . . is in a better position than any other authority to determine the situation in liberated France with regard to art treasures and the destruction thereof already brought about.

I am directing all responsible Prefects to send me all the information they are able to gather on this subject.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the proper services of your headquarters would be able to furnish us useful additional information. I should be very grateful, therefore, if you would kindly send me a copy of any information you may be able to obtain on this matter.

Your co-operation in the work of safeguarding our national artistic heritage will allow me to take the urgent measures which I consider essential, and I should be most grateful if you would kindly issue the necessary instructions.

#### DESTRUCTION IN MILITARY ZONE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM

[Ltr, G-5 Sec, ComZ to ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.04, Fr, MFA&A]

\* \* \* Because of the rapid advance of our armies, destruction has been reduced to a minimum and large sections of the military zone are free from blemish.

<sup>10</sup> Seventh Army Staff Sec Rpts, L-1140, Envelope 5.

Additional Monuments Officers have been called to the Communications Zone and placed at Section Headquarters. . . .

All French officials, whatever their political creed, are co-operating to the fullest extent.

As all monuments, fine arts and archives in France are now their responsibility, an arrangement is being worked out whereby French officials will report all damage to this Headquarters immediately for notation and forwarding to SHAEF.

[Memo, CO, CAHQ, Sixth AGp for PRO, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 523, Opns Rpts]

\* \* \* Most of the monuments and fine arts collections in Southern France seem to have escaped serious damage despite many instances of deliberate attempts by the Germans to destroy priceless works of art dating back to Roman and medieval days. \* \* \*

#### NO SERIOUS DAMAGE IN ARLES-AVIGNON AREA

[Summary 5, CAHQ, Sixth AGp, 23 Sep 44, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 5]

A recent tour of inspection by the Fine Arts and Archives Officer of this Headquarters in the Arles and Avignon area revealed that there has been but slight damage to the various monuments and cultural institutions there. While the local authorities were most cordial and helpful, there appeared to be a hesitancy on their part to reveal the depots where the more valuable collections are stored. This is apparently due to German propaganda to the effect that the Americans and British would loot officially the richer treasures of the country. A discussion with a representative of General Cochet resulted in the French agreeing to share their information as to the location of these depots.

In Arles, some damage was caused to the Church of St. Julien as well as to the Amphitheatre. The chapel of Notre Dame de la Major suffered severe damage. A great number of paintings and valuable collections here had been removed for safe storage.

At Montmajour, the Germans had used the Abbey as a depot for approximately 80,000 weapons. On their retreat they attempted to destroy these arms by fire, causing smoke damage to the interior of the Church.

The city of Tarascon was badly damaged by bombs directed at the bridges. While the Church of St. Marthe suffered some serious injury, the French are already at work collecting the fragments and making emergency repairs and now feel that the Church can be restored because of

the excellent documentation of the monument. The Castle of Roi-René, while very near the bridge, miraculously escaped damage, although it is necessary to remove about half a ton of explosives that the Germans stored there.

At Avignon, there was extensive destruction outside the city walls but only minor damage within. It appears that the Germans deliberately damaged Châteauneuf-du-Pape, Porte Notre-Dame at Pernes and the Roman bridge at Vaison-la-Romaine. There has been some slight damage to a few other monuments, but as a whole this city's historic collections survived destruction.<sup>11</sup> \* \* \*

#### MORE DAMAGE IN TOWNS ALONG THE RHONE THAN ON THE COAST

[Spec Fld Rpt, 21 Oct 44, CAD files, 000.4 (3-25-43) (1), sec. 5]

\* \* \* more damage has been found in the towns on the banks of the Rhône than in the Departments less strategically placed from a military viewpoint. But here, as elsewhere, the Services des Beaux-Arts have continued to function and repairs are in progress, with all necessary measures being taken to conserve those buildings which have been damaged.

No reports have come to the attention of the Fine Arts and Archives officer of any further losses from museums, libraries or archives. The various Prefectures visited have all been grateful for the evidence of Allied interest in the preservation of French monuments and all have offered complete cooperation in fulfilling the requests for information. \* \* \*

A hasty survey of the Departments of Var and Alpes-Maritimes revealed that, in spite of

<sup>11</sup> A special report, dated 18 September 1944, covering in detail damages to historic objects and art collections is contained in the above-cited file.

#### 4. ART OFFICERS TO THE RESCUE IN BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, AND NORWAY

##### BELGIAN ART APPROPRIATED BY NAZI CHIEFS

[MFA&A Officer, 2d Br Army, Report for Period Ending 16 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

The outstanding information is that of an apparent rivalry between Hitler and [Reichsmarschall Hermann] Goering over the theft of the famous Van Eyck painting in the Cathedral of Ghent known as "Agneau Mystique." This work, together with other of the most valuable art treas-

ures of Belgium had been sent to the Museum at Pau in the south of France for eventual removal to the Vatican for safekeeping. In 1941 Goering sent a personal delegate to bring it back to Berlin; evidently the "Fuhrer" took umbrage, for on 3 Aug 42 his own emissary arrived at the Pau Depository with the most intransigent orders, sanctioned by Laval, and removed the entire reredos to Germany. Almost simultaneously the two panels of the reredos at the Church of St.

extensive damages in the coastal area, the monuments there have largely escaped serious damage. Both Toulon and Frejus have suffered from shelling and bombing but a full report was not available on the condition of the monuments. In the places visited further inland, no appreciable damages were apparent or reported. \* \* \*

The museum collections and archives of the Department of Tarn remained in place and have suffered no losses or damage. Further, progress for the restoration and remodeling of a number of monuments in Tarn are in some cases already under way. . . . A CA officer at Toulouse also reports that various local officials have stated no damages were occasioned there as a result of the war. \* \* \*

##### ART TREASURES SUFFERED LITTLE FROM EITHER GERMAN OR ALLIED OCCUPATION

[History of Civil Affairs Operations, DRAGOON, SHAEF files, G-5, 60, Jkt V, pt. VIII]

\* \* \* Despite the precautions taken to avoid it, there were, possibly unavoidably, many incidents after the landings when Allied troops occupied historic chateaus and other monuments and, possibly, were less than careful in their treatment of them. The damage done was not great, however.

In general, surveys made by the Fine Arts and Monuments Officer throughout all Southern France showed that that area had suffered little from German occupation insofar as its art treasures were concerned. Some evidence was unearthed, though, that the Germans actually did go to the lengths of establishing a "clearing house" for cataloguing and routing through to the homeland the treasures they looted from France. Fortunately, though, the activities of this and similar units set up elsewhere seem to have been limited in scope. \* \* \*

Pierre at Louvain, painted by van der Weyden, were taken and are now in the same refuge in Germany. The final known theft is that of the Michaelangelo "Virgin and Child" statue from the Cathedral at Bruges, a deed performed just before evacuation of the city. \* \* \*

[MFA&A Officer, 1st Canadian Army, Report for Period Ending 30 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

5. c. In the summer of 1942 the Germans insisted by threats that the Vichy Government hand over to them the Van Eyck "Adoration of the Lamb" which was at Pau. This was agreed to without the Belgians being informed. On 3 Aug 42 Dr. Büchner (Hitler's personal emissary) removed the picture to Germany.

f. On the night of 7-8 Sep the Germans removed the Michelangelo statue of the Virgin and Child together with eleven pictures from the Church of Notre Dame in Bruges.

7. . . . The names of the officers and men believed to have been concerned in the removal of the works of art from Bruges have been notified to SCAO to be passed to the appropriate authorities so that if any of them are taken prisoner arrangements may be made for special interrogation. \* \* \*

#### FIRST ARMY FINDS CACHE OF DUTCH ART

[MFA&A Officers, FUSA, Rpt, 20 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

3. The collection housed in this repository [St. Pietersburg] consists largely of paintings, drawings, and prints of Netherlandish and Flemish masters, XV to XX centuries. There are, in addition, many works by Italian masters and a smaller number of English, French, German and Spanish origin. Paintings alone number about 800. A limited number of archives are placed here (boxed), also textiles, ceramics, scientific specimens, and a few musical instruments (all boxes or in cases). . . . The general quality of the holdings is very high and the aggregate value is beyond estimate.

4. a. The condition of the paintings, on preliminary examination, is found to be good. . . . There is no evidence and no report of any accidental war damage.

#### WILL BELGIAN CHURCH BELLS RING AGAIN?

[1st Canadian Army, Rpt, 14 Oct 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

5. (a) The Germans first threatened to remove the bells from the churches in 1941 but desisted

in the face of protests. They started again in 1943. . . .

(b) Between May 43 and June 44, 4800 bells were taken down from churches in Belgium. . . . The whole number of bells in Belgium is not known but it is probably more than 12,000. The bells were mostly assembled at Antwerp and taken to Germany by water. . . .

(c) About 800 of these bells are still in Belgium—the bulk having been found. . . . Mr. de Beer [head of the Commission for salvaging the Belgian bells] has a number of problems connected with the recovery of these bells; as they cover all Belgium I have recommended that he get in touch with the MFA&A officer at the Military Mission to Belgium. \* \* \*

[MFA&A Officer, 2d Br Army, Rpt, 28 Oct 55, SHAEF files, G-5, 130.21, Jkt 1]

D. Belgian Carillon Bells. . . . A directive has been received from 21 Army Group and 2d Army has issued instructions to Corps as follows:

(1) During the War Germans have requisitioned a large number of bells and carillons and their accessories and have removed them to Germany for conversion into munitions. At the moment of liberation further material of this nature was in various places in course of transit to Germany.

(2) The Belgian Government is very anxious that such material of this nature as has been captured in transit shall be preserved. Later the question of material captured in Germany but not yet converted will arise.

(3) It is therefore requested that orders may be issued requiring the return of all such material to the Belgian Government when captured and, naturally, forbidding any further such requisition by British forces. The authorities possess records by which they can identify all such material.

#### IN THE NETHERLANDS, BILLETING OF TROOPS THE WORST DANGER TO ART

[SHAEF Mission Netherlands, Final Hist Rpt, 14 Jul 45]

\* \* \* The most important function of this sub-section was to prevent the billeting of troops in buildings of historic value such as museums and old castles. . . . Few instances came to the attention of this sub-section . . . and such occurrences were all in the operational phase.

Many of the valuable works of art from the museums throughout the country were placed in the repository at St. Pietersberg, Limburg, and the specially constructed repository at Paaslo, Overijssel. \* \* \*

A complete inventory of both repositories has been kept by the Dutch authorities. . . .

#### THE GERMANS TOOK EVEN MORE ART FROM NORWAY THAN WAS EXPECTED

[CA, G-5 Div, Hist Rpt, Allied Land Forces in Norway, 1-31 May 45,<sup>22</sup> SHAEF files, G-5, 17.08, Norway, Jkt 2]

\* \* \* The removal of art objects seems to have been more extensive than earlier anticipated, and 51 paintings have been removed by the Germans from the Royal Palace at Oslo. How many of these have been deported to Germany is unknown but details about their present location are now being collected. There have been removed by the Germans from the National Gallery 29 paintings, 21 by the Reichskommissariat and eight by the Einsatzstab Wegener. Of these, only three have been recovered. These were found in the flat of the Reichskommissar [Joseph] Terboven on 15 May. Members of the Resistance Movement and the police are helping in collecting details about all the objects removed. \* \* \*

A circular has been sent out to all Norwegian museums and art galleries asking for details about removal by the Germans during the occupation.

#### OFFICIAL LISTS MAY DO AS MUCH HARM AS GOOD

[Gen Bd Study 36, p. 34]

43. . . . a. The Official Lists of Monuments for liberated and occupied countries became as much a source of trouble as convenience to MFA&A officers. The very fact that a command authority was embodied in these lists worked to a disadvantage. It was tacitly assumed by both tactical and administrative higher authorities that their responsibilities toward monuments, fine arts, and archives ended with the items included. The original purpose of the lists was to act as a guide, rather than to define irrevocably the monuments to be accorded extra consideration. Authorities were extremely reluctant to order evacuation of buildings *not* on the Official Lists even though these structures might be superior to others officially protected. \* \* \*

<sup>22</sup> Early plans provided that assistance in safeguarding monuments, fine arts, and archives would be a function of the Safety and Welfare Section of Civil Affairs but, upon arrival in Oslo, CA officers found that the Norwegian Home Front and Forces of the Interior were in full control throughout the country (Chapter XXIX, Section 3). Therefore, the activities of the Safety Section with regard to objects of cultural significance were confined primarily to inspections and reports.

44. . . . a. To counteract the situation, the MFA&A officers, First U.S. Army, drew up a command letter and form for the exemption of buildings from military use, which was approved and published by Hq, First U.S. Army, 4 February 1945 [see paragraph 51, below].

c. Though this innovation conferred a much needed discretionary authority upon the MFA&A officers within a single army area . . . it became invalid so soon as that area was transferred to a different command authority. In order to supplement the Official Lists for Belgium and the Netherlands, SHAEF issued on 20 February 1945 two additional lists of buildings for these countries. . . .

d. A command form letter similar to that of the First U.S. Army was issued by the Fifteenth U.S. Army 8 April 1945. On 15 April, in order to avoid the necessity of reposting monuments in an area which had been occupied by five other major commands, Hq, Fifteenth U.S. Army issued a letter, the only one of its kind issued during the European campaign by any major headquarters, which provided that . . . protective measures taken in regard to historic/artistic monuments by authorized personnel of other Allied armies would be respected and obeyed by all military personnel within the area of the Fifteenth U.S. Army unless specifically removed or rescinded by . . . that headquarters.

#### THE MONUMENTS, FINE ARTS AND ARCHIVES PROGRAM—AN APPRAISAL

[Gen Bd Study 36]

45. a. The planning by civilian agencies, though begun relatively late when compared to the remainder of planning for the European campaign, was successful and useful except for the lack of definition regarding the actual duties of the MFA&A officer. The limitation of the MFA&A officer to an advisory capacity without providing an adequate operational agency detached him from the usual means of working effectively within the military establishment and handicapped the MFA&A program.

b. Publications undertaken by civilian agencies were of considerable use to the MFA&A officer in the field though duplication . . . by both military and civilian agencies . . . impaired their utility.

46. a. The planning by military agencies was undertaken too late, and with too few personnel, to be effectively integrated with overall operational plans. . . .

b. Operational exigencies were, on the

whole, correctly envisaged but the provision of means for meeting these exigencies was not objective. . . .

c. A more courageous and cooperative approach should have been made to the Air Forces. It is possible that the Air Forces would have been able to prevent inestimable destruction if the MFA&A program had been properly presented to them.

47. a. The overall policy in regard to Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives was both feasible of application and worthy of the best traditions of the Allied Forces. \* \* \*

48. . . . b. The greatest deficiency in some of the personnel assigned or attached to the MFA&A organization was a lack of (1) sufficient military training, including staff procedure; (2) an aggressive approach to the MFA&A program within the military establishment.

c. Knowledge of the fine arts, as such, was proved on the whole to be not entirely necessary. . . . Those with architectural training and engineer experience were perhaps best equipped to operate in the field. . . .

d. The policy of procuring personnel through civilian agencies was successful insofar as it called attention to certain officers who had civilian qualifications though it failed to realize the essential combination of military and professional background.

e. Commissioning of enlisted personnel was a definite success. Enlisted men, by the time they achieved their commissions, were sufficiently trained in military procedures and had lost none of their civilian qualifications.

f. Deployment of personnel through the agency of the European Civil Affairs Division was a mistake.

49. a. MFA&A officers should have been provided with a means of carrying out the policy of the Supreme Commander which was consistent and authoritative for all echelons and areas. . . .

b. Insufficient rank among MFA&A officers was a continuous major difficulty.

50. . . . a. The supplies of protective and restorative materials necessary for the accomplishment of the MFA&A mission were completely inadequate.

b. Organizational equipment was completely inadequate.

51. . . . a. The Official Lists should have been prepared (1) by officers having a full first-hand knowledge of the monuments themselves; (2) with the consideration of preventing military occupation or damage by other military means and the repairing of such damage fully in mind.

b. MFA&A officers were not given sufficient discretionary latitude or authority to act outside the Official Lists. This deficiency should have been remedied.

52. . . . Means of communication for the dissemination of information and intelligence between MFA&A officers at all echelons were impeded by insufficiency of personnel, both staff and operational, and the extent of the area covered.

53. *General.* The MFA&A policy, organization, and operations effected during the European campaign should, with necessary revisions, be continued in future planning of operations. \* \* \*

## Civilian Supply Is a Major CA Problem to the End

While the problem of civilian supply has already been touched upon throughout the volume, the present chapter deals with the more general history of the subject, especially in the latter phase of occupation when acute shortages began to be felt.

Although the delivery of supplies during the first six months ran behind estimated requirements, the lag at first made no great difference because of the limited area, capture of enemy stocks, and the fact that so far as concerned France civil affairs needs had been overestimated. However, when Belgium and a part of the Netherlands were liberated in September and October, CA officials began to feel the pinch. The great need for civil supplies arose at precisely the same time that the combat forces began to experience a shortage in supply. In other words, the critical civil supply problem that developed during the winter of 1944-45 was really only a part of the larger problem arising from the unexpectedly rapid advances of the Allied Armies in August and September, the failure to open the port of Antwerp until 26 November (although the city of Antwerp had been entered on 5 September), and, finally, the Ardennes counteroffensive that came in the middle of December.

Just when Allied shipping and supply authorities were struggling to resolve the difficulties in the military supply program, French authorities were asking to be allowed to import raw materials and pro-

ductive facilities for rehabilitation efforts. SHAEF recognized France's need for such a program but all that could be done for the time being was to plan for a gradual transition from a military to an Allied civilian supply program. The French preferred to take responsibility for their own rehabilitation program, and in 1945 a limited amount of shipping was made available for this purpose, as also for the national program developed by Belgium. At the same time the military supply program continued.

With German surrender there immediately arose the question of how long the military supply program should continue. Some liberated countries, at least, were apprehensive about the consequences of termination. But it was never contemplated that the Army should concern itself with civilian supply indefinitely; indeed, early planning had resulted not only in Anglo-American agreement on a policy of terminating combined supply operations but also in arrangements for ensuing transfer of U.S. Army responsibility to U.S. civilian agencies. The CCAC in November 1944 had agreed that the date for terminating military responsibility for any particular country should be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander. It was also agreed that the CCAC would advise the Combined Liberated Areas Committee of any military

decision affecting the date of termination of military responsibility in time to permit the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to (a) make known any policy consideration that might govern the continuation of such supplies; (b) ascertain whether or not a stable government had been established which could assume the responsibility for civilian supplies; and (c) determine the extent to which supplies and shipping would be available to indigenous governments after termination of military responsibility. The President on 21 May 1945, shortly after German surrender, indicated his desire for early transfer of civilian supply responsibility to civilian agencies in a letter to the Secretary of War directing the Army to relinquish responsibility "as soon as the military situation permits." The actual process of disentanglement ran into some difficulties. France was eager to take over its own program and thought the military were mov-

ing too slowly in getting out. Belgium and Holland, on the other hand, were reluctant to see the Army relinquish its responsibilities and felt it was moving with undue haste. They evidently feared that the civilian agencies would be less successful in obtaining supplies than the military authorities. While the military programs were continued longer than at first contemplated, the War Department was unwilling to defer the close of its general program beyond August. Civilian relief then passed to the national governments involved and to the appropriate civilian agencies of the U.S. Government; still later UNRRA began to furnish supplies to those United Nations without sufficient foreign exchange resources. Thus President Roosevelt's initial plan to entrust civilian relief to the civilian agencies finally achieved, however belatedly, its fulfillment.

## I. DELIVERY FALLS BEHIND DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

### POOR MARKING RESULTED IN SPOILAGE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLIES

[The General Board USFET, Study 33: Procedures Followed by Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Restoration, Reorganization and Supervision of Indigenous Civil Administration, OCMH files]

156. . . . The responsibility for the procurement and handling of Civil Affairs supplies was delegated to the various Supply Services, and was to be handled in the normal supply channel. Supplies in Northern France were cared for, insofar as possible, in the same manner as other military stocks, with the Quartermaster Section responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of food. Difficulty was encountered from the first by poor marking of the supplies, which resulted in confusion on the beaches, since Civil Affairs supplies were included and issued with strictly military stocks. In many cases supplies were left on the beaches and spoilage of food resulted. Supplies were carried inland by transportation furnished by the Allied armies and turned over to the indigenous authorities at the places they were to be

used. Later, an attempt was made to turn over the supplies to the French at the beaches, but the French authorities lacked the transport to keep the beaches and ports cleared.<sup>1</sup> \* \* \*

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<sup>1</sup> G-4 of ComZ was responsible for calling forward and delivering Civil Affairs supplies to all liberated and occupied territories. G-5 personnel being attached for that purpose. In practice, there were deviations from the prescribed method. During the early period of invasion, the responsibility of providing supplies for combat troops became so great that the Supply Services had neither the time nor manpower to take on the added responsibility of Civil Affairs supply. The G-5 Section was thrown on its own resources to receive, store, and issue supplies. In time, with the use of a Civil Affairs Detachment to operate the depot, and with indigenous civilian and displaced person labor, French truck companies, a pool of captured German vehicles, and an Ordnance maintenance section, a unit under G-5 was organized to handle imported civilian supplies and captured enemy equipment released for Civil Affairs purposes. Truck companies were formed under command of French officers, organized under American leadership into the 89th QM Truck Battalion and attached to ComZ Base Sections and to Armies for Civil Affairs purposes. General Board Study 33, Policy on French Use of Allied Motor Vehicles.

## COMMUNICATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION DIFFICULTIES ALSO AGGRAVATE SUPPLY PROBLEM

[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. V]

\* \* \* By the temporary attachment, while in coastal areas, of a United States Navy Officer with Civil Affairs training for port liaison, and of Specialist officers from Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, it was possible to handle requests from Corps and Detachments for special assistance promptly and adequately;

Difficulties arose, of course. The pace of the advance placed a strain upon all communications. Direct telephone contact with Detachments was rare. The wide distance separating Army G-5 and G-5, VIII Corps, had to be overcome by the sheer physical stamina of couriers. Restrictions on travel by staff members, for reasons of necessity, made contact with the operating Detachments a problem of first magnitude.

Just prior to the time that the Army began operations, requisitions were prepared calling forward relief supplies from Advance Section Communications Zone to supply dumps of the Army Quartermaster and Medical depots. These items consisted of food, soap, emergency feeding kits, sanitary and medical supplies. The Third U.S. Army Medical depot carried one Allied Relief Board Basic Medical Unit, and had two more "ARB" Units that were brought up to a depot further forward. Due to rapid movement, however, the Quartermaster Class II and IV forward depot was not established in time to stock Civil Affairs supplies as planned.

A Civil Affairs Operational Supply Detachment was organized 6 August consisting of two officers and two enlisted men from Company I, 2d European Civil Affairs Regiment, which was given charge of the Civil Affairs supplies stocked at the Quartermaster Class I depot No. 10 near Rennes . . . for the use of the Detachment in Brittany. These supplies were called forward to the Rennes depot on the Quartermaster daily Telegram.

Emergency food and soap supplies were issued in the Army Service Area, Avranches, Granville, and Gavray. They were transported to Detachments from Advance Section Communications Zone supply dumps by captured enemy trucks driven by drivers from the G-5 Pool. Normally it was the responsibility of Advance Section Communications Zone to forward supplies to army depots, but due to the extreme shortage of army trucks it was necessary to use Civil Affairs transportation that had been obtained by salvaging damaged enemy vehicles.

Requisitions were approved and minimum requirements of gasoline, diesel oil and greases were furnished through Detachments for use of civilian officials, doctors and veterinarians to enable them to resume essential duties. \* \* \*

## POLICY OF PAYMENT AND ESTIMATE OF IMMEDIATE NEEDS

[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 3, sec. V]

\* \* \* At a conference on 21 July between French National authorities and officers of Communications Zone, 21 Army Group British and Twelfth U.S. Army Group, it was agreed, and confirmed later by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, that delivery of imported relief supplies would be made to departmental directorates of the *Ravitaillement Général*. It was further agreed that delivery of relief supplies would be made to mayors or local officials by Detachments in the combat zone only, and then only under pressure of temporary necessity. No cash payment would be demanded by the Allied authorities delivering the commodities. Arrangements were made for future payment at a higher level.

Following the agreement the Regional Directors, *L'Intendants des Affaires Economiques* of the Regions of Brittany and Angers, were called on for estimates of their minimum requirements of imported relief supplies. Both Regions reported a surplus of food stocks with the exception of sugar and salt. Their only requests were for immediate supplies of coal, gasoline, and fuel oil to care for immediate harvesting needs. Coal was not available but requisitions were approved for Civil Affairs gasoline and diesel oil in sufficient quantities to get the harvesting of crops under way in both Regions. The requisitions for diesel oil were furnished fully in the Region of Angers, and partially so in the Brittany area. Gasoline was not supplied from the dumps on account of the extreme shortage, but small supplies of captured enemy gasoline, diesel oil and coal were released for civilian use. \* \* \*

## POLICY ON FRENCH USE OF ALLIED MOTOR VEHICLES

[Copy of Ltr, Grasett, ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, to Koenig, CG, Fr Mil Forces in Great Britain 8 Aug 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 3006, Sup & Econ Branch]

2. It is desired to indicate in this letter the policy of Supreme Headquarters governing the issue and subsequent operation of such motor vehicles

and trailers as may be released to the French Authorities for use in relief work connected with the French civil population.

3. It is proposed that such vehicles and trailers will be delivered to the French Authorities in accordance with present arrangements for the delivery of property against physical receipt, subject to later settlement and to the following conditions:

a. That the vehicles will be used during the period in which SCAEF has relief responsibilities in Northwest Europe, exclusively for the collection and distribution of food and other essential supplies for the benefit of the civilian population, and that under no circumstances will such vehicles be used for military purposes without prior approval of SCAEF or under his authority.

b. That SCAEF will not undertake to provide any supplies or equipment in connection with the transfer of vehicles, or the activation of formations to operate the vehicles, other than the limited amount of spare parts and repair tools which are now available and which will accompany the vehicles. Uniforms for military drivers will be furnished to the extent that such are available for this purpose.

c. Operation and maintenance of vehicles so turned over is to be a responsibility of appropriate French Authorities. It further being understood that should the need arise for additional parts and supplies not available locally, such requirements will be submitted and processed through military formations as spot demands for supplemental relief supplies in accordance with the procedure currently in use, or as such procedure may be later amended by directive of this Headquarters.

d. That appropriate French authorities agree to so organize the use of these vehicles as to insure that they will be available at all times to assist French civil administrative authorities in the collection and distribution of supplies/stores for relief of French civil populations with particular emphasis on the collection and distribution of foodstuffs and medical supplies. It is agreed that the French officials in charge of the movement of this transportation will coordinate with representatives of the Supreme Commander in the field in order to insure use in a manner which will best further military operations currently in progress. It is further agreed that should the military situation demand such action, SCAEF or his authorized representative may, on completion of mutually satisfactory arrangements with appropriate French authorities, repossess all or any part of the vehicles turned over, it being understood that no French personnel is to accompany ve-

hicles if repossessed by Allied Forces unless arrangements concluded, specifically, so state.

e. It is likewise understood that French authorities will mark the vehicles with a distinctive marking to be agreed upon by French authorities and representatives of SCAEF consummating the sale and delivery of the vehicles. It is the opinion of this Headquarters that this marking should be as follows and should be placed on each door of the trucks and on each side of the trailers:

"Authorized by A.E.F. for movement of civilian supplies"

f. It is further understood that the above does not bind the Supreme Commander to the delivery of any certain number of vehicles and that decision as to the time and place of the release of such vehicles as may be made available will rest with subordinate commanders to whom such vehicles have been allocated by this Headquarters. \* \* \*

#### DURING RAPID ADVANCE RELIEF SUPPLIES COME FROM CAPTURED STORES

[AAR, G-5, Third Army, ch. 4, sec. V, Gen Bd files, dr. 634]

\* \* \* Due to the rapid movement and the consequent priority on transportation required for the tactical forces, it was not possible to bring forward to the Army depots imported relief supplies held in Communications Zone dumps. As a result relief supplies sold to French Authorities in areas of need, during the first three weeks of September, were obtained solely from captured enemy supplies released by Army G-4 and Quartermaster to Civil Affairs for this purpose. Transactions were made by Civil Affairs Detachments on the spot with French authorities, who arranged for equitable distribution through civilian agencies with civilian transportation.

The release of these supplies by Army G-4 and Quartermaster for Civil Affairs use was co-ordinated by the Relief Supply subsection. On 5 September the branch issued an Operational Supply Instruction entitled "Disposition of Captured Enemy Materials." This instruction outlined a uniform procedure to be followed by Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments in arranging the sale of captured enemy materials and for obtaining signed issue receipts from French authorities for future settlement between the national authorities concerned. \* \* \*

Transportation of local surplus supplies from areas of plenty to areas of need was accomplished by agreement between Civil Affairs Detachments and French authorities. At the end of the month trucks from the Civil Affairs Trans-

portation Pool moved 370 tons of civilian-owned flour from Verdun to Nancy where a critical shortage existed. In another area where a shortage of bread existed, a Civil Affairs Detachment arranged with bakers in surrounding communities to bake extra quantities to help the needy areas.

Civil Affairs Detachments at Displaced Persons Centers, with transportation furnished by the Civil Affairs Transportation Pool, built up stocks of local food resources in their respective areas for feeding their charges. Supplementing these local resources were the relief supplies furnished from the Civil Affairs Supply Depot. \* \* \*

At Cinq-Mars enormous quantities of enemy supplies, including foodstuffs, cognac and wines, and clothing were found in caves that covered an area of approximately thirty-five kilometers. Civil Affairs Detachment D3D2 was assigned to provide adequate guard and take a complete inventory of all stores. During the stay of this Detachment 5,780 tons of food supplies were issued to combat forces of the Army, and 5,632 tons were issued to units of the French Army. On 21 September [1944] Cinq-Mars reverted to the Loire Base Section of the Communications Zone, and the Detachment was relieved. It was estimated that there were sufficient foodstuffs alone stored in these caves to feed a United States Army Division for a full year. \* \* \*

#### STANDARD OF DIET SAID TO BE HIGHER IN FRANCE THAN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

[Cable, SHAEF (Fwd) to Subordinate Commands, 19 Aug 44, as Quoted in USFET Gen Bd Study 33]

\* \* \* Reports being received on the standards of living and the reserves of food available in the areas uncovered in France indicate that there are no shortages and that the standard of diet is higher than in the U.K. In view of this, imported food supplies will now only be issued where it is patently clear that there is genuine want. It must be impressed on all Civil Affairs officers that the extreme shortages of transport facilities and the necessity for conserving supplies for later requirements demand that such action be taken promptly. It should also be impressed strongly upon the French that it is their responsibility to accumulate all supplies possible, and that unless they commence this immediately, there will be, in the near future, areas of want for which no supplies can be made available.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>It should be kept in mind this message was sent before the fall of Paris or before any large metropolitan area had been liberated.

#### TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES CONTINUE TO HAMPER COLLECTION OF INDIGENOUS PRODUCTS

[Copy of Ltr, Scowden, Chief, Sup & Econ Branch, G-5 SHAEF, to Under Secy of State for War, 16 Sep 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 3006, Sup & Econ Branch]

1. The greatest difficulty to be overcome in the distribution of relief supplies at the present moment is lack of adequate road transport.

2. The lack of transport has the effect of increasing the requirements of imported supplies as collection and distribution of indigenous production is rendered difficult or impossible.

3. The present necessity for diverting air lift from serving the needs of combat troops to carrying supplies into Paris is caused by this factor.

4. It is expected that the same difficulties of supply now experienced will be met in all densely populated areas but in a worse form.

5. Army Groups have already requested that all transport that is available or can be made available should be provided for them immediately.

9. It is therefore requested that inquiries be made through the appropriate Ministries to ascertain how many lorries can be made available now, or in the immediate future, for Civil Affairs use. It is not suggested that any high proportion should be new vehicles. Any vehicles which are capable of efficient load carrying will be acceptable.

#### SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN IMPROVING CONDITIONS IN FRANCE BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE

[Ltr, Scowden, to M. Armond Meggie, Président, Centre d'Expansion Française, 24 Nov 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2342-1, Sup & Econ Branch]

We are keenly aware of the difficult living conditions endured by the people of France during the German occupation and of the many privations that had to be endured by persons of all ages, including small children. Since liberation, we have worked in unity with the French Government to improve the level of living of the French people generally. In this, I am glad to say, we have made considerable progress. There is still much to be done before normal living conditions, with the unrationed abundance that the term implies, can be possible in France, but it is encouraging that so much progress has already been made.

You are familiar, of course, with the measures that have been and are being taken to improve the lot of the French population. First, liberation

has meant that the food products of France now belong to the French for their own use. The hundreds of thousands of tons of cereals, livestock products, and other foods taken annually by the Germans from France and her colonies is now a thing of the past. The Allied Armies, on the other hand, bring their own food with them; it is only in the case of perishable surpluses such as fruits and vegetables that purchases of French products are made by the Allied Armies, and this is done only upon offer or approval by the French Government.

Furthermore, the Supreme Allied Commander has taken measures to supplement in every way possible the indigenous food resources of France. Beginning with the early days of the invasion, food and the lorries necessary to transport it were brought to France by the Allied Armies in order to furnish emergency relief to the French towns and cities where food supplies had become critically low under German occupation. Lorries of imported food rolled into Paris from the beaches of Normandy on the day following our entry into the city.

Concurrently with food imports, measures are being taken in close collaboration with the French Government to bring about a better distribution of food resources already available in France. One of the major factors in this is the improvement of transportation facilities to move food products from surplus to deficit areas. You are familiar, I am sure, with the depreciated state to which French transportation equipment had been reduced by reason of lack of tires, fuel, and lubricants, to say nothing about the requisitioning of better vehicles by the enemy. We are now making raw materials available to the French Government for the fabrication of tires, and imports of tires, fuel, and lubricants are being made. A large number of Allied trucks are being used to transport civilian goods in France. Likewise, we have been able to bring in fuel and other facilities for French farmers to harvest crops for consumption by French civilians. Power services are being rapidly restored for the operation of flour mills, sugar-beet factories, and other food-processing plants.

Some time will be required, of course, before all of these facilities can be fully restored, but here too, as in other fields, progress is being made. I should like to stress, also, that the great advances being made must be credited in large part to the willingness and ability of the French themselves to solve their problems, provided that they can obtain certain essential items not available in their own country. We are doing our utmost to furnish these essential items.

As a result of the efforts of the French themselves and of the help that we have been able to give them, material improvements have been made. The French Government has increased the food ration scales very materially compared with those that prevailed at the time of liberation. It is hoped that further increases will be possible as additional improvements are made in internal transportation. Increases in the food-ration scales at official prices in turn will permit the wage earner and the person dependent upon a modest income to live without necessity of recourse to the black market. \* \* \*

#### AMERICAN RED CROSS CLOTHING WILL BE USED

[Cable, SMC-OUT 39, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 2821-3, Welfare Agencies, ARC]

1. Due to limited availabilities of clothing against plan "A" procurement plan, it is deemed necessary by this Headquarters that American Red Cross [ARC] clothing be used as source of supply to fullest extent possible. This will alleviate the relief situation in liberated areas and reduce our military requirements accordingly.

2. In order to meet the estimated relief needs of France during the military period the American Red Cross has agreed to make available a total of 2,000 tons, which we are directing be called forward. This amount is in addition to the Red Cross clothing already shipped for southern France (2,000,000 garments).

#### AT THE END OF SIX MONTHS DELIVERIES ARE RUNNING BEHIND ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS

[Samuel I. Rosenman, Report to the President on Civilian Supplies for the Liberated Areas of Northwest Europe (Prepared Pursuant to Ltr of President Roosevelt of 20 Jan 45), AG files, A-51-243]

\* \* \* Civil Affairs imports from D Day to the end of the year 1944 in Northern France were 21% of advance estimates of requirements and in Southern France 75% of advance estimates of requirements.

In Northern France the small percentage imported compared with the advance estimate is in part explained by the fact that the 1944 crop became available about the time of liberation and that local food supplies were depended upon to meet immediate needs. . . .

The total civil affairs food imports from D Day to February 28 were 239,937 tons. An additional 119,000 tons were scheduled to be received in March and April.

The SHAEF estimate of requirements are 70,305 tons a month for April and May. These

are predicated upon the amount of food which SHAEF estimates will be required to bring the average caloric level to 2,000 per person in order to prevent disease and unrest. \* \* \*

#### G-4 READS THE LESSONS OF THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL SUPPLY

[G-4, Theater Service Forces, European Theater [TSFET(R)], 1 Oct 45, Report on Responsibilities and Activities of G-4 in Civil Affairs Supply, app. 4 to Gen Bd Rpt 33]

#### 13. Recommendations

It is recommended that before a similar operation is undertaken again, study be given to the following points:

a. Either the establishment of a separate or parallel civil affairs Supply Service, such as the quartermaster service, which could permit:

- (1) More accurate accounting
- (2) Complete regulation of stocks
- (3) Handling by specialists of special items such as farm machinery
- (4) The formation of an organization prepared to meet sudden emergencies
- (5) Determination of priorities at the general staff level.

Or placing the responsibility squarely on the services, which would involve:

- (1) Using the same standard of accountability for civil affairs as for other items
- (2) Determination of requirements as much in advance for civil affairs items as for other items
- (3) Prescribing a basis for issue which the services could apply as objectively as they apply standards for other issues
- (4) Determination of priority at the Supply Service level
- (5) Less flexibility to meet emergency demands.

b. *G-5 Responsibilities.* Assignment of duties to G-4 and G-5 is dependent upon determination of a, above. If, however, as in the present operation, planning, coordination and control is retained at the general staff level, with only limited supply responsibility placed on the Supply Services, the division of responsibility between G-4 and G-5 must be carefully considered and clearly defined. If the entire responsibility in civil affairs supply were placed on G-4, the likelihood of a lower priority for civil affairs supplies, the necessity for attaching to G-4 specialists capable of analysing local or indigenous re-

sources, determining supply requirements, and controlling the issue of these supplies, must be considered. Such assignment might either duplicate in part or remove from G-5 the control essential to fulfilling the G-5 mission of studying the conditions among the civilian population which might lead to disease and unrest and coordinating action to prevent such condition.

If the responsibility for civil affairs supply were placed on G-5, this might mean competition between two general staff sections for shipping, use of ports, depots and transportation, determination of priorities on the chief of staff level; the supply Services receiving supply instructions from two general staff sections; and determination of requirements for civil affairs supplies on a different basis from that of other supplies.

Should the civil affairs supply responsibility be divided between G-4 and G-5, careful consideration must be given to the most satisfactory assignment of the four major divisions of the supply operation—determination of the over-all requirements including indigenous and imported; procurement, movement, storage of imported requirements; basis of issue; and accounting. It must be remembered that G-5, in fulfilling its responsibility, is in a position, through planning, coordination, and supervision of the production and movement of indigenous supplies, to reduce requirements for imported supplies. Should specialized personnel be required by G-4 or G-5 for this operation, such personnel should be assigned rather than attached or used as liaison officers.

c. *Packing and Marking.* That civil affairs items are subjected to the same field conditions as other Army supplies, and that similar packing and marking standards be applied.

d. *Priority.* Establishment of some tangible basis for determining priority to be accorded civil affairs. When not needed, they are normally given the lowest priority with the result that when an urgent need arises not even the highest priority will assure delivery when needed.

e. *Standardization of Items.* Limiting items of civil affairs issue to those furnished by the Army for its other requirements. This would involve the use of only one pipeline and directing items to civilian needs in quantity and type, according to the urgency of the situation. Types of supplies not imported by the Army for other needs, except clothing, are usually not essential until later in the occupation, when they could be imported through civilian channels. In this way, a reserve smaller than the total of separate civil affairs and

Army reserves, would enable a larger and speedier fulfillment of an emergency requirement. Also the number of different items estimated at

more than twenty thousand, many of which are peculiar to civil affairs, could be materially reduced.

## 2. ACTION TAKEN AS SUPPLY PROBLEM BECOMES CRITICAL

### WHY ARE COMMITMENTS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLIES NOT BEING MET?

[Copy of Ltr, Brig Gen Thomas J. Davis, AG, SHAEF, to CG, ComZ ETOUSA, 18 Nov 44 SHAEF files, G-5, ETOUSA, ComdJ Gen, Opns & Policy]

1. It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that the present stocks of Civil Affairs supplies at present on the Continent in the United States Zone are such that present commitments cannot be met.

2. It is understood that the principal reason for this is that no imports of any material nature of Civil Affairs supplies have been made since last August. \* \* \*

3. It is requested that an immediate report be rendered to this headquarters setting forth:

a. How far present commitments are being met.

b. Whether future commitments through January will be met.

c. The reason for the non-importation of Civil Affairs supplies as programmed.

4. As a result of this non-importation, there is, in the United Kingdom, a large quantity of Civil Affairs supplies allocated to you but still awaiting shipment.

5. It is requested that this headquarters be informed immediately of the proposed program whereby these supplies will be shipped to the Continent.

6. There is an urgent requirement for supplies available in the U.K. for the Western Area Holland. Although, in view of the critical position in the U.S. Zone, it is not desired to remove any of the supplies at present allocated, it is quite apparent that, if any of these supplies cannot be utilized in the U.S. Zone in the immediate future or shipping cannot be provided, they must be reallocated for use in Western Holland.

7. Any supplies, therefore, at present in the U.K. which cannot be shipped by you to the Continent before 31 December, will be transferred for immediate use in Western Holland. Arrangements will be made to have them replaced by allocation of supplies from the U.S.

[1st Indorsement, Hq ComZ, ETOUSA, to SCAEF, 2 Dec 44, same file]

1. Recently this headquarters has received allocations of supplies which are required by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force letter No. US/50, to be received on the Continent from the UK by 31 January 1945. *Paragraph 7, basic communication, seems to conflict with this requirement.*

2. With reference to paragraph 1, 2, and 3a, basic communication, *present needs in many instances can not be met owing to depleted stocks, resulting from no lift from the UK since early September until 24 November.*

3. Reference paragraph 3b, basic communication, *the present plan of lift from the UK consists of 17,000 tons for November; 16,000 tons for December, and 16,000 tons for January. This will leave an unshipped balance of allocated supplies in the UK of 36,856 tons, exclusive of 44,729 gross long tons of POL. It is apparent, therefore, that without total allocated supplies on the continent, commitments . . . can be met only to the extent of supplies received.*

4. Transfer of supplies for immediate use in Holland and replacement by allocation of supplies from U.S. would result in further inability of Communications Zone to meet obligations. *The present allocation of ship tonnage to Civil Affairs from U.S. until 31 January 1945 will not permit lifting the presently allocated supplies from the U.S. Consequently, the proposed requirement of lifting additional supplies from U.S. by 31 January 1945 would be impossible.*

### CIVILIAN SUPPLY SITUATION NOT SATISFACTORY

[Copy of Ltr, Grasset, ACofS, G-5, SHAEF, to DCofS, SHAEF, 7 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, ETOUSA, ComZ, Opns & Policy]

\* \* \* The situation cannot be described as satisfactory, and in the American area we are only meeting our daily problems by hand-to-mouth methods. In the 21 Army Group area the situation is a little happier, and can be described as being reasonably satisfactory—in fact, the re-

serves of Civil Affairs stores available are equal to the reserves of other classes of military stores. The reason for the situation in the American area being as it is, is largely due to factors well known to you, and the difficulty of the provision of military supplies for the Forward area, which has been evident during the last few months. Up to date Civil Affairs stores have had of necessity to take a back seat in relation to military stores, and we have not pressed Com Zone to improve the situation until recently, because we could not maintain that the immediate need was urgent.

Captured German stores have gone a long way to meet emergencies and Com Zone have met spot demands for urgent relief of the civil population in such areas as the Maastricht salient and to the miners in Belgium. As a result of the lack of extreme urgency for Civil Affairs stores, it is probable that G-4 Com Zone has overlooked the problems of the future, but I think all Branches of Com Zone are now aware that the moment has come when Civil Affairs stores can no longer be relegated to a low priority. During the last fortnight Com Zone have been active in examining the problem; two officers have been sent out to America from Com Zone to accelerate the loading of the ships with Civil Affairs stores.

As you are aware the shipping programme was cut during the autumn and the first cut was made on Civil Affairs stores. Furthermore, there are many liberty ships lying about the British Isles and off the beaches and French ports, the contents of which are not known for certainty. There has also been partial unloading of ships for urgently required stores such as ammunition. It may well be that on board these ships there are considerable quantities of Civil Affairs stores which it is hoped will be unloaded and available before very long. \* \* \*

#### SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT GETTING CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLIES TO ARMY AREAS

[Copy of Ltr, Col C. R. Landon, AG, 12th AGP to SHAEF, 13 Dec 44, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, Internal Affairs]

1. It is recommended that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, carefully review the shortage of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies existing on the Continent and also review the present procedures being followed in allocating credits for, and moving Civil Affairs/Military Government supplies to, Army areas. It is believed that positive action is

required to expedite the flow of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies to the Continent and to the Army areas.

2. The above recommendations are based on consideration of the following:

a. Shortage of supplies on the Continent.

(1) According to information obtained orally from the G-5 Supply Branch of Communications Zone,

(a) No Civil Affairs/Military Government supplies arrived on the Continent in September and October 1944.

(b) There is a backlog of over 170,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies in the U.S. and U.K.

(c) Stocks of two specific items concerning which inquiry was made were reported to be as follows on 15 November 1944:

Milk	12 tons
Blankets	117,000 each

(2) On three separate requests recently submitted by this Headquarters to Headquarters, Communications Zone for allocation of credits to the Armies for:

(a) Clothing (b) Trucks (c) Footwear and blankets from stocks of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies, the reply has been that stocks were not adequate to permit suballocation for support of the Armies.

b. Present Civil Affairs/Military Government supply procedure has not and is not delivering adequate relief supplies to Army areas.

(1) During the months of August, September and October the three Armies in Twelfth Army Group issued 5,000 tons of relief food in France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Only 1,000 tons of this were imported supplies. 4,000 or 80% were captured stocks. Thus the Communications Zone furnished 20% of the required supplies to Armies.

(2) On 10 September 1944 a directive was received from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to build up a reserve of 3,000 tons of relief supplies in forward areas for displaced persons. In accordance with this directive, instructions were immediately issued to Armies to create stockpiles. The Armies submitted requisitions to Communications Zone, within their prescribed tonnages and credit allocations, for the purpose of building these stockpiles. In the majority of instances, these requisitions were not honored by Communications Zone. On the 22d of November 1944, Ninth U.S. Army had no stockpile, Third U.S. Army had only 84 tons and while First U.S. Army had 3,242 tons of

supplies, all except 346 tons were captured German stocks.

(3) During October and November, Third U.S. Army submitted requisitions within prescribed tonnages for movement forward of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies for refugees and displaced persons, totaling 2,862 tons. Ninth U.S. Army submitted daily telegrams for 1,949 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies within prescribed tonnage allocations to alleviate near starvation in Limburg Province, Holland. None of these supplies started to move forward until the long delay and acute need caused the Commanding Generals of Third and Ninth Armies to place telephone calls and send telegrams to the Commanding General, Communications Zone. When brought to the personal attention of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, special trains were arranged to transport some of these supplies to the Armies.

(4) Under present tactical plans it is estimated that Twelfth Army Group will require 23,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies during the first month of "ECLIPSE" conditions for Allied displaced persons alone. It is believed that Communications Zone should have a minimum amount of 40,000 tons of Civil Affairs/Military Government relief supplies earmarked and ready for Twelfth Army Group use and not subject to diversion to civilian use in the Communications Zone.

c. The Communications Zone proposes to review the requisitions submitted by Armies and Communications Zone Base Sections and determine the amounts which will be applied against the total requisitions submitted.

(1) This procedure is objectionable as the Communications Zone should not be the agency to decide priorities of supply as between Base Sections and the Armies of this Command.

(2) If supplies are so short that available supplies must be pro-rated, or decisions made as to which demands will be met and which will not, it is believed that the decisions as between Communications Zone Sections and Armies of the Army Group should be made by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

#### EFFECTS OF ARDENNES OFFENSIVE ON THE FOOD SITUATION IN BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG

[Rosenman, Rpt to the President on Civ Sup's for the Liberated Areas of Northwest Europe]

\* \* \* The Ardennes offensive in December 1944 cut through most of the best agricultural sections of Belgium and Luxembourg. The of-

fensive [was] shortly after the time of harvest and the enemy in retreat carried with him large quantities of food stuffs and livestock. Luxembourg which had been in a reasonably satisfactory position on food became a deficiency area.

As a result of the losses sustained in the Ardennes offensive, the inability of SHAEF to import the expected amount, and the early depletion of reserves, the population of Belgium is now seriously underfed. The national diet is low, probably not over 1850 to 1900 calories. There is a general consensus that the caloric intake falls short of 2,000 which is considered a minimum level. The greatest deficiency is in meat, fats, and oils—those products which are in greatest world shortage. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF TAKES STEPS TO INSURE THAT COMBAT ARMIES GET NECESSARY CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLIES

[Copy of Ltr, Gen Davis, AG, SHAEF, to CG, ComZ, 17 Jan 45, SHAEF files, G-5, 702, ETOUSA, ComZ, Opns & Policy]

2. The difficulties experienced to date in meeting the civil affairs supply requirements of the Twelfth Army Group are fully appreciated by this headquarters. Your statement is noted that, with the improvement in port capacity and internal transportation, supplies will be moved to forward areas in increasing quantities and that plans for January contemplate building up depots to the extent that credits may be allocated to armies based on their estimates of requirements.

3. Due to the limited quantity of relief supplies that has been delivered to the forward areas because of difficulties outlined in your report, cumulative requirements, particularly those of displaced persons, and refugees, have become critical and relief supplies to alleviate this situation cannot longer be withheld except for overriding operational necessity as determined by the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, or this headquarters. In future allocations of Civil Affairs supplies made by this headquarters to you, separate suballocations will be designated for operational areas of the Twelfth Army Group. Should the Communication Zone, for any reason, be unable to call forward the quantities designated for the Group or to deliver to the armies relief supplies as requisitioned, Headquarters, Army Group, will be promptly advised of this fact, so that it may reconsider its overall tonnage schedule or if shipping (calling forward to the continent) is involved, it may make appropriate representations to this headquarters. This will insure a command decision in each case and it is hoped will overcome the objection raised

by the Army Group that ". . . the Communications Zone should not be the agency to decide priorities of supply as between Base Sections and the Armies of this Command." It is noted that you have suggested substantially the same procedure in the last paragraph of your report.

4. In the opinion of this headquarters based upon the data available, additional Civil Affairs trucks should be made available to the First, Third, and Ninth U.S. Armies. It is requested that consideration be given to the transfer of sufficient vehicles to these Armies so that each will have not less than 200 3-ton trucks or an equivalent in truck tonnage. It is considered that the 3-ton trucks are more suitable for the Armies but if sufficient of this type of vehicle are not available presently, the 15-cwt with trailer might be substituted until the 3-ton trucks are available. It is considered that priority in 3-ton trucks should be given to the Armies. It is requested that you advise this headquarters of the action taken on this suggestion or any alternate suggestion you may have for meeting the Civil Affairs transport needs of the Armies.

#### BUT THE MILITARY PROGRAM ALSO NEEDS MORE OIL, FATS, AND MEAT

[Copy of Ltr, Kronacker, Minister of Sup, Belgian Embassy to McCloy, 6 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

I have just received the following information from my office in Brussels dated February 3d: "Deliveries on Civil Affairs Military Program have been 40,000 tons up to now, more than 50 per cent of which is wheat and flour. No fats have been brought in at all, and only 1,000 tons of meat, and 5,000 tons of fish."

May I remind you that figures for the military program for January and February which were communicated by SHAEF to the Belgian Government amounted to 126,500 tons. These figures included 11,000 tons of oils and fats, and over 20,000 tons of meat. They were arrived at by military authorities to reach a target of 2,000 calories considered as a minimum requirement to avoid disease and unrest. With imports remaining at such a low level we still are around 1500 calories. . . .

May I, therefore, again draw your kind attention to the fact that from a strictly military point of view and in the interest of the common war effort something should be done to increase the imports under the Civil Affairs Military Program, as well as under the so-called Civil National Program. \* \* \*

#### AN UNUSUAL DEMAND IN THE NAME OF MILITARY NECESSITY

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, CM-IN 12558, 13 Feb 45, CCAC files, 440 (10-7-43), sec. 4]

3. Beyond the small quantity contained in the layette sets heretofore allocated, no nipples are available in Belgium. The Belgian authorities have requested military import of nipples. They regard the provision as too essential and urgent to wait on civil import program. This headquarters approves the request for same to the extent of 25,000 nipples per month for three months calculated on the basis of 3 nipples per infant for 8,333 births estimated to occur monthly in Belgium. A normal rate would be 6 nipples per infant. Request reduced to 3 to take breast feeding into account. Conditions of undernourishment have reduced breast feeding greatly below normal. Continuing unsanitary feeding by make shift substitutes is regarded as likely to produce disease prejudicial to military operations.

In view of the urgency we have submitted a spot demand on the War Office for the first month, 25,000 nipples.

4. It is requested you approve and allocate the source and procurement responsibility for 50,000 for succeeding two months.

5. The Belgians have been requested to consider meeting requirements thereafter by local manufacture from raw materials for production of industrial rubber previously allocated. Such manufacture could not produce nipples in time for the three months requested here.

#### EISENHOWER PROPOSES TO DRAW ON UK STOCKPILES TO MAKE UP DEFICITS

[Copy of Memo, SW Stimson to the President, 28 Feb 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

General Eisenhower informed us in his message (SCAF 210) that a serious situation exists in the 21st Army Group (Montgomery Command) area by reason of retarded deliveries of civil supplies and urgently requested that 100,000 tons of food be available immediately from the UK stock for the 21st Army Group.

In an exchange of messages between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, it developed that a total of 109,000 tons of supplies were required. Provision has already been made for approximately half of this. The problem of meeting the remaining 69,000 tons is now being considered in London. If the 69,000 tons are taken from the stockpile now being held in

England against Dutch requirements, which is the probable course, it will be necessary to secure replacements from the UK stockpile in order to protect Eisenhower against anticipated Dutch needs. \* \* \*

#### THE DEFICIT WILL BE SUPPLIED

[Ltr, McCloy to Kronacker, 12 Mar 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 13]

I should like to clarify the situation which we discussed the other day concerning the deficiency of food stuffs for importation into the 21st Army Group area. The total deficiency amounts to about 109,000 tons. This includes 40,000 tons

which has been scheduled for delivery by the 21st Army Group in March but which could not be loaded in the United States in time for the March arrival. In addition to this 40,000 tons, the theater had notified the Combined Chiefs of a requirement of 69,000 tons which is additional to the original program.

The total of 109,000 tons referred to above, will be delivered by imports of 51,000 tons in March and 58,000 tons in April. The large part of the 109,000 tons will be met from food stocks now in the UK including 30,000 tons of wheat, which are now in transit to the UK and which will be diverted for March arrival in the 21st Army Group area.

### 3. PRESSURES FOR NATIONAL IMPORT PROGRAMS

#### THE FRENCH PRESS FOR A CIVILIAN IMPORT PROGRAM

[Msg, SHAEF Main to WD, SCAF-122, CM-IN 2922, 3 Nov 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

1. French government pressing strongly that for political, social and economic reasons France urgently requires raw materials and productive civil supplies. This type of relief for the French economy is not, however, considered a military responsibility under existing directives.

2. In view of French presentation of urgent needs of France for French procured civilian supplies, SHAEF is making a careful survey of probable port and transportation capacity for French civilian imports and presents the following forecast, subject to certain conditions in connection with Antwerp.

A. 5,000 tons daily between Mediterranean ports of Marseilles, Sette and Fort Vendres, commencing 1st December but with provisions that civil imports through Marseilles shall involve no clearance by rail.

B. 5,000 tons daily between Seine ports of Havre and Rouen commencing 15th January, but to be cleared only by inland water transport.

C. A possible capacity of 4,000 tons daily in coasters through Pas de Calais ports commencing 15th January.

D. Possibility of the entire capacity of Bordeaux which may be opened by February.

3. Foregoing tonnage is in addition to Military Civil Affairs program of direct relief items

which will not exceed port capacity of 3,000 tons per day in northern ports.

4. Inasmuch as a Zone of the Interior has been turned over to the French authorities, SHAEF favors the establishment in the near future of a French civilian import program (as distinct from a military civil affairs program) under which the French can import whatever supplies procured by themselves they wish. Execution of such a program will be dependent upon possible shipping allocations to France, the port capacity SHAEF can make available, and existence of adequate port clearance facilities.

5. Present proposal is that military program of direct relief items will continue concurrently with such program, but that military program will gradually diminish in scope until there is complete termination of military responsibility. Consideration will be given to fixing a date on which the gradual termination of responsibility can be made complete. For the present it is intended that military responsibility will be limited to the direct relief items of food, soap, medical, fuel and clothing in amounts considered a matter of military necessity and intended primarily for forward areas, and French government will be responsible for all other imports, French government responsibility to begin as soon as shipping and port capacity can be definitely committed to French civilian authorities.

6. Available port and clearance capacity can be determined by SHAEF. Procedure whereby France can secure ship tonnage allocation should

be established as a matter of urgency. Considered here that shipping program should be presented to proper authorities by French with some form of certificate of SCAEF with respect to port and inland clearance facilities.

It is further considered that tonnage allocations should be made direct to French government. \* \* \*

#### COMMITTEE TO GUIDE TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN PERIOD OF SUPPLY IN FRANCE

[Msg. SHAEF Main to WD, SCAF-122, 3 Nov 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

7. In order to carry out the foregoing plan [preceding document], a special four-party committee has been established in Paris to assist and guide the transition from the military to the civilian period. This committee, which will function in co-operation with SHAEF Mission to France, will consist of SHAEF, French, American and British economic advisors.

8. Intention is that French will discuss their programs of civilian requirements with the four-party committee prior to formal presentation in Washington and London. After approval by competent authorities, French would themselves procure (or intensify procurement program already in course), thus creating a bank from which supplies could be ordered forward in conformity with considered joint estimates of port and inland movement capacities.

9. Initial program being presented by the French will cover civilian importations through June 1945. This program will be an objective assessment of French needs in the light of probable port capacities and port clearance.

The program will be divided between military civil affairs requirements and French procured civilian import needs in accordance with paragraph 5 above. Military Civil Affairs requirements will be considered by SHAEF Mission subject to approval of SHAEF. Committee will insure that there is no duplication between the two sets of requirements.

10. Monnet expects to have draft program ready next week. After necessary consultation with committee, he will proceed to Washington via London to discuss all relevant matters with appropriate authorities, . . .

Monnet fully understands that items under combined Board jurisdiction will be subject to allocations of quantities and supply source, but intention is that for all other items French should

exercise buyer's choice subject only to shipping limitations. Understood that goods in short supply and those involving lend-lease will require full justification, but for all others it will be for the French to determine what they want to import within limits of civilian port capacity and shipping. \* \* \*

#### WITH NO SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR FRENCH IMPORT PROGRAM, CCS SUGGESTS THAT SCAEF EXPAND PLAN A

[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF Main, *et al.*, LEM-327, CM-OUT 68891, 27 Nov 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

1. Proposals in SCAF 122 are under active consideration here. Until decision is reached, however, French cannot be given separate shipping program and there is no method of enabling them to ship supplies such as raw materials, already procured or to be procured by them, otherwise than in military shipping program. Indications are that it will not at present be possible to increase your overall shipping allocations from the United States to provide tonnage for shipping space for such supplies will depend on priorities you assign to such cargoes.

2. Pending decision on SCAF 122, therefore, you may wish to consider whether, as a matter of necessity in the light of the existing situation, you desire to include in your shipping program for France items outside Plan A; for example, raw materials procured by the French. You may consider provision of such items essential in discharge of your mission. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF IS ABLE TO MAKE SHIPPING AVAILABLE ONLY FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES

[Msg, SHAEF Main to WD, MEL-358, CM-IN 8598, 9 Dec 44, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

1. It is noted that pending decision on SCAF 122 there will be only one shipping program for this Theater. The only tonnage which SHAEF can make available for civil supplies out of present military shipping program is that required for relief supplies essential to the military operation.

4. Although SHAEF has no primary responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of France, nevertheless it is recognized that the minimum economic needs of France have not and will not be met by the present civil affairs relief program and that serious economic and political difficulties may result if these needs are longer

delayed. It is therefore urged that serious consideration be given to making tonnage available for supplies of U.S. and UK origin to the extent possible, such tonnage to be included in the single theater shipping program, provided the necessary additional tonnage is added to that program. . . .

Monnet is now en route to Washington to discuss these and other matters. \* \* \*

#### BELGIANS DEVELOP A CIVILIAN IMPORT PROGRAM

[Ltr, Gen Walter Bedell Smith to The Secretaries, CCAC and CCS, 31 Dec 44, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

\* \* \* Along lines similar to the development of the French civilian import program, a program has been developed by the Belgian Government under the auspices of the Four-Party Committee in Brussels.

The initial program prepared by the Belgian Government covers the period January-March 1945. It has received the unanimous approval of the Four-Party Committee, which considers that conditions in Belgium support the allocations of shipping tonnage sufficient to import the 250,000 tons of supplies in the program. \* \* \*

The responsibility of this Headquarters is limited to an import program of relief supplies. This Headquarters has no responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Belgium, as represented by the Belgian civilian import program. Therefore, this Headquarters has not commented on the necessity for import of the items and quantities contained thereon. Any such comment will be provided by the U.S. and British economic advisers in Brussels through State Department and Foreign Office channels. \* \* \*

#### SMALL AMOUNT OF SHIPPING IS MADE AVAILABLE ON EMERGENCY BASIS FOR FRENCH CIVIL IMPORT PROGRAM

[Msg, CCAC to SHAEF Main, *et al.*, LEM-403, CM-OUT 89099, 9 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 1]

1. Final decision on shipping policy questions presented in SCAF 122 must await conclusions to be reached in high level study of world shipping situation now in progress in Washington.<sup>3</sup> As interim measure to meet urgent French representations up to six ships have been made available for French supplies after clearance with United States Chiefs of Staff and British Joint

<sup>3</sup>The high-level study referred to resulted in the Law-Hopkins Agreement. See following document.

Staff Mission in addition to your allocations for January loading in the United States. \* \* \*

#### HOPKINS-LAW AGREEMENT ON SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES TO LIBERATED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DURING FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1945

[Incl A to CCS-746/8, Shipping Agreement, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 560 (9-30-44), sec. 1]

The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945:

1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for national government import programs separate from and additional to military programs.

2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force has reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure in the near future. \* \* \*

6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these programs for January, February and March loading from North America as follows:

	January Total MWT WSA [War Shipping Ad- ministration]	February Total MWT WSA	March Total MWT WSA
France . . . . .	6	10	10
Belgium . . . . .	1	2	2

8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in paragraph 6 are not to be reduced except in the face of military necessity and not without prior discussion with Mr. Harry Hopkins. \* \* \*

#### FRENCH ARE ANXIOUS TO TAKE OVER THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY BUT THE MILITARY ARE RELUCTANT TO LET THEM DO SO

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, *et al.*, MEL-465, CM-IN 25675, 26 Jan. 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

2. . . . the French authorities now state that they are proceeding with procurement under their

own civilian program and are relying so far as military action is concerned only on the transfer to them of the items and quantities set forth in the military target program.

3. French authorities therefore take the position that they are not interested in any military requirements program for France subsequent to 1 March. In view of the uncertain shipping situation, however, we have determined that it was necessary to submit a military French requirements program after February to protect our position in the event the French civilian program does not develop properly or cannot be sufficiently implemented. Military programs will continue to be submitted for France until our responsibility is terminated. \* \* \*

#### FRENCH FAIL TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN PROGRAM OF CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Msg, WD to Somervell at Yalta, 29 Jan 45, Hearth-61, CM-OUT 28743, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

Meeting held by McCloy, 28th January, to discuss French shipping attended by Monnet, Hilldring, Wylie and representatives of State, FEA and WSA. . . .

Monnet insisted that Army Civilian Program under Plan A be dropped in March and that French assume full responsibility for all civilian imports under a single national program. He complained of confusion in procurement in U.S. and in distribution in France if these imports were not all included in one program. He asserted that the French government could not get information on scheduled Army imports for Civil Affairs and that information on arrivals was not adequate for their needs. . . .

Wylie referred to the opposition of SHAEF, as expressed in MEL 465, pointing out that the theater commander had the responsibility for preventing disease and unrest to the extent necessary to avoid interference with military operations, and that the Commander alone could determine priorities between purely military supplies and civil relief for the prevention of disease and unrest in such shipping as was available to fill his requirements. Therefore some military program of Civil Affairs goods appeared essential so long as there was any question concerning the ability of the French import program to provide supplies sufficient for this purpose.

Monnet strongly objected to any consideration of a continuing Civil Affairs program under the military, asserting that if ships were available to meet the needs of the Theater Commander for

supplies to avoid disease and unrest, such shipping was therefore in existence and should be made available for the French National Program. It appearing no further results could be obtained by extending the conference, Monnet and party then withdrew.

State Department and FEA representatives supported Monnet to the extent that they felt that procurement and internal distribution would be improved if the single National Program were approved. From a political point of view, State Department representatives felt it was desirable for the French to control their own civilian program since by so doing criticism would be diverted from the U.S. . . .

Hilldring stated that obviously the French would probably receive more supplies if the Army retained responsibility although it was desirable to place this responsibility with the French as soon as they were able to assume it if availability of shipping was no longer an obstacle. Wylie stated that the Law-Hopkins agreement now protected the military from demands for ships for the French National Import Program through March but that if the entire program including that portion for preventing disease and unrest was transferred from the Army it would subject all agencies to increased pressures for shipping for this program to an extent which might interfere with world-wide military requirements.

There was no agreement that all Army Civil Affairs Program for France could be discontinued. It was definitely agreed that action to relieve SHAEF of responsibility for a portion of the Civil Affairs Program should be taken only by CCS; also that ARGONAUT/Yalta/ would consider the question of the shipping program and that therefore final decision with regard to ships for Army Civil Affairs versus French National Import Program would be decided there. \* \* \*

#### ARMY IS AFRAID THE FRENCH CIVIL IMPORT PROGRAM WILL INTERFERE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS

[Msg, Somervell, at Yalta, to Secretary Patterson, CRICKET-24, CM-IN 30109, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

Transportation system in France involving as it does complex interrelationships between railways, port facilities and highway transport, is such that further complications introduced by the independent handling of shipping and movement of supplies inland by the French might well produce disastrous consequences to logistical ar-

rangements of our Army and delay the date of the termination of the war.

Already the French have without consultation with the Americans begun to prepare for placing additional tonnage in Le Havre which is now cluttered with Army supplies and where greatest difficulty is being encountered in the operation of the railroads inland from the port.

It has recently been necessary because of failure of the French to operate railways properly for American Troops to take over and actually run trains on part of this system.

Under arrangements approved by the JCS today, priorities on shipping have been set up as follows for the consideration of CCS and Chiefs of State:

A. Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

B. Priorities will be as follows:

1. Military requirements (including civilian relief) vital to the conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. \* \* \*

2. Civil programs desirable but not essential to the war-making capacity of the United Nations. . . .

3. Military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or direct operation in the agreed strategic concept.

4. Civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort. \* \* \*

It will be noted that the really vital part of the French supplies, namely civilian relief, would receive a higher priority under such arrangements than in the plan proposed by Monnet. Opinion here strongly in favor of the continuance of the War Department present policy in respect to these supplies and their shipment to Europe.

[Msg, Patterson to Somervell, Heath-90, CM-OUT 29943, 31 Jan 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

1. The French are pressing for a single National Import Program. \* \* \*

2. Interested agencies of the War Department met with me yesterday to discuss this matter. The general views developed are as follows:

(a) With regard to Plan A, Civil Affairs Program, this must be retained in all operational areas. As for the remainder of France, there may be political reasons for turning Civil Affairs Program over to the French, but we do not favor doing this until such time as the theater commander is assured that the French are able to handle it and that sufficient port capacity and inland clearance can be made available without interference with military needs. \* \* \*

(c) With respect to the French national import program brought over by Monnet, our concern centers on the impact this program may have on our military program with respect to shipping, raw materials and production.

4. We concur in the priorities stated in your CRICKET No. 24. \* \* \*

#### 4. PROBLEM OF TERMINATING THE MILITARY SUPPLY PROGRAM

##### BELGIANS WANT ARMY TO CONTINUE CIVILIAN SUPPLY TO 1 JULY

[Copy of Ltr. Kronacker, Minister of Sup, Belgian Embassy, to McCloy, 5 Feb 45, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

During conversations which took place between the Prime Minister Mr. Pierlot, Major General Erskine and his staff and myself, we indicated that in our opinion it would be necessary to continue the so-called Civil Affairs Military Program through the period from March 30th to the first July. Our main reason therefor was that the country being a military zone, the Army had better possibilities than ourselves for procurement, shipping, and port clearances. \* \* \*

##### THE THEATER RECOMMENDS THAT MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY IN FRANCE BE TERMINATED IN APRIL 1945

[Msg, SHAEF, Fwd. to WD, SCAF-221, CM-IN 6191, 6 Mar 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

1. The French Provisional Government has made a formal request through the Four Party Committee that military responsibility for the importation of relief supplies, excepting coal and petroleum products, be terminated with March shipments and that from 1 April the French Government assume full responsibility for the procurement and shipment of civilian supplies for France. Military responsibility would continue, however, for imports of coal and petroleum products, for the supply of relief

items for operational areas, and for the military production program.

2. Within the limits of port capacity and clearance specified in SCAF 122, the French authorities have developed a program of civilian imports for which procurement and shipping will be arranged by themselves.

3. This headquarters considers it desirable that the French undertake full responsibility for their civilian imports at the earliest possible date. This would relieve us of a great responsibility. However, it is essential, regardless of where the responsibility lies, that relief supplies flow into France in at least the minimum quantities necessary to insure against unrest and civil disturbances in our rear areas. Consequently the specific date of termination of military responsibility for relief supplies is necessarily conditioned on reasonable assurance that the French can:

A. Procure supplies in quantities sufficient to meet at least the relief requirements specified in the military civil affairs program for months subsequent to April, assuming that April C.A. military requirements are met by March shipments.

B. Obtain shipping required to import at least the quantity of relief supplies needed to safeguard against disease and unrest as estimated in the military civil affairs program.

4. It is recommended by this headquarters that subject to the provisions in paragraph 3 that the military responsibility for G-5 program for France be terminated with April loadings.

#### SCAEF RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLIES IN FRANCE

[Msg, CCS to SHAEF, Fwd, FACS-169, CM-OUT 61883, 31 Mar 45, CCAC files, 400, Fr (3-14-44), sec. 2]

1. In accordance with SCAF 221, and upon completion of April loadings, you are relieved of responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for France, except as to POL and coal.<sup>4</sup> You should make appropriate arrangements with the French to assure smooth transition from military to civilian responsibility.

2. However, you may and should, with respect to operational areas<sup>5</sup> . . . import such supplies needed for relief as you consider necessary to accomplish your military mission.

<sup>4</sup> SCAEF was relieved of responsibility for coal and POL beyond the August loadings.

<sup>5</sup> Defined as those areas falling within the Army zones forward of army rear boundaries.

3. It is believed that the steps which will be taken by the Provisional French Government and the U.S. and U.K. civilian agencies and shipping authorities will provide a reasonable assurance that the French can meet the conditions specified in Paragraph 3 of SCAF 221.

4. It is assumed that termination of military responsibility will make it necessary for the French to obtain shipping. Shipping which you would have used to carry G-5 supplies for France would presumably be made available to the French for this purpose. \* \* \*

#### SHAEF WISHES TO TERMINATE ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR RELIEF IN BELGIUM AND HOLLAND WITH JULY DELIVERIES

[Msg, SHAEF to WD, CM-IN 22793, 13 May 45, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

2. Now that military operations have ceased in NW Europe it is considered that military responsibility for the provision of civilian supplies exclusive of POL and Coal should be terminated at the earliest date possible.

3. It is further considered that such action may well be acceptable to the national governments concerned.

4. It is therefore the desire of this headquarters to terminate responsibility with July deliveries. This headquarters will issue instructions as soon as possible indicating what supplies may be delivered in July, but in view of the existing shortages of supply the quantities apart from grain will be less than the present allocations. Irrespective of any outstanding allocations, programmed supplies not actually delivered by July 31st will not be carried over for delivery in subsequent months, but will be treated as being cancelled from the military program. \* \* \*

#### PRESIDENT WISHES ARMY RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SUPPLY

[Ltr, Truman to SW, 21 May 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 15]

On 10 November 1943, President Roosevelt directed the Army to undertake the initial burden of shipping and distributing relief supplies for liberated areas in Europe pending the completion by civil agencies of plans to carry out the necessary long-range plans of relief. The fact that our vast military operations in Europe have been carried on without disease and unrest in liberated areas testified to the Army's successful discharge of the obligations so imposed.

Once liberation of a country has been accomplished, however, I feel that the best interests of

the United States and of the liberated country itself require termination of this military responsibility as soon as the military situation permits. No responsibility for civilian supplies in any liberated country in Europe should continue to rest upon the Army except as may be dictated by actual necessities of the military situation.

On the other hand, no liberated country should be prejudiced by termination of this responsibility. The date and conditions of termination in each case should be subject, of course, to recommendation of the military commander in the field. In order that transition from military to civilian responsibility may be smooth, final decision by the Army to end its responsibility should be made only after consultation with the Government of the liberated country concerned and also with our own State Department and Foreign Economic Administration.

In addition, I think the general policy, upon such termination, should be to continue to assist the national governments involved and the appropriate civilian agencies of our government and UNRRA to the extent that the military situation permits. . . .

To the extent that implementation of this policy requires agreement of the British military authorities, will you please cause negotiations to be initiated through appropriate military channels to obtain such agreement.

#### HOLLAND AND BELGIUM EXPRESS CONCERN OVER TERMINATION OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY IN JULY

[Paraphrase of Msg. SHAEF to WD, MEL-817, CM-IN 29153, 31 May 45, CCAC files, 400, Belgium (6-2-44)]

1. The governments of both Holland and Belgium have stated that they are concerned over SHAEF's suggestion that responsibility for CA supply program (excluding coal and POL) in these two countries be terminated with the month of July shipments.

2. It is the opinion of the Government of Belgium that it is essential that the military continue to be responsible, through the month of August, at least for providing grain. The authorities in the Netherlands do not believe that their purchasing agencies can take over responsibility at once, since they are not sufficiently well organized. The governments of both countries would like to be assured of sufficient shipping to

make up for the number of tons which the military is now bringing in. \* \* \*

#### WAR DEPARTMENT PROPOSES TERMINATION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLIES WITH AUGUST LOADINGS

[Ltr, McCloy to Clayton, Chairman Liberated Areas Committee, Dept of State, 2 Jun 45, CAD files, 400.38 (2-20-43), sec. 15]

\* \* \* The War Department contemplates the following program to implement this letter [the President's letter of 21 May, above]:

1. *As to Holland, Norway, Belgium and Denmark*

a. No funds will be included in War Department budget estimates for fiscal year 1946 for the provision of civilian supplies in these areas.

b. War Department will terminate the provision of civilian supplies to these areas with August 1945 loadings. Supplies already in pipeline resulting from the use of funds appropriated in fiscal year 1945 will be adequate to meet requirements through August loadings.

2. *As to France*

a. War Department will terminate the provision of coal with August loadings. \* \* \*

#### SCAEF'S RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERATED EUROPE IS ENDED

[Msg, CCAC to SCAEF, GOV-382, CM-OUT 19132, 19 Jun 45, CCAC files, 400 (6-9-44), sec. 1]

2. Considered that July loadings is too early to provide adequate notice to the Belgium Government and to assure smooth transition to civilian responsibility but that continuation of military responsibility beyond August loadings is not justified.

3. You are relieved of responsibility for provision and distribution of relief supplies for Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and Denmark on completion of August 1945 loadings except as to POL and coal. Decision on which awaits your recommendation.<sup>6</sup> . . .

You should make appropriate arrangements with the national governments concerned to assure a smooth transition from military to civilian responsibility. \* \* \*

<sup>6</sup> CCAC decided that the combined military responsibility for coal would terminate with the August loadings and that POL should terminate on 1 October 1945.

# Glossary

A	American
A.A.	Antiaircraft
AAI	Allied Armies in Italy
AAR	After Action Report
ABTF	Airborne Task Force
AC	Allied Commission
ACA	Armistice Control Authority
AC/AMG	Allied Commission/Allied Military Government
AC/AUS	Allied Commission/Army of the United States
ACC	Allied Control Commission
ACC/AMG	Allied Control Commission/Allied Military Government
ACMF	Allied Central Mediterranean Force
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg	Acting
ADCCAO	Assistant Deputy Civil Affairs Officer
Adm; Admin	Administrative
Admr	Administrator
ADSEC	Advance Section
Adv	Advance
AEF	American Expeditionary Forces
AF	Allied Forces
AFA	Allied Financial Agency
AFHQ	Allied Force Headquarters
AFLRS	Allied Forces Local Resource Board
AFRA	Allied Forces Records Administration
AG	Adjutant General
AGIP	The Italian semigovernmental organization which had charge of the distribution of petroleum in Italy
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
AGp	Army Group
AGWAR	Adjutant General, War Department
ALCOM	Allied Commission (Italy)
AM	Allied Military
Amcross	American Red Cross
AMFA	Allied Military Financial Agency
AMG	Allied Military Government
AMG/AC	Allied Military Government/Allied Commission
AMGLO	Allied Military Government Liaison Organization
AMGOT	Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory
AMM	Allied Military Mission
ANVIL	The planned Allied invasion of southern France in the Toulon-Marseille area
A.P.B.	Allied Publications Board

APO	Army Post Office
ARB	Allied Relief Board
ARC	American Red Cross
ARGONAUT	International Conference held at Malta and Yalta, January–February 1945
ASAA	Allied Supply Accounting Agency
ASCZ	Advance Section, Communications Zone
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASFM	Army Services Forces Manual
Asst	Assistant
ASW	Assistant Secretary of War
AT(E)	Administration of Territories Committee (Europe)
AUS	Army of the United States
Auth	Authority
AVALANCHE	Invasion of Italy at Salerno
B	British
BAC	Balkan Affairs Committee
B.A.S.	British Army Staff
BAYTOWN	British invasion of Italy on Calabrian coast
Bd	Board
BEW	Board of Economic Warfare
BGS	British General Staff
BIGOT	Special security procedure for OVERLORD
BJSM	British Joint Staff Mission
BMA	British Military Authority
Bn	Battalion
Br	British
Bull	Bulletin
Bur	Bureau
BYSEPP	Code name for Belgium and Luxembourg Section
CA	Civil Affairs
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CAHQ	Civil Affairs Headquarters
CAL	Designates cables from CCAC to G-5, AFHQ on Italian supply and economic matters
CA/MG	Civil Affairs/Military Government
CAO	Civil Affairs Officer; Chief Administrative Officer
CAPO	Civil affairs police officer
C.A.R.	Civil Affairs Regiment
CATS	Civil Affairs Training School
CBR	<i>Commissariat Belge au Repatriement</i>
CBS	Continental Base Section; Channel Base Section
C.C.	Chief Commissioner
CCAC	Combined Civil Affairs Committee
CCAC/L	Subcommittee of Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London
CCAC/S	Supply subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee
CCAO	Chief Civil Affairs Officer
CCC	Commodity Credit Corporation
CCNA	Combined Committee for North and West Africa
CCRR	<i>Carabinieri Raeli</i> (Royal Carabinieri), the National Police force which formed a part of the Italian Army
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff

CEC	Central Economic Committee
CEF	<i>Corps Expéditionnaire Français</i>
CFA	Commissioner of Fine Arts
CFB	Combined Food Board
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CG	Commanding General
C.G.I.L.	<i>Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro</i> (Italian General Confederation of Labor)
CIAA	Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
CIC	Counterintelligence Corps
CID	Civilian Intelligence Division
CinC	Commander in Chief
CinC Med	Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
Civ	Civilian
CIV	Designates cables from Civil Affairs, War Office, London, to British Joint Staff Mission, Washington
CLAC	Combined Liberated Areas Committee
CLN	<i>Comitate di Liberazione Nazionale</i>
CLNAI	<i>Comitate di Liberazione Nazionale per l'Alta Italia</i> (Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy)
CLO	Chief Legal Officer
CM-IN	Classified message, incoming
CM-OUT	Classified message, outgoing
CMF	Central Mediterranean Forces Group
CMP	Controlled Materials Plan
Cmsr	Commissioner
CO	Commanding Officer
COB	Committee of Combined Boards
CofS	Chief of Staff
Com	Commission
Comdg	Commanding
Comdr	Commander
Comdt	Commandant
Comm.	Committee
ComZ	Communications Zone
Conf	Conference
Contl	Control
COSSAC	Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)
Coy	Company
C.P.O.	Civil Police Officer
CPRB	Combined Production and Resources Board
CRICKET	Malta portion of ARGONAUT Conference
CRMB	Combined Raw Materials Board
CSAB	Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
CSO	Chief of Staff Officer
CsofS	Chiefs of Staff
DACofS	Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
D.B.S.	Delta Base Section
DCAO	Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
DCCAO	Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer
DCofS	Deputy Chief of Staff

DCOSSAC	Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Comand
DCPO	Deputy Chief Political Officer
Dept	Department
Det	Detachment
DIA	Algerian or Alpine Infantry Regiment (French)
Dir	Director
Div	Division
DJAG	Deputy Judge Advocate General
DLL	<i>Decreto Legislative Luogotenenziale</i>
DMS	Dept of Medical Supply
DP	Displaced Person
DPIC (British)	Deputy Paymaster-in-chief
DPMG	Deputy Provost Marshal General
DPRSC	Displaced Persons and Repatriation Subcommittee
DPR&W	Displaced Persons Relief and Welfare
Dr.	Drawer
DRAGOON	Final code for Allied invasion of southern coast of France, 15 August 1944
DS	Documentary supplement
EAC	European Advisory Commission
EACS	European Allied Contact Section
E.C.A.	<i>Ente Comunale d'Assistenza</i>
ECAD	European Civil Affairs Division
Ech	Echelon
ECLIPSE	Name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plan for the initial phase of military occupation of Germany
Econ	Economic
Ed.	Edition
E&F	Economics and Finance
EIAR	<i>Ente Italiano Audizioni Radio</i>
EM	Enlisted Men
E.N.A.C.	<i>Ente Nazionale Auto-Trasporti Cose</i>
EOTA	Enemy Occupied Territory Administration
Est	Estimate
ET; ETO	European Theater; European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
Ex.	Exhibit
Exec	Executive
ExecO	Executive Officer
ExecOff	Executive Office
FACS	Designates cables from CCS to SHAEF
FAN	Symbol for messages from Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCNL	French Committee of National Liberation
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FEA	Foreign Economic Administration
FEComZ	Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
FFI	<i>Les Forces Françaises Intérieures</i> (French Forces of the Interior)
F.I.	<i>Front de l'Indépendance</i>
FLAMBO	AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon

Fld	Field
FM	Field Manual
FNA	French North Africa
F.O.	Finance officer
Fr	France
FRS	<i>Forces Républicaines de Sécurité</i>
F.S.P.	Field Security Personnel
FSS	Field Security Service
FTPF	<i>Francs Tireurs et Partisans Français</i>
FUSA	First U.S. Army
FUSAG	First U.S. AGp
Fwd	Forward
G-1	Personnel Division, War Department General Staff
G-2	(Military) Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff
G-3	Operations Division, War Department General Staff
G-4	Supply Division, War Department General Staff
G-5	Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF or AFHQ
GAI	General Administrative Instructions
Gen	General
GHQ	General Headquarters
G.I.L.	<i>Gioventu Italiana del littorio</i>
GO	General Order
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GOV	Designates cables from CCAC to G-5, SHAEF
Govt	Government
Gp	Group
GPA	General Purchasing Agent
GS	General Staff
GSC	General Staff Corps
H.C.	High Commissioner
H.E.	His Excellency
Hist	History; Historical
H.M.	His Majesty
HMG	His Majesty's Government
HORRIFIED	Code designation for Sicily
HQ; Hq	Headquarters
HRH	His (Her) Royal Highness
HS	Historical Section
HUSKY	Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943
HUSKYLAND	Code name for Sicily
I&C	Information and Censorship
ID	International Division
IG	Inspector General
IGCR	Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees
IMPEX	<i>Service d'Importation et Exportation</i>
INC	Information and Censorship Section
Inf	Infantry
Info	Information
Instr	Instructions
INT	<i>Istituto Nazionale Trasporti</i>
Intel	Intelligence

Interv	Interview
IPOW	Italian Prisoners of War
IRCC	International Red Cross Commission
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAGD	Judge Advocate General's Department
JCAC	Joint Civil Affairs Committee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEAPC	Joint Economic and Political Council
Jkt	Jacket
J/S	Jugoslav
Jt	Joint
KCRC	Kansas City Records Center
Km	Kilometer
LAC	Designates cables to CAAC from G-5, AFHQ, on Italian supply and economic matters
LEM	Designates cables from CCAC to Eisenhower for G-5, SHAEF
LO	Legal Officer
L of C	Line of Communications
LST	Landing Ship (Tank)
MAT	Designates cables from AFHQ to CCAC and CCS
MAXWELL	Code name for Belgium and Luxembourg Section
MEL	Designates cables from G-5, SHAEF, to CCAC
MFA&A	Subcommission for Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives
MG	Military Govt
MGD	Military Govt Division
MGSHC	Military Government School and Holding Center at Tizi-Ouzou
MGS	Military Government Section
Mgt	Management
Mil	Military
Miliz	Union of Patriots and Citizens at Large
Min	Minutes
Misc	Miscellaneous
MLA	Military Liquidating Agency
MMIA	Military Mission, Italian Army
MMLA	<i>Mission Militaire Liaison</i> Administrative Welfare teams
M.N.B.	<i>Mouvement National Belge</i>
M.O.	Medical Officer
MOI	Ministry of Information (British)
MOOI	Minister of Occupied Italy
MP	Military Police
MRS	Military Railway Service
MS	Manuscript; military section
Msg	Message
MT	Military Transport
Mtg	Meeting
MTO	Mediterranean Theater of Operations
MTOUSA	Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
MVSN	Fascist Militia
N.A.	North Africa
NAEB	North African Economic Board

NAF Symbol for messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force  
 NATO North African Theater of Operations  
 NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army  
 NEPTUNE Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. This code name was used for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning papers which referred to the target area and date.  
 NMA Netherlands Military Administration  
 OAS Occupied Areas Section  
 OCMH Office, Chief of Military History  
 OCS Office, Chief of Staff  
 OD *Orde Dienst*  
 OEA Office of European Affairs  
 OEW Office of Economic Warfare  
 OFEC Office of Foreign Economic Coordination  
 OFRRO Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations  
 OFT Office of Foreign Territories  
 OLLA Office of Lend-Lease Administration  
 OPD Operations Division  
 OPET Organization, Personnel, Equipment, and Training Group  
 Opn Operation  
 OR Officers Reserve  
 ORC Officers Reserve Corps  
 OSG Office of the Surgeon General  
 OSS Office of Strategic Services  
 OUSW Office of Under Secretary of War  
 OVERLORD Plan for the Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944  
 Ovhd Overhead  
 OVRA Fascist Secret Police  
 OWI Office of War Information  
 PAD Public Affairs Division  
 Par. Paragraph  
 PBS Peninsular Base Section  
 PC Provincial Commissioner  
 Pers Personal  
 PH Public Health  
 PHD Public Health Division  
 PHO Public Health Officer  
 PHS Public Health Subcommission  
 PH&W Public Health and Welfare  
 Pkg Package  
 Plng Planning  
 P.M. Prime Minister; Provost Marshal  
 PMG Provost Marshal General  
 PMGO The Provost Marshal General's Office  
 P.N.F. Fascist Party  
 POL Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants  
 POW Prisoner of War  
 PRD French Ministry of Prisoners, Refugees, and Deportees

PRO	Public Relations Officer
PTT	Post, Telephone, Telegraph
PW	Psychological Warfare
P.W.	Prisoner of War
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch
PWD	Psychological Warfare Division
QM	Quartermaster
QMG	Quartermaster General
QUADRANT	U.S.-British Conference at Quebec, August 1943
R	Royal
RAF	Royal Air Force
RANKIN	Plan for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position
RC	Regional Commissioner
R.C.A.O.	Regional Civil Affairs officer
RCC	Regional Control Commissioner
R Day	The day for disbandment of AFHQ, coincident with the coming into effect of the Italian peace treaty
Regt	Regiment
Rev	Revised
RFC	Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Rgn	Region
Rgnl	Regional
R.P.H.O.	Regional Public Health Officer
RPO	Regional Patriots Officer
Rpt	Report
RRO	Regional Relief Officer
RWO	Regional Welfare Officer
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
S.A.I.	Special Administrative Instruction
SCAEF	Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SCAF	Designates cables from SHAEF to CCS
SCAO	Senior Civil Affairs Officer
Sec	Section
Secy	Secretary
Sepral	<i>Sezione Provinciale Alimentazione</i>
Serv	Service
SET	Telecommunications in Sicily and southern Italy
SEXTANT	International Conference at Cairo, November and December 1943
SG	Surgeon General
SGS	Secretary, General Staff
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
Sitrep	Situation report
SMG	School of Military Government
SN	Secretary of the Navy
SO	Supply Officer
SOE	[British] Special Operations Executive (Europe)
S.O.L.	A Fascist organization

SOMTO	Subversive Operations, Mediterranean Theater of Operations
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SOS	Services of Supply
Spec	Special
Spec. O	Special officer
SS	Special Staff; <i>Schutzstaffel</i> (Elite Guard)
Sup	Supply
SW	Secretary of War
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee
Tab	Table
TAG	The Adjutant General
TAM	Designates cables from CCS and CCAC to AFHQ
T.C.U.	Transport, Communications and Utilities
TD	Temporary Duty
T/E	Table of Equipment
Telecon	Telephone conversation
Tng	Training
T/O	Table of Organization
TORCH	Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942
Transl	Translation
TRIDENT	U.S.-British conference held at Washington, May 1943
TSFET	Theater Service Forces, European Theater
TUSA	Third U.S. Army
U.K.	United Kingdom
UKCC	United Kingdom Commercial Company
Univ	University
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USAFIME	U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East
USATC	U.S.A. Typhus Commission
USCC	United States Commercial Company
USFET	United States Forces European Theater
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USNR	United States Naval Reserve
USW	Under Secretary of War
VOG	Designates cables from G-5, SHAEF, to CCAC
VP	Vice President
WD	War Department
WDCSA	War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WDP	War Department Pamphlet
WE	War Establishment
WO	War Office
WPB	War Production Board
WPD	War Plans Division
WSA	War Shipping Administration
ZI	Zone of Interior



## UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

### The War Department

*Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*  
*Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*  
*Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942*  
*Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944*  
*Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943*  
*Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945*  
*The Army and Economic Mobilization*  
*The Army and Industrial Manpower*

### The Army Ground Forces

*The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*  
*The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*

### The Army Service Forces

*The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*

### The Western Hemisphere

*The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*  
*Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*

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*Stilwell's Mission to China*

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*The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War*

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*The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan*

*The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany*

*The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States*

*The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior*

*The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters*

*The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War*

*The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply*

*The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefield*

*The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I*

*The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II*

*The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan*

*The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany*

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*The Signal Corps: The Outcome*

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## Pictorial Record

*The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas*

*The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas*

*The War Against Japan*

# Index of Topics

(An index of persons begins on page 926.)

- Ad Hoc Economics Committee**, 11
- Administration of Territories Committee (Europe)** (AT/E): role in British planning for N.W. Europe, 116, 120, 654; U.S. accepts U.K. proposal to expand into combined planning agency, 121-22, 124; U.S.-U.K. disagreement over jurisdiction, 123-28; U.S. representative forbidden participation, 136; disagreement settled by creating CCAC(L), 137
- Administrative Section, ACC**, 268, 292n, 511
- Advisory Council for Italy**: preliminary discussion of functions, 255-57; constitution, 258-59; Italy denied participation in, 259-60; Greece and Yugoslavia added, 260; approves first return territory with political safeguards, 296-97; attaches conditions in approving change of government, 466-67; assumption of executive control circumvented, 635n
- AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO)**, 249-50, 263-64, 316, 378
- Agricultural rehabilitation supplies**. See **Rehabilitation supplies**.
- Agriculture**: problem of hoarded produce, 50; retention of Italian *ammassi*: 312-13; efforts to increase Italian production, 358-61; changes in Italian Ministry of Agriculture and in system of corporations, 291. See also "Dehoarding," methods of.
- Agriculture Subcommittee, ACC**, 257, 291, 293, 351, 362, 470, 629
- Agrigento, conditions in, on liberation**, 193-94
- Airborne CAO's 722-24**, 756-57
- Air Force Subcommittee, ACC**, 257, 475-76, 644
- Albania, civilian relief planned for**, 150
- Algiers (headquarters of AF)**, criticism of "remote control" by, 265
- Allied Armies in Italy (AAI)**: CA plans for Rome, 458; CA plans for N.W. Italy, 555-56; name of ACMF changed to, 264n. See also Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold (GOC, AAI, and Military Governor of Italy).
- Allied Central Mediterranean Force (ACMF)**: incorporates 15th AGp and all other Allied forces in Italy, 264n; President ACC delegates CA functions to GOC, 264-65. See also Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold (GOC).
- Allied (Control) Commission (ACC, AC)**: origin of idea of armistice control, 202-24 *passim*; AFHQ planning for, after Mussolini's dismissal, 225-26; provided for in Long Terms Armistice, 235; delay in activation except for advance echelon, 245-46; CCS wishes AMG to be merged with ACC, 253-55; CinC prevails in having forward AMG left independent, 254-55; constitution laid down by CCS, 257-58; activated under CinC as President and under a Deputy President as effective head, 258; CinC makes Military Governor his representative, 264-65; ACC and AMG amalgamated under Military Governor, 265; Deputy President ACC becomes CCAO under Military Governor, 265; ACC takes charge of MG rear territory and supervises technically Army AMG's, 265; ACC reorganized, 266-69; functions and organization in MG Army territory, 269-70; in MG rear territory, 270-71; allocation of principal posts among British and Americans, 268, 271; pattern of initial relations of subcommissions with Government, 288-94; after territory returned, functions become advisory, 300-303; co-ordinates Government legislation and AMG regulations, 303-05; obtains right to approve senior Government appointments, 302; (in Rome) encourages Italian assumption of more responsibility, 468-71; middle "C" dropped in token of New Policy, 507; Acting President translates New Policy into concrete terms, 508-13; under New Policy curtails controls, 515-17, 519-24, 639-42; also withdraws officers from Government territory, 523; also begins civilizationization of Hq, 523; curtailment of functions and final reorganization, 642-44; abolition, 647. See also Joyce, Maj. Gen. Kenyon A.; Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel; Stone, Admiral Ellery W.; Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold; Lush, Brig. M. S.
- Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)**: Civil Administration Section formed in, for TORCH, 31-32; creates NAEB for economic program in North Africa, 40-41; creates field organizations for CA, 181-83, 184-85; creates MGS under CofS, 184; activates ACC and co-ordinates relations with AMG, 258; creates Advanced Administrative Echelon for mainland Italy, 263; creates Central Economic Committee under DCCAO, 316; AFHQ supervision of ordinary CA matters transferred to Hq. Military Governor, 264-66; retains control of broad questions requiring policy guidance, 265; MGS superseded by G-5, 266; receives from SHAEF CA responsibility for southern France in first phase, 701; relieved of CA and supply responsibilities in France, 787-88; relieves AC in supervision of AMG Venezia Giulia, 644; relieves AMG in Phase II in N. Italy, 554, 583n, 584n; also assumes other AC functions, 644-45; supersedes AC entirely, 647; to transfer its functions to MLA on close-out, 647. See also Commander in Chief, Allied Force; Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Military Government Section, AFHQ; G-5 Division, AFHQ.
- Allied Executive Surplus Foods Committee**, 839
- Allied Forces Local Resources Board (AFLRB)**, 267, 269, 360-61
- Allied Land Forces Norway**: GOC also heads SHAEF mission to Norway, 843; activities in CA, 843-46
- Allied military courts**: in Italy, 208, 375-76, 380-81; not planned for trial of civilians in liberated countries, 657, 702; jurisdiction over members and employees of Allied forces, 702
- Allied military currency**: CCS directive to use initially in Sicily, 178; except for France, not used in liberated countries, 687-92. See also Allied military lire; British Military Authority Notes; Francs, supplemental; Yellow seal dollars.
- Allied Military (Financial) Agency (AMFA, AFA)**: in CCS directive on Sicily, 178-79; constitution, 184-85; loans to Italian banks, 205, 282, 459; advances to Italian Government, 354.

- Allied Military Government (of Occupied Territory) (AMGOT, AMG): planning of AMGOT, 157-76; CCS directive on, 177-80; constitution, 181-83; organization for initial phase in Sicily, 183-84; creates AMFA, 184-85; one headquarters set up for stabilized area of Sicily, 200; in invasion of mainland, CCAO administers both rear and forward areas, 252-53; finds combination unsatisfactory, 261, 263-64; AMGOT divided into Hq AMG (Rear AMG) and AMG 15th AGp (Forward AMG), 253; pattern rejected by SHAEF, 677. *See also* Rennell, Maj. Gen. Lord (Chief, AMGOT).
- Allied Military Government, 15th AGp: forward areas assigned to, on division of AMGOT, 253; Forward AMG to be left independent of ACC, 255; CCAO's proposal that Military Governor co-ordinate all CA adopted, 264-65; AMG, 15th AGp, disbanded, 264-65. *See also* Rennell, Maj. Gen. Lord (CCAO); 15th Army Group; Allied (Control) Commission.
- Allied Military Government, Headquarters: established, 253; Regions I and II assigned to, 253; reports to MGS, AFHQ, administratively, 253; plan to merge with ACC, 254; lack of co-ordination with Military Governor alleged, 261; abolished after amalgamation of ACC and AMG, 265; territory under, passes to Hq ACC, 265. *See also* McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J. (Chief).
- Allied Military Government, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies: Seventh and Eighth Armies under separate Hqs in assault on Sicily, 183; put under AMGOT Hq after assault phase, 200; Fifth and Eighth AMG's pass to AMG 15th AGp when AMGOT divided, 253; later come under Hq ACC technically and CG's operationally, 265; CA staffs distributed among corps and divisions, 270. *See also* Fifth U.S. Army; Seventh U.S. Army; Eighth British Army.
- Allied Military Government, Venezia Giulia. *See* Venezia Giulia; 13 Corps.
- Allied military lire: CCS direct use of, as soon as available, 178; advances of, to banks, 205, 282, 459
- Allied Military Mission (AMM): sent to Italian Government at Brindisi, 229; supervision of Government, 239-40
- Allied police mission to Italy, issue of, 625-26
- Allied Publications Board, AFHQ, 438n, 440, 522n
- Allied troops: conduct toward population, 377-78, 744, 764; expenditures and inflation, 255, 745-48
- Ambassadors (U.S. and U.K.), appointment of, 508. *See also* Charles, Sir Noel; Kirk, Alexander.
- American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historical Monuments (Roberts Commission), 88, 414, 863
- American cultural organizations, co-operation with Roberts Commission, 84-89 *passim*
- American Joint Distribution Board, 422
- American Minister, AFHQ, 40. *See* Murphy, Robert D.
- American Political Adviser in Italy. *See* Murphy, Robert D.; Kirk, Alexander.
- American Relief for Italy, 496
- AMGOT, name changed to AMG, 183, 253
- AMGOT General Administrative Instructions, 184
- AMGOT Manual, 180n, 181
- AMGOT Proclamations, 187
- Ammassi: Allied retention of, 196-97, 201; difficulty of obtaining quotas, 359; efforts to improve collection, 359-60
- Anglo-American policy disagreements: nature and location of combined CA committee, 19-25; jurisdiction over planning for ETO, 125-28, 135-38; combined supply procedures, 128-35; question of senior partner, 165-68; direct versus indirect rule, 170-73; question of political representatives in military administration, 174-75; exchange rate for Sicily, 176-77; allocation of ACC positions, 271-74; change in Italian Government during battle for Rome, 442-45; inclusion of Sforza in government, 455-56; acceptance of Bonomi's government, 455-56; replacement of armistice regime, 497, 513; scope of New Policy, 513-15; issue of written agreement with FCNL, 661-62; currency for N.W. Europe and France, 687-94; governmental negotiations with FCNL, 711-13
- Annulment of laws, problem of, 390. *See also under* Defascistization.
- Anti-inflation Committee, ACC, 352-53, 356, 363, 365
- Antwerp, repair of port of, 877
- Aosta Valley, dispute with French over, 568-71, 626
- Appointments in occupied territory: AMG's appointments to important posts temporary pending CCS approval, 177; Badoglio agrees to submit important appointments for ACC approval, 302; Bonomi urges range of offices be shortened, 405-06; left to indigenous authorities in liberated countries, 729-30
- Archives, policy on protection of, 88-89, 867. *See also* Monuments, Fine Art and Archives, protection of.
- Ardennes counteroffensive, CA during, 813-17
- Armistice, Italian: events leading to, 222-27; signature Short Terms, 227; signature Long Terms, 234-36; concessions on, to Badoglio, 236; evaluation of, 236-37; successive governments accept terms, 451, 452n, 466n, 640; relaxation in practice of terms of, 514; issue of replacing with milder regime, 497, 497n, 514-15, 623, 635
- Armistice control, evaluation of, as compared with MG, 217-22 *passim*, 230-32
- Arms (civilian), surrender of, required. *See* Civilians, MG restrictions on; French Forces of Interior; Partisans; Resistance organizations, French; Resistance organizations in northwest Europe.
- Army civilian relief mission, development of: WD must help civilian agencies in North African civilian supply, 51-52; Army must take main role in Tunisian relief, 25-55; OFRRO asks WD to handle supply first ninety days, 74; period extended to first six months, 108n; OFEC economic plan stymied by British opposition, 104; dim operational prospects of OFRRO and UNRRA, 105-08; President assigns initial supply mission to Army, 108-09; explanation and interpretation, 109-10; CAD assumes leadership in foreign economic co-ordination, 111; WD agrees to continue supply mission indefinitely, 345
- Army goods, illegal trafficking in, 752-53, 772-73. *See also* Black market.
- Army Service Forces (Services of Supply) (ASF, SOS): role in supply for North Africa, 52; represented in CAD, 68; adopts Army Supply Program, 77; responsible for American procurement, 77-78; in development of combined supply program, 128-34 *passim*. *See also* Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.; Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D.; Wright, Brig. Gen. Boykin C.
- Army Specialist Corps: initial procurement agency for CA specialist officers, 13; dissolved, 79n. *See also* Specialist Reserve Section, Officers Reserve Corps.
- Army supply program, 73-78. *See also* Army civilian relief mission, development of.
- Assistant Secretary of War: represents WD on CA committees, 44; office of, among those chiefly concerned with CA, 66. *See also* McCloy, John J.
- Atlantic Charter, influence of, on CA policy, 38, 371, 670

- Austria: attachment of German-speaking groups in N.E. Italy to, 555, 571-75; LofC to, from Trieste, 591, 593-95
- Badoglio government. *See under* Italian Government; Badoglio, Marshal Pietro.
- Balkan Affairs Committee, 150
- Balkans: WD hesitation over involvement in relief operations, 148-50; U.S. decision that Balkan relief will be combined, 150; small number of CA personnel to participate in relief operations, 150
- Bank of Italy: AMFA uses as agent in dealing with other banks, 282; takes over advance of currency to Government, 354-55
- Bank of Sicily, use of, as agent of AMFA, 179, 205
- Banks and banking controls: CCS instructions for Italy, 179; provision of cash reserves for, 204-05, 281-82; blocking accounts of Fascists and enemies, 179, 384-85, 695-96; in liberated countries, control left to native authorities, 695-96; actions authorized if French unable to act, 695. *See also* Allied Military Financial Agency.
- Bari, Congress of, 438-39, 441
- Base sections, co-ordination of, with CA, 266, 321-22, 789-90, 795. *See also* Continental Base Section; Peninsular Base Section.
- Bastogne, CAO's during defense of, 816-17
- Belgium: CA agreement with, 660; discussion of financial problems with government, 696; country section planning for, 798-800; SHAEF directive on implementing CA agreement, 800-801; conditions in, on liberation, 801-02; early problems of First Army in, 802-04; SHAEF Mission arrives and reports on conditions, 804-05; resistance forces take law in own hands, 802-03; Eisenhower urges Resistance to surrender arms, 805-06; government crisis and Allied measures planned in event of administrative breakdown, 806-08; crisis brought under control, 808-09; CA during German counteroffensive, 813-17 *passim*; formation of new government and ensuing stabilization, 817-19; MFA&A work in, 873-74; main responsibility for DP's and refugees assumed by government, 851-52; massive movement of DP's through, from Germany, 856-57; food shortage due to distribution difficulties, 806, 886; Government's civil import program, 890; fear premature termination military supply program, 892-93
- Belgrade Agreement (with Tito); 601-02
- Belluno, Austrian minority problem in, 552, 554-55, 571
- Benevolence, policy of: Eisenhower raises question of, for Sicily, 160; CCS authorizes within limits, 177; Rennell questions compatibility of, with fighting spirit, 185; relative novelty of, 370-75 *passim*
- Billeting of troops: efforts to prevent further damage to historic buildings, as a result of, 417, 870-71, 874; CAO's help in, 738, 785
- Black market: CCS on penalties for, 180; Italy, 346-48, 363-64, 462-63; France, 772-73; Belgium, 806
- Board (Office) of Economic Warfare, 13, 16-18, 23, 27, 56, 60, 97
- Bolzano: problem of Austrian separatism, 552-55, 571-75; South Tyrolese Party, 572, 574; international complications delay return to Government, 552, 575, 585, 586n; finally returned, 638-39
- Bonomi government. *See* Bonomi, Ivanoe.
- Bouzaréa, planning at, 180, 697, 700
- Bread ration: in Sicily, 204; raised to 300 grams in Sicily and S. Italy, 363; President wants 300 grams in all occupied Italy, 501; shipping shortage delays CCS authorization, 504; finally authorized and granted, 518-19; in France, 782, 782n
- Brenner Pass, movement of DP's through, 581-82, 641
- Brindisi: King and Badoglio set up rump government at, 230-31; inadequate facilities cause move to Salerno, 291
- British Army Staff (BAS): takes part in planning for Sicily, 123; consults with ASF on combined supply plans, 131
- British CA practices: described, 8, 87, 161; AFHQ adopts some for Sicily, 163
- British Chiefs of Staff: propose that a largely civilian committee frame supply plans, 120; propose AT(E) be expanded by appointment of U.S. representatives, 121; accept with provisos JCS proposal of CCS subcommittee for CA, 121-22; reluctant to have De Gaulle informed of nonrecognition decision, 670. *See also* Combined Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.
- British Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer (DCCAO), 798-99
- British Directorate of Civil Affairs, War Office, 120, 799
- British Embassy in Washington: represented on COB, 39; on CCNA, 42; participates in planning for Sicily, 123
- British Foreign Office: member of CCAC, 122; of CCAC/L, 137; threatens to reconsider policy toward CLN's, 542
- British High Commissioner in Italy. *See* Charles, Sir Noel.
- British Joint Staff Mission: member of CCAC, 123; consults with CAD on establishing combined committee, 122
- British Military Authority (BMA) Notes; use, Italy, 178, 185, 187, 229; British wish to avoid use of, in liberated countries, 687-90
- British Ministry of Economic Warfare, 37
- British Ministry of Food, 129
- British Ministry of Information, 522
- British Ministry of Production, 128
- British Resident Minister AFHQ: appointment of Macmillan as, 42; co-operates with U.S. Minister in North Africa, 41-42; discussion of, in planning for Sicily, 174-75; becomes British representative on Advisory Council for Italy, 260. *See also* Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold; Political advisers, issue of.
- British Supply Council in North America, 687-88
- British Treasury Department: represented on CCAC/L, 137; represented on Anti-Inflation Committee, Italy, 363; favors use of local currency in ETO, 690
- British War Office: opposed to OFEC plan that civilian agencies enter theaters, 104; resents American abstention from AT(E) committee, 122; initially disinclined to provide supplies in hiatus areas, 135; represented on CCAC/L, 137. *See also* Bovenschen, Sir Frederick E.
- Brussels, conditions in, on liberation, 802
- Bureau of Budget, Director of: criticizes lack of co-ordination of civilian agencies, 60-61; prepares plan for OFEC, 62, 100. *See also* Webb, James E.
- Cabinet (U.S.), discussion of Charlottesville School in, 23, 24
- Canada, 517, 685, 689
- Canadian First Army, CA experiences in Holland, 823, 825, 831-33
- Cannes-Nice area, troubles in, 763-64
- Carabinieri: success with, as nucleus of local police force, 196; Allies improve condition of, 283; attached to Fifth and Eighth Armies in C. Italy, 481-82; ceiling raised, 626
- Casablanca Conference, 160n, 218
- Censorship: handled by INC, AFHQ, in collaboration with AMG, 180; Rennell instructs INC to allow press

- much latitude, 284; press censored for military security, 437-38
- Central Economic Committee, AFHQ, 262, 268, 316
- Central Italy: new AMG expedients during advance through, 481-87; conditions in towns of, on occupation, 483-84
- Central Mediterranean Force (CMF), change of name of AAI to, 647
- Centralization, advocacy of, 253, 262-66, 277-78, 790
- Centralization versus decentralization, issue of, 248-71 *passim*. See also Centralization, advocacy of; Decentralization, advocacy of.
- Chain of command, military versus separate: WD wants tactical commander in Sicily to be supreme, 168; Eisenhower favors eventual CA chain of command, 169; military chain of command in assault phase, 183-84; CA chain of command in garrison stage, 183, 200; chain of command from CCS to AFHQ, 174; from Allied CinC to ACC, 257; military chain of command adopted by SHAEF, 677, 679
- Channel of communication, CA technical (advisory): GOC may authorize, in Sicily in assault phase, 183; criticism of operation of, 200n; allowed under SHAEF when co-ordination with other branches is unnecessary, 677, 679; in Seventh Army in S. France, 704
- Charlottesville School of Military Government: established, 11; curriculum, 11-12; proposal to increase student body, 13, 17, 18; IG report on, 21-22; merits of, debated, 22-29 *passim*; proposed expansion training program, 78-83 *passim*; attitudes prevailing at, 157-58, 188, 192, 370. See also Training, development of Army program.
- Cherbourg, occupation of, 731-38
- Chief Civil Administrator, AFHQ: post assigned to Murphy, 31-32; President's directive to, 32-33; Administrator is civil chairman NAEB, 40. See also Murphy, Robert D.
- Chief Civil Affairs Officers (CCAO): post created by AMGOT instead of deputy military governor, 182n; Deputy President ACC also becomes CCAO of occupied territory, 265; ACofS, G-5, AFHQ, becomes, on close-out AC, 647; Deputy CCAO heads G-5, Special Staff, SHAEF, 676; CO 2678th Regiment, Seventh Army, is also CCAO, 703n; British create Deputy CCAO in planning for N.W. Europe, 798-99. See also Rennell, Maj. Gen. Lord; Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel; Stone, Adm. Ellery W.; Hamblen, Brig. Gen. Archelaus L.; Parkman, Col. Henry, Jr.; Lee, Brig. S. Swinton.
- Chief Commissioner, ACC: position combined with post of Deputy President for Mason-MacFarlane, 265; Stone becomes Chief Commissioner on Mason-MacFarlane's resignation, 252. See also Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel; Stone, Adm. Ellery W.
- Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: proposal to place CA under, 68; CAD initially placed under, 68; shortly transferred to Special Staff, 68; corresponds with Eisenhower on CA in North Africa and Italy, 35, 45-47, 54-55, 215, 223-24, 413-15; opinion on importance of CA, 142. See also Marshall, General of the Army George C.
- Chief of Staff to President. See Leahy, Adm. William D. Chrea, training center at, 164, 180-81
- Circulation passes, civilian, 793-94, 855
- Civil affairs, difficulties inherent in, 3-4, 228, 375
- Civil affairs, functional divisions of, 8, 64
- Civil affairs, meaning of: in generic sense, 3; as distinguished from MG, 3
- Civil affairs, military versus civilian control of, 3-5, 15-29 *passim*, 30-31, 56-59, 91-113 *passim*. See also War Department, attitudes in, toward Army's CA role; Civilian agencies (U.S.), plan for control of CA by.
- Civil affairs, objectives of, 3, 145, 154
- Civil affairs, precedents in American history, 4, 15-16, 56
- Civil affairs, qualities needed in, 3-4, 207, 218
- Civil affairs agreements: reasons for making, 654; content, 655; agreement with Norway, 656-58; U.S. and U.K. disagree over which agency should consider, 125-28, 655; U.S. decides signing of will be on military level, 659-60; agreements consummated with Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Norway, 660; later with France, 715-18; with Denmark, 838
- Civil affairs companies, 675
- Civil affairs detachments: SHAEF plans for, 678; in France in beachhead phase, 722-26; Detachment A1A1 from UTAH Beach to Cherbourg, 730-38; found too large for beachhead phase, 726; in liberation of Paris, 743-45; soon replaced in Seventh Army by smaller units, 754; in S. France, 761; in Belgium, 801; during German counteroffensive in Ardennes, 813-17; Luxembourg CA Detachment, 820; in Netherlands, 822; in care of refugees and DP's, 854-57
- Civil Affairs Division, COSSAC: created for combined CA planning, 126n, 671; planning stymied during Anglo-American jurisdictional disagreement, 128; dissatisfaction with organization, 673; country sections of British DCCAO used, 671, 799; issues considered in planning, 671; superseded by G-5 Division, SHAEF, 674. See also Lumley, Maj. Gen. Sir Roger (CSO); Bendletsen, Col. Karl R. (DCSO).
- Civil Affairs Division, WDSS: WD organization for CA judged inadequate, 66-68; various locations for centralized control considered, 68; constitution, 68-69; transferred from General Staff to Special, 68; relation of new unit to theater commanders, 69; JCS delegates planning of CA to, 69-71; co-ordinates CA in WD, 71-72; co-ordination with Navy and creation of JCAC, 72-73; CAD becomes co-ordinating agency for all U.S. CA planning, 96-98, 122-23; *Ad Hoc* Economics Committee, 92. See also Haskell, Col. John H. F.; Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H.
- Civil Affairs Group, Continental Base Section, 754
- Civil Affairs Guides, OSS, 146n, 371
- Civil Affairs Handbooks, 800, 861, 865-66
- Civil affairs headquarters, separate versus tactically integrated, 671, 677
- Civil Affairs Headquarters (CAHQ), Seventh Army: as Civil Affairs Regiment in planning period, 703; plan to activate, when operations sufficiently advanced, 705; reports to G-5, AFHQ, 753; jurisdictional conflict with G-5, Seventh Army, 753; established quickly because of speed of advance, 758; activities, 753-58 *passim*; transferred to Sixth Army Gp, 787. See also Parkman, Col. Henry, Jr. (CCAO).
- Civil Affairs Officers (CAO), functions in AMGOT, 182
- Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPO), 5, 182, 280, 328, 384
- Civil Affairs policy, innovations of, in World War II, 141-42, 370-75 *passim*
- Civil Affairs Regiments: 2678th Regiment activated in Seventh Army, 703; reorganization, 754; activities in S. France, 756-86 *passim*; superseded by 6837th Regiment, Sixth Army Gp, 787; evaluation of use for both army and CA administration, 790; 2d European CA Regiment, 879
- Civil Affairs Section, ACC, 479, 520
- Civil affairs sections, ways of organizing: single head versus joint Anglo-American heads, 673-74; executive with military background versus civilian in uniform, 673-74
- Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS), 79-84 *passim*

CA Unit, Force 163 (Seventh Army), 700-701

Civilian agencies (U.S.), plan for control of CA by: early movement for control CA training, 14-15, 25-29; control of CA in N. Africa, 30-62; Roosevelt assigns civilian relief to State Department, 37; State Department creates agencies for N. Africa, 37-42; Roosevelt re-enforces relief authority of OFRRO, 98; links civilian agencies in OFEC, 100-101; OFEC plan stymied, 102-03, 216; difficulties of FEA, OFRRO, and UNRRA, 102-05; Army saddled with CA administration task but civilian agencies control policy, 108-09, 112, 144-45; also responsible for supplies outside military program, 78, 114, 144, 894

Civilian relief, Army purposes in, 75, 77, 150-53

Civilian supplies, combined military planning for: WD preliminary study, 112; CCS recommends co-ordination of U.S. and U.K. planning, 128, 129; U.S. rejects U.K. unilateral determination requirements of ETO, 129; creation of CCAC/S to prepare program, 131-32; CCS state basic principles, 132-33; divergencies between U.S. and U.K. supply procedures ironed out, 131-35; CCAC/S complete estimates for enemy-occupied Europe, 681-82; approved by CCAC and CCS, 682n, 686n; U.K. stockpiles made available for initial supplies, 683; SCAEF authorized to provide for hiatus areas, 684; separate CA truck program impossible, 684; U.S.-U.K. division of procurement and payment obligations, 685-86; SHAEF plan for supply procedure, 686-87. *See also under countries.*

Civilian supplies, combined planning for nonmilitary programs: general procedure for, 78, 516-17. *See also* Combined Liberated Areas Committee; Committee of Combined Boards; Liberated Areas Committee.

Civilian supplies, reimbursement for: countries supplied held responsible for, 154; no payment for supplies distributed to needy, 147

Civilian supplies, responsibility for distribution of: French North African authorities assume main task, 45; Army must assume, in Tunisia, 53-55; distribution in Italy by AC/AMG, 204, 269; Italian Government begins to help, 470; indigenous authorities in liberated Europe, 147, 686

Civilian supplies, shortages in Western Europe: develop in first six months, 878-82; acute by winter, 882-83; measures to overcome, 884-88

Civilian supplies, termination of military responsibility for: in Italy, 627; in ETO, 892-94

Civilian Supply, field organization and procedures for, 40-41, 44-45, 76, 312, 316, 319n, 684, 742, 754-55, 773-75, 781n, 878-79, 886-87

Civilian Supply Branch, International Division, ASF, 61, 76n

Civilian Supply (and Resources) Division, AMGOT, 129, 182, 310, 311, 347, 348

Civilianization of ACC, issue of: State Department proposes, after Rome occupied, 487; CAD repeatedly asks for, 487, 490, 522; ACC thinks practicable only at hq, 511; CCS recommends progressive civilianization at AC Hq, 516; AC progress in, 522, 536. *See also* Civilians (Allied), use of, in theaters.

Civilians (Allied), use of, in theaters: AMGOT authorized to use individual civilians, 216; AC's difficulties with, 490, 522; difficulty in obtaining, 491, 642-43

Civilians, chaotic conditions among, 192, 197-98, 483, 762

Civilians, evacuation of, from dangerous areas, 319, 327n, 355, 725-26, 825, 852

Civilians, MG restrictions on. *See* Proclamations. *See also* Freedom, scope of.

Clothing, import of: omission from initial supply program criticized, 151; asked for by AFHQ but declined, 362-64; included in program for ETO, 681, 683; ARC clothing used, 854, 882

Coal, import of: inclusion in supply program under fuel, 132-33, 309, 681-82; serious shortage in occupied countries, 576, 628, 784-85, 806, 818, 829-30, 844; in FEA posthostilities program for Italy, 629n, 643

Collaborationists, 736, 759, 789, 803, 824, 844-45

Combat forces, help to, CAO's main duty, 3, 153, 186

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS): delegate supervision of CA in North Africa to COB, 37; establish subcommittees for CA, 123, 137; on principles of combined supply program, 132-33; directive on Sicily, 176-80; directive on invasion of Italy, 217; extend Sicily directive to mainland, 227; directive on creation of ACC, 257-58; allocate major positions in ACC, 271; wish safeguards in returning Italian territory, 297; authorize transfer, 298; wish measures against Italian inflation, 352; wish Italian food problem studied, 358; authorize care for civilian internees in Italy, 405; wish Yugoslav partisans to help refugees escape, 409-10; liberalize policy on political activity in Italy, 439; on shortage of shipping, 363, 504-06; directive for a New Policy toward Italy, 515-17; authorize extending 300-gram bread ration to all occupied Italy, 518; urge close watch on CLNAI, 546; wish AMG set up in all Italian disputed areas, 591; accept SACMED's proposal of compromise with Tito, 598; direct SACMED to reinforce troops in crisis with Tito, 600; direct AFHQ to introduce Italian system in Venezia Giulia, 607; on British termination supply responsibility in Venezia Giulia, 613; raise ceiling of Italian armed forces and authorize transfer to Government's control, 625; raise ceiling of Carabinieri in Italian Army, 626; specify size of Allied force allowable in Italian posthostilities occupation, 626; lift ban on Italian institutional question, 633; authorize agreement modifying Italian armistice, 636; authorize return of Italian occupied areas, 638; relieve SACMED of supply responsibility, 641; direct AC to reduce functions, 644; authorize relief in ETO hiatus areas, 684; on CA agreements with FCNL, 716; directive on Denmark, 837; on Norway, 542-43.

Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC): discussion between U.S. and U.K. Joint Chiefs on combined CA committee, 119-23; constitution, 123-24; revision par. 6, 124-25; disagreement over whether CCAC has jurisdiction over ETO, 125-28; disagreement stymies planning in CCAC, 128, 136n; settled by creation subcommittee in London, 137; on participation of U.S. in Balkans CA, 148, 150; compromises U.S.-U.K. divergences on COB, 134-35; civilian agencies not admitted into advance planning, 112-13; permits AMGOT only to admit individual civilians, 216; opposes Soviet proposal to divide executive power between CinC and Advisory Council, 256; opposes giving up rights of occupying power in territorial transfer, 297; authorizes AMFA advances to Government, 354; asks SACMED to consider repatriation of UN nationals during war, 412; U.S. and U.K. members disagree over scope of New Policy, 513-15; relaxes controls on Italian exports, 517-18; declines approval of relief supplies for Russian-occupied Norway, 840-41; proposes SCAEF consider expanding supply program, 889; makes limited shipping available for civil import programs, 890; plans for terminating military supply responsibility, 877-78; terminates SCAEF's supply responsibility, 894, 894n

Combined Civil Affairs Committee London (CCAC/L): British propose London echelon of CCAC for CA

- matters of ETO, 136-37; constitution, 137; Hill-dring's views on, 138
- Combined Civil Affairs Committee Supply Subcommittee (CCAC/S): proposed, 131; constitution, 131-32; discusses Italian supply program, 132-33, 319; settles question of basic ration, 133; also of role of COB, 133-34; will not let civilian agencies share in advance planning, 134; appoints Supply Group to study Italian food problem, 320; rejects clothing requisition for Italy, 364; on shipping shortage, 503; estimates for ETO relief needs, 681-83. *See also* Combined Supply Group.
- Combined CA committees, establishment of, in Washington and London, 114-36 *passim*
- Combined Committee for French and West Africa, 42
- Combined Liberated Areas Committee (CLAC), 144, 517, 877
- Combined Requirements Group, 39
- Combined Supply Group, CCAC/S: created, 320, 358; criticize food planning for Sicily, 320; recommendations, 321-22, 359-60, 362
- Commander in Chief, Allied Force: Eisenhower holds post till departure for SHAEF, 31, 265n; has full authority over CA in North Africa confirmed, 32, 43; makes and defends agreement with Darlan, 34-37; on political problems of North Africa, 45-49 *passim*; on North African economic and supply programs, 50; on organizational problems, 59; recommends joint Anglo-American responsibility in Sicily, 160; favors separate CA chain of command in second stage, 169; queries on Italian peace terms, 225; recommends he be empowered to negotiate, 223; on advantages of using Italian civil machinery, 224; propaganda to Italian people, 224-25; recommends combination MG and armistice control, 225-26; on armistice discussions, 227; recommends provisional support of Badoglio government, 231-32; discussion with Washington on relation of ACC and AMG, 253-54; becomes *ex officio* president ACC, 253, 258; wishes authority over ACC and Advisory Council while military needs prevail, 256-57; disregards nationality in appointments, 271-72; enjoins respect for historical monuments, 417; calls relief of Italian food shortage military necessity, 315. *See also* Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.
- Commerce Subcommittee, ACC, 293, 641, 644. *See also* Industry and Commerce Subcommittee, ACC.
- Committee of Combined Boards (COB): created for combined economic activities in North Africa, 38n, 39; handles communications on North Africa for CCS, 38-39; in North African economic issues, 40, 43; British proposal that COB supervise CA planning rejected by U.S., 69-70; CCAC permits CCAC/S members to consult on supply, 134-35
- Committee for North African civilian supply, establishment of in WD, 44
- Committees of National Liberation (CNL): Naples CLN agitates for retirement of King and new government, 440-41; Rome CLN proposes deferring change till Rome is occupied, 433; when Rome occupied, cooperates with ACG/AMG, 458-59; CLN's encountered in central Italy, 484-85; 532-35; CLNAI coordinates CLN's of N. Italy, 529-30; CLNAI seeks recognition, 539-40; agreement with SACMED, 541-42; agreement with Italian Government, 542-43; reports of communist leadership, 544-45; more cautious Allied policy toward, 545-46; CLN's found in control in N. Italy, 560-61; get out of hand, 564-65; brought under control, 565-68; CLN's in Bolzano and Trento, 571-74; CLN's in Venezia Giulia driven underground by Yugoslavs, 603; some CLN's in north threaten separate government, 621; CLNAI parties chief force in Parri government, 621-22. *See also* Partisans.
- Communal councils, encouragement of by AMG, 284, 287
- Communications and communications facilities: difficulty with, in Sicily, 199; on mainland conditions compel decentralization, 262; supplies for, to be imported to Italy, 516, 524; importance to administration in S. France, 785; CAO's work with Signal officers in repair of, 785
- Communications Section, ACC, 257, 268, 644
- Communications Subcommittee, ACC, 268, 644
- Communications Zone, ETOUSA: G-5 section planned for, 678; responsibility for CA in Paris, 741, 745; assumes CA responsibility for S. France when AFHQ is relieved, 788; supply responsibilities of G-4, ComZ, 787n; discusses supply shortage, 884-87 *passim*
- Communism: in S. Italy, 210; Italian Communist Party aided by Soviet exchange of representatives, 447-48; among partisans of CLNAI, 544-46; in N.E. Italy, 592; strength of, 614, 619-20; Bonomi fears a future Communist government, 620-21; Chief Commissioner proposes policies to counter, 622-23; presents problem in S. France among FTP and FFI, 764, 772; in Belgium, 803. *See also* Political parties, Italian.
- Concentration camps, priorities for victims of, 581
- Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), 399
- Constituent assembly, Italian. *See* Institutional question, Italian; Elections, Italian.
- Continental Base Section (CBS), 754, 762-63, 778-79, 789
- Co-ordination of CA agencies, inadequacies of: among civilian agencies concerned with North Africa, 59-62; among initial WD agencies for CA, 63-64, 66-67; among agencies brought into OFEC, 102-04; among Allied agencies prior to ACC/AMG amalgamation, 248-52, 261-64; among voluntary philanthropic agencies in Italy, 489-90; between G-5, Seventh Army, and CAHQ, Seventh Army, 753
- Controlled routes for refugees, 581, 849, 852
- Corporative syndical system (Italian), abolition of, 291, 391
- Corsica, 230, 787
- Counterintelligence Corps, co-ordination with CAO's, 193, 199, 383, 704, 735
- Country Staff Sections, Operations Branch, G-5, SHAEF: represent views of country units, 681; channel of of communication with country units, 681
- Country Units, ETO: established by British DCCAO, 671; pass to supervision of COSSAC, 671; established in SHAEF, 677; debate over use, 671; decision to use as nuclei of military missions, 671, 677; placed in G-5, Special Staff, 676; transferred to control Operations Branch, G-5, 680-81
- Courbet-Maine, AFHQ, planning at, 698, 700
- Courts: closed in Italy until judiciary defascistized, 206-07; shortage of buildings delays reopening, 207, 380; Allied supervision of Italian courts, 379-82; French military tribunals try offenses against military interests, 727. *See also* Allied military courts.
- Currency, local: CCS wishes used in Italy soon as possible, 178; use of in N.W. Europe decided on, 691. *See also* Allied military currency.
- Currency sections, SHAEF missions, 691-92
- DDT, use in Naples typhus epidemic, 324-26
- D-day, CAO's on: in Sicily, 191-92; in mainland Italy, 227-28; in France, 722-23, 756-57
- Darlan-Eisenhower Agreement: terms of, 36-37; defense of, 34-36

- Decentralization, advocacy of: in Allied organization, 248-52 *passim*, 261-63; to correct Italian overcentralization, 394
- De facto authority, recognition of FCNL as in France, 714-15
- Defascistization: conflict with administrative expediency, 373-75; of Italian administration by AMG, 195, 382-89, 485-86; prefascist institutions and titles revived, 284-86, 303-05; abolition of Fascist Party and affiliated organizations, 390-91; of Fascist laws and institutions, 391-92; effort to eradicate Fascist doctrines, 190, 371, 392; of school textbooks, 400-401; Italian Government legislation, 392-93, 471-73; Government's epuration program, 471-77; ACC sets up Italian defascistization commissions, 473-74, 485-86; evaluation of defascistization record, 476-77
- De Gasperi government. *See* De Gasperi, Alcide.
- "Dehoarding," methods of: police action to enforce *ammassi* regulations, 312; import of barter goods, 50, 51, 313; raising of bread ration, 363; importance of problem, 50, 314, 320
- Delegation of CA administration, policy of: maximum possible delegation to economize on effort and manpower, 139-42; to French administration in North Africa, 31-37; to Italian Government in Government territory, 217-22; to indigenous authorities in friendly countries, 147-48, 656-58; to local authorities in France, 702; danger risked in France if French had been unready, 761; recommended for all liberated countries, 791
- Democracy: and misgivings over Army control of CA, 5, 22, 23; Moscow Declaration promises Italy opportunity for, 430; becoming more popular in Italy, 439; not restored in true sense during hostilities, 275, 286, 631; revival of democratically oriented local institutions, 284-87; posthostilities aid and Italian local elections, 629-33
- Denazification, 13, 146n, 573, 696
- Denmark: political developments in during German occupation, 836; CCS instructed to treat as friendly state, 837; CA agreement to be negotiated with, 838; SHAEF instructions to Denmark Mission, 837-38; Mission finds government in operation, 838-39; civilian supply situation good except for coal and POL, 839; supply relief extended, 839; export of surpluses to deficit areas, 839
- Department of Agriculture, 22, 28, 38
- Department of the Interior: misgivings of executives over Army's CA plans, 23, 26-27; wishes to administer CA in Pacific islands, 25-26
- Department of State: and study of CA training, 27-29; leadership in African CA, 37-42 *passim*, 60-62; favors military administration in Sicily, 95-96; gives WD policy guidance in planning, 97; delays in policy determination, 98; concurs in CAD's draft of directives, 98; leadership in OFEC, 100-101; jurisdictional boundary unclear between FEA and, 105; represented on *Ad Hoc* Economics Committee, 111; supports WD in combined supply issue, 129; favors UNRRA's handling relief in Balkans, 149; opposes political section in AMGOT-Sicily, 169-70; favors liberalization of Italian government, 427; recommends civilianization of ACC, 487; favors replacement of Italian armistice, 497; delays return of Bolzano to Government, 485-86; wishes AMG in disputed frontier areas, 590-91; wishes Italian local elections held quickly, 632. *See also* Secretary of State; Hull, Cordell; Byrnes, James F.; Grew, Joseph C.
- Department of the Treasury: determines CA fiscal policy, 20; and French N. Africa, 41, 59; provides currency for use in Italy, 178; and OFEC, 102-03; represented on Anti-Inflation Committee, 363; favors military currency for ETO, 688-90. *See also* Morgenthau, Henry.
- Deputy President, ACC. *See* Joyce, Maj. Gen. Kenyon A.; Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel.
- Direct versus indirect rule, issue of: discussion of, during planning for Sicily, 170-73; decision on, left to CinC, 173. *See also* Direct rule; Indirect rule.
- Direct rule: Americans advocate, 171-73; initial tendency of CAO's in Sicily toward direct action, 212-13
- Disease and unrest, prevention of: formula underlying Army's civilian relief program, 77, 150-53 *passim*; interpretation of, broadened by CCS, 516
- Displaced persons, care of: definition of DP's 84; care authorized by CCS, 405; in Sicily and S. Italy, 405-13 *passim*; plans for, in N. Italy, 579; influx of DP's into N. Italy after end of hostilities, 579-83; attempt to delegate care of in rear zones to governments in ETO fails, 852-53; military must assume more responsibility in France and Belgium, 854-59; serious problem as Allies advance into Germany, 858-59; frontier and transit centers, 854-59; shortage of supplies for, develops in ETO, 886; unrepatriables a continuing problem after hostilities, 643, 859; turnover of unrepatriables to ICGR, 648
- Displaced persons, repatriation of: considered for only key persons during hostilities, 412; CCAC asks SACMED to consider for UN nationals, 412; planning for repatriation to Italy at end of hostilities, 579-81; AFHQ-SHAEP Bolzano conference on intertheater repatriation, 580-81; status of, at successive dates, 583, 643
- Displaced Persons (Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, Displaced Persons and Repatriation) Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 268, 333, 406, 406n, 579-80, 582-83, 644, 683
- Displaced Persons Record Bureau, Italy, 408-09, 583
- Dollar exchange: provision to liberated countries of equivalent of local currency paid to U.S. troops, 500; Roosevelt announces similar policy for Italy to make supplies available, 500
- Dunn-Wright Agreement on France, 662, 664
- Eastbourne, training at, 676
- "Eaton Square jitters," 801-02
- Economic and Administrative Section, ACC (later divided), 257, 268, 271
- Economic associations, revival of, in Italy, 286
- Economic barrier in northern Italy: plan for, 559; abandonment of, 576
- Economic reconstruction, European: Secretary of War considers, as responsibility of State Department, 366; Secretary of State gives long-range plans for, 366
- Economic rehabilitation, Italian: initially assigned second place, 186-87; need for, more clearly recognized as urgent, 340-44; Director of CAD criticizes ACC record in, 367; ACoFS, G-5 AFHQ, defends and explains, 367-69; need of directive on, asserted, 369
- Economic Section, ACC, 268, 271, 271n, 292, 292n, 317-21, 317n, 351-52, 354-55, 359n, 364-65, 367, 470, 490, 501-02, 520, 575, 620. *See also* Grady, Henry F.; O'Dwyer, Brig. Gen. William; Antolini, Anthony.
- Economy of effort and personnel, principle of in FM 27-5, 33-34
- Education, Italian: failure to plan for, 400, 402-403; problems in reopening of Italian schools, 400-403; longer-range educational program, 403-05; Italian

- cultural contacts with other United Nations facilitated under New Policy, 515-16, 523
- Education (first called Education, Fine Arts and Archives) Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 293, 402-04, 516. *See also* Educational Adviser, Hq AMG.
- Educational Adviser, Hq AMG, 400-403
- Eighth British Army: plans for MG in Sicily, 180; CAO's in Sicily, 191-202 *passim*; during landing at Reggio Calabria, 191-92; problems with refugees and DP's, 307, 328, 332, 407; labor policy differs from Fifth Army's, 399; relations with Partisans of Central Italy, 532-33; in N.E. Italy and Venezia Giulia, 551, 597. *See also* Benson, Gp Capt. C. E.; 13 Corps, Eighth Army.
- Elba, 230n
- Elections, Italian: impracticability of, during hostilities, 453; AC helps Italians prepare for local elections, 516, 631; local elections held, 633n; referendum on institutional question, 633n; elections for Constituent Assembly, 633n
- Electric power systems, Italian: German damage to, 340; Allied supply aid for rehabilitation, 500, 516, 524
- Enemy countries, planning for: military administration more necessary in than in friendly countries, 58, 95, 188; importance of Sicily as first Allied case of, 160
- Enemy government assets, impounding of, 179
- Enemy Property Division, AMGOT, 182. *See also* Property Control.
- Equal partnership, Anglo-American. *See* Senior partnership.
- Establishment Branch, ACC, 269
- European Advisory Commission, 135-36
- European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD), ETOUSA, 674-75
- European Theater of Operations (ETO): U.S.-U.K. disagreement over agency having jurisdiction over, 116-19, 125-27, 135-37; planning for, 653-718; operations in, 721-859
- European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA): Hq in U.K. activated, 675, CG to appoint representative on AT/E, 124; CG directed to sign CA agreements, 660; organizational components, 675-76; plan for CA sections in field echelons of, 678
- Exchange rate: French North Africa, 178, 748; Italy, 176-77, 230; question of equity of Italian rate, 355; left to national authorities in liberated countries, 695-96; decisions upon, in France and N.W. Europe, 693-94, 697, 749; rate in France felt unfair to Allied soldiers, 747-48
- Executive Branch, ACC, 644
- Executive Commissioner, ACC creation of position, 268. *See also* Lush, Brig. M. S.
- Export trade, Italian. *See* Foreign trade, Italian.
- Fascist organizations, problems in abolition of: distinction among made on basis of public benefit, 176-77, 391; disagreements with Government on nature of, 393-94
- Fascist organizations' assets, confiscation of, 391
- Fascist Party officials, arrest of, 388
- Fascist-tainted officials, occasional retention of: until replacements found, 384-85; on ground of indispensability to war effort, 874-76
- Ferramonte di Tarsio, Yugoslav internees' camp at, 407
- Field Manual of Military Government (FM 27-5): preparation of, 7, 154; quoted, 7-9, 13, 33-34, 90, 145-46, 169, 344
- Field Manual of Rules of Land Warfare (FM 27-10), 7, 85
- Field Security Service (FSS), 209, 228, 383
- Fifth U.S. Army: creation and sources of personnel, 228; CAO's in invasion at Salerno, 228; occupation of Naples by, 240-41; dissatisfaction in, with centralized AC direction, 270n; problems with refugees in S. Italy, 328-30; occupies Rome, 458-61 *passim*; labor policy, 399; new expedients used in C. Italy, 481-87 *passim*; experiences with partisans and CLN's in C. Italy, 335, 536; in N. Italy, 560-67. *See also* Hume, Brig. Gen. Edgar Erskine (SCAO).
- 15th Army Group (Task Force 141): GOC, General Alexander, appointed Military Governor of Sicily, 182; CCAO, Lord Rennell, appointed Chief of AMGOT, 182; comprises Seventh and Eighth Armies in invasion of Sicily, 188-89; Fifth Army replaces Seventh on invasion of mainland Italy, 227-28; CCAO 15th AGP initially supervises both forward (Army) and rear (Regional) AMG's 252-53; after division of AMGOT, AMG 15th AGP supervises Army AMG's, 253; AMG 15th AGP disbanded on amalgamation of AMG and ACC, 264-65; 15th AGP incorporated into ACMF, 264n; role in occupation of N. Italy, 257-58, 568-69. *See also* Rennell, Maj. Gen. Lord (CCAO); Allied Military Government (of Occupied Territory); Allied Military Government, 15th AGP.
- Fifteenth U.S. Army, distinctive MFA&A policy of, 875
- Finance, public: in CCS directive on Sicily, 178-79; in AMGOT instructions on AMFA, 184; AMG and local government revenues and disbursements, 201-02; despite contrary policy, CCAC authorizes advance to Government, 354; also advocates reduction of Government expenditures, 354; ACC finds strict budget control impossible, 354; Italian tax reform desirable but not enforced, 365; issue of stabilization loan for Italy, 357; financial and foreign exchange controls over Italy, 235, 517-18, 640-41; financial policies for liberated W. Europe, 695-96; subject to concurrence of governments if able to act, 695-96
- Finance Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 292-93, 347, 349n, 353-55, 357, 458-59, 520, 627, 644
- Financial Adviser, AMGOT Hq. *See* Southard, Lt. Comdr. Frank A., Jr.
- Financial Division, AMGOT, 182, 196, 347
- Financial Officers (Allied), problems handled by, 185, 196-97
- Finmark, issue of relief in, 840-42
- First Canadian Army. *See* Canadian First Army.
- First U.S. Army (FUSA): activated, 676; early experiences of CAO's in France, 725, 731-38 *passim*; directive to, on Paris, 739-42; in N.W. Europe, 809-10, 819, 823
- 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG): activated, 676; plans for employment CA units, 676
- FLAMBO. *See* AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon.
- Florence, bad conditions in, on occupation, 483
- Food crises: in Sicily, 203-04; in Italy in winter of 1943, 308-18; in Rome and C. Italy, 461-62, 503-04; in S. France, 781-85; among DP's and refugees of liberated W. Europe, 886; in Netherlands, 830-33; in Belgium, 806; in N. Norway, 840
- Food Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 269, 293, 317-18, 320, 484-85, 629
- Foreign Economic Administration (FEA): supersedes OFEC, 104-05; seems not to have succeeded in coordination, 105; member of *Ad Hoc* Economics Committee, 111; not admitted to CCAC planning, 112-13; joins WD in request for over-all relief appropriation, 113; responsible for items outside military supply program, 113; rejects WD proposal to take over civilian supply in S. Italy, 345; FEA Survey Mission reports on economic problems in Italy, 344, 351; employees loaned to AC raise administrative

- problem, 490, 522; military supply program for Italy combined with FEA rehabilitation program, 524-25; takes over after military program ends, 628-29. *See also* Crowley, Leo T. (Director).
- Foreign trade, Italian: policies on, in CCS directive, 180; Allied rights over under Armistice terms, 235; price policy formulated for Italian imports and exports, 350-51; Government begins to assist in import transactions, 470-71, 470n; AFHQ requests U.S.-U.K. civilian agency assistance, 489; Roosevelt proposes modifying Trading with Enemy Act to benefit, 499; under New Policy controls to be relaxed, 517-18; some controls lifted, lifting of others contingent upon Italy's recognizing Allies' Black List, 640-41
- Fort Custer Schools, 80-82
- Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., PMGO School Center at, 19
- Fort Ontario, N.Y., admission of 1,000 refugees to, 411
- Four Party Supply Committee, 839, 841, 889-90
- IV Corps, Fifth Army: responsibilities for MG in N.W. Italy, 557-58; and Aosta Valley dispute with French, 569-70
- Forward AMG, administrative separation of from Rear AMG, 252-55, 269-71
- Forward Zone, France: CA agreement distinguishes from Zone of Interior, 717; Supreme Commander's special rights in, 717-18
- France, planning for: hope of delegating CA as in other liberated countries, 653; uncertainty due to absence of CA agreement with FCNL, 655-56; U.S.-U.K. disagreements over approach to FCNL, 661-70 *passim*; supply planning, 681-87; currency planning, 687-91; division of planning between SHAEF and AFHQ, 697; responsibility of 21 AGP, 667, 697; AFHQ planning for CA in S. France, 697-706; currency dispute with De Gaulle, 706-10; temporary *modus vivendi*, 710-11; high-level negotiations and final agreement, 711-17; CA agreement with FCNL, 716-18. *See also* French Committee of National Liberation.
- Francs, supplemental: plan for military francs, 690-91; SCAEF to issue, but will not call them military, 691; De Gaulle's protest against, 707-10; temporary *modus vivendi* reached, 710-11; currency for the most part accepted, 785; CA agreement resolves issue 716-18
- Frances Tireurs et Partisans Français (FTPFP), 752, 765
- Free Territory of Trieste, 612, 613n, 646
- Freedom, scope of: discussion in CCS directive, 177; discussion in Moscow Declaration on Italy, 430; of speech, 190, 430, 439, 662; of religious worship, 190, 430, 463; of political activity, 178, 435-40 *passim*, 539, 633; of press, 190, 210, 284, 422, 430, 463, 662; of political belief, 430, 662; of public meeting, 430-35 *passim*, 639-40; in respect to France, 662
- French Committee of National Liberation (FNL): limited Allied recognition on formation, 48-49; forces of, take Corsica and Elba, 230; represented in Advisory Council, 258; in ACC, 260; Roosevelt unwilling to extend political recognition, 655-56, 663, 667-70 *passim*; U.S.-U.K. efforts to reach common ground on method of dealing with, 661-70 *passim*; relations with still tentative after D-day, 705-06; plan for SCAEF to issue currency in France offends De Gaulle, 706-07; gives only very limited aid in France initially, 707-11; stalemate broken by recognition of FCNL as *de facto* authority, 711-14; CA agreement with, 717-18; U.S. and U.K. recognize as Provisional Government, 749. *See also* Provisional Government of France.
- French Forces of the Interior (FFI): help in N. France, 729; backbone of civil administration in S. France, 757, 770n; undesirable elements of disarmed, 764, 766, 769, 770-72
- French Imperial Federation, 45, 46
- French liaison officers: attachment to Allied forces in France planned, 706; Administrative Liaison Group, French Army "B," 705-06; De Gaulle limits to twenty on D-day, 706-07; assistance in N. France, 738; in S. France, 767-69, 791; evaluation of services, 768, 791; Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative, 850. *See also* Liaison offices.
- French Military Delegate for Southern Zone. *See* Cochet, Gen. Henri.
- French military forces: *Corps Expéditionnaire Français* and Italian refugees, 330; First French Army in dispute over Aosta Valley, 570; Army "B" helps Seventh Army through French CA liaison officers. *See also* French Forces of the Interior.
- French Military Mission, Chief of. *See* Koenig, Lt. Gen. Pierre.
- French North Africa: civilian control put to test, 30-31; plan to delegate CA to French, 32-34; Eisenhower-Darlan Agreement and defense of, 34-37; politico-economic problems in theory devolve on Dept of State, 37-38; civilian agencies created in North Africa and Washington, 37-42; integrated with military for hostilities period, 43-45; political and economic problems thrust on commander, 45-49, 50-51; WD must assist in civilian supply, 51-52; Army must take main role in Tunisian relief, 52-55; WD disinclined to continue N. African pattern in enemy areas, 55-59 *passim*; lack of co-ordination among civilian agencies criticized, 59-62; deprecation of N. African control pattern, 64-65, 102; food shipments to Italy inadequate, 311-12
- French West Africa, 46
- Friends Service Committee on Refugees, 412
- Fuel Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 644
- G-1 Division, WDGS, 7-9, 11, 66-67, 78, 79n;
- G-2 Division, WDGS, 8-9
- G-3 Division, WDGS, 8-9, 67;
- G-4 Division, WDGS: possibility of putting CA under considered, 67; question of boundary between G-4 and G-5 in civilian supplies, 883;
- G-4 Division, Communications Zone, 878
- G-5 Division, AFHQ: supersedes MGS, 266; concerned only with Italian issues entailing high policy guidance, 265; disagrees with CCS on degree AC can be curtailed, 634-44; asked by CCS to take over certain AC functions, 644; assumes AC functions after abolition of AC, 647; ACofS becomes also CCAO, 647; establishes Administrative Echelon in Rome, 644. *See also* Spofford, Brig. Gen. Charles M.; Hamblen, Brig. Gen. Archelaus L.
- G-5 AFHQ Administrative Echelon, 645
- G-5 Division, General Staff, SHAEF: created on supersession of COSSAC by SHAEF, 676; executive for, discussed, 673-74; reorganization of, 677, 680-81; plans for field, 667, 677-78; negotiates with and reports on FCNL, 706-14; recommends discretion in dealing with De Gaulle appointees, 728; on program to minimize inflationary troop spending, 745-47; final reorganization, 864; policy of examining appointment of technical personnel, 864, 864n. *See also* Grasett, Lt. Gen. Sir A. E.; Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C.; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

- G-5 Division, Special Staff (Civil Affairs Special Staff under SHAEF): activation and directive to DCCAO, 676; comprises training establishments and country houses, 676; views of CoS, SHAEF, on, 677; planning by, 860-63. *See also* McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J. (DCCAO).
- G-5 Section, Seventh Army: created for S. France, 703; ACoS held precluded from operational function, 703; jurisdictional conflicts with CAHQ, Seventh Army, 753; speed of advance forces operational responsibilities on, 789. *See also* Gerry, Col. Harvey S. (ACoS)
- General Board, USFET, 674-76, 746, 774, 819, 848-49, 860-61, 875-76, 878
- Geneva Convention, 759
- Genoa, conditions in, on occupation, 561-62
- German armed forces: extensive destruction and exploitation in Italy, 340-41; pass refugees through Allied lines, 307, 849; captured foodstuffs aid relief in W. Europe, 880-81; distinctive status of surrendered forces in Norway, 845
- Germany: U.S. occupation in World War I, 6-7, 12-13; German occupation policies in World War II, 689, 978; Army's supply mission in case of collapse of, 108-09; DP problem in Belgium and France mounts with advance into, 354-58
- Governments in exile, UN: liaison with, in CA planning, 799-800; missions of, to SCAEF provided for in CA agreements, 148, 657;
- Greece: represented in Advisory Council for Italy, 259n; included in combined supply program, 682. *See also* Balkans.
- Greenland, U.S. occupation of, 837  
*Groupes de Transport*, 752, 776-77
- Hague, The, arrival of Allied authorities at, 833
- Hague Conventions, 85, 146, 390n, 546
- Headquarters supervision, question of desirable degree of, 212-13
- Hiatus areas: meaning of, 135; U.S. favors provision of relief in, 110, 135; N.W. Italy planned for as, 355-56; SCAEF to provide relief in, if conditions permit, 684; hiatus area of S. France, 764-65
- Historical records, preservation of: among aims of MFA&A officers, 867; proposal to make ACC records available for future research, 645
- Historical Section, AFHQ, to function till shortly after close-out, 647
- Hopkins-Law Agreement: considered in reference to UNRRA shipping needs, 506; in reference to civil import programs, 891, 896
- Imperialism: imputed to Army, 23, 26, 27; repudiated, 24, 26, 29
- Import programs, governmental: Italian program under New Policy, 516-17, 524-25; French program and problem of shipping, 888-92; Belgian program, 890
- Improvisations in the field, 197, 207-08, 380, 608n
- Indirect rule: favored by British, 172-73; CAO's initial difficulties in using, 211-13; further development of method of, 279-84
- Industrial Coordination Committee, AFLRB, 361, 361n
- Industrial plants, issue of military versus civilian utilization, 368, 732
- Industrial rehabilitation, Italian, 367-69, 575-78
- Industry and Commerce Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 269, 351, 362, 362n, 364, 394
- Industry Subcommittee, ACC, 294, 644
- Inflation, programs to control: Italian inflation and its causes, 346-47; rationing, wage, price, and fiscal controls, 346-58; efforts to increase local production, 358-61; emphasis shifts to higher bread ration and imports, 361-64; CCS directs placing major responsibility on Government, 517; program for preventing inflationary troop expenditures in France, 745-49. *See also* Anti-inflation Committee, ACC.
- Information, Press and Censorship Subcommittee, ACC, 257
- Information and Censorship Section (INC), AFHQ, 180
- Inspector General, report of, on School of Military Government, 21-22
- Institutional question, Italian: Naples CLN wishes King to abdicate, 434, 440-43; Allied pressure secures King's promise, 451; King transfers powers to son when Rome occupied, 465; Allies approve new government on condition institutional question is deferred, 452, 466; problem of whether decree law violated commitment, 466-67; liberation of north held not to end ban, 630; U.S.-U.K. decision to lift ban, 630; left-wing parties favor constituent assembly but AC favors referendum, 629-31; Government decides on referendum, 633; Italians vote for republic, 633
- Intelligence (information), inadequacies of: on Sicily, 181; on agricultural production in Italy, 312; on possibility of Italian typhus epidemic, 322; on number of DP's in Axis-occupied Europe, 847
- Inter-Allied Postwar Requirements (Leith-Ross) Committee, 129
- Interdepartmental Committee, for French North Africa, 39-40, 440
- Interdepartmental Committee (for study of training civilians for CA overseas), 23, 28, 29
- Interdependence, Allied-Italian, concept of, 614, 648-49
- Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 412, 489, 648
- Interior Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 287, 292-93, 301. *See also* Local Government Subcommittee, ACC.
- International Division ASF: in ASF civilian supply procedure, 52, 77-78; views of, on combined supply procedure, 131. *See also* Wright, Gen. Boykin C.; Palmer, Lt. Col. Arthur E.; Army Services Forces.
- International law: on belligerent occupation, 146, 161; on change of legal rights when occupant returns territory, 296; on changing basic polity of state during occupation, 146, 390, 392; on occupation of friendly countries during war, 654; distinctive status of surrendered German forces in Norway, 845
- Internees. *See* Displaced persons.
- Italian armed forces: prospect of aid from, a factor in Allied decisions, 220, 231, 526; Allied controls and relaxation of controls over, 515, 626; decision to accept partisan units in, 537; posthostilities ceiling set, 625. *See also* Service Subcommittees, ACC.
- Italian co-belligerency: Allied pressure, 233-34, 244-45; Italian declaration of war against Germany, 245; recognition of co-belligerency, 245; immediate results, 245-47; a factor in New Policy, 493, 496-99
- Italian Government: Allied decision to support and strengthen, 230-34; supervision and aid by ACC subcommittees in earlier phase, 288-94; legal and political problems of first return of territory to, 294-300; Allied rights added to, by Secret Agreement, 298-99; later territorial returns, 468-69, 471, 480, 636-39; broadening of political base of, 425-35, 441-53, 464-67; assumption of broader responsibility after move to Rome, 467-71; anti-Fascist legislation and repuration program, 392-94, 471-73, 476-77; restiveness under Allied controls, 448n,

- 495-96, 506; controls relaxed under New Policy, 499-500, 513-16, 519-24, 639-42; relations with CLNAI and partisans, 530-31, 542-43, 565; more liberal supply and economic policy toward, 500-501, 516-19, 524-25; resumption of normal diplomatic relations, 446, 508, 509-10, 515, 520, 522-23; changes in composition of, 433-34, 451-52, 465-66, 478-79, 621-22, 639; attitude toward change in armistice regime, 614, 634-36; toward peace treaty, 613, 634, 645
- Italian officials: shortage of qualified, 280, 283, 482; traits and attitudes discussed, 242-43, 275, 279, 283, 302
- Italian people: attitude toward Fascism and defascistization, 208, 385, 387, 431, 439; toward AMG, 208-11, 244, 300, 639; toward controls and relaxation of controls, 495-96, 521; Allied attitude toward Italians softens, 496-99
- Italian prisoners, release of classes of, 379
- Italian Refugee Branch, ACC, 307-08, 330
- Italy, civilian supplies for: AFHQ and WD prepare program, 76; combined planning in Washington, 128-29; initial food program for Sicily, 306, 308-09; liberalization of supply policy discussed and authorized, 369, 512-13, 516-17; rehabilitation supply program prepared, 524-25; military program superseded by civilian programs, 627-29
- Japan: Italian resources to be used against, 516; continuing war with, prevents giving up all foreign trade controls, 640
- Jews, 46, 393, 412, 463, 763
- Joint AFHQ-SHAFF Committee for Intertheater Repatriation Movements Coordination, 580
- Joint Anglo-American administration of CA, principle of: proposed by Eisenhower for Sicily, 160; seen feasible due to similarity of systems, 161; means equal partnership, 162; also nonzonal system, 162n; plan for Sicily includes elements of both systems, 163; CAO's enjoined to adapt to, 186; application in allocation of AMGOT and ACC positions, 166, 168, 258, 271-74; as applied in COSSAC, 673; in SHAEF; 679; British personnel in Seventh U.S. Army in S. France, 702-03. *See also* Joint military government, planning of for Sicily.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.: President considers putting CA under, 18; delegate CA planning responsibility to CAD, 70; persuade British Chiefs to create CCS subcommittee for CA, 120-25; approve conditionally U.S. participation in EAC, 136; oppose senior partnership in Sicily, 165; averse to indefinite entanglement in Mediterranean, 217; note divergence of American policy from British on De Gaulle, 670; Eisenhower signs CA agreement with FCNL at direction of, 715. *See also* King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J.; McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.
- Joint Civil Affairs Committee, 72-73
- Joint military government, planning of, for Sicily, 157-87
- Judge Advocate General, The, 7, 9, 11, 747
- Judiciary, Italian: epuration of, 206-07; efforts to improve standards, 381-82; shortage in, 381
- Justice, administration of: as ideal in Allied military courts, 376-77; expedition of Italian justice, 379-80; effort to improve standards of Italian justice, 379
- King of Italy. *See* Victor Emmanuel III; Institutional question, Italian.
- King's Italy: four provinces initially under King, 229; MG not proclaimed in, 229
- Labor: CAO's help to obtain, for armed forces in Sicily and S. Italy, 202-03, 220; return of rights to Italian labor, 395-98 *passim*; encouragement of Italian trade unions, 399; Italian General Confederation of Labor, 399; wage and working standards established for branches of Allied forces employing Italians, 394-95, 397; disturbance of labor relations in N. Italy by CLN's, 565, 567; working standards in S. France, 780-81; delegation of armed forces' labor problems to French, 779-81; shortage in S. France, 777-79; procurement for armed forces viewed as CA function, 791
- Labor offices, creation of, in Italy, 392, 398
- Labor Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 293, 395-96, 399, 470, 575, 578
- Lampedusa, 191n, 595n, 638-39
- Land Forces Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 537, 579
- Landing operations, methods of gearing CAO's into, 195, 227-28
- Law and order, preservation of, as major CA aim, 154, 186
- Laws, local: existing laws in Italy retained except as annulled, 390; principle of retaining *status quo* as stated in FM 27-5, criticized, 146. *See also under* Annulment of laws; Defascistization.
- Legal Division, AMGOT, 181-82
- Legal officers, Allied, 180, 380-81
- Legal Subcommittee, 257, 293, 630, 644
- Lessons of CA experience, discussion of: 198-99, 236-37, 319-22, 789-96, 817, 875-76, 883-84
- Liaison, CAO function of: seen as main CAO function in N. France and in S. France, 729, 752
- Liaison officers, Allied; attached to Allied Military Mission, 239-40; with partisans, 530, 538, 541; used in Government territory under New Policy, 521; in France and N.W. Europe, 756, 769; maintained in Italian disputed areas, 644
- Liaison officers (indigenous), provision for, in CA agreements, 657. *See also* French liaison officers.
- Liaison offices, Southern France, 767-69. *See also* French liaison officers.
- Liberated Areas Committee, 144, 517
- Liberated peoples, Western European: similarities among, from viewpoint of planners, 653; CA problems differ from MTO, 653-54; basic policies toward, 653-54; distinctive problems in the case of France, 653-56 *passim*.
- "Liberation complex" of DP's 847, 858
- Lieutenant General of the Realm, Italy: Victor Emmanuel appoints Crown Prince Umberto as, 465; rebuked by Council of Ministers for public statement, 629-30. *See also* Umberto, Crown Prince.
- Limitation of CA commitments, Army's principle of; fear of excessive commitments, 139; standards used to limit, 140-41; failure of limitations to work, 141-42 illustrations of policies, 144-54
- Lines of communication: length adds to importance in North Africa, 50; LoC from Trieste to Austria, 591, 593-95; Allied Commander given special rights in by CA agreements, 657; SCAEF responsible for relief in, 684. *See also* Communications Zone, ETOUSA; Southern Line of Communications.
- Linosa, Island of, 191n, 595n, 638-39
- Lipari Islands, Yugoslav internees found in, 405
- Lira account for Allied procurement, issue of, 356-57, 515
- Lira currency: Italian Government obligated to provide Allies with, 353; lack of Italian facilities compels printing in U.S., 353; public distrust of, 354

- Loans and advances, Allied policies on, 184, 344, 695, 696. *See also* Allied Military Financial Agency; Finance, Public; Inflation.
- Local government; in Italy, 188-213 *passim*, 240-44, 275, 279-87, 303-05, 560-68, 571-78; distinctive pattern in Venezia Giulia, 607-12; entrusted to indigenous authorities in liberated countries, 657. *See also* Indirect rule; Defascistization; Northern France; Southern France; Belgium; Netherlands.
- Local Government Subcommittee, ACC, 287, 302-03, 481, 632-33. *See also* Interior Subcommittee, ACC.
- Local resources, policy of maximum utilization, 344, 358-61, 686-87, 702
- London: British wish ETO planning agency to be in, 116; CCAC/L established in, 137
- London Foreign Ministers Conference, 635
- Looting, 198, 725, 729, 735
- Luxembourg: CA agreement with, 660; planning for, 798-800; Army delegates CA to resistance forces, 811; SHAEF Mission's initial impressions, 810-12; Mission temporarily dissolved, 812; CAO's during German counteroffensive, 813-15; SHAEF Mission's CA element comes under 12 Army Gp, 819; SHAEF representation in, restored, 820
- Lyon, distinctive liaison office in, 768-69
- Mafia, 208, 210
- Malaria Control Branch, ACC, 327
- Malta Conference, 233, 238
- Marseille, task of rehabilitation in, 762-63
- Medical and sanitary supplies, 78, 324, 336, 339, 741, 792
- Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO): CA in, 30-61, 157-649, 700-706, 751-87; influence of experience in, on ETO planning, 490n, 653, 677; CG MTOUSA, 638; CinC Mediterranean, 638. *See also* Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.
- Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Mideast), 149n, 411
- Milan, AC forward office in, 577
- Military Districts (British logistical areas in Italy), 408
- Military expediency, Allied aims transcend, 370-424 *passim*
- Military government, planning or proclamation of; planned for in North Africa but not proclaimed, 33; proclamation of, in Sicily, 190-91; plan for Italy capable of co-ordination with armistice control, 222-23; not established in Italian Government territory, 229; proclamation softened in view of Italian cobelligerency, 229; plan for France abandoned, 697, 701
- Military Government Division, PMGO, 16, 18, 63, 66. *See also* Gullion, Maj. Gen. Allen W.; Miller, Col. Jesse I.
- Military Government Section, AFHQ: WD prefers, instead of proposed political section, 168, 170; established under CofS, 184; plans for MG and armistice control in Italy, 222, 225-26; Hq AMG reports to, 253; supply plan of, 314-15; conference at, on price control, 350-51; routine control of CA by, replaced by Hq ACC control, 264-66; MGS becomes G-5, AFHQ, 266n. *See also* Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C.; Maxwell, Col. A. Terrence.
- Military Governor: Alexander as GOC Force 141 becomes Military Governor of Sicily, 182; becomes Military Governor of occupied territory in Italy, 227; CCS wishes Deputy President of ACC to be, 254; CinC persuades CCS Alexander's authority over forward zone should continue, 254-55; authorized to incorporate Hq ACC in his hq, 264-65. *See also* Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold.
- Military Liquidating Agency, 647
- Military Mission to Italian Army (MMIA), 360
- Military necessity, appeals to: as paramount determinant of CA policy, 154; by Eisenhower as basis of political policy in North Africa, 46; as ground for supporting Badoglio government, 232; as ground for food imports to Italy, 315; outweighs protection of historic buildings, 414-15; basis of rights of Supreme Commander in CA agreements, 659; SHAEF limits CA operations to those required by, 679
- Military police schools (at Chickamauga), 17
- Military priorities: deplete Italian resources needed for civilians, 320-21, 336-37; waived during Italian food crisis, 316; AFHQ changes AFLRB to give civilian claims greater representation, 361; difficulties in French civilian life from, 734-35
- Military routes, aid of CAO's in keeping clear, 220
- Military Section, ACC, 257, 271-72
- Military zones, right of Allied Commander under CA agreements to declare certain areas as, 657, 717-18
- Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative, 850
- Mob violence, 241, 373-74, 385, 478
- Mobile CA operations: separated in Italy administratively from "static," 252-53; SHAEF adopts principle of, for liberated areas, 679
- Monaco, 764, 783-84
- Monte Casino, damage to, 418, 860
- Monuments, fine arts, and archives, protection of: proposed and aided by civilian organizations, 84-88; WD planning for, 85-90; Office of MFA&A Adviser to CCAO, AMG, set up, 87; German looting of art treasures, 869-70, 873-74; discussions and directives on Italy, 413-15; effort to minimize damage in Italy, 415-24; planning for ETO, 860-67; activities of MFA&A specialists in ETO, 768-75; appraisal of ETO record, 875-76
- Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Subcommittee, ACC, 293, 419, 422, 644. *See also* Education, Fine Arts and Archives Subcommittee.
- Morgan Line, 600n, 602
- Moscow Declaration on Italy, 371, 426-27, 430
- Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference, on peace treaty, 635
- Moscow Tripartite Conference of 1943: results in creation of Advisory Council for Italy, 255-58; Declaration on Italy, 430; considers CA plan for France, 772
- Naples: early problems of occupation, 240-41; conflicts of jurisdiction among CA agencies in, 266; typhus epidemic in, 322-26; restrictions on political activity in, liberalized, 435-39; retained under AMG due to logistic importance, 637; finally returned to Government, 638. *See also* Naples CLN *under* Committees of National Liberation.
- Naval Forces Subcommittee, ACC, 257
- Navy, U.S., co-operation of with Army, 204, 725, 731, 737-38, 766
- Navy Department: co-ordination between CAD and Occupied Areas Section of Navy, 72; JCAC created as formal medium of co-ordination, 73; represented on interdepartmental and combined CA agencies, 123, 132, 137
- Nazis, arrest or internment of, 177, 605
- Netherlands, The: draft agreement with changed by U.S., 659; guilders printed in Canada, 688; planning for, 821-23; liberation of southern Holland, 823-24; problems with collaborationists and resistance movements, 824; no centralized administration but aid

- from NMA, 824-26; civilian relief in liberated area and planning for relief in unliberated area, 826-32; complete liberation, civilian relief, and termination military phase, 832-34; DP assembly center near Eindhoven, 852; MFA&A work in, 874-75; Dutch concern over termination of military supply program, 894
- New Dealers, 23-24, 27, 124, 158
- New Policy toward Italy: meaning and scope of policy, 492-95; Italian pressures toward, 495-96; factors disposing Allies toward, 496-99; Hyde Park joint declaration, 499-500; Roosevelt's unilateral New Deal, 500-501; inability to increase supplies promptly, 501-05; delay also in relaxing political controls, 506-08; Macmillan works out specific proposals, 508-18; U.S. members think proposals too limited, 513-15; CCS directive on, 515-18; facilities granted for cultural contacts and interchange of learning with UN countries, 516, 523; granting 300-gram bread ration to all occupied Italy, 518-19; controls relaxed, 19-23; Government rehabilitation supply program, 24-25; further relaxation controls after hostilities end, 637-42
- Ninth U.S. Army, civilian supply problems of, 885-86
- Noninterference in foreign politics, principle of, 145, 440
- Normandy, occupation of, 722-30
- North African Economic Board (NAEB): constitution, 40-41; integrated with AFHQ, 40; reorganized, 40n; plan eventually to have the two Ministers supervise, 42; represented in Civil Affairs Section, AFHQ, 54; acts jointly with Army in Tunisian relief, 54; contemporary criticisms of, 57-59; not admitted into later MTO planning, 164; superseded by North Africa Joint Economic Mission, 58n
- North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), 74, 83
- North Italy Industrial Council, 577
- North Italy Industrial Price Fixing Board, 577-78
- North Italy Joint Advisory Committees, 558-59
- Northern France, occupation of: no CA directive on D-day, 697; lack of recognition leads De Gaulle to curtail number of liaison officers, 699, 707; CAO's in beachhead phase, 722-24; FCNL authority initially suspicious of CAO's, 709-10; FCNL becomes reassured and co-operative, 710-11; in local government CAO's work through French, 726-30; occupation of Cherbourg, 731-38; supply preparations for Paris, 738-42; liberation of Paris, 742-45; troop spending and anti-inflationary measures, 745-49; Zone of Interior created, 749-50; FCNL recognized as Provisional Government, 749. *See also* France, planning for.
- Northern France, planning for. *See* France, planning for.
- Northern Italy: importance and scope of problems, 550-54; planning for, 554-59; initial experiences and impressions are promising, 560-63; CLN's must be brought under control, 564-68; dispute with French over Aosta Valley, 568-71; establishing Italian system in provinces with German-speaking elements, 571-75; economic and supply problems, 525, 575-78; DP problem at end of hostilities, 579-83; delay in AC phase and in return of north to Government, 583-86
- Northwest Italy: planning for, as hiatus area, 555-58
- Norway: CA agreement with, 656-58; main issues of occupation, 835-36; issue of relief supplies for Soviet-occupied area, 840-42; CCS directive, 842-43; German surrender and arrival of CA authorities, 843; GOC Allied Land Forces Norway also heads SHAEF mission, 843; resistance forces found in control, 843-44; shortages of civilian supply relieved, 844-45; return of King and end of military phase, 846
- Occupation, idea of divisibility into military and post-military periods, 5, 19, 64-65, 104, 120, 143, 257
- Occupation costs, Italian: Italy's commitment to pay, 235; remission of, 646-47
- Occupational police: schools for, 80; decision not to use occupational police, 147
- Occupied Areas Section, Navy Department, 72
- Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC): plan for, and President's letter on, 62, 100-101; departments represented in, 101; difficulty of obtaining agreement among component agencies, 102-03; British will not approve entrance of OFEC agencies into theater, 104, 214-16; succeeded by FEA, 104-05. *See also* Civilian agencies (U.S.), plan for control of CA by.
- Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO): created, 38n; plans for North Africa, 53-54; acts jointly with Army in Tunisian relief, 54-55; Director urges central WD agency for CA liaison, 67-68; Director discusses relation of mission chief to theater commander, 89-90; and OFEC, 103; proposal to WD for joint supply program declined, 105-07; difficulty in obtaining supplies, 107-08. *See also* Lehman, Herbert H.
- Office of Foreign Territories (OFT): created to supervise North African program, 38n; organization and procedure developed by, 39-40. *See also* Appleby, Paul.
- Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA): President authorizes financing and procuring supplies for North Africa, 38; operational problems and difficulties, 39, 51-52, 58-61
- Office of Strategic Services: CAD links in with CA planning, 123; Director criticizes MG doctrine of retaining *status quo*, 145-46; prepares CA Guides, 371; and Italian partisans, 508
- Office of War Information, 55, 498, 522, 545
- OMAHA Beach, 725
- Operations Branch, G-5 Division, SHAEF: in May 1944 reorganization of G-5 Division, 677; divided into two groups, 680-81; abolished in March 1945, 864n. *See also* McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J. (Chief).
- Operations Division, WDGS: represented in WD committee for North Africa, 44; considered for control of CA, 67, 68n; represented in CAD, 68; handles communications of CAD to field commanders, 68; favors tactical commander's supremacy in CA, 168. *See also* Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T.; Tansey, Brig. Gen. Patrick H.
- Overlapping jurisdictions. *See* Co-ordination of CA agencies, inadequacies of.
- OVERLORD, effect of plan on CA policy in Italy, 217, 221
- Pantelleria, 191n, 595n, 638-39
- Paris: administrative and supply plans for, 738-42, 745; conditions in, on liberation, 742-43; experiences of CA detachment, 743-45
- Parri government. *See* Parri, Ferruccio.
- Partisans (patriots): difficulties in C. Italy, 459-60; origins and problems of policy toward, 526-32; difficulties of dealing with, 459-60, 532-35; decision to accept units in Italian Army, 535-37; partisans of N. Italy, 538-49, 559-61, 564-68. *See also* Committees of National Liberation; Northern Italy.
- Paternalism in CA, 277, 278, 493-94
- Patriot centers, 547-48
- Patriots Branch, ACC, 531n, 533

- "Payment by results," policy of, 233
- Peace Treaty with Italy: issue of punitive claims delays, 614; international conferences on, 635, 645; terms of, 612-13, 645; attitudes toward, 613, 645-46; Allied troops withdrawn after, 648
- Peninsular Base Section, 249, 266, 326, 440-41
- Personnel, CA: sources, 13-14, 20, 25; criteria of selecting, 10, 20, 22, 81-82; categories trained 19; quality of trainees 21-22, 24; number of trainees needed, 78-80, 83-84; numbers requested by theaters, 82-83, 163, 222, 871; high quality asked for, 222; numbers allocated, 164, 671, 675; shortages in field, 37, 51, 195, 217-18, 222, 227
- Philanthropic agencies, need for co-ordination of, 489-90
- Philippeville, DP camps at, 411
- Plan A (assumption of no enemy scorching): basis of combined supply program, 135n, 672, 682, 686; and supply planning for Holland, 821-23; expansion proposed, 889
- Planning Division, ASF, 77
- POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants): inclusion in combined supply program under fuel, 309, 682; shortages in occupied areas, 776, 836, 839, 879
- Police, local: initial uncertainty whether to use, in Sicily, 171; decision to use carabinieri and other local forces, 196; use in France and N.W. Europe, 735, 803. *See also* Carabinieri.
- Political activity in occupied areas, policy toward: initially prohibited in MG areas in Italy, 178, 435-37; political meetings permitted in Government territory, 438-39; more liberal policy adopted for MG territory, 439; policy liberalized further after hostilities end, 639-40; in liberated countries permitted in rear zones, 702
- Political advisers, issue of: Eisenhower asserts principle of theater commander's paramount authority, 32; status of American Minister, AFHQ, queried and clarified, 32, 40; State Department opposed to, in enemy areas, 95; Roosevelt precludes for COSSAC, 96; issue over Macmillan in administration of Sicily, 174-75; permitted on assumption of armistice control over Italy, 258-59. *See also* Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold; Murphy, Robert D.
- Political aims, CA: for Italy, 223, 614; in general in World War II, 370-75 *passim*; for European liberated countries, 653-54; for France, 662, 667-68
- Political Committee. *See* SACMED's Political Committee.
- Political and Economic Council (Joint), AFHQ, 41-42, 44, 214
- Political Intelligence Section, Hq AMG, 383-84
- Political parties, Belgian, 805-09 *passim*, 817-19 *passim*
- Political parties, Italian: resurgence of, in formation of anti-Fascist six-party Giunta, 431-35; six parties enter Badoglio government, 451-52; Rome parties represented in Bonomi government, 465-66; parties of north in Parri government, 621-22; Christian Democrats and more conservative parties get upper hand, 617, 618, 642. *See also* Political activity in occupied areas, policy toward.
- Political prisoners, release of, 178, 379
- Political questions, attitudes of soldiers toward: U.S. Army defer to civilian authorities in, 20, 144-45; Charlottesville School's hesitancy in, 23, 157-58; tendency not to take overt stand on, 157-58; CAO's enjoined to be neutral in, 440-42; tendency to postpone when controversial, 425-26; theater commanders express views on, when military interest is directly impinged upon, 46, 232, 442, 594, 600, 665, 669
- Political Section, ACC: channel of communication between UN governments and Italian, 260-61; also advisory, 268; advice on DP's, 268; abolished under New Policy when Italy resumes diplomatic relations, 515-20, 522. *See also* Reber, Samuel; Caccia, Harold.
- Political Section, AFHQ, creation of in London, 31n
- Political section, issue of, in planning for Sicily, 163n, 169-70
- Political subdivisions, conformity of CA organization to, 169, 283, 678
- Port detachments, CA, 775, 781n, 794, 837
- Posthostilities occupation of Italy: reasons for length of, 614; problems of, 614-49 *passim*
- Posthostilities planning: WD representation in, 135-36, 144; civilian agencies concerned with, 135, 144
- Prefects, Italian: Roosevelt dissuaded from plan to replace with Allied officials, 171, 173; replaced with non-Fascists, 202; shortage of career officials compels choosing noncareer persons, 482
- President, ACC: Allied CinC *ex officio*, 258; makes Military Governor his representative in most functions, 264-65; Macmillan appointed Acting President, 508. *See also* Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force; Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold.
- President, U.S.: Roosevelt's attitude toward Army training program, 14, 18, 20, 22-28 *passim*; holds CA primarily a civilian task, 22; assigns leadership in CA to Secretary of State, 37-38; assigns OFRRO relief mission, 98; asks WD to co-operate in OFEC plan, 100; assigns supply mission to Army, 108-09; wishes CCAC promptly activated, 123; makes and withdraws claim to U.S. senior partnership in Sicily, 165-67; favors direct rule, 171; wants military administration in Sicily, France, and COSSAC, 95-96, 175; applies unconditional surrender principle to Italy, 222, 224; opens Fort Ontario to 1,000 refugees, 411; wishes to protect historic buildings, 413; favors demands of Italian anti-Fascist parties, 444-45; yields to Churchill to preserve Anglo-American harmony, 445; on significance of liberation of Rome, 459; has faith in Italian Government despite Rome violence, 478; joins Churchill in Hyde Park declaration on Italy, 499-500; promises Italy economic aid and seeks higher bread ration, 500-501; Truman appeals to De Gaulle in Aosta Valley crisis, 570; expresses U.S. interest in Italy's economic stability, 628; after U.S. troops are withdrawn, expresses continuing U.S. interest in Italy's independence, 648; Roosevelt will not recognize FCNL, 663; directs Eisenhower not to consider exclusive relation with FCNL, 667-68; approves conditionally inviting De Gaulle to London, 669; wishes Eisenhower to inform De Gaulle that recognition is precluded, 670; firm on French currency issue, 709; urges Churchill to avoid unilateral action on FCNL, 713; willing to accept FCNL as *de facto* authority, 714; Truman wishes Army supply mission to end, 893-94. *See also* Roosevelt, Franklin D.; Truman, Harry S.
- Press and radio, control of, in Italy, 180, 437-38, 470, 522
- Price control in Italy, 347-48, 350-53, 559, 576
- Price Group, ACC, 351-52
- Prime Minister, British: expresses hope British will be senior partner in Sicily, 167; withdraws request, 167-68; favors indirect rule, 175; wants Macmillan to remain, 175; exhorts Sforza to support King, 430; speech against premature political change, 443-44; urges Roosevelt to postpone change till Rome is taken, 445; shows forgiveness toward Italy, 497-98; joint declaration with Roosevelt on New Policy, 499; tells President his promises to Italy were speculative, 501; on problem of currency for France, 708-09; suggests Roosevelt reconsider position on FCNL, 712; but promises to avoid unilateral action, 713-14. *See also* Churchill, Winston S.

- Prisoners of war: question of status for partisans, 449, 546-47; proposed abolition of status of "cooperative" Italian POW's, 516, 523n; use of Italian POW's as laborers in S. France, 778-79; German troops surrendered in Norway not treated as, 845; repatriation of, at end of hostilities, 579, 643
- Prisoners of War Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 268
- Proclamations: AMGOT's, 187; Military Governor's in Sicily, 190-91; Eisenhower's in Sicily, 190; Military Governor's in Italy as revised, 498; in liberated countries issued normally through indigenous authorities, 702, 724-25; matters covered in, 735
- Propaganda: governed by CCS directives, 178; INC, AFHQ, handles, 180; to Italians after Mussolini's dismissal, 224-25; PWB's Italian Newspaper, 281-82; change of line on partisans, 531-32
- Property Control (Controller): in Italy, 187, 282-83, 293, 469-70; in ETO left to indigenous authorities, 695-96
- Property Control Subcommittee, ACC, 257-293, 469-70
- Provincial administration (ACC/AMG): AMGOT revives in Sicily, 200-202; use of indirect control, 280-81; pre-Fascist provincial organs restored, 284-85, 304; temporary regulations for appointing functionaries, 285-86. *See also* Local government; Defascistization.
- Provincial Commissioners (Allied), role of under ACC, 270
- Provisional Government of France: FCNL proclaims itself and is recognized by some governments, 699; exercises governmental functions in France from outset, 709-10, 749; CA agreement followed by recognition of, by U.S. and U.K., 749-50; terminates military delegations, 796. *See also* French Committee of National Liberation; France, occupation of.
- Provost Marshal General's Office: assigned responsibility for advance training, 8-9; opens School of Military Government, 10-11; establishes Military Government Division, 16-18; aim of WD leadership in CA, 16; not at sufficiently high level for mission, 68; superseded by CAD in control of CA, 68. *See also* Gullion, Maj. Gen. Allan W.; Miller, Col. Jesse I.
- Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ, 282, 361, 438, 438n, 470, 521-22, 531-32
- Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, 699
- Public health: basic ration determined in light of, 133; endangered by food shortage, 311, 828-29; Naples typhus epidemic, 322-26; typhus control transferred from AMG to ACC, 326; malaria control and malaria at Anzio, 327; AMGOT organization and policies for, 335-36; work of AMG medical officers, 338-39; regulation of prostitution in France, 736; medical preparations for liberation of Paris, 741-42; reporting on communicable disease, 335, 786
- Public Health Division, AMGOT, 311, 334-36
- Public Health Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 293, 323, 325-26, 339
- Public Relations Officers (PRO), 360, 765-66
- Public relief: civilian supplies to be distributed free among indigent, 53, 147; AMGOT policies of, 333-34; supervision of Italian public relief agencies, 335; co-ordination of provincial agencies, 336; AMG standards of public relief assistance, 336-37; CAO's make welfare surveys in France, 786. *See also* Welfare departments, Italian.
- Public safety: held second only to safety of occupying troops, 186; Mafia and subversive movements in Sicily, 210; anti-Fascist violence, 385; SACMED declares higher food ration essential to public order, 502-03; troubles with partisans, 564-68; perils if too few troops left in Italy, 624, 626; procedures in Cherbourg, 736; problems with elements of FFI, 770-72; differing points of view about, in Seventh Army, 794-95; unlawfulness among Belgian resistance forces, 803-04. *See also* Carabinieri; Police, local; Civil Affairs Police Officers.
- Public Safety Division, AMGOT, 182, 312, 377
- Public Safety Officers, Allied, 534, 735-37, 794-95
- Public Safety Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 293, 360, 534, 584
- Public works and utilities: severe damage to, in Italy, 240-41, 340-41; supplies for rehabilitation made available, 500, 516, 524; CAO's and repair of, 734, 769; proper responsibility of CAO's for, discussed, 792
- Public Works and Utilities Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 293, 655
- QUADRANT (Quebec) Conference, 132n, 697
- Quartermaster General, U.S. Army, The, 76, 518n
- Quartermaster sections, 774, 783, 878
- R-Day, plans for, 648
- Railways, AMGOT responsibilities for, in Sicily, 204. *See also* Transport.
- RANKIN plans, 98, 98n, 663, 698
- Rapid advance, CAO's in periods of, 192-94, 756-62
- Ration, food: U.S.-U.K. agreement on 2,000 calories, 133; disagreement on precise content compromised, 133; higher in Italy for civilians employed by Allied forces, 317; ration scales in Italy, 317-18, 755; target figures never met, 318
- Ration cards: effort to eliminate illegal holders, 359; given out in civilian registration, 737
- Rationing in Italy: existing controls initially retained, 348; found too broad and curtailed to a few essentials, 351-52
- Red Cross: American, 53, 410, 412, 489, 850; British, 412, 489, 819; Italian 330, 331, 412; International Red Cross Joint Relief Committee, 830
- Referendum, Italian. *See* Institutional question, Italian.
- Refugee Field Section, AMG Fifth Army, 307, 329-30
- Refugee Field Section, AMG 15th Army Gp, 329
- Refugees: problem first serious in advance beyond Naples, 328; unreadiness and improvisation, 328-29; plans drawn up and agencies created, 329-30; Italian help conscripted, 330-31, 482-83; methods of handling in spring advance, 331-33; in XX Corps area CA detachments aid 40,000, 854-55
- Regional Commissioners (RC), 267-68
- Regional Control and Military Government Section, ACC, 268-69
- Regional organization, ACC/AMG: Italian *compartimento*, geographic basis of, 222n; regions created initially, 222; divided between Hq AMG and AMG 15th AGp, 253; CCAO 15th AGp defines spheres wherein RC's must consult Hq, 263; AC Hq creates section to co-ordinate regions, 268-69; regional control in MG Rear territory, 269-70; regions established as of August 1944, 270. *See also* Lush, Brig. M. S. (Vice President, RC&MG Section).
- Registration, of civilian populations: for Italians wanting work, 202-03; for ration cards in France, 737
- Rehabilitation supplies: distinction between, and relief supplies, 344n; types permissible in initial supply program very limited, 344; need for, felt increasingly in Italy, 361-64; program for Italy proposed and authorized, 516-17, 524-25; becomes basis of UNRRA program, 525n; in Combined supply program for ETO, 681-82

- Republic, vote of Italians for, 633
- Republican Fascist government: created in Rome under German auspices, 231, 472; policies on dismissal of officials of, 387-89; AC retains certain decrees of, favorable to labor in N. Italy, 578; Italian Social-Fascist Party continues underground propaganda during Allied occupation of N. Italy, 563
- Requisitioning, military: right of, preserved in territory returned to Italian Government, 237; ACC criticisms of extent of, 360; measures taken to give claims of civilian economy more weight, 360-61; CA agreements provide for exercise where possible through national authorities, 657-58; to be exercised through French whenever possible, 702; CCS instruct SCAEF to resort to, sparingly in France, 716; difficulties with French over interpretation of CA agreement, 789, 792; discussion of best method of, 792
- Resistance organizations, French. *See* French Forces of Interior; *Francs Tireurs et Partisans Français*.
- Resistance organizations in northwest Europe: initially resist disarmament in Belgium, 805-09; Holland organizations contend with NMA, 824; discipline shown by in Norway, 843-45
- Rockefeller Foundation Medical Staff, 326-27
- Roman Catholic Church in Italy: CCS enjoin respect for position, 178; helpfulness in Sicily, 208-09; CAO philosophizes about, 209; co-operative relations with Vatican, 458, 461, 463-64
- Rome: importance of capture to CA plans, 238, 454; planning for, 457-58; first forty-eight hours in, 458-61; problems of occupation, 461-64; Government moves to, 467-68; move enables Government to assume broader role, 469-71
- Rotterdam, undernourishment in, 833
- SACMED's Economic Committee, 576
- SACMED's Political Committee, 457, 470, 475, 492-93, 540-42, 576, 592-93
- SACMED's Political Conference, 507-08, 576-77
- Salerno: Fifth Army invasion and CAO's at, 220, 228; move of Government to, 290n, 291; inadequacy of facilities, 467-68
- San Marino, 483n
- Sardinia: RC sent to, pending activation of ACC, 230; Soviet official criticizes slow defascistization, 387
- Scheda Personale*, 383-84, 386, 386n. *See also* Defascistization.
- Scorching, enemy: extensive and serious in Italy, 340-41, 364-65, 368; plans for partisans to minimize in the north, 538; supply plans for ETO assume sudden enemy collapse and no scorching, 681-82; in France and N. W. Europe, 762, 821, 823
- Second British Army: relations with French administration in N. France, 709-10, 726-27; SCAO decries extent of Army's CA burdens in Holland, 826. *See also* Lewis, Brig. R.M.H. (SCAO).
- Secretary of State, U.S.: assigned leadership in CA economic and relief phases, 37-38; accepts Murphy's subordination to CinC's authority, 43; approves CAD's initiative in drafting plans, 98; on economic and supply aid to Europe, 152, 366; opposes senior partnership in Sicily, 166; disavows for U.S. Mason-MacFarlane's representation on Sforza, 455; Grew wishes AMG in disputed Italian areas, 590-91; statement of Byrnes on peace conferences and treaty, 646; Hull discusses British policy on FCNL, 662-63. *See also* Hull, Cordell; Byrnes, James F.
- Secretary of War: and Army training program, 11, 20, 22, 24, 25; believes CAD should report to him, 68; interest in MFA&A project, 87; accepts President's OFEC plan with misgiving, 102; on limitations upon Army's civilian supply program, 152-53, 366, 503, 519; favors equal partnership in Sicily, 166; favors military franc in France, 690. *See also* Stimson, Henry L.
- Security (informational): held endangered if all civilian agencies admitted into planning, 70, 97, 134n; precludes advance notice to FCNL on invasion, 698
- Security, Italian: statements of U.S. interest in, 614, 627-28; question of forces needed to protect, after hostilities end, 624-25
- Security of occupying forces: main purpose of AMGOT proclamation, 187; military courts try Italian civilians endangering, 375-76; *Tribunaux aux Armées* in France, 727
- Self-determination, political: Moscow Declaration on eventual restoration to Italy, 430; seems to preclude recognizing FCNL, 662, 670
- Self-governing capacity, rehabilitation of, in Italy; Allied aim of and methods, 275-79 *passim*; on local level, 279-87; on level of central government, 288-305
- Senior Civil Affairs Officers (SCAO): head AMG's in larger military units, 180, 270; head AMG in Italian provinces, 262; question of degree of independent action allowable to, in provinces, 262. *See also* Benson, Gp Capt. C. E.; Hume, Brig. Gen. Edgar Erskine; Bowman, Col. Alfred C.; Lewis, Brig. R.M.H.; Poletti, Col. Charles.
- Senior partnership: U.S. and U.K. claims and retractions over Sicily, 165-68; for U.S., favored by International Division in combined supply planning, 131; CAD opposes, 131; Americans fear British preponderance in AMG and ACC, 168, 271-74 *passim*
- Separatist movements: in Sicily, 435-36; in Bolzano, 571-75; minority rights in Bolzano, 573-74, 639; threat of separatism among radicals of N. Italy, 621
- Service Subcommissions, ACC, 516, 644. *See also* Air Forces, Land Forces, Naval Subcommissions.
- Seventh U.S. Army: as 343 Force, plans for Sicily, 180; in invasion of Sicily, 192-202 *passim*; directive to on S. France, 701-03; revised CA plan for France, 703-05; operations in France, 751-86 *passim*
- SENTANT Conference, 663-64
- SHAEF. *See* Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- SHAEF Field Handbook of Civil Affairs, 686-87, 704, 848-49
- SHAEF Handbook of Standard Policy and Procedure, 672, 679, 686, 704, 863-64
- SHAEF Missions: France, 749-50; Belgium, 551-52, 804-06, 820; Luxembourg, 809-12; Netherlands, 821-22, 826, 832-33; Denmark, 835, 837-38; Norway, 843. *See also* Allied Land Forces Norway.
- Shipping, shortage of, for imports: 50-51, 358, 363, 503-04, 506, 525, 565, 685
- Shipping (and Ports) Subcommission ACC, 257, 268, 293, 644
- Shipping and Supply Subcommittee (British committee), AT/E, 120n, 133n
- Shrivenham Civil Affairs Center, 675n, 800
- Sicily: political factors involved in planning, 157-60; Eisenhower raises basic problems, 160; AFHQ Appreciation and Outline plan, 161-63; issues debated, 163-75; CCS directive, 176-80; final planning and creation of organizations, 180-87; operations as first test of military administration, 188-89; beachhead and assault phases, 190-99; AMGOT headquarters set up and provincial administration restored, 200-203; problems of rehabilitating civilian life, 203-08; relations with Sicilians, 208-11; difficulties in learning to delegate responsibility, 211-13; plan for en-

- trance of civilian agencies miscarries, 214-16; becomes Region I and comes under Hq AMG, 253; food shortage, 203-04, 309-10; returned to Government, 298; efforts to improve amassment, 360-61
- 6th Army Group: relieves Seventh Army in S. France, 787; incorporates CA personnel of Seventh Army, 787; and DP's, 786
- Sinclair-Young estimates (of European food needs), 133
- Sloveness, difficulties with, in Venezia Giulia, 603-13 *passim*
- Soap, inclusion of, in supply program, 339, 683
- Social insurance benefits, 201-02, 367, 791-92
- Southern France, occupation of: general characteristics, 751-53; final organizational changes, 753-55; first ten days, 756-62; problems in troubled areas, 762-67; liaison offices, 767-69; disarming undesirable elements in FFI, 770-72; black market, 772-73; transport, 773-77; labor, 777-81; civilian supply, 754-55, 766, 773-75, 781-85, 792-93; food shortage, 781-85; DP's and refugees, 786; SHAEF and 6th AGp take over, 787-88; lessons learned, 789-96
- Southern France, planning for. *See* France, planning for.
- Southern Line of Communications, activation of 787-88
- Sovereignty: in question of return of territory to Italian Government, 297; military currency in France seen as violating, 689, 694
- Soviet Union: opposes lightening Italian armistice terms, 233; wishes political control of Italy in international commission, 255-56, 259; represented in Advisory Council, 258; also in ACC, 260, 449; criticizes delay in defascistization, 387; suddenly exchanges representatives with Italy, 446; move weakens Allied political position, 446-49; forces Allies to support noncommunist leftist parties, 450-51; no forcible repatriation of DP citizens to, 582; moderating influence on Tito hoped for, 593; supports Tito in claim to Venezia Giulia, 613, 635n; reparations from Italy, 645. *See also* Communism; Vishinsky, Andrei Y.; Bogomolov, Alexander E.
- Spearhead currency, 688-90. *See also* Allied military currency.
- Specialist officers: training, 14-21 *passim*, 79-83 *passim*; in theaters, 486, 521, 704-05, 769, 790-91
- Specialist Reserve Section, ORC, 79
- State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 98n, 842n
- State of Siege laws; U.S. objection to, as basis of CA agreement with Netherlands, 659; French invoke, on liberation of France, 729
- Subversive (Special) Operations, MTO (SOMTO), 411, 538-41, 544-45
- Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED): title assumed by Wilson upon succeeding Eisenhower, 265n; on political demands of Naples Giunta, 442-45, 448, 450; on need for higher bread ration, 502-04; proposes liberalization supply policy, 369, 505-06; asks for directive on New Policy toward Italy, 506-07; extends 300-gram bread ration to all occupied Italy, 519; views on CLNAI and agreement with, 540-42; on treatment of partisans, 546; Aosta Valley issue with French, 568; on Venezia Giulia and Tito, 592-98 *passim*, 600-601; on return of N. Italy to Government, 585-86, 637-38; on posthostilities Italian security problems, 624-26; on supply continuing in posthostilities period, 628-29; office to be continued till peace treaty, 635; assigned responsibility for S. France in initial phase, 701; directive to Seventh Army, 701-03; relieved of responsibilities in S. France, 788. *See also* Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland; Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold; Morgan, Maj. Gen. William D.
- Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF): Eisenhower assumes post January 1944, 265; wants to collaborate with FCNL in planning for France, 665-68; proposes inviting De Gaulle to London, 669; remarks to CA personnel before invasion, 679-80; civilian supply estimates for ETO, 681-82; on need to use U.K. stockpiles, 683; recommends recognizing French Provisional Government, 749-50; appeals to Belgian resistance to disarm, 805; on relief for Holland, 828; enjoins respect for historic monuments and archives, 864-65, 867; on Red Cross clothing for Europe, 882; relieved of supply responsibility, 893-94. *See also* Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.
- Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF): main issues of CA planning, 671-72; planning of headquarters organization, 673-74, 676-77, 680-81; planning for field organization, 677-79; civilian supply planning, 681-87; currency and financial planning, 687-96; delegates to SACMED responsibility for S. France in initial phase, 701; reports on negotiations and final agreement with FCNL, 711-15; revised directive on S. France, 716-17; assumes control in S. France, 787-88; directive on Belgium, 800-801; directive on Holland, 822; directives to SHAEF Missions, 800-801, 837-38, 842-43; instructions on DP's, 851-52, 854-56; on MFA&A, 863-64, 866-67; on civilian supply, 881-82, 884-91 *passim*
- Tables of Organization (T/O), 17, 163, 412, 423, 675, 703, 703n, 754, 794, 861, 871
- Tactical commanders: WD wishes supremacy of, over CA organization, 168-69; praise work of CAO's, 203; sometimes not appreciative, 45, 198, 743; SHAEF to relieve of CA duties as soon as possible, 678
- Taxation: CCS authorizes maintaining Italian laws on, 179; restoration of machinery for, in Sicily, 202; tax laws maintained except for *contributi sindacati*, 356; tax reform in Italy not enforced, 356
- Technical services: insufficient appreciation for CA supplies alleged, 321; better co-ordination of, with CA supply officers recommended, 321
- Teheran Conference, 697
- Theater commanders, CA authority of: overrides that of political functionaries in theater, 43-44; over all CA matters in theater during period of military responsibility, 99; over civilian agencies in theater during such period, 99; right to determine when military conditions permit termination of his final authority, 257
- Third U.S. Army: DP's, 849; civilian supply, 885-87
- 13th Corps, Eighth Army: in Sicily, 188; responsible for AMG in Venezia Giulia, 605-13 *passim*. *See also* Harding, Lt. Gen. Sir John; Bowman, Col. Alfred C. (SCAO); Venezia Giulia.
- Tizi Ouzou, MG Holding Center, 164
- Training, development of Army program: marked by debate over military versus civilian control of CA, 3-6; question of WD agency to handle advance training, 7-8; assigned to PMGO, 8-9; Charlottesville School established, 10-11; found inadequate and broader program planned, 12-21; President and others have misgivings, 21-25; WD retains jurisdiction over training but debate continues, 25-29; expansion of program, 78-84. *See also* Charlottesville School of Military Government; Civil Affairs Train-

- ing Schools; Specialist Officers; Training Program, Far East; Training Curriculum.
- Training centers, theater. *See* Bouzaréa; Chrea; Courbet-Maine; Eastbourne; Shrivenham; Tizi Ouzou; Wimbledon.
- Training curriculum: at Charlottesville, 10-11, 21-22; for specialists, 79-83
- Training program, Far East, 83-84
- Transport: AMGOT responsibilities for public transportation in Sicily, 204, 204n; Sicilian experience shows CAO's need own transport, 198; seen as decisive in civilian supply, 301; depletion and damage in Italy, 364-65, 368; trucks provided for Italy, 204, 313, 482, 500, 556; Allied aid for rehabilitation of Italian transport, 500, 516, 524; ETO supply program includes materials for initial repairs, 682; shortage in ETO, 775-76, 806, 882; trucks provided for France and N.W. Europe, 684-85, 776-77, 887; policies on use of trucks by French, 879-80; organization of local trucking companies, 204, 482, 500, 776-77, 878-80, 878n
- Transportation Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 268, 294, 309n, 316, 482, 484, 580-81
- Trento, 552, 554-55, 572, 574
- TRIDENT Conference, 125n
- Trieste, 591-613 *passim*, 646
- Tunisia, civilian relief in, 52-54
- Tunisia Committee, 42
- Tunisian Detachment, 54-55
- Twelfth Army Group: Paris plan of, 739-41; G-5's impressions of Paris, 742-43; deals directly with Luxembourg Government on CA, 819; civilian supply shortage develops in areas of, 885-86; to alleviate SHAEF will designate ComZ allocations for Army Gp, 886-87
- XX Corps, handling of 40,000 evacuees by, 854-55
- 21st Army Group: responsible initially for CA in N. France, 667; shares planning for CA with SHAEF, 697; defines policy on issuance of proclamations, 724-25; civilian supply problem in Holland, 826, 828-30; instructions on use of MFA&A officers, 862, 865; civilian supply situation of, 884-85
- Typhus Commission, U.S., 324-25
- Udine, 575, 585, 627n, 638, 641
- Unconditional surrender principle, 219-20, 222, 224
- Under Secretary of War: in efforts to establish and defend WD's CA jurisdiction 17-19, 26; acts in broad CA policy matters, 66. *See also* Patterson, Robert W.
- Unemployment: in N. Italy due to lack of fuel, 576; in Belgium, 806
- United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC), 489, 518
- United Nations Declaration, influence on CA policies, 38
- United Nations nationals: aid to, in occupied areas, 408; special aid to U.K. and U.S. nationals, 408
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA): committed to relief of all United Nations in need from war, 108; legal difficulties preclude early sharing of Italian burden, 108; to operate only by military invitation in military period, 111; can present views through *Ad Hoc* Economics Committee, 111; Council authorizes relief program for Italy, 499n; gradually able to increase relief in Italian DP operation, 413, 583, 643; delayed in taking over Italian supply responsibility from WD, 345, 616, 628, 643; supply program for Italy follows FEA's, 525, 629n
- United States Commercial Company (USCC): 489, 518
- United States posthostilities aid programs: military supply programs continue several months, 627, 894; FEA program for Italy, 628-29; supply aid to Free Territory of Trieste, 613; supply programs under Public Law 84, 646; renunciation of war claims against Italy, 646-47
- Universities, CA training at, 13, 17, 19-20, 79-84
- UTAH Beach, 731
- Venezia Giulia: political principle versus military pragmatism in issue of, 587-89; Allies wish AMG in all of, to settle Yugoslav claims at peace conference, 590-91; Tito will accept only in LoFC to Austria, 591-92; SACMED tries to find basis for compromise, 592-95; Tito's defiant occupation and Allied reactions, 599-600; Belgrade Agreement and division of Allied-Yugoslav areas of occupation, 599-603; Allies discontinue Yugoslav committee system, 603-07; AMG institutes new system of local government, 607-12; Peace Treaty creates Free Territory of Trieste, 612-13; treaty plans fail to continue and Allied MG must continue till final settlement, 613. *See also* Harding, Lt. Gen. Sir John; Bowman, Col. Alfred C.
- Vice-presidents, ACC Sections: are senior officers of sections, 257; deputy vice-presidents of opposite nationality, 258
- Vichy government: issue of annulling discriminatory laws in North Africa, 46; break with Vichy legal succession when Darlan assassinated, 48; SCAEF directed to have no relations with, in France, 668; French themselves remove adherents, 702, 742
- Volunteers of Liberty (*Voluntari della Libertà* Corps of CLNAL), 529, 541-42
- Wage controls, 348-51 *passim*, 578
- Wage supplements, 578
- War criminals, 178, 223
- War Department, attitudes in, toward Army's CA role: assertion of Army's primary role during period of military necessity, 3-6 *passim*, 12-21, 57-59, 63-65; 91-95 *passim*; desire for military control of civilian supply, 56-59 *passim*, 73-75, 109; desire for aid of civilian government and private agencies, 13-21 *passim*, 27-29, 85-87; wish to limit CA commitments, 139-54 *passim*; deferment to civilian authorities in politico-economic policies, 144-45; goal of earliest possible turnover to civilian agencies, 142-44, 345, 487-91 *passim*
- War Department, organization of, for CA: decentralization of functions prior to World War II, 7-8; progress toward centralization with creation of MGD, 16, 18; decision to centralize further and on higher level, 66-68. *See also* Civil Affairs Division, WDSS.
- War Department, statements of, on MG policy, 19-20, 64-65
- War Department committee for French North Africa, 44n
- War Materials Disposal (and Prisoners of War) Subcommittee, ACC, 257, 579
- War Refugees Board, 412
- War Shipping Administration, 28, 38, 501, 629
- Washington: location of CCS in, 119; makes location of CCAC there seem reasonable, 119
- Welfare aims, limitations on, 153-54, 339
- Welfare Branch, Public Health Subcommittee, ACC, 339
- Welfare departments, Italian, 336-38
- Wimbledon Civil Affairs Staff Center, 799
- Withdrawal operations, principles of CA for, 817
- World War I, CA issues in, 6-7

Yalta Conference, 558

Yellow seal dollars; used initially in MTO, 178, 229; use in ETO favored by U.S. Treasury, 688-89; not used because of U.K. Treasury and SHAEF opposition, 688, 690

Yugoslavia: relief planned for, 150; represented on Advisory Council for Italy, 259n; Yugoslav internees in Italy, 405-10 *passim*; issue with Tito over Ven-

ezia Giulia, 587-602 *passim*; obtains zone in Venezia Giulia in peace treaty, 612; most of Venezia Giulia given to, in final settlement, 613n. *See also* Venezia Giulia.

Zone of Interior, France: provisions concerning, in CA agreement on France, 717-18; establishment of, 749-50

# Index of Persons

- Aaronson, Lt. Col. Henry, 700, 786  
 Acheson, Dean, 105, 110, 149, 345  
 Acquarone, Duke of, 431-32  
 Adcock, Gen. Clarence L., 784  
 Aldisio, Salvatore, 361, 452  
 Alexander, Maj. Archibald S., 744  
 Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold, 162n, 166, 180, 182, 190, 191n, 250-51, 253, 264-65, 288, 298, 310, 312-13, 335, 360-61, 421, 457, 469, 493-94, 496, 503-04, 519, 538, 552, 568-71, 585-86, 587-98 *passim*, 599-600, 605-06, 624, 626, 628, 700  
 Alibertu, General, 239  
 Altmeyer, Arthur J., 27  
 Ambrosio, General, 231  
 Amendola, Signor, 440  
 Ames, Maj. John D., 192  
 Amonn, Erich, 572-73  
 Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 97  
 Antolini, Anthony, 469, 565, 576  
 Ansiaux, Hubert, 696  
 Appleby, Paul, 39-40, 142-43  
 Arangio, Ruiz, 440  
 Armstrong, Lt. Col., 599, 607, 611-12  
 Ashworthy, Maj. Robert L., 193  
 Aubrac, Raymond, 698, 761, 766, 774, 779, 783-84  
 Auer, Col. Henry A., 8  
 Azzi, Gen. Arnaldo, 479  
 Azzolini, Vincenzo, 472  
  
 Badoglio, Marshal Pietro, 219-21, 227-34, 236-40, 244-47, 259-60, 276-78, 288-91, 294-95, 298-301, 355, 358, 421, 425-35, 442, 446-452, 455, 457-58, 464, 495-96, 507  
 Bain, Col. Joseph T. R., 397  
 Balfour, Capt. R. E. L., 861  
 Barker, Maj. Gen. Ray W., 125, 128, 664, 666, 671  
 Bastianini, Guiseppe, 472  
 Batt, Maj. Wm. L., 700  
 Bauer, Richard, 480  
 Beaverbrook, Lord, 786  
 Bech, Joseph, 819  
 Beesley, Lt. Jesse C., 728-29  
 Bell, Daniel W., 716, 749  
 Bencivengo, Gen. Roberto, 454, 458  
 Bendetsen, Col. Karl R., 110, 136, 671  
 Bennett, Captain, 533  
 Bennett, Maj. Robert, 700, 775  
 Benson, Gp. Capt. C. E., 180, 195, 242-43, 272, 286, 436, 532-33  
 Bergeret, Gen. Jean Marie, 48  
 Berkeley, G. K., 309  
 Berle, Adolph A., Jr., 433  
 Bernhard, Prince, 824  
 Bernstein, Lt. Col. Bernard, 37, 45, 164, 350  
 Beucler, Brig. Gen. George, 458  
 Bevk, Signor, 610  
 Biddle, Col. Anthony D., 819  
 Birley, Wing Comdr. T. E. H., 125, 715  
 Bishop, Col. Harry A., 325  
 Blaskowitz, Gen. Johannes, 831-32  
 Board, Lt. Col. N. T., 358  
 Boettiger, Maj. John, 272  
 Bogomolov, Alexander E., 387, 447-49  
 Boisson, Pierre, 46  
 Bolles, Col. Lammell L., 164  
 Bonomi, Ivanoe, 356, 432-33, 455, 461, 465-67, 475n, 481, 496, 500, 538-39, 542-43, 543n, 565, 615, 621, 625, 631, 641  
 Bosworth, Lt. Col. Lawrence, 823  
 Bouchet, M., 731  
 Bourdin, M., 731  
 Bovenschen, Sir Frederick E., 135, 138, 149, 272, 660, 712-13, 798  
 Bowman, Col. Alfred C., 381, 486, 605-13 *passim*  
 Bowyer, Maj. Oscar R., 767  
 Boyd, Col. Paul B., 840-41  
 Braine, W. H., 399, 564-65, 575-76  
 Bracker, Mr., 513  
 Bredenburch, Mijnheer, 659  
 Brister, Lt. Col. F. M., 332  
 Britten, Colonel, 458  
 Broad, P., 508  
 Broadhead, Lieutenant, 757, 760  
 Brooke, Capt. T. H., 422  
 Brown, Colonel, 869  
 Brown, Gen. Thoburn, 478  
 Browning, Maj. Gen. L., 534, 537, 547n  
 Bruce, Lt. Col. David, 87  
 Brunetti, Gen. Brunetto, 480  
 Büchner, Dr., 874  
 Buckingham, Capt. R., 431  
 Buckley, Capt. R. W., 529, 532, 564-65, 575-76  
 Buhl, H. R., 838  
 Bullitt, William, 24-25  
 Bullock, Maj. T. D., 533, 547  
 Bullova, 1st Lt. A. M., 546  
 Bundy, McGeorge, 95  
 Burgess, Lt. Col. Carter L., 828n  
 Burnett, Lt. Col. Charles P., Jr., 89, 272n  
 Burrill, Col. Joseph R., 563  
 Burton, Harold, 53  
 Butterworth, Col. James E., 556-57  
 Bye, Lt. Col. Ernest, 535  
 Bygott, Col. J. F., 799, 804  
 Byrnes, James F., 104, 131, 553, 575, 586n, 635, 646  
  
 Caccia, Harold, 469  
 Cadorna, Gen. Raffaele, 544  
 Cairns, Huntington, 88  
 Campbell, Sir Ronald, 169, 174  
 Carretta, Donato, 478  
 Carmichael, Lt. Col. Albert A., 803  
 Carpentier, Maj. Gen. Marcel, 571  
 Carr, Brig. M., 361  
 Carreta, Donato, 478  
 Carroll, Col. C., 460-70  
 Carter, Brig. Gen. Arthur H., 37, 45  
 Caruso, Pietro, 478, 478n  
 Casenove, Brig. Gen. A. de L., 823  
 Casey, Mr., 175  
 Castellano, Gen. Guiseppe, 227n  
 Cate, Lt. Col. Karl S., 766, 787, 795  
 Chambers, Maj. Jo, 329

- Chanler, Lt. Col. William C., 181, 187, 200n, 206-08, 202-63, 392  
 Chapin, Sheldon, 707  
 Chapman Oscar, 27  
 Charles, Prince, of Belgium, 802, 805  
 Charles, Sir Noel, 428, 450, 465, 480-81, 508, 544  
 Charlotte, Grand Duchess, of Luxembourg, 811, 819  
 Chatel, Gen. Yves, 35, 49  
 Cheyne, Col. D. Gordon, 164, 334-6  
 Christian X, 836  
 Churchill, Winston S., 147, 160, 167-68, 173, 175, 426-30, 439, 443-45, 455, 467, 473, 478, 492-93, 497-501, 504, 506, 508, 519, 587-88, 591, 606, 688-89, 708-09, 712-14, 828  
 Cislser, Colonel, 802, 823  
 Clabaugh, Col. Samuel E., 266, 313-14, 362  
 Clark, Lt. Gen. John G. W., 320, 356, 489-90, 822n, 834  
 Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 36, 43, 47-48, 458, 503, 569, 595  
 Clasen, Andrew J., 819  
 Clay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D., 65, 68, 73-74, 77-79, 91, 108n, 109, 130n, 133, 147, 149, 151, 345, 684  
 Clayton, William L., 525, 894  
 Cleveland, Harlan, 479  
 Coates, Capt. John B., Jr., 868  
 Cochet, Gen. Henri, 698, 705-06, 756, 764n, 767-78, 776, 781, 791, 796, 872  
 Coe, Mr. (FEA), 111  
 Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 731  
 Conklin, Maj. Edward M. 78  
 Connor, Col. Voris H., 227n  
 Cooper, Duff, 706  
 Corson, John J., 27  
 Coulet, François, 709-10, 726, 728  
 Cox, Oscar, 52  
 Coxwell, Maj. Gen. N. A., 423-24  
 Coy, Wayne, 22  
 Cramer, Maj. Gen. Myron C., 9  
 Cranmer, Maj. Forrest, 700  
 Crichton, Col. E. H., 325-26  
 Cripps, Lieutenant Colonel, 417  
 Criswell, Maj. Raymond M., 803  
 Crittenger, Maj. Gen. William D., 569-70  
 Croce, Benedetto, 426, 432, 434, 444, 451  
 Crowley, Leo T., 109, 110, 522  
 Crosby, Mr., 418  
 Currie, Laughlin, 111  
  
 Daniels, Jonathan, 24, 27-28  
 Daniels, Josephus, 24  
 Darlan, Admiral Jean François, 30, 34, 36, 46-48, 232n, 445  
 D'Argenlieu, Adm. George Thierry, 732  
 D'Astière, de la Vifierie, 733  
 Davis, Elmer, 49  
 Davis, Gen. Thomas J., 884, 886-87  
 Dawson, Colonel [CLO], 381-82  
 Dayton, Kenneth, 67, 71  
 Deane, Brig. Gen. John R., 34  
 De Angelis, Col. Bruno, 572-73  
 De Beer, M., 184  
 De Chevigné, Col. Pierre, 709, 726, 728, 731-32  
 De Coursel, Commandant, 711  
 De Gasperi, Alcide, 613, 618, 621, 639n, 642n, 649  
 De Gaulle, Gen. Charles André Marie Joseph, 48, 96, 552, 569-70, 653, 655-56, 665, 673, 697-98, 705-15, 725-26, 742  
 Delsinc, Léon, 818  
 Demany, Fernand, 807  
 De Monsaber, Lt. Gen. Aimée de Goislard, 763  
  
 De Nicola, Enrico, 431-32, 444, 450, 467  
 De Tassigny, Gen. Jean de Lattre, 706, 767  
 Deutsch, Maj. Eberhard P., 722-24  
 Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 124, 274, 458, 659-60, 664  
 De Wald, Maj. E.T., 416n  
 Dewing, Gen. Richard H., 837-38  
 Dill, Sir John, 122, 124, 165, 274  
 Dillon, Col. Joseph Y. de P., 16  
 Di Napoli, Attilio, 452  
 Dinsmoor, Dr. William Bell, 84-88, 863  
 Dispy, Raymond, 807  
 Dixon, Maj. Campbell, 756  
 Doherty, Lt. Col. Walter, 283, 332-33, 534  
 Donomovich, Jovan, 405  
 Donovan, Brig. Gen. William J., 99, 145-46  
 Dort, Dallas, 488-89  
 Doyen, Lt. Gen. Paul, 552, 568-69, 571  
 Duff, Maj. Gen. Robinson E., 599  
 Dunlop, Brig. John K., 567, 571-72, 599-600  
 Dunn, Capt. Charles I., 272n, 561-62  
 Dunn, James C., 73, 129, 169-70, 174, 497, 659, 664, 716  
 Dupong, Pierre, 811  
 Dykes, Brigadier, 416  
  
 Ecke, Dr. [U.S. Typhus Commission], 326  
 Eden, Sir Anthony, 135, 165, 168, 245, 256, 433, 620, 712-13, 715  
 Edgerton, Maj. Gen. Glen M., 505  
 Edwards, Maj. Gen. J. K., 822  
 Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 23, 30-39 *passim*, 70-71, 88-89, 92, 95, 143-145, 148, 153, 160-61, 165-66, 169-70, 177, 190, 197, 214-16, 217-38 *passim*, 244-45, 249, 253-59, 271-72, 295-96, 307, 314-15, 417-18, 421, 426-27, 429, 432-33, 435, 654-56, 660, 665-72, 679-85, 697, 699, 706, 708-09, 712, 714-15, 788, 805-06, 809, 828, 830-31, 861, 864-69 *passim*, 890  
 Elliott, Maj. Sheldon, 700  
 Ellis, Maj. H. C., 488-89  
 Enrietto, Lt. Col. John, 843-45  
 Enthoven, MFA&A officer, 424  
 Ercoli. *See* Togliatti, Palmiro.  
 Erskine, Capt. David I., 533  
 Erskine, Maj. Gen. George W. E., 533, 797, 804-08, 818, 820  
 Escande, M., 783-84  
 Estéva, Vice-Adm. Jean Pierre, 35  
 Eve, Brigadier, 599  
 Ewsch, Maj. François, 811  
  
 Feildem, Brig., 852  
 Felix, Prince (of Luxembourg), 810  
 Feri (Communist partisan leader), 529  
 Findlay, Col. C. B., 412, 582  
 Finletter, Thomas K., 39, 53-54, 61, 74, 104, 107, 216  
 Finley, David, 86, 88  
 Fiske, Col. Norman, 473, 574  
 Foley, Col. Edward H., Jr., 394  
 Forestier, M., 849-50  
 Forrest, Maj. Maulsby, 107  
 Forrestal, James V., 73  
 Foulkes, Lt. Gen. C., 831-32  
 Fox, Brig. Gen. Leon A., 324, 326  
 Franks, Col. John B., 39, 51  
 Fraser, Col. Frank E., 819-20  
 Frederick, Maj. Gen. Robert T., 756, 764, 783-784  
 Frenay, M., 852  
 French, Col. C. H. A., 637  
 Freyburg, Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard C., 596n  
 Frignani, Guiseppe, 384

Gabler, Col. P. Earnest, 868  
 Gale, Maj. Gen. H. M., 40  
 Galloway, Brig. R. W., 326  
 Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H., 540  
 Garigue, Lieutenant, 533  
 Gayre, Lieutenant Colonel, 401, 403  
 Geddes, Maj. James R., 581-82  
 Geguen, M., 783-84  
 Gerbrandy, P. S., 827-28  
 Gerfen, Col. Roye P., 779  
 Germann, Capt. Ralph F., 470  
 Gerry, Col. Harvey S., 55, 253, 700, 703, 756, 791-94, 871  
 Gibson, Harvey, 733  
 Gilardi, Ferdinando Vicco, 572  
 Giolitti, Giovanni, 431  
 Girard, M., 770  
 Giraud, Gen. Henri Honoré, 34-36, 48-49, 653  
 Gluckstadt, Commander, 111  
 Godbold, Captain, 533  
 Goering, Reichmarschall Hermann, 873  
 Goetcheus, Captain, 816  
 Gordon, Lt. Col. D., 164  
 Gorman, Maj. Robert N., 164  
 Grady, Henry F., 271, 273, 319-20, 355n, 364, 390  
 Graham, Maj. Frederick K., 700  
 Grandi, Count Dino, 429  
 Grasett, Lt. Gen. Sir A. E., 148, 667, 676, 706, 711, 828, 879-80, 884-85  
 Gray, Brig. Gen. Carl R., Jr., 329  
 Greenbaum, Col. Edward S., 66  
 Greening, Maj. V. C., 798  
 Gregory, Maj. Gen. Edmund B., 76  
 Gresselin, Capt. Schuman, 731  
 Grew, Joseph C., 590-91, 634, 748, 749  
 Griffin, Maj. James H., 192  
 Grosetto, Michael J., 470  
 Gruenther, Maj. Alfred M., 458  
 Gueterbock, Brig. E. A. L., 864  
 Gueterbock, Brig. R. E., 295  
 Guidicelli, Lieutenant, 731  
 Gulick, Luther, 53  
 Gulley, Lt. Col. Edward J., 734  
 Gullion, Maj. Gen. Allen W., 9, 11, 14-16, 18-20, 23-24, 27-28, 65-68, 79-84, 91, 852-53  
 Gullo, Fausto, 452  
 Gunn, Col. Damon M., 191, 193, 741, 744, 810  
 Guzzy, Lieutenant Colonel, 795  
  
 Haakon VII, 842, 846  
 Halifax, Lord, 514, 690  
 Hall, Capt. J. O., 67  
 Hamblen, Brig. Gen. Archelaus L., 638-39, 644  
 Hamilton, Lt. Col. Robert M., 743  
 Hammett, Captain, 861, 869  
 Hammond, Capt. Mason, 87-88, 414-15, 861  
 Hammond, Col. Thomas W., Jr., 104, 124, 216, 227  
 Hancock, Col. A. N., 361  
 Hancock, Capt. Walker K., 861  
 Handy, Brig. Gen. Thomas T., 53, 68n, 136, 150-52, 224  
 Hansen, Brig. P. H., 843, 846  
 Harding, Lt. Gen. Sir John, 531, 538-39, 589, 599, 602, 611, 648  
 Harriman, W. Averell, 32  
 Harris, Mr. (British member of CCAC), 216  
 Harris, Lt. Col. Aaron E., 418, 423  
 Harrison, Brig. Gen. Wm. K., Jr., 50n  
 Hart, MFA&A officer, 424  
 Hartmann, S/Lt., 840  
 Haskell, Col. John H. F., 28-29, 54, 67-69, 86, 95, 165, 168, 174, 185  
 Hatch, Lt. Col. Azel, 817  
  
 Hathaway, Lt. Calvin S., 861  
 Hay, Lt. Col. M., 769  
 Henn, Brig. J. R., 582-83, 600  
 Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H., 62, 68, 71-76 *passim*, 81-88 *passim*, 93, 97-98, 102-13 *passim*, 119, 122, 125-27, 135-37, 154, 173, 176n, 271-72, 313, 315, 319, 358, 367, 422, 487, 489, 519, 522, 652, 659-60, 664-67, 673-74, 685, 690-91, 693, 716, 747, 863, 891  
 Hilliard, Lieutenant Colonel, 747-48  
 Hitler, Adolf, 224, 563, 870, 873-74  
 Holdsworth, Comdr. G. R., 539  
 Holmes, Brig. Gen. Julius C., 58, 95, 160n, 161-63, 184-85, 197-98, 203, 214, 229-30, 236, 238-40, 245-46, 254n, 294-95, 297n, 301n, 457, 666, 671, 674, 693, 708, 711-15, 746-47  
 Hoover, Col. Donald D., 387  
 Hopkinson, H. L. d'A., 542, 573-74, 621  
 Hopkins, Harry, 20, 27, 591  
 Horne, Admiral Frederick J., 72-73  
 Howe, Col. Mark de W., 700, 771  
 Howley, Lt. Col. Frank O., 730n, 732, 743-44  
 Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 324  
 Hull, Cordell, 28, 30, 36-37, 43-44, 53, 62, 91, 98, 100, 104, 144-45, 152, 166-67, 245, 271, 455, 655, 662-63, 668, 690  
 Hull, Maj. Gen. John E., 170  
 Hull, Capt. Roger F., 816  
 Hulls, Col. L. R., 329-31  
 Hume, Brig. Gen. Edgar Erskine, 241, 247, 281-82, 317, 379, 384-86, 404, 422, 438-40, 454, 458-61, 486-87, 563, 566-67  
 Hunt, Col. Irwin L., 6-7  
 Hyneman, Charles S., 21, 29, 82  
 Hynes, Lt. Col. J. H., 131  
  
 Ickes, Harold L., 23n, 25-28  
 Ingresso, Gustavo, 287  
 Innocenti, General, 239  
 Irish, Lt. Col. Wynot R., 191-92  
 Italo (partisan leader), 544  
  
 Jaconini, Francesco, 472  
 Jacquinet, Louis, 733  
 James, Macgill, 86  
 Jackson, Gardner, 22  
 Jaujard, M., 868  
 Jean, Prince (of Luxembourg), 819  
 Jenkinson, Lt. Col. Hilary, 418  
 Jenny, Col. E. Ross, 843  
 Johnson, Lt. Col. E. A. J., 843-44  
 Johnson, Maj. Gen. Harry H., 458  
 Jones, Brig. S. O., 812  
 Joyce, Maj. Gen. Kenyon A., 239, 258, 289-90, 295, 316, 438  
 Juin, Gen. Alphonse, 35, 570-71, 749  
 Jung, Guido, 288  
 Justis, Lieutenant (36th Div. Seventh Army), 757  
  
 Keagwin, Major (CAO), 207  
 Keller, Capt. Deane, 378  
 Kennedy, Maj. Russell, 770-71, 773, 794-95  
 Kenny, Maj. Raymond, 330  
 Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, 446  
 Kesselring, Feldmarschall Albert, 511  
 Keyes, Maj. Allen L., 488-89  
 Kilroe, Colonel, 191  
 Kincaid, Lt. Col. James T., 281  
 King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., 860  
 King, Col. Morris C., 411  
 Kirby, Maj. Gen. S. W., 799

Kirk, Alexander, 365-66, 500, 508, 540, 544, 593, 598, 625-26, 632, 634  
 Kirkwood, Col. Robert G., 409  
 Knecht, Capt. John J., 722-24  
 Knight, Executive Officer Region III, AMG  
 Knox, Frank, 18  
 Koenig, Lt. Gen. Pierre, 669, 699, 705-06, 710-11, 715n, 741  
 Kolgore, Captain, 773  
 Komer, Lt. Robert W., 755  
 Konsbruck, Maj. Guill, 811, 819  
 Kraege, Colonel, 329  
 Kronacker, M., 818, 887, 892-93  
 Kruls, Maj. Gen. H. J., 833  
  
 Laan, Captain, 824  
 La Farge, Capt. Louis B., 861, 867  
 La Guardia, Fiorella H., 55, 56, 59n  
 Laidlaw, Col. R. F. E., 843  
 Lalmand, Edgar, 818  
 Landon, Col. O. R., 885-86  
 Lang, Will, 418  
 Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 788  
 La Roque, Colonel, 744  
 Laux, Lt. Col. Ray E., 222  
 Laval, Pierre, 870  
 Lavilleon, Colonel, 759, 770  
 Lavitrano, Cardinal Luigi, 360  
 Leahy, Adm. William D., 35, 56-57, 136, 165, 167, 591  
 Lebas, Edouard, 732  
 Lee, Gen. John C., 151  
 Lee, Brigadier S. Swinton, 798-99  
 Legg, Col. W. J., 318  
 Le Gros, Lieutenant Colonel, 766  
 Lehman, Herbert H., 38, 40, 53-54, 65, 67, 69, 73-74, 88, 91, 97-99, 103, 105-08, 122n, 123, 129, 132, 344  
 Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick, 129n, 642  
 Lemnitzer, Maj. Gen. Lyman L., 642  
 Leopold III, 802  
 Leviandier, M., 732  
 Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T., 749  
 Lewis, Brig. R. G., 170  
 Lewis, Brig. R. M. H., 709-10, 725-26, 826  
 Liese, 1st Lt. Theodore W., 329  
 Lincoln, Brig. Gen. George A., 518  
 Lipsius, Harold B., 619  
 Lipsius, 1st Lt. Theodore, 611  
 Longhi. See Pizzoni, Dr. Alfredo.  
 Lorbert, General, 571  
 Louis, Prince (of Monaco), 764  
 Louize, M., 744  
 Lovett, Robert A., 711  
 Lowenthal, Max, 16  
 Lubin, Isadore, 27  
 Lucal, Allison, 765  
 Luizet, Charles, 230  
 Lumley, Maj. Gen. Sir Roger, 128, 674  
 Lush, Brigadier, M. S., 251, 264, 287, 304, 329, 403, 418, 423, 438-39, 468-69, 487-88, 491, 540, 566, 574, 584-85, 600, 621, 631, 642  
  
 MacFarlane, Lieutenant Colonel, 406  
 MacGeagh, Sir Henry F., 658-59  
 Mack, W. H. E., 35  
 MacLean, Comdr. Malcolm S., 154, 207-08  
 MacLeish, Archibald, 88  
 Macmillan, Rt. Hon. Harold, 42n, 96, 165n, 166, 170, 175, 214, 233, 246, 260, 288-89, 298n, 450-51, 493-94, 496, 508-14, 521, 527, 540, 556, 712  
 Macready, Lt. Gen. G. N., 104, 134, 136, 715  
 Makins, Roger M., 513  
 Marcantonio, Vito, 519  
 Marcus, Col. David, 136n, 660  
 Mare (partisan leader), 554  
 Marris, A. Dennis, 134  
 Marshall, Lt. Col. G., 482-83  
 Marshall, General of the Army George C., 31, 35, 45-47, 54-55, 68, 89, 92, 124, 142-43, 165, 168-70, 215, 223-24, 413-15, 429, 665, 674, 712  
 Marteau, Albert, 807-818  
 Mason-MacFarlane, Lt. Gen. Sir Noel, 229, 231, 233, 251-52, 264-65, 268-69, 272-74, 287-89, 301, 349-50, 359, 381, 408, 428, 433, 441-44, 452-53, 455, 457-58, 462, 464-67, 495, 507  
 Massenet, M., 779  
 Massigli, René, 707, 715  
 Mast, Brig. Gen. Charles E., 32  
 Matthews, Freeman N., 32, 34  
 Matthews, Herbert, 418  
 Maxse, Capt. F. H. J., 87n  
 Maxwell, Lt. Col. A. Terrence, 164, 180, 184, 232, 287-88  
 Mayne, Colonel (member AMM), 239  
 McBride, Harry A., 86  
 McCaffrey, Lt. Col. George H., 193, 253, 280, 435  
 McCamy, Mr. (FEA), 111  
 McCarthy, Col. E. D., 531  
 McCleary, Lt. Col. F. H., 620, 625  
 McCloy, John J., 24, 27, 44, 51, 57, 65-66, 72-73, 92, 96, 98, 109-11, 126-27, 132-35, 143, 149, 150n, 174-75, 216, 226, 252, 255, 273-74, 298n, 344-45, 414, 514, 525, 614, 628, 656, 664-666, 673, 685, 688n, 707-08, 712, 716, 888  
 McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A., 180  
 McDougal, M. S., 52  
 McDowell, Major, (CA Detachment), 824  
 McGaw, Capt. M. S., 287  
 McGaw, Colonel (British member CCAC), 487  
 McGoldrick, Francis M., 111  
 McGrigor, Rear-Admiral Roderick Robert, 271-72  
 McIntyre, Marvin, 154  
 McKey, David K., 563  
 McKinley, Brig. Gen. Edward B., 522  
 McLean, Maj. D. H., Jr., 38, 61, 76, 105, 111, 194-95, 282, 715  
 McLeary, Lt. Col. F. H., 620  
 McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 109, 123n, 271, 598-99, 623, 624n, 625, 670  
 McSherry, Brig. Gen. Frank J., 164, 240-41, 261, 310, 312, 401, 476, 676-77, 683n  
 Meggio, Armond, 881  
 Mendes-France, Pierre, 709  
 Meyjes, Lt. Col. W. Chr. Posthumus, 823  
 Mickelsen, Brig. Gen. Stanley R., 853  
 Miller, Col. Jesse I., 10, 15-17, 19, 20, 27, 52, 66n, 68n, 80-81, 97, 144  
 Mirsky, Professor, 407  
 Mitchell, Lieutenant Colonel, 871  
 Mitchell, Maj. Gen. P. E., 161  
 Mocatto, Lieutenant Colonel, 130  
 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 233  
 Monfort, Lt. Col. Nelson, 239-40  
 Monnet, Jean, 664, 684-85, 690, 706, 709, 745-46, 889, 891  
 Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard, 191n, 838, 852  
 Monti (partisan leader), 529, 544  
 Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E., 126, 671, 674  
 Morgan, Maj. Gen. William D., 588, 597, 625-26, 629, 633, 642, 648

- Morgenthau, Henry, 18, 691  
 Moronny, Col. William J., 742  
 Morse, Capt. David A., 202-03, 206, 395-96  
 Morton, Lieutenant Colonel, 287  
 Moseley, Lt. Col. K. T., 802  
 Mounier, Brig. Gen. P., 727  
 Murphy, Robert D., 32, 35, 38, 40-44, 49, 55, 57, 233-34, 238, 259-60, 289, 296-97, 387, 428-30, 445, 451, 457-58, 474n, 706, 712  
 Musetto, S. E. Francesco, 383  
 Mussolini, Benito, 219, 224, 231, 235, 276, 497, 563  
 Mynors, Maj. D. R. B., 572, 580
- Ncary, E. C., 24  
 Neff, Harold H., 16, 66-67  
 Nenni, Pietro, 482, 616, 618, 621, 635, 639, 645  
 Nethersole, P., 582  
 Newcomb, Dr. John Lloyd, 111  
 Newton, Col. Henry C., 422-23, 862-63, 865-66  
 Nicholls, Maj. Gen. L. B., 474n  
 Norgaard, Mr., 513  
 Noguès, Gen. Auguste Paul, 35, 48  
 North, Rex, 78-79, 727-28  
 North, Col. Thomas, 78  
 Noyes, Pierrepoint B., 7  
 Nunn, Maj. Rupert L. H., 730n
- Occhetto, Roberto, 478n  
 O'Dwyer, Brig. Gen. William, 367, 498  
 Omodeo, Dr. Adolfo, 389, 417  
 Orlando, Taddeo, 480  
 Ox, Col. Francis H., 329
- Pacciardi, Randolph, 567n  
 Pacelli, Prince Carlo, 461  
 Padover, Saul K., 26-27  
 Palatte, Captain, 533  
 Palermo, Mario, 530-31  
 Palfry, Major, 744  
 Palmer, Lt. Col. Arthur E., 39, 52, 58, 61, 67, 75, 77, 111, 131, 134, 841  
 Palmieri, Maj. E. L., 379  
 Paquette, Lieutenant, 563  
 Parker, Maj. A. J. P., 629  
 Parkinson, Brig. G. S., 326n, 339  
 Parkman, Col. Henry, Jr., 700, 703n, 753-54, 761, 765, 787, 790-91  
 Parr, Lt. Col. T., 338-39  
 Parri, Ferruccio, 575, 617, 621-22, 625, 634, 640-41  
 Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M., 697, 705, 756  
 Patterson, Robert W., 15, 17-19, 22n, 26, 144, 892  
 Patton, Maj. Gen. George S., 35, 169, 180, 191n, 194  
 Paul, Arthur, 524-25  
 Payette, Major, 769  
 Peake, Charles B. P., 663, 713  
 Pellegrini, Ugo, 474, 476  
 Peltier, Mr., 767  
 Pence, Capt. Harry L. C., 72, 111  
 Pendleton, Col. H. M., 675n  
 Perkins, Maj. J. B. Ward, 419  
 Pesenti, Signor, 481  
 Pétain, Marshal Henri Philippe, 34-35  
 Peterson, Maj. Gen. Vergil L., 21  
 Petrequin, Colonel, 764  
 Peyrouton, Marcel, 49  
 Pfister, Dr. W., 830  
 Pforzheimer, Col. Carl, 748-49  
 Phillips, William, 663-65, 686-88  
 Piccardi, Leopoldo, 239, 281, 434  
 Pierlot, Hubert, 802, 804-05, 808-09, 818, 818n, 892  
 Pinsent, Capt. C. R., 424
- Pizzoni, Dr. Alfredo, 540  
 Pleven, René, 748-49  
 Poletti, Col. Charles, 174, 176-77, 180, 195, 197, 200-201, 203, 253, 285-86, 296, 302, 335, 383, 462, 464, 565-67, 625  
 Porzio, Signor, 431  
 Powhida, Maj. John P., 761  
 Prichard, Captain, 783  
 Prunas, Guisepe, 447  
 Puck, Commander, 111
- Quintieri, Quinto, 452  
 Quisling, Vidkun, 844
- Raffa, Major, 383, 400  
 Rainaut, Mark, 770  
 Ratay, Brig. Gen. John P., 783  
 Reali, Vito, 291  
 Reber, Samuel, 236-38, 449  
 Redman, Maj. Gen. Harold, 749  
 Reed, Philip, 151  
 Renault, M., 731-32, 770  
 Rennell, Maj. Gen. Lord, 164, 171-72, 175, 180-83, 185, 189, 195, 197, 200-204, 208-12, 227-29, 240-42, 249-53, 260-64, 284, 291, 294, 296, 307, 371, 375-76, 385, 401, 407, 435-36, 440, 445-46  
 Reynolds, Maj. P. K. Braille, 415, 418  
 Richards, Maj. Gen. George J., 154, 345  
 Richardson, Major, 483  
 Rickards, Col. G. A., 133, 134n  
 Rickless, Lt. H. W., 856  
 Ringland, Arthur C., 14-15, 17-21  
 Roatta, Gen. Mario, 231, 479  
 Robbins, Brig. T., 804  
 Roberts, Owen J., 88  
 Robertson, Maj. Gen. Sir Brian, 307, 330, 408, 557, 576-77  
 Robertson, Col. Henry S., 610  
 Robilot, M., 765  
 Robinson, Maj. Donald, 766, 813  
 Rochat, M., 709  
 Rodd, Lt. Col. Peter R., 195, 212-13, 279, 284, 377, 383, 436  
 Rogers, Major, 569  
 Rogers, Brig. Gen. P., 742  
 Rolph, Ralph L., Lt. Col., 485, 535  
 Rongvaux, Ernest, 818  
 Ronse, Edmund, 818  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 5, 6, 15, 17-19, 22-28 *passim*, 30, 32, 37-40, 45-48, 150n, 165-67, 171, 173, 175, 214n, 218, 224, 226, 231-33, 244-45, 371, 373, 411, 413, 426-28, 439, 444-45, 459, 467, 473, 478, 492-95, 498-501, 503, 506, 508, 519, 587, 591, 655-56, 662-71, 673, 697, 699, 709, 712-15, 733, 827-28, 878, 882, 887, 893  
 Rooth, Col. Charles W., 45  
 Rosenman, Samuel, 882-83, 886  
 Ross, Capt. Marvin C. J., 96-97, 861, 869  
 Rostow, Eugene V., 133  
 Rounds, Col. William A., 164, 239-40  
 Rowell, Maj. Henry T., 149, 325  
 Royce, Maj. Gen. Ralph, 475  
 Rusco, Lt. Col. Luigi, 475  
 Ryan, Charles R., 490  
 Ryan, Col. Cornelius E., 125, 742
- Sachs, Dr. Paul J., 88  
 Sacra, Maj. William W., 765  
 Salisbury-Jones, Brig. A. G., 852  
 Sanchez, Manuel, 89n  
 Saulini, Capt. Pietro, 475

- Sayre, Francis Bowes, 67, 71  
 Scammel, Maj. Joseph M., 56  
 Scholtz, Lt. Col. Joseph D., 599  
 Schommer, Maj. George, 811  
 Schulgen, Col. George F., 24  
 Schuman, Captain, 731  
 Schwein, Brig. Gen. Edwin E., 843n  
 Scoccimaro, Signor, 476  
 Scorza, Signor, 231  
 Scowden, Maj. Gen. Frank F., 841, 881-82  
 Seguin, Lt. J. G., 243, 329  
 Seitz, Lt. Col. John F. R., 164  
 Selvaggi, Francesco, 287  
 Sepp, Lt. Col. Nicholas J., 799  
 Seyss-Inquart, Reichskommissar, 829, 832  
 Sforza, Count Carlo, 374, 425-26, 429-30, 432-34, 444, 450-52, 455, 465, 473  
 Shaw, G. Howland, 28  
 Shedd, Brig. Gen. William E., 7  
 Shepard, Katherine, 86  
 Shepherd, Maj. (CA Detachment A1A1), 734  
 Sherman, Col. John B., 804  
 Shipman, Fred, 89n  
 Siciliani, Tanasso, 291  
 Silvère, Captain, 795  
 Simic, Stanoye, 613  
 Simmons, Lt. Col. B. E. L., 627  
 Simmons, Brig. Gen. James S., 327  
 Simpich, Maj. Frederick E., 726  
 Simpson, Lieutenant (CAPO, Eighth Army), 432-33  
 Simson, Lt. Col. A. G., 607  
 Sinclair, Sir Robert J., 128  
 Sizer, Maj. Theodore, 861  
 Smith, Col. A. P. Grafty, 164  
 Smith, Captain (Public Safety Branch, Seventh Army), 795  
 Smith, Capt. Robert S., 816  
 Smith, Col. T. V., 402, 404  
 Smith, Lt. Col. Walker, 805  
 Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 49, 214, 234, 265, 298, 306, 313, 315, 418, 428, 665-66, 671, 673, 678, 694, 715, 828, 831-32, 890  
 Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 38, 57-58, 65, 71, 74, 134, 153, 309, 748, 891-92  
 Soprano, Domenico, 281  
 Soragna, Lupi di, 613  
 Southard, Lt. Comdr. Frank A., 347, 357, 361  
 Spaak, Paul H., 818  
 Spalding, Brig. Gen. George R., 68  
 Spaulding, Albert, 545  
 Spencer, Colonel, 795  
 Spencer, Maj. O. A., 313  
 Spicer, Col. Cyril B., 291, 302-03, 496  
 Spofford, Brig. Gen. Charles M., 43n, 61, 61n, 160-64, 172, 180-81, 183, 185, 216n, 254n, 274, 280-81, 349, 367-69, 400, 439, 471, 489-90, 514, 522-24, 574, 576, 585, 628, 639-40  
 Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 439  
 Stansgate, Lord William, 287, 419n, 473  
 Stawell, Maj. Gen. W. A. M., 539-40  
 Stearns, Brig. Gen. Cuthbert P., 675, 858-59  
 Steele, Major (6th Armored Division AMG), 533  
 Stein, Harold, 113, 151  
 Stettinius, Edward R., 52, 109-10  
 Stevenson, Adlai, 342  
 Stimson, Henry L., 5, 11, 20-24, 27, 68, 73, 87, 94-96, 99-100, 102, 108, 145, 152-53, 166-67, 214n, 366, 372, 673-74, 690, 712, 887-88  
 Stinebower, Mr. (Dept. of State), 98  
 Stone, Admiral Ellery W., 230, 252, 357, 367, 387, 455-56, 462, 466-68, 471, 473, 475-81, 485-86, 502-04, 508n, 519-21, 536-40, 542-43, 548-49, 553-55, 558-59, 561, 568, 575-76, 582-84, 590, 593, 615, 620-24, 628-33, 635-37, 639-43  
 Stone, Harlan F., 86  
 Stone, Col. Wm. S., 324  
 Story, Lt. Stephen B., 191  
 Stout, Lt. George L., 84n, 861  
 Strang, William, 166  
 Strickland, Brig. Gen. Aubrey C., 191  
 Strong, Maj. Gen. George V., 56  
 Sturgis, Preston, 215, 216n  
 Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 68  
 Subásieth, Dr. Ivan, 606  
 Sufirin, Maj. Sidney C., 98  
 Sullivan, Captain (CAO, Sardinia), 380  
 Summer, Col. E. R., 798, 843  
 Talbot, Maj. H. C., 798-99  
 Tansey, Brig. Gen. Patrick H., 68n  
 Tarchiani, Attilio, 452  
 Tasca, Allesandro (Lucio, Polio), 435-36  
 Tassigny, Gen. Jean de Lattre de, 706  
 Taylor, Mr. (Treasury Department), 102-03, 688  
 Taylor, Lt. Comdr. Perry, 61  
 Taylor, Dr. Francis Henry, 84-85, 88, 418  
 Taylor, Brig. Gen. Maxwell D., 244, 246-47, 288, 431-32  
 Taylor, Maj. Thomas R., 77  
 Tedder, Sir Arthur W., 862  
 Tedeschi. See Togliatti, Palmiro.  
 Temple, Capt. Ralph, 287  
 Terboven, Joseph, Reichskommissar, 875  
 Thomson, S. Harrison, 82  
 Thorndike, Captain (Detachment A1A1), 734  
 Thorne, Gen. Sir. A. F. Andrew M., 843n  
 Thorne, Col. T., 180  
 Thurmond, Lt. Col. James S., 722-24  
 Tito, Marshal, 372, 544-45, 587-601 *passim*, 606  
 Tizzano, Signor, 476  
 Todd, Maj. J. R., 313  
 Togliatti, Palmiro, 447, 450-51, 619-21  
 Tornaquinci, Medici, 543  
 Toscani, Frank E. (Senior SO), 484  
 Townsend, C. H. S., 86  
 Traina, Gen. Francesco, 381  
 Troclet, Léon E., 818  
 Truman, Harry S., 569n, 570, 588, 606, 618, 628, 648-49, 892-93  
 Tschoffen, Lt. Gen. Paul, 806  
 Turner, Col. Thomas B., 326  
 Umberto, Crown Prince (Lieutenant of the Realm), 231, 439, 442-43, 451, 455, 464-65, 630  
 Upjohn, Col. G. R., 296, 377-78, 390, 469, 473-74  
 Van Acker, Achille, 818  
 Van Buren, Prof. Albert William, 422  
 Van Buskirk, Arthur B., 129  
 Van Dusen, Maj. Lewis H., 700, 761  
 Velebit, General, 411  
 Vergeer, Lieutenant Colonel, 824  
 Victor Emmanuel III, 220, 229-31, 239, 244-45, 425-35, 440-44, 448, 450, 454-55, 464-65  
 Vienot, Pierre, 712  
 Vishinsky, Andrei Y., 259-60, 445-46, 663  
 Volla, Captain (Education Subcommittee, ACC), 404  
 Von der Heydte, Lt. Col. Baron, 816  
 Vos, Herman, 818  
 Wade, Col. A. H., 67n  
 Waley, Sir David, 688n  
 Walker, Col. H. T., 560

Walker, John, 86  
 Warburg, Capt. E. M. M., 856  
 Ward, Major (ComZ Hq), 868  
 Washburne, Maj. Carlton W., 402-04  
 Waters, Maj. S. R., 108  
 Watson, Brig. Gen. Edwin M., 28  
 Webb, Prof. (Col.) Geoffrey, 861-64, 869  
 Webb, James E., 60-61  
 Wedemeyer, Brig. Gen. Albert C., 309  
 Welch, Captain, 783  
 Welles, Sumner, 28  
 Wells, Herman, 105  
 Welsh, Lt. Joseph, 756, 764  
 Westervelt, Capt. Alan H., 734  
 Weston, Harold, 14n  
 White, Brig. Gen. Miller G., 57  
 White, Lt. Col. S. H., 477, 562-63  
 Whitely, Maj. Gen. J. F. M., 241  
 Wickersham, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W., 11-13, 15-16,  
 19n, 22-23, 25, 84-87, 135, 144, 216, 272, 438, 490,  
 779  
 Wiener Lt. Col. Frederick B., 56  
 Wiesenberger, Maj. R. S., 817  
 Wilcox, Maj. G. L., 243  
 Wilcox, Capt. Theodore M., 378  
 Williams, Capt. A. W., 801-02  
 Williams, Capt. C. G. R., 287  
 Williams, Col. William D., 795  
 Wilmer, Col. R. H., 382  
 Wilson, Col. Charles H., 843n  
 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland, 265, 272-73,  
 298, 300, 327, 343-44, 362-63, 425, 442-45, 448,  
 451, 455, 457, 493, 502-03, 505-07, 513, 540, 566,  
 697, 788  
 Winant, John G., 135, 713, 715  
 Windsor, Duke of, 824  
 Winkel, Captain, 824  
 Wood, Maj. Murray, 411  
 Wood, Brig. Gen. Walker A., 64  
 Woodward, Dr. (U.S. Typhus Commission), 326  
 Wooley, Lieutenant Colonel (War Office), 863  
 Wray, Col. Francis M., 360  
 Wright, Brig. Gen. Boykin C., 77, 111-12, 129-34, 681  
 Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 52, 891  
 Yost, Mr. (State Department), 105  
 Young, Col. A. E., 360  
 Young, Robert N., Col. 23  
 Zellars, Col. John T., 381